DOCSLIB.ORG

Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: a Reply to Professor Mayton Howard O

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: a Reply to Professor Mayton Howard O Cornell Law Review Volume 67 Article 2 Issue 2 January 1982 Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton Howard O. Hunter Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Howard O. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 283 (1982) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol67/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MAYTON Howard 0. Huntert In his Article on first amendment process,' Professor Mayton chal- lenges a "sacred cow" of current first amendment theology and, in so doing, forces us to consider more carefully the implications of certain accepted approaches to the resolution of disputes about speech. Much of what he says about the process by which government restrains speech is true, especially that the prior restraint doctrine has often been inade- quately understood and inappropriately invoked. 2 Nevertheless, some of his premises are subject to question. Furthermore, his conclusion- that a prior restraint model provides a better mechanism for the protec- tion of speech than does a subsequent punishment modd 3-does not necessarily follow from his premises, nor does the conclusion reflect an adequate understanding of the prior restraint doctrine. What follows is an effort to highlight some of these problems, in the hope that the argu- ments presented will focus and perhaps add to Professor Mayton's discussion. I THE PROBLEM OF COSTS Professor Mayton argues that a state bent on restraining speech will prefer a system of post-speech punishment because it is less costly than a system favoring injunctive relief.4 There may sometimes be cost advan- tages to a system of subsequent punishment, but certainly this is not always the case. We can begin with two assumptions that lack empirical t A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale University. Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. [While this Article was in the stages of final preparation, Professor Blasi published an article in the Minnesota Law Review that touches upon many of these issues. Time constraints prevent an incorporation of Professor Blasi's ideas into this dialogue, but I can say that I find myselfin general agreement with his conclusions. Se Blasi, Towarda Theory of PriorRestraint The CentralLinkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11 (1981)-Author's Note]. I Mayton, Towarda Theor of FirstAmendment Process- Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Pun- ishment, and the Costs of the Pi"orRestraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELLu L. REv. 245 (1982). 2 Id. at 247-49. 3 Id. at 279-81. 4 The cost of each enforcement process is measured both in terms of time, including administrative delays, and in dollars spent. Id. at 266-74. CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:283 support, but seem to make sense:5 (1) most people are risk-averse;6 and (2) a government will prefer a simple, cost-effective means to reach a certain end, all other things being equal. 7 Accordingly, we can posit that most people will ordinarily act as self-censors and not engage in speech that may lead to legal or social opprobrium. A government that wants to limit speech will prefer the enforcement process that most effec- tively induces a natural tendency toward self-censorship.8 This may or may not be a subsequent punishment system. Assume, for example, that an empirical study shows that the word "mud," when spoken aloud or printed in newspapers, magazines, and books of general circulation, causes antisocial behavior. Based on the study, a state legislature decides to prohibit the use of the word "mud" except in private communications and academic research. If the propo- sition is debated in the legislature and if the study in question is publicly discussed, the debate itself will have an educative effect that may begin the entire process of self-censorship. Although iconoclasts, free-will types, and others will shout "mud" in public places and write books filled with thousands of "muds," the average citizen will eschew the use of "mud" if told that its use leads to bad ends and may be punishable by the state.9 Passage of a law prohibiting its use will further encourage the self-censorship already begun. To make its prohibition effective, the legislature will have to choose an enforcement mechanism. The most effective means to censor printed works, movies, videotapes or videodiscs would be an administrative li- censing system. Although it may be highly effective, such a system would hardly be cost-efficient, because it would require the creation of a bureaucracy of indefinite duration. Furthermore, licensing schemes are generally disfavored because they are especially intrusive. As Professor Mayton correctly observes,10 the American doctrine of free speech was 5 These assumptions are developed at various points in Mayton's Article. See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 1, at 253-54, 256, 272. 6 This certainly seems to be true for businessmen. For an interesting discussion, see Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties andAttiludes TowardRisk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1973). 7 All other things are rarely equal. There may be good social or political reasons for choosing a more expensive means, or the process of government may itself be so cumbersome that the most cost-effective method is overlooked. 8 1 assume that the state has a legitimate interest in limiting speech and that it has the power to do so. Although thepower is usually present, the legitimacy of the limitation is often subject to question. 9 This will only be true if some societal consensus exists as to both the legitimacy of state intervention and the dangers of the word "mud." As in most speech cases, the danger lies not in the utterances but in the reactions of others to those utterances--in the actions likely to occur rather than in the speech. Mayton correctly points out that the speech/action prob- lem is central to an understanding of what is actually meant by free speech. Mayton, sura note 1, at 253-59. 10 Id. at 247-49. 1982] PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE founded in large measure on opposition to the English system of licens- ing-the classic prior restraint. Such procedures were once used widely in this country to control pornography, but they have largely fallen into desuetude, albeit more often for reasons of constitutional infirmity than for purposes of governmental economy." In our example, then, the leg- islature more likely will choose to enforce its prohibition either by pro- viding criminal sanctions for use of the word "mud" or by granting jurisdiction to the appropriate court to enjoin its usage. Which of these two systems is less costly? Mayton argues that the former is cheaper. In many instances, however, the latter may prove equally effective and no 2 more costly.1 Every state has a system already in place to pursue either criminal prosecutions or equitable restraints. Neither process requires additional personnel. To make out a criminal case, however, the local prosecutor normally must secure the help of the police, make a grand jury present- ment, prepare for and prosecute a jury trial, prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, and contend with the complexities of the criminal process from arrest through arraignment, indictment, and trial. The en- tire process usually takes several months. In contrast, to seek an injunc- tion the prosecutor need only file a complaint, perhaps post a bond, and prepare for a non-jury hearing in which he will bear only a civil burden of proof. If he seeks a temporary restraining order, the hearing will oc- cur within a matter of days or even hours. A hearing on a preliminary injunction is also held quite soon after the filing of a complaint. The trial on the merits may not take place any sooner than a criminal trial, but if the prosecutor is successful in obtaining a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the issue may well become moot. There are, to be sure, instances in which an equity action may not be practicable. If the speech in question has already occurred or will occur before the prosecutor can prepare a complaint, find a judge, and obtain hearing, he may well prefer a criminal process of subsequent punishment. A legislature could provide him with both, and even the current prior restraint doctrine recognizes that equity can intervene in 13 some extreme cases despite the availability of a criminal sanction. Most of the time, however, the prosecutor can proceed with equal or greater speed, with fewer people, fewer hearings, and a less burdensome 11 Se, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion picture licensing scheme held invalid for denying license on ground that film was "sacrilegious"). 12 Mayton does recognize that in limited circumstances an injunction may be more ef- fective. Mayton, supra note 1, at 272. 13 Both the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and the Progressive case, United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Self-Censorship and the First Amendment Robert A
    Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy Volume 25 Article 2 Issue 1 Symposium on Censorship & the Media 1-1-2012 Self-Censorship and the First Amendment Robert A. Sedler Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp Recommended Citation Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 13 (2012). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol25/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES SELF-CENSORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ROBERT A. SEDLER* I. INTRODUCTION Self-censorship refers to the decision by an individual or group to refrain from speaking and to the decision by a media organization to refrain from publishing information. Whenever an individual or group or the media engages in self-censorship, the values of the First Amendment are compromised, because the public is denied information or ideas.' It should not be sur- prising, therefore, that the principles, doctrines, and precedents of what I refer to as "the law of the First Amendment"' are designed to prevent self-censorship premised on fear of govern- mental sanctions against expression. This fear-induced self-cen- sorship will here be called "self-censorship bad." At the same time, the First Amendment also values and pro- tects a right to silence.
    [Show full text]
  • Bloggers and Netizens Behind Bars: Restrictions on Internet Freedom In
    VIETNAM COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUÊ ME: ACTION FOR DEMOCRACY IN VIETNAM Ủy ban Bảo vệ Quyền làm Người Việt Nam BLOGGERS AND NETIZENS BEHIND BARS Restrictions on Internet Freedom in Vietnam Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, January 2013 / n°603a - AFP PHOTO IAN TIMBERLAKE Cover Photo : A policeman, flanked by local militia members, tries to stop a foreign journalist from taking photos outside the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court during the trial of a blogger in August 2011 (AFP, Photo Ian Timberlake). 2 / Titre du rapport – FIDH Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5
    [Show full text]
  • The Stored Communications Act, Gag Orders, and the First Amendment
    10 BURKE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2017 1:29 PM WHEN SILENCE IS NOT GOLDEN: THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, GAG ORDERS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT Alexandra Burke* I. INTRODUCTION Cloud computing has completely changed the landscape of information storage. Sensitive information that was once stored in file cabinets and eventually on computers is now stored remotely using web-based cloud computing services.1 The cloud’s prevalence in today’s world is undeniable, as recent studies show that nearly forty percent of all Americans2 and an estimated ninety percent of all businesses use the cloud in some capacity.3 Despite this fact, Congress has done little in recent years to protect users and providers of cloud computing services.4 What Congress has done dates back to its enactment of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in 1986.5 Passed decades before the existence *J.D. Candidate, 2018, Baylor University School of Law; B.B.A. Accounting, 2015, Texas A&M University. I would like to extend my gratitude to each of the mentors, professors, and legal professionals who have influenced my understanding of and appreciation for the law. Specifically, I would like to thank Professor Brian Serr for his guidance in writing this article. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends, who have always shown me unwavering support. 1 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (defining cloud computing as “the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself”); see also Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS.
    [Show full text]
  • Case 4:15-Cv-00358-O Document 41 Filed 06/17/21 Page 1 of 28 Pageid 502
    Case 4:15-cv-00358-O Document 41 Filed 06/17/21 Page 1 of 28 PageID 502 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:15-cv-358-O Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER A. NOVINGER, et al., Defendants. June 17, 2021 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REOPEN AND FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO F. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and subsect. (4) and (5) Margaret A. Little N.D. Tex. Bar No. 303494CT Kara M. Rollins, pro hac vice forthcoming New Civil Liberties Alliance 1225 19th St. NW, Suite 450 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202-869-5210 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Attorneys for Movants Christopher A. Novinger and ICAN Investment Group, LLC Case 4:15-cv-00358-O Document 41 Filed 06/17/21 Page 2 of 28 PageID 503 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................... 1 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3 I. STANDARDS RELATING TO RULE 60(b)(4) MOTIONS ........................................................... 3 II. THE GAG ORDER VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT .........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • In 2017, Broad Federal Search Warrants, As Well As
    A PUBLICATION OF THE SILHA CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF MEDIA ETHICS AND LAW | FALL 2017 Federal Search Warrants and Nondisclosure Orders Lead to Legal Action; DOJ Changes Gag Order Practices n 2017, broad federal search warrants, as well as from disclosing the fact that it had received such a request. nondisclosure orders preventing technology and social On Oct. 12, 2017, the Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of media companies from informing their customers that their Expression at Yale Law School and 20 First Amendment Scholars, information had been handed over to the government, led to including Silha Center Director and Silha Professor of Media legal action and raised concerns from observers. However, Ethics and Law Jane Kirtley, fi led an amici brief in response Ithe U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) also changed its rules on the to the ruling, explaining that National Security Letters (NSL) gag orders, leading a large technology company to drop its lawsuit issued by the FBI are accompanied by a nondisclosure order, against the agency regarding the orders. which “empowers the government to preemptively gag a wire or In 2017, the DOJ fi led two search warrants seeking extensive electronic communication service provider from speaking about information from web hosting company DreamHost and from the government’s request for information about a subscriber.” Facebook in connection to violent protests in Washington, The brief contended that these orders constitute prior restraints D.C. during President Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration in violation of the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court festivities. On Aug.
    [Show full text]
  • The Difficulty of Balancing the Doctrine of Prior Restraint with the Right of Privacy
    Touro Law Review Volume 31 Number 4 Article 3 August 2015 The Difficulty of Balancing the Doctrine of Prior Restraint with the Right of Privacy Bridgette Nunez Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons Recommended Citation Nunez, Bridgette (2015) "The Difficulty of Balancing the Doctrine of Prior Restraint with the Right of Privacy," Touro Law Review: Vol. 31 : No. 4 , Article 3. Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/3 This First Amendment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Nunez: Prior Restraint with the Right of Privacy THE DIFFICULTY OF BALANCING THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT WITH THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC1 (decided April 17, 2014) I. INTRODUCTION The public has always been curious about the lives and per- sonalities of celebrities.2 In an effort to capitalize on this demand, networks seek exclusive rights to the individual’s story in order to produce docudramas.3 Unfortunately, docudramas may expose un- flattering facts in dramatic detail.4 Under the assumption that “the life of a public figure belong[s] to the citizens,” high public demand has given rise to unauthorized docudramas.5
    [Show full text]
  • Prior Restraint and the Police: the First Amendment Right to Disseminate Recordings of Police Behavior
    WALDMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2014 2:20 PM PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE POLICE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DISSEMINATE RECORDINGS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR JACQUELINE G. WALDMAN* Freedom of speech under the First Amendment once again is in jeopardy—this time, in the form of unconstitutional prior restraints on personal video recordings. In the age of smartphones and media- sharing services like YouTube and Facebook, video recording and uploading or distributing has become a natural—and even expected— form of communication. It is commonplace that people record trivi- al, everyday moments, and, it remains routine for people to record noteworthy events or occurrences. In a certain sense, countless media users and sharers around the country have become the functional equivalents of journalists reporting and commenting on all aspects of life and society. Thus, in the wake of a growing public disillusion- ment regarding law enforcement and the criminal justice system, peo- ple have begun video recording police behavior as the officers are act- ing in the public discharge. Such videography has not existed without pushback from law enforcement. In response to these civilian-made video recordings, many police officers confiscate the video recording devices and/or de- stroy the files containing the recordings. This type of police interfer- ence has brought with it a storm of controversy. The debate centers on whether personal video recording of police conduct is “speech” that qualifies for First Amendment protection, and if so, whether con- fiscating and/or destroying the videos before their dissemination amounts to an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech—the most serious incursion of one’s First Amendment speech freedom.
    [Show full text]
  • Gagged, Sealed & Delivered
    Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket Stephen Wm. Smith* What is the most secret court docket in America? Many would point to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, set up during the Carter Administration to oversee requests for surveillance warrants against suspected foreign intelligence agents.1 Due to the sensitive nature of its bus- iness, FISA proceedings and records are closed to public view. Since 1979, that court has processed over 28,000 warrant applications and renewals,2 a rate of nearly one thousand secret cases a year. But the FISA court is not number one in the secrecy parade, not by a long shot. According to a recent study by the Federal Judicial Center, there is another federal docket that handles tens of thousands of secret cases every year.3 That docket is presided over by federal magistrate judges in United States district courts around the country. Most of its sealed cases are classi- fied as “warrant-type applications,” a category that includes not only routine search warrants but also various forms of electronic surveillance, such as the monitoring of electronic communications and data transmitted by the cell phones, personal computers, and other digital devices that now dominate our everyday lives. This type of electronic surveillance is regulated principally by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).4 Although the ECPA has often been amended, most changes have been technical tweaks to the existing framework.5 Some are now pushing for an update of the ECPA, which after all was enacted over two generations ago, long before Google or the smart phone was even conceived.
    [Show full text]
  • Some Observations on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers
    Denver Law Review Volume 59 Issue 4 Article 5 February 2021 Some Observations on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers Richard M. Schmidt Jr. Gregory M. Schmidt Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr Recommended Citation Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. & Gregory M. Schmidt, Some Observations on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, 59 Denv. L.J. 721 (1982). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SWINGING COURTHOUSE DOORS OF GANNE7T AND RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, JR.* GREGORY M. SCHMIDT** INTRODUCTION For nearly two hundred years, the closing of a courtroom in the United States to the press or public was an extremely rare event. In the last five years it has become commonplace. The closure motion is threatening to become a routinely employed weapon in every criminal defense attorney's arsenal and its use in civil proceedings is growing at an alarming rate. The Supreme Court has both promoted and responded to this develop- ment. It has now granted certiorari in three courtroom closure cases in the last four years. The first two decisions addressed the validity of closures designed to protect criminal defendants from the dissemination of prejudi- cial publicity. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,l the Court approved closure of a pretrial suppression hearing, holding that the sixth amendment right to a public trial is personal to the accused and does not provide the public or the press an independent right to attend such a proceeding.
    [Show full text]
  • Broadcast Profanity and the Right to Be Let Alone: Can the FCC Regulate Non-Indecent Fleeting Expletives Under a Privacy Model Edward L
    Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal Volume 31 | Number 1 Article 1 1-1-2008 Broadcast Profanity and the Right to Be Let Alone: Can the FCC Regulate Non-Indecent Fleeting Expletives under a Privacy Model Edward L. Carter R. Trevor Hall James C. Phillips Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_comm_ent_law_journal Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Edward L. Carter, R. Trevor Hall, and James C. Phillips, Broadcast Profanity and the Right to Be Let Alone: Can the FCC Regulate Non- Indecent Fleeting Expletives under a Privacy Model, 31 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1 (2008). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol31/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Broadcast Profanity and the "Right to Be Let Alone": Can the FCC Regulate Non-Indecent Fleeting Expletives Under a Privacy Model? by EDWARD L. CARTER,* R. TREVOR HALL' AND JAMES C. PHILLIPS I. Introduction .................................................................................................. 2 II. Brief Legal History of Profanity .................................................................. 7 A. Profanity Under the Common Law of Nuisance ................................... 8 B. The U.S. Supreme Court and Profanity ............................................... 12 C. Profanity's Place in the Law Today ................................................... 16 III. Free Speech Rationales and Profanity ....................................................... 22 IV. The FCC and Regulation of Profanity ....................................................... 26 A .
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters
    Washington University Journal of Law & Policy Volume 47 Intellectual Property: From Biodiversity to Technical Standards 2015 Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters Brett Weinstein Washington University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy Part of the National Security Law Commons Recommended Citation Brett Weinstein, Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters, 47 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 217 (2015), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters Brett Weinstein INTRODUCTION In early June of 2013, governmental surveillance suddenly and dramatically entered the public consciousness, prompting a torrent of debate and backlash. The Guardian published a top secret court order requiring Verizon to hand over all telephone call records to the National Security Agency (NSA); the Washington Post disclosed a secret but widespread Internet surveillance program, and months of similar revelations followed, all stemming from leaks by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden.1 As a result, the public and the press began to question the tools that the government uses for surveillance, including National Security Letters (NSLs), and the relationship between the government and the technology and telecommunications companies that seemingly possess all personal and private information generated in the modern, digital world.2 J.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Comparison of the Extent of Censorship Laws in India and Abroad
    Journal of Critical Reviews ISSN- 2394-5125 Vol 7, Issue 13, 2020 CENSORSHIP IN INDIA VIS-À-VIS FREEDOM OF SPEECH: COMPARISON OF THE EXTENT OF CENSORSHIP LAWS IN INDIA AND ABROAD 1Priyanka Ghai,Dr. 1Arnind P Bhanu 1Amity Law School Noida, Amity University, Sector-125, Uttar Pradesh, India-201313 Email: [email protected] ,[email protected] Received: 12.04.2020 Revised: 13.05.2020 Accepted: 09.06.2020 Abstract With the current outrage at the arbitrary method of censorship applied by the board of film certification in India, it was pertinent to understand and take a closer look at the methods and principles which guide the method of censorship in India, this is also an attempt to understand why censorship is a vital tool to ensure peace and unity in India. The paper also looks at the past and present of censorship, in the form of how it came to be, why it came to be and also what role it plays in society today. In order to get a bigger picture of censorship an attempt has been made to understand censorship in the United States of America, which is a champion of democracy and also in the People’s Republic of China which uses censorship to shepherd its populace in the other direction. The effects both schools have on censorship have been explored in this paper. India being a mixture of both influences has the right to expression subject to certain instances and therefore must understand that even though the right of free speech is indeed a requirement in these times and places, but why censorship as a necessary evil as well in India.
    [Show full text]