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1 NINE 2 3 4 Welfare and active labour market 5 6 policies in the UK: the coalition 7 government approach 8 9 10 Anne Daguerre and David Etherington 11 12 13 14 Introduction 15 From the mid-1980s onwards, the UK social security system has 16 become increasingly residual in nature, with the language of contracts 17 pervading most areas of welfare, as evidenced by the creation of 18 Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in 1995/96. By the mid-1990s, a cross- 19 party consensus had emerged concerning the need to move away 20 from a passive welfare system based on entitlement to unemployment 21 benefits towards an active welfare model based on responsibilities, 22 encapsulated in the notion of the moral obligations of citizenship. 23 There has been a marked shift away from an approach based upon 24 the duty of the state to support its citizens towards one concerned 25 with the enforcement of a citizen’s obligation to participate in the 26 labour market (Harris, 2010). Under the new welfare contractualism 27 (White, 2000; Freedland and King, 2003; Griggs and Bennett, 2009), 28 social rights can be understood as consisting of rights to reasonable 29 access to benefits, rather than unconditional rights to welfare benefits 30 as such. This new welfare contractualism has become a strong area of 31 bipartisan consensus, not least because New Labour under Tony Blair 32 had promoted a ‘work-first’ approach based on the active monitoring 33 of claimants. Work over welfare (Haskins, 2006), or how to enable the 34 non-working poor to enter or re-enter the world of paid employment, 35 has been at the heart of welfare reform changes over the past three 36 decades. Here, we can identify two di!erent views of the causes and 37 cures for welfare dependency of the issue, which gave rise to di!erent 38 sets of policy prescriptions in the 1980s and 1990s: 39 40 • Behavioural deficiencies – economic inactivity, underemployment 41 and long-term unemployment (all di!erent phenomena in labour 42 market terms) are the result of a lack of work ethic and/discipline

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1 on the part of the non-working poor. From this perspective, entry- 2 level jobs are available and welfare claimants need a combination 3 of hassle and help to take them up. The issue of unemployment is 4 explained in terms of behavioural deficiencies. The portrayal of the 5 non-working poor as lacking the drive and motivation to take up 6 available jobs means that there is an emphasis on churning people 7 into low-paid jobs or maintaining them in a perpetual state of job- 8 readiness (Peck, 2001, p 12). The policy instruments deployed for 9 getting people into jobs rely on a mix of sticks (in the form of benefit 10 sanctions in case of non-compliance with work-related activities, 11 time-limited benefits, close monitoring of claimants to ensure that 12 they comply with the requirements and incentive reinforcement) and 13 carrots (such as in-work credits or income disregards, or transitional 14 and or passport benefits) [[changes to sentence ok?]]. 15 • Human capital – while work-first measures rely on rapid attachment 16 to the labour force, with an emphasis on stick and carrots and 17 with strong disciplinarian and authoritarian tendencies, human 18 capital approaches insist on the importance of individual barriers 19 to employment, such as a lack of professional skills. From this 20 perspective, there is a fierce competition for jobs that places people 21 who lack skills at a severe disadvantage, not simply because they find 22 it increasingly di"cult to access entry-level jobs, but also because 23 they can only take up unstable, low-paid employment, leading to 24 a pattern of ‘labour market churning’, whereby people cycle back 25 and forth between low-paid, low-skilled employment and welfare 26 benefits. The lack of relevant skills in a highly selective labour market 27 is seen as the primary cause of long-term unemployment and, 28 increasingly, the widespread experience of economic marginality. 29 There is an emphasis on upskilling the labour force (Bonoli, 2012) 30 by providing on-the-job training, basic skills sets (including literary 31 and numeracy) or postgraduate diplomas. 32 33 Between 1997 and 2010, successive Labour administrations had pledged 34 to rebuild the welfare state along the logic of mutual obligations on 35 the part of the state and its citizens, with a corresponding emphasis 36 on paid work as the best way to combat poverty. There was not much 37 emphasis on skills, however; instead, Labour endeavoured to make 38 work pay through the introduction of the National Minimum Wage 39 and in-work tax credits, which became more generous in 2003. 40 The Labour governments endorsed a ‘workfarist’ approach, and 41 gradually extended work-search requirements to categories of 42 the working-age population who had in the past been exempted

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1 from such requirements – essentially lone parents and people with 2 health conditions. The expansion was achieved in stages through 3 the implementation of various New Deals (Daguerre, 2007; Driver, 4 2009). The Welfare Reform Act 2009 realised the vision of the Gregg 5 (2008) report, according to which conditionality (the principle that 6 entitlement to benefits should be dependent on satisfying certain 7 conditions) should be extended to the vast majority of the working-age 8 population so that virtually no one may claim benefits without taking 9 active steps to address their barriers to work. The aim was to establish 10 a personalised conditionality regime tailored to the individual needs 11 of jobseekers regardless of administrative classification. The legislation 12 was couched in a strong personal responsibility language, with the key 13 notion that there was a need for a much clearer sanction regime for 14 those who failed to attend an interview or failed to sign on without 15 a good reason (Daguerre and Etherington, 2014). 16 To a large extent, welfare reforms post-2010 have strengthened the 17 dominant work-first logic, where the focus is on strict job search, the 18 key element of which is to increase labour supply. This emphasis on 19 the obligation to take up work as a condition of receiving benefits was 20 laid out by the future Prime Minister David Cameron when describing 21 the Conservative welfare contract: 22 23 We’re going to change the whole way welfare is done in 24 this country so everyone takes responsibility and plays their 25 part. This is our new welfare contract: do the right thing and 26 we will back you all the way. But fail to take responsibility 27 – and the free ride is over. (Cameron, 2010) 28 29 The welfare-to-work system was designed to condition and coerce 30 benefit claimants into jobs through tougher and more widespread 31 benefit sanctions for those who are closest to the labour market 32 (JSA claimants). This was the policy announced by the Conservative 33 manifesto in 2010. The manifesto stipulated that: 34 35 Anyone on Jobseeker’s Allowance who refuses to join the 36 Work Programme will lose the right to claim out-of-work 37 benefits until they do, while people who refuse to accept 38 reasonable job o!ers could forfeit their benefits for up to 39 three years. (Conservative Party, 2010, p 15) 40 41 This chapter seeks to characterise the policies of the Conservative-led 42 coalition government between 2010 and 2015. The chapter is divided

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1 into three sections. First, we briefly summarise the main reforms to the 2 tax and benefit systems (cuts to tax credits, a tougher conditionality 3 regime and the introduction of Universal Credit) (see also Chapter 4 Eight). We also examine the characteristics of work-for-your-benefit 5 schemes, which represent workfare in the strictest sense of the word 6 since welfare claimants have to work for their benefits. Second, we 7 argue that the coalition’s welfare-to-work agenda was, to a large 8 extent, dominated by a traditional Conservative discourse based on the 9 stigmatisation of welfare dependency on moral and economic grounds. 10 Participation in paid work was portrayed as a moral duty of citizenship 11 (Larkin, 2014), with social assistance being concentrated on the most 12 ‘vulnerable’ and ‘deserving’ individuals. Third, we conclude that the 13 Liberal Democrats did exert a moderating influence in some areas of 14 social policy, mainly in relation to welfare policies for young people 15 and cuts to tax credits. 16 17 The reforms 18 19 As noted by Hills (2015), the coalition government agreement (Cabinet 20 O"ce, 2010) was relatively vague and succinct in relation to welfare 21 and employment policies. However, three main principles underpinned 22 the new government’s approach. First, the tax and benefit system 23 should positively encourage participation in paid work, which meant 24 that out-of-work benefits should be kept at a bare minimum and even 25 reduced; this justified both the introduction of in-work conditionality 26 through Universal Credit and the benefit cap. Indeed, a major change 27 compared with New Labour’s policies was the cuts to tax credits that 28 had subsidised low-paid workers since the 2000s. Second, taxpayers’ 29 money was to be spent wisely on both the most deserving and the most 30 vulnerable; in particular, the threat of benefit sanctions in the form 31 of cuts to out-of-work benefits was geared to promote behavioural 32 change on the part of benefit claimants so that they would fulfil their 33 part of the bargain, that is, engage in paid work whenever possible. 34 Of course, the idea that the benefit system could be used to steer 35 behavioural change and instil a work ethic among welfare recipients 36 had also been a central tenet of New Labour policies, but the main 37 di!erence between the approaches of Labour and the coalition was that 38 the latter put a much greater emphasis on sticks (financial sanctions 39 in case of non-compliance with work requirements), as opposed to 40 carrots, both in terms of rhetoric (as illustrated by the previous quote 41 from David Cameron) and in actual policies. Third, the coalition 42 government was committed to reducing the role and the size of the

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1 state through the generalisation of the contracting out of employment 2 and training services to private providers (elements of privatisation and 3 contracting out had already been introduced by New Labour under 4 the Flexible New Deal, but the Work Programme (WP) was much 5 more ambitious in this respect). We will review the main changes to 6 the benefit system with a particular emphasis on benefit sanctions (as 7 encapsulated by the ), as well as the expansion 8 of work-for-your-benefit schemes (see also Chapter Eight). 9 The coalition government’s tax and benefit policies were spelled out 10 in the 2010 Green Paper, 21st century welfare, and the White Paper, 11 Universal Credit: welfare that works (DWP, 2010a, 2010b). The most 12 radical reform consisted of the unification of several means-tested 13 benefits ( [IS], Employment and Support Allowance 14 [ESA], JSA and Housing Benefit) and tax credits (Working 15 and Housing Benefit [[sense? ?]]) in order to 16 simplify a complex and confusing system and ensure that work always 17 pays through the introduction of Universal Credit (Patrick, 2014, p 18 61). In this respect, the coalition were following the 1997–2010 Labour 19 administrations’ attempts to simplify the welfare system, when Labour 20 established the Benefit Simplification Unit in 2006 (Harris, 2013, pp 21 18–19). The model for in-work conditionality had been introduced 22 by the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), and was explained at length in 23 the document Dynamic benefits (CSJ, 2009). Universal Credit involves 24 in-work conditionality, with the requirement for claimants to attain 25 an ‘earnings threshold’ set at the level of e!ort that it is reasonable 26 for an individual to undertake. Working-age adults are subject to 27 conditionality until they work full-time (35 hours) at the National 28 Minimum Wage. If someone is earning below the conditionality cut-o! 29 point, they will be expected to ‘look for work, more work or better- 30 paid work’. Exceptions to this are those with caring responsibilities 31 and those with health conditions (Tarr and Finn, 2012). Universal 32 Credit is being introduced in stages, starting with the most simple cases 33 (single unemployed claimants), and followed by more complex cases, 34 essentially couples and families. The trials and delays associated with 35 Universal Credit are beyond the scope of this chapter, but the scheme 36 has su!ered several setbacks due to the introduction of a number of 37 ambitious reforms at a time of spending cuts, thus a!ecting the capacity 38 of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to carry out reforms 39 within rigid time frames (National Audit O"ce, 2015). 40 Other changes in the tax and benefit system included the introduction 41 of a cap of £26,000 per year in the total amount of benefits that 42 working-age people and their families can receive (excluding those

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1 on certain disability benefits or working enough hours to qualify for 2 ). Crucially, tax credits, a central component of 3 making work pay under New Labour, were also made less generous 4 through various means, notably, the abolition of the ‘baby element’ 5 of Child Tax Credit (Hill, 2015, pp 16–17), The decisions to freeze 6 major out-of-work benefits, to cut and freeze tax credits, and to restrict 7 access to disability benefits represent fundamental, cumulative changes 8 to the tax and benefit system. 9 The coalition also built upon previous Labour policies by extending 10 work-search requirements to other groups of benefit claimants who 11 had been subjected in the past to moderate work-search requirements, 12 namely, single parents on IS and people with health conditions who 13 had been either on Incapacity Benefit (IB) or, in some cases, IS on 14 the grounds of disability. 15 IB is traditionally determined within a framework of rules and 16 without a specific limit on budgets. Two sets of rules determine the 17 eligibility: a test of incapacity to work and an assessment of benefit 18 eligibility, based either on national insurance contributions or on means 19 testing. The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) devised in 2007/08 20 led to a reduction in the range of conditions that enabled people to 21 qualify for IB. It essentially restricted eligibility criteria for IB receipt 22 and introduced a kind of employability test (Gulland, 2013, pp 71–3). 23 Claimants can be placed in the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) 24 if they are unwell but may still be able to do some work. Claimants are 25 expected to attend a work-focused interview and training, and will 26 have regular reassessments to decide if they should claim JSA instead 27 of ESA. Once placed in the Support Group, claimants do not have to 28 attend work-focused interviews and training unless they would like 29 to. The coalition government wanted to accelerate the migration of 30 IB claimants onto ESA, and initially aimed to move 1.5 million IB 31 claimants onto ESA between 2010 and 2014 (Patrick, 2014, p 60). 32 They were, however, unable to meet this ambitious target, in part, 33 because a higher than expected volume of IB claimants were found 34 incapable of some form of work-related activity, and also because the 35 screening process carried out by the private company ATOS resulted 36 in a large number of appeals from claimants who had been found fit for 37 work: 40% of new claimants found fit for work appealed, with almost 38 40% of those appeals being successful (Hood and Phillips, 2015, p 25). 39 The coalition government also subjected more lone parents to the 40 requirements of JSA by moving them o! IS. The reform, known as the 41 Lone Parent Obligation (LPO), started in 2008 under Labour, and as a 42 result, lone parents whose youngest child was aged 12 were subjected

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1 to a work-search requirement. The age condition was reduced to 10 2 from October 2009, to seven from October 2010 and to five from 3 May 2012 (Hood and Phillips, 2015, p 28). 4 The new policy framework for benefit sanctions was consolidated in 5 the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and subsequent regulations. Although 6 the drive towards the adoption of a more stringent sanctions regime 7 had started well before 2010, there was a significant qualitative and 8 quantitative di!erence between the benefit sanction regime prior to 9 2010 and the policy framework post-2012. The length of sanction 10 periods was extended at the end of 2012, with the minimum sanction 11 period being increased from one week to four weeks and the maximum 12 from 26 weeks to three years. Higher-level sanctions represent a ‘very 13 much more stringent sanctions regime than those previously applicable’ 14 (Wood et al, 2013 [[citation not referenced, but see 2015. Please 15 add/correct]], p 93). The new sanctions were applied to JSA claimants 16 from October 2012. 17 In practice, the coalition clearly delivered on its promise to implement 18 a tougher sanctions regime, with JSA sanctions reflected as a proportion 19 of claimants after reconsiderations and appeals having stabilised at 5.5% 20 and 6% of claimants per month, compared to an average of 2.2% of 21 claimants between 2000 and 2006. There was an upward trend in JSA 22 sanctions between 2007 and 2008, from 2.2% to 3.5%, followed by 23 a sharp decline with the start of the intense economic recession. JSA 24 sanctions rates then increased from 2.2% in April 2010 to 4.3% in 25 December 2010, which corresponded to the increased use of sanctions 26 once the coalition government took o"ce. This was then followed by 27 a sharp decline in JSA sanctions in 2011, when WP providers become 28 responsible for monitoring JSA claimants. However, from 2011, and 29 especially as a result of the implementation of the new sanctions regime 30 under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, JSA sanctions increased from a 31 low of 3.5% in April 2012 to 5.8% in December 2013, and then fell 32 slightly to 5.4% in December 2014 (Webster, 2014). 33 Another policy change was the widespread expansion of work-for- 34 your-benefit schemes, mainly the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory 35 Work Activity Scheme) Regulations (SI 2011/688), the Jobseekers 36 Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise) Regulations 2011 37 (SI 2011/917) (known as ESE), which replaced the Jobseekers 38 Allowance (Work for Your Benefit Pilot Scheme) Regulations 2010 (SI 39 2010/1222) introduced as part of the Welfare Reform Act 2009. The 40 2011 Regulations were made in terms of section 17 of the Jobseeker’s 41 Act 1995. The ESE scheme initially covered four initiatives: (1) Skills 42 Conditionality was aimed at improving the take-up of help and support

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1 for those claimants with an identified skills need – was 2 to refer claimants to a skills training provider; (2) Service Academies 3 aimed to support jobseekers who were close to the labour market but 4 who would benefit from participating in pre-employment training 5 and work experience leading to a guaranteed interview to help them 6 move into sustained employment; (3) the New Enterprise Allowance 7 aimed to promote self-employment under the guidance of a business 8 mentor, providing access to a weekly financial allowance and business 9 start-up loan finance; and (4) the WP provided back-to-work support 10 for a wide range of claimants, including JSA, ESA, IB and IS claimants. 11 The other work-for-your-benefit scheme was the Mandatory Work 12 Activity Regulation. Its purpose, as explained by the Explanatory Notes 13 to the Mandatory Work Activity Regulations 2011, was: 14 15 to target the small number of customers who do enough to 16 meet the conditions of their claim while at the same time 17 continually failing to demonstrate the focus and discipline 18 that is a key requirement of finding, securing and retaining 19 employment. [[ref?]] 20 21 The language of the Explanatory Notes made it clear that there were 22 a minority of JSA claimants who failed to engage with employers, and 23 who did not have the work ethic or the discipline that was required 24 to find, secure and retain employment. 25 Under the WP, private providers could decide to place people in 26 work-related activities such as work experience placements. The WP 27 is, in most cases, a mandatory programme: individuals aged 18–24 are 28 referred to the WP after the nine-month point of their claim, while 29 those aged 25 and over are placed on to the WP after claiming JSA 30 for 12 months. The WP was emblematic of the governmental strategy 31 of opening up the public sector to the market. Prime contractors 32 (generally from the private sector) were appointed to deliver in localities 33 (contract areas) on the basis of plans and strategies that were generally 34 negotiated directly between the contractor and the DWP. The WP 35 extended the contracting model and the role of private providers in 36 the delivery of previous welfare-to-work programmes (Crighton et 37 al, 2009). Providers were funded on a ‘payments by results basis’, 38 structured in relation to initial attachment to the programme, job 39 outcomes and job sustainability, with additional payments made for 40 higher-performing contractors. 41 The other work-for-your-benefit scheme was the Work Experience 42 Scheme, which is targeted at 18–24 year olds with little or no

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1 experience of work. Young people can participate in the scheme after 2 they have been claiming JSA for three months, but before they join 3 the WP. Work Experience Schemes started in January 2011, and entry 4 was voluntary but, as with the other work-for-your-benefit schemes, 5 participation became compulsory after the individual began his/her 6 placement. Table 9.1 provides a summary of the main work-for-your- 7 benefit schemes under the coalition government. 8 Table 9.1: Main work-for-your-benefit schemes 9 10 Title Eligibility Length of Mandatory or 11 placement voluntary? 12 Work experience Young people Up to 8 weeks Voluntary, originally 13 on JSA for three risk of sanction if 14 months, no work leaving. Became experience voluntary after 15 February 2012 16 Sector-based work Any age on JSA Up to 6 weeks Deciding whether or 17 academy not to take part is 18 voluntary but once placement starts, 19 participation is 20 mandatory 21 Work Programme Participant in Work Up to 4 weeks Mandatory 22 (if referred to work Programme 23 experience) 24 Mandatory Work Any age on JSA Up to 4 weeks Mandatory Activity 25 26 Help to Work (post JSA claimants who Placement of 30 Mandatory Work Programme complete 104 hours a week for up 27 provision) weeks on the Work to 26 weeks 28 Programme

29 Source: CESI ‘Government work experience schemes, what are the differences?’ (available at: http://www. 30 cesi.org.uk/keypolicy/government-work-experience-schemes-what-are-differences). 31 32 Work experience represented the single most important workfare 33 scheme under the coalition, with 300,290 placements between January 34 2011 and November 2014 (Dar, 2015). Work Experience Schemes, 35 which were originally mandatory, became completely voluntary at the 36 end of February 2012 following negative media coverage and employers 37 dropping out of the scheme. As a result, Work Experience Schemes no 38 longer qualify as workfare. Work-for-your-benefit schemes have been 39 subjected to intense scrutiny in the courts, as shown by the number 40 of legal challenges surrounding the work-for-your-benefit regulations 41 (Larkin, 2013; see also Daguerre and Etherington, 2014). 42

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1 The Conservative-led coalition government’s approach 2 3 How can we characterise the coalition government’s policies, and to 4 what extent did they di!er from what might have emerged from a 5 traditional Conservative majority government? To what extent, if any, 6 did the Liberal Democrats exercise a moderating influence? In general, 7 Conservative ministers took the lead on welfare reform within the 8 DWP (see also Chapter Eight). Indeed, a division of labour occurred 9 between the Conservatives and the Liberal democrats, with Iain 10 Duncan Smith, as Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, and his 11 personal advisers (notably, Philippa Stroud, from the CSJ), taking the 12 lead on welfare and employment, and Steve Webb, a Liberal Democrat, 13 in charge of pension reform. 14 In general, as indicated by Bochel and Powell in Chapter One of 15 this volume, the coalition government’s approach to welfare reform 16 was characterised by a New Right philosophy, with a strong emphasis 17 on the responsibilities of citizenship (see Powell, 1999). Indeed, the 18 focus was on the obligation to take up paid employment as a condition 19 of citizenship. In fact, the goal of welfare reform under the coalition 20 government was to produce self-reliant, autonomous citizens, whose 21 dependency on the public purse should be reduced to a minimum. 22 To help achieve this, the coalition believed that benefit levels should 23 be kept at a low level, as evidenced by cuts to tax credits and the 24 introduction of the benefit cap. Although the coalition espoused the 25 logic of making work pay promoted by New Labour, its main policy 26 instrument to promote participation in the labour market was sticks 27 instead of carrots. In line with the goal of reducing welfare spending 28 and ultimately the size of the state, the coalition first and foremost 29 used negative financial incentives in the form of benefits sanctions and 30 low benefit levels to encourage people to either stay o! benefits or to 31 leave cash assistance. 32 The rhetoric of personal responsibility was one of the most prevalent 33 principles underpinning the Welfare Reform Act 2012, especially 34 through the claimant commitment. According to the Welfare Reform 35 Act 2012, the claimant commitment ‘is a record of a claimant’s 36 responsibilities in relation to an award of universal credit’, and ‘is to be 37 in such form as the Secretary of State thinks fit’. In general, the claimant 38 commitment includes an expectation that claimants will comply with 39 a 35-hour work-search rule, although the DWP may agree a reduced 40 time if claimants have impairments or caring disabilities. The claimant 41 commitment was part of the ‘cultural transformation’ introduced by 42 Universal Credit, whereby jobseekers ‘will have to account more clearly

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1 for their e!orts to find work and will be given a weekly timetable of 2 tasks to complete’ (DWP, 2013). 3 With reference to the claimant commitment, 4 declared: 5 6 Through the ‘claimant commitment’, which deliberately 7 mirrors a contract of employment, we are making this 8 deal unequivocal. Those in work have obligations to their 9 employer; so too claimants a responsibility to the taxpayer: 10 in return for support, and where they are able, they must 11 do their bit to find work. (Duncan Smith, 2014) 12 13 The good citizen is viewed as first and foremost economically self- 14 reliant. From this perspective, there is no entitlement to public 15 assistance. 16 In terms of the mixed economy of welfare, the coalition opened up 17 the welfare-to-work market to contracted-out providers; indeed, the 18 WP e!ectively privatised training and employment services. Central 19 to this approach was the view that public service provision should be 20 kept at a low level. 21 One of the most influential intellectual inputs to government 22 thinking was the work conducted by the CSJ, the think tank founded 23 in 2004 by Iain Duncan Smith. The CSJ was commissioned in 2006 24 by David Cameron to examine the causes of poverty in the UK. The 25 report Breakdown Britain (CSJ, 2006) was hailed as evidence-based and 26 identified five ‘pathways to poverty’ (see also Chapter Twelve): family 27 breakdown, educational failure, economic dependence, indebtedness 28 and addiction. This document is interesting because it set out a 29 ‘modern’ Conservative vision, which drew on classic authors and 30 political Conservative political figures such as Adam Smith (including 31 in relation to notions of relative poverty), Disraeli and Churchill, while 32 at the same time paying tribute to the work of Guardian columnist Polly 33 Toynbee (2003), the Child Poverty Action Group and the academic 34 John Hills’s report on economic inequality (Hills et al, 2010). However, 35 the document primarily gave a contemporary twist to the notion of an 36 underclass culture based on drug and alcohol addiction, the breakdown 37 of marriage and family relationships, the rise of fatherless families, 38 and the lack of male role models for young people. The report stated: 39 40 We reject the comfortable mantra that policy can or 41 should be wholly morally neutral on the grounds that this 42 is unworkable in practice.… The failure to form a durable

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1 bond between a mother and father often leads to welfare 2 dependency. This report makes clear the extent to which 3 families su!er financially after family breakdown.… Family 4 breakdown is both contributor to and a consequence of 5 poverty and most other social problems. (CSJ, 2006, pp 6 29–32) 7 8 In e!ect, Iain Duncan Smith reverted to a traditional Conservative 9 moral underclass discourse that attributed poverty and unemployment 10 to essentially individual and moral failings. Poverty and unemployment 11 were portrayed as being caused by individual behaviour, such as 12 alcohol and drug addiction, chaotic lifestyles, and a lack of purpose 13 (dissolution). The structural causes of poverty, such as a lack of available 14 jobs in the aftermath of the recession, tended to be overlooked or 15 marginalised. Moral arguments regarding an intergenerational culture 16 of worklessness were also embraced with a renewed vigour, as pointed 17 out by Shildrick et al (2012, p 9). 18 New paternalism approaches based on the close supervision of 19 benefit recipients (Mead, 1997 [[citation not referenced, but 20 see et al. Please add/correct]]; MacGregor, 1999) also played an 21 important role in government thinking. The Secretary of State for 22 Work and Pensions spelled out a vision almost exclusively centred 23 on the individual and the family, with a marked emphasis on the 24 need to strengthen family life and stable relationships as the best way 25 to provide children with a loving, stable environment. The aim was 26 to deliver ‘life change’ because spending on benefits, referred to as a 27 ‘poverty-plus-a-pound’ approach, which was seen as characterising 28 Labour’s antipoverty and social exclusion policies, did not address the 29 root cause of the problems, whether it be addiction, low expectations 30 or, most importantly, family breakdown. At the heart of Iain Duncan 31 Smith’s vision is a system of monitoring individual behaviour as early 32 as possible in the life cycle: 33 34 This must be based on prevention throughout someone’s 35 life, intervening early to tackle the root causes of problems 36 before they arise rather than waiting to treat the symptoms. 37 That starts with the family, the most important building 38 block in a child’s life. When families are strong and stable, 39 so are children. (Duncan Smith, 2012) 40 41 In general, the Conservative-led coalition government used divide- 42 and-rule rhetoric, along the lines of the hard-working majority versus

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1 the minority living on welfare benefits, in order to justify both tougher 2 benefit sanctions and the expansion of workfare schemes. Although the 3 divide between the deserving and the undeserving poor is a classical 4 theme in the history of social security, especially in the field of social 5 assistance and unemployment benefits (Deacon, 1976), ministers 6 devised a new theme around the idea of ‘fairness to the taxpayer’. 7 This narrative has been at the heart of the Conservative Party rhetoric 8 on the unemployed and social security since the 1980s. For instance, 9 in 1987, the Conservative Secretary of State for Social Security, John 10 Moore, justified targeting social spending on those in greatest needs 11 in these terms: 12 13 The indiscriminate handing out of benefits not only spreads 14 limited resources too thinly, it can also undermine the will 15 to self-help, and builds pools of resentment among the 16 taxpayers who are footing the bill, often from incomes 17 barely larger from the money benefit recipients receive. By 18 targeting our welfare resources we will be able to provide 19 more real help where need is greatest. (Moore, 1987, cited 20 by King, 1995, p 180). 21 22 In particular, under the coalition, the notion that the ‘taxpayer’ directly 23 pays jobseekers to look for employment and accept job o!ers was 24 consistently used as a powerful rhetorical device to justify tougher 25 benefit sanctions, as spelled out by Iain Duncan Smith in May 2010: 26 27 The Job Seeker’s Allowance has a sanction at present. It just 28 has not been used. If you simply are not going to play ball, 29 then the taxpayer has a right to say: ‘You need to know 30 there is a limit to the amount of support we are going to 31 give you’. The sanction comes into play. (Duncan Smith, 32 2010 [[citation not referenced. Please add/correct/ 33 delete year]], quoted by Wintour, 2010) 34 35 One of the fundamental tenets of the Conservative-led welfare-to-work 36 programme was the portrayal of income maintenance as a privilege or 37 ‘advantage’ ‘unfairly’ enjoyed by claimants to the detriment of those 38 who abide by the rules, taxpayers and full-time workers who are not 39 being helped with living costs. This representation of life on welfare 40 as a lifestyle choice fundamentally di!erent from the life of the general 41 population represented the main moral justification for implementing 42 a much stricter benefit sanction regime. This narrative had no real

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1 equivalent under the previous Labour governments. Conservative 2 ministers advocated the implementation of a conditionality regime 3 that strictly mirrored ‘life in the real world’, especially employment 4 contracts. In particular, ministers held that people on welfare should 5 be subjected to exactly the same requirements and conditions as those 6 who were in full-time work by spelling out that individuals should 7 spend up to 35 hours a week looking for work because 35 hours a 8 week is the average working week in the UK. 9 The coalition enjoyed widespread public support in relation to its 10 welfare-to-work policies, especially the benefit cap and the stricter 11 conditionality regime backed by tougher financial sanctions. These 12 policies were supported by the electorate, as measured by public 13 attitude surveys and focus groups. Indeed, public attitudes towards 14 the unemployed have considerably hardened, with most people now 15 ‘firmly believing that JSA claimants could get a job if they really wanted 16 one’ (Deeming, 2014, p 18; although see also Chapter Three). In this 17 context, the coalition was able to portray harsher benefit sanctions as 18 essentially ‘fair’. 19 20 Conclusion 21 22 To conclude, what emerges under the WP and the escalating 23 sanctions regime is the image of an authoritarian workfare state that 24 delegates much of its sanctioning powers to contracted-out welfare- 25 to-work providers, while, at the same time, eroding some of the 26 support services that are at the heart of active labour market policies. 27 Welfare beneficiaries are being subjected to increased monitoring and 28 surveillance in what appears to be an unbalanced welfare contract. As 29 MacLeavy (2011, pp 362–3) observes: 30 31 The allotment of state resources to encouraging work 32 through these programmes serves to discipline citizens in 33 politically and economically expedient ways.… Austerity, 34 in this sense, provides a means of legitimating the coalition 35 government’s arrangements to expand programmes to 36 orientate state assistance towards work, which increases 37 levels of state control over welfare recipients’ lives, at the 38 same time as dampening public expectations regarding 39 citizenship entitlements. 40 41 Taken together, the cumulative impact of the reforms – benefit caps, 42 higher benefit sanctions, changes in benefit rules and conditions of

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1 entitlement, accelerated migration of IB claimants onto ESA through 2 the WCA, and additional requirements for benefit claimants – 3 corresponds to a recasting of the UK’s welfare state, with an erosion 4 in terms of substantive social rights, both through statutes, regulations 5 and policy implementation. 6 The record so far of the Conservative government post-2015 suggests 7 that the Liberal Democrats did exert a moderating influence on their 8 coalition partners in relation to workfare policies for young people 9 and cuts to tax credits and disability benefits. The Conservative Party 10 manifesto of 2015 singled out young people aged 18–21 for stronger 11 work requirements, with the suppression of JSA and the introduction 12 of a time-limited (six months) youth allowance, ‘after which young 13 people will have to take an apprenticeship, a traineeship or do daily 14 community work for their benefits’, the justification for which is 15 framed in terms of ‘fairness to the taxpayer’, so that ‘it is not fair – on 16 taxpayers, or on young people themselves – that 18–21 year-olds with 17 no work experience should slip straight into a life on benefits without 18 first contributing to their community’ (Conservative Party, 2015, p 19 18). During the coalition government, the Liberal Democrats had 20 opposed ending Housing Benefit for young people, which had been a 21 key objective of the Prime Minister between 2010 and 2015. Indeed, 22 cuts to social security payments for young unemployed people have 23 been one of the key ideological characteristics of Conservative Party’s 24 social policies since the 1980s. As in the 1980s, Conservative policy 25 post-2015 aims to deliberately prolong the dependence of the young 26 unemployed on their families (Harris, 1988, p 518). In July 2015, the 27 Conservatives’ Budget stated that: 28 29 To prevent young people slipping straight into a life on 30 benefits, from April 2017 the Budget will also remove the 31 automatic entitlement to housing support for new claims 32 in Universal Credit from 18–21 year olds who are out of 33 work. This will ensure young people in the benefits system 34 face the same choices as young people who work and who 35 may not be able to a!ord to leave home. (HM Treasury, 36 2015, p 41) 37 38 Other measures announced in the summer 2015 Budget included 39 cutting the rate of ESA for new claimants in the WRAG to the lower 40 JSA rate in order to promote full employment (the objective is to 41 remove any financial incentive to claim sickness benefits over JSA), 42 cuts to tax credits through reducing the level of earnings at which

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1 a household’s tax credits and Universal Credit award starts to be 2 withdrawn for every extra pound earned, and removing tax credits for 3 non-disabled claimants without children (HM Treasury, 2015, p 37). 4 The Conservative government post-May 2015 has therefore resumed 5 with renewed fervour a policy of residual welfarism (Wintour, 2015 6 [[citation not referenced, but see 2010. Please add/correct]]). 7 The announcement of a ‘’ is likely to only 8 partially o!set the cuts to tax credits in a radical departure from the 9 previous Labour administrations’ approach to making work pay through 10 generous in-work benefits. 11 12 References 13 Bonoli G. (2012) ‘Active labour market policy and social investment: 14 a changing relationship’, in N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (eds) 15 Towards a social investment state , Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 181–204. 16 Cabinet O"ce (2010) The coalition: our programme for government, 17 London: Cabinet O"ce. 18 Cameron D. (2010) ‘Ending the free ride for those who fail to take 19 responsibility’. Available at: http://www.conservatives.com/News/ 20 News_stories/2010/04/Ending_the_free_ride for_those_who_fail_ 21 to_take_responsibility.aspx (accessed 15 December 2010). 22 Conservative Party (2010) Invitation to join the government of Britain: the 23 Conservative manifesto 2010, London: Conservative Party. 24 Conservative Party (2015) The Conservative Party manifesto 2010, 25 London: Conservative Party. 26 Crighton, M., Turok, I. and Leleux, C. (2009) ‘Tensions in localising 27 welfare to work in Britain’s cities’, Local Economy, 24(1): 46–67. 28 CSJ (Centre for Social Justice) (2006) Breakdown Britain: interim report 29 on the state of the nation, London: Centre for Social Justice. 30 CSJ (2009) Dynamic benefits, London: Centre for Social Justice. 31 Daguerre, A. (2007) Active labour market policies and welfare reform: Europe 32 and the US in comparative perspective, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 33 Daguerre, A. and Etherington, D. (2014) ‘Workfare in 21st century 34 Britain’. Available at: http://workfare.org.uk/images/uploads/docs/ 35 Workfare_in_21st_century_Britain_Version_2.pdf (accessed 17 36 September 2015). 37 Dar, A. (2015) Work experience schemes, House of Commons Briefing 38 Paper 06249, London: House of Commons. 39 Deacon, A. (1976) In search of the scrounger, London: G. Bell and Son. 40 Deeming, C. (2014) ‘Foundations of the workfare state – reflections 41 on the political transformation of the welfare state in Britain’, Social 42 Policy and Administration [[vol(no): pp?]].

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1 DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2010a) 21st century welfare, 2 London: The Stationery O"ce. 3 DWP (2010b) Universal Credit: welfare that works, London: The 4 Stationery O"ce. 5 DWP (2013) ‘Claimant commitment to spell out what jobseekers must 6 do in return for benefits’, press release, 29 August. 7 Driver, S. (2009) ‘Work to be done? Welfare reform from Blair to 8 Brown’, Policy Studies, 30: 69–77. 9 Duncan Smith, I. (2012) ‘Transforming lives’, speech, Department for 10 Work and Pensions. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ 11 speeches/social-justice-transforming-lives (accessed 17 September 12 2015). 13 Duncan Smith, I. (2014) ‘Speech on welfare reform’, Centre for 14 Social Justice, London. Available at: http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/ 15 coffeehouse/2014/01/iain-duncan-smiths-speech-on-welfare- 16 reform-full-text/ (accessed 17 September 2015). 17 Freedland, M. and King, D. (2003) ‘Contractual governance and 18 illiberal contracts: some problems of contractualism as an instrument 19 of behaviour’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27(3): 465–77. 20 Gregg, P. (2008) Realising potential: a vision for personalised conditionality 21 and support: an independent report to the Department for Work and Pensions, 22 London: The Stationery O"ce. 23 Griggs, J. and Bennett, F. (2009) Rights and responsibilities in the social 24 security system, Social Security Advisory Committee, occasional paper 25 no 6, London: Social Security Advisory Committee. 26 Gulland, J. (2013) ‘Ticking boxes: decision-making in Employment 27 and Support-Allowance’, Journal of Social Security Law, 18(2): 69–86. 28 Harris, N. (1988) ‘Social security and the transition to adulthood’, 29 Journal of Social Policy, 17(4): 501–23. 30 Harris, N. (2010) ‘Conditional rights, benefit reform and drug users: 31 reducing dependency?’, Journal of Law and Society, 37(2): 223–36. 32 Harris, N. (2013) Law in a complex state, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 33 Haskins, R. (2006) Work over welfare, Washington, DC: Brookings 34 Institution Press. 35 Hills, J. (2015) The coalition’s record on cash transfers, poverty and inequality 36 2010–2015, Working Paper 11, CASE, London: LSE. 37 Hills, J., Brewer, M., Jenkins, S., Lister, R., Lupton, R., Machin, S., 38 Mills, C., Modood, T., Rees, T. and Riddell, S. (2010) An anatomy 39 of economic inequality in the UK – report of the National Equality Panel, 40 London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE. 41 42

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1 HM Treasury (2015) Summer Budget 2015, London: The Stationery 2 O"ce. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 3 system/uploads/attachment_data/file/443232/50325_Summer_ 4 Budget_15_Web_Accessible.pdf (accessed 17 September 2015). 5 Hood, A. and Phillips, D. (2015) Benefit spending and reforms: the coalition 6 government’s record, IFS Briefing Note BN160, London: Institute for 7 Fiscal Studies. 8 King, D. (1995) Actively seeking work: the politics of unemployment and 9 welfare in the United States and Great Britain, Chicago, IL: University 10 of Chicago Press. 11 Larkin, P. (2013) ‘A permanent blow to workfare in the United 12 Kingdom or a temporary obstacle? Reilly and Wilson V Secretary of 13 State for Work and Pensions’, Journal of Social Security Law, 20(3): 110. 14 Larkin, P. (2014) ‘The new puritanism: the resurgence of contractarian 15 citizenship in common law welfare states’, Journal of Law and Society, 16 41(2): 227–56. 17 MacGregor, S. (1999) ‘Welfare, neo-liberalism and new paternalism: 18 three ways for social policy in late capitalist societies’, Capital and 19 Class, 23(1): 91–118. 20 MacLeavy, J. (2011) ‘A “new politics” of austerity, workfare and gender? 21 The UK coalition government’s welfare reform proposals’, Cambridge 22 Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 4(3): 355–67. 23 [[Reference not cited, but see Mead, 1997. Please cite/ 24 correct/delete as appropriate]] Mead, L.M., Lewis, J. and Webb, 25 R. (eds) (1997) The new paternalism: supervisory approaches to poverty, 26 Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 27 Moore, J. (1987) ‘Secretary of State for Social Security, speech 26 28 September, Conservative Party conference’, Conservative Party News, 29 London. 30 National Audit O"ce (2015) Welfare reform, lessons learned, London: 31 The Stationery O"ce. 32 Patrick, R. (2014) ‘Welfare reform and the valorization of work’, in M. 33 Harrison and T. Sanders (eds) Social policies and social control, Bristol: 34 The Policy Press, pp 55–70. 35 Peck, J. (2001) Workfare states, New York, NY: The Guildford Press. 36 Powell, M. (1999) ‘Introduction’, in M. Powell (ed) New Labour, new 37 welfare state, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 1–27. 38 Shildrick, T., MacDonald, R., Furlong, A., Roden, J. and Crow, R. 39 (2012) Are ‘cultures of worklessness’ passed down the generations?, York: 40 Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 41 42

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1 Tarr, A. and Finn, D. (2012) Implementing Universal Credit: will the 2 reform improve the services for users?, London: CESI. Available at: http:// 3 www.cesi.org.uk/publications/implementing-universal-credit-will- 4 reforms-improve-service-users (accessed 15 September 2015). 5 Toy n b e e, P. ( 2 0 0 3 ) Hard work: life in low-pay Britain, London: 6 Bloomsbury. 7 Webster, D. (2014) ‘Evidence submitted to House of Commons Work 8 and Pensions Committee’. Available at: http://www.publications. 9 parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmworpen/479/479vw36. 10 htm (accessed 17 September 2015). 11 White, S. (2000) ‘Review article: social rights and the social contract – 12 political theory and the new welfare politics’, British Journal of Political 13 Science, 30(3): 507–32. 14 [[Reference not cited. Please cite/correct/delete as appropriate]] 15 Wikeley, M.A., Bonner, D. and Mesher, J. (2013) Social security 16 legislation. Volume 2, Income Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance, State Pension 17 Credit and the Social Fund, London: Sweet & Maxwell. 18 Wintour, P. (2010) ‘Coalition government sets out radical welfare 19 reforms’, , 26 May. Available at: http://www. 20 theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/26/coalition-welfare-reforms- 21 duncan-smith (accessed 15 September 2015). 22 [[Reference not cited, but see 2013. Please cite/correct/delete 23 as appropriate]] Wood, P., Poynter, R. and Wintour, P. (2015) 24 ‘Osborne’s first Budget without Lib Dems likely to hit welfare state 25 hard’, The Guardian, 2 July. Available at: http://www.theguardian. 26 com/uk-news/2015/jul/02/osbornes-first-budget-without-libdems- 27 likely-to-hit-welfare-state-hard (accessed 17 September 2015). 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

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