Shame, Admiration, and Self-Esteem Colin Earl BA (Hons) Murdoch University This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Murdoch University, 2006. Declaration I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution. --------------------- Colin Leslie Earl. Table of Contents Abstract. i Acknowledgments. iii Introduction. 1 Chapter One: The Pursuit of Self-Esteem. 18 Chapter Two: The Love of Esteem and Pride. 45 Chapter Three: Admiration. 69 Chapter Four: Concealment and Shame. 96 Chapter Five: Shame and Self-Worth. 126 Chapter Six: Shame, Guilt and Remorse. 158 Chapter Seven: Resentment and Envy. 190 Chapter Eight: Envy, Admiration, and Humility. 219 Conclusion. 251 Bibliography. 256 Abstract This thesis is an exploration of the shame that inheres in not being able to self-admire. I call this incapacity to admire oneself ontological shame, and I argue that it is the source of the masquerades, concealments and negative emotions that surround the pursuit and defence of a self-esteem founded on an impoverished form of pride. I argue that there is a radical asymmetry between our admiration and esteem for others and how we evaluate our own sense of self-worth. Where admiration at its highest pitch is the wonderful agape experience of apprehending preciousness in others, our own sense of self-worth is limited to experiences of pride and other forms of self-affirmation; none of which allow us the joy of seeing ourselves as wonders in the world. Because we can admire and want to be admired, not being able to self-admire amounts to a limitation of a sort which carries with it a primordial resentment against life itself. It is largely how we respond to our ontological limitation and to our resentment that determines the positive or negative manner in which we interact with others, and whether or not we are likely to have an envious or humble disposition. In the first three chapters I lay the groundwork for the main argument of the thesis by highlighting the difficulties self-esteem theorists have in agreeing upon the value of ‘high’ self-esteem, introduce the relation between self-esteem and shame, argue for a distinction between self-esteem and public esteem, and provide an account of the gift- exchange nature of admiration which explains why we cannot self-admire. In the central chapters I focus on shame; on acts of concealment that can be either appropriate covering for, or deceitful denial of our ontological limitation; how self-worth is created through a reconciliation to shame, and why the ‘self-act dissociation’ theories of guilt fail to capture the shame attached to ‘being guilty’ of a wrongdoing. In Chapters Seven i and Eight I examine envy, first in how it can be disguised as moral resentment; how it differs to admiration in its role in emulation, and finally how as a disposition it stands in stark contrast to humility. It is in humility that we grasp the benefits associated with our own incapacity to self-admire through our need to interact and exchange gifts with others. ii Acknowledgment Sincere thanks go to my supervisor Dr. Peta Bowden for her encouragement, advice and guidance throughout this thesis. I thank the Murdoch Board of Research and Postgraduate Studies for funding the final year of my candidacy. The following people assisted me in preparing the dissertation: Karen Olkowski, Cheryl Miller and Ian Lee, and I am grateful to each of them for their help. I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Jacqueline, whose patience and understanding has been wonderful, and to my four children who had to make a greater sacrifice of their ‘fun- time with daddy’ than either they, or I, wanted. iii Introduction This thesis is an exploration of the shame that inheres in not being able to self-admire. I call this incapacity to admire oneself ontological shame, and I argue that it is the source of the masquerades, concealments and negative emotions that surround the pursuit and defence of a self-worth founded on a truncated and isolated form of self-esteem. I argue that there is a radical asymmetry between our admiration and esteem for others, and how we evaluate our own sense of self-worth. Where admiration at its highest pitch is the wonderful agape experience of apprehending preciousness in others, our own sense of self-worth is limited to experiences of pride and other forms of self-affirmation, none of which allow us the joy of seeing ourselves as wonders in the world. Because we can admire and want to be admired, not being able to self-admire amounts to a limitation of a sort which carries with it a primordial resentment against life itself. It is largely how we respond to our ontological limitation and to our resentment that determines the positive or negative manner in which we interact with others, and whether or not we become prone to an envious or humble disposition. In the first three chapters I lay the groundwork for the main argument of the thesis by highlighting the difficulties self-esteem theorists have in agreeing upon the value of ‘high’ self-esteem, introduce the relation between self-esteem and shame, argue for a distinction between self-esteem and public esteem, and provide an account of the gift- exchange nature of admiration. It is the gift-exchange nature of high admiration that best explains why it is that we cannot self-admire. In the central chapters I focus on shame; on acts of concealment that can be either appropriate covering for, or deceitful denial of our ontological limitation; how self-worth is created through a reconciliation to shame, and why the ‘self-act dissociation’ theories of guilt fail to capture the shame attached to ‘being guilty’ of a wrongdoing. In Chapters Seven and Eight I examine envy, first in how it can be disguised as moral resentment; how it differs from 1 admiration in its role in emulation, and finally how as a disposition it stands in stark contrast to humility. It is in humility that we grasp the benefits associated with our own incapacity to self-admire, and the pleasures associated with our need to interact and exchange gifts with others. I draw upon insights from social psychology, philosophy and practical theology to piece together a fresh perspective on shame, admiration and self-esteem. I argue that in social psychology, an emphasis on self-esteem has created a prism through which emotional states such as anger, shame, resentment, guilt and admiration are viewed, so that these emotions often become distorted and consequently lose much of their explanatory power. I think the same prismatic effect has occurred in philosophy and the concepts of shame, self-esteem and guilt, and emotions like pride, resentment, envy and humility have been shaped by and often subsumed under an overriding interest in one or another moral system. While I recognise that these emotions and reactive attitudes do have a moral dimension, I think a better understanding of them and their moral worth will come if we do not become enmeshed in philosophical debates over the competing values of different moral systems. I consider these systems merely supplement the wrong of exposing others to their shame with rules and principles about justice, injury, harm, etc. This is a very large claim and I do not attempt to support it directly by addressing the ways in which different understandings of these emotions embed different (and conflicting) understandings of moral worth. Rather I proceed by shifting the focus of attention to the deep source of shame in our ontological condition. My aim is to show that once we recognise the force of ontological shame in our emotional psychology we are better placed to grasp the nature and function of related emotions and reactive attitudes, like pride, admiration, self-esteem, resentment, envy, guilt. This understanding, in its turn, allows us to assess the value and difficulties of these emotions in our lives. Instead of beginning with an (implicit) understanding of moral 2 value and exploring shame and related emotions within this schema (and thereby raise questions about the validity of the schema itself), I work from the opposite direction, as it were, beginning with our ontological condition of shame to show how these emotions contribute to our ongoing daily struggles with this condition. In order to unpack the central role of shame in our emotional lives, I begin, in Chapter One, with what may seem to be its antithesis: self-esteem. In the field of social psychology, the attainment of self-esteem has been predominantly presented as an unmitigated good and integral to a fulfilling and flourishing life. As one author puts it, “[t]he widespread conviction that self-esteem deficits lie at the heart of countless dysfunctional behaviors has catapulted the quest for self-esteem into something of a modern day search for the holy grail”1 But this view of self-esteem has now become contentious, and a debate is taking place in psychology over whether high self-esteem is as valuable as has been generally thought, and whether it is high or low self-esteem which is the major contributor to anti-social behaviour. Recently, in separate articles, two groups of social psychologists have challenged the prevailing view that low self-esteem is a major cause of aggression and violence.2 They claim that rather than low self-esteem being the problem it is a ‘pre-occupation with self’, ‘ego-threats’, and the pursuit of high self-esteem which contributes significantly to violence.