Insight Investment Thoughts for 2021
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FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ONLY. NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO RETAIL CLIENTS. This strategy is offered by Insight North America LLC (INA) in the United States. INA is part of Insight Investment. Performance presented is that of Insight Investment and should not specifically be viewed as the performance of INA. Please refer to the important disclosures at the back of this document. INSIGHT INVESTMENT THOUGHTS FOR 2021 DECEMBER 2020 We believe the economic shock caused by the coronavirus crisis, and the policy response it triggered, are of sufficient magnitude to warrant a reassessment of the investment landscape – and that frames our outlook for 2021 INTRODUCTION AT CERTAIN POINTS IN HISTORY, INVESTORS ARE FORCED TO CONFRONT A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE INVESTMENT LANDSCAPE. AT THESE POINTS, SOME WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE PAST, RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THAT A STRUCTURAL CHANGE HAS OCCURRED. OTHERS REACT MORE QUICKLY, ADAPTING THEIR OUTLOOKS AND STRATEGIES TO THE NEW REALITY. WE BELIEVE THE ECONOMIC SHOCK CAUSED BY THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS, AND THE POLICY RESPONSE IT TRIGGERED, ARE OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO WARRANT A REASSESSMENT – AND THAT FRAMES OUR OUTLOOK FOR 2021. Historically, we have observed investors purchase fixed income for two key reasons, income generation and diversification; the price of government bonds tending to gain during periods when other risk assets decline. But, with yields at historical lows, and a sizeable proportion of government bond yields in negative territory, history is unlikely to be a reliable guide for the future. In our view, the role of fixed income has been in a process of evolution – many holders of debt instruments are now primarily concerned with finding secure ways to match future cash outflows. A modest level of income is a welcome bonus in a strategy that is focused on certainty. For those that need a higher income, the economic background is tricky, as there is little buffer for potential defaults. But we believe there are still options, structured credit and emerging market corporates both providing ways to boost income without materially increasing risk. For those accepting that a structural change has occurred, then a more fundamental shift in view may be needed. If yields are to remain in a new lower range for a considerable period of time, then assets need to be made to work harder. An incremental increase in credit risk – shifting from government holdings into highly rated investment grade credit – is one way to potentially grind out some additional yield. Or a more radical shift could be to move from low-risk holdings held as a diversifying asset to more focused, higher-risk credit, targeting long-term returns. 2 GLOBAL RATES THE ERA OF NEOFISCALISM Fiscal and monetary policy has been pushed to extraordinary levels as central FURTHER READING banks and governments battle the economic consequences of the coronavirus crisis. Quantitative easing programs have been restarted and massively increased Neofiscalism in scale, and combined with other stimulus measures, this has seen central bank A shift to a new economic regime could balance sheets expand by more in the first ten months of 2020 than during the already be under way, with governments global financial crisis (see Figure 1). around the world increasing spending and large fiscal deficits becoming the norm. Arguably, major central banks have now already reverted to their original purpose of monetary financing, funding government deficits when necessary This has significant implications for investors, with policies such as quantitative via an increase in the monetary base. With this backdrop, we believe that a easing and yield curve control used to keep new paradigm of big government could have begun, which we are calling interest rates at historically low levels. Neofiscalism. If we are correct, then Neofiscalism could last for decades just as Neoliberalism and Keynesian Fiscalism did. In order to help fund government DRAFT. PENDING DRAFT. APPROVAL. FOR PROFESSIONAL CLIENTSCLIENTS, AND QUALIFIED QUALIFIED INVESTORS, INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL ONLY. INVESTORS, WHOLESALE INVESTORS NOTAND TOLICENSED BE REPRODUCED FINANCIAL WITHOUT ADVISORS PRIOR ONLY. WRITTEN NOT TO APPROVAL.BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN APPROVAL. deficits, a period of financial repression, where interest rates are held below PLEASE REFER TO ALLTHE RISKIMPORTANT DISCLOSURES INFORMATION AT THE BACK AT THE OF BACK THIS DOCUMENT.OF THIS DOCUMENT. the rate of inflation, seems likely, with quantitative easing used to suppress GLOBAL MACRO RESEARCH both yields and bond market volatility. NEOFISCALISM IMPLICATIONS OF BIG GOVERNMENT IN A POST-COVID WORLD AUGUST 2020 As investors recalibrate their medium and long-term outlooks, so they will need to re-examine previous assessments of value. With the shorter end of yield curves likely anchored by easy monetary policy for years to come, any re-steepening of yield curves may represent an opportunity, despite R O C R A E M S long-term yields being at historically low levels. E Click to read L A A R B C O H L • G Figure 1: Global central bank balance sheets have expanded rapidly in response to the coronavirus crisis1 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 ) 4,000 3,000 Billions ($ 2,000 1,000 0 -1,000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 YTD Japan China UK US Euro Area 1 Source: Insight and Bloomberg, shows annual change in central bank balance sheets. Data as of October 31, 2020. 3 GLOBAL INFLATION THE FED CHANGES THE GAME Emerging market corporate On 21 August 2020, following an extensive review, Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Jerome Powell announced that the central bank would shift to a new credit could be a way to policy framework2: flexible average inflation targeting. This will see the Fed generate additional yield continue to target inflation at 2%, but over longer periods. In future, if inflation persistently fails to meet the 2% target, it will be allowed to run moderately above and increase diversification. target such that inflation averages 2% over time. By making this change, the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) hopes to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at the 2% rate. Another critical change was on employment, with the Committee now focusing on the extent of any shortfall in employment from its maximum level and noting that the maximum level of employment is “not directly measurable and changes over time”. This implies that maximizing employment and sustaining it at elevated levels will become a more important factor in future policy decisions. Since the Fed’s 2% inflation target was introduced by Ben Bernanke in 2012, inflation, as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditure Price Index, has persistently failed to meet that target over time. A considerable gap has grown between the recorded level of prices and the level had inflation met the 2% target (see Figure 2). This means that even if inflation were to move above 2% earlier than expected, there is no guarantee that it would be met with higher interest rates. Given the extent of the undershoot in recent years and the level of unemployment, it could be argued that the Fed would now accept quite an extended period of above-target inflation, if it materialized, before meaningfully seeking to constrain growth. Of course, recent experience would suggest that getting inflation to meaningfully accelerate may not be that easy. This change in policy framework at the Fed will also potentially give other global central banks greater confidence to pursue their own unprecedented policy moves. Figure 2: US inflation has consistently undershot target3 125 25 120 0 20 10 115 to 15 110 % ebased 105 10 -r x 100 Inde 5 95 90 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Cumulative inflation gap (RHS) PCE (LHS) 2% per annum target (LHS) 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy- strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy- 4 strategy.htm 3 Source: Insight and Bloomberg. Data as of September 30, 2020. INVESTMENT GRADE CREDIT INVESTORS APPEAR STRUCTURALLY UNDEREXPOSED TO IG The most popular fixed income benchmark in the US is the Bloomberg Barclays In a world where US Aggregate Index, which has over $1 trillion of assets managed against it. As yields have declined, the importance of investment grade corporates to the interest rates are overall yield of the Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Index has risen. In 1990, investment grade corporates provided 32% of the yield of the index – but today likely to be held they generate 63% of it – almost double (see Figure 3). Over the same period the at historically low weight of investment grade credit within the index has risen from 19% to 27%. This demonstrates how important investment grade credit has become for levels for many investors that want to be able to generate any meaningful income. years to come, In our view, in a world where interest rates are likely to be held at historically low levels for many years to come, fixed income holdings need to be made fixed income to work harder. This suggests that investors could actually be structurally holdings need underexposed to credit, and should be shifting government bond exposure into high quality investment grade credit as a way to add to be made to incremental yield for limited additional credit risk. A similar argument can be made in most developed markets. work harder. Figure 3: The share of credit spreads within the Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Index has risen4 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Corporate share of Agg OAS credit spread Trend 4 Bloomberg, Barclays, October 31, 2020 (calculated by averages corporate IG Option Adjusted Spread (OAS) multiplied by IG market cap, divided by agg OAS multiplied by Agg market cap).