U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hazard Mitigation Actions in Relation to State Hazard Mitigation Plans and - 2013

INTRODUCTION The overlapping responsibilities for many natural hazards that are shared by multiple state and federal agencies, especially flooding, can be challenging to clearly understand. Complicating this, many agencies have different divisions, districts, communities of practice and stovepipes that could interact better. The stovepipes make us blind. Federal agencies can better communicate their actions aimed at reducing risks from natural hazards. This document seeks to meet this aim. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has districts, usually setup by watershed boundaries (see figure below), and this is completely different than the states and FEMA regions. In addition, the NOAA National Weather Service and U.S. Geological Survey all have areas of responsibility that differ. The counties and local hazard mitigation plans also need help understanding how the broader efforts of federal agencies may translate down to the local level.

Figure 1. The states, counties, and USACE districts in and surrounding Kansas and Missouri.

The USACE Kansas City District is charged with leading coordination for USACE in Kansas and Missouri. Under the USACE Silver Jackets Program, the district has prepared the summary paragraphs herein that will strongly enhance the state hazard mitigation plan (SHMP) section on flooding, including sections on levees and dams, drought, and some other hazards. The development and delivery has been coordinated by the Kansas City District Silver Jackets Coordinator, the lead for Kansas and Missouri.

This coordination was done internally with the various districts’ programs to better inform the states’

• Risk assessments and • Actions supporting hazard mitigation.

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Strategic and Cost Effective Hazard Mitigation. The USACE has a real opportunity to contribute to the states’ efforts in developing the most effective use of mitigation dollars. This new communication process is possible as a direct result of the USACE National Flood Risk Management Program. USACE brings this product to the state through USACE Silver Jacket funding. Other federal agencies should consider providing similar data and leveraging Silver Jackets and state hazard mitigation teams’ interagency coordination. The states’ hazard mitigation efforts can only be as good as the available information is. State budgets are very tight. The best strategies and cost effective approaches that the state may take depend on federal agencies following suit, not just for the SHMP, but also to inform state budgeting priorities and decisions.

History of this Endeavor. The most notable items that are synonymous with hazard mitigation actions at USACE are the interim risk reduction measures (IRRMs) related to the USACE Dam and Levee Safety Programs. These IRRMs are the USACE equivalent to the state’s hazard mitigation actions. The Dam Safety Program developed and released dam safety action classifications (DSACs) between 2006 and 2009. In May of 2012, the Levee Safety Program began a similar effort with the state hazard mitigation teams. Silver Jackets Coordinators and Levee Safety Program Managers are establishing the revised Levee Safety path forward with state teams and plan specific actions through new processes, such as this very document. Tools such as fact sheets and Strong Points [USACE news bulletin] on topics including risk assessment, risk-informed decision-making, and IRRMs specifically developed for communicating flood risk associated with levee systems are available through a USACE Silver Jackets Coordinator.

Clearly the opportunity for risk communication comes up as the SHMPs look at state-wide risk assessments. The USACE understands that more than 15 other natural hazards, besides flooding, exist, which the states’ must also address. Flooding remains the highest priority risk, although USACE can also acknowledge some of the other natural hazards in this document.

Leading the Local Plans. The state plan is the best place where the county or local HMPs can find more and better understand the roles of people at other agencies who have more information, such as the USACE Dam and Levee Safety Project Managers. The state plan is a resource about many agencies, and it attracts users. Being easily available off the state web pages makes the SHMP a fine place to also help the communities in the states better understand who, what, when, where, and how USACE is addressing hazard mitigation. This information allows these communities to improve local emergency action plans, as well. The shared responsibilities of risk management can only be shared when understood. Therefore, USACE is providing this basic text within this document to enable situational awareness. Introduction to Silver Jackets Activities and State Hazard Mitigation Efforts Several relevant USACE Civil Works programs overlap with the Kansas Hazard Mitigation Team, or KHMT, in Kansas and the State Risk Management Team, or SRMT, in Missouri.

Silver Jackets. This is the USACE Civil Works program enabling participation in the states hazard mitigation teams, including the KHMT and the SRMT. Some of the states use the name Silver Jackets, however, many of the teams have existed longer than the inception of Silver Jackets around 2009. The Lead Silver Jackets Coordinator for Kansas and Missouri directly participates on the KHMT and the SRMT, representing all the USACE districts within the state at the team's regular meetings. Each district also has a Silver Jacket Coordinator, whom is encouraged to attend. The lead coordinator provides regular status updates, available on request. The status updates provide detail information on active USACE Civil Works projects and programs, including specific project information that is useful during the FEMA Risk MAP Discovery Phases. The Silver Jackets Coordinators will participate in the FEMA Risk MAP Resiliency Meeting.

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Regional State Risk Management Team. This is the hazard mitigation teams in the four state region of Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska, with a focus on the Missouri River. The team is primarily composed of the state agency officials directing those state teams and representatives from the local USACE Districts. The SRMT co-leads are one of the four states leading this broader team.

Levee Safety Program. The KHMT and the SRMT get periodic updates on this USACE Civil Works program. Note the USACE is not responsible for all levees in the Nation. The USACE Levee Safety Program activities have complemented both the KHMT and the SRMT work and have included establishing a National Levee Database, inspecting levees, communicating risks, taking steps to reduce risks, and establishing a levee safety portfolio internally at USACE for prioritizing levee work.

Dam Safety Program. This USACE program complements the KHMT and the SRMT work with the two states’ dams. The focus is USACE owned and operated dams. The USACE Dam Safety Program focuses on the large reservoirs, many of which are multipurpose. Reservoirs act together with levees and other infrastructure to reduce impacts of floods, and the reservoirs may also maintain flows for navigation downstream. The program is a little older than the USACE program on levee safety and also has a risk portfolio for prioritizing dam work.

Emergency Management. This USACE Civil Works program addresses flood fighting and the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, such as levees or dams. In addition, major disasters and emergencies are also coordinated through this program.

Water Management. The control of flow releases from the many USACE lake projects is done by the district and divisions responsible for the various river basins.

The flows of the Missouri River are managed by the USACE Northwestern Division. Eight authorized purposes must be addressed, including flood risk management. Flows on the Missouri River are managed by two districts. The Kansas City District Water Management handles reservoirs in Kansas and Missouri that drain to the Missouri River. The Omaha District handles major dams upstream of Rulo, Nebraska. Missouri lakes that are managed by the Kansas City District Water Management include Blue Springs Lake, Harry S. Truman Reservoir, Long Branch Lake, Longview Lake, Pomme de Terre Lake, Smithville Lake, and Stockton Lake. Upstream in Iowa is Rathbun Lake, which flows via the Chariton River to reach the Missouri River.

The eastern side of Missouri is part of the USACE Mississippi Valley Division, which does water management for tributaries of the Mississippi River. Reservoirs on that side of the state, including Mark Twain Lake, Clearwater, and Wappapello Lake, are managed in the St. Louis District. St. Louis District also addresses the navigation mission and water management for the associated locks and dams.

In southern Missouri, Bull Shoals Lake, Norfolk, and Table Rock Lake are managed by the Little Rock District, which is part of the USACE Southwestern Division.

Flood Risk Management Projects. The USACE Civil Works program has planning studies (General Investigations, or GI, and other programs), projects under design phase (Preconstruction Engineering and Design, or PED), and others in construction phase (Construction General, or GI) within the State of Missouri. Those in the Missouri River Basin are part of the Kansas City District. Those USACE projects in the Mississippi River Basin are managed by either the St. Louis District (eastern Missouri), the Rock Island District (northeastern Missouri), or the Memphis District (in the Boot Heel). In southern Missouri, the Little Rock District is responsible. The Kansas City District has a map to more clearly illustrate the areas of responsibility (see map in Figure 1).

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Floodplain Management Services. The USACE offers assistance in questions about floodplains through the Floodplain Management Services Program. Those in the Missouri River Basin need to contact the Kansas City District program manager at 816-389-3121. For those in the St. Louis District phone 314- 331-8790. For those in the Little Rock District, phone 501-324-5032. In the Memphis District, dial 901- 544-3832.

PURPOSE The Lead Silver Jackets Coordinator will report this information to the state’s agency(ies) responsible for use in informing the SHMP revision in a document similar to this preceding future revisions required by the FEMA Stafford Act in three year cycles.

In this document the USACE Kansas City District is providing “one door to the Corps,” where the USACE districts in Kansas and Missouri are unified in one communication effort to inform the SHMP revision. The main objective is to get the data to all of the state agencies on the hazard mitigation team. This report is providing the Kansas and Missouri hazard mitigation teams with hazard assessment and actionable hazard mitigation information that is currently available and in some cases will be done in USACE Civil Works programs in the two states to better inform their state hazard mitigation plan, per the May 5, 2012 Headquarters guidance, and also to enhance local or county level hazard mitigation plans.

This document also establishes the following:

• An active, not passive, communication process to the state hazard mitigation teams • A single information source for multiple districts to consolidate risk communication messages to the states hazard mitigation teams • A consistent message, in the spirit of “one door to the Corps,” for all hazard mitigation, regardless of districts’ areas of operation

On January 8, 2013 in Kansas City, Missouri a meeting was held at FEMA Region VII Headquarters. The meeting was regarding all state hazard mitigation plans (SHMPs) and USACE actions on reducing risks. Attending was USACE Kansas City District, the Kansas and Missouri floodplain managers, and Missouri’s state hazard mitigation officer (SHMO). The objective was to establish exactly what USACE information and risk communication may inform and enhance the SHMPs, in both Kansas and Missouri, since both are slated for revision in the summer on their three-year cycle. Both states specifically asked for Silver Jackets to continue the May 2012 work elements regarding doing risk communication on Levee Safety Action Classifications (LSACs) and interim risk reduction measures (IRRMs), and the states requested more than general information. They need specifics on these IRRMs. The reason is they are equivalent to hazard mitigation actions (even if USACE's actions or not, such as a levee district’s actions), and the state wants to know what USACE districts are doing in their states so that they too can prioritize funds, as USACE does through the USACE Risk Management Center functions for Dam and Levee Safety.

While the SHMP is viewed as a tool to become eligible for FEMA grants, it is also a strategy for prioritizing where a state will need to budget funds. Basically, the two states want a risk communication data set in a report to inform their three-year update to the SHMPs. They do not want something that is too general, they want the measures being taken very specifically listed, as these are actions the USACE districts or sponsors in levee programs is/are taking. Knowing the nature of this work allows each state to prioritize their state hazard mitigation funding and develop good, effective mitigation strategies. Without this kind of risk communication, their hazard mitigation efforts are limited. A state may be better able to participate with the USACE to support work and key messages on dams or levees. The states may wish to team up in future public meetings on similar topics. Finally, this is also an opportunity for "one door to the Corps" in states like Missouri, where six districts have overlapping areas of responsibility.

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COMMUNICATION PROCESSES This document will be updated every three years in a sequence coinciding with the FEMA required state plan updates and will be prepared in advance of the states’ revision preferably three months prior to the time the state would turn their plan in to FEMA for approval. For Kansas and Missouri, whichever due date come first in the three year cycle will dictate when this document is to be provided to both the states. The hazards that USACE will focus include mainly flooding and drought. Communication on levee systems and dams in each state is offered in sections that follow, however, in depth details are not provided, because of security. Homeland security best practices recommend that an aggregated list of some specific risk identifiers not be made. To the extent practicable in this light, the district is seeking to provide as best a level of communication under this constraint. For example, while interim risk reduction measures (IRRMs) are unique to dam and levee safety, only a general indication is shown, herein. At the very least, the recommended text below describes, how further information can be found at the district. The objective is to alert the state, county, and local officials when, where, and which role at the district can easily provide further details, especially in times of emergency.

Dam Safety Action Classifications (DSACs) are relevant when between a DSAC I and III (a DSAC I is number one priority for USACE). The bulk of the Levee Safety Action Classifications (LSACs) will not be available until late in 2013 in Kansas and Missouri. This would be data for official use only that will be available to state, county, and local officials on request.

Communicating these issues to each state is important to help the nation improve resiliency to impacts of flooding.

What Can Agencies on State Hazard Mitigation Teams Do? The state hazard mitigation team and lead agencies at the state level need to review the following questions. The discussion of these questions will help to improve this very document and the SHMP.

1. Will this information be useful? What can it be used for? 2. How does this process align with the state’s hazard mitigation plan (SHMP)? How will it inform the SHMP? 3. What Actions does this process enable? 4. How can state teams assist communities in the communication of flood risk (and LSAC assignment)? 5. What can participating agencies do to help communities at risk? Can team collaboratively work with communities to reduce and manage risk? 6. Are there additional coordination activities needed? 7. Two-way updates through state team meetings? 8. Closer coordination with communities? 9. Impacts to SHMP process?

The state, county and local officials that are responsible for managing and mitigating hazards and responding to emergency situations can find out more on the specific hazard mitigation actions that the USACE is pursuing in or near their community(ies). The first step is checking the hazards listed in this document with which USACE has some relation. Then focus in on specifics, such as list of dams and levees and associated hazard mitigation work that USACE is pursuing. The lists indicate which structures are or will be affected by hazard mitigation actions related to USACE programs as of this revision to your state’s hazard mitigation plan. If work will certainly be done in the next three years, then the table indicates this. Status Updates. The lead Silver Jackets coordinator provides status updates. This communication technique is conducted for attendees of the state hazard mitigation team meetings. In the updates, current

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(General Investigations, or studies, and Construction General) projects, including dam and levee construction and studies, are mentioned. They are also listed in this document and can be found on each of the USACE districts’ websites. The USACE programs, FloodPlain Management Sevices (FPMS) program, Planning Assistance to States (PAS), and Silver Jacket Pilot Projects are also listed in the status updates. Officials can find out more through the USACE website hyperlinks and phone numbers below. Please do not forward this document outside the state hazard mitigation team.

Silver Jackets. Silver Jackets Coordinator of each district is listed below.

District Phone

Kansas City District Brian Rast, 816-389-3337 (Lead coordinator for Kansas and Missouri)

Little Rock District Chad Dulaney, 501-324-5032

Memphis District Don Davenport, 901-544-3393

Rock Island District Jerry Skalak, 309-794-5605

St. Louis District Matt Hunn, 314-331-8568

Tulsa District Gene Lilly, 918-669-7196

Levee Safety Program. Levee Safety Project Manager of each district.

District Phone

Kansas City District Geoff Henggeler, 816-389-3238

Little Rock District Elmo Webb, 501-324-5840

Memphis District Melissa Mullen, 901-544-0716

Rock Island District Alan Tamm, 309-794-5165

St. Louis District Jason Anderson, 314-331-8408

Tulsa District Ms. Jamie Watts, 918-669-7485

Dam Safety Program. Dam Safety Project Manager of each district is listed below. Some of these districts do not have a USACE dam in their area of responsibility in Missouri. All in Kansas have at least one.

District Phone

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Kansas City District Doug Crum, 816-389-3604

Little Rock District Daniel Smith, 501-324-5819

Memphis District Janet Berry, 901-544-3679

Rock Island District Matt Stewart, 309-794-5290

St. Louis District Jamie Mcvicker, 314-331-8413

Tulsa District Mark Locke, 918-669-7456

Flood Risk Management Program. Flood Risk Management Program Manager of each district is listed below.

District Phone

Kansas City District John Grothaus, 816-389-3110

Little Rock District Biggs, Mike, 501-324-6235

Memphis District Davenport, Donald, 901-544-3393

Rock Island District Jerry Skalak, 309-794-5605

St. Louis District Jamie Mcvicker, 314-331-8426

Tulsa District Gene Lilly, 918-669-7196

Technical Floodplain Issues. FloodPlain Management Services Program Manager of each district is listed below.

District Phone

Kansas City District Don Meier, 816-389-3121

Little Rock District Chad Dulaney, 501-324-5032

Memphis District Jackie Whitlock, 901-544-3822

Rock Island District Jerry Skalak, 309-794-5605

St. Louis District Harold Graef, 314-331-8790

Tulsa District Rick Thomas, 918-669-7022

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FLOODING The USACE launched the Flood Risk Management program in 2006, under many related authorities of the Civil Works mission for flood risk management (FRM). The intent is the collaborative management and shared responsibility managing in the variety of programs that deal directly with flood risks in USACE. This umbrella program is over all of the small programs listed below.

1. General Investigations in FRM 9. Inspection of Completed Works (ICW) 2. Construction General in FRM 10. Rehabilitation and Inspection Program 3. Silver Jackets (RIP) (covers one of PL 84-99 4. FloodPlain Management Services activities) (FPMS) 11. Water Management 5. Planning Assistance to States (PAS) 12. Sustainable Rivers Project 6. Continuing Authority Program (CAP) in 13. USACE Campaign Plan FRM 14. Coastal 7. Levee Safety 15. Watershed Studies 8. Dam Safety Overview of reservoirs (circles) and levee protected areas in the central .

Figure 2. Dams and levees in the USACE districts in and around Kansas and Missouri.

Under the hazard, flooding, the USACE has two main topics dams and levees. Dam Safety In Kansas, seventeen dams are maintained and operated by the USACE. Of those maintained by USACE, eight are maintained by the Tulsa District and nine are maintained by the Kansas City District. In Missouri, twelve dams are maintained and operated by the USACE. Of those maintained by USACE, seven are maintained by the Kansas City District, three are maintained by the Little Rock District, and two are maintained by the St. Louis District. Available Data. Several sets of data are available to inform the state hazard mitigation efforts, whether in the SHMP or in hazard mitigation budget developments for the state. First, the USACE pursues hazard mitigation actions through the Dam Safety Program in what USACE terms interim risk reduction measures (IRRMs). For dams considered a higher priority, based on the Dam Safety Action Classification, IRRMs have been established and are in various stages of implementation. A second set of

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data are tri-fold fact sheets that have been shared at public meetings, and these can be obtained from the dam safety project managers. A third data source regarding USACE dams are the dam break inundation map main index sheets that are available for the state hazard mitigation officer to reference. Finally, the following tables, below, help to raise awareness of the risks associated with USACE dams in the state.

Inundation Maps. These inundation maps are in various stages of development, and the USACE Modeling, Mapping, and Consequences (MMC) Production Center, which is part of the USACE Risk Management Center, are producing these maps. The maps’ index sheets show a regional look at the extent of possible inundation with travel times for the peak flow at various points along the rivers. The table below summarizes status of the maps.

Interim Risk Reduction Measures. The USACE is actively engaged in a program to assess and communicate risk associated with dams and levees. Actions to reduce inundation risks associated with USACE programs have been termed interim risk reduction measures (IRRMs). IRRMs are temporary actions taken to reduce inundation risks posed by dams and/or levees while longer term solutions are planned and implemented. The IRRMs do not preclude or in any way replace long term measures needed to reduce any risk. IRRMs are a critical part of responsible, adaptive flood risk management and recognize the dynamic nature of flood risk. Even levee systems that may not pose high risks can benefit from IRRMs. In establishing IRRMs, the prevention of loss of life is the highest priority. These IRRMs can be non-structural or structural. IRRMs differ from permanent measures. Below are examples of IRRMs. Interim measures should not induce additional risks beyond what the dam safety deficiency present. Interim measures would be timely, implemented within 6 months or less. Some interim measures, whether structural or non-structural, may become permanent based on the recommendations of a USACE study or report. A prime example of hazard mitigation action, in some case containing the IRRMs, is the emergency action plan for a dam. Flood risk is a shared responsibility including communities and residents within the flood plain, owners & operators of dams and levees, owners and operators of infrastructure within the flood plain, and agencies with jurisdiction for emergency management and evacuation authority. Local residents, especially those living within a leveed area, are expected to know their risk. One key public message is that flood risk mitigation projects (including dams and levees) reduce risk; they do not eliminate it. The USACE has implemented IRRM's at many of its dams. IRRM's completed in the last several years have included open houses to communicate risk assessment result with the public, EAP updates, orientation seminars with EAP plan holders, new instrumentation for monitoring dam performance, some specific engineering evaluations, and some expedited repairs. Emergency Action Plans. Each USACE dam has an emergency action plan (EAP). These EAPs get updated generally on an annual basis. A copy of the EAP for each dam is also sent to the state hazard mitigation officer (SHMO) in each state: In Kansas, the Kansas Department of Emergency Management (KDEM) and the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) in Missouri. At the local level, the county emergency managers also get a copy. The generic IRRMs mentioned in USACE guidance documents can include two categories, mentioned below, structural or non-structural. Examples of non-structural Interim Risk Reduction Measures for Dams (hazard mitigation actions): 1. Reservoir pool restrictions or change in water control plan the district should begin immediate action to update the water control plan to reflect the operational change or pool restriction. 2. Guidance is provided in ER 1110-2-240, Water Control Management (Reference A.49) for water control plan deviations and updates. In the interim a deviation from the current water control plan

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should be implemented until the water control plan is updated to reflect the operational change or pool restriction. Regulation plan changes must be documented, and formal deviation requests from the Water Control Plan must be approved by the MSC. 3. Annual command level reviews of IRRM implementation are required for DSAC I, II, and III dams and revision to the IRRM plan are to be made as necessary. These reviews should also include review of the communication plans with stakeholder engagement and public involvement plans. 4. Pre-position emergency contracts for rapid supply of other needed items/equipment. 5. Stockpiling emergency materials, e.g., rock, sand, sand bags, emergency bulkheads, or other operating equipment, etc. 6. Use of other reservoirs in the system may be required to mitigate the impact of regulation schedule changes. If the change in regulation schedule is required for other dams in the system, then a regulation deviation for those dams would be required as well. 7. Improved and/or increased inspection and monitoring to detect evidence of worsening conditions to provide an earlier warning to the public for evacuation. 8. Update the Emergency Action Plan and the inundation mapping to include project-specific failure mode(s). The NWS must be included in the EAP to take advantage of their television/radio announcement and stream forecasting capabilities. The Modeling, Mapping, and Consequence Production Center (MMC) has overall responsibility for developing dam failure, inundation mapping, and consequence models for USACE dams in support of the EAP. 9. Explicit procedures, communications systems, and training of appropriately skilled team members for prompt and effective emergency response by the USACE in the event of the detection of worsening or catastrophic conditions. Refer to Chapter 16 for guidance on the appropriate type and frequency of exercises. 10. Conduct appropriate emergency exercises that plan for a range of failure scenarios (including the combined effects of multiple failure modes and different timing of detection) to improve warning and evacuation times. 11. Coordination with local interests and Federal and non-Federal agencies, including the National Weather Service (NWS) and local Emergency Management Agencies (EMA), with a focus on the specific failure mode(s) and the effectiveness of response including appropriate response exercises. 12. Identify instrumentation/monitoring “trigger” or threshold pools that would initiate more urgent monitoring or emergency response. In addition, threshold values should be established for instrument readings where possible. 13. Installation of early warning systems to increase evacuation percentage and time. 14. Preventive maintenance and repairs such as cleaning drains and improving spillway gate reliability where non-functioning components would exacerbate the existing conditions in an emergency. 15. Acquisition of real estate (if possible) that would preclude damages and potential loss of life from a potential dam failure or other IRRM. Examples of Structural Interim Risk Reduction Measures for Dams (hazard mitigation actions): Some of these hazard mitigation actions can be incorporated in long term remedial measures: 1. Isolate problem area (e.g., cofferdam around problem monolith(s) or other project feature). Many Agencies, One Solution: Be Risk Aware 10

2. Improve seepage collection system. 3. Lower the spillway crest to aid in prevention of failure (A consequence estimate may be warranted to ensure overall risk is not increased by this measure). 4. Increase spillway capacity/construct another spillway. (A consequence estimate may be warranted to ensure overall risk is not increased by this measure). 5. Breach/lower saddle dams along the reservoir perimeter. (A consequence estimate may be warranted to ensure overall risk is not increased by this measure). 6. Strengthen weak areas (e.g., upstream or downstream blanket to cut off/slow seepage; install tie- backs/anchors; and install additional buttresses). 7. Construct a downstream dike to reduce head differential. 8. Construct stability berm. 9. Increase dam height. (A consequence estimate may be warranted to ensure overall risk is not increased by this measure). 10. Modify outlet discharge capability such as by installing temporary siphon(s). 11. Increase erosion protection where necessary. 12. Protect downstream critical facilities (e.g., medical and emergency services). 13. Construct shallow cutoff trench to slow seepage. 14. Target grout program specifically for suspected problem area(s) to slow seepage. 15. Remove significant flow restrictions (downstream bridge conditions may restrict maximum discharge from the outlet works. Upstream bridges or small dams may restrict flow caused by debris buildup that could result in a large release). Active Hazard Mitigation Actions. At a glance the tables below provide a starting point for the members of the state hazard mitigation team members to find more information for the useful information from USACE for doing hazard mitigation planning on the topic of dams. This may enable the state hazard mitigation to find synergy or common key messages related to state dams facing similar issues or need for partnering in public meetings. The tables do not include major construction, so the long term actions must be found on the districts’ respective websites as active Civil Works projects. See the respective district websites (under Missions, Civil Works) for the latest details.

• Kansas City District (northern half of Kansas, west central Missouri) • Tulsa District (southern half of Kansas) • St. Louis District (eastern Missouri) • Rock Island District (northeastern Missouri) • Memphis District (boot heel of Missouri) • Little Rock District (southern Missouri) Dams with higher hazard mitigation priority have details presented in sections that follow the tables. Dams with a lower priority can be requested from the appropriate district’s dam safety project manager or, again, found described on the respective districts’ websites.

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Table 1. Hazard mitigation data for USACE dams, Kansas.

Dam Break Flooding Inundation Map Hazard Planning USACE Division / Available (from Mitigation Region Reservoir County(ies) River District USACE MMC)? Priority Level Quality assurance Clinton Wakarusa Northwestern Division K Douglas complete, Maps being Lower Lake River Kansas City District finalized. Harlan Harlan, NE Republican Northwestern Division Draft complete, But N/A County Jewell, Republic Higher River Kansas City District may revise IDF Lake, NE in KS Quality assurance Hillsdale Big Bull Northwestern Division J Miami Linn complete, Maps being Lower Lake Creek Kansas City District finalized. Kanopolis Smoky Hill Northwestern Division Draft complete, But F Ellsworth Lower Lake River Kansas City District may revise IDF Quality assurance Melvern Marais des Northwestern Division J Osage complete, Maps being Lower Lake Cygnes River Kansas City District finalized. Quality assurance Milford Republican Northwestern Division F Geary Clay complete, Maps being Lower Lake River Kansas City District finalized. Quality assurance Jefferson Delaware Northwestern Division K complete, Maps being Lower Douglas River Kansas City District finalized. Quality assurance 110 Mile Northwestern Division J Pomona Osage complete, Maps being Higher Creek Kansas City District finalized. Tuttle Pottawatomie Big Blue Northwestern Division I Final complete Lower Creek and Riley River Kansas City District Quality assurance Russell Northwestern Division B Wilson Saline River complete, Maps being Higher Lincoln Kansas City District finalized. Labette, Big Hill Southwestern Division H Big Hill Not started Lower Montgomery Creek Tulsa District Council Southwestern Division I Morris, Lynn Mapping/consequences Lower Grove Tulsa District Southwestern Division G El Dorado Butler, Cowley Walnut River Not started Lower Tulsa District Montgomery, Southwestern Division H Elk City Elk River Not started Lower Nowata OK Tulsa District Greenwood, Elk Southwestern Division H Fall River Fall River Not started Lower (Wilson close) Tulsa District John Coffey, Southwestern Division J Neosho River Mapping/consequences Lower Redmond Woodson Tulsa District North Southwestern Division G Marion Marion, Chase Cottonwood Not started Lower Tulsa District River Woodson, Verdigris Southwestern Division H Toronto Not started Lower Wilson River Tulsa District Reno and North Fork Cheney Southwestern Division G Kingman, Ninnescah Not started Lower Lake Tulsa District Sedgwick River

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Table 2. Hazard mitigation data for USACE dams, Missouri.

Dam Break Flooding Inundation Hazard Planning USACE Division / Map Mitigation Region Reservoir County(ies) River District Available? Priority Level Quality Northwestern assurance Little Platte A Smithville Lake Clay Division complete, Higher River Kansas City District Maps being finalized. Quality East Fork Northwestern assurance Little B Long Branch Lake Macon Division complete, Lower Chariton Kansas City District Maps being River finalized. Northwestern Little Blue A Longview Lake Jackson Division Final complete Lower River Kansas City District Quality East Fork Northwestern assurance A Blue Springs Lake Jackson Little Blue Division complete, Lower River Kansas City District Maps being finalized. Appanoose County, Northwestern Chariton B Rathbun Lake IA Schuyler, Division Final complete Higher River Putnam, MO Kansas City District Northwestern Harry S. Truman Osage A Benton Division Final complete Lower Reservoir River Kansas City District Quality Northwestern assurance Pomme de Terre Pomme de D Hickory Division complete, Higher Lake Terre River Kansas City District Maps being finalized. Quality Northwestern assurance D Stockton Lake Cedar Division complete, Higher Kansas City District Maps being finalized. Mark Twain Lake, Mississippi Valley B Clarence Cannon Ralls, Monroe Salt River Division Not started Higher Dam St. Louis District Cannon Mississippi Valley Lower by mid B Re-Regulation Ralls, Monroe Salt River Division Not started 2013 Dam St. Louis District Mississippi Valley G Clearwater Wayne Black River Division Final complete Higher St. Louis District Mississippi Valley Wayne Butler, St.Francis E Wappapello Division Draft complete Higher Stoddard River St. Louis District Southwestern D, G Bull Shoals N/A Division Lower

Little Rock District Southwestern D Table Rock Barry, Stone, Taney White River Division Final complete Higher Little Rock District

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Active Hazard Mitigation Actions Related to Dams for Kansas. The following dams have IRRMs in Kansas.

• Harlan County Lake. The DSAC review determined that under current standards the tainter gate design is structurally deficient, the spillway is hydrologically deficient, and the spillway foundation has stability concerns. An interim operating plan to reduce the likelihood of filling the Harlan County flood pool has been in effect since 2003. The tandem balance diagrams to optimize flood control storage between the Republican Basin flood control projects were revised in 2011 and will be revised again in 2013 after the upstream Hugh Butler Lake is placed back in service. The EAP was updated and dam safety exercises were conducted with emergency management agencies in 2011. Instrumentation has been updated. "Relief wells" (actually horizontal drains in the gallery for foundation drains) were installed in 1969 after the spillway stability concern was first recognized. Tainter gate repairs are awaiting budgeting. It should be noted that the 1935 flood event for which the Republican River flood control system was designed was far greater in volume than any subsequent event, demonstrating the impact that upstream water use has on the reservoir inflows. The record pool elevation in Harlan County's period of operation since storage began in 1952 only filled 29% of the allocated flood pool. Upstream depletions have been increasing since the 1960's. See the DSAC Fact Sheet for additional details on IRRM measures. • Pomona. The DSAC rating is primarily due to seepage concerns with the embankment and foundation. The lake and the outlet works remain hydrologically adequate for holding the design storm and making required releases according to the Lake Regulation Manual flood control plan. IRRM measures accomplished to date include elevation surveys to evaluate the instrumentation, a coordination meeting with local and State emergency management officials, and an open house for public communication. Measurements of drainage flows is awaiting further technical study and funding. See the DSAC Fact Sheet for additional details on IRRM measures. • Wilson. Wilson has some concerns with seepage and its resulting impact on stability in the abutments during high pool events. Risk reduction measures have been undertaken (see Fact Sheet). It should be noted that was constructed with a large flood pool with the intention that it could store flood waters for a long period of time, during which substantial portions of the flood storage accumulation in Milford and Kanopolis lakes could be be evacuated. In spite of this, the pool reached 79% of its capacity during the 1993 flood of record. The lake also has a very large extension of the flood pool zone between the designated top of flood pool and the uncontrolled spillway crest (elevation 1582.0). Stilling basin structural stability concerns were also noted in the 1990's, but they were addressed with reconstruction of the fill behind the training walls. A county bridge limits releases from the lower portion of the flood control pool, but current operational criteria allow releases that would overtop the bridge when a substantial portion of the flood pool is filled. See the DSAC Fact Sheet for additional details on IRRM measures. • Long Term Hazard Mitigation Projects by USACE. See the district websites for information on current studies and construction work. All studies, design work, and construction work is posted under the Civil Works Programs and Projects webpage.

Active Hazard Mitigation Actions Related to Dams for Missouri. The following dams have IRRMs in Missouri.

• Smithville Lake. Smithville has had observed seepage at the left abutment since initial pool filling, which has generated stability concerns. A large amount of instrumentation was installed to better define the seepage pressures beneath the dam during the 1980's, which has provided data that substantiate adequate stability. Drainage provisions were also installed to reduce seepage pressures. See the DSAC Fact Sheet for additional details on IRRM measures. Many Agencies, One Solution: Be Risk Aware 14

• Rathbun Lake. The designated flood control space has been filled twice since storage began in 1969, which is more frequent than the design anticipated (1% recurrence). The uncontrolled spillway crest is at the top of the flood control pool, but the two peak pools were only slightly higher than the top of the flood pool, and the spillway release was minimal. The problem is exacerbated by an apparent increasing trend in inflows over the life of the project, restricted downstream channel capacity, and restricted stilling basin capacity. Seepage occurs in all abutments. Two drainage systems were installed, one at the Chariton embankment in 1988 and deepened in 1994, and one at the Buck Branch embankment in 2011. Spillway erosion was determined to be adequate to pass the spillway design flood, but is a maintenance concern because of the increased likelihood of use. During the 2010 flood, the stilling basin was improved to handle higher flood control releases. Downstream channel capacity has likely increased in recent years due to changes in land use. A Water Control Manual revision study has been initiated, which should lead to higher allowable releases and a better balance between lake benefits and downstream benefits. See the DSAC Fact Sheet for additional details on IRRM measures. • Pomme de Terre Lake. The original stilling basin had severe concrete erosion problems because of rockfill and resulting ball milling during discharges. The stilling basin concrete was repaired in 2009-11. The dam was initially placed in the DSAC 3 category because of the stilling basin condition and concern for foundation and abutment seepage concerns through rock joints, filters in the embankment, and possible deterioration in the grout curtain. Secondary concerns included stability issues in the rim dike and possible spillway erosion with spillway design floods. A periodic assessment was completed in 2012 that addressed all these concerns, and downgraded the project risk to the DSAC 4 level. See the DSAC Fact Sheet for additional details on IRRM measures. The flood pool at Pomme de Terre Lake was not constructed with a sediment reserve. The 1974 lake survey showed that about 358 AF of sediment had been accumulated in the pool. In itself, this is insignificant. The flood pool was not measured during the 2009 survey. At some time in the future, it would be useful to make a measurement of the remaining flood pool space. The design of the flood pool and its ability to contain the standard project flood assumed that flood pool sedimentation would continue to be minimal. • Stockton Lake. The DSAC review found that there are concerns regarding foundation seepage. In addition, there have been continuing maintenance problems with the turbine and generator. A turbine blade broke in 2009, leading to a long term shutdown while the blade was repaired. At the same time needed repairs were also made to the penstock and gates. The turbine was eventually brought back into service for a year in 2012 while additional repairs/improvements were being made elsewhere in the generation system. In Feb 13, it was again taken out of service in preparation for the installation of a new generator and associated equipment by early 2014. The previous turbine/generator were sized for an assumed downstream channel capacity that turned out to be too high. This required close monitoring of the unit generation during peaking periods and long term flood control pool evacuation in order to prevent exceeding downstream flood stages. The new system will be properly sized and more efficient. IRRM measures addressing the stability concerns included replacing caulking on the spillway piers, adding/replacing instrumentation to measure water levels below the spillway structure and to monitor seepage on the right abutment. See the DSAC Fact Sheet for additional details on IRRM measures. • Mark Twain Lake. Scour survey, Settlement survey, Vegetation maintenance, flood damage repair, stilling basin inspection, periodic inspection, additional dam safety inspections, additional walk over inspections, post earthquake inspections, annual periodic inspection review, periodic assessment, toe drain inspection, update PMP/PMF, update pool frequency data, seepage analysis, emergency action plan, EAP exercise, dam safety training, annual meetings with local authorities,

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communication plan, news and press releases, stockpile materials, equipment availability, new inundation maps • Wappapello. Additional piezometer installation, update earthquake instrumentation, periodic inspection, stilling basin inspection, foundation drain inspection, dam safety training, SPRA recommendations, spillway erosion study, inundation maps, P&S to repair and paint gates, additional piezometer readings, additional walk-over inspections, additional dam safety inspections, annual periodic inspection review, EAP exercise, repair and paint gates, remove vegetation, annual meetings with local authorities, EAP, news and press releases, communications plan. • Long Term Hazard Mitigation Projects by USACE. See the district websites for information on current studies and construction work. All studies, design work, and construction work is posted under the Civil Works Programs and Projects webpage. Levee Safety The USACE national portfolio of levee systems is large (more than 2,500 systems totaling more than 14,700 miles), aging (on average 55+ years), incredibly beneficial to communities (more than 14 million people live and work behind them and they contribute to more than $141 billion in damages prevented in 2011 alone), and relied upon to be the quiet sentinel against unpredictable flooding. In addition to the physical condition of levee systems, risks are also influenced by the dynamic natural environment (changing flood frequency and increasing ground subsidence) and the intensification of development in and upstream of leveed communities. The USACE Levee Safety Program’s mission is to work with others to assess, communicate and manage inundation risks to people, property and the environment resulting from breach or malfunction of components of levee systems. An inventory of levee infrastructure that includes collecting and visualizing physical features, documents, and status about the levee systems, is available to state, county, and local officials via the National Levee Database (NLD). While USACE administers the NLD, we have authority to address only about 10 percent of the total national portfolio of levees. Currently, the NLD contains levee systems within USACE authorities and is accessible to both official data users and partners such as federal, state, and local governments, and sponsors, and the general public. USACE is working closely with other federal agencies, states, and others to incorporate their data into the database on a voluntary basis. Under the Levee Safety Program, the USACE accesses the general condition of the infrastructure. The USACE conducts levee inspections (routine, periodic and special event), which have identified a wide array of deficiencies including unsatisfactory culverts, non-compliant vegetation, encroachments, and animal burrows. USACE uses inspection findings to “rate” the levee system to determine compliance with operation and maintenance requirements (including some measures of performance), understand the overall levee condition, and determine eligibility for federal rehabilitation assistance under P.L. 84-99. Currently, approximately 10 percent of USACE levee systems are “acceptable,” while about 80 percent are “minimally acceptable” and 10 percent are “unacceptable.” Assessing Risks Associated with Levees: The USACE uses risk assessment to place the inventory, inspection, and flood performance findings in context to better understand the nature and degree of risk, as well as the priority and urgency of action. Seepage, which represents a small percentage of the deficiencies, and overtopping are the major drivers for performance concerns and life safety risk. Characterization of Risks: The USACE is performing screening-level risk assessments and assigning a Levee Safety Action Classification (LSAC) to each system under its authority. LSACs are intended to help the public and partner agencies understand the inundation risk in the area behind a levee, actions needed to reduce risk, and prioritize risk reduction actions for levee systems under USACE authority.

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Interim Risk Reduction Measures for Levees. IRRMs are actions to reduce inundation risks posed by a levee system that has identified levee safety issues while more long-term and comprehensive inundation risk reduction and management solutions are being pursued. “Inundation risk” is defined as the likelihood and consequences that may arise from inundation of a leveed area. For the USACE Levee Safety Program, four inundation scenarios have been adopted as defined below in Figure 3. Many IRRMs are good practice for levee operators and maintainers regardless of the levee condition. Understand that IRRMs represent an important step in an ongoing adaptive risk management process that recognizes the dynamic nature of sources of inundation risk. In establishing IRRMs, the prevention of loss of life is paramount, followed by prevention of high economic or environmental losses. The IRRM Plan (IRRMP) is intended to reduce the probability and consequences of inundation risk of the leveed area from the four inundation scenarios. These four scenarios are to be addressed in the IRRMP.

Figure 3. Inundation Scenarios.

Planning and implementing IRRMs for levees are ultimately the levee sponsors responsibility. The USACE districts that operate and/or maintain levee systems are required to develop IRRM plans. For federally authorized - locally operated and maintained levee systems, IRRMs are ultimately the levee sponsors' decision but the USACE may advise and recommend the need for IRRM's. Potential USACE programs for joint collaboration of IRRM's (USACE participation in advising levee sponsors concerning IRRMs) include Silver Jackets interagency teams, Planning Assistance to the States (PAS), or Floodplain Management Services (FPMS). Some events that may lead to recommendations for IRRM's include: • Scheduled inspections • Risk assessments or levee screenings • Flood events or incidents revealing performance issues • System-wide Improvement Framework requests for participation in the PL 84-99 recovery assistance program

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Examples of Nonstructural Interim Risk Reduction Measures for Levees (hazard mitigation actions): 1. Develop or update a levee system-specific Flood Warning and Emergency Evacuation Plan (FWEEP) that reflects system-specific risks and includes emergency exercises that are appropriate for the risk involved. A coordinated FWEEP addresses who, what, when and how the flood warning and emergency response will be executed. The FWEEP should include an explanation of flood warning procedures, emergency notification, evacuation routes, trigger elevations, monitoring, detection and flood fighting. The FWEEP should also include inundation mapping that illustrate consequences of potential failure mode(s). The FWEEP should describe the actions by the entity responsible for levee system operations and maintenance in the event of a flood or hurricane, earthquake or natural disaster type emergency. The FWEEP document should be complementary to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) All Hazards Mitigation Plan requirement and the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101. See also the USACE; “General Guidelines for Comprehensive Flood Warning/Preparedness Studies” dated October 1988. 2. Develop specific response plans with specific “trigger” conditions to activate plans. For example, use stream gages, instrumentation and monitor visual indicators as “trigger points” or threshold limits to initiate more urgent or emergency response. This includes contingency plans or “what’s next type planning” if initial actions prove ineffective. 3. Conduct appropriate emergency exercises that plan for a range of failure scenarios (including the combined effects of multiple failure modes and different timing of detection). Train existing and/or additional personnel for prompt and effective emergency response. Exercises should include setting closures on a routine basis. 4. Pre-position emergency supply contracts or stockpile emergency materials, such as, rock, sand, sand bags, emergency bulkheads, or other operating equipment or supplies. 5. Consider temporary deviations to upstream reservoirs water control plan within existing authorities and policies to reduce the potential impact of known levee deficiencies. 6. Improve and/or increase inspection and monitoring pre-flood event, during and after the flood event to detect evidence of worsening conditions. Map and document levee system performance. For example, identify seepage areas and the related water level when the seepage started. Use this information to guide repairs and pre-flood preparation for future events. 7. Conduct appropriate engineering investigations and analysis to confirm potential failure modes. 8. Adapt local National Levee Database processes to accommodate use during emergency response. 9. Collaborate with federal, state and local agencies, including the National Weather Service, FEMA, and state and local Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs). More specifically, ensure collaboration with state Hazard Mitigation Officers and state National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) coordinators. Work with existing interagency teams when available. 10. Work with the local communities to promote flood mitigation and emergency response. Inform them of opportunities and resources available to complete activities that reduce risk and provide reduction in NFIP premiums through FEMA’s Community Rating System and other programs (www.fema.gov). 11. Create and implement a communication plan to actively advise people about the levee condition and potential inundation risk, flood insurance availability and FWEEP measures. Ensure information about flood insurance, flood risk, floodplain management, and evacuation is readily

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available, for example, through direct mailings, community events, community websites and social media, local television and print media, and at the local library. 12. Enact and enforce regulations that exceed FEMA’s NFIP minimum standards. 13. Prepare, adopt, implement, evaluate, and update a comprehensive floodplain management plan, which may include zoning. Acquire, relocate, or retrofit existing buildings and maintain drainage ways and retention basins. 14. Reinforce landward critical facilities (e.g., medical and emergency services). 15. Additional information on nonstructural alternatives can be found on the USACE National Nonstructural Flood Proofing Committee (NFPC) website. Examples of Structural Interim Risk Reduction Measures for Levees (hazard mitigation actions): 1. Isolate problem area (for example construct sub-levee around failed gravity drain(s) or other levee feature to reduce head differential). 2. Construct or improve seepage control measures to retard seepage and reduce uplift, such as toe drains, relief wells, riverside or landside seepage control blankets, or shallow cutoff trenches. 3. Implement a target grout program specifically for suspected problem area(s) to slow seepage. 4. Increase resilience to overtopping. 5. Increase erosion protection at waterside toe where necessary. 6. Lower levees along the downstream perimeter until the levee can safely withstand design water levels (this may result in more frequent interior flooding). 7. Construct landside stability-berm to strengthen weak areas. 8. Evaluate internal drainage features, such as ponding areas, and consider alternatives such as additional pumps, to address potential issues. Communication Processes. Starting in 2012, the Levee Safety Project Managers in each district will reach out to levee owners regarding LSACs. The state hazard mitigation teams need to decide, especially over the next three years and by 2016 (especially in time for the next SHMP revisions), how the KHMT and the SRMT may wish to be involved as levee sponsors approach these issues. This is important to consider, because for the state to staff some level of involvement may require advance budgeting by decision makers or elected officials. These levee sponsors will be encouraged to begin a public communication process as needed, depending on the LSAC. Progress on this outreach process will be provided to the states’ hazard mitigation teams through either the Levee Safety Project Managers, and with assistance from the Silver Jackets Coordinator. If a levee district declines to provide the needed public involvement on apparent risks, then the USACE will proceed with public participation. The hazard mitigation teams can assist and reinforce this process. Discussion of USACE Levee Projects. Levees have been constructed to manage the risk of flooding throughout the state of Missouri and Kansas over many decades, beginning as early as the early 1900s. No single entity (federal, state, or other) has authority over all levees within the state. Instead, levees are covered under various programs administered by various agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. Some private levees are completely unregulated. Most levees within the state are owned and operated by a local sponsor that is neither a state nor federal agency. Some levees within the state were constructed by the USACE but then turned over to a local sponsor for operations and maintenance. A very few levees are owned and operated by

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federal agencies; these are mainly levees owned and operated by the USACE and associated with various dam projects. A number of federal programs exist that have some involvement with levees. Levees constructed by the USACE and then turned over to a local sponsor are covered by the Inspection of Completed Works (ICW) program. Most levees that are constructed to exclude at least the 10-year flood are enrolled in the USACE Rehabilitation and Inspection Program (RIP, this includes all ICW levees) which provides federal assistance when levees are damaged by flooding. Many levees are accredited through the Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Flood Insurance Program. The USACE has established a National Levee Database (NLD, http://nld.usace.army.mil) to track pertinent information on levees around the country. At present, generally only the levees enrolled in the Corps' RIP program and Bureau of Reclamation levees are enrolled. The NLD is the best source of information on levees located within the states of Missouri and Kansas. Some statistics on NLD data for the two states are shown in the table below. Table 3. General USACE National Levee Database information on USACE levees.

Missouri Kansas # of Levee Systems 192 98 Total Length of Levee Miles 2,068 miles 490 miles Area of Land Behind Levees 8,800 sq. miles 366 sq. miles Population Behind Levees 346,000 295,000 Property Value Behind Levees $42 Billion $35 Billion

The USACE is undertaking an effort to perform screening level risk assessments (screenings) on all levees within the RIP program, with a goal to complete all screenings by October 2015. The goal of these screenings is to identify critical risk drivers associated with each levee system. Because most of these levees are owned and operated by a non-federal sponsor, the USACE will not take the lead in managing and communicating the identified risks to the public. Instead, that lead will fall to the non-federal sponsor and communities located behind the levees. However, the USACE will make public some basic information related to the critical risk findings and other pertinent information for each levee system screened. As of March 1, 2013, no screenings results have been finalized for public release. When screenings are eventually finalized for public release the NLD will be used as a central repository of screening-related information. The USACE does not intend to release a comprehensive list of all critical risk findings identified in levee screenings because of the issues discussed with the individual levee owners being the primary entity responsible for risk management and communication. However, some general risk factors that are pertinent to Missouri and Kansas levees are included below for incorporation into the state risk management plan. • Basic information on screening findings, when released, will be available through the NLD at http://nld.usace.army.mil. The levee sponsor is the primary entity responsible for managing and communicating identified risk drivers. • Various USACE districts are working with communities and local sponsors on a number of potential improvement projects to federal levees or even entirely new levee construction

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projects. These projects are in various stages ranging from studies to determine whether a Federal interest exists for constructing some measure, to new or improved structures, to ongoing construction activity. See the appropriate USACE district websites under Civil Works missions for the most complete and current information about these projects. • Levee owners throughout both states have historically performed satisfactory operations and maintenance on their levees. This is evident in the small number of performance issues arising during recent flooding that can be traced to maintenance deficiencies. However, many levee owners, particularly those outside of major metropolitan areas, are fiscally constrained and face challenges in executing the major repairs and capital improvements that will be necessary as these levees age. Additionally, the fiscal constraints faced by levee owners lead to challenges in properly flood-fighting problem areas during elevated water stages and in repairing damages caused by flooding.

o For example, under the RIP program levee owners whose levees were not originally constructed by the USACE are required to contribute 20% of the repair cost. For levees where repair costs totaled $100s of thousands of dollars the local sponsor contribution can exceed $20k. This is no small figure considering that the annual O&M budget for these levees may be as little as a few thousand dollars.

o Another example, many levees were constructed with corrugated metal gravity drainage pipes. The design life expectancy for one of these pipes is 50 years, an age that many of them are approaching or have surpassed. The cost to repair or replace one of these pipes can range from $50k to $500k or more. Again, these cost levels greatly exceed the annual O&M budgets of many levees. • As referenced in the above item, many levee owners face challenges in producing the amount of capital necessary to conduct major improvements or repairs. During the 2011 Missouri River flood many levees experienced damages that required repair. Many levee owners faced challenges in coming up with the funds necessary to complete repairs (whether or not they were cost shared repairs). These levee owners were eventually able to obtain this funding through grants and other programs from FEMA, HUD Block Grants, and other state assistance. Due to the expected fiscal constraints in federal and state funding for the foreseeable future, these avenues are not a reliable source of funding for levee owners. • Many levees that were not constructed by the USACE feature very low levels of protection. The capacity of these levees may be exceeded by 10 to 25 year floods. Many of these levees also do not feature resiliency (resiliency is the ability of a levee to be overtopped by floodwaters without experiencing catastrophic failure or damages). Without resiliency, when levees are overtopped they experience very severe damages that require expensive repairs. Resilient levees would not require such extensive repairs for floods that only slightly exceeded the capacity of the levees. • Because no single regulatory entity exists to regulate the levees within the state, there is no entity to monitor and enforce the wise use of floodplains located behind levees. Unregulated development of areas behind levees can lead to the potential for very high risk due to the potential consequences associated with inundation of the leveed area. Floodplain management plans would be a good tool to ensure that the floodplain located behind a levee is used wisely and that its development does not contribute to excessive risk.

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• The USACE has developed a technical document that describes Interim Risk Reduction Measures (IRRMs) that might be planned and implemented in order to reduce the risk associated with a levee system. That document is Engineering and Construction Bulletin (ECB) 2012-1. Some of the most common IRRMs that might be applicable to Missouri and Kansas levees are listed below.

o Development of a levee-specific flood warning and emergency action plan o Development of specific response plans with specific “trigger” conditions identified o Pre-position emergency supply contracts and/or materials o Development of communication plans to advise people about levee conditions and potential inundation risk

o Implementation of a comprehensive floodplain management plan, including zoning o Increase resilience to overtopping o Evaluate internal drainage features (pump stations, ponding areas, etc.) and pre-plan for potential interior dewatering • As the USACE completes levee screenings and shares findings with levee sponsors, many levee sponsors will require assistance in implementing risk management activities. The responsibility for some activities may lie outside the authorities of the levee owner (e.g., evacuation planning, etc.). State risk management teams could play a role in coordinating and assisting with local sponsors. Specific concerns or questions related to any levees enrolled in the USACE RIP program may be addressed to the Levee Safety Program Manager (LSPM) within the applicable USACE district. Contact information for each LSPM is provided below. Emergency Management Besides the dam and levee programs, USACE also has an avid emergency management program. Each year, the USACE sends hundreds of people to respond to disasters around the world. When disasters occur, it is not just a local USACE district or office that responds. Personnel and other resources are mobilized across the country to carry out our response missions.

In any disaster, USACE three top priorities are:

• Support immediate emergency response priorities; • Sustain lives with critical commodities, temporary emergency power and other needs; and • Initiate recovery efforts by assessing and restoring critical infrastructure.

Response for Flood Events. During the response, USACE follows the procedures outlined in Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources, Civil Emergency Management Program - Procedures (ER and EP 500-1-1). USACE will soon publish a new version to revise the current one dated 30 September 2001. The new version will feature a more integral role for the Silver Jackets Coordinators of each district. Also, the System Wide Improvement Framework (SWIF) will be highlighted to enable speedier action after a flood. The SWIF

• is intended to identify the corrective action for overarching deficiencies. For example, a system- wide culvert replacement due to deterioration.

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• entails using partnerships and interagency collaboration for assistance. • needs a financial plan and commitment from the sponsor. • includes interim risk reduction measures (IRRM) and risk communication while the plan is created and executed.

The Silver Jacket Coordinator or Levee Safety Project Managers in each district will assist in engaging levee owners with SWIFs.

National Response Framework Under the National Response Framework, the USACE is assigned as the primary agency for Emergency Support Function #3 – Public Works and Engineering. The USACE assists the Department of Homeland Security/FEMA by coordinating federal public works and engineering-related support, as well as providing technical assistance, engineering expertise, and construction management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from domestic incidents.

Missions:

• Critical Public Facility Restoration • Debris Management (used in the Joplin F5 Tornado Recovery) • Emergency Infrastructure Assessments • Packaged Ice and Bottled Water • Temporary Emergency Power • Temporary Housing • Temporary Roofing • Urban Search and Rescue

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DROUGHT In general, during drought, the USACE Civil Works mission has lake operation manuals that may adjust operations depending on needs. More intense actions may fall under the category of a long term project, where Civil Works programs conduct either a study, design or construction phases. See the respective district websites (under Missions, Civil Works) for the latest details.

• Kansas City District (northern half of Kansas, west central Missouri) • Tulsa District (southern half of Kansas) • St. Louis District (eastern Missouri) • Rock Island District (northeastern Missouri) • Memphis District (boot heel of Missouri) • Little Rock District (southern Missouri) Water Control Drought can mean low water levels within the reservoirs and on the associated rivers. To mitigate the impacts of this natural hazard, the USACE districts may take the following actions, as related to the many Civil Works mission areas. These mission areas include water quality, navigation, and water supply.

• Water Control staff may coordinate releases to help address water quality concerns (see details below) • Water Control staff may coordinate releases to meet safe navigation standards. The authorization is further defined in the respective water operations manual for each reservoir. • For the Mississippi River, the Operations Division considers dredging a possible action to avoid hazards to navigation.

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Figure 4. The USACE navigation mission in the region.

Further information:

http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/Emergency%20Ops/Drought_Waterways_29Nov.pdf Water Quality Water quality concerns do not fit neatly into the current set of natural hazards for the SHMP, although in drought conditions serious issues come up.

State agencies that are familiar with the USACE water supply policies at USACE owned reservoirs are listed below:

• Kansas Water Office (KWO) • Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)

The National Drought Mitigation Center has recommended that USACE and other agencies to make the following an important hazard mitigation action: Improve monitoring of water levels in state reservoirs. Working with state agencies, such as KDHE and MDNR, the USACE districts in Kansas and Missouri monitor water levels per the individual reservoirs authorization and available funding for operation and maintenance of the reservoir. In addition to water quantity control, water quality is also monitored. The Water Control staff in the responsible districts can provide further information on water levels. The environmental resource staff in each district monitors water quality. These water quality specialists provide this monitoring to address hazard mitigation actions related to water supply, as well as recreation.

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Actions include identifying blue-green algae trends at USACE lake projects, when blooms are detected (typically in summer months) and, because of associated toxins,

o limiting recreation use, and o limiting water supply intakes Water quality questions may be directed to the USACE Lake Water Quality Coordinator: 816-389-2381 or 816-520-5425.

Table 4. Water Quality and Hazard Mitigation Actions by USACE.

PRIORITIZED PRIORITIZED COOPERATING IMPACTS PLANNED ACTIONS AGENCIES Water quality monitoring 1. Monthly monitoring results are USEPA, activities for priority pollutants reported for public use and MODNR, occur monthly April through stakeholders IDNR, September according to http://www.nwk.usace.army.mil/L NDEQ, USACE guidelines (ER 1110-2- ocations/WaterQuality.aspx KDHE. 8154). 2. Many priority pollutants are regulated and monitored by other state and federal agencies. Most are related to spills or discharges which can be detected by but are not the focus of USACE Water Quality monitoring. Data is shared between agencies. Dissolved metals (Fe, Mn, Hg) Exceedances are reported to state MODNR, found in stratified lake agencies and water treatment plant KDHE, conditions can occasionally operators when necessary. NDEQ, exceed state and federal IDNR. standards in summer months. Algal toxins occur at levels of 1. Blue green algae cell counts and KDHE, concern exceeding World microcystin toxins are sampled as NNDEQ, Health Organization guidelines needed by reported blooms to state KDWPT, in 4 of 18 District Lakes. agencies (KDHE) and as needed IDNR, by weekly inspections at USACE MODNR, lakes. KWO. 2. Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska lakes have weekly sampling plans, policies, and reporting protocols for public swim beaches. 3. Weekly conference calls occur in Kansas with all stakeholders to discuss the current conditions, warning, advisories and media announcements for all Kansas public waters. E. Coli populations spike at Swim beach safety is monitored and MODNR, USACE beaches in relation to reported quarterly at USACE owned KDWPT, fecal material in runoff events. and operated beaches. IDNR, NDEQ.

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Drought Hazard Mitigation Actions by USACE Water supply is generally one of several purposes that USACE lakes may be authorized. Two tables presented below provide a brief summary of some of the USACE lakes in regards to drought. The first is regarding water quality problems. The prime concern of water supply / irrigation is addressed in the second table. One USACE Civil Works partnering tool for addressing drought concerns may be addressed in studies conducted under the Planning Assistance to States (PAS) program. Note that PAS may also be used for studying other water resource issues, such as flooding. The states generally have one agency that helps to decide when to leverage this planning tool (KWO and MDNR).

DROUGHT (Water Quality) Reservoir Description of Hazard Mitigation Action / Measures

Uncertain, but at this time the allocated space appears to be adequate. The State's reservoir accounting shows that about 30% of the water quality storage used to make minimum releases for downstream water quality was used during the 2012 severe drought year. But Clinton Lake generally has a better than average chance of substantially refilling each year.

None Water Quality is not an authorized or operating purpose at Harlan County Harlan County Lake, Lake. Minimum releases during the winter time are provided for the NE benefit of downstream waterfowl and fishery habitat under some circumstances when water is available in the irrigation pool. This has incidental benefits in improving downstream water quality.

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The water quality allocation used to make minimum releases for downstream water quality was originally estimated to have a 50-yr drought assurance (2% chance of shortage). The State's reservoir accounting shows that about 40% of the water quality storage was used during the 2012 severe drought year alone. So the chance of shortage may need to be reevaluated. But Hillsdale Lake generally has a better than average chance of substantially refilling each year.

As part of the 2002 multipurpose pool reallocation, a specific general purpose allocation was added, primarily to support minimum releases for downstream water quality. In 2008, the State of Kansas reevaluated the yield from , determining that it was only about half of what was previously estimated. That determination primarily affected how much water the State could subcontract to regional water suppliers. But it also confirmed that the multipurpose pool could not sustain the minimum release criteria in effect at that time during a severe drought. Subsequently, Kanopolis Lake a lake regulation manual revision was approved in 2012 to allow reduced minimum releases during drought periods. But even with this revision, it is likely that the remaining general multipurpose allocation can only support minimum releases under drought scenarios less severe than a 50-yr recurrence (2% chance of shortage). The State's reservoir storage accounting shows that about half of the water quality storage was used during the severe 2012 drought. A 50-yr drought would likely last four or more years (similar to the 1950's).

None. The 1989 reallocation of multipurpose space reduced the water quality allocated space from 90,000 AF to 40,000 AF to provide a water supply space allocation of 50,000 AF. This effectively reduced the ability of the lake to make the required minimum water quality releases from a 100-yr assurance (1% chance of shortage) to a 10-yr assurance (10% chance of shortage), according to the reallocation report. However, the State's reservoir accounting shows that only about 25% of the water quality storage was used during the severe drought year of 2012. Therefore, this estimate of a 10-yr assurance may be underestimated, especially since Melvern Lake has a better than average chance of refilling each year.

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None. The required minimum releases used for downstream water quality on the Republican and Kansas rivers are an interim use of the multipurpose space until the State places all of the future use water supply space into service. Additional releases are sometimes made for Kansas River water quality flow support and Missouri River navigation flow support in conjunction with releases from Tuttle Creek and Perry Lakes. The State is considering returning some of the contracted water supply space to the Corps, as support of Kansas River flows during the 2012 drought was an important use of Milford Lake water. But doing so would require changes in both Federal and State law/regulations, and a possible Federal reallocation action.

None. The required minimum releases used for downstream water quality on the Delaware and Kansas rivers are an interim use of the multipurpose space until the State places all of the future use water supply space into service. Additional releases are sometimes made for Kansas River water quality flow support and Missouri River navigation flow support in Perry Lake conjunction with releases from Tuttle Creek and Milford Lakes. The State is considering returning some of the contracted water supply space to the Corps, as support of Kansas River flows during the 2012 drought was an important use of Perry Lake water. But doing so would require changes in both Federal and State law/regulations, and a possible Federal reallocation action.

None. The 1965 and 1989 reallocations of multipurpose space reduced the water quality allocated space from 56,000 AF to 11,000 AF to provide a current water supply space allocation of 33,000 AF. Space was also added to the sediment reserve in order to increase its design life from 50 years to the current 72 years. The reduction in the water quality allocation effectively reduced the ability of the lake to make the required minimum Pomona water quality releases from a 100-yr assurance (1% chance of shortage) to a 10-yr assurance (10% chance of shortage), according to the reallocation report. The State's reservoir accounting shows that about 45% of the water quality storage was used during the severe drought year of 2012. Pomona Lake has a better than average chance of refilling each year, and in balance this estimate of a 10-yr assurance appears to be appropriate.

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The 1989 reallocation of multipurpose space reduced the general multipurpose pool allocation from 185,000 AF to 72,000 AF. Space was also added to the sediment reserve in order to increase its design life from 50 years to the current 73 years (2035). The reduction in the general multipurpose allocation reduced the ability of the project to provide supplemental releases for Missouri River navigation flow support. The Lake Regulation Manual criteria for navigation were modified in 1995, and the flow support criteria for Kansas River water quality were also defined more specifically. is now operated in conjunction with Tuttle Creek Milford and Perry lakes for navigation and Kansas River flow support. But the manual revision studies estimated that Tuttle Creek Lake alone could provide the entire downstream requirements for conditions up to a 50-yr drought (2% chance of shortage). The State's reservoir accounting shows that about 65% of the general multipurpose storage was used during the severe drought year of 2012. Tuttle Creek Lake has an extremely high chance of refill each year, but this estimate of a 50-yr assurance is now somewhat uncertain. In 2012, both Perry and Milford lakes contributed to the Kansas River flow support.

None Wilson Lake has a very large multipurpose pool relative to current needs, due to its history as a potential irrigation project. The multipurpose pool is now primarily used for recreation, fish/wildlife, and support of minimum releases for downstream water quality. The chance of shortage during a drought is undefined due to its large size, although increasing upstream Wilson depletions result in a continuing reduction of potential yield. This in turn has led to long periods of time during which the lake stays below its normal pool elevation, most recently the 2002-08 period, with consequent impacts mainly on recreation and fish/wildlife. The most recent lake survey indicated that the multipurpose sediment reserve is filling in a little faster than expected, but this should not be a concern due to the large size of the lake and lack of specific allocations.

Pearson-Skubitz

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Council Grove Lake

El Dorado Lake

Elk City Lake

Fall River Lake

John Redmond Dam Pool raise and Reallocation in process. and Reservoir

Marion Reservoir Re allocation needed

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Toronto Lake Re allocation needed

Cheney Lake Re allocation needed

DROUGHT (Water Quality) Reservoir Description of Hazard Mitigation Action / Measures

None The multipurpose pool contains a small allocation for water quality, intended to provide the minimum releases required by current Lake Regulation Manual criteria. It was estimated at the time of design that the Smithville Lake allocation would be sufficient for a 50-yr drought (2% chance of shortage). That estimate has not been checked, but with the large amount of space in the uncontracted water supply allocation the status of the water quality allocation has not been a concern.

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The multipurpose pool contains a small allocation for water quality. The water quality allocation was designed to provide the minimum releases required by current Lake Regulation Manual criteria for conditions up to a 50-yr drought (2% chance of shortage). That estimate has not been checked, but with the large amount of space in the uncontracted water supply allocation the status of the water quality allocation has not been a Long Branch Lake concern. Similarly, the lake has a small sediment reserve which was designed to last for 100 years, but a sediment survey in 2003 indicates it may be filling in faster than expected. If future sediment surveys confirm this, it may be necessary to reallocate unused water supply space to sediment reserve to protect the remaining water quality and water supply allocations.

About half of the multipurpose pool is allocated to water quality, intended to provide the minimum releases required by current Lake Regulation Manual criteria. It was estimated at the time of design that the allocation would be sufficient for a 50-yr drought (2% chance of shortage). That estimate has not been checked, but with the large amount of space in the Longview Lake recreation allocation, the status of the water quality allocation has not been a concern. Similarly, the lake has a small sediment reserve which was designed to last for 100 years, but a sediment survey in 2009 indicates it may be filling in faster than expected. If future sediment surveys confirm this, it may be necessary to reallocate recreation space to sediment reserve to protect the water quality allocation.

None The project does not have a water quality allocation, nor does it provide Blue Springs Lake minimum releases. All of the multipurpose pool is designated for general multipurpose uses, with a small sediment reserve. The primary benefits of the lake are for recreation and flood control.

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None The 1985 reallocation action reduced the recreation allocation to add a water supply allocation. The water quality allocation was not affected. Recent yield estimates appear to confirm the original estimate that the Rathbun Lake current water quality allocation can provide up to 33 cfs with a 50-year drought assurance (2% chance of shortage). To date only 11-20 cfs has been needed for downstream water quality and fishery needs. Up to 11 cfs of this is passed through a downstream State fish hatchery, but the use is nonconsumptive and the effluent does not require treatment.

Harry S. Truman Reservoir does not have a water quality purpose or allocation. There are no required minimum releases for downstream water quality. However, the MOU with Ameren coordinating Truman and Bagnell Dam operations provides that releases equivalent to 450 cfs or reservoir inflows, whichever is less, will be provided during drought periods. The total releases can be in the form of generation releases or spill and are evaluated on a monthly basis. Another agreement with the State Department of Conservation provides that a steady release of about 4000 Harry S. Truman cfs (1/2 unit generation) will be provided for 45 days beginning in late Reservoir March when water is available to enhance the downstream fish spawn. Some surges may also be provided to improve fish capture conditions for the downstream State fish hatchery. Small releases through the spillway gates are also often made during warm weather periods to improve poor DO conditions in the stilling basin when power releases are not being made. Fish kills have sometimes been a problem without the small spillway releases. Based on the experience at Stockton Lake, a skimming weir was constructed upstream of the dam to ensure that power releases would utilize better quality surface water from the normal pool.

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None Pomme de Terre Lake makes minimum releases for downstream water quality and to enhance downstream recreation, in accordance with operating critiria in the Lake Regulation Manual. The releases are taken from the general use multipurpose allocation, since there is not a specific Pomme de Terre Lake allocation for water quality. Future release criteria may be adjusted as demands on the available water in the multipurpose pool increase. The percent chance of shortage for the current minimum release criteria has not been computed, although it is known that drawdowns during drought due to minimum releases are minimal, and the lake has a very high percent chance of refill each spring.

None Stockton Lake makes minimum releases for downstream water quality, in accordance with operating critiria in the Lake Regulation Manual. The releases are taken from the general use multipurpose allocation, since there is not a specific allocation for water quality. The percent chance of shortage for the current minimum release criteria has not been computed, although it was estimated during the reallocation study that the effective Stockton Lake 2% yield is multiple times the amount currently needed for the water quality and water supply withdrawals. Early in the project life, a skimming weir was constructed upstream of the dam with a crest elevation of 845.0. Power releases taken from the bottom of the lake were having a detrimental effect on downstream water quality. The skimming weir results in releases from the multipurpose pool being taken from near the top of the normal pool, presumably resulting in better water quality downstream.

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Mark Twain Lake,

Clarence Cannon Dam

Cannon Re-Regulation Dam

Wappapello

Bull Shoals Lake

Lake Tanneycomo and Powersite Dam

Table Rock

Clearwater

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DROUGHT (Water Supply/Irrigation) Reservoir Description of Hazard Mitigation Action / Measures

None All allocated water supply space (89,200 AF) is contracted to the State of Kansas. The State has subcontracted 53,500 AF for current local needs and retains 35,700 Clinton Lake AF for future use. A reallocation and multipurpose pool raise may be needed by 2035 to preserve the water supply allocation. The sedimentation status will be reviewed around 2020.

The Harlan County multipurpose pool operational plan described in the Corps Lake Regulation Manual and the Field Working Agreement with Reclamation was revised in 2001 to add a dual use storage zone below the normal irrigation pool zone, increasing the available irrigation water during extended drought periods. The criteria for minimum releases intended for waterfowl habitat support were subsequently revised in 2002 to reduce required releases during Harlan County Lake, extended droughts. These measures have increased the potential yield from the NE lake available for irrigation, but during an extended drought it is likely that they have only added about one year to the period of time the lake can make irrigation releases. Base flows in the Republican River basin are in a long-term decline since the 1960's. A lawsuit settlement around 2000 requires the State of Nebraska to pass more water downstream to the State of Kansas. The result has been less surface water irrigation available to farmers and a moratorium on well drilling.

None All water supply space (53,000 AF) is contracted to the State of Kansas. The Hillsdale Lake State has subcontracted 13,250 AF for current local needs and retains 39,750 AF for future use.

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The top of the multipurpose pool was raised from 1459 to 1463 in 1968 partly to improve recreation and partly in anticipation of irrigation contracts that never materialized. However, this increased the storage capacity of the multipurpose pool by about 50%, most of which was subsequently designated for general multipurpose uses. All of the multipurpose storage before that point had been reserved for a 100-yr sedimentation design life. The lake authorization was Kanopolis Lake subsequently changed by Congress to require further congressional action before future irrigation contracts can be issued. The multipurpose pool was reallocated in 2002 to provide the initial water supply allocation (12,500 AF), which was then contracted to the State of Kansas. All the Kansas water supply space is in- service. At this time only one portion has been subcontracted to a local distributor, but other applications for the remaining yield are being considered. The State reports that there are more applications than available yield.

None In accordance with a 1985 MOU between the State of Kansas and the Corps of Engineers (NWK and SWT), the multipurpose spaces in Melvern, Pomona, and Tuttle Creek lakes were reallocated in 1989 to increase water supply space. The Melvern Lake water supply space was subsequently contracted to the State of Kansas. At Melvern Lake, all of the reallocated water supply space (50,000 AF) is in service, but only about half (24,752 AF) of the available water has been subcontracted to individual distributors. The other 25,248 AF of water supply space is designated by the State as reserve space.

None All allocated water supply space (300,000 AF) is contracted to the State of Milford Lake Kansas. The State has subcontracted 101,650 AF for current local needs and retains 198,350 AF for future use.

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None All allocated water supply space (150,000 AF) is contracted to the State of Kansas. The State has subcontracted 25,000 AF for current local needs and retains 125,000 AF for future use. A small water withdrawal contract has also been executed with the City of Valley Falls at the upstream end of the reservoir, Perry Lake but that is primarily a backup supply available to them if problems developed with their well field. A recent lake survey showed that the multipurpose pool sediment reserve may be filling in a little faster than designed, but the rate of filling is somewhat uncertain due to a change in measurement methodology. Another survey is planned in about 10 years using a similar methodology, and this may better define the actual rate of sedimentation.

None In accordance with a 1985 MOU between the State of Kansas and the Corps of Engineers (NWK and SWT), the multipurpose spaces in Melvern, Pomona, and Tuttle Creek lakes were reallocated in 1989 to increase water supply space. Pomona Lake already has a small water supply allocation of 1000 AF due to a 1965 reallocation, a portion of which was contracted directly to a Rural Water Pomona District. The 1989 reallocation increased the allocated water supply space to 33,000 AF, with all the remaining space (32,500 AF) contracted to the State of Kansas. All of the State's contracted water supply space is in service, but only a portion (11,070 AF) of the available water has been subcontracted to individual distributors. The other 21,430 AF of the State's water supply space is designated as reserve space.

None In accordance with a 1985 MOU between the State of Kansas and the Corps of Engineers (NWK and SWT), the multipurpose spaces in Melvern, Pomona, and Tuttle Creek lakes were reallocated in 1989 to increase water supply space. The Tuttle Creek water supply space was subsequently contracted to the State of Kansas. At Tuttle Creek Lake, all of the reallocated water supply space (50,000 AF) is in service, with 41,350 AF subcontracted to individual distributors. The other 8,650 AF of water supply space is designated by the State as reserve space.

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None Water supply is not currently considered an authorized purpose, although all Federal lakes can be reallocated to provide a water supply allocation. Irrigation is an authorized but not an operating purpose. The main impediments for use of lake water for these purposes is the cost of treatment (salinity) and cost of transmission. The feasibility of a Wilson Lake reallocation for water supply has Wilson been studied a number of times beginning in the 1980's at the request of the State of Kansas, due to increasing water supply needs regionally. But the cost of water treatment and transmission difficulties continue to be barriers, and to date no customer has been identified who would be willing to commit to the storage. Studies were again begun as part of the current Kansas River PAS study, but active studies under that authority were suspended in 2011.

Pearson-Skubitz Big Hill Lake

Council Grove Lake

El Dorado Lake

Elk City Lake

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Fall River Lake

Sedimentation, starting dredging of reservoir. A two-foot pool raise and associated reallocation is under final review and will probably be approved and implemented in 2013. It will increase the current capacity of the conservation pool from 50,501 AF to 67,700 AF. The pool raise is proposed as a mitigation measure for the higher than expected sedimentation. Dredging is also being John Redmond Dam considered as a supplemental option. The State of Kansas contracted for about and Reservoir 76.18% of the conservation pool in two increments (1975, 1996) for water supply. This is the entire allocated water supply storage of 37,450 AF. 10,000 AF of the water supply allocation was made available through a reallocation action in 1996, which moved that portion from the water quality allocation to the water supply allocation.

Marion Reservoir

Toronto Lake

Cheney Lake

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DROUGHT (Water Supply/Irrigation) Reservoir Description of Hazard Mitigation Action / Measures

None Almost all of the multipurpose pool is allocated to water supply (95,200 AF), but only a portion (19,500 AF) has been contracted to local water supply distributors. Of that amount, only 4,650 AF is actually being used by the two local suppliers. Smithville Lake They reserve their unused contracted space for future needs. Most of the remaining water supply space was intended for Kansas City, but at this time their supplies from well fields and the Missouri River meet all of their current and projected needs.

None Most of the multipurpose pool is allocated to water supply (24,400 AF). Currently, the City of Macon, the intended primary beneficiary, has contracted Long Branch Lake for just 4,400 AF. About 6,200 AF was intended for other distributors, but at this time no other potential needs have been identified. Therefore, the available water supply space should be sufficient for all future projected needs.

None This project does not have a water supply allocation, nor have there been any Longview Lake expressed needs for water supply. The project lands are managed by Jackson County as a county park. At one time they had a small water withdrawal contract for lake water for irrigation needs, but that contract has been terminated.

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None This project does not have a water supply allocation, nor have there been any Blue Springs Lake expressed needs for water supply. The project lands are managed by Jackson County as a county park. They do not use the lake for irrigation and they do not have a water withdrawal contract.

A 1985 reallocation action added a water supply allocation (15,000 AF) to the multipurpose pool. A portion of that allocation (6,680 AF) has been contracted to the Rathbun Rural Water Association. Their demand has been growing and they soon will be contracting for additional storage. Although the current water supply allocation is likely satisfactory for their current needs, future use Rathbun Lake projections by RRWA indicate a need for an additional reallocation action to increase the water supply allocation. Their Board is considering technical reports on their usage, but at this time they have neither committed to contracting for additional space nor to contracting for future space that may become available through reallocation actions.

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A 1992 reallocation action added a small water supply allocation (1,000 AF) to the multipurpose pool. The reallocated space was taken from the flood pool, effectively raising the top of the multipurpose pool from 706.00 to 706.018. Two small water supply contracts have been issued to rural water districts, totaling 283 AF, leaving 717 AF for future needs. We do not regularly monitor the water supply usage, although the contracts require that their usage be reported. A 2013 analysis showed that the districts' current usage is probably more than what can be supported by their current contracts in severe droughts, but the total usage is Harry S. Truman still insignificant compared to other lake water budget factors. The 1992 lake Reservoir survey showed an adequate amount of sediment reserve space remaining in the pool. But a 2010 bathymetric lake survey determined that the multipurpose pool sediment reserve has been filled. This is not a concern because of the large undesignated general use multipurpose allocation. The 2010 survey used a different methodology than previous surveys, so it is uncertain what the actual sedimentaton trend may be. This will be determined with a future lake survey around 2020. At that time, it will be determined if a reallocation action is necessary to restore the sediment reserve.

None. This project does not have a water supply allocation, although the pool was authorized and partly designed with the expectation that water supply would be a use. The City of Springfield and other southern Missouri communities have indicated some interest in using Pomme de Terre Lake as a water supply, but to date primary interest has been focused on Stockton Lake. Pomme de Terre Lake was constructed with a relatively small sediment reserve with a short 50-yr design life. A 1974 lake survey already showed that a substantial portion of the Pomme de Terre Lake sediment reserve had been filled. A 2009 bathymetric lake survey determined that the multipurpose pool sediment reserve had been completely filled. This is not a concern because of the large undesignated general use multipurpose allocation. The 2009 survey used a different methodology than previous surveys, so it is uncertain what the actual sedimentaton trend may be. This will be determined with a future lake survey around 2020. At that time, it will be determined if a reallocation action is necessary to restore the sediment reserve.

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A 1993 reallocation action added a water supply allocation (50,000 AF) to the multipurpose pool. The allocation was strictly taken from the hydropower allocation, but in effect it was taken from a lower portion of the hydropower allocation that is no longer usable due to the construction of the upstream skimming weir. The weir crest is at elevation 845.0, whereas the power allocation nominally extends down to elevation 830.0. The entire water supply allocation was then contracted to the City of Springfield. Half of the contract space (25,000 AF) is in service, while the remaining half is reserved for future use. Their demand has been growing, but their current in-service space appears to be adequate for the near term. Stockton Lake is often drawn down 5-8 ft Stockton Lake during the winter and during drought periods, but it has usually refilled within 1 year (2 years during a severe drought period). Stockton Lake was constructed with a small sediment reserve (12,109 AF in the MP pool). The 1987 lake survey showed that it had been entirely filled in. This was not a concern, since there is a large general multipurpose allocation of 220,000 AF below the power pool, plus a large portion of the power pool itself which is not usable due to the upstream skimming weir. The 2009 sediment survey showed that the 220,000 AF general multipurpose allocation had been reduced to 202,000 AF. If this is treated as a sediment reserve, then the 2009 survey would indicate that it will be about 2270 before it is filled.

OTHER USACE PROGRAMS CONDUCTING HAZARD MITIGATION As the nation’s environmental engineer, the USACE manages one of the largest federal environmental missions: restoring degraded ecosystems; constructing sustainable facilities; regulating waterways; managing natural resources; and, cleaning up contaminated sites from past military activities. Most of these are not directly related to hazard mitigation work for the natural hazards.

USACE environmental cleanup programs focus on reducing risk and protecting human health and the environment in a timely and cost-effective manner. USACE manages, designs and executes a full range of cleanup and protection activities, such as

• Cleaning up sites contaminated with hazardous, toxic or radioactive waste or ordnance through the Formerly Used Defense Sites program • Cleaning up low-level radioactive waste from the nation’s early atomic weapons program through the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program • Supporting the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by cleaning up Superfund sites and working with its Brownfields and Urban Waters programs • Supporting the Army with the Base Realignment and Closure Act program • Ensuring that facilities comply with federal, state and local environmental laws • Conserving cultural and natural resources

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See the districts’ respective websites for details on possible active projects under the USACE environmental programs, as related to hazard mitigation work. Some efforts need to be situational aware of these sites where such work, as described above, may be needed is important in avoiding costly changes to projects that begin prior to such knowledge. Therefore, this USACE information is a possible resource for helping the state to develop the most effective and budget conscience mitigation strategies for the natural hazards.

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CONCLUSION Risk communication is a priority at the USACE. The USACE staff dealing with floods and other natural hazards want to provide enough information to help state, county, and local officials fully understand the hazard mitigation work being done and that will need to be done. During the three year SHMP cycle, the staff are available to help your officials do their risk management work better.

Future updates to this report will be important. The USACE Levee Safety Program will make significant progress over the next three years. The next update can be much better informed on the condition of the many levees across these areas. Also, the responsible owners will have to have communicated their respective IRRMs. The future update will assist the states in deciding how they may wish to collaborate or partner in addressing the flood hazards related to those levees.

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