Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, vol. 151, part 1, 2018, pp. 28–38. ISSN 0035-9173/18/010028-11

Rationality and post- — the threat to democratic society

Donald Hector AM PhD FRSN The Royal Society of New South Wales Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract Two-thirds of Americans get at least some of their news from Facebook and over half get some of their news from Twitter. What has happened to ? The post-modernists and relativists are in the ascendancy. The great Enlightenment philosopher said that errors in religion are dangerous but that errors in are only ridiculous. That is not the case. Rejecting established sources of reason and accepting that should have equal sway with fact puts an open, free society in great danger. This paper examines two issues: what is meant by the words “is true”? And the criteria for truth — how can we establish whether something is true or false? The situation is further complicated by the cogni- tive processes humans used to consider these issues. To determine whether a judgement, a choice, or a decision is likely to be successful, there are two to things consider. First: is the judgement rational — that is, is it coherent with the prevailing paradigm? and second: is the judgement accurate – does it cor- respond to established, accepted facts? Both are necessary for a sound judgement to be reached but neither is sufficient. But human cognition is flawed – our rationality is bounded and this can lead to serious errors. Bringing these two subjects together – philosophy and cognitive – can give some insight into the of post-truth and the implicit threat to our open, democratic society.

Introduction dangerous but errors in philosophy are only hat a mess! Why can’t people be sensi- ridiculous. That is not so. Rejecting estab- Wble! Wherever we turn, there are astrol- lished sources of reason and accepting that ogers, homeopaths, conspiracy theorists, belief should have equal sway with fact puts miracle workers and anti-vaxers. Politicians an open, free society in great danger. prefer to follow their “gut instinct” rather The advances made in human civilisa- than -based rationale. The internet tion in the last 600 years have been greater has made everyone an expert! Two-thirds of than in the previous 60,000. In 1840, there Americans get at least some of their news was no country in the world where the life from Facebook and over half get some from expectancy at birth was greater than 40 years. Twitter. How much substance can there be in Today, just 180 years later, there is no coun- 140 characters? Is it the case that only twits try in the world where life expectancy is less tweet? Are the post-modernists and relativ- than 40 years — there are several countries ists in the ascendancy? What has happened where now it is more than double this. The to reason? rediscovery of Greek philosophy during the The great Enlightenment philosopher Renaissance, the emergence of the scientific David Hume said that errors in religion are method, mathematics, flourishing art, music

28 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth and literature together brought about the emotion and personal belief. One might be agricultural revolution, the scientific revo- tempted to say that Twitter trumps fact. lution, the Industrial Revolution and an I will discuss truth and then examine extraordinary period of human creativity. Of rationality. Then I will briefly outline why I these the scientific revolution was the most believe post-truth is so dangerous. important because it changed the fundamen- But, first, I will make three statements tal paradigm of Middle Ages Christianity upon which my subsequent remarks are and the ancient world: belief gradually gave based. way to evidence and reason. First, there is a physical world independ- The gains were greatest and emerged earli- ent of human thought. Second, from birth, est in what are now referred to as developed every human acquires a body of countries, most particularly those of West- that represents the physical world they expe- ern Europe and North America but the phe- rience through their senses. This is their sub- nomenon has now spread world-wide. Today, jective knowledge. And, third, there is an most prosperous countries share a common independent body of knowledge that has feature. Although far from perfect, they have been developed through human thought developed or have adopted institutions in and communication. This includes the full areas of law, politics, health, education and range of shared ideas, such as stories, writ- social institutions (such as universities and a ings, art, music, mathematics and so on. As free press) that place great value on evidence far as I know, the first philosopher to bring and fact. These institutions are the foun- this together quite so succinctly was Karl dations of today’s civil society. In such an Popper (Popper 1972). It was not original environment, enquiry is rigorous and subject — Popper drew upon philosophical thinking to review by one’s peers. Key to this is our that has emerged over the last two millennia modern notion of knowledge: as the Oxford — but he did put it very clearly. He referred English Dictionary puts it, “the apprehen- to these as the Three Worlds and claimed sion of fact or truth with the ; clear that they are three distinct ontological states. and certain perception of fact or truth; the Some philosophers would dispute this, but state or condition of knowing fact or truth”. it is a good way to think about things in the Why is this emphasis on truth so important? context of today’s discussion. Because it led to the settling of disputes with Truth evidence and reason, rather than by force, and this then became the foundation of In considering truth philosophers generally institutions that people could trust. look at two issues: what is meant by the words The topic of this forum — truth, rational- “is true” (referred to as the “truth predicate”); ity and post-truth — is important because of and the criteria for truth (for example, if I the threat to these institutions posed by the say the book is blue, how do I determine emergence of “post-truth”. What is meant by whether the book really is blue?). the term “post-truth”? Simply that objective An example might show why this distinc- facts are less influential in shaping political tion is important. Pontius Pilate was famously debate or public opinion than appeals to reported to have asked the question “what is truth?”. He should have asked “is he guilty?”. The point is that it is important not to mix

29 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth up the question of what truth is with what The linguistic approach became influential we mean when we try to establish whether with the analytical philosophy of Russell and something is true or false. Wittgenstein in the early 20th century and The concept of truth only has relevance to was at its most influential with the logical self-conscious, linguistic beings, capable of positivists’ interpretation (in particular, the understanding and using concepts of truth semantic treatment by Tarski) of the cor- and falsity. Theoretical approaches to what is respondence theory of truth in the 1930s meant by “truth” fall into two broad groups. (Davidson 1990). There have been two Those that consider truth to be some genuine major epistemic approaches to truth, both property of a proposition, assertion or belief of which have their origins in Spinoza, Hegel — these are substantive approaches — and and other traditional philosophers. These are non-substantive approaches that argue that the pragmatist theory of truth, proposed by such a property or relation does not exist. C.S. Peirce, James, and Dewey in the late Non-substantive approaches argue that we 19th century (Haack 1976) and the coher- should not be misled by the similarity of the ence theory of truth, heavily influenced by truth predicate “is true” to other predicates the British idealist Bradley in the early 20th (such as, for example, “is blue”) into think- century (Schmitt 2004a). The coherence ing that similarly it denotes something real. theory of truth has been the more influential, In other words, it is wrong to interpret the particularly within the decision sciences. truth predicate as representing a genuine The correspondence and coherence theo- property (truth) of a thing, proposition, or ries of truth have been particularly influen- belief in the same way as blueness might be tial in the last century or so and these will considered to be a property. These deflation- be contrasted here. Both are substantive ary approaches (Lowe 1995, Schmitt 2004b) approaches in that both hold that truth propose that the truth predicate exists to exists and that it is a property of, or a rela- fulfil a purely linguistic function enabling tion involving a “truth-bearer” (that is, a speakers to do certain things, such as express proposition, sentence, or belief-state) and agreement with one another. a theoretical, omniscient “cogniser”. Cor- Another distinction that can be made respondence approaches propose that truth regarding theories of truth is between lin- is correspondence with “the way the world guistically- and epistemically-oriented is” and is independent from the cogniser, approaches. Modern, linguistically-oriented whereas coherence approaches argue that approaches attempt to analyse the meaning truth is coherence between truth-bearers of words and grammar to logically identify and include relationships between the and describe the nature of truth. In contrast, truth-bearer and the cogniser (Schmitt epistemic approaches argue that the linguis- 2004c). Thus, truth is not independent from tic approaches fail to give an account of truth the cogniser and contains elements of sub- that allows us to understand how the notion jectivity. Correspondence theories have their of truth contributes to our efforts to know origins in Greek philosophy, whereas coher- and thus give an inadequate account of our ence theories are more modern, emerging in quest for knowledge. the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

30 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth

In the discussion below, two theories will monly formulated is satisfactory. Indeed, be discussed primarily in the context of pro- in a notable exchange between Austin and viding criteria for truth but some passing Strawson in 1950, (Austin 1950, Strawson observations will be made regarding their 1950), the generally accepted view is that usefulness in determining the nature of Strawson largely dismissed the commonly truth. articulated correspondence theory of truth If you subscribe to the view that a physi- as a means for understanding the meaning cal world (Popper’s World One) does exist, of truth, demonstrating that the argument independent of the human mind, then it was circular (Hamlyn 1962, Sainsbury 1998, follows that there must be truth-bearers Searle 1995). However, Strawson did not that can be independently and objectively deal with the usefulness of the correspond- evaluated. That is, observations about the ence theory as a criterion for determining physical world must be viewed from a cor- truth. respondence perspective. Hence, science Surprisingly, in the philosophical liter- is predominantly about correspondence: ature of the last century or so, the corre- making propositions and evaluating them, spondence and coherence approaches have independent of the observer. Now there are generally been placed in opposition to one all sorts of philosophical objections to this. another. But even if you accept the dubious There is a strong argument that much scien- claim that the two are opposed, this is only tific enquiry is socially determined — even the case when they are used as definitional down to questions that scientists decide to theories of truth (that is, the meaning of the investigate — but it is difficult to avoid the truth-predicate). When considered just in conclusion that there should be able to be the context of being criteria for truth, the truth-bearers formulated that can be objec- two approaches can be complementary and tively evaluated, even if we can never really provide valuable insights into issues. The achieve observer independence. theoretical limitation is only that they cannot On the other hand, Popper’s World Two provide sufficient justification to determine and many World Three phenomena cannot truth with absolute . be dissociated from the cogniser, because Perhaps this might be clearer with an they are entirely products of human thought. example. I can make a statement, “the Thus, they can only be evaluated using a book is blue,” and assert that this statement coherence approach. contains the truth. The coherence theorist It is important to note that this conclu- might then ask: how do I sense and perceive sion is not based on the claim that accept- blue light? Is my perception of blueness the ance of realism requires the correspond- same as someone else’s? The correspond- ence theory of truth. It is simply that if a ence theorist argues that the statement does real world independent of human thought not require someone to think about it: it is exists, human thought needs a way to form either true or it is false. I can use a spectro- accurate representations that in some way photometer to see whether the wavelength correspond to these independent real-world of the light being reflected by the book is phenomena. Nor is this to argue that the about 475 nanometres: if it is, the statement correspondence theory of truth as com- is true. The most complete answer lies in a

31 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth combination of both the coherence and cor- quantum mechanics, astrophysics, chemis- respondence approaches: if the light is at 475 try, and biology) and should be considered nm, it is blue light, so the book is blue. But correspondence-theoretically. And, as noted the perception of blueness may be different above, the correspondence approach pro- from person to person. I am colour-blind vides the means for determining whether and I am fairly confident that my perception our understanding of real-world phenom- of blueness is different to about 93% of the ena is true. Hence, in structuring the highly men and about 99.5% of the women in this complex problems of the 21st century, it is room. We cannot be certain how another important to establish as much of the prob- person perceives blueness but science pro- lem content as possible within an objective vides us with the means to finding an objec- domain so that it can be tested using cor- tive answer to the question. respondence criteria, without compromis- This distinction, I think, is at the heart ing the need to utilise coherence criteria in of the point that C.P. Snow tried to make relation to those things that are subjectively in his controversial essay, “The two cultures” determined. (1959). The scientific method is largely Let us now turn to the subject of ration- based on the correspondence approach (but ality. recognising that some questions are socially Rationality influenced), whereas the social sciences and the humanities refer more to the coherence All conscious animals need to make sense of approach because of the subjectivity in most the they encounter in the world, of the issues they consider. The problem is and must either adapt to it or control it. To that scientists and technologists are reluc- do this they form mental representations of tant to recognise the social determinants that the world, based on the information they influence their investigations and outcomes, receive through their senses. They then react while those in the humanities and social sci- and behave accordingly (Polanyi 1957). As ences can be dismissive of expert opinion, Epstein (1994) puts it, they form a theory of even when it is based on overwhelming — a world theory — by which they scientific evidence. If we really want to see relate their own existence to the real-world knowledge advance, we should recognise the phenomena they encounter. This form of importance of both approaches to truth and cognition is intuitive. In humans, intuitive use them together. thought is experiential: it relies heavily on In summary, the important point is this. visual insight and the recognition of patterns The coherence approach (in its criteriologi- that emerge from complex systems. It is ori- cal sense) is useful as a criterion of truth for ented toward immediate action and it leads beliefs, statements, or theories about things to the formation of images that are persist- that are subjectively determined, that is, ent and slow to change. Intuition is experi- about norms, values, morals, , aesthet- enced both passively and subconsciously and ics and so on. But there are some beliefs, is affected by emotion. Judgements arising statements, and theories about things where from intuition are compelling and bring with the aim of inquiry is for them to be objec- them a of certainty and infallibility: tively determined (for example, mathematics, they appear to be self-evident. Indeed, we often see as irrational people who disagree

32 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth with our intuitively-determined judgements. (1991) (narrative/propositional), Hammond Intuitive cognition is often thought of as (1996) (analytical/intuitive) and Stanovich being imaginative, creative and even mysteri- and West (2000) (system 1/system 2), to ous. (Hammond 1996). name but a few. But humans have also developed a second These have generally been taken to be form of thought that is rational and analyti- dichotomous, rather than a complementary cal in nature. “cognitive continuum”, that recognises the This form of cognition is logical and importance of both forms of cognition. But derives from conscious understanding and if we do consider the two as a continuum, appraisal of real-world phenomena in the they give a much greater insight into the context of the ’s own thoughts. “commonsense” nature of human thought. Analytical thinking is slower to process but Humans seem to be the only species to have can change rapidly: eureka moments. It developed such a sophisticated analytical rea- exists in the abstract and is denoted through soning capacity and this has made our spe- language and other symbols, such as num- cies very successful. It is the combination of bers. Unlike intuition, analytical cognition is these two aspects of human thought upon active and conscious: the individual controls which our view of rationality is constructed. its own thoughts and has the capacity for Our belief systems are largely a product of self-awareness and to be self-reflective. It is intuitive thinking and it takes a great deal based on evidence and (even if the logic of effort to undertake the rigorous analytical might be flawed). Importantly, the argument thinking needed for us to be truly rational. is retraceable. Epstein (1994) refers to this as Ultimately, the purpose of all this is to the “self theory”. Thus, the complete theory determine whether a judgement, a choice, of reality for a human is a cognitive system or a decision is likely to be successful. There consisting of a world-theory that emerges are two essential aspects to this. First, is the from intuitive thought and a complemen- judgement coherent with the prevailing tary self-theory that comes from analysis paradigm? And, second, is the judgement and reason. accurate? Does it correspond to established, Such a concept of a bimodal system of accepted facts? Both are necessary but nei- cognition is by no means new. The ancient ther is sufficient. For example, a rationally- Greek philosophers distinguished between determined judgement may not be accurate scientific knowledge and intuition (Aristo- because it is based on a wrong paradigm. tle 350BCE), as did early philosophers of And a judgement made through erroneous the modern era, for example, Pascal (1660) thinking (or is based on a wrong paradigm) in noting the difference between the math- may be accurate purely by chance. In other ematical and the intuitive mind. More words, for a judgement to be ultimately suc- recently various versions of a bimodal system cessful, it needs to correspond with observed of cognition have been developed, for exam- facts and phenomena and it must be coher- ple, Polanyi (1957) (problem-solving/heu- ent with our best objective understanding of ristic), Simon (1983) (/ the way the world works. intuitive rationality), Tversky and Kahne- This sounds quite straightforward but man (1983), (extensional/intuitive), Bruner cognitive psychologists have found we are

33 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth

prone to major errors in both our intui- experienced practitioners were subject to tive and analytical thinking. I will discuss these biases “when they think intuitively”. briefly two of the more influential areas of Furthermore, they noted that “the inher- research into this. An early pioneer in the ently subjective nature of probability has led area was Kenneth Hammond, who, in the many students to believe that coherence, or 1950s, developed a theory by Egon Brunswik internal consistency, is the only valid crite- on perception. He observed that people rion by which judged probability should be respond to various cues that they perceive evaluated”. They go on to say, “for judged and interpret. Each individual receives dif- probabilities to be considered adequate, or ferent cues and interprets them differently. rational, internal consistency is not enough. This gave rise to what Brunswick called the The judgements must be compatible with “lens model”. Just as an optical lens presents the entire web of beliefs held by the indi- a different image to observers, depending vidual ... the rational judge ... will attempt on their relative position, in much the same to make his probability judgements compat- way, people form different perceptions of ible with his knowledge about the subject situations because the cues they receive are matter, the laws of probability, and his own different and so their interpretations also judgemental and biases” (Tversky differ. Hence, it is to be expected that people and Kahneman 1974: 1130). reach different conclusions about the nature What Tversky and Kahneman referred of the problem from apparently identical to as “heuristics” are biases introduced observations.1 through the application of intuitive rather The second stream of research that has than analytical judgement. Further work become particularly influential in the last was done in a number of areas of profes- couple of decades relates to bias and error, sional practice, confirming the existence of particularly in intuitive thinking. The work bias in intuitive thinking (for example, in of Tversky and Kahneman was particu- finance (Slovic 1972), the judicial system larly influential. (For example, Tversky and (Carroll 1978), medical diagnosis and choice Kahneman (1974), Tversky and Kahneman of treatment (McNeil et al. 1982), clinical (1986), and Kahneman and Tversky (1984) diagnosis (Arkes 1981, Kleinmuntz 1984), found that both laymen and experienced and public policy decision-making (Thaler practitioners were subject to these biases.) 1983). This has led to a particularly pessimis- They investigated why people make appar- tic view regarding human judgement: that it ently simple mistakes in estimating prob- is irrational and untrustworthy. But many of abilities. Further investigation in several these researchers appear to have overlooked areas of professional practice confirmed the the caveat noted above, that Tversky and existence of bias (for example, in finance, Kahneman (and others, for example, Arkes the judicial system, medical diagnosis and (1981)) identified: bias is primarily a prob- choice of treatment, and public policy for- lem with intuitive judgement, not with mulation). rational judgement. In the first of these papers, Tversky and Indeed, a comprehensive review of deci- Kahneman found that both layman and sion-making errors presented by Fraser et al. (1992) suggests that, by understanding the 1 See also Enfield (2018) - Ed.

34 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth source of bias, often it can be removed from intuitive thought with the power of analy- the problem situation. For example, bias due sis to recognise the differences in percep- to the practitioner not understanding the tion and the bias introduced due to our problem adequately, erroneous assumptions intuitive thinking. This process of creativity, regarding problem data (such as probability combined with rigorous criticism, enables data), differences in assumptions between them to develop deep and rich subjective the practitioner and the observer, can give and objective knowledge and thereby form the appearance of bias where, upon closer a more comprehensive understanding of the examination, none exists. More specifi- world. cally, Nisbett et al. (1987) demonstrated In this brief review, I have argued that that training in inference enhances rational there is a remarkable consistency and con- thinking; Gigerenzer et al. (1991) showed vergence in the philosophy and psychology that when carefully analysed, some biases around both the nature of truth and criteria actually did not contravene probability for distinguishing between truth and falsity. theory and Lopes (1991) showed that with Both are important in understanding the more rigorous application of methodology, way in which humans make complex deci- some biases are reduced or disappear. sions and try to form rational judgements. But there is another important issue that Post-Truth emerges from this work on the rational- ity of human decision-making. Examples Let me now turn to post-truth and why I from law, medicine, science, and engineering think it poses such a threat to free, open soci- show that where intuition encroaches upon eties. If you look back over history, whenever the domain where analysis is required, the there has been a major change in the tech- application of intuition can lead to blindly nology of communication, social disruption over-confident judgements and decisions and change follows. Sometimes this is for the (Hammond (1996) p106). But to set aside better but often for the worse. The printing- the value of intuitive thought based on this press was used to great effect during the Ref- would be to overlook the great benefit that ormation, with the distribution of drawings derives from the creativity and insight of and pamphlets. The first English newspapers intuition across all aspects of human crea- were started in London in the 1660s at a tivity, from mathematics and science, to time of great social upheaval that gave birth the arts and humanities. A more optimistic to many of our modern institutions. interpretation of the relationship between Large-scale, automated printing-presses intuition and analysis is that in specific were developed in the 1850s and the daily instances, people may appear irrational but newspaper became possible. Together with are less so in the context of the entire prob- photography, which was also invented at lem situation; and that bias can be reduced if about this time, newspapers were major appropriate steps are taken, such as training influences in the American Civil War. Not the individual and appropriate selection of long after the invention of motion pictures, analytical methodologies. they were seized upon as a propaganda tool Very successful people seem to meld the and were used to sway public sentiment insight and creativity that derives from during World War I. Russia and both embraced motion pictures and estab-

35 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth lished government-sponsored film industries. nature, these appeal to and reinforce per- In 1933, Hitler created the Reich Ministry sonal bias and prejudice. for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda, Shrewd communicators, from shock-jocks run by Joseph Goebbels. It was used to great to politicians can now exploit this to directly effect in the Holocaust. Wherever you find target the individual, play to influence and a totalitarian regime, you will find a state- sentiment, and to shape public opinion. In sponsored ministry of information. such an environment, truth becomes one of The difference between totalitarian propa- the first casualties as the sheer volume of dis- ganda machines and the free press of open information and misinformation drowns out societies is that the free press aims for truth rationally-determined knowledge. This has in reporting, however imperfectly. This much the same effect as totalitarian propa- holds the establishment and its institutions ganda ministries: it erodes people’s trust in to account and thereby helps to maintain established institutions, replacing it with a our trust in them. Totalitarian propaganda false trust in belief-centric half- and units create false trust by deliberately pro- falsehoods that are loaded with disinforma- ducing disinformation and misinformation tion and misinformation and carefully avoid to conceal aspects of the truth, to support critique. For evidence of this, look no further the regime. than the misleading innuendo and deliber- The development of the World Wide Web ate lies that were propagated through social in the 1990s and the 24-hour availability of media in the Brexit referendum, the 2016 news has marginalised the established news US Presidential election, virtually every elec- media. The emergence of social media with tion in Australia of the last decade and the the extraordinary penetration of Facebook endless discussion around climate change. and Twitter has brought about a funda- mental change in the way in which news Conclusion is delivered to consumers and the political So, what can we do about it? The challenge discourse unfolds. News is no longer dis- is predominantly one of leadership. Lead- tributed via universally-accessible media. ers should critically evaluate propositions Rather, algorithms used by Facebook, Twit- in the light of fact and reason, while at the ter and Google deliver news, based on your same time recognising their own fallibility. search preferences. These companies do not We should be clear on what we mean by uncover news themselves but parasitically “truth”. We should insist that the criteria harvest information from established com- we use to distinguish truth from falsity are panies that invest in the human and financial clear. We should recognise the shortcom- resources needed to report it and many other ings of human cognition. We should insist sources as well. This so-called news is not on the same rigour from others. We should about the dissemination of objective infor- be vocal in our criticism when we see truth mation. It is about marketing a commodity being compromised. We must not let public called “content”, regardless of its truth, to an policy-making enter the domain of unsub- audience segmented down to the individual, stantiated, untrue and belief. We driven solely by data analytics, marketing must protect the institutions of our society strategies and search engines. By their very by holding those who run them to account and supporting them in adversity. The more

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37 Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales Hector — Rationality and Post-Truth

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Donald Hector AM PhD FRSN is a chemical engineer with extensive in large- scale industrial processing and the evaluation and commercialisation of new technologies. He was managing director of Dow Corning Australia and the executive director responsible for the Australian/New Zealand, ASEAN and Indian subsidiaries of Dow Corning Corpora- tion, a high-technology, American multi-national company. He was also managing director of Asia Pacific Specialty Chemicals Ltd, an ASX-listed specialty chemicals and food-additives company and has been a non-executive chairman and director of ASX-listed and private companies and not-for-profit organisations. He is a Vice President and former President of the Royal Society of NSW.

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