1 Moral Philosophy Closely Relates to Value Theory Which Can Be Understood Inside the Philosophical Area of Normative Ethical Theory

Notes

1 Moral philosophy closely relates to value theory which can be understood inside the philosophical area of normative ethical theory. This is of particular concern to consequentialists. In their understanding, value theory can be seen as being synonymous with axiology which is primarily concerned with classifying which things are good, and how good they are (Hartman 1967; Findlay 1970; Jones 1989:2; Koslowski 2002 & 2010). 2 In the context of this book management is not seen as the invented and dreamed- up version of affirmative textbook writers (cf. Alvesson & Willmott 1996:25; Klikauer 2007:90f. & 216f.) who more often than not are pure ‘Servants of Power’ (Baritz 1960; cf. Durkheim 1983:34). Instead, management is seen as outlined by Magretta (2002:7 & 196). In the following chapters all text that appears in italics is taken from her book if not otherwise referenced. The chapter is not designed as a negative view of management but as a realistic one as put forward by the former editor of the Harvard Business Review (HBR), Magretta, whose subsequent book truthfully divides the essential from the accidental (cf. Essentialism). There may be accidental articles in various journals and chapters in textbooks that contradict Magretta’s overview of management but her book does not rely on the occasional or accidental article but on the essence of ‘What Management Is’ (2002). Hence, this book seeks to represent her views as authentic as possible, even though some might argue that one cannot elaborate on the essence of management by relying on one single book. Firstly, the book relies predominantly on her work but also on a few other sources as well. Secondly, the HBR is, after all, the most widely read journal in management. Thirdly, the HBR and its editor strongly reflect mainstream views on management and with it the essence of management. Fourthly, Margretta’s book is not just ‘a book’ but combines years, if not decades, of experience in editing the HBR; and finally, there might be sources that contradict the HRB editor – even inside the HRB itself – but they, unlike Magretta (2002), do all too often constitute marginalised, accidental, isolated, etc. view- points that are not representative of mainstream management. 3 The former CEO of Standard Oil Company (Indiana) ‘called on big business colleagues to run their business as they intended to and – for profit to stand up and fight, to talk about profits in terms of their central function, and to throw all sentiments to the wolves’ (Levitt 1958:43; cf. Kothari 2010). In other words, the main game of management is profit-making just as Karl Marx (1844 & 1890) had outlined 100 years earlier. Managers should not bother with ethics – ‘throw all sentiments to the wolves’ – just as Marx predicted. Marx would have agreed with Standard Oil’s CEO that management’s No. 1 goal is profits (cf. Baumhart 1961:19 & 163; Carr 1968:143; Hawken 1993:10; Alvesson & Willmott 1996:23; Kirkeby 2000:3; McCloskey 2006:2; Crowson 2009:106). ‘Mit entsprechendem Profit wird Kapital kühn. Zehn Prozent sicher, und man kann es überall anwenden; 20 Prozent, es wird lebhaft; 50 Prozent, positiv waghalsig; für 100 Prozent stampft es alle men- schlichen Gesetze unter seinen Fuß; 300 Prozent, und es existiert kein Verbrechen, das es nicht riskiert, selbst auf Gefahr des Galgens. Wenn Tumult und Streit Profit bringen, wird es sie beide encouragieren. Beweis: Schmuggel und Sklavenhandel.’ (P.J. Dunning, quoted in Karl Marx: ‘Das Kapital’ (1890), vol. 1, p. 801, Berlin: Dietz-Publisher,

225 226 Notes

1961); translation: ‘With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10% will ensure its employment anywhere; 20% certain will produce eagerness; 50%, positive audacity; 100% will make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300%, and there is not a crime at which it will scruple, nor a risk it will not run, even to the chance of its owner being hanged. If turbulence and strife will bring a profit, it will freely encourage both. Smuggling and the slave-trade have amply proved all that is here stated’ (cf. Hare’s What is Wrong with Slavery, 1979). The Harvard Business Review listed 939 articles on profit and 29 on morality between 1922 and 2009 which represents a 33:1 ratio and indicates the true state of morality as seen from a managerial perspective by the world’s foremost important management journal (cf. Cohen 1973; Chamberlain 1973:3; Clinard 1983:10 & 133; Sores 2002; Satre 2005). 4 For example, employees, staff, customers, suppliers, competitors, communities, trade unions, states, and even NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Greenpeace, PETA, etc. (cf. Lucas 2003:20; Campbell & Kitson 2008:17; Friedman 2008). 5 Charles Darwin (1871:129) even argues that our ability to anticipate the more remote consequences of [our] action is contributed to the development of morality in human evolution. In other words, the better management anticipates consequences of [their] action, the more developed its morality is. This stands in sharp contrast to management’s reality of externalisation (Petit 1961:98; Fried- man 1970; Gintis 1976; Trevino 1986:603–4; Cornes & Sandler 1986; Alvesson & Willmott 1996; Mander 2001; Magretta 2002; Bakan 2004; Painter-Morland 2008; Archie 2009; Wicks 2010) and its focus on shareholder value i.e. profit maximisation. For Korten (1995:9), it is ‘making money for the rich at the expense of the life of society and the planet’. In the words of Levitt (1958:49) ‘business will have a much better chance of surviving if there is no nonsense about its goals – that is, if long-run profits maximisation is the one dominant objective in practice as well as in theory’. According to McCloskey’s Ethics for an Age of Commerce (2006:1) externalities have been part of management’s virtues, ‘the American bourgeois organised official and unofficial apartheids. It conspired against unions. It supported the excesses of nationalism. It delighted in red bating and queer bashing’. From ‘The Servants of Power’ (Baritz 1960) this sounds rather different: ‘by providing jobs, investment capital, purchasing goods, and doing business every day, corporations have a profound and positive influence on society’ (Porter & Kramer 2006:91). The positive influence on society comes from investing. Unmentioned is that this is done in expectation of returns so that profits can be made. And finally, it is summed up as doing business. This leaves providing jobs as the only positive for society. And those jobs are, according to Porter’s only ideology, a cost- factor that needs to be reduced. In line with that, Drucker (1981:35) has argued that ‘business ethics might well be called “ethical chic” rather than ethics – and indeed might be considered more a media event than philosophy or morals’. This sentiment is echoed by an executive who complained ‘morality threatens to engulf us’ (Silk & Vogel 1976:229; cf. Powers & Vogel 1980:8). 6 Hence, a book on ethics – the philosophical study of morals – needs to be written in theory language rather than observation language. Theory language is abstract language. According to Marcuse (1966:138), ‘nobody really thinks who does not abstract from that which is given, who does not relate the facts to the factors which have made them, who does not – in his mind – undo the facts. Abstract- ness is the very life of thought, the token of its authenticity’. Observable science is often linked to a technical-scientific project that ‘tends to identify things and Notes 227

their function. As a habit of thought outside the scientific and technical language, such reasoning shapes the expression of a specific social and political behaviourism. In this behavioural universe, words and concepts tend to coincide or rather the concept tends to be absorbed. The former has no other content that is designated by the word in published and standardised usage, and the word is expected to have no other response than the publicised and standardised behaviour (reaction)’; cf. Feldman (1978); MacIntyre (1989); Singer (1994); Arrington (1998); Malachowski (2001); Calaco & Atterton (2003); Shaw (2003); Graham (2004); Campbell et al. (2005); Olen et al. (2005); Wiggins (2006); Driver (2007); LaFollette (2007); Shafer-Landau (2007); Shafer-Landau & Cueno (2007); Hinman (2008); Pogge & Horton (2008); Koslowski (2010); Muhr et al. (2010); Velasquez (2012:38–45). 7 Singer (1985:1); cf. www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1985. 8 Perhaps this is not so for management because management’s foremost existence is found in creating shareholder value i.e. profit maximisation, the bottom line, market shares, business growth, competition (cf. Kohn 1999:22; Kothari 2010), etc. Hence, standard textbooks on management rarely engage in moral philosophy, often not even at the level of pure tokenism. In Hegelian terms (cf. Klikauer 2010:88–125), the essence of management is shareholder value i.e. profit maximisation while the essence of humanity is morality. Hegel would say that shareholder value and profit maximisation are not essential to humans, they are accidental while for management, it is the other way around: shareholder value and profit maximisation are essential, not accidental. Koslowski (2002:54) quotes a shareholder, ‘I do not want management to use the capital I have entrusted to it to impose its notions of international morality on the world’. ROI (return of investment), not ethics or international morality counts. 9 If this is an acceptable definition of ethics, then the Journal of Business Ethics is a tautology because it is not concerned with the ‘philosophical’ study of morality (Collins 2000). Instead it is concerned with empirical studies, sur- veys, business improvement, and ethical codes etc. In Magretta’s (2002) real management – not textbook management – neither ethics nor morality is to be found. They aren’t even listed as index entries because, as it appears, management morality is a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron like ‘military intelligence’ or ‘academic administration’ (McCloskey 2006:5). Similarly, Deckop’s HRM Ethics (2006) is entirely free of any classical or modern moral philosophy; it only mentions Aristotle once. Moral philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Mill, Bentham, Adorno, Baumann, Singer, etc. do not seem to exist for the ethics of HRM. 10 Cf. Bowles & Gintis (2002). ‘What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that he raises his structure in his head before he builds it in wax’ (Wood 1972:248). In other words, humans and chimpanzees may behave morally and have developed moral codes but animals cannot conceptualise them, write about them, or reflect upon them before applying them. In short, both have some grasp of morality while only humans have ethics – the philosophical study of morality. Axelrod & Hamilton (1981:1391; cf. Axelrod 1984 & 1984a) noted ‘many of the benefits sought by living things are disproportionably available to cooperating groups’ (cf. Miller 2007:100 & 103; Tomasello 2009:XIII & 61); ‘most humans are emotionally compelled to impose “altruistic punishment” on others who act selfishly’ (Miller 2007:111). 11 In some respects, one might argue, management’s morality hasn’t progressed much since then. It may even have regressed because it hardly shares its bread 228 Notes

with the hungry otherwise around 800 million people would not go hungry every day while management receives multi-million dollar payouts, bonuses, share- options, fringe benefits, and gold parachutes. And one would not see homeless and hungry people in virtually every large city in virtually every country on virtually every continent (UN-Habitat 2010). 12 Quoted from Wood (1972:250 & 257; Klikauer 2010:88–125). On this Massey (1982:305) noted, ‘the first important class need of the bourgeoisie is to secure the loyalty to capitalism of the vast majority of people who are not among its primary beneficiaries…This would be achieved by trying to convince them both that the system of capitalist production is itself moral, and that people operating within the system are essentially honest, fair individuals whose integrity is not compromised by the roles they perform in the economic system’. 13 Management ethics is not meta-ethics – issues about ethics – but normative ethics and morality. This is the area of philosophy that is concerned with standards for right conduct and moral evaluation. Morality issues specific requests towards management to which it has to respond. There is no escape and no avoidance from morality for management. Even though management and morality are inextric- ably linked, substantial sections of management and many individual managers have sought to negate, neglect, bypass, avoid, and diminish ethical questions (cf. Diefenbach 2009). 14 Cf. Trevino & Nelson’s Managing Business Ethics (2011); Wicks et al.’s ‘Ethics in the functional areas of business’, in their Business Ethics: A Managerial Approach (2010); cf. CIMA (2008); Carroll (2009); Leopold & Harris (2009); Dessler (2011). 15 One manager summed this up as ‘if the majority are foolish enough to follow moral codes, why should I, if I can get away with not doing so’ (Donaldson & Waller 1980:54); cf. Chamberlain (1973:6); Brenner & Molander (1977:60 & 62); Buskirk (1974); Massey (1982:307); Clinard (1983); Lukes (1985); Schwartz (1990); Rosenfeld et al. (1995); Bird (1996); Punch (1996 & 2008); Kaptein (1998:6, 42f. 43); Sikula (1996:127); Beder (2000); Brunsson (2002); Bakan (2004); Jones et al. (2005); Clegg & Rhodes (2006:3–7); Shah (2006); Leap (2007); Shaw & Barry (2010). 16 Silk & Vogel (1976:228). Another view is that a company’s ‘stockholders would suffer, and other firms “with less scrupulous management” would win out’ (Silk & Vogel 1976:228). One of the best ways to understand management is view everything in zero-sum terms: I win – you lose and you win – I lose. 17 It is seen as mired in irresolvable disagreements, misguided, and indeed pointless, because what it seeks is a chimera. There are no principles for philosophical business ethics to uncover (Crisp 2003:2). On this, Macintyre (1983:357) noted, ‘a corporate executive understands every project in terms of a suitably narrow conception of cost-benefit analysis and ignores larger side-effects of one’s activity’ (cf. Goodpaster & Matthews 1982:136). Jones (1989:3) noted, ‘business decisions are made strictly according to the calculus of economic rationality…these decisions seem to lack ethical content’. 18 On public relations, Quinn (1953:1) noted, ‘complex commercialisation and cultural coercion, partly through the efforts of hired public-relations experts whose business it is to gild the gold curtain’ (cf. Petit 1961:98; Silk & Vogel 1976:238; cf. Djelic & Vranceanu 2009). 19 The Drucker quote is from: Hoffman & Moore (1982:299) and from Drucker (1981:18 & 34) who also said that ‘the confusion [about business ethics] is so great – and the noise level even greater’ (1981:18); see also: Harvard Business Review’s Albert Carr (Carr 1968:148), cf. Cohen (1973); Groucho Marx is from Henriques (2007:19); cf. Gupta (2010). Notes 229

20 Carr (1968:143); Trevino (1986:601–2); Punch (2001:110–11); Provis (2004:17); Audi (2009); Archie (2009); Wicks (2010) and Brunsson’s Organisation of Hypocrisy (2002) when there is a significant difference between words and deeds (2002:xiii); cf. Baumhart (1961:19). Brenner & Molander (1977:59, 64f., 68) who emphasised that managers are ‘preoccupied with gains [profits… and there is a] lack of reinforcement of ethical behaviour, competition, and a sense that only “results” are important…’ (p. 602). Hence, managers find normative ethical theory not particularly helpful in explaining or predicting ethical decision-making. In other words, managers want explanations and to predict – control, shape, and manipulate decision-making because managers do think about ethical dilemmas with the context of the organisation, i.e. under the profit- and shareholder value maxim. Not surprisingly, a few managers are likely to think of their day-to-day decision making as following normative ethical theories of utilitarianism, justice, or rights. According to Standard Oil’s CEO, morality and ethics are all sentiments that should be thrown to the wolves because they represent the dangers of social responsibility (Levitt 1958:43 & 47; Friedman 1970; Sullivan’s moral blindness, 1977:373; moral attention deficit disorder (MADD), the veil of ignorance (Rawls 1980:522), and the ‘Myth of Amoral Business’ (DeGeorge 2001:74; cf. Klikauer 2010). Baumhart (1961: 168) noted ‘there are many businessmen who are willing to “fence themselves in” with an ethical practice code’. This is especially so when a code is impossible to police (Baumhart 1961:170). A code provides a covering or covering-up fence, no code exposes one. What occurs far behind company fences (today called security) is a different matter. According to McCloskey (2006:2), a businessman is an ethical shell or worse (Jones 1989:2). 21 Ballpark Figure, Bandwidth, Baste the Turkey – meaning to attend to a task that has been ignored for sometime, Business-to-Business – also known as B2B, Business-to- Consumer – also known as B2C, Best of Breed, Best practices, Bizmeth (shortening of ‘business method’), Boil the Ocean (take on a task with an overwhelming and impossible scope), Brand, Brick-and-mortar, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), Buzzword compliant, Client-centric, Circle back, Co-Opetition (coined to describe cooperative competition), Core competency, Customer-centric, Downsizing, Drinking the Kool-Aid – refers to the cyanide-laced Flavour Aid used by Jim Jones cult – means trusting in things offered by authority figures, Eat their own dog food or ‘dog food’ (to use a product yourself which you sell to others), Enterprise [dis- ambiguation needed], Event horizon, Eyeballs, Free value, Fulfilment issues, Going forward (in the future), Granular, Herding cats, Holistic (approach/integration), Infrastructure, Integrated, Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO), Logistics – now commonly used for shipping, and shipping companies, Logistically (i.e. ‘speaking logistically’, ‘thinking logistically’), Long Tail, Low Hanging Fruit, Make it Pop, Metrics, Mindshare, Mission Critical, New economy, Next generation, Next level, Offline (to continue a conversation privately), Offshoring also known as Offshore outsourcing or something being offshore-able, Open kimono (to be open and trans- parent in discussions), Paperless Office, Return on Investment (ROI), Reverse fulfilment, Rich Media, Rightshoring, Seamless (integration), Share options, Siloed (completely separated with no communication between), Solution, SOX (Sarbanes- Oxley Act, 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley, Sarbox or SOX is a US-bill enacted as a reaction to major corporate scandals including Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom), State-of-the-Art, Tail Risk, Touch Base, Tic-tac, Value- added, Visibility (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_buzzwords). 22 It may even be the case that when moral philosophy uses certain terms they mean one thing and when management uses the same terms, they mean something 230 Notes

completely different. For example, freedom for moral philosophy means the freedom of human beings (negative or positive, Berlin, 1969) while for management freedom means pure non-interference with market forces (Koslowski 2002:51) or freedom of choice; for one values are considered human values linked to virtue ethics while for the other it means shareholder value i.e. profit maximisation; for one the environment means environmental ethics while for the other it means natural or mineral assets to be exploited, or market environments, legal environments, etc.; for one human beings means human beings while for the other it means human resources or human capital (cf. Friedman 2008). 23 Among the so-called doyens of management, Peter Ferdinand Drucker stands out because ‘he has been most consistent in his opposition to business ethics. He insisted years ago that business ethics was not needed (1973)…business ethics was irrelevant (1993)…the ethical position…becomes pure sentimental- ism’ (1949; cf. Schwartz 1998:1686). Drucker favoured ‘the ordinary rules of ethics. Similarly for Friedman business executives cannot be expected to factor ethical concerns into management decisions’ (Hoffman & Moore 1982:294). 24 Top 50 Management Guru Listing: 1. Michael E. Porter 2. Tom Peters 3. Robert Reich 4. Peter Drucker 5. Peter Senge 6. Gary S. Becker 7. Gary Hamel 8. Alvin Toffler 9. Hal Varian 10. Daniel Goleman 11. Rosabeth Moss Kanter 12. Ronald Coase 13. Lester Thurow 14. Charles Handy 15. Henry Mintzberg 16. Michael Hammer 17. Stephen Covey 18. Warren Bennis 19. Bill Gates 20. Jeffrey Pfeffer 21. Philip Kotler 22. Robert C. Merton 23. C. K. Prahalad 24. Thomas H. Daven- port 25. Don Tapscott 26. John Seely Brown 27. George Gilder 28. Kevin Kelly 29. Chris Argyris 30. Robert Kaplan 31. Esther Dyson 32. Edward de Bono 33. Jack Welch 34. John Kotter 35. Ken Blanchard 36. Edward Tufte 37. Kenichi Ohmae 38. Alfred Chandler 39. James MacGregor Burns 40. Sumantra Ghoshal 41. Edgar Schein 42. Myron S. Scholes 43. James March 44. Richard Branson 45. Anthony Robbins 46. Clay(ton) Christensen 47. Michael Dell 48. John Naisbitt 49. David Teece 50. Don Peppers. 25 Another one is R. M. Hare’s One Philosopher’s Approach to Business Ethics (1989a). 26 On the teaching of business ethics, Jones (1989:3) noted, ‘an ethics course can also help legitimise the role of ethical considerations in business decisions in the minds of students’. The self-deception of the language used directs one to the following: a) an ethics course can provide some help, no more. b) It does legitimise rather than change management to make management ethical – ethics is a tool for management that helps legitimise its actions rather than making them ethical. In short, management’s actions are primary while ethics is secondary. c) Ethics only plays ‘a’ role, no more. d) It is all in the minds of students anyway, i.e. not real (cf. Fromm 1949:141). 27 These subjects are: administrative theory, aggressive behaviour, anthropology, corporations, economy, education, epistemology, linguistics, Marxism, observational empirical studies, politics, prisons, definitions of rationality, various social institutions, society, and sociology; cf. Kohlberg et al. (1971); Hampden-Turner (1971); Baxter & Rarick (1987); Maclagan & Snell (1992); Sridhar & Camburn (1993); Collins (2000); Rossouw & van Vuuren (2003); Donleavy (2008); Hartman et al. (2009). In sum, while there have been a number of articles on Kohlberg and management there hasn’t been a comprehensive study that reaches beyond the article- format (cf. journal-science, Klikauer 2007:95). 28 Kohlberg & Armon (1984:384) noted, an ethical philosophy is more than a structure of moral reasoning defined by justice operations and moral conflict resolution (cf. Afzalur 2010). Kohlberg’s stages represent: (1) a structured whole Notes 231

that (2) develops in an invariant sequence that (3) forms hierarchical inte- grations (Kohlberg & Armon (1984:387). Kohlberg associates this with Piaget’s stages model (Piaget 1928, 1932, 1951); cf. Anderson (2009:73). 29 On management and ideology, Neimark (1995:88) noted ‘the official discourse [of management on ethics], in short, fits all of sociologist Anthony Giddens’ criteria for an ideology’ (Giddens 1979:193–5). It naturalises the status quo, including its mechanisms for systemic survival (such as globalisation, productivity-enhancing technological change, down-sizing and re-engineering) by accepting them as natural, immutable and/or inevitable. It deflects attention away from contradictions and tensions that would otherwise translate into social conflict and change by reducing the matter of business ethics to cases of individual cor- ruptions, by masking the frequent incompatibility of social and corporate interests under a rhetorical gloss that allows the comfortable cohabitation of social responsibility and corporate profitability. 30 On what became known as Managerialism, Burham (1945:29 & 63–71) noted, ‘the theory of the managerial revolution predicts that capitalist society will be replaced by “managerial society” with managers establishing social dominance’ (Burham 1945:83; cf. Enteman 1993; Korton, D. C. 1995; Rees & Rodley 1995; Furnham 1996; Mander 2001; Pena 2001; Parker 2002; Bakan 2004; Beder 2006; Klikauer 2007:103–5; Dienfenbach 2009:11ff.; Delbridge & Keenoy 2011). 31 Managerialism is the belief that organisations and society can be run through the application of generic management skills and models. To a practitioner of managerialism, there is little difference in the skills required to run a college, a public utility, a Kindergarten, an advertising agency, and an oil rig (cf. Malachowski 2001:1; Mandell 2002). Experience and skills pertinent to an organisation’s core business are considered secondary. The term is used disparagingly to describe organisations perceived to have a preponderance and excess of managerial techniques, solutions, rules and personnel, especially if these seem to run counter to the common sense of observers. It is said that the MBA degree is intended to provide generic skills to a new class of managers not wedded to a particular industry or professional sectors (Bazelon 1967; Enteman 1993; Pena 2001; Rees & Rodley 1995; Linstead et al. 2004:260–4; McCloskey 2006:1). While Bauman (1989) argues the Holocaust was the application of modern management techniques, Goldhagen (1996) views it as an act based on willingness to act cruel and sadistically where ‘sadists do not care for their victims’ (Petit 1961:746); cf. Samson & Daft (2009); Hinman (2008:299–300); Klikauer (2008); Driver (2007); Martin (2007); Shafer- Landau (2007); Wiggins (2006); Linstead et al. (2004); Singer (1994); Deetz (1992 & 2001); Rest (1999); Habermas (1990); Blum (1988); Reed (1987); Gilligan (1982); Goodpaster (1982); Kohlberg (1971, 1981, 1984). It also carries connotations of Adorno’s Mediation on Metaphysis: After Auschwitz in his masterpiece Negative Dialectics (1973); cf. Mumby (1988, 1997, 2000, 2001); Deetz (1992 & 2001); Rest et al. (1999:1–34); Habermas (1990); Blum (1988); Reed (1987); Goodpaster (1982); Kohlberg (1971, 1981, 1984) & Habermas (1990:116ff.). As a rough estimate, all 20th century genocides combined killed approximately 151 million people (Mysterud 2000:583). 32 Kohlberg also conducted research in Malaysian aboriginal villages, Turkey, the Yucatán, and Mexico to verify that his theory is not culturally-based but universal. 33 Henry (2001:259) states ‘every psychology textbook published in the last quarter- century touches upon Kohlberg’s work’. Already in 1982, Puka (1982:477) noted that ‘literally hundreds of Kohlbergian studies have been performed’. However, Kohlberg’s work should be seen not so much in terms of psychology but in terms 232 Notes

of moral philosophy arguments regarding the moral adequacy of ethical judgements (Modgil & Modgil 1985:4; cf. Eddy 1988:409). It seeks to balance the extremes of moral authority and empirical classification with interdisciplinary research as it is using empirical psychology and anthropological data to make philosophical claims (Kohlberg 1985:505). 34 By Kohlberg: Kohlberg (1958, 1964, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1987); Blatt & Kohlberg (1975); Higgins, Power & Kohlberg (1984); Jennings & Kohlberg (1983); Kohlberg & Turiel 1973; Kohlberg et al. (1983); Kohlberg & Kramer (1969); Kohlberg & Armon (1984). On Kohlberg: Hampden-Turner (1970:137–46 & 1971); Simpson (1974); Ward (1975); Gibbs (1977:6–7 & 2003); Reid & Yanarella (1977); Phillips & Kelly (1975); Trainer 1977; Owen (1977); Sullivan (1977); Tsujimoto (1979); Carter (1980); Forsyth (1980); Lagerspetz & Westman (1980); Locke (1980 & 1985); Manning (1981); Stratton (1981); Damico (1982); Goodpaster & Matthews (1982:136); McDonagh (1982); Puka (1982); Walker (1982); Burris (1983); Jennings & Kohl- berg (1983); Reimer et al. (1983:52f. & 58–61); Forsyth & Scott (1984); Lifton, P. D. (1985); Nunner-Winkler (1984); Pritchard (1984); Crain (2005:151–73); Modgil & Modgil (1985); Sison (1985); Bloom (1986); Guerrette (1986); Trevino (1986); Wagner (1986); Baxter & Rarick (1987:244); Colby & Kohlberg (1987); Lavoie & Culbert (1987); McSwain & White (1987); Veneziano & Veneziano (1988); Victor & Cullen (1988:105); Jones (1989:5&8); Inbar (1990:25); Nelson & Obremski (1990); Senchuk (1990); Weber (1990 & 1991:295f.); Blass (1991:403); Maclagan (1992); Kavathatzopoulos (1993); Leeman et al. (1993); Sridhar & Camburn (1993); Sonnert (1994); Sonnert & Commons (1994); Kjonstad & Willmott (1995); Carr (1996); Habermas (1996:71); Habermas & Nielsen (1990:94); Punzo (1996); Snell (1996); Tisak & Jankowski (1996); Mason & Mudrack (1997); Petrick & Quinn (1997:118–20); Reed (1997:59ff.); Sigurdson (1997); Kaptein (1998:8, 54, 56f.); Whetstone (1998:192 & 195); Derry (1999); Werhane (1999); Arnold (2000); Walsh (2000); Greene et al. (2001); Priem & Shaffer (2001:214); Tsui & Windsor (2001); Lynch et al. (2002:353ff.); Turner et al. (2002); Christensen & Kohls (2003:342); Dallmayr (2003); Doise (2003:6–7); Gibbs (2003:37–47); Menesini (2003); Rossouw & van Vuuren (2003); VanSandt et al. (2006:145); Young (2003:11); Forte (2004); Baucus & Beck-Dudley (2005); Harrison (2005:51–4); Fox & Boulton (2006); Krebs & Denton (2005 & 2006); Gibbs (2006); Jorgensen (2006); Lapsley (2006:37ff.); Killen & Smetana (2006); Ronel (2006); South & Wood (2006); Erman (2007); Tumanov (2007); Krebs (2008:165–8); A[o]slund et al. (2009); Hartman et al. (2009); Hoy (2009:168); Malti et al. (2009). On _ stages, overlaps, and soft-vs.hard stages: Kohlberg & Armon (1984); Kohlberg (1990:263ff.); Dawson (2002:164) on stage 3.5 1 or 3 /2, Lapsley’s 3A & 3B (2006:48); Krebs & Denton’s 3/4 (2005:643); Trevino (1986:608); Krebs & Denton (2006:672); Badhwar (2009:278); Linstead et al. (2009:385–93); Klikauer (2011:33–56); Koslowski (2010); Shaw & Barry (2010); Wicks et al. (2010:38–42); Treino & Nelson (2011:455); Velasquez (2012:38–45). 35 Initially, Kohlberg developed six real stages of morality. In fact there are eight stages but the stage of pre-morality is not actually counted as a real stage. Kohlberg also added a hypothetical stage called seven. The first or pre-stage – zero – is not regarded as a complete stage of morality because it describes behaviour before humans develop a moral consciousness. Stage 7 is called hypothetical because Kohlberg could not find much evidence in his fieldwork but was sure that it is there (cf. Reimer et al. 1983:53f.; Foot 2007:153–9). 36 The first group contains two stages: a highly individualistic form of punishment avoidance at stage 1 and individualism, selfishness, and egoism at stage 2. At the Notes 233

conventional level, the third and fourth stages include group-orientation at stage 3 and formal organisational rules at stage 4. The final group of post- conventional morality comprises not only the two stages (5 and 6) but also stage 7. In fact, the post-conventional group contains three stages. These are the level of a democratic society with welfare provisions (stage 5), universalism (stage 6), and environmental and animal ethics (stage 7). Gintis et al. (2003:163) noted, ‘among species that live in groups and recognise individuals, humans are unique in their capacity to formulate and communicate rules of behaviour and to inflict heavy punishment at low cost to the punisher’. 37 Kohlberg (1973:631–2; 1984:44–52); Damico (1982:411); Reed (1997:57–8); Frederick (1999:404); Priem & Shaffer (2001:208); Weber (2008); Hartman et al. (2009:3). The conventional group is about organisational maintenance while the post-conventional group is about organisational creating. It is rule-abiding (group 1), rule-interpreting (group 2), and rule-creating (group 3). 38 Damico (1982); Reimer et al. (1983:66); Kohlberg (1985:410); McMahon (1995:294); Monk (1997:57); Klikauer (2008:164). It has even been applied to individual characters in the US comedy series M*A*S*H (Sison 1985). 39 The origins of the business term company reach back to somewhere between the year 1337 and 1453. Around that time privatised armies gathered together as groups and provided employment for soldiers and ex-soldiers alike. These groups or bands of soldiers saw themselves as soldiers ready to sell their services to anyone who paid. Their modus operandi was to rent out the business of war-making, killing, assassination, and the like. But their employment organisation in gangs, cohorts, or groups specialising in killing and related war activities was subject to the infrequencies of organised warfare. During the unfortunate event of peace time they suffered. Without money, food or career prospects outside the war business, mercenaries and ex-soldiers all over Europe, including the 14th-century infamous Englishman John Hawkwood, formed com-pan-ies. These companies or small communities derived from the Italian term ‘con’ i.e. sharing and ‘pane’ i.e. bread, linking bread to sharing. Among employed and unemployed mercenaries, private army members, ex-soldiers, and bands of soldiers, the bread that these members shared laid an organisational groundwork for early half military and half business organisations. The 14th-century bread sharing – con pane – became today’s company as military warlike activities and modern business organisations merged. Instrumental rationality is closely linked to the army as well as to management as both transfer organisational principles to business or war organisations. Behind both lie ideologies that conceal their political character. Principally, war is no longer called war but defence. Profit is not called profit but organisational goal. Conveniently, profit-making corporations are just called ‘organisations’ which sounds much more neutral through their almost value-free appearance. Originally the term organisation stems from the Greek organon. It means tool, apparatus, or instrument. Organisations carry connotations of a formal system with them that has a teleological orientation towards achieving goals (Klikauer 2007:144; McCloskey 2006:44). 40 Habermas’ (1985); Bauman (1993:5 & 2008: 113); Klikauer (2007:59). 41 The term ‘manager’ refers to a predominantly male profession that even today is still only partly occupied by female managers. Kohlberg’s work has been criticised for neglecting gender, being sex-biased, and lacking a feminist perspective. His studies had been conducted on boys rather than on girls or a mixed group (Gilligan 1982; cf. Broughton 1983; Reimer et al. 1983:45 & 105; Nunner-Winkler 1984; Lifton 1985; Bloom 1986; Rothbart et al. 1986; Senchuk 1990; Reed 1997:54; 234 Notes

Sigurdson 1997:8; Collins 2000:11; Dawson 2002; VanSandt et al. 2006:149; Crain 2005:167–9; Chanter 2006; Donleavy 2008:807–8). Significant differences between boys and girls and between men and women can be found in the area of ethics (cf. Reed 1997:51ff. & 88). Jorgensen (2006) argued that there is no critique (not about sex-bias, 2006:182) but a difference in voices (Gilligan’s title), one emphasising justice (Kohlberg) and the other care (Gilligan). Despite all this, the fact remains that today’s managers are primarily male and that Kohlberg’s study was also conducted with male participants. 42 ‘The office-holders in an optimally functioning free-enterprise system always intend their own gain’ (McMahon 1981:267; cf. Howard 2008). 43 Charles Darwin (1871) saw three types of unselfish behaviour: obedience to authority, cooperation, and altruism (Krebs 2008:153; cf. Fehr & Schmidt 1999:852; Toma- sello 2009:30 & 60). Krebs (2008:156) noted that ‘biologically altruistic strategies can evolve in at least three ways: through sexual selection, kin selection, and group selection’. Crowson (2009:105, 106, 108) noted, management morality occurs when ‘tangible benefits exceed the cost, rather than altruism…corporate social responsibility is no more than a by-product…it is something that spills-over into the wider community’. When management acts, altruism is seldom, if ever, the motive. 44 Evolutionary science has long known that man is by nature a social creature (Dugatkin 1997:3). Hence, the essence of humans (Hegel; cf. Gadamer 1976) is social, not individual and it is social cooperation, not competition that makes us what we are. In The Origins of Species (1859) Darwin spent considerable space outlining the various cooperative and altruistic tendencies that almost always define the social instincts (Dugatkin 1997:5). Gibbs (2003:38) sees this stage as a ‘pragmatic stage of moral reciprocity in primate societies’. The earliest surviving ethical writings prepared by the Egyptian ruling class some 3,000 years before the Chris- tian era established those who have bread are urged to share it with the hungry (cf. Kraut 2007). Today’s management represents the complete opposite. As Levitt (1958:48) pointed out, ‘corporate welfare makes good sense if it makes good economic sense… Welfare as an end in-itself (Kant) makes no sense for management. It does so “only” as a means (Kant) and a tool – good economic sense (Levitt) – for profit-making’ (cf. Clinard 1983:141). 45 One of the earliest codified moral codes has been enshrined in Babylonian law – ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’. Kohlberg (1987:21) sees this as the revenge stage. Gibbs (2003:37f.) calls it ‘crude short-term “tit-for-tat”…even vengeance…in all its brutality’ (cf. Axelrod & Hamilton 1981:1393; Sachs et al. 2004: 139). ‘Blood- demands-blood, the avenger of blood’ (Rashdall 1891:20), ‘“blood revenge” or revenge can be incredibly destructive if left untamed’ (Gibbs 2003:45; cf. Chagnon 1988). Even in 2,300 BC, the rule an ‘eye-for-an-eye’ – the amount of punishment should correspond with the amount of the offence – only applied when the victim was of the patrician class. If an eye of a commoner was lost, a fine of a quantity of silver was the rule. It established, probably for the first time in human history, morality and law based on class (cf. Colby & Kohlberg 1987:21). It is same for same or Eskimos kill seals so seals should kill Eskimos (Kohlberg 1985:491). Stage 6 and 7 are about the morality that is established when distinguishing between the killing of animals and of men (Trainer 1977:57). 46 Externalities are seen as a neighbourhood effect or spill over. They are distinguished into (mostly) negative (pollution, death, destruction, etc.) and (rarely) positive (e.g. a beekeepers bees’ pollination of surrounding areas); cf. Brenner & Molander (1977: 62); Heller (1989:39); Weber (1990); Brunsson (2002:6); Bakan (2004); Buchanan & Badham (2008); Kreitner (2009:376–80). Notes 235

47 Dalton (1959) emphasised, ‘the power struggle [is] a major aspect of managerial interaction…the power seeking executive’. Brenner & Molander (1977:68) noted, ‘the American business executive [is a] power-hungry, proﬁt-bound individualist, indifferent to the needs of society’ (cf. McCalley 2002) and Quinn (1953:215) noted, ‘not often has the power of one man over another man been used more callously than in the American labor market after the rise of the large corporation’ (cf. Weber 1990). 48 Cf. Hegel’s ‘the other’ and Mead’s signiﬁcant and general other (1934); evolu- tional ethics on groups, cooperation, altruism, etc. (cf. Tomasello 2009). 49 Klikauer (2008:34ff.). It establishes what Hegel called ‘the essential’ rather than an accidental form of management behaviour. To categorise management ethics, it is imperative to analyse essential principles or patterns of management behaviour as structurally determined rather than as anecdotes. This may even be seen as a version of Occam’s Razor that refers to the act of shaving away unnecessary [i.e. accidental] assumptions to get to the simplest explanation even though the essence of a thing may not be as simple as the rather conservative tool of Occam’s Razor would like to have it. 50 Cf. Gibbs (2003:50f.) stage mixture emphasising a considerable overlap, also outlining the preference for stages not schemas (p.52f.; cf. Krebs & Denton’s 11 propositions (2005:640–3); Krebs & Denton (2006); cf. Rousseau’s stages model (1762)). 51 Kohlberg (1973:633 & 640; cf. Kohlberg 1975:48; Kohlberg & Armon 1984:386) emphasised that ‘the later stage is morally better or more adequate than the earlier stage. Development through the stages indicates a progressive differentiation of categories from one another…’ (cf. Sichel 1976:57–8; Reid & Yanarella 1977:516; Trainer 1977:41 & 49; Carter (1980:88 & 94); Locke (1980:104); Damico 1982:411 & 426f.; Walker 1982:1334; Jennings & Kohlberg (1983:34); Modgil & Modgil 1985:4; Kohlberg 1985:498; Eddy 1988:406 & 412; Sridhar & Camburn (1993:728); Reed 1997:74; Kaptein 1998:1; Dawson 2002:154; Gibbs 2003:53; VanSandt et al. 2006:146; Crain 2005:165; Lapsley 2006:38; Donleavy 2008:808; Krebs 2008:151 & 165; Hartman et al. 2009:3). There is, of course, also an ascen- dancy from external constructiveness towards internationalisation and moral socialisation (Gibbs 2003:235; cf. Fromm 1949:143ff.) and from structure towards agency while simultaneously, forms of alienation (Hegel) diminish. This ascen- dancy marks a qualitative difference in the actual mode of thinking (Sichel 1976:57; cf. Bauman 1993:31); cf. Singer’s The Expanding Circle (1981); cf. Carter (1980:89); Gomberg (1994:545). 52 Kohlberg (1973:636f.); Linstead et al. (2009:385–93). 53 Management ethics is distinctively different from business ethics. Business ethics deals with issues such as false advertising, anti-trust laws, deceptive packaging of products, etc. Management ethics does not deal with such issues (cf. Kaptein 1998:52). 54 KZ stands for the German word Konzentrationslager (concentration camp). While KZ represents the worst punishment regime, punishing has a long tradition with its roots in religion (cf. Goldman 1979). According to Singer (1985), ‘those who obey the moral law will be rewarded by an eternality of bliss while everyone else roasts in hell’. According to Gomberg (1997:57), ‘they [Hobbes and Locke] train the young to obey and to internalise norms of obedience in forming their identities’ (cf. Levi 1959; Gert 2010). 55 According to Reed (1997:81), these stages (except for Kohlberg’s illusive 7th stage) are summed up as: the naïve moral realism of stage 1, the relativism of interests 236 Notes

and claims of stage 2 (cf. Moser & Carson 2001; Levy 2002), the interpersonal norms and perspectives of stage 3, the social norms and perspectives of stage 4, the universal principles of stage 5, and the explicit formulation of a criterion of reversibility of stage 6. Kohlberg himself saw these stages as a universal model. They apply to every form of management, in every country, under every condition (Bauman 1993:8). 56 However, one can exclude this stage because of its irrelevance to the morality of management. It indicates an early infant stage arguing that newborns cannot develop moral understanding because of insufficient self-determination and self- reflection based on limited and restricted interactions with the outside world. In the words of Socrates ‘an unexamined life is not worth living’ (cf. Quinn 1953:214). Kohlberg et al. (1983:17) define moral judgement as ‘(a) prescriptive: a categorical obligation to act, and (b) universalisable: a point of view which any human being could or should adapt in reaction to a moral dilemma’ (cf. Locke 1980:104). 57 Robinson Crusoe (1719) is no more than a romantic, conservative – if not racist – idea (cf. Solomon 2004:1028). On Hegel’s The Other, Krebs (2008:165) noted, ‘at first we judge others; we then begin to judge ourselves as we think others judge us; finally we judge ourselves as an impartial, disinterested third party might’ (cf. Reid & Yanarella 1977:522; Gomberg 1997:44f.; Krebs 2008). According to Fromm (1949:23), ‘man is not a blank sheet of paper on which [management] can write its text’ (cf. Dalton 1959:253; Sayer 2008:21). 58 Kohlberg’s stages are based on rationally created forms of organisations which establish patterns of thought (Dugatkin 1997:3); Krebs (2008:164) noted ‘moral judgments are viewed by most theorists as products of moral beliefs. Dual- processing theories have shown that people may derive beliefs in two ways: by processing information quickly, automatically, and mindlessly and by processing information in a more considered and controlled manner’. 59 Cf. Darwin (1871:474); Kropotkin (1902); Allee (1931 & 1938); Axelrod & Hamilton (1981); Lovejoy (1981); Singer (1985); Ridley (1996); Dugatkin (1997); Gomberg (1997:45); Sober (1998), Mysterud (2000:583); Gintis et al. (2003); Sachs et al. (2004); McCloskey (2006:439); Krebs (2008); Tomasello (2009). 60 Coercion is seen as a thing that must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary (Wertheimer 1987). Aquinas claims that ‘the notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive power’. Kant thinks there are two sorts of ‘incentives’ to follow the law: ethical and juridical. Coercion becomes a legal tool that works as a hindrance to freedom. Nozick (1969) sees coercion as a technique that influ- ences or alters the will of the coercee. A coercee does not act, but rather is acted upon. This applies to management because dealings in capitalist labour markets are often highly exploitative and labour is often acted upon (Zimmerman 1981 & 2002; cf. McGregor 1988–89). In these cases, a labour-offer-maker may be guilty of engaging in exploitation, though not coercion. When one party is in a much stronger bargaining position than another (as management is), the stronger party (management) sometimes uses its advantage to keep for itself most or all of the gains from cooperative interaction between the parties. So employers and managers who are in a stronger bargaining position than their employees/workers exploit them by paying them a small fraction of the value their labour contributes to the production of goods for the employer. This is especially feasible when one party has achieved a relative monopoly position or a dominant position with respect to employment. One might retain the exclusive connection between threats and coercion by saying that offers made by management from a position of their Notes 237

superior bargaining strength are very likely to be exploitative; and that sometimes coercion is used to create or maintain one’s bargaining advantages. 61 Kreitner (2009:44); cf. Ellerman (2001); Bobic & Davis (2003); Arnold (2005:311); Arnold & Randal (2010:268–74); Aamondt (2010:443). Nearly every textbook on management and organisational behaviour mentions McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y. In 2009 ‘Theory X and Theory Y’ received 7.8 million hits on the Google internet search site. 62 Cf. The Servants of Power (Baritz 1960); Skinner’s reference is quoted from Kohn (1999:19); cf. Kohn (1999:24–6); Lemov (2006); Klikauer (2007:76–96). One of the early ‘Servants of Power’ knew this already: Harvard Business School’s Roethlins- berger (1943:180) noted in ‘Management and Morale, modern psychopathology has contributed a great deal to the subject of control’ (cf. Karlins & Andrews 1972) and Karlins & Andrews (1972:6) noted ‘…most forms of scientific behaviour control are intrinsically evil because they deprive man of his “freedom”’ (cf. Powers & Vogel 1980). 63 Gibbs (2003:46f.) called all subsequent stages after stage 4: beyond peer (cf. Kohl- berg 1985:409; Dugatkin 1997:14ff.). This carries connotations to mutualism where cooperative acts benefit one person or more (Dugatkin 1997:31ff.; Rawls 1980:528; Sachs et al. 2004:137). The lion has two choices – hunt cooperatively or don’t hunt at all; Krebs (2008:154f.) outlines five types of cooperation: mutualism, concrete reciprocity, cooperation with cooperators, indirect reciprocity, and long- term social investment (cf. deWaal 1996). ‘In fact we know from both Kapauku and Hawaii of the practice of killing those, even kings, who refuse to share’ (Gomberg 1997:50); ‘most humans are emotionally compelled to impose “altruistic punishment” on others who act selfishly’ (Miller 2007:111); cf. free-rider-problem (Petit 1961:738; Bowles & Gintis 2002; Tomasello 2009:77, 82f.). 64 Reed (1997:9); cf. Levitt (1958:47) emphasised in the Harvard Business Review ‘welfare and society are not the corporation’s business. Its business is making money, not sweet music. Making money means that their starting salaries are four times the poverty threshold for four-person families’ (Crittenden 1984). Top-managers take this without moral concerns. 65 Kohlberg (1973:635) saw this stage – together with Rawls (cf. Nagel 1973; Gom- berg 1997:59f.), Locke, Rousseau, and Kant – as the highest level of abstraction (cf. Clark & Gintis 1978; Punzo 1996:20; Gibbs 2003:46f.; Schaefer 2007) because well defined moral imperatives (Kant) have been applied universally. Kohlberg believed there are ten universal moral values that are common to all human societies (Wood 1972:246; Reimer et al. 1983:84; cf. Gibbs 1977). 66 Sidgwick (1874 & 1889) regarded an egoist [stage 2] as someone who expresses no concern of the point of view of the universe (stage 6). Petit (1961:726) would see economic gain (stage 2) and social acceptance (stage 3) as prime drivers for moral action. Most philosophers believe that egoism is not acceptable, i.e. I should secure my own interest without regard for the effect on others (Gomberg 1994:538); cf. Sikula (1996:6, 140); Rachels (2003:63–90); Graham (2004:17ff.); Lapsley (2006:52); McCloskey (2006:36). 67 In McMahon’s words (1981:247), ‘a firm is morally required to benefit the community in which it operates – or society at large – in ways that go beyond the pro- vision of jobs, goods, and services as part of the firm’s normal (profit-seeking) operations’ (cf. Phillips et al. 2003:493). It also means to go beyond Carr’s statement (1968:152), ‘all sensible businessmen prefer to be truthful, but they seldom feel inclined to tell the “whole” truth’. This applies to businessmen previously known as ‘Robber Barons’ (Silk & Vogel 1976:11) a term successfully deleted from 238 Notes

public discourse by corporate mass media. Stage 5 means telling the whole truth, not a selected, modified, and manipulated version of it. But Carr (1968:153) concludes, ‘if a man has become prosperous in business, he has sometimes departed from the strict truth’. As Hampden-Turner (1970:217) noted in his chapter on Corporate Radicalism, ‘people often stumble over the truth but they pick themselves up and hurry along as if nothing had happened’. 68 Cf. Colby & Kohlberg (1987:23ff.) and more specifically Keller et al.’s discussion on stage 2 (1989). While punishment (stage 1) looks to the past, not to the future (Rashdall 1891:20), stage 2 is more future oriented. 69 Kohlberg & Armon (1984:386); cf. Gibbs (1977:7–8) discussion on transformational vs. additive model using the metaphor of a ‘layer-cake’ (cf. Kohlberg 1985: 498; Gibbs 2003:52f.); cf. hard-vs.-soft stages (Kohlberg 1990:263ff.) 70 One of the core strengths of the seven stages of morality is its predictive power. It makes it possible to anticipate managerial decisions before these are taken. Once the stage of morality inside which management operates is known, its moral decision- making capacity and limitations can be predicted. The predictive value of the model converts it from model- into theory-status. Hence, the seven stages of morality present theory rather than concepts, models, types, or modes. 71 This is not to be understood in Plato’s sense who advocated that ‘the highest pleasure, in fact, comes from intellectual speculation’. A somewhat opposite view is presented by Sade’s pursuit of pleasure even when this was evil and criminal (1787). 72 Kohlberg (1987:22); cf. Brunsson (1985). 73 Milgram’s experiment on obedience to authority figures was a series of social psychology experiments conducted at Yale University that measured the willingness of participants to obey an authority figure who instructed them to perform acts that conflicted with their personal conscious. The experiments began in July 1961, three months after the start of the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. Milgram’s testing revealed that it is possible that the millions of accom- plices were merely following orders, despite violating their deepest moral beliefs. Milgram summarised the experiment: The legal and philosophic aspects of obedience are of enormous importance, but they say very little about how most people behave in concrete situations. I set up a simple experiment at Yale University to test how much pain an ordinary citizen would inflict on another person simply because he was ordered to by an experimental scientist. Stark authority was pitted against the subjects’ [participants’] strongest moral imperatives against hurting others, and, with the subjects’ [participants’] ears ringing with the screams of the victims, authority won more often than not. The extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority constitutes the chief finding of the study and the fact that most urgently demanded explanation. Ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terribly destructive process. Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently obvious and they were asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, relatively few people had the resources needed to resist authority (cf. Fromm 1949:141). 74 Damico’s (1982:420); Trevino (1986:612) noted that ‘manager’s ethical behaviour will be influenced significantly by the demands of authority figures’ (cf. Painter- Morland 2008; Audi 2009; Goldhagen 2009; Wicks 2010). 75 Simon (1947); Dalton (1959:242); Whyte (1961); Gintis (1976); French (1979:213); Thompson & O’Doherty (2009); Jones (2010). Notes 239

76 Taylor (1911), cf. Fayol (1916); Weber (1947); Whyte (1961); Marglin (1974); Murphy (1993:19ff.); Magretta (2002); Klikauer (2007:153), Kreitner (2009); cf. Ackroyd (2010). 77 Today, management – at least in most OECD countries – may not act as bru- tally as it did during the 18th, 19th and perhaps early 20th century but management brutalities still exist in many non-OECD countries and perhaps in OECD countries as well. This apart, down-sizing, for example, still instils fear into those not down-sized. According to McCalley (2002:5), ‘fear is the motivating force and positive motivation becomes nonexistent’. 78 Monk (1997:57); Arnold (2005:250); Arnold & Randal (2010:289); Klikauer (2008: 164); Aamondt (2010:539). 79 Engels (1892); Rashdall (1891:24); Thompson (1963); Orwell (1948); Kohlberg (1964:383); Marcuse (1966:256); Milgram (1974); Clark & Gintis (1978:318); Damico (1982); Reimer et al. (1983:65 & 109); Zuboff (1988); Bauman (1989); Sewell & Wilkinson (1992); Barker (1993); Goldhagen (1996); Lyon (2001); Cairns et al. (2003); Klikauer (2007:171). 80 Reducing humans to numbers on a balance sheet (balanced scorecard) dehuman- ises humans. This is not dissimilar to the use of people and the dehumanisation through the tattooing of a number on their forearm in order to be used in a Nazi SS-Industry programme called Menschenmaterial (human resource). In short, stage 1 might not represent the physicality of such a punishment regime and employees are surely allowed to leave – at certain times – but management still relies on rudiments of punishing systems – fear – and the creation of distance between itself and employees (Chamberlain 1973:4; Kaplan & Norton 1992 & 1993; Weiss & Finn 2005; McCloskey 2006:2; Thompson 2008; Bolton & Houlihan 2008; Klikauer 2008:53, 163, 211; Sayer 2008:22; Muhr et al. 2010; Kothari 2010). 81 Cf. Schwartz (1990); in short, selfish managers ‘routinely violate moral requirements when it is to their advantage to do so’ (McMahon 1981:251). One example is: ‘the banker’s paradox – the tendency for banks to be least likely to lend people money when people need it most’ (Krebs 2008:155). 82 Cf. Singer (1985); even Darwin (1871) suggested that ‘animals feel good or satisfied when they behave in ways that are consistent with their social instincts and that they feel bad when they do not’ (Krebs 2008:158; cf. Nowak & Highfield 2011). McMahon (1981:252) noted, ‘while self-interest is to a certain extent at odds with morality, it appears to belie at the foundations of business…Adam Smith claims that individuals who intend only their own gain are led by an invisible hand to promote the good of society’. In other words, capitalist societies had to come up with an ideology to close a non-closable gap. This non-closable gap is between individual selfishness as the sole motor of economic action (Adam Smith 1759) on the one hand and the pretence that this favours the common good. The mysterious conversion of selfishness into a moral good is hidden behind the myth of an invisible hand (Smith 1776; cf. Henriques 2007:21). The invention of the so-called invisible hand provided an ideal ideological cover for the unsustainable contradiction between individual wealth and public welfare under capitalism (Smith 1776; Evensky 2005). On this, the godfather of liberal-capitalism published two books separating morality from business (cf. Sen 2001; Young 2003). 83 Dalton (1959); Baumhart (1961:164); Brennan et al. (1961); Petit (1961); Nader (1967); Carr (1968:143 & 149); Powers & Vogel (1980:5); Clinard (1983:15); McSwain & White (1987:422–4); Kohn (1999:21); Neimark (1995:84 & 89); McCloskey (2006:3); Saunders (2006:17); Henriques 2007:137ff.); cf. Friedman (2008); Carroll (2009); Reynolds & Ceranic (2009); Kothari (2010); Lennerfors (2010). Howard & Korver 240 Notes

(2008:13, 17, 21) note that as manager, ‘we fib, embroider, doctor, dupe, bend, dress up, cover up, overstate, understate, misinform, misguide, and stretch the truth. We varnish, inflate, embellish, garnish, warp, spin, and gild the lily. If we’re serious, we fake, con perjure, dissemble, distort, and tell bald-faced lies, we bluff, beguile, gloss over, downplay, puff up, leave in the dark, and hoodwink. We white- wash, sweet-talk, exaggerate, string along, take for a ride, propagandise – and snow, often we “define down” stealing as mooching, pinching, snitching, filching, encroaching, copping, hustling, scrounging, sneaking, cribbing, and lifting’. 84 Brenner & Molander (1977); Jones (1989:12); Weber (1991:298); Punch (1996); Minkes & Minkes (2008); Croal (2009); Klikauer (2010); www.transparency.org. 85 An incomplete list of unethical behaviour of management and business would look like this (cf. Shaw & Barry 2010; Velasquez 2012:38–45): A7D Affair, Agent Orange & Dow Chemical-Monsanto-Diamond-Shamrock, Aldephia-Fraud scandal, Amato-Barilla-DeCecco-Divella-Garofalo Italian pasta cartel, American Airlines illegal political contributions, American International Group; American Shipping, Arthur Anderson’s auditing of Enron, Arthur D. Little’s waste disposal; Australia’s HIH-insurance, BAE’s corruption, Baster-vs.-Ford Motor Co., Bath Iron Works, BCCI, Bechtel Power Co.’s union discrimination, Beech-Nut’s Bogus Apple Juice, Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme fraud; Big Brother at Procter & Gamble, Bre-X Minerals, British-American Tobacco hidden lobbying activities, hiding the truth on addiction & cancer, British Petroleum’s Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak, British Printing Corp.’s Asbestos, Charles Keating in Lincoln Savings & Loans, Chevron in the Amazon, ChoicePoint Inc., Chrysler’s Odometer Controversy, Danville Airlines, DC-10 Crash in Paris & McDonnell-Douglas, Dexel, Burnham & Lambert’s insider trading, Doe Run Co.’s lead smelter in Herculaneum, Dow Chemicals’ manufacturing of Napalm, Dow Corning’s breast implants, Enron, Exxon paying Italian political parties, ExxonMobil’s Chad/Caeroon Pipeline, Exxon Valdez, Fasco Motors in Thailand, Film Recovery Systems Inc., Fingerhut’s price strategy, Ford Pinto, Ford’s-Firestone Brawl, Four Seasons Nursing Centres of America Inc., Fraud at WorldCom, GAP’s Sweatshops, GAP and child labour, GE Health Care India (Wicks et al. 2010:121ff.), General Electrics’ anti-trust violation, General Motor’s job cut announcement just before Christmas 1991 (Neimark 1995:87); Goodrich Brake Scandal, Google in China, Goldman Sachs’ CEO & Global Financial Crisis (2007); Greyhound Bus Company and Motor Carrier Safety Act, the Guinness Affair, Gulf Oil’s extortion in South Korea, Gulf Oil’s payoffs to the Bolivian President, H. B. Fuller Co. & Sniffing Glue, Heavy Electrical Equipment Anti-Trust Case, Hewlett- Packard & journalists, Hooker Chemicals & Love Canal, IBM in Nazi Germany, ITT & Pinochet, Jacksonville Shipyard, James Hardy Industries, Japan’s Minamata, Japan’s Nitrogen Ltd., Jewish Prison Labour for Germany’s Nazi-Industry, Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol, KPMG & Tax Shelter Industry, KPMG for Enron, Lavish Pay at Harvard, Leeson & Barings, Lehman Brothers, MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., Levi Strauss in San Antonio (Texas), Lockheed’s bribe to a Japanese airline company, Malden Mills, Martha Stewart’s Insider Trading, Mattel’s massive recall of toys, McDonald’s Big Mac rewrapping, McDonald’s Hot Coffee, McDonald’s McLibel- Trial, Merck & Aids in South-Africa, Merck and Riverblindness; Miniscribe Corporation (Wicks et al. 2010:58ff.), Mitsubishi Motor Ltd., Moex Inc. (Wicks et al. 2010:157ff), Monsanto’s GM Seeds, Morton-Thiokol, Nestle’s Baby Formula, Nike in Southeast Asian Sweatshops, Nike’s misleading advertising, Northrop paying off Saudi Arabian generals, NoTel (Wicks et al. 2010:255ff.), Pacific Lumber Co. in Oregon, Parmalat, Procter & Gamble’s Rely Tampons, Race Discrimination at Texaco, Revco Medicaid and the State of Ohio, RSV Débâcle (NL), S & L Débâcle, Sears Auto Notes 241

Centre, Seveso, Sex Discrimination at Wal-Mart, Shell Oil in Nigeria, Shell Oil’s sinking of Brent Spar (Shell’s declared values are honesty, integrity and respect for the people) (Henriques 2007:22), Siemens, Solomon Brothers Treasury Bond Scan- dal, Standard Fruit Company & Banana Republics, Starbucks & Fair Trade Coffee & exploitation, Stauffer Chemical fraud (1982), Stew Leonard’s Dairy Stores (Neimark 1995:85); Subprime mortgage lending (2007–2010), The Arms Industry, Toys ‘R’ Us & Child World, Wal-Mart in 2005 (Wicks et al. 2010:201ff.), Weapons & Land-Mine Industry, Westinghouse’s anti-trust violation, Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster, Thalidomide: the Drug that Deformed, Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident, UNR Industries Inc.’s asbestos pipe insulation, Union Carbide’s Bhopal, US Car-Maker CEO’s private-jet begging trip to Washington DC; Visy-Amcor cartel (Australia), Walden Paddler’s plastic bottles, Whitewater Brewing Co. & free speech, Yahoo in China. Carr (1968: 148) reported an automobile master key manufacturer that mailed master keys for cars to anyone including thieves. 86 Carr (1968:146); Clinard (1983); Brunsson (2002:6); Shah (2006); Punch (1996 & 2008); Rahim (2010). 87 McMahon (1981:260). Examples for legal requirements to sanction ‘economic actors’ (management) are OHS, industrial relations laws, working time regulations, etc. (cf. Murphy (1993). 88 Kohlberg (1981:642) also emphasised, ‘since Kant, formalists have argued that rational moral judgements must be reversible, consistent, and universalisable. The keystone of [this] logic is reversibility’ (1973:641; cf. Gibbs 2003:16f.). 89 Erdynast (1990:258) emphasised that ‘the fundamental distinction between stage 5 as the perspective of basic rights independent of the moral norms of any particular society and its laws and stage 6 as the perspective of universal ethical principles has remained a constant difference. Kohlberg’s definition of stage 6 has undergone several distinct formulations that have radically different theoretical foundations’. Unfortunately, he left open why and where this might be the case (cf. Adorno 1959; Hill 2010). 90 In Marxist ethics this would mean, for example, that man is the highest essence for man and there is a categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, and abandoned being (Marx 1890). For utilitarians like Singer (1985) the core question of stage 6 is: ‘can we justify living in opulence while elsewhere in the world people are starving?’ (cf. Klikauer 2008; UN-Habitat 2010; Klikauer (2011:33–56). 91 Under stages 6 and 7, the concept of globalisation takes on a moral rather than a managerial meaning (cf. Singer 1985; Fabre 2003; Light & Rolston 2003; Palmer 2003; Stiglitz 2003 & 2004; Nussbaum 2004; Schrijvers 2004 & 2005; Monbiot 2005; Singh 2005; Dehesa 2006; Desjardins 2006 & 2006a; Fischlin & Nandorfy 2006; Snith 2006; Mandle 2007; Olen et al. 2005:452ff.; Pogge & Horton 2008; Hayward & Gould 2009; Pogge 2010). 92 An ideal type is formed from characteristics and elements of the given phenomena, but it is not meant to correspond to all of the characteristics of any one particular case. It is not meant to refer to perfect things, moral ideals nor to statistical averages but rather to stress certain elements common to most cases of the given phenomena (cf. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/#IdeTyp). 93 The ‘first’ stage or stage zero occurs when management acts reflexively without any concern for morality exposing itself to be seen as being amoral as identified at stage zero. It is an extreme version of pragmatism that shows no concern for others and no morality. Management purely reacts to whatever reaches it. At this level, management is trapped in here-and-now operations showing no engagement with 242 Notes

morality. This is generally not seen as a moral stage and therefore can be excluded. 94 McMahon (1995:295) states: ‘so we should understand the ultimate foundation of managerial authority…as a legal contract…as a moral promise to obey’ (cf. Levitt 1958:42; Marglin 1974; Peter & Hull 1969 & 2009; Henriques 2007:35; Klikauer 2007 & 2008; Jones 2010; Jones & George 2011). 95 Macho-management is an authoritarian management style that asserts a manager’s right to manage. Macho management is a term coined by Michael Edwardes, and it was adopted by the media in the 1980s. Macho managers tend to take a tough approach to improving productivity and efficiency, and are unsympathetic to trade unions (Horstman 1988). 96 Colby & Kohlberg (1987:42) saw this as the avoidance of getting into trouble. When management talks about trouble-makers, it operates at the lowest possible level (1) of morality (cf. Rashdall 1891:21). 97 According to Baumhart (1961:166), ‘of course the task of top management is to get results. And to do so every executive must apply some sort of pressure or sanction to subordinates in order to obtain excellent work…it is only fair that pressure be kept on subordinates. After all, stockholders and competitions keep the pressure on top management all the time’. Under HRM, the pressure placed on other managers downstream and employees has been modernised and camouflaged behind a veil of sophisticated techniques such as the balanced scorecard (Kaplan, R. S. & Norton 1992 & 1993). Not surprisingly, these techniques do not indicate a diminishing of relentless business pressures; rather the opposite might be the case (Klikauer 2007:205ff.; cf. Dalton 1959; Higgins et al. 1984; Victor & Cullen 1988). On this, Tomasello (2009:51) quotes Korsgaard: ‘the primal scene of morality…is not in which I do something to you or you do something to me, but one in which we do something together’. This is the opposite to management as management does not even conceptualise a ‘together’ instead it depends on separation – management and staff – and ‘I do something to you’ as enshrined in the managerial pre- rogative and ‘you do something for me’ (‘achieving performance through others’, Magretta 2002). 98 Kohlberg (1985:493) noted for this stage, this is the place where ‘norms have no fixed value…and categories of good and bad actions or actors have no inherent value’ which has been expressed as: ‘the governing rule in industry should be that something is good only if it pays’. It is, for example, the closure of unprofitable plants in communities which depend on them (McMahon 1981:262; cf. Feinberg 1978 & 2007; Hunt 2007; Rachels 2007). According to Bauman (1993:50) selfish management adopts a position of ‘the man might on moral grounds refuse to legis- late for anyone else than himself’. In that way, closing a plant becomes moral for management only because others are seen as irrelevant. It is a ‘restless never-ending process of profit-making alone…this boundless greed after riches’ (McCloskey 2006:2 & 36). 99 McMahon (1981:248) & Levitt (1958:48); cf. Barnard (1938:278); Milgram 1974 (www.stanleymilgram.com); Baumhart (1961:8); Bauman (1989); Jackall (1988); Weber (1990); Schwartz (1990); Punch (1996); Gintis et al. (2003); Schrijvers (2004, 2005). 100 In the words of Levitt (1958:42–4, 49), ‘it is not fashionable for the corporation to take gleeful pride in making money. Nevertheless, the function of business is to produce sustained high-level profits…and…the trouble is not that it is too narrowly profit-oriented but that it is not narrowly profit-oriented enough’. In short, it is too bad that corporations cannot be gleeful about profits and profit-making is Notes 243

the prime interest of management. It should be narrow about it so that it does not fall for the dangers of social responsibility as the title of this Harvard Business Review article says (cf. Cohen 1973; Crittenden 1984; Baumhart 1961:8 & 158; Jones 1989:2; Baumhart’s economic-vs.-ethical man, 1961:163). 101 Key to the ideology of Managerialism is the following: ‘we have to convince the have-nots that the way they can become haves is not by tearing down our system but by supporting us’ (Massey 1982:303; cf. Diefenbach 2009:108ff.). 102 Crittenden (1984:A1); in the words of Damico (1982:418 & 420), ‘it is the structured inter-relationship among the members of the military company, not simply the moral structure of any given person that defines the justness of what occurs’ (cf. Milgram 1974; Styron 1979; Bauman 1989; Sample et al. 2004:213–76). Milgram comes close to denying that the individual has any choice in deciding what to do (Damico 1982:421; cf. Clark & Gintis 1978:313; Trevino 1986:612; Bauman 1993: 31; McMahon 1995:293; Bakan 2004; Chrisholm 2004; Holbach 2004; Sterba & Kourany 2004; Pereboom 2004; Ayer 2007; Slote 2007; Taylor 2007). McMahon (1995:308; cf. Petit 1961:95) noted that shareholder-value is part of a system of shareholder rights that is connected to property rights, not moral rights. The system is based on right-holders – shareholders – rather than moral-holders or morality (Clinard 1983:134–6). 103 Cf. Sample et al.’s Are We Free (2004:213–76) with Holbach, Ayer, Chisholm, Frankfurt, Sterba & Kourany, Pereboom, and Double on ‘Freedom-vs.-Deter- minism’. Solomon (2004:1031) argues that ‘people in corporations are defined by the corporation’ (cf. McSwain & White 1987:412; cf. French 1979:213). On this, Macintyre (1983:351) noted, ‘we ought to remember what the keenest of all students of business ethics, Karl Marx, remarked: that we thought not to “make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains…”’. The remedy (1983:358) to corporate immorality according to Macintyre ‘lies not in the perceptions or the resolution of individuals, but in changing the forms of corporate life. But this cannot be achieved without making the operations of the corporations visible to the public outside as well. And this runs counter to corporate habits, indeed to our whole culture’. According to Badhwar (2009:281) ‘Milgram himself focuses on the lack of autonomy as the central problem, calling the all- too-common propensity to surrender our autonomy when we become part of an organisation a “fatal flaw nature has designed into us” – “flaw”, because “in the long run [it] gives our species only a modest chance of survival”’ (cf. Fromm 1949:141; Chamberlain 1973:4; Goodpaster & Matthews 1982; Heller 1989:20 & 81; Painter-Morland 2008:94ff.). 104 Kohlberg (1985:421) also outlined three types of responses to moral judgement situations: an external type (judging in terms of punishment), a conventional type (judging in terms of upholding rules) and a humanistic type (judging in terms of consequences to the interest and feelings of others). 105 Evolutionary biology has defined cooperation ‘as an outcome that – despite potential relative costs to the individual – is “good” in some appropriate sense for the members of a group, and whose achievements requires collective action’ (Dugatkin 1997:14). Wilson and Sober (1994) have shown that cooperative groups are more productive than selfish groups (cf. Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Tomasello 2009; Nowak & Highfield 2011). 106 Kreitner (2009:448f.) describes three bargaining zones: a) negotiation useless, b) negotiation necessary, and c) negotiation unnecessary. In short, in two out of three occasions management views bargaining negatively while in one occasion it is deemed necessary, i.e. unavoidable (cf. Walton et al. 2000). 244 Notes

107 Corps-esprit is a form of group moral that can be seen as the capacity of a group of people to pull together persistently and consistently in pursuit of a common purpose. As the military origins of management suggest (Klikauer 2007:102 & 129–33), corps-esprit carries militaristic connotations. In a military-managerial sense it means the cohesion of a managerial or military unit, task force, or any other group, cohort, troop, platoon, or party. An army with good supplies (management = supply chain management), sound air cover (management = good production & marketing), and a clear objective (military/management = leadership by generals or general managers) can be said to possess, as a whole, good or high morale. 108 ‘Strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid’ (Gintis et al. 2003:153; cf. Welch 2009). 109 Already Charles Darwin (1871) pointed out that ‘rejection and ostracism are poten- tially lethal in social species’ (Krebs 2008:155; Nowak & Highfield 2011). Manage- ment’s use of isolation, ignorance, rejection, and ostracism plays on one of our most ingrained fears in terms of human evolution. 110 ‘Inside the rule-obedience model they can be seen as a) rule-makers and b) rule- abiders. Rule-abiders combine two subsets, those of rule-interpreters or rule-appliers at the lowest level. Those who create and invent rules are usually called managers, while those who have to interpret and live by these rules are called workers’ (Klikauer 2007:190; cf. Brennan et al. 1961:8). 111 Pogge & Horton (2008; cf. Pogge 2010); Wood (1972:262) noted on global justice and perhaps on globalisation too, ‘the value of labour power depends on what is socially necessary; it therefore contains a historical and moral element. In China, it might consist of a bowl of rice a day [50cents/hour in today’s sweatshops], in affluent America, it might include the means necessary to supply the worker with a late-model automobile, a colour TV set, and similar depraving and debilitating necessities of life’ (cf. Campbell 2010). 112 In reality however, management, corporations, employers’ federations and their lobbyists seek to minimise the role of the state under its neo-liberal offensive that enshrines deregulation (cf. Friedrich August von Hayek (1944, 1948, 1960); Levitt (1958:47); Friedman (1970). 113 According to Reed (1997:84), this stage also ‘embodies a religio-cosmic perspective …based on constructing a sense of identity or unity with being, with life, or with God’ (cf. Carter 1985:16f.). 114 Reed (1997:91) calls this ‘moral atmosphere’ i.e. the collective norms of a group or community (Kohlberg 1984:257–70 & 498–581). Management styles tend to create such a moral atmosphere representing managerial norms for the group of management and the organisational community. As such, management styles influence the content and the form of moral reasoning and action (cf. Reed 1997: 96; cf. McCalley (2002:13). 115 Commonly management style refers to autocratic, paternalistic, democratic, and laissez-faire styles (Tannenbaum & Schmidt 1958). 116 The infamous prisoner dilemma was first created by Flood and Dresher of the Rand Corporation and popularised by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944); cf. Clark & Gintis (1978:310); Axelrod & Hamilton (1981:1393); Jennings & Kohlberg (1983: 35); Axelrod (1984); Petit (1961:742); Ridley (1996:51ff.); Dugatkin (1997:11); Fehr & Schmidt (1999:853); Shaw (2003:16); Krebs (2008:151); DeCremer (2009) Toma- sello (2009:54); Leonard (2010); Nowak & Highfield 2011; Styron’s Sophie’s Choice Notes 245

(1979). Trained in the prisoner dilemma, managers immediately click into: ‘I’m ethical, but is he?’ (Baumhart 1961:7). 117 President George W. Bush, in an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001 said, ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’; Benito Mussolini declared in speeches across fascist Italy: ‘O con noi o contro di noi’ – ‘You’re either with us or against us!’ (cf. FreedomAgenda.com Quotes and Facts on Iraq & WhiteHouse.gov Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/You’re either with us or against us). American developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello (2009:99f.) noted ‘indeed, recent evolutionary models have demonstrated what politicians have long known: the best way to motivate people to collaborate and to think alike is to identify an enemy and charge that “they” threaten “us”’. 118 Alvesson & Willmott (1996:40) noted in ‘mainstream management thinking, it is widely believed that corporations are generally beneficial, neutral, technological “systems of production” that equally serve the interests of many stakeholders…this assumption ignores the destructive aspects of corporate activities’ (cf. Sternberg 1997). 119 Brenner & Molander (1977:68). 120 Levitt (1958:49) noted, ‘in the end business has only two responsibilities – to obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-face civility (honesty, good faith, and so on) and to seek material gain’. In other words, the prime objective is to seek material gain – profits – and then obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-face civility. This is not morality. ‘Canons of everyday civility’ which applies only ‘in face-to-face’ actions are imposed on management from the outside – civility, and have to be obeyed by management (passive) while it seeks material gains (active). 121 Normative ethics asks questions such as what is right, wrong, good, morally obligatory, and the like, and why. Meta-ethical thinking does not address either particular or general questions about ‘what is good or right’. It addresses logical, epistemological, and semantic questions like: is the meaning of the expressions morally right or good? The latter is about ethics itself while the former about good and bad, right and wrong, etc. (Shafer-Landau & Cueno 2007). 122 Colby & Kohlberg (1987) outlined the philosophic foundation for his stage model in A Theory of Early Education and The Young Child as a Philosopher (cf. Kohlberg & Armon 1984). 123 Kreitner’s management textbook (2009), for example, has 28 index entries for leadership but none for followers! A 2009 search on ‘leader’ in The Academy of Management Journal produced 62 hits while ‘follower’ just 11 (cf. McCloskey 2006:473; Ciulla 2004). 124 In this concept, leaders are assumed to be almost natural even though they are created and sustained in a social process. Leaders – be it management or political leaders – are a socially constructed reality. Leaders are at their best (sic!) when fighting a market share war (management) or a real war (politics). The sub-leader of the most heinous leader (Der Führer Adolf Hitler) in human history, Hermann Goering, put his finger on it in 1946, not long before he committed suicide. Gustav Gilbert, an intelligence officer, interviewed him in his jail cell in Nuremberg during the war crimes trials. The transcripts of these interviews were published in 1947 in Gilbert’s Nuremberg Diary. Gilbert said to Goering that in a democracy the people have some say through their elected representatives and that in the US only Con- gress can declare war. Goering’s recorded reply was: ‘That is all well and good, but voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. 246 Notes

That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country’. Old Hermann certainly knew a thing or two (Klikauer 2008:275; cf. Gomberg 1994:544). 125 This assumes that, despite all propaganda by Managerialism, it is not ‘normal’ for human beings to sit eight hours a day, five days per week, and 30 years in front of a computer on a desk or to screw the left front-wheel to a car (cf. Simon 1947; Dalton 1959; Whyte 1961; cf. Jones 2010). Rather than being reflective of human life, it alienates human life (Hegel). 126 Trivers (1985:388) suggested that a ‘sense of fairness has evolved in the human species as the standard against which to measure the behaviour of other people, so as to guard against cheating in reciprocal relationships’ (cf. fairness as inequity- aversion, Fehr & Schmidt 1999:819; cf. Rawls 1980:532; Jennings & Kohlberg 1983:48; Heathwood 2010). 127 Stage 6 (Locke 1980) contains democracy and democratic processes that cannot be reduced to recognising obligations to society, as Sridhar & Camburn (1993: 732) have claimed. One cannot delete parts of Kohlberg to make it fit to the Moral Development of Corporations (Sridhar & Camburn’s title). Deleting democracy to make Kohlberg fit into the anti-democratic orbit of corporations exposes one to a charge of being The Servants of Power (Baritz 1960). 128 Moral philosophy distinguishes between inherent or intrinsic value and extrinsic value. The former denotes that an intrinsic value is said to be a value that a thing has in-itself (Kant), or for its own sake, as such, or in its own right. An almost complete listing of intrinsic values was outlined by American moral philosopher William Frankena (1908–1994). It includes: life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience; morally good dispositions or virtues; mutual affection, love, friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and proportion in one’s own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-expression; freedom; peace, security; adventure and novelty; and good reputation, honour, esteem (Frankena 1973). Extrinsic values, on the other hand, are good not for their own sake but for the sake of something else to which they are related in some way. In short, management is all about extrinsic values and not about intrinsic values as enshrined in the external value of shareholder-value i.e. profit-maximisation, performance management, competitive advantages, etc. What management does is – in theory – good for someone else (shareholder-value i.e. profit-maximisation) and not for the self (e.g. management; cf. Djelic & Vranceanu 2009). 129 On the irrationality of rationality, German philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1898– 1979) wrote (1968:207), ‘in the unfolding of capitalist rationality, irrationality becomes reason: reason as frantic development of productivity, conquest of nature, enlargement of the mass of good (and their accessibility of broad strata of the population); irrational because higher productivity, domination of nature, and social wealth become destructive forces’ (cf. Feyerabend 1981; Bowman 1982; Brunsson 1985; Langley 1989; Nozick 1993; Habermas 1997; Heath 2003; Gilabert 2005; Cooke 2006). 130 McCloskey (2006:1–2 & Banerjee 2008:1541); Missing from McCloskey’s list is Hugo Boss, the former maker of SS-uniforms and the brand clothes paraded today on any high street in any city (wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_chic & Hugo Boss Acknowledges Link to Nazi Regime, in: New York Times, 15th August, 1997, p. B01). Notes 247

131 Carr (1968:144); Lucas (2003:25). On this, Macintyre (1983:352) noted, ‘anyone’s gain is somebody’s loss and usually somebody else’s loss; anyone’s benefit is somebody’s cost and usually somebody else’s cost’. 132 In the philosophy of ethics, there are two basic versions of moral orientations: one version does not examine moral motives when a managerial action is taken. Instead it only examines outcomes and consequences of management’s actions. If the outcome of management’s action – disregarding its motives, intentions, and purpose – produces an ethically good result, then such an action is deemed morally good. This is the philosophical idea of consequentialism. When management, for example, favours a design of a commercial good that is cheaper to produce and therefore increases profit margins but is also safer for consumers to use, then such an action is seen as morally good. In such a case, management’s original intention was to produce a cheaper product. But because it is also a safer product as a by-product, it is morally good in terms of consequentialism because it only looks at the outcome – not the intention – of management’s action. The extreme opposite of consequentialism is, for example, Kantian morality. Kant focuses our attention on moral motives. For Kant, only if the intentions are good, an act can be considered morally good. In the above case, management’s intention was to produce a cheaper product, not a safer product. The safer good only came along rather accidentally as a side- effect. In Kantian ethics, management cannot claim to have acted morally because its intentions were not directed towards a safer product. Under consequentialism management acted morally while under Kantian ethics it did not because its intentions were not directed towards moral outcome. In short, in the philosophy of ethics consequentialism and Kantian ethics constitute opposites to each other. One favours outcomes while the other favours intentions and motives (cf. Brennan and Lo 2010). 133 Taylor (1911); Klikauer (2007:143–59); Fayol (1916) Kreitner (2009:13f.); cf. stage model in: Kohlberg (1985:491ff.). 134 Kohlberg (1985:421) noted, because the ‘authoritarian’ is insecure about the effec- tiveness of his own internal moral control, he exaggerates the value and power of external authority and projects his own uncontrolled or ‘immoral’ impulses upon ‘evil’ members of various out-groups. This includes a strong belief in social and religious authorities, adherence to conventional rules, punitive attitudes towards criminals, and deviants, belief in the prevalence of evil in the world, and the denial of unconventional inner feelings. It is quite likely that the chief opponent of authoritarianism is an internalised superego which is integrated with the ego. 135 Kohlberg (1985:491) uses the term heteronomous to describe a subordination or subjection to law; political subjection of a community or state as opposed to autonomy (Metaph.); and as a term applied by Kant to those laws which are imposed on us from without, or the violence done to us by our passions, wants, or desires. 136 Kohlberg (1985:392f. & 492; Nunner-Winkler 1984). Erdynast (1990:251) defines justice based on Rawls. Rawls (1980) defines the sense of justice as ‘the capacity to understand, to apply and normally to be moved by an effective desire to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice as the fair terms of social cooperation’ (cf. Wood 1972; Nagel 1973). 137 Kohlberg (1985:417) noted, ‘not ratting’ on a friend tended to be justified in the same external terms (retaliation, being ridiculed, and so on) as conformity to more conventional norms (cf. Bowles & Gintis’ homo reciprocans undertaking peer punishment, 2002); Jennings & Kohlberg (1983:35). 138 Rawls (1972). According to Locke (1980:104), ‘utilitarians…adopt the good of the whole as the ultimate moral arbiter, taking precedence over justice and respect for persons’ (cf. Macintyre 1983:355f.). 248 Notes

139 For consequentialism hypothetical ‘if-then’ constructions are the basics of ethics. For instance, ‘if’ an outcome of a managerial act is moral ‘then’ such an act is moral. 140 A good example is Kant’s categorical imperative: ‘act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means’. Immorality is the treatment of others as a means. Morality is the treatment of others as an end in-itself. This is what Kant meant by his ‘Kingdom of Ends’ (Fromm 1949:27; cf. Korsgaard 1996) as the final and universal destination of every human being. Kantian ethics differs fundamentally from consequentialism. In Kantian ethics it is the intentions and motives that make management moral, not an accidental outcome. In Kantian ethics, management acts morally when it had the moral intention (cf. Callinicos’ ‘Justice & Universality’ in his Resources of Critique (2006:217–42). 141 Kohlberg (1985:491); cf. Carter (1985). 142 Cf. Taylor’s Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (1986); Rolston’s Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (1988); Keller (2010); and Grenberg’s Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue (2005); cf. Beder (2000a). 143 Four forms of justice can be outlined: distributive, commutative, corrective, and procedural. On ‘Contract Theory’ or contractualism, Gomberg (1997:49) noted the difference between Hobbesian Contractualism and Rawls’ Contractualism; cf. Rawls on Kantian Constructivism (1980; cf. Rawls 1972, 1993, 1999, 2001). 144 Kohlberg (1973:634) found that most philosophical reasoning relates to stages 5 & 6 emphasising that without formal moral theory men naturally aspire to be at stage 5 (cf. Gilbert 1983). 145 This list of names, philosophical concepts, and moral theories is by no means designed to deliver a complete catalogue. However, these are useful examples of ethical theories that can be associated with specific stages of morality (Singer 1994; LaFollette 2000 & 2007). In some cases it identifies a philosopher’s or philosophy’s moral stage (cf. Bauman’s ethics in stage 1) while in other cases it identifies philosophers who have dealt with specifics of a stage (cf. Kantian ethics in stage 6). 146 ‘Most Nazis, slave-holders, and commanders of Russian Gulags did not think they were immoral; they assumed they were doing the right thing’ (LaFollette 2007: 13). On the individual-vs.-organisation continuum, Tsujimoto (1979:79) noted, ‘individuals are naturally benevolent and that rigid, dehumanizing institutions are responsible for most injustice’. This has been powerfully proven by Milgram (1974) and Bauman (1989). Both, together with Tsujimoto (1979:79) see institutions as the major source of injustice (cf. tenBos 1997; Bernstein 2006). 147 According to Singer (1985), ‘social life, even for animals, requires constraints on behaviour’. This is achieved through an inter-group morality developed by a group for a group. For evolutionary biologists it became clear that cheaters do worse than cooperators and that lions, for example, have two choices: hunt cooperatively or do not hunt at all (cf. Kohlberg 1964:386; Kohlberg et al. 1983:42; Simon 1990; Dugatkin 1997:31f.; Tomasello 2009). 148 Gibbs (2003:37f.) describes this as tit-for-that morality, vengeance in all its brutality; pragmatic or instrumental, crude, short-term, and sometimes brutal morality; destructive revenge and blood revenge (p.45); cf. Chagnon (1988); Petit (1961:736); Mysterud (2000:585); Sachs et al. (2004:139). 149 According to Singer (1985), ‘like humans social animals may behave in ways that benefit other members of the group at some cost or risk to themselves’. In other Notes 249

words, morality starts with cooperation and inner-group relations, not competition (cf. Dugatkin 1997:viii; Kropotkin 1902). When management establishes a moral code that benefits others – non-managerial staff – even at a risk to management itself, it establishes morality. If it does the reverse – benefiting management while offloading risks onto others – it fails morally. Gibbs (2003:49) calls stage 1+2 the immature stages. 150 Under virtue ethics (Greek arête and Roman virtus), morality is not regarded as a matter of conformity to a law but an ethical desire to be morally good as an inner desire. Such individuals carry ‘a bag of virtues’ (Sichel 1976:61) including: personal honour, being loved, temperance, piety, courage, justice, wisdom, and self- aggrandizement (Socrates), honesty, rectitude, charity, faithfulness, non-violence, modesty, courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, high-mindedness, gentle- ness, truthfulness, wittiness, shared friendship, and justice (Aristotle, cf. Kohlberg et al. 1983:18; Derrida 1997); simplicity and sincerity (Lao-Tzu); prudence, justice, restraint or temperance, courage or fortitude (Aquinas 1265–74); love, charity, harmony, and generosity (Descartes), benevolence, generosity, sympathy, and gratitude (Shaftesbury) and purity of heart, patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy (Darwin (1871) thought that sympathy is integral to the evolution (in: Krebs 2008:156–8; Tomasello 2009:53)), humanity, justice, generosity, and public spirit (Adam Smith, according to Sen, 2001:200), nobleness, dignity, decency, and courtesy (Hume), while falsehood, egoism, cruelty, adultery, theft, rank, luxury, and glamour (Lao-Tzu), hedonism & individual greed (Brenner & Molander 1977:63), nepotism, favouritism, and arbitrariness (Henry 2001:267) narrow-mindedness, greed, avarice, selfishness, myopia, and egoism (Sikula 1996:18; cf. Rand 1965; Solomon 2004:1025), hypocrisy and inconsistencies (Brunsson 2002; cf. Heller 1989:39), conformity, vengefulness, a desire for status ranks with the desire for wealth and power (Petit 1961:725 & 745) aggressiveness, domineering, narcissistic, and lacking in empathy are considered to be vices (Miller 2007:106) to be avoided; morality prohibits actions such as killing, causing pain, deceiving, and breaking promises but requires charitable actions, promoting people living together in peace and harmony, not causing harm to others, and helping them; generosity, kindness, honesty, courage, social sensitivity, political idealism, intellectual integrity, empathy to children, respectfulness to parents, and loyalty to friends (Miller 2007:104) & emotional responsiveness to the needs of others, lovingness, affection, fondness, commitment, forgivingness, trust, and perspective-taking, niceness, agreeableness, non-violence, honesty, and heroism (Miller 2007:109); truthfulness, justice, honesty, benevolence, purity, and gratitude (Price & Reid); honesty, responsibility, loyalty, courage, and friendliness (Kohlberg 1964:390); cooperation, altruism, generosity, sympathy, kindness, and selflessness (Ridley 1996:38), fidelity, reparation, gratitude, and self-improvement (Ross); loyalty, fairness, integrity, and courtesy (Petit 1961: 725), knowledge, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion (Finnis) in line with European Christendom of faith, hope, charity, love, kindness, equality, humility, and conscience (quoted from Miller 2007:104); injury of living things are to be avoided; while wrongdoing harms the soul (Socrates, in: Arrington 1998:7; cf. Lovejoy 1981:345; Erdynast 1990:252; Gomberg 1997:45). 151 Today, evolutionary science, anthropology, and evolutionary ethics have proven that the survival of the fittest is pure nonsense (cf. Krebs’ evolutionary ethics, 2008; Tomasello 2009). Nevertheless, it is an important ideology for economists and business (Murphy 1993:149ff.). Hence The Servants of Power (Baritz 1960) and corporate mass media keep the myth alive. Quinn (1953:99) who often sat in GM’s Alfred Sloan’s office where he educated us, wrote, ‘survival of the fittest was Mr Sloan’s law’. 250 Notes

152 According to Solomon (2004:1021), Aristotle is famous largely as an enemy of business. He declared trading for profit wholly devoid of virtue. Aristotle despised the financial community…he called those who engaged in commerce ‘parasites’. 153 The opposite of moral rules and its adherence to it occurs when management adopts what Brunsson (2002) called the ‘Organisation of Hypocrisy’ because ‘hypocrisy is the assumption or postulation of moral standards to which one’s behaviour does not conform’ (2002:xiii). When hypocrisy obtains, there is still a causal relation between talk, decisions, and actions, but the causality is the reverse. Talk or decisions pointing in one direction reduce the likelihood of the corresponding action actually occurring, while actions in the particular direction reduce the likelihood of any corresponding talk or decisions taking place. Talk and decisions pointing in one direction do not encourage actions in the same direction; rather, they compensate for actions in the opposite direction, just as action in one direction compensates for talk and decisions in a different one (Brunsson 2002:xiv). Hypocrisy makes it possible for people to talk and make decisions about high values, even if they do not act in accordance with such values themselves (Brunsson 2002:xvii). 154 Hegel (1803/4, 1807, 1821, 1830); cf. Marx (1843); Sterrett (1892); Watson (1894); Marcuse (1940 & 1941); Kojève (1947); Taylor (1975); Gross (1976); Gadamer (1976); Rockmore (1981 & 1992); Ritter (1982); Singer (1983); Cook (1984); Min (1986); Smith (1987); Honneth & Gaines (1988); Wood (1990); Luhmann (1991); Adorno (1993); Zˇizˇek (1993); Kedourie (1995); Althusser (1997); Gomberg (1997:46); Pinkard (2000); Baynes (2002); Belmonte (2002); Deranty (2005); Fox (2005); Grum- ley (2005); James (2007); Schaefer (2007); Speight (2008); Klikauer (2010:88–125). 155 Kohlberg et al. (1983:13). 156 It is also when the social role of a conception of justice is to enable all members of society to make mutually acceptable to one another their shared institutions and basic arrangements, by citing what are publicly recognised as sufficient reason, as identified by that conception (Rawls 1980:517). In Rawls’ concept justice is part of a shared arrangement that is publicly recognised. Both go beyond the acceptance of justice as a given that defines stage 4. Rawls’ (1980:536) well-ordered society is a closed system; there are no significant relations to other societies. 157 Locke (1980:105) noted, stage 6 moral reasoning is universal only in the sense that it involves treating all men alike, according everyone the same respect and value, regardless of status, regardless of situation. 158 Cf. Kant’s ‘we have no duties to animals’ (1785), in: Shafer-Landau (2007:395–6). In The Moral Status of Animals, Gruen (2003), noted: ‘Though Kant believed that animals were mere things, it appears he did not genuinely believe we could dispose of them any way we wanted. In the Lectures on Ethics he makes it clear that we have indirect duties to animals, duties that are not toward them, but in regard to them insofar as our treatment of them can affect our duties to persons. If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men’ (Kant 1780). 159 Examples are aggression, apathy, attacks upon an out-group, authoritarianism, viciousness, brutality, hostility, despotism, dictatorial regimes, duress, intimidation, tyranny, domination, indifference, anti-democratic attitudes, top-down relations, suppression, permissiveness, persecution, ruthlessness, scapegoat-ism, exploitation, submission, mercilessness, sadism, destructiveness, cold-bloodedness, the ‘Politics of Fear’, totalitarianism, friends-&-foe perceptions, enemy-thinking, life-&-death Notes 251

struggles, battles, strong leadership, and violence. Cf. Lewin et al. (1939), Fromm’s Man for Himself (1949) & Fear of Freedom (1960), Adorno et al.’s Authoritarian Personality (1964), Marcuse’s Repressive Tolerance (1969:96f.), Clinard (1983:161); Heller (1989:15); Calas (1993); Gilligan (1996); Bauman (2000), Füredi’s Politics of Fear (2004), McCalley (2002:12); Bauman’s Liquid Fear (2006); Storey (2007:2); Badhwar (2009:257); Kothari (2010); Tasioulas (2010); Schultz & Schultz (2010: 270ff). On fear, Kohn (1999:135) quoted an AT&T and an IBM manager: ‘I hope everybody here comes to work scared to death about the fate of the company’, said a top executive at AT&T. Making the bottom 10% uncomfortable is good business, declared a senior vice president of personnel at IBM. An ironic motto posted in some office and school perfectly captures the illogic of the retrograde approach to management: ‘THE BEATING WILL CONTIMUE UNTIL MORALE IMPROVES’ (Kohn 1999:136). 160 Cf. Kafka’s The Penal Colony (1919); Orwell’s Nineteen-Eighty-four (1948; cf. Marcuse 1969:110); Foucault (1995); Feldman (1998); Arnold (2005). On this, Adorno (1944:74) emphasised that Bettelheim’s observation on the identification of the victims with the executioners of the Nazi camps contains a judgment on the higher seeding-grounds of culture, the English ‘public school’ [original in English], the German officer academy. The absurdity perpetuates itself: Dom- ination reproduces itself all the way through the dominated. The fear of punishment appears to be deeply enshrined in Christian value systems. In an article on ‘US Evangelists are Twisting the Bible’, Giles Fraser (2006:16) wrote: ‘he that spareth this rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes (Proverb 12:24)…Somehow, after eight or 10 licks, the poison is transformed into gushing love and contentment’; cf. Marcuse (1969:104 & 117; 1971); Rummel (1994); Wrong (1994:3); Beder (2000:193ff.); McCalley (2002:5); Saunders (2006: 11); Baillargeon (2007:210ff); Passer & Smith (2007:627–31); Davis (2009); Croall (2009); Tasioulas (2010). 161 Unlike the philosophers Hobbes and Nietzsche, Machiavelli served his direct employer. He was employed by Giuliano de’ Medici whose ‘Master’s Voice’ he spoke. His work concerned cruelty and clemency, and whether it is better to be loved than feared (Jay 1967:33). In management terms, the issue whether it is better to be loved than feared is called Theory X (fear) or love’s Theory Y (McGregor 1960 & 2006; cf. Clark 2010). 162 Cf. Robespierre’s terror of liberty and terror of despotism, in: Marcuse’s Repressive Tolerance (1969:117; Tocqueville 1848:317); cf. Badhwar’s sorry record of human- kind’s obedience to authority (2009:258); cf. Jay’s Management and Machiavelli (1967); Fromm (1949:12). 163 Cf. Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes – the war of all against all (cf. Gert 2010; Axelrod’s ‘The Live-and-Let-Live System’ and the military logic of kill or be killed (1984:273); Wrong’s cut-throat struggle (1994:25; cf. Zimmerman 1981:124; Heller 1989:80; Glover 1977; Shah 2006); Dalton’s struggle for power (1959; cf. Kirkeby 2000:4). Burham (1945:52) saw management as a Struggle for Power in his: The Managerial Revolution; McCalley’s Six Positions of Power (2002:1–118); cf. Rummel (1994). Machiavelli thought that commerce is like war (Jay 1967:176). Despite all this, Tomasello (2009:60) maintains that all social animals are, by definition, cooperative in the sense of living together relatively peaceful in groups. 164 Not to forget historical horrors such as religious crusades, the slaughter of Albigensian heretics, the Turkish decimation of the Armenians, and even the British invention of concentration camps during the Boer War (Bauman 1989:2). 252 Notes

165 Quoted from Kohn (1999:19); Lemov (2006); cf. Roethlinsberger’s workers have conditioned reflexes (1943:6). B F. Skinner once noted, those who have explicitly avowed an interest in control have been roughly treated by history. Machiavelli is the great prototype (Karlins & Andrews 1972:5); cf. Bauman’s (2006:3) distinction between direct and ‘derivative fear’. 166 Cf. Chomsky (1959, 1971); Beder (2000:93ff.); Baum (2005); Martin & Pear (2007 & 2011). On this, Skinner (1983) noted, ‘what a fascinating thing! Total control of a living organism’ (quoted from Kohn 1999:19). The underlying assumption [of behaviourism], according to one critic, seems to be that ‘the semi-starved rat in the box, with virtually nothing to do but press on a lever for food, captures the essence of virtually all human behaviour’ (Kohn 1999:24 & 26). 167 For management, this is needed when workers have gone Bolshevik as one of management’s prime ‘Servants of Power’ (Mayo) once noted (Bramel & Friend 1981:871 & 872). 168 According to Lemov (2006), the maze has been the core experimental construct used to test and condition animals and humans. 169 Cf. Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943/1992); Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1949); Camus’ Reflections on the Guillotine, an Essay on Capital Punishment (1959); Warnock’s Existentialist Ethics (1967). 170 Cf. Arnold (2005); Arnold & Randal (2010:289); Aamondt (2010:307f.). 171 Cf. Arnold (2005:313ff.; Arnold & Randal 2010:312ff.); Kreitner (2009:335–9); Aamondt (2010:334 & 337); Cullen (1997). While Maslow’s hierarchical theory was regarded as an improvement over previous theories of personality and motivation (punishment), it had its detractors. For example, in their extensive review of research based on Maslow’s theory, Wahba and Bridgewell (1976) found little evidence for the ranking of needs Maslow described, or even for the existence of a definite hierarchy at all. Still, it cements hierarchies and hierarchical thinking that is most welcome by management and The Servants of Power (Baritz 1960). Chilean economist and philosopher Manfred Max-Neef (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manfred_ Max-Neef) has also argued fundamental human needs are non-hierarchical, and are ontologically universal and invariant in nature – part of the condition of being human; poverty, he argues, may result from any one of these needs being frus- trated, denied or unfulfilled. The order in which the hierarchy is arranged (with self-actualisation as the highest order need) has been criticised as being ethno- centric by Geert Hofstede (Hofstede 1984. The cultural relativity of the quality of life concept, Academy of Management Review, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 389–98; cf. Peter & Hull 1969 & 2009). 172 Joan Magretta is a Senior Institute Associate at the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness. Her work with Professor Porter began in the early 1990s when she was the strategy editor at the Harvard Business Review (cf. Cohen 1973). Prior to joining HBR, Dr. Magretta was a partner at the management consulting firm of Bain & Co. Her recent book, What Management Is (2002), reflects her career-long interest in the intersection between strategy and general management. In 1998, she won the McKinsey Award given each year for the best article to appear in HBR. She has also written for the Sloan Management Review. Before completing her MBA at Harvard Business School in 1983, Magretta was a university professor in the humanities. She is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Wisconsin, with an MA from Columbia and a PhD from the University of Michigan. 173 Cf. Hare’s What is Wrong with Slavery (1979); Zimmerman (1981:126); Nazer (2005); Satre’s Chocolate on Trial: Slavery, Politics, and the Ethics of Business (2005); Satre (2005); Craig, G. et al. (2007); Shrage (2007); Bales & Trodd (2008). Notes 253

174 Cf. Marcuse (1941 & 1966); Fromm (1960); Adorno et al. (1964); Bauman (1989); Bowles & Gintis (1976, 1981, 2001); Freire (1970 & 2000). 175 Kreitner (2009:416ff.); Arnold (2005); Aamondt (2010:307f.); for an application of Kohlberg to employees, see Schumann (2006:115ff.) 176 Repulsed by the concreteness of the administered society [and managerial regimes], the effort of emancipation becomes ‘abstract’: it is reduced to facilitating the recognition of what is going on, to freeing language from the tyranny of the Orwellian syntax and logic, to developing the concepts that comprehend reality (Marcuse 1969:126; cf. Heller 1989:15). 177 On punishment and rewards, Magretta (2002) quoted Peter Drucker who had the last word. ‘One can never simply hire a hand’, he wrote, ‘the whole person always comes with it. And that is the problem’. In management, workers had only to do exactly what they were told, and supervisors made sure they complied. Manage- ment is about having the authority to reward and punish – being in charge. Skinner assumes that punishable behaviour can be minimised by creating circumstances in which it is not likely to occur (cf. Fromm 1949:11; Drucker 1949 & 1981; Chomsky 1971:33; Apel 1980:180ff.; Hoffman & Moore 1981; Heller 1989:48; Schwartz 1998; Klein 2000). 178 This is in line with Foucault’s predictions (cf. Discipline and Punish, 1995). In management, discipline dates back to J. Salter Lewis’ The Commercial Organisation of Factories (1896) who advocated a ‘forward looking modern approach…[of]…a system of strict discipline…[based on]…military organisational practices…[and its]…relevance to management organisational practices’ (cf. Klikauer 2007:102). Much later in the history of management, this became known as the brief-case- syndrome. Highly creative persons often imposed disciplined habits upon themselves as the necessary concomitant of their work. 179 See: Reich (1946); Arendt (1951, 1958 & 1994); Bauman (1989). 180 A not uncommon view is that ‘my boss is a feudal psychopath, an incompetent nitwit who threatens everyone; he surrounds himself with boot-lickers’ (Jackall 1988:97). Next to psychopaths (Punch 2008:107) there are also managerial oppor- tunists, fast trackers, chameleons, and hypocrite feigns (Petrick & Quinn 1997:62) while Petrick & Quinn (1997:103–4) noted that management is full of arrogant people, greedy people, envious people, gluttonous people, jealous people, slothful people, hateful people, and resentful people (cf. Saunders 2006:11). 181 Cf. Schrijvers (2004); Schwartz (1990); Taylor (1991:14f.); Alvesson & Willmott (1996:39). 182 Concurrent with turning humans into objects of power goes the fostering of mechanisms that disallow these objects of power to ever realise what they are made into. Adorno (1944:22) has commented on this. He wrote, ‘part of the mechanism of domination is that one is forbidden to recognize the suffering that domination produces, and there is a straight line connecting the evangelical lecture on the joy of life to the construction of slaughter-houses for human beings so far off in Poland, that everyone in one’s own ethnic group can convince themselves they don’t hear the screams of pain’ (cf. Marcuse 1969:107; tenBos 1997; Baillargeon 2007; Callinicos 2006; Diefenbach 2009:74ff.). 183 People are often degraded to others and eliminated from most management writings by The Servants of Power (Baritz 1960). This results in the total absence of the term labour. In contrast, Karl Marx called those ‘who make things’ (Aristotle) ‘pro- ducers’ because they – not management – make things. Standard management texts are blissfully ignorant to labour. This indicates Karl W. Deutsch’s deﬁnition of power: ‘power is the ability not to learn’ (Offe & Wiesenthal 1980). It also 254 Notes

shows that management is in a definition-creating position powerful enough to derecognise (Hegel; Honneth 1995) those ‘who make things’ (Aristotle; cf. French & Raven 1960; Deutsch & Singer 1964; Deutsch 1966; Galbraith 1983; Toffler 1990). 184 The ‘Banality of Evil’ has been expressed by Arendt (1994) and in Management by Fear (cf. cf. Fromm 1949:8f.; McCalley 2002:5 & 12; Klikauer 2008:164). On guilt, Schwartz (1990:43) noted, ‘in asserting its control over the participant’s guilt, the organisation asserts its right to end it and asserts that it, itself, is free of guilt’. This applies not only to the depersonalised term organisation (Klikauer 2007:144) but also to the equally depersonalised term management. The managerial structure of every company depicts an Egyptian pyramid. A pyramidal structure is designed to generate and secure authority. Ideologically, HRM’s idea of promotions as a pathway to the top engineers no more than an illusion for the vast majority of those ‘who make things’ (Aristotle). Numerically, the pyramidal structure of corporations acts against HRM’s ideology of promotions. The idea of promotions is no more than a false hope. It is part of the arsenal of managerial weapons. A careerist orientation is very helpful because it makes people want to appear ‘promotable’, cooperative, helpful, showing upward appeal, and signal competitiveness. Senior management only needs to foster the illusion of success, promotion, loyalty, compliance, and coalition-building and collusion is virtually guaranteed (Schrijvers 2004). 185 Katz & Kahn (1966:352) emphasised that ‘most people don’t get promoted at all. Most production workers remain production workers, and most typists remain typists’. In fact, those in managerial authority are numerically shielded against those in the lower ranks. According to Magretta (2002) hierarchies and lines of authority are essential to management because self-organisation which sounds seductive is wishful thinking. As a concept for management self-organisation is fundamentally flawed. On this Schrijvers (2004) noted, ‘in their arsenal of weaponry, the careerist orientation of others is very helpful because they want to appear “promotable”, appear cooperative, helpful, showing upward appeal, and signal competitiveness. All senior management needs to do is to foster the illusion of accomplishment, promotion, loyalty, compliance, coalition-building, collusion, and success is virtually guaranteed. For that one doesn’t even need to be in a position of ‘compliance professionals’. Such a specific group of managers is associated with sales, fundraising, advertising, and marketing’. Rothbard quotes Hayek in his F. A. Hayek and The Concept of Liberty (1982:219) who wrote, ‘coercion occurs when one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own but for the other’s purpose’. This represents an almost perfect definition of management: managerial coercion occurs when workers’ actions are made to serve management’s will, not for his own but for management’s purpose (cf. Zimmerman 1981). Rothbard (1982:220) continues: Hayek states that ‘There are, undeniable, occasions when the condition of employment creates opportunities for true coercion’; cf. Marcuse (1966); Foucault (1995); tenBos (1997); Leslie’s Walter Benjamin – Overpowering Conformism (2000); cf. Schultz & Schultz (2010:166). 186 As the focus on Milgram’s work is on the moral implications of his obedience studies, research details on laboratory experimentations can be gained from his original work (1963, 1973, 1974, 1992) and from works such as Adorno et al. (1964), Hampden-Turner (1970:132–4), Damico (1982), Alfonso (1982), Kelman & Hamilton (1989), Blass (1991, 1992, 1999, 2002), Tumanov (2007), Massey (2009). Notes 255

187 Blass (1991:398); Milgram’s experiments have been popularised in ‘We do as we are told – Milgram’s 37’ by rock musician Peter Gabriel on his 1986 album, the British play ‘The Dogs of Pavlov’, and featured in the French film ‘I…comme Icare’ (1979) starring Yves Montand (cf. Badhwar 2009). 188 According to Dahl (1957), power has four properties attached to it: (a) base as the base of power expressed in resources, opportunities, acts, objects, etc. that can be exploited in order to affect the behaviour of others; (b) means or instruments such as threats or promises; (c) amount of an actor’s power expressed in probability statements such as ‘9 out of 10’; and (d) scope that consists of responses that an actor receives during the application of power. Power can be seen as machinery in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised. Power resides not simply in relations of cause and effect (as Dahl suggests), but in structured relations of autonomy and dependence that are an endemic feature of working life. Power’s communicative aspect emphasises: power is defined in terms of the ability of individuals or groups to control and shape dominant interpretation at work. Finally, power is prevalent horizontally and vertically, in vertical relationships [management and worker] and horizontal relationships [management–management and worker–worker] (cf. Honneth 1991). 189 In On Violence (1970), Arendt quoted Sartre’s Jouvenel: ‘a man feels himself more of a man when he is imposing himself and making others the instrument of his will…and Clausewitz: war is an act of violence to compel the opponent to do as we wish. The source of power is the power of man over man…to command and to be obeyed: without that, there is no power…’ (Arendt 1970:37; cf. Jay 1967:13; Badhwar 2009:261). Rothbard quotes Hayek in his F. A. Hayek and The Concept of Liberty (1982:219) on the issue of violence. Rothbard writes, Hayek states that the threat of force or violence is the most important form of coercion. But they are not synonymous with coercion, for the threat of physical force is not the only way in which coercion can be exercised. 190 For Max Weber (1924) there are three main types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational/legal. The first form rests on managerially defined and operated customs and practises precluding any challenges to authority because it would upset established customs and practices (‘that’s how we always did it’, ‘this is how things are around here’, etc.). The second form is advocated through rafts of books on management leadership and the focus of the popular management press on great corporate leaders. The last form of authority is enshrined in property law, business law, and the legal right of management to manage. In Manage- ment and Machiavelli, Jay (1967:177) noted ‘but of all parallels between war and industry, the most consistently instructive is that between generalship and leadership’; cf. Kothari (2010). 191 Quoted from Blass (1992:288; cf. Glover 1977). On this, McCalley’s (2002: 21) ‘Lesson Four states…the use of strong position power is appropriate and productive’. 192 Blass (2002:70 & 72); Blass (1991:406) reports that Milgram’s subjects were volunteers (just as in the SS) and that a binding factor is needed. It establishes an authoritarian relationship between subject and experimenter, between the Jews and an SS-man, and between management and subordinates. 193 Milgram found there were no male-female differences in obedience (Blass 1991: 406). According to Badhwar (2009:281) Milgram himself focuses on the lack of autonomy as the central problem, calling the all-too-common propensity to surrender our autonomy when we become part of an organisation a ‘fatal flaw 256 Notes

nature has designed into us’ – ‘flaw’, because ‘in the long run [it] gives our species only a modest chance of survival’. 194 Blass (1999:958); cf. Weber (1904/05, 1924, 1947); Marcuse (1964). 195 Milgram (1973:77) noted ‘the problem of obedience is not wholly psychological. The form and shape of society and the way it is developing have much to do with it…a person does not get to see the whole situation but only a small part of it, and is thus unable to act without some kind of overall direction. He yields to authority but in doing so is alienated from his own action…no one is confronted with the consequences of his decisions to carry out the evil act. The person who assumes responsibility has evaporated. Perhaps this is the most common characteristic of socially organised evil in modern society’. 196 This is designed to create a kind of Eichmannian excuse (‘I am just doing my job’) by management which in reality cannot be sustained as Arendt (1994; cf. Adorno et al. 1964; Milgram 1974; Bauman 1989) have proven. Despite this, the managerial setup still seeks to design such a structure to make morality disappear between managerial authority (‘I didn’t do it’) and obedient employees (‘I followed orders’). 197 Bauman (2000:25; cf. Bernstein 2006:36) calls this a technique of de-ethicalising the relationship with the ‘Other’. 198 This is not to say that management operates like the SS. It does not and has never done so. But the common element between both is the way in which morality is displaced away from the individual. 199 Next to punishment regimes – disciplinary action in HRM-language – it has always been obedience to authority that denotes one of the core elements of management. Magretta (2002) noted on authority, the sometimes invisible, but always important, lines of authority make management possible. And, having the authority to reward and punish – being in charge is the essence of management…people need clarity about roles, authority, and accountability…designing the organisation – drawing its boundaries and lines of authority – is essential. And on obedience, Schrijvers (2004) noted, all of this [management] is bountiful ground for authoritarian, totalitarian, anti-democratic, inhuman, and unethical conduct usually administered from managers above. It demands obedience and servility from those below (cf. Quinn 1953:1; Massey 1982:303). 200 Milgram noted on the inverse ratio of readiness to cruelty and proximity to its victims. It is difficult to harm a person we touch. It is somewhat easier to afflict pain upon a person we only see at a distance. It is still easier in the case of a person we only hear. It is quite easy to be cruel towards a person we neither see nor hear (Hampden-Turner 1970:126; Bauman 1989:155 & 2000:27; Blass 1991:400 & 407; Katz 2006). 201 Management understands that and hence, child- and sweatshop labour are not placed directly outside of Nike or GAP stores but in far away locations (the management buzzword is: ‘off-shoring’). It creates distance through a web of sub- contracting, outsourcing, franchising, etc. 202 According to Magretta (2002), it is not so much delayering as it is the sometimes invisible, but always important, lines of authority that are relevant to management. While standard management textbooks focus on the myth of delayering, the managerial reality focuses on lines of authority (chain-of-command) and there are plenty of lines (cf. Lewin et al. 1939:273; Kotter 1999). 203 According to Max Weber (1924, 1947), rationalisation refers to the way that management increasingly organises itself through the development and spread of institutional hierarchies (cf. ‘instrumental rationality’ in: Klikauer 2007 & 2008). Notes 257

204 Impression management enables managers to act towards self-enhancement con- sisting of seeing oneself responsible for positive outcomes and others responsible for negative outcomes… so that the subordinate has to see the world in a way that enhances not his or her own self-image, but the self-image of the leader (Schwartz 1990:25; cf. Rosenfeld et al. 1995). 205 According to Milgram, one of the most remarkable features of the managerial system of authority is, however, the shrinking probability that the moral oddity of one action will ever be discovered (Bauman 1989:159). In other words, the greater the distance between top-management and those who suffer from its immoral actions, the less likely it is that top-management is discovered to be immoral. In general, the blame for immoral action can be put onto those lower down the line if it cannot be eliminated altogether. Traditionally the shielding of management has three steps: denial, delaying, and diminishing of moral responsibility (e.g. tobacco, asbestos, etc.). This sort of ethical cleansing shields top- management from any blame to have acted unethically. In the Bhopal case, for example, the fault was assigned solely to the plant manager or some individual employee – never to top-management or the CEO who retired wealthy but quietly in Bridgehampton (Long Island, New York). In the Ford Pinto case, it was down to bad engineering or even bad driving. And in the cigarette industry it is down to bad personal habits, not to the billions spent on advertising and the five decades of mass-deception that smoking is harmless. It has nothing to do with falsifying research, paying off willing and corrupt scientists, marginalising, and outright lying. In most cases, top-management was not held responsible. If it was responsible at all, it was civilly (compensation & out-of-court-settlement), not criminally responsible (prison). The immorality lies solely with a Bhopal employee, with a bad Ford Pinto driver, and with those who smoke. No Union Carbide, no Ford, and no cigarette industry CEO has ever faced up to their ethical and criminal responsibilities and received jail sentences. Schrijvers (2004) noted an important source of power can be found in all sorts of rules, regulations, procedures, statues, and laws. We call these formal sources. You can find tips about how to uphold your rights and how to evade your responsibilities. 206 Management is achieving results through others (Magretta 2002); Alvesson & Willmott (1996:17). 207 According to Magretta (2002), in management, ‘everyone is focused on the problem they have to solve. Too often, managers are forced by deadlines and other pressures to look at a problem and simply ask, how can I resolve this in the quickest way?’. 208 Bauman (1989:151ff.); cf. Baillargeon (2007:210ff.); Levi (1959); Haas (1988:385); Reed (1997:7); Levy & Szander (2004:145); Bernstein (2006). 209 Bauman’s thesis that the Holocaust was an application of modern managerial techniques indicates that it was not the work of evil and insane monsters. This is not designed to relieve Germans and German Nazis from their collective guilt. Bauman explains – he does not excuse (cf. Bauman 1990; cf. Katz 2006). 210 In Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (1976:251ff.) Joseph Weizenbaum (1923–2008) noted: ‘instrumental reason converts each dilemma, however genius, into a mere paradox that can then be unravelled by the application of logic, by calculation. All conflicting interests are [reduced to an issue of] technique alone…It is, in fact, entirely reasonable, if “reason” means instrumental reason, to apply American military force, B-52’s, napalm, and all the rest, to “com- munist-dominated” Vietnam (clearly an “undesirable object”), as the “operator” to transform it into a “desirable object”…People, things, events, are “programmed”, 258 Notes

one speaks of “inputs” and “outputs” of feedback loops, variables, parameters, and so on, until eventually all contact with concrete situations is abstracted away. The only graphs, data sets, printouts, are left. And only “we” the experts, can understand them…’ (cf. Rahim 2010). 211 According to Magretta (2002), management must keep cost down through coordination and cooperation that come with hierarchy (that is, with ownership) establishing clear command-and-control structures (cf. Metcalfe’s cost control, in his The Science of Administration, 1885). 212 Once Alfred Sloan stated, ‘co-operation is an arrangement whereby you and I get together to do something for me’ (Quinn 1953:99). 213 www.google.com/images + ‘Abu Ghraib photos’ shows 100s of photos. Most are too horrible to be depicted here (cf. Rodin 2010). 214 Cf. Levi (1959); Milgram (1973:75); Arendt (1994); Levy & Szander (2004:151f.); Bernstein (2006). Otto Adolf Eichmann (1906–1962) was a high-ranking Nazi and SS-Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel). Due to his organisational talents and ideological reliability, he was tasked by Obergruppenführer Reinhard Hey- drich to facilitate and manage the logistics of mass deportation to ghettos and extermination camps in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe and worked under Ernst Kaltenbrunner (the highest-ranking SS leader) until the end of the war. Eichmann was captured by Israeli Mossad agents in Argentina and indicted by an Israeli court on 15 criminal charges, including charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. He was convicted and hanged. He claimed, ‘I was never an anti-Semite. … I personally had nothing to do with this. My job was to observe and report on it…whether they were bank directors or mental cases, the people who were loaded on those trains meant nothing to me. It was really none of my business’. 215 Milgram (1974) suggested that it is more difficult to harm or hurt another person who is looking you in the eye. On hurting a man, Milgram (1972:186) noted ‘hurting a man is an action that for most people carries considerable psychological significance; it is closely tied to questions of conscience and ethical judgement’. Hence most people find depictions of hurtful child labour (living labour) abhorrent but once they are hidden inside a cheap commercial product (dead labour), they become invisible and therefore no ethical judgement on a pair of cheap sneakers, a T-Shirt, or a hair-dryer for $5, takes place. 216 The Eichmannian excuse ‘I only did my job’ only testifies to the abdication of morality to a higher authority be it the SS (as Eichmann did) or top-management. On this, Badhwar (2009:286) quotes Milgrim (1974:88), ‘but it didn’t bother me even to find that he was dead, I did a job’. These were the words of subject Pasqual Gino (Experiment 7) not Eichmann. Badhwar (2009:281) concludes ‘most people are disposed to abdicate their own better judgement in favour of the judgement of a trusted authority-figure, or of a group, losing their sense of responsibility for their own actions, and needing neither temptation nor fear to be induced to do evil’. While Eichmann’s SS operated more on the side of fear (management’s Theory-X (McGregor 1960 & 2006); cf. Goldhagen (1996); Katz (2006), management also operates with rewards and temptation (management’s Theory-Y; cf. Doris 2002)). 217 Neither Milgram (1974) nor MacIntyre (1983) nor Bauman (1989), nor this chapter is saying that management equals the SS or that managerial actions equate to the Holocaust. But the fundamental principles that underlie obedience to authority and punishment regimes are to be found in both institutions. 218 Milgram 1974, quoted from Blass (1999:955). Notes 259

219 In Lewin et al.’s Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created Social Climates (1939:290; cf. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1977) these so-called heroes show aggression within a group [or] otherwise aggression against an outgroup depicting a pattern of aggressive behaviour that creates a social climate of fear (cf. Freud’s hostility against intruders, 1930:103). It is obedience, domination, and submissive- ness to a fictional Hollywood movie character and fictional leader or a Great Business Leader. Harvard’s website (www.hbs.edu/leadership/database/) lists more than 1,100 such great business leaders or robber barons as they are called: John Jacob Astor (real estate, fur) – New York City; Andrew Carnegie (steel) – Pittsburgh and New York; Jay Cooke (finance) – Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Charles Crocker (railroads) – California; Daniel Drew (finance) – New York State; James Buchanan Duke (tobacco) – near Durham, North Carolina; James Fisk (finance) – New York State; Henry Morrison Flagler (railroads, oil, the Standard Oil company) – New York City and Palm Beach, Florida; Henry Clay Frick (steel) – Pittsburgh and New York City; John Warne Gates (steel); Jay Gould (railroads); Edward Henry Harriman (railroads) – New York state; Milton S. Hershey (Chocolate); Mark Hopkins (railroads) – California; J. P. Morgan (banking, finance, steel, industrial consolidation) New York City; John D. Rockefeller (oil) Standard Oil; John D. Spreckels (San Diego transportation, water, media) – San Diego, California; Leland Stanford (railroads) – Sacramento, California and San Francisco, California; Cornelius Vanderbilt (railroads). They all defended their empire (ingroup) against evil forces (outgroups: trade unions, the state, other corporations, etc.) The sub- leader of the most heinous leader (Führer) in human history, Hermann Goering, put his finger on it in 1946, not long before he committed suicide. Gustav Gilbert, an intelligence officer, interviewed him in his jail cell in Nuremberg during the war crimes trials. The transcripts of these interviews were published in 1947 in Gilbert’s Nuremberg Diary. Gilbert said to Goering that in a democracy the people have some say through their elected representatives and that in the US only Congress can declare war. Goering’s recorded reply was: ‘That is all well and good, but voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country’. All those 1100 Great Business Leaders had to do was to tell their employees they were being attacked [by another corporation] and denounce the trade unions for lack of corporate patriotism and exposing the company to danger. It works the same way in any company. Old Hermann certainly knew a thing or two (Klikauer 2008:275). 220 One of the core names associated with personal benefits, rewards, and selfishness is Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527) who was an Italian political writer and is considered one of the main founders of modern political science. He was a diplomat, political philosopher, musician, and a playwright and a civil servant of the Florentine Republic. He is considered a political theorists rather than a moral philosopher (cf. Jay 1967). But even Machiavelli thought that ‘a prince must learn how not to be good’ (Tomasello 2009:3) assuming that humans are good by nature and hence must learn to be evil. One of the great debates in Western philosophy is whether humans are born cooperative and helpful and society later corrupts them (e.g. Rousseau), or whether they are born selfish and unhelpful and society teaches them better (e.g. Hobbes, Dawkins 1989). Most of moral philosophy agrees that the first rather than to the latter is the case (even Machiavelli); cf. Axelrod (1984 & 1984a). 260 Notes

221 Delaney (2005:2004) writes, Friedman, in his classical book Capitalism and Freedom, noted that ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits’ (cf. Rothbard’s F A. Hayek and The Concept of Coercion, 1982:219ff.; cf. Saunders 2006:12; Bouguignon 2009). On profit, Silk & Vogel (1976:19) noted, ‘businessmen and economist do not distinguish between profit making and profiteer- ing…’, a term used for profit making with unethical methods (cf. Gasparski 2002; Minkes & Minkes 2008). 222 Hegelian philosopher Marcuse (1941:175) noted on the individual-vs.-society interface, ‘every private business in this society, he [Hegel] declared, by its very nature sets the individual against the community. Realty owners as well as trades- men and others who find themselves in possession of property or of a craft are interested in preserving the bourgeois order, but their direct aim herein is to preserve their private property. They are prepared and determined to do as little as possible for the universal’. 223 Moral selfishness and ethical egoism represent the opposite of Kant, Hegel, and utilitarianism. Utilitarianism includes the ‘Greatest Happiness Principle’ demand- ing the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. Ethical egoism denotes the opposite. People only do what they want to do and for their own benefit. It requests that I have a moral obligation to do what matters to me. Moral egoism demands that I am someone who is not moved by the predicament of others, of society, of workers, and of universal humanity (Kant). A moral egoist is not distressed by the distress of others. On this Fromm (1949:118) noted ‘we make egoism or selfishness the norm of human conduct when actually the aim of ethics should be its defeat’. 224 Actors who subscribe to moral egoism are made to do what management wants them to do in expectation of rewards (cf. Kohn 1999:45; Aamondt’s reward power, 2010:458). Magretta (2002) quoted Peter Drucker who had the last word. ‘One can never simply hire a hand’, he wrote, ‘the whole person always comes with it. And that is the problem. In management, workers had only to do exactly what they were told, and supervisors made sure they complied. Management is about having the authority to reward and punish – being in charge’. On this Fromm (1949:10) noted, ‘materially, or according to content, authoritarian ethics ans- wers the question of what is good or bad primarily in terms of the interest of the authority, not in the interest of the subject; it is exploitative, although the subject may derive considerable benefits, psychic or material from it’. 225 Kohn (1999:120); cf. Cyert et al. (1963); Maier (2005); Schultz & Schultz (2010:139). 226 This negates Greek virtue ethics, Kant, Hegel, Rawls, and utilitarianism. In its severest version, selfishness and extreme individualism is the very expression of what has been called ‘the free rider problem’. Free riders are those who consume more than their fair share of a public resource, or shoulder less than a fair share of the costs of its production. The name free rider comes from a common textbook example: someone using public transport without paying the fare (cf. Cornes & Sandler 1986). Tomasello (2009: XIII) noted that ‘social institutions represent cooperatively organised and agreed-upon ways of interacting, including rules of enforcement for non-cooperators…it has been shown that punishment of non-cooperators (including negative gossip about reputation) helps to stabilise cooperation’ (2009:52f.). 227 Chomsky (1994:9) wrote, ‘146 countries that ratified the international conven- tion on the rights of children, but one had not: the US. That’s a standard pattern of international conventions on human rights. However, just of fairness, it’s only Notes 261

proper to add that…conservatism is Catholic in its anti-child, anti-family spirit, so the World Health Organisation (WHO) voted to condemn the Nestle Corporation for aggressively marketing their infant formula which kills plenty of children. The vote was 118 to 1. I’ll leave you to guess the one. However, this is quite minor compared with what the WHO calls the ‘silent genocide’ that’s killing millions of children every year as a result of the free market policies for the poor and the refusal of the rich to give any aid. Again, the US has one of the worst and most miserly records among the rich societies’. While written in 1994, it appears that not much progress has been made since then. 228 According to Magretta (2002) ‘good managerial negotiators see the deal through the other party’s eyes. Increasingly, our working relations – up, down, and lateral – have come to resemble negotiations’. Management deems some relationships as absolutely necessary. These are conducted through give and take or zero-sum negotiations. Carr (1968:149) noted ‘a man who intends to be a winner in the business game must have a game player’s attitude’, i.e. winning and annihilating competitors (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1977:127). Silk and Vogle (1967:222) quoted a manager who said, ‘we all use the jackal technique of management selection – hold the red meant over the pack and see who can jump the highest’. 229 For non-textbook writer Schrijvers (2004:16–18), management often mouths phrases about ‘openness and honesty’, ‘commitment’, ‘synergy’, and jet they know that top management always keeps essential information to itself, that personal say one thing in the canteen and another in meetings, and that everybody fences in their own little back yard (cf. Klikauer 2007 & 2008). 230 Cf. Klikauer (2007 & 2008); Tomasello (2009:XII & XIII) noted that social institutions represent cooperatively organised and agreed-upon ways of interacting, including rules of enforcement for non-cooperators (for employees, see Schumann 2006:117). 231 By 2010, the Harvard Business Review alone carried 6,000 articles on ‘leadership’ (cf. Kothari 2010). 232 Cf. Mintzberg et al.’s Strategy Safari (1998); according to Clinard (1983: 161), the former chairman of GM asserted that [there are] some enemies of business (cf. Klikauer 2007:129–42). 233 The ability to bargain for oneself reflects Gare’s concept of ‘The Triumph of the Airheads and the Retreat from Commonsense’ (2006). One does not need managerial and technical expertise but a Machiavellian character. 234 This would be a return to Kohlberg’s stage 1 which is always a more preferable option for management rather than moving upwards on the scale of morality (cf. McGregor’s Theory-X; Bramel & Friend 1981:869 & 870). 235 German philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) called private profits a totalitarian logic in his work The One-Dimensional Man (1966). According to Kohn (1999:131f.), the sociologist Philip Slater once remarked, ‘the idea that everybody wants money is propaganda circulated by wealth addicts to make themselves feel better about their addiction’ (cf. Kasser 2002; Bouguignon 2009). 236 Managerialism finds Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943) is particularly helpful in support of the money and power code. Higher order needs are: self-actualisation, self-esteem, and social acceptance, and lower order needs are safety and security and basic physiological needs. Maslow’s starting for the hierarchy of needs was in fact research on captive primates with regard to dominance behaviour [with an interest in] reproductive strategies of female primates. Based on this somewhat problematic study, then, Maslow concluded that the apes that were less aggressive and most relaxed about their dominance (and consequently the most worthy of their 262 Notes

positions) had greater confidence in themselves. He carried his idea through into research on sexuality, which focused on women and what he called ‘dominance- feeling’ (later self-esteem)… (Brewis & Linstead 2004:71; cf. Aamondt 2010:334 & 337). Maslow’s idea is useful for Managerialism because it relates to captive primates with regard to dominance and to workplace captivity of humans with regard to dominance by management. Just as apes, humans at work should feel less aggressive and most relaxed about their dominance. This can be achieved by making them believe that they are the most worthy of their positions. Consequently, workers should not feel managerial dominance. This can be achieved by convert- ing Maslow’s dominance-feeling into the feeling of self-esteem. It appears almost self-evident that studies on apes in captivity are the base for nearly all books on organisational studies, organisational psychology, management, and HRM. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs significantly narrow human needs. It excludes, for example, the enjoyment of warm personal relationships and being free to peruse one’s project without interference by others. These are human – but unfortunately management unsupportive – needs and therefore they are not mentioned in textbooks. 237 Arnold (2005:287); Arnold & Randal (2010:240f.); Aamondt (2010:307f.); Schultz & Schultz (2010:142ff.). 238 Cf. Petrick & Quinn (1997:26). The infamous prisoner dilemma was first created by Flood and Dresher of the Rand Corporation and popularised by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). 239 The idea of individualism has been highlighted by Danish philosopher Søren Kirkegaard (1813–1855) who emphasised that ‘only as the single individual is he the absolute, and this consciousness will save him from all revolutionary radicalism’ (cf. Feinberg’s Psychological Egoism, 1978; cf. DeCremer2009). On the other hand, Tomasello (2009:xix) noted in his Why We Cooperate that unselfishness, altruism, and cooperation are fundamental to human evolution and this can be seen in relative distant areas such as teaching. Humans actively teach one another things and they do not reserve their lessons for kin. Fundamental is not selfishness but altruism (one individual sacrificing in some way for another); and collaboration (multiple individuals working together for mutual benefit (2009:xvii). Based on laboratory testing Tomasello (2009:87) concludes, ‘the subject apes quickly learned which was which, and they avoided choosing the poor collaborators…a “biological market” serve to discourage poor collaborators’. 240 Arrington (1998:24); Klikauer (2008:108ff.). 241 Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short: many occupations are carried out in solitary (train- and truck drivers), the poor tend to be at the lower end of the managerial hierarchy (e.g. working poor); nasty: nastiness may be a managerial quality but it is also found in lower ranks, brutishness is almost exclusively assigned to lower levels (sweatshops, child labour, harsh working environments, etc.), and finally short: the live of those in non-managerial positions is, in general, shorter than those at in top-management (e.g. oilrig workers, nurses, shift-workers, construction workers, etc.). 242 The codeword of managerial order is organisations culture. It is a nicer term and takes out the real culprit behind it: management. And culture is so much better and positive than order. 243 It is the implicit trade-off between our exposure to management’s structural violence in return for wages that allow petty-bourgeois consumerism and materialism washed with things we do not need, often paid with money we do not have to impress people we do not like (cf. Kasser 2002; Koslowski 2002:46; Saunders 2006:12). Notes 263

244 This is in almost complete contradiction to everything we know from evolutionary science and evolutionary ethics (Kropotkin 1902; Axelrod 1984, 1984a, 1997; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1985; Skyrms 1996; Sober 1998; Mysterud 2000; Gintis et al. 2003; Sachs et al. 2004; Baum 2005; Krebs 2008; Krebs & Denton 2005 & 2006). 245 Goodrich (1920); Ramsay (1977); Offe & Wiesenthal (1980), Zimmerman (1981 & 2002). 246 Interestingly, Hobbes’ punishment that must be greater than the benefit of the breach applies to management in the reverse order when it comes to industrial accidents, industrial deceases, environmental destruction, and many other white- collar crimes (Minkes & Minkes 2008). Many corporate crimes go relatively unpunished or ‘benefit is substantially greater than the punishment’ (Bhopal: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/news/justice-for-warren-anderson). 247 This simply follows from the fact that when two men desire the same thing which cannot be enjoyed by both, they become enemies. For management this is what strategists call ‘a zero-sum game’ because what one gains, the other one loses. On strategies, Hobbes warns that defensive strategies – the general-ship of deceiving an enemy (Klikauer 2007:129ff.) – are not enough to protect ourselves. Hence, management has developed a raft of forward-looking and aggressive strategies, called strategic management. It is offensive rather than defensive. As Hobbes explains, management must mistrust others and hence anticipate attacks, called friendly or unfriendly corporate takeovers. Management must seek to subdue its business enemies before they subdue them; cf. Magretta (2002). It is very much in line with the so-called Pareto-Optimum stating that ‘no one could do better without someone else doing worst’ (cf. Buskirk 1974). These are the classical lessons taught at almost every management school. According to Magretta (2002), the essence of management is to know the battleground and to be better prepared than one’s opponents. 248 A good example of taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquests is US-based AIG’s celebration in 2008. AIG borrowed $37.8 billion via a secured asset credit facility created by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Following that, the U.S. Treasury announced it would purchase $40 billion worth of AIG stocks. The week following the US-government’s bailout, AIG employees participated in a California retreat which cost $444,000 featuring spa treatments, banquets, and golf outings. 249 According to Magretta (2002), in the managerial war game the other side will be defeated. In the strategists zero-sum game any victory for ‘A’ is necessarily a defeat for ‘B’. Philosopher Hobbes supports this notion (cf. Friedman 2008; Wicks 2010). 250 Magretta (2002) noted that to ‘sustain a competitive advantage is paramount for management…in a competitive world, doing a good job of creating value is a necessity’ (cf. Kirkeby’s survival, profit/revenue and development, 2000:3f.). McCalley (2002:11) noted that some executives rationalise, ‘if it’s good for me, it’s good for the company’. 251 According to Heller (1989:16), ‘people are made unequal by applying different norms and rules to the members in another cluster’. To achieve that, management has created at least two basic clusters: management-vs.-non-managerial staff. Both are assigned different norms and rules. 252 Cf. Bernays (1928); Chomsky’s Media Control – The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda (1991) & Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (1999); Beder’s Free Market Missionaries – The Corporate Manipulation of Community Values (2006); Maclagan (1990); Jex (2002); Gaines-Ross (2008); Hosmer (2008); Michael Wolff 264 Notes

(2008:46) noted in his authorised biography of News Limited’s CEO, Rupert Murdoch, The Man Who Owns The News, ‘it’s this company that acts in a hungry, animal fashion. That impulse is not modulated in any way. It’s raw. It’s real’. 253 This applies even to Mother Theresa. Through helping the poor she received media recognition, awards, and the acknowledgment of Church and Pope. Some have even argued she only acted selfishly towards what she desired for her own good, thus depicting self-interest as the ultimate end – something hardly any manager would deny. 254 Buchanan & Badham (2008:40ff.); cf. Buskirk (1974:7). 255 Nietzsche’s idea of strong-vs.-weak carries strong connotations of the survival of the fittest. Despite the common myth, survival of the fittest has not been invented by Darwin but by social-Darwinist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). Darwin assigned his idea of survival to adaptation to environmental changes. Spencer – without the empirical foundation of Darwin – claimed it is down to the fittest. The ideology of the survival of the fittest became popular during the rise of industrial capitalism in the 19th century. It is still carried through in management. Representing pure ideology, social-Darwinism has been important to justify free- market capitalism. It is used as an ideology and as a weapon against the opponents of competition. It is directed against those who see human society not based on rivalry, opposition, and antagonism, but on solidarity, community, and mutual support. Management, managers, Managerialism, and corporate PR have linked competition and survival to the survival of the fittest and corporate mass media have successfully moored it in the mind of the public; cf. Darwin’s The Decent of Man (1871) and German philosopher Max Scheler’s (1874–1928) Man’s Place in Nature (cf. Tomasello 2009:60). Tomasello (2009:94) also noted that the exact opposite of Spencer has been the case because in human evolution, those with the most effective social practices thrived relative to others, i.e. human survival was depended on cooperation not competition. Hence, humans came to engage in collaborative activities which a joint goal and distinct and generalised roles, with participants mutually aware that they were depended on one another for success (Tomasello 2009:98f.; cf. Gasparski 2002:9). 256 Management needs to follow Noble Prize Winner Milton Friedman’s (1970) maxim: ‘it is the social responsibility of business to increase its profits’. Already on the first page of Sage’s Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society (Sage 2007), Milton Friedman’s famous statement is mentioned (cf. Jones et al. 2005:161). 257 According to Magretta (2002) ‘we all need management, managers can also control events, managers get organisations to perform, and managers will go about their business of making things work’. As Magretta (2002) says ‘management creates performance through others’; e.g. Bhopal, James Hardie Industries, Seveto, Enron, Ford Pinto, and simple downsizing and outsourcing activities. 258 Following one’s instincts is something we have inherited from our non-human ancestors (Singer 1994:6). 259 Engels (1892); Webb & Webb (1894); Thompson (1963); Arnold (2005:250); Brown & Kelly’s You’re History! (2006); Arnold & Randal (2010: 231f, & 297f.); Aamondt (2010:5–8); Schultz & Schultz (2010); Dessler (2011). 260 Management tends to employ the rather nonsensical term of pro-active. 261 It appears that most of Nietzsche’s ethics is nothing more than a reversal of traditional Greek ethics. He also seems to have misappropriated large sections of Hegel and simply reversed it; Hegel’s ‘Master-Slave’ dialectics becomes the power of the strong to rule the weak in Nietzsche (cf. Drucker 1981:30). Notes 265

262 Schrijvers (2004:16–18) noted that managers ‘feel…employees think only about themselves’. 263 On the uncritical belief in technology, German philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1966) commented: ‘technological rationality reveals its political character as it becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are kept in a state of per- manent mobilisation for the defence of this universe’. Nietzsche’s Will to Power is nothing but an application of Machiavellian theories (Machiavelli 1532; Jay 1967; Buskirk 1974; McAlpine 1998). 264 Tellingly, Nazi-philosopher Heidegger (1889–1976) emphasised on interpretation: ‘the manner of access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself to itself on its own terms’. In other words, the being of management must select interpretations that show management to management in management’s terms. Hence, management is the centre, creates its own interpretations on its own terms, and thereby creates its own reality that only needs to be projected onto others (cf. Hall’s argument that technology includes managerial systems, 2010). 265 Horkheimer & Adorno (1947:12) emphasised: ‘as immovably, they insist on the very ideology that enslaves them’. This is the ideology of Managerialism which includes the idea that to manipulate workers with incentives is to treat them like children (Kohn 1999:25) only exchanging Brownie Points and starts with wages, bonuses, rewards, and benefits. Kohn (1999:46; cf. Aamondt 2010:458) also noted that ‘rewards usually improve performance only at extremely simple – indeed, mindless – tasks, and even then they improve only quantitative performance’. 266 Bowie (1999); Bowie & Werhane (2005); Baritz (1960); cf. Lynd (1939). 267 This has been perfectly summed up by the former US president, George W. Bush who said: ‘we’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors … and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do’. 268 The problem of the rat race is: ‘even if you win the rat race, you are still a rat!’ (cf. Schrijvers’ The Way of the Rat, 2004). 269 Jones (1989:8) noted that in business schools too much emphasis has been placed on solving ethical problems – quandaries – and too little emphasis placed on the development of moral character – virtues. This is done for two reasons. Such schools teach narrow problem-solving skills often sold as hands-on approach and real-live cases, so that moral philosophy can be avoided while simultaneously being able to claim to teach management ethics or its even further watered down version of CSR, corporate social responsibility. 270 Aristotle would see the endless pursuit of profits as: they ‘live on an endless treadmill of desire that never reaches a final goal, and they remain ever empty’ (Arrington 1998:66; cf. Murphy 1993:149ff.; Slote 2010). 271 The contemporary virtue theorist Alasdair MacIntyre…has argued that the figure of the manager, as a contemporary character, is incapable of virtues in a genuinely Aristotelian sense (Jones et al. 2005:66; cf. Murphy 1993; Doris 2002). For philosopher Descartes (1596–1650), virtue is a supreme good, he argued, because ‘it is the only good, among all those we can possess, which depends entirely on our free will’. For management, the supreme good is not virtue but shareholder-value i.e. profit-maximisation and management free will is submerged into market forces while the free will of subordinates is entirely unwarranted and comprehensively 266 Notes

suppressed. For Descartes, virtue is the target at which we ought to aim. Manage- ment’s aim (called organisational goals) deliberately excludes virtues (cf. Beadle & Moore 2006). 272 Harvard Business School divides its curricular into required (RC) and elective curriculum (EC). RC includes: Finance I, Financial Reporting and Control (FRC), Leadership and Organisational Behavior (LEAD), Marketing, Technology and Oper- ations Management (TOM), Business, Government, and the International Economy (BGIE), Strategy, The Entrepreneurial Manager (TEM), Finance II, Leadership and Corporate Accountability (LCA) and EC includes: Accounting and Management, Business, Government & the International Economy, Entrepreneurial Management, Finance, General Management, Marketing, Negotiation, Organisations & Markets, Organisational Behavior, Strategy. Apart from the somewhat dubious subject ‘The Moral Leader’ (class no. 1562), moral philosophy, ethics, and virtue ethics, and moral education (Aristotle) are totally absent. Similarly, Kreitner’s textbook ‘Manage- ment’ (2009, 11th ed.), has five parts (management challenge; planning and decision making; organising, managing human resources, and communication; motivating and leadership; and organisational control process) but none on moral philosophy, ethics, virtue ethics, and moral education (Aristotle); cf. Beadle & Moore (2006). 273 In The Republic (written in the 5th century BC), Plato’s suggestion that ‘men and women are [to be] equally educated’. This is negated by management through the predominantly male occupation of management, top-management, and CEOs and through the fact that so-called in-house managerial education, training, seminars, etc. are asymmetrically distributed in favour of male managers. Rather than supporting Plato’s virtue of equal education, management strongly favours the exact opposite and thereby counteracts Plato’s ethics. 274 Cf. Schwartz (1990); Punch (1996); McCalley (2002: 60); Schrijvers (2004); Green- peace (2010). 275 In the words of Adorno and Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment 1947), modern mass consumption is based on the ideology that ‘something is provided for all so that none may escape…consumers appear as statistics on research organisation charts, and are divided by income groups into red, green and blue areas; the technique that is used for any type of propaganda’; cf. Walsh & Lynch (2008). 276 In The Laws, Plato argued ‘citizens shouldn’t have anything to do with money’ (Walsh & Lynch 2008). 277 Aristotle (often described as the quintessential Greek philosopher though he was Macedonian) believed that slaves and women are defective reasoners and could not possess full virtues. In ancient Greece it was permissible to own slaves and women should be sequestered; (cf. Marcuse 1941). Greek philosophy only every marginally raised the problem of slavery. 278 Ethics’ core question of ‘what shall I do?’ leads to the wrong path because the ‘I’ indicates individuality whereas ethics is a social project (from Aristotle to Adorno) not a project of the individual (ethical egoism, etc.). Without Hegel’s ‘the Other’ ethics would not exist. Historically, not the individual but the community (tribes, groups, collectives, etc.) created human history and ethics. Marcuse (1941) noted that the community comes first. Ethics has always been an issue for human communities who initially developed codes of conduct on how to live together. History is not individual but universal consciousness. Perhaps, this is best represented in the consciousness of a primitive group with all individuality submerged in the community. Feelings, sensations, and concepts are not properties of individuals but are shared among all. The common – not the particular – defines consciousness and ethics. Notes 267

279 On ideology, French philosopher Althusser (1918–1990) noted ideology is as such an organic part of every social totality. The ideology of Managerialism has been made an organic part of the social totality of management and this has extended into the realm of society as well. Burham (1945:157) noted all organised societies are cemented together, not merely by force and the threat of force, and by established patterns of institutional behaviour, but also by accepted ways of feeling and thinking and talking and looking at the world by ideologies. The problem with an ideology is not, when properly understood, whether it is true, but: what interest does it express, and how adequately and persuasively does it express them?…ideologies are not controlled by facts…these ideologies are able to gain the acceptance and often the enthusiasm of the masses (1945:159; cf. Fromm 1949:164–7; Kohn 1999:26; Klikauer 2007 & 2008). 280 By 2010, the Harvard Business Review, for example, carried 2,709 articles on ‘competition’ and 14 of ‘friendship’. Saunders (2006:14) argues that in management, ‘alliances are formed, favours are asked, deals are made, debts are owned, careers are advanced’ but no friendships are established because ‘the more successful among them are those who have learned how to work the system’. 281 Management allocates, and transforms human and material resources into proﬁt- making operations (Magretta (2002). In The Organisation Men, William Whyte describes social ethics as organisational and bureaucratic ethics. It is a pervasive form of dull conformity supported by the managerial ideology of The Docile Worker (Dalton 1959:268f.; Bramel, C. & Friend, R. 1981:867ff.; Jones et al. 2005:148). In a Freudian (1930) analysis, the primary friction in management stems from the individual’s quest for instinctual freedom and management’s contrary demand for conformity and instinctual repression. Schrijvers (2004) even argues that you can give or deny power to your employees by the place you allocated them in your company. 282 Magretta (2002) argues management ‘must create a nervous edge that keeps [others at] arm’s-length…on their toes [to keep] the anxiety of competition going’. 283 It is Plato who analyses the virtue of pure pleasure (Levinas 1961). 284 Even though management has no use for friendships based on pleasure and virtues, this is not to say that individual managers do not have friends. They do. But what is at stake here is the essence of management and not the behaviour of an individual manager. 285 A list of Aristotelian virtues is presented in: Arrington (1998:76). 286 Aristotle lived in a society based on the surplus value of slaves. Today’s society lives on the surplus value of labour. Those who govern the process of surplus- extraction were called slave-owners. Today, these overseers are called management (for employees, see Schumann 2006:119ff.). 287 Offe & Wiesenthal (1980); cf. Zimmerman (1981). 288 Perhaps not all too surprising is the fact that among all organisational behaviour, organisational change, organisational culture, organisational members, organisational practice, organisational action, organisational strategy, organisational knowledge, organisational learning, organisational commitment, organisational performance, organisational development, organisational structure, and on and on and on, a term called organisational happiness is totally absent from management’s vocabulary and thinking. 289 Marsden & Townley (1996); Klikauer (2007:138); Kreitner (2009). By 2010, the Harvard Business Review carried 4743 articles on ‘managers’ and 783 on ‘workers’, a 6:1 ratio even though the reality of working is more than the reverse. There are more than six-times more workers than managers! 268 Notes

290 Management contradicts even utilitarian virtues. Mill (1861) noted the multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue. Management’s project is not the multiplication of happiness but the multiplication of shareholder-values. For the foremost philosopher on justice, John Rawls (1921–2002), justice is the first virtue of social institutions. On that basis, management as a social institution would need to produce justice, including wage justice. There is still no wage justice between men’s and women’s earnings while under a Marxian understanding wage justice is a tautology. Quite apart from Marx, management is, in Rawls’ conception, not only unjust but also unethical (cf. Heller 1989:65 & 79). 291 Instead of openness and participation, ‘management’s use of participation power’ (McCalley 2002:51ff.) is used to incorporate subordinates into the managerial framework. In short, participation is use as a power against subordinates. It is a form of soliciting the compliance of victims (Bauman 1989). 292 Greek philosophy saw only men as relevant. But even in antiquity some suspected that there is no difference between men and women. 293 According to Magretta (2002) ‘numbers are essential to organisational performance …numbers…truly matter’. 294 This has been outlined in Schrijvers’ The Way of the Rat (2004), Jackall’s Moral Mazes (1988), and Punch’s Dirty Business (1996). These three authors reflect on the reality of management and the role virtues play inside it. 295 The ideology of individualisation engineered through textbooks and corporate PR has been negated by managerial standardisations (standard employment contracts, standard operational policies, standard job descriptions, standard mission statements, standard CSR-statement, standard performance measures, etc.). Instead, Managerialism demands the ideology of individualism. This ideology needs to be established at work and also in the off-work sphere of consumption. The standardised ‘Organisation Man’ (Whyte 1961) have been paralleled by the standardised consumer purchasing standardised mass-products for equally standardised body-parts (M, S, L, XL, & A-cup to E-cup). This has been linked to the ideological mass-deception of individual choice. Simultaneously, real life choices are reduced to consumer choices which confines humans to a narrow band of consumer-work oscillation for most of their existence. 296 Managers have developed a kind of schism between the world of corporations and the world outside of them. At home, they moan and groan. They say what they really feel: the boss is a pig, the department is arrogant, employees think only about themselves. They are made to believe that they can be highly moral in their private lives and leave their conscience at home when entering the corporate world (cf. Dalton, M. 1959:244; Petit 1961:99; Carr 1968:145 & 152; Jones & George 2011). On this Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) noted the bourgeois whose existence is split into a business and a private life, whose private life is split into keeping up his public image and intimacy, whose intimacy is split into the part- nership of marriage and the bitter comfort of being quite alone, at odds with himself and everybody else, is already virtually a Nazi replete both with enthusiasm and abuse; or a modern city-dweller who can now only imagine friendship as a ‘social contact’. In other words, there is a self-constructed fantasy of separating private from company life. This carries pathologies that cannot bring one’s emotions and dispositions into the harmony of an inner peace of mind. Rather, the opposite is the case. It dilutes virtue ethics and personal wellbeing, and obstructs harmony and inner – and outer! – peace; cf. Johnsen’s Is Your Manager a Psycho- path?…Are you? – The Human–Animal Divide at Work (2010). Notes 269

297 http://hbr.org/search/taugh%25252520leader/; cf. Kothari (2010). 298 Cf. Klikauer (2007:183–204; Nowak & Highfield 2011). Such a socialisation to conformity starts at an early age and uses sophisticated methods rather simple punishment. Hence, the child is no longer aware of being bossed (nor are the parents of giving orders), and he cannot fight back and thus develop a sense of independence. He is coaxed and persuaded in the name of science, common sense, and cooperation – and who can fight against such objective principles? (Fromm 1949:156). On conformity, Tomasello (2009:93f.) noted, ‘at some point in human evolution, it became important for individuals in a group to all behave alike; there arose pressure to conform…those with the most effective social practices thrived relative to others’. While evolutionary ethics and ethics in general mean one thing by cooperation, management means quite a different thing (cf. Brennan et al. 1961:168). Roethlinsberger (1943:110) noted ‘the first human problem of any business organisation is how to secure the cooperation of people in attaining its collective purposes’. For management it is the use of human cooperation for management’s purpose. And for that Roethlinsberger (1943:180) knew, modern psychopathology has contributed a great deal to the subject of control. This theme is continued in with Alfred Sloan stating ‘co-operation is an arrangement whereby you and I get together to do something for me’ (Quinn 1953:99). 299 Management is not about preserving human life, as Aquinas wrote, but the exploitation of human life. This is done even if it costs human lives (cf. Ford Pinto). The essence of management is to give preference to profit not to preserving life as demonstrated in: Bakan’s The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (2004); Chomsky’s Profit over People (1999) among others (cf. www.babymilk- action.org/pages/boycott; and numerous websites: WWWs: wikipedia.org; geocities. com; breastfeeding.com; mcspotlight.org). These exemplify managerial misbehaviour and the fact that the virtues of management do not adhere to the principles acknowledged in the Biblical commandments (thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, and thou shalt not bear false witness). Management have killed (from Nestle’s baby formula to Bhopal, Pinto, etc.); management has stolen (from colonial exploitation to industrial spies), and management has borne false witness (senate inquiries, court cases, Enron, World.Com, asbestos, tobacco). None of the three commandments – kill, steal, lie – represent the essence of management. Instead the exact opposite has been executed by management ever since its invention (Taylor 1911; Marglin 1974; Klikauer 2007:97ff.). 300 The philosophy of trust dates back to Aristotle’s idea of being a trustworthy person. For that one must be a person who can be counted on. One needs to be able to take care of those things that others entrust to one and whose ways of caring are neither excessive nor deficient. A distinction between full and special (in some cases only) trustworthiness has also been made. On sincerity, Jean-Paul Sartre (1992) noted the essential structure of sincerity does not differ from that of bad faith since the sincere man constitutes himself as what he is ‘in order not to be it’. Therefore, management always needs to pretend to be sincere in order not to be seen as insincere. Given the managerial power and dominance over corporate communication (Klikauer 2007 & 2008), this has been achieved successfully. Management has been able to present itself as sincere – having corporate social responsibility (Subhabrata 2007) – and even as being an ethical actor (cf. Beder 2000). On trustworthiness, Adorno (1944:38) noted ‘only that which they do not need to know counts as understandable; only what is in truth alienated, the words moulded by commerce, strikes them as trustworthy’. For Adorno, it is only when language has been recast in the absence of management that trust can be 270 Notes

established. In the managerial use of language, words are deprived of their real meaning and put to use as deception. It is then, when people are asked to believe managerial ‘Weasel Words’ (Watson 2003). 301 The core virtue of management is precisely not calling one’s self into question. It appears as if management is carried out in a morally indifferent and even selfish world, a world that is somehow placed beyond good and evil (Jones et al. 2005:58). For Hegel (1821) selfishness has been enshrined in the colonisation of new markets and the sphere of industrial activity creating human isolation that reduces him to the selfish aspect of his trade. Hence, in Hegel’s ethics of Sittlichkeit, the fundamental elementary structure of capitalism creates selfish human beings, preventing them from developing true human values. 302 Jones et al. (2005:78). On ethics codes, Nader (1967:8) noted, in a 1961 survey by the Harvard Business Review of its subscribing executives, four out of seven res- pondents believed that businessmen ‘would violate a code of ethics whenever they thought they could avoid detection’. 303 According to (Magretta 2002), Peter Drucker had the last word. ‘One can never simply hire a hand, he wrote, the whole person always comes with it. And that is the problem’; i.e. person, workers, and humans are no more than a ‘problem’ to management. 304 Management is in a somewhat self-contradictory position. On the one hand, it does not acknowledge workers – seen as others (Magretta 2002). On the other hand, it depends on workers and conflict between management and workers still exists. Hence, conflict is pretended to be minor inconvenience that management has to manage, just like ethics. Therefore, ‘The Servants of Power’ (Baritz 1960) have the tricky task of mentioning conflict without aiding the legitimacy of those who work under management. The fact that the relationship between management and non- managerial staff is not based on the ethics of unity and cohesion but on conflict has been highlighted by in Offe and Wiesenthal’s Two Logics of Collective Action (1980). They have outlined the two logics of interests and the resulting collective action. In the arena of negotiating (Kreitner 2009:447ff.) three core interests meet: (a) wages are a cost to management while they are the livelihood for workers; (b) working conditions and job security are also a cost and hindrance to management’s right to manage while for workers they reflect decency at work and protection from unreasonable and dangerous workloads; (c) finally, management wants working time to be expanded whilst workers want it shortened. 305 For Adorno Mündigkeit also entails the ability of not cooperating with a bad life even though this might lead to frustration, isolation, alienation, and despair because cooperation with a bad life will not create a good life of fulfilment and happiness; cf. Diefenbach (2009:74ff.). 306 Even the often rehearsed textbook case of 3M shows how an individual – despite management’s resistance – contributes to the company’s profits but it also shows that Mündigkeit is not something management can use. As Hampden-Turner (1970: 127) noted the axiom of Albert Camus ‘I rebel, therefore we exist’. 307 At the time when a banking CEO (Mr Moss) received $2,400/hr (even in his sleep!), workers are downsized (Orwell’s Newspeak) or fired (Oldspeak), while an unemployed person gets just $224/week (Horin 2009), any ethical claim by management is destroyed by its own actions. 308 According to Wrong (1994:5) ‘order consists of predictability, of human conduct on the basis of common and stable expectations’. This is crucial for management because its regime depends on a predictability of organisational behaviour and an ability to operate with a stable expectation of subordinates’ conduct. Management depends on order, regularity, and predictability (Wrong 1994:5). Notes 271

309 Hence, the suggestion of the legal philosophy of legal positivism that law and order have an intrinsic value apart from moral ends is a fallacy. Positive law is man-made by a given political community, society, or nation-state functioning. Natural law or the law of nature (lex naturalis) posits the existence of a law whose content is set by nature and that therefore has validity everywhere (cf. Rothbard 1982:1–26; Latour 2009). According to Dworkin’s philosophy of constitutionalism (1978, 1985, 1986, 1996, 2002), the term legal positivism denotes a universal claim that a law of any social or managerial group includes more than explicit rules and decisions authoritatively adopted in accordance with accepted managerial regulations. It includes rule and decision that can be found in managerial statute books, decisions, and written managerial regulations (e.g. mission statements, etc.). The uncritical adaptation of these rules by subordinates is part of positive law. Legal positivism tends to rationalise purely political decisions by management, consciously or not, by eclipsing management’s own political ideologies. Hence, managerial regulations tend to suppress women, minority racial groups, the poor, and so on whose interests are not adequately recognised and protected by the dominant, mainstream ideologies of management and Manager- ialism. Cf. Howard Zinn’s Disobedience and Democracy – Nine Fallacies on Law and Order (1968); on legal positivism see: Kelsen (1928, 1945, 1967); Fromm (1949:9); Marcuse (1969:95); Raz (1979 & 2003); Waldron (1993); Wrong (1994:1); Latour (2009); Gardner (2010). 310 For Wrong (1994:11) ‘the problem of order is the problem of how individual units…are arranged in non-random social patterns’. Wrong has described the precise problems for management which are: firstly, to convert people into individual units; secondly, the need to arrange those units and treat them as objects of power (Bauman 1989); and thirdly, these units need to be made to follow a managerial pattern of ‘achieving organisational outcomes’ (Magretta 2002) inside a managerial order. This, almost inevitably creates the entrenched viciousness of organisational life (Story 2007:2). 311 Cf. Habermas (1985, 1996, 1997); Deetz (1992). 312 Baritz (1960); Brief (2000); Clegg & Haugaard (2009); Sonderberg (2010:66ff.). 313 At the gateway between feudalism and modernity, the involvement of society in its self-rule was seen as crucial. This has been part of modernity and enlightenment ever since remaining as an unchallenged foundation of modern societies. 314 On authority legal positivist writer Raz (1979:34) noted, it is in the nature of authority that it requires submission even when one thinks that what is required is against reason. Therefore, submission to authority is irrational. Since authority sometimes requires action against one’s own judgement, it requires abandoning one’s moral autonomy. Managerial authority is a near perfect example of this (cf. Gellner 1987:310). Milgram (1974) has shown that people abandon reason and morality and show unquestioned obedience to managerial authority (cf. Fromm 1949:8f.). On authority, Hampden-Turner (1970:124) emphasised, ‘those of us who needlessly accept the commands of authority cannot yet claim to be civilised men’. 315 A codified system of rules is, for example, a written and codified collection of managerial rules, policies (policies represent authority, McCalley 2002:71), mission statements, and procedures. The use of company cars, for example, is often codified while dress-codes often follow informal (non-written) policies. For management, however, these codified rules do not prescribe what Hungarian philosopher Agnes Heller called the Gold Rule (1989:21): ‘I do unto you what I expect you to do unto me’. Hence, Heller (1989:21) correctly states, ‘the gold rule only applies to symmetrical relations, never to asymmetrical ones’. The relationship between management and non-management is not symmetrical but asymmetrical. Management exists 272 Notes

because of an asymmetrical relationship (Taylor 1911; Fayol 1916; Marglin 1974). Hence, managerial regulations can never have a levelling-function (Heller 1989:32). Instead, they need to cement the exact opposite. 316 In popular culture rules are often associated with games (Marcuse 1969:97). But in social reality this is not the case for one single reason. A game is often played vol- untarily (i.e. a game of chess or a football game). In social reality rules that govern kindergarten, school, workplaces, consumption, legal rules (laws) and even political rules are not rules one can choose to play. They are constructed as an unavoidable fact-of-life, not as a game to be played or not. Significantly, almost all rules are also constructed as given so that the subject has no input in creating them and is converted from a subject into an object of power (Bauman 1989). It constitutes the absence of the subject (Giddens 1984:25; cf. Latour 2009). 317 Giddens (1984:22) noted, ‘most rules imply…the production and reproduction of social practices. There is a structuring quality of rules’ (Giddens 1984:23). 318 Hegel (1807); Honneth (1995); Williams (1998); Anderson (2009); Hoy (2009). 319 Giddens (1984:20) noted, after all, the word ‘regulative’ already implies rule: its dictionary definition is ‘controlled’ by rules. Fromm (1949:155) noted that the authority as lawgiver [i.e. management] makes its subjects [i.e. subordinates] feel guilty for their many and unavoidable transgressions…the dependence of irrational authority results in a weakening of will in the dependent person and, at the same time, whatever tends to paralyse the will makes for an increase in dependence. Thus a vicious circle is formed. 320 Management’s term ‘will be deducted’ is always formulated in the passive to make the active part – management – disappear (Klikauer 2007 & 2008). 321 In the relationship of crime and business things are different. Nader (1967:7–8) noted, the report quotes Professor Sanford Kadish: ‘It is possible to reason con- vincingly that the harm done by violations of many…regulatory laws [on business] is of a magnitude that dwarfs in significance the lower class property offences. The hard mode to human health and safety by business crime should dispel the distinguishing characteristic of “white-collar crime”’. 322 Instead of creating political life inside corporations, management and Managerial- ism have achieved the opposite. They have extended their ideology into the sphere of the state and government, changing the role of the state fundamentally (cf. neoliberalism). Burham (1945:91f.) correctly predicted the role of government under Managerialism: ‘the government acts in the economy chiefly to preserve the integrity of the market and of capitalist property relations, and to give aid and comfort, as in wars or international competition or internal disturbance, were these are needed. Capitalist economy is a system of private ownership, of ownership of a certain type vested in private individuals, of private enterprise. The capitalist is therefore, and necessarily, a “limited” state…the state in modern capitalist society as a capitalist state, as the state of the capitalists’ (1945:99; cf. Brennan et al. 1961:168; Chamberlain 1973:6; Korten 1995:331). 323 Dalton (1959:244) noted, that there is an ambiguity between ‘an individualist privately and a conformist publicly…[and a manager] must appear to believe in the values of his company’ (cf. Schrijvers 2004; Storey 2007:2). 324 Schrijvers (2004:11) noted there is excitement about dirty tricks at corporate level when big companies with cruel and fraudulent CEOs use backstabbing and treachery to set the tone in order to win on the battlefield. The battlefield methods that come in use are dirty tricks, sedition, coups, blackmail, and emotional cruelty in ‘I’m really going after that one’, and ‘I’m going to do everything I can – yeah, everything – to sabotage the team’. Notes 273

325 On justice, Macintyre (1983:354f.; cf. Sen 2009) noted it is a commonplace that in a market economy there is no such thing as a just price or a just wage; and this remark, that a market economy excludes justice from the market-place, has class- ically been accepted as much by the protagonists of a free market as by any of its socialist critics. Moreover the process of capital accumulation itself tends to generate inequality and not only in market economies. Growth often accentuates the gas between those who control investment decisions over which we have no control. The Hungarian philosopher Agnes Heller (1989:5) noted, the formal concept of justice means the consistent and continuous application of the same norms and rules to each and every member of the social cluster to which the norms and rules apply. Management fails to achieve that. Instead, it represents Trasymachos’ ideas of justice (Heller 1989:68) that argues that what is called ‘just’ is simply the expression of the interest of those who rule and of the stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant. 326 It seeks to liberate management from moral responsibility and creates a much needed distance between management and subordinates (Bauman 1989). In that way, management gets further away from subordinates, thus totally negating what US-Austrian philosopher Alfred Schütz (1970; cf. Wrong 1994:11; Heller 1989:82) called reciprocity of perspectives. Management is unable to enter into the role of subordinates conceptualising them only as ‘others’ (Magretta 2002). 327 Free Will is a term used by moral philosophy for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. There is (a) freedom of action and (b) freedom of will (cf. Zimmerman 1981). David Hume described it as the power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will, while Wolf (1990) noted that an agent acts freely only if he had the ability to choose the true and the good. The philosophy of a free will also relates to the external manipulation problem (Mele 1995) while Fischer (1994 & 1998) distinguished two sorts of control over one’s actions: guidance and regulative control. 328 Constitutionality has been associated with Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (1689–1755) or simply Montesquieu (1752), John Locke, and John Austin (1832); for legal positivism, see: Kelsen (1928, 1945, 1967); Hart (1958 & 1961); Campbell (1996). Interestingly, many constitutions include a bill of rights but none an Economic Bill of Rights (cf. Quinn 1953:2). 329 In ordinary society, policemen cannot make the law, arrest someone, and be the judge, even if in each case it was a different policeman; it would still violate the separation of power. 330 Cf. Locke, J. 1690. Two Treatises of Government (10th ed.), Project Gutenberg. www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/trgov10h. 331 According to Heller (1989:3), ‘social inequality is constructed by the application of distinct sets of norms and rules’. 332 Cf. Allison et al. (2010); Geiger (2007); Beiner & William (1993); Fleischacker (1999); Flikschuh (2000). 333 Kant uses Rousseau’s terms when discussing free will: ‘will of all, public will, and general will’. Rousseau’s theory of freedom denotes that individual freedom is achieved through participation in the process whereby one’s community exercises collective control over its own affairs in accordance with the ‘general will’. MacCallum (1967) deﬁned the basic concept of freedom as a subject, or agent, free from certain constraints or preventing conditions to do or become certain things. Freedom is therefore a triadic relation – that is, a relation between three things: an agent, certain preventing conditions, and certain doings or becomings of an agent (cf. Marglin 274 Notes

1974; Rothbard 1982:215; Heller 1989:84f.; Zimmermann 1981); see also Kant’s Rechtslehre (Pogge 1997). 334 For Raz (1979:212) the rule of law means literally what it says: the rule of the law. Taken in its broadest sense this means that people should obey the law and be ruled by it. In the realm of management, it means that subordinates should be ruled by managerial regulations, should obey them, and should be ruled by them. Hence, if the law is to be obeyed it must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects (Raz 1979:214). This is exactly why management has invented managerial regulations, rules, and procedures; they guide the behaviour of subordinates in total absence of what Kant called self-determination and Hegel self-actualisation (cf. Heller 1989:107; Sayer 2008:35; Hoy 2009). 335 Cf. Hegel (1803/4, 1807, 1821, 1830); Durkheim (1983:33); Klikauer (2010, Chapter 6). 336 Israeli philosopher Ido Geiger (2007) noted, the state seeks to justify itself through the order it has imposed on nature, but that nature, as non-rational, cannot actually be the source of this authority. In other words, management cannot legitimise its authority by imposing it onto subordinates. Not because these are non-rational agents but because they are not in a position of self-determination (for employees, see Schumann 2006:122). 337 Hence, management and managerial regulations represent what Plato has noted (quoted in: Heller 1989:67), ‘bad constitutions breed unjust citizens, and that unjust people enact unjust laws’. For Plato, this is evil and evil is the misuse of reason (Heller 1989:67). Management uses reason to create managerial regulations that are unjust and thereby violate Plato’s demand for just laws and the application of reason for that. 338 For Kant, this is expressed in recognition of an original contract. It is Kant’s reason that forces the sovereign to give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will. When management creates managerial regulations, it almost never has this in mind. 339 Sovereignty can be seen as the right to command and correlatively the right to be obeyed. Hobbes conceived the sovereign as being above the law. Jean Bodin (1530–1596) was the ﬁrst European philosopher to treat the concept extensively. His souveraineté featured as a central concept in his work, De la république (1576). For him, only a supreme authority within a territory could strengthen a fractured community. Maritain’s Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Political Good (1951) acknowledges that sovereignty is an important attribute of modern political authority; it is needed to quell disputes within the state and to muster cooperation in defence against outsiders. He noted that ‘authority carries with it the obligation to command the thing that should be commanded’ (1957: 201; cf. Heller 1989:79). 340 Dworkin (2002); Kumar (2000 & 2001); Miller (2002); Norcross (2002); O’Neill (2003); Petit (2006); Raz (2003), Reibetanz (1998); Scanlon (1982, 1998, 2000, 2003); Timmons (2003); Watson (2002). 341 On this, Heller (1989:11) noted, ‘every teacher who ever failed a student, every parent who ever punished a child, every person who ever ranked, graded, distributed and judged (and we all have), has felt the coldness and even the cruelty of justice’ (cf. Fromm 1949:143ff.). 342 Instead of creating Kant’s ‘Kingdom of Ends’ or Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, the strong executive, says Dalton (1959), ‘is one for whom rules are a means, not an end… strong executives are [also] most likely to bypass rules’. 343 Cf. Bauman’s Does Ethics have a Chance in a World of Consumerism? (2008). Notes 275

344 According to Macintyre (1983:356), every action management takes and every policy it implements alters the options that are available to subordinates as well as their heirs and successors. On this, Carr (1968:149) noted, when he is obliged to carry out company policy that challenges his conception of himself as an ethical man, he suffers. Fromm (1949:10) emphasised, authoritarian ethics denies man’s capacity to know what is good or bad; the norm giver is always an authority tran- scending the individual. 345 On obedience, see: Milgram (1974); Blass (1991, 1992, 1999, 2002), on obedience to law: see Singer’s legal, moral, and political obligation (1973:1–6). 346 Karl Marx’s The German Ideology (1846), part I: Feuerbach – Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook, A. Idealism and Materialism, The Illusions of German Ideology, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ ch01a.htm; Wrong (1994:218) noted, Marx may have been ‘the master sociologist of disorder’ and Durkheim ‘the master sociologist of order’. 347 Marcuse (1969:108); Enzensberger (1974); Herman & Chomsky (1988); Chomsky (1991); Zengotita (2005); Reiner (2007). 348 Non-textbook management analyst Schrijvers’ (2004) concept of power, for example, is purely Machiavellian. It uses power to conceal your true nature because most evil people live normal and respectable lives. Subversive tactics are used to get rid of other managers involving the using of others’ weakness to his or her own advantage. It focuses on the fact that everyone has weak spot, a whim, a nasty habit, a tick, a childish fear or a phobia – something that undermines their autonomy and makes them dependent on the outside world (cf. Galbraith 1983). 349 It is the panoptical version of surveillance as expressed in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1995); cf. Thompson (2003); Klikauer (2007:171f.). On this, Kohn (1999:33) noted, ‘control breeds the need for more control, which then is used to justify the use of control’. 350 Cascading down is a managerial buzzword for transmitting information downward or issuing orders. It is part of directing downward and reporting upward. Workers view cascading down rather crudely as ‘they piss on us’ (cf. Klikauer 2007:171). 351 The Greek philosopher Thrasymachus (459–400BCE) thought that the greater the injustice, the greater the payoff, the more power and strength it brings (cf. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche). 352 This is in complete contradiction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everything Kant has ever written [www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/], and evolutionary ethics: the universality of social norms, and their critical role in human evolution, is apparent (Tomasello 2009:42). 353 Cf. American philosopher Brian Skyrms’ Evolution of the Social Contract (1996). 354 Lao-Tzu (Chan 2007); Rand (1965); Brenner & Molander (1977:63); Petit (1961:725 & 745); Sikula (1996:18); Henry (2001:267); Brunsson (2002); Miller (2007:106); Solomon (2004:1025). 355 Weber (1904–05); Beder (2000); Maier (2005). 356 Bowles & Gintis (1972, 1975, 1976 & 2001); Hechter & Horne (2009). 357 Tolerance and acceptance of managerial regulations is managerially administered to manipulate and indoctrinate individuals and subordinates who parrot, as their own, the opinion and managerial regulations of their masters (Marcuse 1969:104). 358 Cf. utilitarian philosophers are also Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) and Lytton Strachey (1880–1932). 359 This is in sharp contrast to Kant who demands that ethics be based on one’s intentions. Management does have moral intentions. Its exclusive intention is 276 Notes

however not saving a fellow creature but shareholder maximisation; cf. Williams’ A Critique of Utilitarianism (2006; Heller 1989:94; cf. Heathwood 2010; for employees, see Schumann 2006:122f.). 360 Happiness and wellbeing carry connotations of hedonism (Epicurus 341–270 BC) that Mill developed into a hedonistic theory of value. This has been further modified into the ‘Swine Morality’. 361 In Utilitarianism (1861), Mill noted, ‘happiness intends pleasure and the absence of pain’. Management does not have the intention to create happiness. Its essence is not working towards the absence of pain. Accidentally, management might create happiness as a by-product of its action. If it creates pain (usually to others) management is sometimes at pains to justify it. It is often legitimised with ‘it will be hard at first, but in the long run it will pay off’. On this Macintyre (1983:353) noted, ‘they [managers] are necessarily going to be involved in situations where they cannot benefit someone without harming someone else’ (cf. Fromm 1949:14 & 19; Heller 1989:96). 362 The offloading of harm to others is an issue for corporate management in regard to customers (cf. Ford Pinto). The tobacco industry can relate to this. 363 For management, this means treating equals [i.e. management] equal and unequals [non-managerial staff] unequal in relative – not – absolute terms (Heller 1989:2). For management, Orwell’s dictum that some pigs are more equal than others remains (Orwell 1945). It is, as Rousseau (1755) said, the creation and reinforcement of inequality (cf. Murphy 1993). 364 Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (vol. II; 1997:267–73). 365 Quoted from Driver (2007:59), cf. Layard’s Happiness – Lessons from a New Science (2005). 366 On consciousness, Marx (1844) noted: ‘consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of man in their actual life-process’. According to Sidgwick, consciousness can be inherently good. But actual managerial processes and the labour process (Ackroyd & Thompson 1999) turn humans into objects of managerial power (Bauman 1989). The natural inherently good consciousness (Sidgwick) has been deformed by an artificial process of management negating moral and ethical consciousness with the ‘Organisation Men’ (Whyte 1961). 367 Cf. Mill’s Utilitarianism (1861). 368 Not surprisingly, managerially governed workplaces are not places of happiness but rather represent what Layard (2005:48) called the Hedonistic Treadmill, where you have to keep running in order that your happiness stands still. 369 Happiness is also at the core of Eudemonism (Aquinas 1250 & Aristotle 35BC). It states that an action is good if it promotes or tends to promote the fulfilment of goals constitutive of human nature and its happiness. 370 Cf. Hegel’s concept of satisfaction as intellectual and moral mastery (Smith 1987:121; Klikauer 2010:88–125). 371 On the unmentioned employees, Graves (1924) noted decades ago the organisation is a sort of hierarchy which chooses to ignore ‘the little fellow’ (1924:48); cf. Marsden & Townley (1996); Klikauer (2007:138). 372 Cf. Polish-German theorist and philosopher Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919) on ‘Democracy and Dictatorship’ in: The Russian Revolution (http://www.marxists.org/ archive/luxemburg/1918/russian-revolution/index.htm); Deetz’s Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization (1992); Canfora (2006); Klikauer (2008:95); cf. Audi (2009). 373 On this, Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) noted the way in which a girl accepts and keeps the obligatory date, the inflection on the telephone or in the most Notes 277

intimate situation, the choice of words in conversations, and the whole inner life as classified by the now somewhat devalued depth psychology, bear witness to man’s attempt to make himself a proficient apparatus. This is similar to the model served up by the cultural industry. 374 Cf. Arnold’s Satisfaction Measure (2005:258) and Modification of Work Behaviour (2005:276ff.); cf. Aamondt (2010:328–62); Arnold & Randal 2010:246ff.). 375 Management hardly ever employs philosophers just as business schools hardly ever employ them except in cases where a bit of alibi-ethics by ‘The Servants of Power’ (Baritz 1960) is in demand to give management the appearance of being ethical. Having a mission statement on CSR is part of ‘The Myth System’. Watson (2003:29) illustrates this in the following way: James and J. S. Mill wrote books that changed the course of history while working for the East Indian Company, a multinational. Today they wouldn’t. Today they would be attending countless meetings, seminars and conferences to update their knowledge of work-related subjects, all of them conducted in the mind-maiming language of Managerialism. 376 One of the godfathers of management, Henry Ford, reportedly complained: ‘Why is it that whenever I ask for a pair of hands a brain comes attached?’ Just as the invention of the so-called and daily rehearsed Scientific Management talks about ox and gorilla in (dis)respect of workers, Ford also thought that non-intellectual workers are the ones management needs. Anti-intellectualism might even be in the essence of management. Management is not an intellectual enterprise and so are those who support it. From business school professors to textbook writers with the very occasional exception, of course (!), management has all but excluded intellectuals and replaced them with functionalists. Not surprisingly, standard textbooks such as Kreitner (2009) not only look and feel like Cosmopolitan, they are structured in a very similar way. Cosmopolitan and management textbooks are easy to consume, have nice pictures, sell well, and, above all, they are non- intellectual so that Drucker’s donkey (Magretta 2002) can understand them. 377 In those few cases of commercial laws where corporate lobbying fails to achieve pro-management outcomes, management has the usual Hirschman’s (1970) three options of exit, loyalty, and voice. It can ignore or bypass regulations (exit). If forced by courts management simply obeys them (loyalty), even at a cost to management, or it can fight them through the courts and lobby politicians for a more pro-management regulation (voice). 378 Schrijvers (2004:76) writes ‘a monopoly is excellent for us, because we can exploit it to make and keep people dependent on us. In our economy, business people, professionals and technicians profess gladly to embrace free market competition. Let’s face it: it’s all a sham. Given half a chance, any business would become a monopolist like a shot so that it could set the rules in its own interest’. The fourth version of power relates to back-up sources. ‘Most organisations have people who can make your life easier or harder. If you are able to acquire such a source of power yourself, consider yourself extremely fortunate, one down!’ (cf. Schrijvers 2005). 379 The important thing is to have a good memory so that you don’t contradict the lies you have already told (Macklin 2007:266). 380 One of the most insightful studies on this has been Nestle’s corporate lying during the baby food scandal (cf. World Health Organisation). 381 Kreitner (2009:143–234); cf. Horkheimer (1937 & 1947); Horkheimer & Adorno (1947); Klikauer (2008:62–75). 382 For example, none of Whittington’s four strategic options – classical, evolutionary, systemic, and procedural strategy (2001) – are related to ethics. 278 Notes

383 The motive of one of the foremost ethical philosophers, Jeremy Bentham, for writing his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) has been his resolute indignation about the fact that English governors preferred to exploit everyone and everything for their own benefit and advantage rather than serving the common good and not creating happiness but rather unhappiness. On unhappiness, Marcuse (1966) noted ‘“false” [needs] are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs with perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice…the result then is euphoria in unhappiness’ (cf. Heller 1989; Sen 2009; Heathwood 2010). 384 In his non-textbook study The Morally Decent HR Manager, Macklin (2007:266) found ‘the important thing is to have a good memory so that you don’t contradict the lies you have already told’. Sun Microsystems’ CEO put an essential part of a reputation that way. ‘Promises’, he says, ‘are still promises until somebody delivers the goods’. Implicitly, he separated promises from delivery. The two are totally separated for management. 385 In The High Cost of Managerialism, Rees & Rodley (1995) have shown how things are off-loaded onto the public. This ranges from health costs of smoking, fast-food → obesity links, the months-long slow and painful choking and coughing death of asbestos victims without compensation, Ford Pinto’s gas-tank explosions, Nestle’s dying babies, the still unpaid victims of Bhopal, and so forth. 386 We all need management (Magretta 2002). 387 For Magretta (2002) in a competitive world, doing a good job of creating value is only the necessary first step toward superior performance; one also needs to out- perform its competitors. The other side will be defeated. This is what strategists call ‘a zero-sum game’. Any victory for A is necessarily a defeat for B. Strategy in management is about winning. 388 Probably the only emotion management is truly capable of is ‘love oneself’ as outlined in Schwartz’s Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay (1990). 389 By the time capitalism established itself and Mill wrote Utilitarianism (1861) management also started to manifest itself. Only 50 years later in 1911 management elevated itself to ‘Scientific Management’ (Klikauer 2007:143–59). 390 Enlightenment has been seen as the negation of feudalism overcoming feudal limits of science and philosophical worldviews. Enlightenment’s rationalism replaced the irrationalism of religion. When rationalism was elevated to an all-inclusive theme of Enlightenment, Kant developed his three critiques in response to that. Cutting off the critical element from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, capitalism and management was left with pure reason. Management needs reason and instrumental rationality to operate. It does not need critique. However, without Kant’s Critique instrumental rationality remains handicapped and insufficient. Nevertheless, management’s instrumental rationality became one of the utmost distorted versions of the original Enlightenment project. One example is the allocation of labour based on instrumental rationality. Initially labour was told that technology and mechanisation will set them free from the bounds of feudalism but mechanisation, the very means that should liberate man from toil, makes him a slave of his labour (Marcuse 1941); cf. Kreitner (2009:13ff.). 391 Magretta (2002) quotes Warren Buffett who emphasised ‘somebody once said that in looking for people to hire, you look for three qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy. And if they don’t have the first, the other two will kill you’. 392 According to Schrijvers (2004), managers operating inside the ‘Moral Maze’ (Jackall 1988) specifically set out to hurt others (cf. Schrijvers 2005). Notes 279

393 In Zizek’s Ontology, Johnson (2008:13) noted, ‘the prior sequence of various philo- sophies doesn’t become “Philosophy” per se until the advent of the Kantian “Coper- nican” revolution’. Kant’s Copernican revolution represents morality (Moralität) based on abstract formulas. His predecessor, Hegel, saw ethics as Sittlichkeit. This is based on social relations (Sterrett 1892:177). Hegel once called Kant’s philosophy Ursprungsphilosopie, the original and ﬁrst philosophy (Smith 1987:103; cf. Hill 2010). 394 Darwin follows Kant in his The Origins of the Moral Sense. Darwin said that the difference between man and lower animals is a moral sense or conscious. This is by far the most important difference. 395 Kantian ethics is based on categorical imperatives, not on hypothetical ‘if-then’ constructions. However, nearly every textbook on management ethics contains sentences that use these constructions. They contravene Kant’s ethics because they violate his categorical imperative. They are unethical in the Kantian meaning of ethics. Kant’s categorical imperative renders claims that ‘management should…’, ‘management needs to…’, and ‘management could…’ obsolete. In Kant’s categorical imperatives there is nothing to choose from. Either one follows Kantian ethics or one does not. Management represents the latter. 396 Kantian ethics is the negation of intuitionism and ethics based on feelings. 397 Marcuse (1941) thought that the individual is determined not by his particular but by his universal qualities; cf. Marcuse’s Kant (1971:79ff). Schrijvers (2004:76) writes ‘a monopoly is excellent for us, because we can exploit it to make and keep people dependent on us. In our economy, business people, professionals and technicians profess gladly to embrace free market competition. Let’s face it: it’s all a sham. Given half a chance, any business, would become a monopolist like a shot so that it could set the rules in its own interest’. Magretta (2002) added: ‘business executives are society’s leading champions of free markets and competition. Truth be told, the competition every manager longs for is a lot closer to Microsoft’s end of the spectrum than it is to the dairy farmers’. All the talk about the virtues of competition notwithstanding, the aim of business strategy is to move an enterprise away from perfect competition and in the direction of monopoly; cf. Beder (2000). 398 The more problematic issue for management is Kant’s formula which says: act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as and end and never simply as a means. This is the most devastating categorical imperative for management. The essence of management is that it operates through people creating performance through others (Magretta 2002; Brunsson 2002). This raises a number of ethical dilemmas for management because management and Kantian ethics are contradictions in concept (Kant/Hegel). Cf. Sartre’s philosophy of ‘condemned to be free’ outlined in his Being and Nothingness (1943/1992); Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974); Jones et al. (2005:45); for employees, see Schumann (2006:123f.). 399 According to Jones (2005:5) ‘the employment contract is treated as if it is not of concern for business ethics’. This is despite, or perhaps because, of the existing asymmetrical relationship between management and workers (Offe & Wiesenthal 1980; cf. Klikauer 2011:33–56). It was none other than one of the great inventors of management, Henry Ford, who claimed ‘why is it that whenever I ask for a pair of hands a brain comes attached?’; cf. Hegel (1807 & 1821); Kojève (1947); Honneth (1995); Sinnerbrink (2007:101–22; Klikauer 2010:88–125). 400 Often, 80% of its proﬁts come from 20% of its customers…it is universally true that some small numbers of ‘x’ (decisions, products, customers, distribution channels – you name it) will account for a disproportionately large percentage of results. 280 Notes

401 On Kant’s concept of the subject Johnson (2008:13f.) noted: Kant, instead of Descartes, is the true founder of the notion of the subject…Kant’s transcendental idealism focuses on the category of the ‘subjective objective’ (cf. Negri 1970). Kant’s successor Hegel negated Kant’s concept of ‘the thing in-itself’. It falls apart once exposed to Hegelian dialectics (Klikauer 2010:88–125). 402 German philosopher Fichte noted in his Wissenschaftslehre (1797–1800) that a clear consciousness is linked to self-determination. For management, this has to be avoided because most subordinates should never develop self-consciousness. They should not engage in self-determination either because this might lead to an awareness of the undemocratic, top-down, and hierarchical order enforced by management. 403 On self-determination Schrijvers’s (2004) noted: ‘nothing instils greater fear in an organisation than people doing their own thing’. 404 If management grants some sort of partial self-determination inside, for example, semi-autonomous work teams, then it assures it always retains the controlling power over these teams. Thereby it negates Kant’s ethics. 405 A classical case is the management of overseas subsidiaries by central management. Central management has three choices. It can send a local manager overseas, it can use an overseas manager, and it can use a so-called third-country national. Ultimately, any one of these three must make decisions on central management’s behalf. In all three cases central management retains some control over decision-making. Some managers will exert more autonomy while others will use less when making decisions on behalf of central management but they all violate Kant’s ethical concept of self-determination. 406 In his The Fear of Freedom (1960:215), the philosopher Erich Fromm noted ‘that truth is one of the strongest weapons of those who have no power’. This is exactly why the essence of management is not related to truth but to power. 407 According to Schrijvers (2004:14) of course, we choose neutral terms, scientific terms, and we describe the law as follows: ‘Managers give priority to the interest of the organisation in those situations where a conflict of interest occurs…we make use of scientific jargon to describe how we obstruct our boss and exclude our colleagues…objective language removes all emotion and nuance from the action that people initiate’ (Klikauer 2008:96–108; cf. Macklin 2007:266; Watson 2009). 408 Magretta (2002) writes it is important to have an overall sense of the direction when marching towards management’s real bottom line. Management uses strategy inside a battleground even if this incurs civilian casualties. 409 Tellingly, philosophical articles on the subject such as, for example, Green’s ‘What does it Mean to Use Someone as “A Means Only”: Rereading Kant’ (2001) do not mention ‘respect’ once. 410 Management is self-centred and ignorant of workers who Magretta (2002) merely calls others. It leads to the contradiction of: a) workers have been disrespected, reduced to mere others, and have been deliberately unrecognised (cf. Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition, 1995) while b) Boatright’s standard textbook on ‘Ethics and the Conduct of Business’ (2009) tells us that management ‘respects’ them (cf. Sage 2007). 411 On Kant’s ‘thing in-itself’ Johnson (2008:17) noted: ‘the Ding an sich [thing in itself] evidently involves a paradox, an unsustainable contradiction’. 412 For that, affirmative textbook writers have to rule out treating people only as means. They cannot admit that management’s essence, in accordance with Magretta (2002), is that management operates through people. They can also not admit Notes 281

that this totally contradicts Kant’s idea of the ‘Kingdom of Ends’ because it deni- grates people to pure means, instruments, tools, apparatuses, and others and that their only purpose is to service management when it operates through people. In sum, the fact that the essence of management rests on the formula management creates performance through others does not allow for any other interpretation. If Kant contradicts the very essence of management, something else must be used to support management. 413 An example of this has been outlined in Bowie’s Version of Kant (Jones et al. 2005:43–8). 414 In Kreitner’s 11th edition of Management (2009) 13 out of 546 pages are on ethics (2.37%). The rest is on the technicalities of management (97.63%). 415 In that way, ethics becomes a means to an end rather than being an end in-itself. It is also a form of managerially created knowledge. The worst expression of such ethical knowledge is when managers self-invent their own ethics in the absence of philosophical knowledge. In such cases, their self-invented quasi-knowledge on ethics is claimed to present ethics based on common sense. Kant labelled all versions of common sense-based knowledge vulgar and unsophisticated. For Kant common sense does not lead to ethics however critical reflection does (cf. Lukes 1985:100–38). 416 Management uses strategy inside a battleground even if this incurs civilian casualties (Magretta 2002). Schrijvers (2004:22) agrees with Magretta (2002). People who know the battleground are better prepared than their opponents. Inside the ‘Moral Maze’ (Jackall 1988) of management there is excitement about dirty tricks at corporate level when big companies with cruel and fraudulent CEOs use backstabbing and treachery to set the tone in order to win on the battlefield (Schrijvers 2004). 417 Historically, Kant’s universalism was directly opposed by management in the 18th century version of mercantilism. On this, Kant noted that it is essential not to confuse the point of ethical duties with duties as such. Because a merchant who acts neither from duty nor from direct inclination but only for a selfish purpose does not act inside what Kant sees as moral duty (cf. Heller 1989:35). 418 For example, the rule-obeying for performance-related pay is designed for staff members while golden parachutes, CEO payouts, share options, special allowances (school fees, health insurance, free housing, etc.) and other bonuses are disconnected from actual achievements. 419 A good case in point is Kreitner’s 11th edition of Management (2009) where workers appear as workforce on pages 61–6, a mere five pages out of 546 pages. It testifies to the claim that management and management textbooks have a lot to say about those who manage, they are rather silent on those who are managed (Klikauer 2007:129). Kreitner (2009) supports the claim that management has not much to say about those over whom they rule (cf. Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition, 1995). 420 Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (1788: Part IX): ‘On the Wise Adaptation of the Human Being’s Cognitive Faculties to his Practical Vocation’. 421 Cf. Hegel (1807 & 1821); Kojève (1947); Adorno (1993); Sinnerbrink (2007:101ff.) 422 Kohn (1999:25) noted management also seems to assume that machines and workers are alike in that they are both normally passive agents who must be stim- ulated by management in order to go into action. In the case of the machines, management turns on electricity. In the case of workers, money takes the place of electricity. 423 For two successors of Kant, German philosopher Hegel and later Marx, alienation is linked to employment and work. On this Marx (1844) noted: alienation shows 282 Notes

itself not only in the result; but also in the act of production, inside productive activity itself. Therefore, he does not confirm himself in his work, he denies himself, feels miserable instead of happy, deploys no free physical and intellectual energy, but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. To prevent critical, reflective, and self-knowledgeable employees, management has invented a raft of measures starting with organisational behaviour to create the ‘Organisation Men’ (Whyte 1961). Management needs to eclipse all feelings of misery and workplace pathologies (cf. Lukes 1985). 424 Bowles & Gintis’ Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contra- dictions of Economic Life (1976, 1981, 2002) delivers the reason for the fact that ‘almost all schooling is boring’ (Albert 2006). 425 Cf. Whyte (1961); Beder (2000:193–272); Klikauer (2007:183ff.) 426 This is evident in just two examples. One is the wide, open, and empty country roads visible in nearly every car advertisement while the reality for most drivers are jammed up city streets. The deception of the empty country road sells cars by deceiving drivers about the reality of car traffic. Secondly, almost every cereal box is at least 1/3 empty because a large box simply sells better and less content increases profits. It also means deceiving customers about the real content. Once you have internalised what 20-second ads tell you over and over again, self-deception starts. Similarly, when management’s marketing experts start believing that those are good car ads and good cereal boxes and both are good for society, self-deception is established. On advertising, German philosophers Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) noted: ‘advertising today is a negative principle, a blocking device: everything that does not bear its stamp is economically suspect’. Inside corporations, management’s use of deception ranges from faked promises of promotion to pay increases, workloads, etc. Corporate and managerial deception is truthfully depicted in Michael Moore’s first documentary Roger and Me (Moore, M. 1989. Roger & Me (documentary), Warner Brothers, December 20th 1989 (USA), 91 min. English). 427 The numbers that truly matter are the ones that tell a story about how the organisation is doing (Magretta 2002). 428 Bagley (2003:19) and Kinicki & Kreitner (2008:29). 429 In Kreitner’s management textbook (2009:143–234) decision-making takes up 91 pages while ethics takes up a mere 13. 430 Several managerial ideologies are brought into gear to prevent this from occurring. These instruments prevent non-managerial staff from reaching their own understanding. They also advance a one-dimensional managerial understanding through the creation of a one-dimensional framework inside which the world of work is to be understood. It is not possible for management to follow the demands of Kantian ethics that are directed towards allowing non-managerial individuals self-understanding. Management has to negate Kantian ethics in order to secure its own position. The managerial ideologies are established in management schools, induction programmes, corporate culture, leadership seminars, teamwork, corporate communication via newsletters, emails, brochures, as well as in more structured managerial initiatives such as promotions, remuneration, benefits, and bonuses. 431 Jean-Paul Sartre noted in his Being and Nothingness (1992) that Kant’s ‘You ought, therefore you can’ is implicitly understood. Everything that ought to be always carries in it the seed of potentialities and of practical transformations. 432 The one-dimensional TINA approach of management remains stuck in what is while refraining from all utopian and speculative ideas about ethical possibilities. After all, management includes all the activities associated with making some- Notes 283

thing…and…all the activities associated with selling something. For management any speculative thinking has to be confined to selling something, thus exterminat- ing any form of ethics based on what ought to be. Selling and making are all about the self-invented so-called hard facts of business and ‘The Real Bottom Line’. What counts for management is not ethical speculation on what ought to be but thinking associated with making and selling. The essence of management, therefore, rests on what is (making and selling) and not on what ought to be. Not surprisingly, neither management nor the discipline of management studies run by ‘The Servants of Power’ (Baritz 1960) has been known for advances in ethical thinking (cf. Singer 1994; Farmer 2003; Shafer-Landau 2007; Shafer-Landau & Cueno 2007; Pogge & Horton 2008; Pogge 2010). 433 One of the most prominent voices in advancing animal rights has been the philosopher Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975), Practical Ethics (1993), Writings on an Ethical Life (2000); cf. Singer (2005 & 2008); cf. Animal Rights & Environmental Ethics in Olen et al. (2005:452ff.). This represents the exact opposite of what Stoops (1913:462) detected, it is said that the packing houses turn to profit every part of the pig but its squeal (cf. Rollin 2007; Boggs 2010; Donovan 2010; Carter 2010; Theodore & Theodore 2010). 434 ‘Mono’-culture reflects consumer society as a monopoly on culture in which culture has been reduced to saleability. It is the monopoly of the market that determines what culture is. The seemingly vast array of microscopically different consumer choices provides no more than superficial alterations of the same thing. These ornamental choices of consumerism are paralleled by a significant reduc- tion of life-choice, thus creating a one-dimensional society of birth → school → work → consume → death (Marcuse 1966). 435 Cf. Olen et al. (2005); Light & Ralston (2003); Chanter (2006); Desjardins (2006) Brennan & Lo (2010). 436 Cf. Kreitner (2009). Apart from Kreitner’s standard textbook definition of environment in the realm of management, it also outlines that the environment is something out there rather than an integral part of our lives hence, a growing environmental anxiety among consumers is then seized upon as a new opportunity for product differentiation and achieving competitive advantage (e.g. through so-called greening of products or the building of ‘environment friendly’ corporate images (Alvesson & Willmott 1996:21 & 26; cf. Brennan & Lo 2010; Theodore & Theodore 2010). 437 Kant developed a highly influential moral theory according to which autonomy is a necessary property to be the kind of being whose interests are to count directly in the moral assessment of actions. Since animals are not capable of representing themselves in this way, they cannot have rights. One of the clearest and most forceful denials of animal consciousness is developed by Rene Descartes (1596–1650) who argues that animals are automata that might act as if they were conscious, but really are not. This stream of moral philosophy is also represented in Rawls. If we do extend Rawls’ conception of fairness and justice to animals, then animals will have no direct moral standing; (cf. Keller 2010:82ff. & 257ff.; Kazez 2010; Mendieta 2010; Gerhardt 2010; Carter 2010). 438 In Groundwork, Kant writes ‘…every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will…Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves’ (Kant 1785; cf. Fromm 1949:4). 284 Notes

439 American moral philosopher and Kant expert Christine Korsgaard (1996:153–4), for example, writes ‘it is a pain to be in pain. And that is not a trivial fact. When you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are perceiving a reason. An animal’s cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason, a reason to change its conditions. And you can no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you can the words of a person. Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way another person can. So of course we have obligations to animals’. 440 Consider factory farming, the most common method used to convert animal bodies into relatively inexpensive foodstuff in industrialised societies today (cf. Jensen et al. 2011). An estimated 8 billion animals in the United States alone are born, confined, biologically manipulated, transported and ultimately slaugh- tered each year so that humans can consume them. The conditions in which these animals are raised and the method of slaughter causes vast amounts of suffering (cf. Mason and Singer 1990; Kazez 2010; Carter 2010). 441 Not surprisingly, one campaign strategy of PETA (people for the ethical treatment of animals) is to bring the cruelty administered to animals directly to managers, their wives, families, and children (http://www.peta.org/). 442 Passmore, J. 1974. Man’s Responsibility for Nature, London: Duckworth; cf. Keller (2010, part IV, p.147ff. & part V, p.221ff.; Bell 2010). 443 In his Theory of Natural Man (Discourse on Inequality, 1755), French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, the first man who, having fenced in a piece of land, said ‘This is mine’, and found people naïve enough to believe him, that man was the true founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody (cf. Soron 2010). 444 The moral values of integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community as expressed by Leopold (1949) are of no use to management (cf. Mander 1991 & 2001; Goldsmith & Mander 2001); cf. Mander’s In the Absence of the Sacred: The Failure of Technology and the Survival of the Indian Nations (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books). For Korten (1995:9) it is making money for the rich at the expense of the life of society and the planet (cf. Keller 2010:245ff.; Theodore & Theodore 2010; Benton 2010; Llorente 2010; Weisberg 2010). 445 Cf. Rolston’s Future of Environmental Ethics (Part XI) in: Keller’s Environmental Ethics (2010). 446 Cf. Næss (1973 & 1989); Witoszek and Brennan (1999); Keller (2010, chapters 25–9, pp.211–44); Jensen et al. (2011). 447 Moore, M. (2007) Sicko (DVD – The Weinstein Company Lionsgate, USA, release date: June 22, 2007); cf. ‘US health professionals in support of Sicko’, British Medical Journal (2007), no. 334 (www.bmj.com/). 448 According to Magretta, mangers are forced by deadlines and other pressures to look at a problem and simply ask, ‘how can I resolve this in the quickest way?’ 449 ROI = return of investment. Regan (1985) noted, …animals are treated routinely, systematically as if their value were reducible to their usefulness to others, they are routinely, systematically treated with a lack of respect, and thus are their rights routinely, systematically violated. The animal rights position is an abso- lutist position. Any being that is a subject of a life has inherent worth and the rights that protect such worth, and all subjects of a life have these rights equally. Thus any practice that fails to respect the rights of those animals, e.g. eating animals, hunting animals, experimenting on animals, using animals for enter- Notes 285

tainment, is wrong, irrespective of human need, context, or culture (cf. Rollin 2007). 450 Marx (1890); Itoh (1988); Baudrillard (1996); Lindstrom (2005 & 2008). 451 Magretta (2002) noted the icon of competitiveness and good management is a huge conglomerate named GE which, under Jack Welch’s leadership, bought hundreds of companies. In that, it is not so much delayering as it is the sometimes invisible, but always important, lines of authority. This has been exem- plified by none other than Ford. Ford’s strategy was the epitome of command and control where a central office could coordinate the divisions. Their maxim was ‘when you do something yourself, using your own resources and employees, you have more control’. And, you must create a nervous edge that keeps arm’s-length supplies (and freelances) on their toes, the anxiety of competition. Management must innovate and it must keep cost down through coordination and cooperation that come with hierarchy (that is, with ownership). This establishes clear command- and-control structures (cf. Boggs 2010). 452 Animism is the philosophical, religious or spiritual idea that souls or spirits exist not only in humans but also in other animals, plants, rocks, natural phenomena such as thunder, geographic features such as mountains or rivers, or other entities of the natural environment. Animism may further attribute souls to abstract concepts such as words, true names or metaphors in mythology. It is particularly widely found in the religions of indigenous peoples, although it is also found in Shinto, and some forms of Hinduism and Neopaganism. Throughout European history, philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, among others, contemplated the possibility that souls exist in animals, plants and people, however the currently accepted definition of animism was only developed in the 19th century by Sir Edward Tylor. 453 On ‘region’ the Harvard Business Review carries the following: Kimberly-Clark Andean Region: Creating a Winning Culture, Stanford and Silicon Valley: Lessons on Becoming a High-Tech Region, Citibank Credit Card: Commercials from the Asian-Pacific Region, Presents the launch of advertisements in four Asia Pacific countries, USAA: Business Process Review for the Great Lakes Region, USAA: Busi- ness Process Review for the Great Lakes Region, Regional Strategies for Global Leadership (plus 372 other articles on ‘region’ in 2010). Hence, for management ‘region’ is a term used to define a geographical space for business – no more. 454 Utilitarians maintain that what is really important is the promotion of happiness, pleasure, or the satisfaction of interests, and the avoidance of pain, suffering, or frustration of interests. Bentham, one of the more forceful defenders of this ‘senti- entist’ view of moral consideration, famously wrote, ‘other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things…The day has been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated…upon the same footing as…animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the black- ness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the “os sacrum”, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse?…the question is not, Can they reason? nor, 286 Notes

Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ (Bentham 1789; cf. www.utilitarianism. com). 455 ROI; cf. numbers are important (Magretta 2002), hence financial risk management, commodity prices, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, stock prices, corporate finance investment and financing decisions, preserving firm value derivatives, standard derivative instruments, options, futures contracts, forward contracts, swaps, financial engineering; financial risk; defaults, credit risk; interest rate risk; liquidity risk; market risk; operational risk; volatility risk; settlement risk, creative accounting, and exotic accounting, etc. The year 2001 witnessed a series of financial information frauds involving Enron Corporation, auditing firm Arthur Andersen, the telecommunications company WorldCom, Qwest and Sunbeam, among other well- known corporations. These problems highlighted the need to review the effective- ness of accounting standards, auditing regulations and corporate governance (cf. Soederberg 2010:66ff.) principles (i.e. management’s non-compliance with stage 4 – law and order!). In some cases, management manipulated the figures shown in financial reports to indicate a better economic performance. In others, tax and regulatory incentives encouraged over-leveraging of companies and decisions to bear extraordinary and unjustified risk. The Enron scandal deeply influenced the development of new regulations to improve the reliability of financial reporting, and increased public awareness about the importance of having accounting standards that show the financial reality of companies and the objectivity and independence of auditing firms. In addition to being the largest bankruptcy reorganisation in American history, the Enron scandal undoubtedly is the biggest audit failure. The scandal caused the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, which at the time was one of the five largest accounting firms in the world. It involved a financial scandal of Enron Corporation and their auditors Arthur Andersen, which was revealed in late 2001. After a series of revelations involving irregular accounting procedures conducted throughout the 1990s, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in December 2001. 456 Meerkats in the Kalahari Desert are known to sacrifice their own safety by staying with sick or injured family members so that the fatally ill will not die alone. Darwin reported this in The Descent of Man: ‘So intense is the grief of female monkeys for the loss of their young, that it invariably caused the death of certain kinds’. 457 Skinner (1948, 1953, 1971, 1974); Chomsky (1959 & 1971); Cavalieri & Singer (1994); Lemov (2006). 458 James (2011); Krebs (2011). 459 The phrase ‘Reverence for Life’ is a translation of the German expression ‘Ehr- furcht vor dem Leben’ (more accurately translated as: ‘to be in awe of the mystery of life’); cf. Schweitzer (1965). 460 On this, French (1979:213) quoted Peter Drucker’s Concept of ‘The Corporation’ (1946) stating, ‘because the corporation is an institution it must have a basic policy. For it must subordinate individual ambition and decisions to the “needs” of the corporation’s welfare and survival’. For management writers there is no human ‘will’. Humans are reduced to having ambitions. Secondly, the human beings must be subordinated to the [managerially invented] ‘needs’ of a corporation. 461 Any irreversibility of a once destroyed ‘wild’ is excluded from managerial thinking that might turn wilderness into a business park – which is no more than a tautology using the positive term ‘park’ to cover up the ugliness of such premises. A business park is a form of territorial colonisation, the proliferation of spaces which escape the control of the built realm: voids between fragments of unconnected residen- tial schemes, gaps between urbanised zones, abandoned farmland, etc. While we Notes 287

debate on whether the traditional city block is a naïve solution to the problem of ordering immediate periphery, a new approach to spatial organisation arises with the ease that characterises any new consumer good, an approach which questions the conventional references of urbanism: the so-called ‘commercial, industrial, business and theme park’. 462 An adaptation of Karl Marx’s original quote (Das Kapital (1890), vol. 1, p. 801, Dietz-Verlag Berlin, 1961) would read: ‘with adequate profit, management becomes bold. A certain 10% will ensure environmental destruction anywhere; 20% certain will produce eagerness; 50%, positive audacity; 100% will make it ready to trample on every environmental entity; 300%, and there is not one environmental crime at which management will scruple, nor a risk it will not run, even to the chance of its owner being hanged. If devastation of nature and environmental destruction will deliver profit to management, it will freely execute both’. 463 Not surprisingly, management (Kreitner 2009:335–9), organisational behaviour, and organisational psychology (Arnold 2005:312–15, 335–6, 341; Arnold & Randal 2010:19f.) often quote their beloved ‘Hierarchy of Needs’ (Maslow 1943) to the exclusion of the environment. The human need to live in a clean, healthy, undam- aged, and life-supporting environment has to be excluded from the supposed ‘needs’ of standard management textbooks. 464 Cf. Bookchin (1962, 1982, 1990, 1995, 2001); Bookchin & Foreman (1991); Keller (2010, chapters 35–8, pp. 281–317). 465 This really divides management into two groups, one that creates these statements and the other who thinks they are rubbish. But it also divides those who see behind the deception of affirmative management writers and those who enhance the mystification of management. Demystifying examples of managerial reality are hardly ever found in textbooks on management. They are created and sold on a textbook market that demands conflict free – usually labelled as non- controversial – texts. It introduces unsuspecting students to management so that they fulfil their function as future managers through the use of managerial language and do their ‘moaning and groaning at home’ (Schrijvers 2004:16). Tellingly, Harvard Business Review’s ‘Ethical Leader’s Decision Tree’ (Bagley 2003) does not mention the environment at all (cf. Henderson 2001; Capaldi 2005). 466 By January 2010, the internet website [http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/ 34827.html] with this quote had received four million hits. 467 When management uses the term environment it means the competitive environment or the business environment (Kreitner 2009; Schultz & Schultz 2010:235). Management’s use has nothing to do with the everyday understanding of environment that carries connotations of nature. 468 Cf. Magretta (2002); Mander (1991 & 2001). For many managers climate change means no more than changing the climate on an air conditioning system so that an office, boardroom, or car gets colder or warmer. The environment is an externality that only comes into boardrooms as filtered air. It is of no concern to management because it exists separate from it. 469 In the Harvard Business Review editor’s book, Magretta (2002) quotes one of the US’ most prolific management-gurus and the world’s most widely read writer on management, Peter F. Drucker. For him management first of all appears to be like a mindless game of chances at which any donkey could win provided only that he be ruthless. 470 Nazi armaments chief Albert Speer told a congressional investigator that Germany could not have attempted its September 1939 Blitzkrieg against Poland without the performance-boosting technology provided by Alfred P. Sloan and General Motors. 288 Notes

Edwin Black (Hitler’s Carmaker: The Inside Story of How General Motors Helped Mobilize the Third Reich) outlines Sloan’s support for Nazi Germany: ‘For Sloan, motorizing the fascist regime that was expected to wage a bloody war in Europe was the next big thing and a spigot of limitless profits for GM. But unlike many commercial collaborators with the Nazis who were driven strictly by the icy quest for profits, Sloan also harbored a political motivation. Sloan despised the emerging American way of life being crafted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Sloan hated Roosevelt’s New Deal, and admired the strength, irrepressible determination and sheer magnitude of Hitler’s vision’ (from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_P._Sloan). 471 Economies of scale, in microeconomics, are a cost advantage that a business obtains due to expansion. It is a long run concept and refers to reductions in average unit cost as the size of a facility, or scale, increases. Economies of scale may be utilised by any firm expanding its scale of operation. The common ones are purchasing (bulk buying of materials through long-term contracts), managerial (increasing the specialisation of managers), financial (obtaining lower-interest charges when borrow- ing from banks and having access to a greater range of financial instruments), and marketing (spreading the cost of advertising over a greater range of output in media-markets). 472 Otto Adolf Eichmann (1906–1962) was a high-ranking Nazi and SS-Obersturm- bannführer (Lieutenant Colonel). Due to his organisational talents and ideological reliability, he was tasked by Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich to facilitate and manage the logistics of mass deportation to ghettos and extermination camps in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe. He worked under Ernst Kaltenbrunner (the highest- ranking SS leader) until the end of the war. Eichmann was captured by Israeli Mossad agents in Argentina and indicted by Israeli courts on 15 criminal charges, including charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. He was convicted and hanged. He claimed, ‘I was never an anti-Semite. … I personally had nothing to do with this. My job was to observe and report on it…whether they were bank directors or mental cases, the people who were loaded on those trains meant nothing to me. It was really none of my business’. 473 In Mander’s Seven Rules of Corporate Behaviour (2001), it is rule number six that relates to nature. Management transforms nature into commodities and thereby intervenes into nature. It is this ravaging of nature that identifies immorality (cf. Petrick & Quinn 1997:3); Marx (1890) and Engels (1820–1895) noted in their work on ‘Alienated Labour’ in their Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), ‘the worker becomes a commodity that is all the cheaper the more commodities he creates’. In modern managerial language (Orwell’s Newspeak): productivity gains by human resources contribute to organisational goals and thereby reduce the cost of that resource. 473 The managerial process demands that nature is nothing more than a commodity to be used and – if needed – abused when shareholder values are at stake. Like no other life-form on earth, managerial corporations intervene into nature on a scale unseen in the history of planet earth. It started with gold, silver, and copper mining in South America, the slave trade through the triangle of death, and moved on to oil exploration (Middle East), and the attempted patent of an entire natural rainforest as the latest. This has had a ravaging effect on nature culminating in the distinction of entire species and global warming (cf. Greenpeace 2010). Almost everything management does to nature indicates the total opposite of Kohlberg’s ethics at level 7. For Mander (2001) it is corporate misbehaviour. For Magretta (2002; cf. Kreitner 2009) it is the essence of management that demands the treatment of nature in such a way. Notes 289

474 If truth does not fulfil managerial demands, it is without value to management. What counts for management is saleability. Marcuse (1968:143) saw truth inside an existing order as problematic because when truth cannot be realised within the established social order, it always appears to the latter as mere utopia. Manage- ment is not a utopian enterprise. It deals with facts and figures, with here and now, and with ‘what is’ rather than with ‘what ought to be’ (Kant). 475 In life-centred morality the good (wellbeing, welfare) of individual organisms is considered as entity. It has inherent worth that determines our moral relations with the Earth’s wild communities of life. From the perspective of a life-centred theory, we have prima facie moral obligations that are owned to wild plants and animals themselves as members of the Earth’s biotic community (Taylor 2004: 505; cf. Olen et al. 2005:485ff.; Kazez 2010). 476 According to Magretta (2002), operating measures and financial measures tell managers how well they’re using resources, people, facilities, and capital. Good managers know they can’t live without performance measures…resource allocation is one of those awful, technocratic phrases that make people’s eyes glace over but management is essentially about allocating resources. 477 For Singer (1990), the idea of equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans; it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings (cf. Davis 2010). 478 In the spirit of George Orwell’s Animal Farm ‘some pigs are more equal than others’. In management, for example, the – always as ‘necessary’ announced – dismissals and retrenchments of workers are almost never done under equal considerations. It is not management but foremost those who make things (Aristotle) who are down-sized, right-sized, and sui-sized. Similarly, when it comes to bonuses, it is management who considers itself first and as the exclusive recipient. 479 Singer (1990:494–5) notes, ‘the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a pre- requisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. A mouse, for example, does have an interest in not being kicked along the road, because it will suffer if it is. If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering – insofar as rough comparison can be made – of any other being’; cf. Regan (2006). 480 Singer (1990:495) emphasises that ‘racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of the own race when there is a clash between their interest and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate the principle of equality by favouring the interests of their own sex. Similar, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species’. 481 Interestingly and tellingly, early capitalism started with Mercantilism, an economic theory considered to be a form of economic nationalism which holds that the prosperity of a nation is dependent upon its supply of capital. Economic assets (or capital) are represented by bullion (gold, silver, and trade value) which is best increased through a positive balance of trade with other nations (exports minus imports). The theory assumes that wealth and monetary assets are iden- tical. Mercantilism suggests that the ruling government should advance the goals by playing a protectionist role in the economy by encouraging exports and dis- couraging imports, notably through the use of tariffs and subsidies. The theory 290 Notes

dominated Western European economic policies from the 16th to the late 18th century. In other words, when the first nations developed capitalism, they did the exact opposite of what they prescribe today to those countries that are assigned to develop industry and capitalism. Today’s managerial capitalism aided by MIF, World Bank, OECD, GATT, G7, G20, etc. demands that these developing nations open their nations to commerce. This might explain why the term Mercantilism has been abolished from the public sphere (Habermas 1997). 482 The historical continuity of Figure 11.1 applies to developed (mostly western) European countries, plus Canada, the USA, and perhaps Japan. It is a sequential model that applies to all countries that have developed and continue to develop managerial structures. In all cases, management has or will make the transition from punishment regimes (1) to rewarding regimes expressed as performance management (2). And in all cases, it will stop there and not developed higher forms of morality (3–7). 483 Cf. Engels (1892); Thompson (1963 & 1967); Hobsbawm (1968). 484 Cf. Braverman (1974); Edwards (1979); Burawoy (1979 & 1985); Kothari (2010). 485 Different levels of managerial hierarchy may not be preventative of shared norms by themselves, but the existence of top-management as the exclusive source of power with the right to issue directives unilaterally may prevent the creation of shared norms. More often than not, subordinate levels are simply requested in order to follow top-management’s norms without consultation and without being given any influence over norm-creation, norm-interpretation, and even norm- application. The hierarchical levels depicted here are a rough guide. Many larger companies, nearly all corporations, and almost all multinational corporations have more hierarchies (cf. Leopold & Harris 2009; Dessler 2011). 486 A command-and-control structure is only good as long as it supports the bottom- line expressed in numbers that matter. Hence management has developed its own specialised vocabulary, much of it quantitative because of two factors: a) management requires the discipline of quantifications and b) numbers are essential to organisational performance. Measurement is necessary because the numbers that truly matter are the ones that tell a story about how the organisation is doing. Therefore, good managers use numbers to create a common middle ground of purposeful action. This is the management-by-numbers approach (Magretta 2002). 487 Even though the balanced scorecard (1992 & 1993; cf. Weiss & Finn 2005) is not balanced at all, it is nevertheless the most recent invention that links work conducted by those ‘who make things’ (Aristotle) and profits. This managerial method is part of a human capital theory that views human beings exclusively as a factor of capital, i.e. the human factor of capital. Only as such humans are assigned worth. It is the height of management’s ‘Kingdom of Means’ and the most complete opposite of Kant’s ‘Kingdom of Ends’ (Korsgaard 1996). 488 An incomplete list of unethical behaviour of management and business would look like this (cf. Shaw & Barry 2010; Muhr et al. 2010): A7D Affair, Agent Orange & Dow Chemical-Monsanto-Diamond-Shamrock, Amato-Barilla-DeCecco-Divella- Garofalo Italian pasta cartel, American Airlines illegal political contributions, Amer- ican International Group; American Shipping, Arthur Anderson’s auditing of Enron, Arthur D. Little’s waste disposal; Australia’s HIH-insurance, BAE’s corruption, Baster- vs.-Ford Motor Co., Bath Iron Works, BCCI, Bechtel Power Co.’s union discrimination, Beech-Nut’s Bogus Apple Juice, Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme fraud; Big Brother at Procter & Gamble, Bre-X Minerals, British-American Tobacco’s hidden lobbying activities, hiding the truth on addiction & cancer, Charles Keating in Lin- coln Savings & Loans, Chevron in the Amazon, Chrysler’s Odometer Controversy, Notes 291

DC-10 Crash in Paris & McDonnell-Douglas, Dexel, Burnham & Lambert’s insider trading, Doe Run Co.’s lead smelter in Herculaneum, Dow Chemicals’ manufacturing of Napalm, Dow Corning’s breast implants, Enron, Exxon paying Italian political parties, Exxon Valdez, Film Recovery Systems Inc., Ford Pinto, Ford’s- Firestone Brawl, Four Seasons Nursing Centres of America Inc., Fraud at WorldCom, GAP’s Sweatshops, GAP and child labour, General Electrics’ anti-trust violation, Goodrich Brake Scandal, Google in China, Goldman Sachs’ CEO & Global Financial Crisis (2007); Greyhound Bus Company and Motor Carrier Safety Act, Guinesty – the Guinness Affair, Gulf Oil’s extortion in South Korea, Gulf Oil’s payoffs to the Bolivian President, H B Fuller Co. & Sniffing Glue, Heavy Electrical Equipment Anti- Trust Case, Hooker Chemicals’ & Love Canal, IBM in Nazi Germany, ITT & Pino- chet, Jacksonville Shipyard, James Hardy Industries, Japan’s Minamata, Japan’s Nitrogen Ltd., Jewish Prison Labour for Germany’s Nazi-Industry, Johnson & John- son’s Tylenol, KPMG & Tax Shelter Industry, KPMG for Enron, Lavish Pay at Har- vard, Leeson & Barings, Lehman Brothers, MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., Levi Strauss in San Antonio (Texas), Lockheed’s bribe to a Japanese airline company, Malden Mills, Martha Stewart’s Insider Trading, Mattel’s massive recall of toys, McDonald’s Big Mac rewrapping, McDonald’s Hot Coffee, McDonald’s McLibel- Trial, Merck and Aids in South Africa, Mitsubishi Motor Ltd., Morton-Thiokol, Nestle’s Baby Formula, Nike in Southeast Asian Sweatshops, Nike’s misleading advertising, Northrop paying off Saudi Arabian generals, Pacific Lumber Co. in Oregon, Parmalat, Procter & Gamble’s Rely Tampons, Race Discrimination at Texaco, Revco Medicaid and the State of Ohio, RSV Débâcle (NL), S & L Débâcle, Sears Auto Centre, Seveso, Sex Discrimination at Wal-Mart, Shell Oil in Nigeria, Shell Oil’s sinking of Brent Spar (Shell’s declared values are honesty, integrity and respect for the people) (Henriques 2007:22), Siemens, Solomon Brothers Treasury Bond Scandal, Standard Fruit Company & Banana Republics, Starbucks & Fair Trade Coffee & exploitation, Stauffer Chemical fraud (1982), Subprime mortgage lending (2007– 2010), The Arms Industry, Toys “R” Us & Child World, Weapons & Land-Mine Industry, Westinghouse’s anti-trust violation, Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster, Thalidomide: the Drug that Deformed, Three Miles Island Nuclear Accident, UNR Industries Inc.’s asbestos pipe insulation, Union Carbide’s Bhopal, US Car-Maker CEO’s private-jet begging trip to Washington DC; Visy-Amcor cartel (Australia), Whitewater Brewing Co. & free speech, Yahoo in China. Carr (1968:148) reported an automobile master key manufacturer that mailed master keys for cars to anyone including thieves. 489 Cf. Hare (1979); ASS (1998); Fyfe (1989); Nazer (2005); Satre (2005); Craig et al. (2007); Bales & Trodd (2008); Humphries (2010); Hynson (2010); Watkins (2010); Buck (2011); by 2010 a google search on child labour had 3.7 million hits. 490 Taylor (1911); Fayol (1916); Magretta (2002); Kreitner (2009); Aamondt (2010). 491 Controlling is described in the sense that a manager must receive feedback about a process in order to make necessary adjustments. The principle of management’s division of work is the same as Adam Smith’s division of labour. Specialisation increases output by making employees more efficient. Authority: managers must be able to give orders. Authority gives them this right. Discipline: employees must obey and respect the rules that govern the organisation. Good discipline is the result of effective leadership, a clear understanding between management and workers regarding the organisation’s rules, and the judicious use of penalties for infractions of the rules. Unity of command: every employee should receive orders from only one superior. Unity of direction: each group of organisational activities that have the same objective should be directed by one manager using one plan. Subordination of individual interests to the general interest: the interests of any 292 Notes

one employee or group of employees should not take precedence over the interests of the organisation as a whole. Remuneration: workers must be paid a fair wage for their services. Centralisation refers to the degree to which subordinates are involved in decision making. Whether decision making is centralised (to management) or decentralised (to subordinates) is a question of proper proportion. The task is to find the optimum degree of centralisation for each situation. Scalar chain: the line of authority from top management to the lowest ranks represents the scalar chain. Communications should follow this chain. However, if this creates delays, cross-communications can be allowed if agreed to by all parties and super- iors are kept informed. People and materials should be in the right place at the right time. Equity: managers should be kind and fair to their subordinates. Stability of tenure of personnel: high employee turnover is inefficient. Management should provide orderly personnel planning and ensure that replacements are available to fill vacancies. Employees who are allowed to originate and carry out plans will exert high levels of effort. Esprit de corps: promoting team spirit will build harmony and unity within the organisation. 492 An incomplete list of such pathologies might include: child-labour, sweatshops, anti-unionism, slave labour, gender discrimination, ethnic discrimination, discrimination against people with disabilities, age discrimination, male-female wage gaps, wage theft, unfair dismissals, workplace bullying, harassment, Karoshi, industrial deceases, workplace deaths, poverty, environmental destruction, atypical work arrangements, family-work imbalances, animal testing, etc. 493 Cf. Pascal (1660s); Krailsheimer (1980); Bourdieu (2000). 494 Of course, all current societies practice forms of punishment and obedience regimes (stage 1) and forms of rewards and benefits (stage 2) but the essence (Hegel) of societal organisations does not rest on punishment (e.g. prison), obedience regimes (e.g. military), individual rewards and benefits (e.g. selfishness and moral egoism) but on social organisations (stages 3–5), i.e. social, communal, and political organisations such as kindergarten, schools, universities, trade unions, social clubs, democracy, political parties, local-, state-, and federal parliaments, and even supra-national organisations such as the European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN, United Nations, NGOs, etc. 495 Cf. Habermas (1985); d’Entrèves & Benhabib (1997). Perhaps this comes to the discomfort of many post-modernists, but modernity remains an unfinished project. Its completion and therefore modernity is not yet accomplished. It is still outstanding or a work-in-progress. Hence, there can be no post-modernism when modernism is still in the making. In Hegelian philosophy, modernity is an issue of becoming. 496 This is not to say that moral philosophy operates separate from the sphere of society (3–5) and management (1–2). On the contrary, it has been shown that moral philosophy extends to all spheres of human society without any exception. Moral philosophy has a lot to say about spheres 1 to 2 (management) and spheres 3 to 5 (society). However, when seen from Kant’s ‘what is’-vs.-’what ought to be’, moral philosophy appears to focus more on ‘what ought to be’ (stages 6–7) than simply on ‘what is’ (1–5). This may be the case because moral philosophy is primarily engaged with questions such as: ‘how shall we live?’, ‘what shall I do?’, etc. 497 The difference between management morality and moral philosophy lies in the fact that the former seeks to establish rules for moral conduct and discusses the morality of an actor (management) while the latter (moral philosophy) discusses morality from a philosophical point of view. Put simply, the former is interested in practice (e.g. Keller 2010), the latter in theory (e.g. Shafer-Landau 2007). Notes 293

498 Weber (1991:308) notes that ‘organisational values appear to be associated with a particular stage of moral reasoning’. 499 The three lists presented here are: a) business theorists; b) Harvard Business School Survey, and c) 50 business intellectuals. None includes ‘morality, ethics, or moral philosophy’. The lists: David A. Aaker – marketing strategy (1980s) Russell L. Ackoff – operations research and systems theory (1950s–2004) Karol Adamiecki – management (1890s–1930s) Igor Ansoff – strategic management (1950s–1970s) Chris Argyris – learning systems (1970s, 1980s, 1990s) Chester Barnard – management (1920s, 1930s) Patrick Blackett, Baron Blackett – operations research (1930s, 1940s) Matthew Boulton – labor productivity (1800s) James A. Champy – Business process reengineering (1990s) Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. – Management – Pulitzer prize for The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977) Ronald Coase – Transaction costs, Coase theorem, Theory of the firm (1950s) (Nobel Prize in 1991) James C. Collins – vision statement, strategic planning and BHAG (1990s) George S. Day – marketing (1970s) W. Edwards Deming – statistical quality control, (1950s, 1960s) Peter Drucker – management (1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s) Henri Fayol – management (1910s) Armand V. Feigenbaum – quality control (1950s) Ronald Fisher – statistics (1920s) Mary Follett – organisational studies (1930s) J. K. Galbraith – The New Industrial State (1967) Henry Gantt – Gantt chart (1900s) Michael Gerber – E-Myth Revisited, others Sumantra Ghoshal – Frank Gilbreth – Time and motion study (1900s) Eliyahu M. Goldratt – Theory of Constraints (1980s) Vytautas Andrius Graiciunas – management (1933) Erich Gutenberg – theory of the firm (1950s) Gary Hamel – core competency, strategic management (1990s) Michael Hammer – business process reengineering (1990s) Charles Handy – organisational behaviour (1990s) Frederick Herzberg – two factor theory, motivation theory, job enrichment (1970s) David Heitman – branding (2000s) Kaoru Ishikawa (1915–1989) – Ishikawa diagram in industrial process; quality circles (1960s) Masaaki Imai (1930) – Kaizen (continuous improvement) (1980s, 1990s, 2000s) Joseph M. Juran (1904–2008) quality control, especially quality circles (1960s, 1970s) Rosabeth Moss Kanter – Business Management and Change Management (1977) Robert S. Kaplan – management accounting and balanced scorecard (1990s) Philip Kotler – marketing management and social marketing (1970s, 1980s, 1990s) John Kotter – organisational behaviour and management (1980s, 1990s) Albert S Humphrey – strategic planning, SWOT analysis (1970s, 1980s) William Henry Leffingwell – office management (1910s)–(1940s) Theodore Levitt – marketing and globalisation (1960s, 1970s) John Lintner – capital asset pricing model (1970s) James G. March – theory of the firm (1960s) Constantinos Markides – strategic management and strategy dynamics (1990s) Harry Markowitz – modern portfolio theory (1960s, 1970s) – Nobel Prize in 1990 George Elton Mayo – job satisfaction and Haw- thorne effect (1920s, 1930s) Daniel McCallum – organisational charts (1850s) Leo Melamed – currency futures and derivatives (1980s, 1990s) Henry Metcalfe – the science of administration (1880s) Merton Miller – Modigliani-Miller theorem and corporate finance (1970s) Henry Mintzberg – organisational architecture, strategic management (1970s–2000s) Franco Modigliani – Modigliani-Miller theorem and corporate finance (1970s) Hugo Münsterberg – the psychology of work (1910s) Nicholas Negroponte – human-computer interaction (1970s–1990s) Nils Brunsson – institutionalised hypocrisy of organisations (1990s onwards) Kenichi Ohmae – 3C’s Model and strategic management (1970s, 1980s) Taiichi Ohno – Toyota Production System, lean manufacturing, just in time (1980s) David Ogilvy – advertising (1960s–1980s) William Ouchi – Theory Z (1980s) Robert Owen – cooperatives (1810s) Luca Pacioli – double-entry bookkeeping system and financial statements 294 Notes

(1494) Edith Penrose – Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959) Laurence J. Peter – peter principle (1970s) Jeffrey Pfeffer – organisational development (1970s) – Henry Varnum Poor – the principles of organisation (1850s) – Michael Porter – strategic management and Porter’s 5 forces (1970s–1990s) Thomas J. Peters – management (1970s, 1980s) C. K. Prahalad – core competency (1980s) Eugen Schmalenbach – economic value added (1920s–?) Walter Scott – the psychology of personnel management (1920s) Oliver Sheldon – business philosophy (1920s) Walter A. Shewhart – control charts (1920s–1930s) Shigeo Shingo (1909–1990) – Zero Quality Con- trol (Poka-Yoke) and Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED) Herbert A. Simon – (1916–2001) Nobel Prize, 1978 Adrian Slywotzky – marketing strategy (1990s) Adam Smith – economics, capitalism, free trade (1770s) Genichi Taguchi (1924–) Taguchi methods, quality control Frederick Winslow Taylor – scientific management, time and motion study (1900s) Henry R. Towne – scientific management (1890s) Jack Trout – marketing warfare strategies and positioning (marketing) (1980s–2000s) James Watt (1736–1819) – Industrial Revolution, division of labour, standard operating procedures, cost control (1810s) Max Weber – a founder of the modern study of sociology and public administration (1900) Joseph Wharton (1826–1909) – protective tariffs, business cycles, Wharton School of Business Eli Whitney (1765–1825) – interchangeable parts, cost accounting (1810s, 1820s) Oliver Williamson – transaction costs, theory of the firm (1960s) Harvard Business Review Survey: The Harvard Business Review asked 200 management gurus – the business thinkers most often mentioned in the media and management literature – who their gurus were. Below are their responses. Eight mentions of Peter Drucker: Management theory seven mentions of James G. March: Social scientist at Stanford six mentions of Herbert Simon (1916–2001): Nobel laureate economist and organisational theorist at Carnegie Mellon five mentions of Paul Lawrence: Organisa- tional researcher at Harvard Business School four mentions of Richard Beckhard (1918–1999): Management theorist at MIT • Fernand Braudel (1902–1985): French historian • Ian Koshnick: Attorney organisational designer at the University of Maryland; Henry Mintzberg: Management writer and critic at McGill • Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950): Economist at Harvard • Karl Weick: Social psychologist at the University of Michigan three mentions of Russell Ackoff: Operations and systems theorist at Wharton • Warren Bennis: Leadership theorist and writer at the University of Southern California • Ronald Coase: Nobel laureate economist at the University of Chicago • W. Edwards Deming (1900–1993): Statistician and quality consultant • Erving Goffman (1922–1982): Sociologist • Gary Hamel: Consultant and management writer • Jay Lorsch: Organisational researcher at Harvard Business School • Michael Porter: Professor of strategy and competitiveness at Harvard Busi- ness School • C. K. Prahalad: Management theorist at the University of Michigan • Jack Welch: Former CEO, General Electric • Oliver Williamson: Organisational economist at the University of California, Berkeley two mentions of Chris Argyris: Organisational psychologist at Harvard • Kenneth Arrow: Nobel laureate economist at Stanford • Gregory Bateson (1904–1980): Anthropologist • Daniel Bell: Sociologist at Harvard • John Seely Brown: Former chief scientist at Xerox • Alfred Chandler: Historian at Harvard Business School • C. West Churchman: Systems theorist • James C. Collins: Management writer and consultant • Eric Erikson (1902–1994): Psychological-growth theorist at Harvard • Michel Foucault (1926–1984): French polymath • Anthony Giddens: British sociologist • Andrew Grove: Former CEO, Intel • Everett Hughes (1897–1983): Sociologist • Michael Jensen: Organisational stra- tegist and former professor at Harvard Business School • Stuart Kauffman: Biologist, chaos and complexity theorist • Kurt Lewin (1890–1947): Social psychologist Notes 295

• Karl Marx (1818–1883): German economist and social theorist • Douglas McGregor (1906–1964): Management theorist at MIT • Robert K. Merton (1910–2003): Socio- logist at Columbia • Geoffrey Moore: Management writer and consultant • Richard Pascale: Management writer and consultant • Jeffrey Pfeffer: Business professor at Stanford • Paul A. Samuelson: Nobel laureate economist at MIT • Edgar Schein: Psychologist and management scholar at MIT • Adrian Slywotsky: Management writer and consultant • Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915): The ‘father of scientific management’ • John Van Maanen: Ethnographer at MIT • Sidney Winter: Econ- omist at Wharton. Accenture top 50 business intellectuals: In 2002, the Accenture consulting company compiled a list of the top 50 business intellectuals. From a list of 300 brainstormed by their staff, they found the top 50 by summing of the ranks of these rankings: The LexisNexis media databases to 1997 Citations found in the Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index to 1997 The resulting list is: 1. Michael E. Porter 2. Tom Peters 3. Robert Reich 4. Peter Drucker 5. Peter Senge 6. Gary S. Becker 7. Gary Hamel 8. Alvin Toffler 9. Hal Varian 10. Daniel Goleman 11. Rosabeth Moss Kanter 12. Ronald Coase 13. Lester Thurow 14. Charles Handy 15. Henry Mintzberg 16. Michael Hammer 17. Stephen Covey 18. Warren Bennis 19. Bill Gates 20. Jeffrey Pfeffer 21. Philip Kotler 22. Robert C. Merton 23. C. K. Prahalad 24. Thomas H. Davenport 25. Don Tapscott 26. John Seely Brown 27. George Gilder 28. Kevin Kelly 29. Chris Argyris 30. Robert Kaplan 31. Esther Dyson 32. Edward de Bono 33. Jack Welch 34. John Kotter 35. Ken Blanchard 36. Edward Tufte 37. Kenichi Ohmae 38. Alfred D. Chandler 39. James MacGregor Burns 40. Sumantra Ghoshal 41. Edgar Schein 42. Myron S. Scholes 43. James March 44. Richard Branson 45. Anthony Robbins 46. Clayton Christensen 47. Michael Dell 48. John Naisbitt 49. David Teece 50. Don Peppers. 500 Management sets up a business model on how an enterprise works that includes paying out all the costs that go into a product (labour and raw materials) before they can sell it and recover their costs. Hence, all managerial models have two parts: part one includes all the activities associated with making something, and part two includes all the activities associated with selling something. Hence, management must innovate and it must keep cost down through coordination and cooperation that come with hierarchy (that is, with ownership). It establishes clear command-and-control structures (Magretta 2002). 501 The former CEO of Standard Oil Company (Indiana) called on big business colleagues to run their business as they intended to – for profit [and] to stand up and fight, to talk about profits in terms of their central function, and to throw all sentiments to the wolves (Levitt 1958:43). In other words, the main game of management is profit-making just as Karl Marx (1844 & 1890) had outlined roughly 100 years earlier. Managers should not bother with ethics – throw all sentiments to the wolves – just as Marx predicted. Marx would have agreed with Standard Oil’s CEO that management’s No. 1 problem is profits (cf. Baumhart 1961:19 & 163; Carr 1968:143; Hawken 1993:10; Alvesson & Willmott 1996:23; Kirkeby 2000:3; McCloskey 2006:2; Crowson 2009:106). The Harvard Business Review listed 939 articles on profit and 29 on morality between 1922 and 2009 representing a 33:1 ratio indicating the true state of morality seen from a managerial perspective by the world’s foremost important management journal (cf. Cohen 1973; Chamberlain 1973:3; Clinard 1983:10 & 133; Sores 2002; Satre 2005; Bouguignon 2009). Bibliography

Aamondt, M. G. 2010. Industrial/Organizational Psychology: An Applied Approach (6th ed.), Belmont: Wadsworth-Cengage Learning. Ackroyd, S. 2010. Critical Realism, Organization Theory, Methodology, and the Emerging Science of Reconfiguration, in: Koslowski, P. (eds.) Elements of a Philosophy of Manage- ment and Organization, Berlin/London: Springer. Ackroyd, S. & Thompson, P. 1999. Organisational Misbehaviour, London: Sage. Adorno, T. W. 1944. Minima Moralia – Reflections from the Damaged Life, Dennis Redmond (2005) translation: http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MinimaMoralia.html Adorno, T. W. 1959. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Adorno, T. W. 1971. Erziehung zur Mündigkeit, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Publishing. Adorno, T. W. 1973. Negative Dialectics, London: Routledge. Adorno, T. W. 1993. Hegel – Three Studies, Cambridge: MIT Press. Adorno, T. W. 2003. Can One Live after Auschwitz?: A Philosophical Reader (ed. Tiedemann, R.; trans. Livingstone, R. et al.), Stanford: Stanford University Press. Adorno, T. W. & Horkheimer, M. 1944. The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception, transcribed by Andy Blunden 1998; proofed and corrected February 2005, web-download, November 2005. Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J. & Nevitt, R. 1964. The Authoritarian Personality, New York: John Wiley. Afzalur, R. M. 2010. Managing Conflict in Organizations (4th ed.), New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Agamben, G. 2000. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (trans. Heller- Roazen, D.), New York: Zone Books. Albert, M. 2006. Realizing Hope – Life Beyond Capitalism, London: Zed Books. Alexander, J. 2011. Performance and Power, Oxford: Polity Press. Alexander, R. D. 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems, New York: Aldine. Alfonso, J. D. 1982. The Sociology of Justice, in: Kohlberg and Milgram, Political Theory, vol. 10, no. 3 (August 1982), pp. 409–33. Allee, W. C. 1931. Animal Aggregations, a Study in General Sociology, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Allee, W. C. 1938. The Social Life of Animals (1st ed.), New York: Norton. Allison, H. et al. (eds.) 2010. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation, 19 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Althusser, L. 1997. The Spectre of Hegel – Early Writings, London: Verso. Alvesson, M. 2002. Understanding Organisational Culture, London: Sage. Alvesson, M. & Willmott, H. 1996. Making Sense of Management: A Critical Introduction, London: Sage Publications. Améry, J. 1980. At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor of Auschwitz and Its Realities (trans. Rosenfeld, S. & S. P.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Améry, J. 1984. Radical Humanism – Selected Essays, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Améry, J. 1999. On Suicide: A Discourse on Voluntary Death (trans. Barlow, J. D.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Anderson, S. S. C. 2009. Hegel’s Theory of Recognition – From Oppression to Ethical Liberal Modernity, London: Continuum.

296 Bibliography 297

Apel, K-O. 1980. Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, London: Routledge. Aquinas, T. 1265–1274. The Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology or Highest Theology or Summa Theologiæ or Simply Summa, Second part of Part II: Treatise on the Cardinal Virtues); in: Treatise on the Virtues (1984), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Archie, C. B. 2009. Business Ethics: Brief Readings on Vital Topics, New York: Routledge. Arendt, H. 1951. The Origins of Totalitarianism, Orlando: A Harvest/HBJ Book. Arendt, H. 1958. The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Arendt, H. 1970. On Violence, New York: Harcourt, Brace. Arendt, H. 1994. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, New York: Penguin. Arnold, D. & Guha, R. (eds.) 1995. Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia, Delhi: Oxford University Press. Arnold, J. 2005. Work Psychology – Understanding Human Behaviour in the Workplace (4th ed.), London: Prentice-Hall. Arnold, J. & Randal, R. 2010. Work Psychology – Understanding Human Behaviour in the Workplace (5th ed.), London: Prentice-Hall. Arnold, M. L. 2000. Stage, Sequence, and Sequels: Changing Conceptions of Morality, Post-Kohlberg, Educational Psychology Review, vol. 12, no. 4. Arrington, R. L. 1998. Western Ethics – An Historical Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell Press. Arthur, J. 2012. Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code, in: Cahn, S. M. & Markie, P. (eds.) Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (5th ed.), New York: Oxford University Press. Asch, S. E. 1955. Opinions and Social Pressure, Scientiﬁc American, no. 193, pp. 31–5. Åslund, C. et al. 2009. Social Status and Shaming Experiences Related to Adolescent overt Aggression at School, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 1–13. ASS 1998. A Pattern of Slavery: India’s Carpet Boys, London: Anti-Slavery Society. Attenborough, D., 1998. The Life of Birds, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Audi, R. 2009. Business Ethics and Ethical Business, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Austin, J. 1832. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books. Axelrod, R. 1984a, The Live-and-Let-Live System in Trench Warfare in World War I, in: Hechter, M. & Horne, C. (eds.) 2009. Theories of Social Order: A Reader, Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences Press. Axelrod, R. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. 1981. The Evolution of Cooperation, Science, vol. 211, pp. 1390–6. Ayer, A. J. 2007. Freedom and Necessity, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Badhwar, N. K. 2009. The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits, Journal of Ethics (special issue on Situationism), vol. 13, no. 2–3, pp. 257–89. Bagley, C. E. 2003. The Ethical Leader’s Decision Tree, Harvard Business Review, February, p. 19. Baillargeon, N. 2007. A Short Course in Intellectual Self-Defense – Find Your Inner Chomsky, Toronto: Seven Stories Press. Bakan, J. 2004. The Corporation – The Pathological Pursuit of Proﬁt and Power, London: Free Press. 298 Bibliography

Bales, K. & Trodd, Z. 2008. To Plead Your Own Cause: Personal Stories By Today’s Slaves, Cornell: Cornell University Press. Ball, M. & Friedrich, B. 2009. The Animal Activists’ Handbook: Maximizing Our Positive Impact in Today’s World, New York: Lantern Books. Banerjee, S. B. 2008. Necrocapitalism, Organization Studies, vol. 29, no. 12, pp. 1541–63. Baritz, L. 1960. The Servants of Power. A History of the Use of Social Science in American Industry, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press. Barker, J. R. 1993. Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2. Barnard, C. 1938. The Function of The Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Barney, R. 2004. Callicles and Thrasymachus, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (internet: ﬁrst published: Wed August 11, 2004). Baucus, M. S. & Beck-Dudley, C. L. 2005. Designing Ethical Organizations: Avoiding the Long-Term Negative Effects of Rewards and Punishments, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 56, no. 4. Baudrillard, J. 1994. Simulacra and Simulation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Baudrillard, J. 1996. The System of Objects, London: Verso. Baum, W. 2005. Understanding Behaviorism – Behavior, Culture, and Evolution, Oxford: Blackwell. Bauman, Z. 1987. Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity, and Intellectuals, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Z. 1989. Modernity and Holocaust, Oxford: Blackwell. Bauman, Z. 1990. Effacing the Face: On the Social Management of Moral Proximity, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 7. Bauman, Z. 1993. Postmodern Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell. Bauman, Z. 2000. Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Z. 2006. Liquid Fear, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Z. 2008. Does Ethics have a Chance in a World of Consumerism?, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Baumhart, R. C. 1961. How Ethical are Businessmen?, Harvard Business Review, July–August, pp. 6–19 & 156–76. Baxter, G. D. & Rarick, C. A. 1987. Education for the Moral Development of Managers: Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development and Integrative Education, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 243–8. Baynes, K. 2002. Freedom and Recognition in Hegel and Habermas, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 28. Bazelon, D. T. 1967. Power in America: The Politics of the New Class, New York: New American Library. Beadle, R. & Moore, G. 2006. MacIntyre on Virtue and Organization, Organization Studies, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 323–40. Beauvoir, S., 1949. The Second Sex (trans. by Parshley, H. M., 1989). New York: Vintage Books. Beder, S. 2000. Selling Work Ethics – From Puritan Pulpit to Corporate PR, London: Zed Books. Beder, S. 2000a. Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism, Melbourne: Scribe Publications. Beder, S. 2006. Free Market Missionaries – The Corporate Manipulation of Community Values, London: Earthscan Press. Beiner, R. & William, J. B. (eds.) 1993. Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, New Haven: Yale University Press. Bibliography 299

Bell, A. 2010. Dialectic of Anthroposentrism, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Bell, D. 1976. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, New York: Basic Books. Belmonte, N. 2002. Evolving Negativity: From Hegel to Derrida, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 28. Benedict, R. 1934. Patterns of Culture, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Bentham, J. 1789. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, London: Pickering (1823). Benton, T. 2010. Humanism = Speciesism? in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Berlin, I. 1969. Two Concepts of Liberty, in: Berlin, I. (eds.) Four Essays on Liberty, London: Oxford University Press. Bernays, E. 1928. Propaganda, 2005 edition, New York: IG Publishing. Bernstein, J. M. 2001. Adorno – Disenchantment and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bernstein, J. M. 2006. Intact and Fragmented Bodies: Versions of Ethics ‘after Auschwitz’, New German Critique, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 31–52. Bird, F. B. 1996. The Muted Conscience – Moral Silence and the Practice of Ethics in Business, Westport: Quorum Books. Blass, T. 1991. Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 398–413. Blass, T. 1992. The Social Psychology of Stanley Milgram, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 25, pp. 277–329. Blass, T. 1999. The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 955–78. Blass, T. 2002. The Man Who Shocked the World, Psychology Today, March/April, pp. 68–74. Blatt, M. M. & Kohlberg, L. 1975. The Effects of Classroom Moral Discussion Upon Children’s Level of Moral Judgment, Journal of Moral Education, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 129–61. Blau, P. M. 1964. Exchange & Power in Social Life, New York: J. Wiley. Bloom, A. H. 1986. Psychological Ingredients of High-Level Moral Thinking: A Critique of the Kohlberg-Gilligan Paradigm, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 16, no. 1. Blum, L. 1988. Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, Ethics, vol. 98, no. 3. Boatright, J. R. 2009. Ethics and the Conduct of Business (6th ed.), London: Pearson. Bobic, W. P. & Davis, E. 2003. A Kind Word for Theory X: Or Why So Many New- fangled Management Techniques Quickly Fail, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol. 13, pp. 239–64. Bodin, J. 1576. On Sovereignty: Four Chapters From Six Books of the Commonwealth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992). Boggs, C. 2010. Corporate Power, Ecological Crisis, and Animal Rights, in: Sanbon- matsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Bolton, S. C. & Houlian, M. (eds.) 2008. Searching for the Human in Human Resource Management, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bookchin, M. 1962. Our Synthetic Environment, New York: Knopf. Bookchin, M. 1982. The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy, Palo Alto: Cheshire Books. 300 Bibliography

Bookchin, M. 1990. The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism, Montreal: Black Rose Books. Bookchin, M. 1995. Re-Enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit Against Antihumanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism, and Primitivism, London: Cassell. Bookchin, M. 2001. What is Social Ecology? In: Boylan, M (eds.) Environmental Ethics, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Bookchin, M. & Foreman, D. 1991. Defending the Earth, New York: Black Rose Books. Bordum, A. 2005. Immanuel Kant, Jurgen Habermas and the Categorical Imperative, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 13, no. 7. Boucher, D. 2009. The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Human Rights in Transition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bouguignon, A. 2009. Are Management Systems Ethical? The Reiﬁcation Perspective, in: Djelic, M-L. & Vranceanu, R. (eds.) Moral Foundations of Management Knowledge, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Bourdieu, P. 2000. Pascalian Meditations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bowie, N. E. 1999. Business Ethics – A Kantian Perspective, Oxford: Blackwell. Bowie, N. E. & Werhane, P. 2005. Management Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 1972. Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought, New York: Basic Books. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 1975. The Problem with Human Capital Theory – A Marxian Critique, American Economic Review, vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 74–82. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 1976. Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life, New York: Basic Books. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 1981. Contradictions and Reproduction in Educational Theory, in: Barton, L. (eds.) Schooling, Ideology, and Curriculum, Sussex: Falmer Press. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 2001. Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited, http://www.unix. oit.umass.edu/~bowles. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 2002. Homo Reciprocans, Nature, no. 415, pp. 125–8. Bowman, J. R. 1982. The Logic of Capitalist Collective Action, Rationality and Society, vol. 21, no. 4/5. Bramel, C. & Friend, R. 1981. Hawthorne, the Myth of the Docile Worker, and Class Bias in Psychology, American Psychologist, vol. 36, no. 8, pp. 867–78. Braverman, H. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital – The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, New York: Monthly Review Press. Brennan, A. 1984. The Moral Standing of Natural Objects, Environmental Ethics, vol. 6, pp. 35–56. Brennan, A. 2008. Environmental Ethics, in: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (internet: substantive revision Thursday January 3, 2008). Brennan, A. & Lo, N. Y. S. 2010. The Environment, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Brennan, J. J., Valtz, J. J., Shallenberger, J. B. & Stanton, V. P. 1961. How Ethical Are Businessmen?, Harvard Business Review (July–August), pp. 6–16 & 158–76. Brenner, S. N. & Molander, E. A. 1977. Is the Ethics of Business Changing, Harvard Business Review (January–February), pp. 57–71. Brief, A. 2000. Still Servants of Power, Journal of Management Inquiry, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 342–51. Brewis, J. & Linstead, S. 2004. Gender and Management, in: Linstead et al. (eds.) Management and Organisation – A Critical Text, London: Palgrave. Broswimmer, F. 2002. Ecocide: A Short History of Mass Extinction of Species, Oxford: Pluto Press. Bibliography 301

Broughton, J. 1983. Women’s Rationality and Men’s Virtues: A Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development, Social Research, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 597–642. Brown, M. & Kelly, R. (eds.) 2006. You’re History!, London: Continuum. Browning, C. 1992. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York: HarperCollins. Brunsson, N. 1985. The Irrational Organisation, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Brunsson, N. 2002. The Organisation of Hypocrisy – Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organisations (2nd ed.), Abingdon: Marston Books. Buchanan, D. & Badham, R. 2008. Power, Politics, and Organisational Change (2nd ed.), London: Sage. Buck, T. 2011. International Child Law (2nd ed.), New York: Routledge. Burawoy, M. 1979. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Burawoy, M. 1985. The Politics of Production, London: Verso. Burnham, J. 1945. The Managerial Revolution or What is Happening in the World Now, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Burris, V. 1983. Stages in the Development of Economic Concepts, Human Relations, vol. 36, no. 9. Buskirk, R. H. 1974. Modern Management and Machiavelli, New York: Meridian Books. Byrne, R. W. & Whiten, A. (eds.) 1988. Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Experience and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cairns, G. et al. 2003. Organisational Space/Time: From Imperfect Panoptical to Heterotopian Understanding, ephemera (ephemeraweb.org), vol. 3, no. 2. Calaco, M. & Atterton, P. (eds.) 2003. The Continental Ethics Reader, London: Routledge. Calas, M. B. 1993. Deconstructing Charismatic Leadership: Re-Reading Weber from the Darker Side, Leadership Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 305–28. Callicott, J. B. 1989. In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, Albany: SUNY Press. Callinicos, A. 2006. The Resources of Critique, Oxford: Polity Press. Campbell, J. et al. 2005. For Business Ethics, London: Routledge. Campbell, R. & Kitson, A. 2008. The Ethical Organisation, Houndmills: Palgrave. Campbell, T. 1996. The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism, Dartmouth: Aldershot. Campbell, T. 2010. Rights, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Camus, A. 1959. Reﬂections on the Guillotine, an Essay on Capital Punishment (trans. by Richard Howard), Michigan City: Fridtjof-Karla Publications. Canfora, L. 2006. Democracy in Europe – A History of an Ideology, London: Blackwell. Carr, A. Z. 1968. Is Business Blufﬁng Ethics?, Harvard Business Review, January–February 1968, pp. 143–53. Carr, D. 1996. After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development, Studies in Philosophy and Education, vol. 15, no. 4. Carruthers, P. 1992a. The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carruthers, P. 1992b. Human Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carruthers, P. 2004. The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction, London: Routledge. Carson, R. 1963. Silent Spring, London: Hamish Hamilton. 302 Bibliography

Carter, A. 2010. Animals, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Carter, R. E. 1980. What is Lawrence Kohlberg Doing?, Journal of Moral Education, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 88–102. Carter, R. E. 1985. Does Kohlberg Avoid Relativism?, in: Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (eds.) Lawrence Kohlberg – Consensus and Controversy, Barcombe: Falmer Press. Carroll, A. B. 2009. Business Ethics: Brief Readings on Vital Topics, New York: Routledge. Cavalieri, P. & Singer, P. 1994. The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity. New York: St. Martin’s Press. CBS News 1979. Transcript of Sixty Minutes Segment of ‘I was only following orders’ (31st March 1979), New York: CBS. Chagnon, N. A. 1988. Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and Warfare in a Tribal Population, Science, vol. 239, no. 4843, pp. 985–92. Chamberlain, N. W. 1973. The Limits of Corporate Responsibility, New York: Basic Books. Chan, A. 2007. Laozi, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, plato.stanford.edu/entries/ laozi [First published 15th December 2001; substantive revision 5th May 2007]. Chandler, A. 1962. Strategy and Structure, Cambridge: MIT Press. Chanter, T. 2006. Gender – Key Concepts in Philosophy, New York: Continuum. Chomsky, N. 1957. Syntactic Structures, The Hague Mouton. Chomsky, N. 1959. Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, Language, vol. 35, no. 1. Chomsky, N. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge: MIT Press. Chomsky, N. 1971. The Case Against B. F. Skinner, The New York Review of Books, December 30th (internet download). Chomsky, N. 1986. Barriers. Linguistic Inquiry Monographs, Cambridge: MIT Press. Chomsky, N. 1991. Media Control – The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda (2nd ed.), New York: Seven Stories Press. Chomsky, N. 1994. Democracy and Education, Mellon Lecture, Loyola University, Chicago, October 19th, download: www.zmag.org/chomsky/talks/. Chomsky, N. 1999. Proﬁt Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, New York: Seven Stories Press. Chrisholm, R. M. 2004. Human Freedom and the Self, in: Sample, R. et al. (eds.) Philosophy – The Big Question, Oxford: Blackwell. Christensen, S. L. & Kohls, J. 2003. Ethical Decision Making in Times of Organizational Crisis – A Framework for Analysis, Business & Society, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 328–58. CIMA. 2008. Managing Responsible Business, London: Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. Ciulla, J. B. (eds.) 2004. Ethics, the Heart of Leadership (2nd ed.), Westport: Praeger. Clark, B. & Gintis, H. 1978. Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 302–25. Clark, J. 1997. A Social Ecology, Capitalism Nature Socialism, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 3–33, also in: Zimmerman M. et al., Environmental Philosophy (2nd ed.), Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Clark, J. & Martin, C. 1996. Liberty, Equality, Geography: The Social Thought of Elisée Reclus, Littleton: Aigis Publications. Clark, M. 2010. Nietzsche, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Clarke, S. R. L. 1977. The Moral Status of Animals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Clegg, S. R. & Haugaard, M. (eds.) 2009. The SAGE Handbook of Power, London: Sage. Clegg, S. & Rhodes, C. (eds.) 2006. Management Ethics – Contemporary Contexts, London: Routledge. Clinard, M. B. 1983. Corporate Ethics and Crime: The Role of Middle Management, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Bibliography 303

Cohen, P. 1973. The Gospel According to the Harvard Business School, Garden City: Doubleday. Colby, A. & Kohlberg, L. 1987. The Measurement of Moral Judgement – Volume 1: Theoretical Foundations and Research Validation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collins, D. 2000. The Quest to Improve the Human Condition: The First 1 500 Articles Published in Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 26, no. 1. Cook, D. 1984. Hegel, Marx and Wittgenstein, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 10. Cook, J. W. 1999. Morality and Cultural Differences, New York: Oxford University Press. Cooke, M. 2006. Resurrecting the Rationality of Ideological Critique: Reflections on Laclau on Ideology, Constellations, vol. 13, no. 1. Cornes, R. & Sandler, T. 1986. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cottingham, J. 1995. Descartes, Oxford: Blackwell. Craig, G., Gaus, A., Wilkinson, M., Skrivankova, K. & McQuade, A. 2007. Contemporary Slavery in the UK, London: Rowntree Foundation. Crain, W. C. 2005. Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications (5th ed.), Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall. Cramme, O. & Diamond, P. 2009. Social Justice in the Global Age, Cambridge: Polity Press. Crisp, R. 2003. A Defence of Philosophical Business Ethics, in: Shaw, W. H. (eds.) Ethics at Work – Basic Readings in Business Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crittenden, A. 1984. The Age of ‘Me-First’ Management, The New York Times (Late Edition, East Coast), New York: August 19th 1984, p. A.1. Croall, H. (eds.) 2009. Corporate Crime (Three-Volume Set), London: Sage. Crompton, R. 2008. Class and Stratification, Cambridge: Polity Press. Crowson, P. 2009. Adding Public Value: The Limits of Corporate Responsibility, Resources Policy, vol. 34, pp. 105–11. Crozier, M. 1964. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Cullen, D. 1997. Maslow, Monkeys, and Motivational Theory, Organization, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 355–73. Curry, P. 2011. Ecological Ethics, Oxford: Polity Press. Cyert, R. M., March, J. G. & Clarkson, G. P. E. 1963. A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Dahl, R. A. 1957. The Concept of Power, Behavioural Science, vol. 2, pp. 210–15. Dahl, R. 1959. A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dallmayr, F. 2003. Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political, Political Theory, vol. 31, no. 3. Dalton, M. 1959. Men Who Manage – Fusions of Feeling and Theory in Administration, New York: Wiley. Damasio, A. R. 1994. Descartes’s Error – Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, New York: Avon Books. Damico, A. J. 1982. The Sociology of Justice: Kohlberg and Milgram, Political Theory, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 409–33. Darwin, C. 1871. The Decent of Man (2nd ed.), London: John Murray. Davis, K. 2010. Procrustena Solutions to Animal Identity, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Davis, M. 2009. Punishment Theory’s Golden Half Century: A Survey of Developments from (about) 1957 to 2007, Journal of Ethics, vol. 13, pp. 73–100. Dawkins, R. 1989. The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dawson, T. L. 2002. New Tools, New Insights: Kohlberg’s Moral Judgement Stages Revisited, International Journal of Behavioral Development, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 154–66. 304 Bibliography d’Entrèves, M. P. & Benhabib, S. 1997. Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity – Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge: MIT Press. Dean, H. 2004. The Ethics of Welfare: Human Rights, Dependency, and Responsibility, Bristol: Policy Press. Deckop, J. R. 2006. Human Resource Management Ethics, Greenwich: Information Age Pub. DeCremer, D. (eds.) 2009. Psychological Perspectives on Ethical Behavior and Decision Making, Charlotte: Information Age Pub. Deetz, S. 1992. Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization, Albany: State University of New York Press. Deetz, S. 2001. Conceptual Foundations, in: Jablin, F. & Putnam, L. (eds.) The New Handbook of Organizational Communication – Advances in Theory, Research, and Methods, London: Sage. DeGeorge, R. T. 2001. The Myth of Corporate Social Responsibility, in: Malachowski, A. R. (eds.) Business Ethics – Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, London: Routledge. Dehesa, G. 2006. Winners and Losers in Globalisation, Oxford: Blackwell Press. Delaney, J. 2005. Ethical Challenges to Labor Relations, in: Budd, S. & Scoville, J. (eds.) The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, Champaign: Labor and Employment Relations Association. Delbridge, R. & Keenoy, T. 2011. Beyond Managerialism, International Journal of Human Resource Management, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 799–817. Deleuze, G. 1983. Nietzsche and Philosophy (trans. by Hugh Tomlinson), New York: Columbia University Press. Deranty, J. P. 2005. Hegel’s Social Theory of Values, Philosophical Forum, vol. xxvi, no. 3. Derrida, J. 1997. Politics of Friendship, London: Verso. Derry, R. 1999. The Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy and the Diversity Debate, Knowledge@ Wharton, Philadelphia: Research Centre: Legal Studies Department, knowledge. wharton. upenn.edu/paper. Descartes, R. 1628. Rules for the Direction of Our Native Intelligence, in: Descartes, R. 1988 edition of Descartes Selected Philosophical Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Descartes, R. 1637. A Discourse on Method, New York: Washington Square Press (1965). Descartes, R. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy (trans. by Laurence J. Lafleur) (2nd ed.) New York: Liberal Arts Press (1961). Descartes, R. 1644. Principles of Philosophy (trans. by Blair Reynolds), Lewiston: E. Mellen Press (1988). Descartes, R. 1649. The Passions of the Soul (trans. by Stephen Voss), Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. (1989). Desjardins, J. E. 2006. Business, Ethics, and the Environment, London: Pearson. Desjardins, J. E. 2006a. Environmental Ethics – An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy, Belmont: Thomson – Wadsworth. Dessler, G. 2011. Human Resource Management (12th ed.), Boston: Prentice Hall. Deutsch, K. W. 1966. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, New York: Free Press. Deutsch, K. W. & Singer, D. 1964. Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability, World Politics, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 390–406. deWaal, F. B. M. 1996. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bibliography 305

Diefenbach, T. 2009. Management and the Dominance of Managers: An Inquiry Into Why and How Managers Rule Our Organisations, New York: Routledge. Djelic, M-L. & Vranceanu, R. (eds.) 2009. Moral Foundations of Management Knowledge, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Doise, W. 2003. Human Rights As Social Representations, London: Routledge. Donaldson, J. & Waller, M. 1980. Ethics in Organizations, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 34–55. Donleavy, G. D. 2008. No Man’s Land: Exploring the Space between Gilligan and Kohlberg, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 807–22. Donovan, J. 2010. Sympathy and Interspecies Care: Towards a Uniﬁed Theory of Eco- and Animal Liberation, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littleﬁeld. Doris J. M. 2002. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Douzinas, C. & Perrin, C. 2011. Critical Legal Theory, London: Routledge. Downs, A. 1997. Beyond the Looking Glass: Overcoming the Seductive Culture of Corporate Narcissism, New York: AMACOM. Driver, J. 2007. Ethics – The Fundamentals, Oxford: Blackwell. Drucker, P. F. 1946. Concept of The Corporation, New York: The John Day Company. Drucker, P. F. 1949. The Unfashionable Kierkegaard, in: Drucker, P. F. 1971. The New Market and Other Essays, London: Heinemann. Drucker, P. F. 1981. What is Business Ethics, The Public Interest, vol. 63 (spring), pp. 18–36. Dryzek, J. 1996. Democracy in Capitalist Times – Ideals, Limits, and Struggles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dugatkin, L. A. 1997. Cooperation Among Animals – An Evolutionary Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press. duGay, P. 2000. In Praise of Bureaucracy, New York: Sage. Durkheim, E. 1983. Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, in: Baumrin, B. & Freedman, B. (eds.) Moral Responsibility and the Professions, New York: Haven Publications. Dworkin, R. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth. Dworkin, R. 1985. A Matter of Principle, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dworkin, R. 1986. Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dworkin, R. 1996. Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dworkin, G. 2002. Contractualism and the Normativity of Principles, Ethics, vol. 112, no. 3, pp. 471–82. Eddy, P. 1988. Kohlberg and Dewey, Educational Theory, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 405–13. Edwards, M. 2009. Civil Society, Cambridge: Polity Press. Edwards, R. 1979. Contested Terrain, London: Heinemann. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, L. 1977. Evolution of Destructive Aggression, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 127–44. Elias, N. 1991. The Society of Individuals, Oxford: Blackwell. Ellerman, D. 2001. McGregor’s Theory Y vs. Bentham’s Panopticism: Toward a Critique of the Economic Theory of Agency, Knowledge, Technology & Policy, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 34–49. Engels, F. 1892. The Condition of the Working Class in Britain in 1844, London: Allen & Unwin (reprint 1952). Enteman, W. F. 1993. Managerialism: The Emergence of a New Ideology, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 306 Bibliography

Enzensberger, H. G. 1974. The Consciousness Industry – On Literature, Politics, and the Media, New York (1974): Continuum Book, The Seabury Press. Erdynast, A. 1990. A Rawlsian View of Kohlberg’s Conception of Stage-Six Justice Reasoning, in: Commons, M. L. et al. (eds.) Adult Development – Volume 2, London: Praeger. Erman, E. 2007. Conﬂict and Universal Moral Theory: From Reasonableness to Reason- Giving, Political Theory, vol. 35, no. 5. Evensky, J. 2005. Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy – A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on Markets, Law, Ethics, and Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ezorsky, G. (eds.) 1972. Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, Albany: State University of New York Press. Fabre, E. 2003. Justice in a Changing World, Oxford: Polity Press. Fanon, F. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth (pref. by Jean-Paul Sartre; trans. by Constance Farrington), New York: Grove Press. Farmer, P. 2003. Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor, Berkeley: University of California Press. Fayol, H. 1916. Administration Industrielle et Generale (Industrial and General Admin- istration), London: Sir I. Pitman & Sons, Ltd. (1930). Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. 1999. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 144, August-issue, pp. 817–68. Feinberg, J. 1978. Psychological Egoism, in: Cahn, S. & Markie, P. (eds.) 2006. Ethics – History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (3rd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feinberg, J. 2007. Psychological Egoism, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Feldman, F. 1978. Introductory Ethics, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Feldman, S. 1998. Playing with the Pieces: Deconstruction and the Loss of Moral Culture, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 35, no. 1. Feyerabend, P. 1981. Realism, Rationality, and Scientiﬁc Method, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Feyter, K. 2005. Human Rights – Social Justice in the Age of the Market, London: Zed-Books. Findlay, J. N. 1970. Axiological Ethics, London: Macmillan. Finlayson, J. G. 2002. Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable, European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 1. Fischer, J. M. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell. Fischer, J. M. 1998. Responsibility and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fischlin, D. & Nandorfy, M. 2006. Concise Guide to Global Human Rights, Montreal: Black Rose Books. Fleischacker, S. 1999. A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Flikschuh, K. 2000. Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press. Fodor, J. A. & Katz, J. J. 1964. The Structure of Language, Englewood: Prentice-Hall. Foer, J. S. 2009. Eating Animals, New York: Little, Brown and Company. Foot, P. 1978. Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California Press. Foot, P. 2007. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Forsyth, D. R. 1980. A Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 39, no. 1. Bibliography 307

Forsyth, D. R & Scott, W. L. 1984. Attributions and Moral Judgement: Kohlberg’s Stage Theory as a Taxonomy of Moral Attributions, Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 321–3. Forte, A. 2004. Antecedents of Managers Moral Reasoning, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 51, no. 4. Foucault, M. 1970. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, London: Tavistock Publications. Foucault, M. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Vintage Books. Fox, A. M. 2005. The Accessible Hegel, New York: Humanity Books. Fox, C. L. & Boulton, M. J. 2006. Friendship as a Moderator of the Relationship between Social Skills Problems and Peer Victimisation, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 110–21. Fox, M. A. 1986. The Case for Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective, Berkeley: University of California Press. Fox, M. A. 1987. Animal Experimentation: A Philosopher’s Changing Views, Between the Species, vol. 3, pp. 55–60. Fox, W. 2007. A Theory of General Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature and the Built Environment, Cambridge: MIT Press. Frankena, W. K. 1973. Ethics (2nd ed.), Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Fraser, G. 2006. Suffer, the Little Children, The Guardian Weekly, vol. 174, no. 26, p. 16. Fraser, N. 2008. Scales of Justice, Oxford: Polity Press. Frederick, R. 1999. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. Freeman, M. 2010. Human Rights (2nd ed.), Cambridge: Polity Press. Freire, P. 1970. Pedagogy of the Oppressed (trans. by Myra Bergman Ramos), New York: Continuum. Freire, P. 2000. Pedagogy of the Oppressed (30th anniversary edition), New York: Continuum. French, A. P. 1979. The Corporation as a Moral Person, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 207–15. French, J. P. R. & Raven, B. 1960. The Bases of Social Power, in: Cartwright, D. & Zander, A. (eds.) Group Dynamics, New York: Harper and Row. Freud, S. 1914. On Narcissism, in: Sandler, J., Person, E. S. & Fonagy, P. (eds.) Freud’s ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ (1991), New Haven: Yale University Press. Freud, S. 1920. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (trans. by Hubback), Mansﬁeld: Martino Publications. Freud, S. 1923. The Ego and the Id (1949), London: Hogarth Press Ltd. Freud, S. 1930. Civilization and Its Discontents (trans. by Jean Riviere), New York: Cape & Smith; cf. Freud, S., in: Hechter, M. & Horne, C. (eds.) 2009. Theories of Social Order: A Reader, Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences Press, pp. 102–11. Friedman, D. 2008. Morals and Markets: An Evolutionary Account of the Modern World, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Friedman, M. 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Proﬁts, The New York Magazine, 13th September 1970. Fromm, E. 1949. Man For Himself – An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics, London: Routledge. Fromm, E. 1957. Man is Not a Thing, Saturday Review, vol. 40. Fromm, E. 1960. The Fear of Freedom, London: Routledge. Fromm, E. 1973. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Fromm, E. 1995. To Have or to Be?, London: Abacus. 308 Bibliography

Füredi, F. 2004. Politics of Fear, London: Continuum. Furnham, A. 1996. The Myth of Management – Forty Fables from the World of Management, London: Whurr. Fyfe, A. 1989. Child Labour, Cambridge: Polity Press. Gadamer, H-G. 1976. Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies (trans. by Christopher Smith, P.), New Haven: Yale University Press. Gadgil, M. & Guha, R. 1995. Ecology and Equity: The Use and Abuse of Nature in Contemporary India, London: Routledge. Gaines-Ross, L. 2008. Corporate Reputation: 12 Steps to Safeguarding and Recovering Reputation, Hoboken: Wiley. Galbraith, J. K. 1983. The Anatomy of Power, Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin. Gardner, J. 2010. Ethics and the Law, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Gare, S. 2006. The Triumph of the Airheads and the Retreat from Commonsense, Ch. 8: Management for Airheads, Double Bay (Sydney): Media21 Publishing. Gasparski, W. W. 2002. Editorial, in: Zsolnai, L. & Gasparski, W. W. (eds.) Ethics and the Future of Capitalism (The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology, vol. 9), London: Transaction Publishers. Gautrey, C. & Phipps, M. 2006. 21 Dirty Tricks at Work, New York: MJF Books/Fine Communications. Geddes, P. 1895. The Evergreen, a Northern Seasonal, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co. Geddes, P. 1972. Patrick Geddes: Spokesman for Man and the Environment; a Selection (ed. by Marshall Stalley), New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Geiger, I. 2007. The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gellner, E. 1987. Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order, in: Hechter, M. & Horne, C. (eds.) (2009) Theories of Social Order: A Reader, Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences Press. Gerhardt, C. 2010. Thinking with: Animals in Schopenhauer, Horkheimer and Adorno, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littleﬁeld. Gert, B. 2010. Hobbes, Oxford: Polity Press. Gladwell, M. 2002. The Talent Myth, www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/0207222fa_ fact. Gibbs, J. C. 1977. Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Judgment: A Constructive Critique, Harvard Educational Review, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 43–71. Gibbs, J. C. 2003. Moral Development and Reality – Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman, London: Sage. Gibbs, J. C. 2006. Should Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Approach to Morality be Replaced with a More Pragmatic Approach? A Comment on Krebs and Denton (2005), Psychological Review, vol. 113, no. 3, pp. 666–71. Giddens, A. 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradictions in Social Analysis, Berkeley: University of California Press. Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Berkeley: University of California Press. Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gilabert, P. 2005. The Substantive Dimension of Deliberate Practical Rationality, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 31, no. 2. Gilbert, H. 1983. Justice and Moral Bargaining, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 114–31. Bibliography 309

Gilligan, C. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gilligan, J. 1996. Violence: Reﬂections on a National Epidemic, New York: Pantheon Books. Gintis, H. 1976. The Nature of Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist Production, Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 36–54. Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R. & Fehr, E. 2003. Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, Evolution and Human Behaviour, vol. 24, pp. 153–72. Glover, J. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Goldhagen, D. J. 1996. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, New York: Knopf & Random House. Goldhagen, D. J. 2009. Worse Than War – Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, New York: Perseus Books. Golding, W. 1954. Lord of the Flies – A Novel, New York: Coward-McCann. Goldman, A. H. 1979. The Paradox of Punishment, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 42–58. Goldsmith, E. & Mander, J. (eds.) 2001. The Case Against the Global Economy & for a Turn Towards Localisation, London: Earthscan Publications. Gomberg, P. 1994. Universalism and Optimism, Ethics, vol. 104, no. 3, pp. 536–57. Gomberg, P. 1997.. How Morality Works and Why It Fails: On Political Philosophy and Moral Consensus, Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 43–70. Goodpaster, K. 1982. Kohlbergian Theory: A Philosophical Counterinvitation, Ethics, vol. 92, no. 3. Goodpaster, K. & Matthews, J. B. 1982. Can Corporations have a Conscious?, Harvard Business Review, January–February, pp. 132–41. Goodrich, C. L. 1920. The Frontier of Control, London: Pluto Press. Gordon, N. 2004. From the Margins of Globalization: Critical Perspectives on Human Rights, Lanham: Lexington Books. Gore, A. 2006. An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It, Emmaus: Rodale Press. Gorz, A. 2010. Ecologica (trans. by Chris Turner), Chicago: Chicago University Press. Graham, G. 2004. Eight Theories of Ethics, London: Routledge. Graves, H. B. 1924. Codes of Ethics for Business and Commercial Organisations, International Journal of Ethics, vol. 35, no. 1. Greco, J. & Sosa, E. (eds.) 1999. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell. Green, A. 1999. The Work of the Negative, London: Free Association Books. Green, R. M. 2001. What does it Means to Use Someone as ‘A Means Only’: Rereading Kant, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol. 11, no. 3. Greene, J. D. et al. 2001. An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgments, Science, vol. 293, pp. 2105–8. Greenpeace 2010. Koch Industries Secret Funding the Climate Change Denial Machine, Washington: Greenpeace, 44 pages. Greer, G. 2008. On Rage, Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing. Grenberg, J. 2005. Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue, New York: Cambridge University Press. Gross, R. 1976. Speculation and History: Political Economy from Hobbes to Hegel, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 4. Grote, D. 2006. Discipline Without Punishment – The Proven Strategy that Turns Problem Employees into Superior Performers (2nd ed.), New York: American Management Association. 310 Bibliography

Gruen, L. 2003. The Moral Status of Animals, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/. Grumley, J. 2005. Hegel, Habermas, and the Spirit of Critical Theory, Critical Horizons, vol. 6, no. 1. Guerrette, R. H. 1986. Environmental Integrity and Corporate Responsibility, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 5, no. 5. Guha, R. 1989. Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique, Environmental Ethics, vol. 11, pp. 71–83. Guha, R. 1998. Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South, Delhi: Oxford University Press. Gupta, A. D. (eds.) 2010. Ethics, Business, and Society: Managing Responsibly, Thousand Oaks: Response Books. Haas, P. J. 1988. The Morality of Auschwitz: Moral Language and the Nazi Ethic, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 383–93. Habermas, J. 1985. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1986. Autonomy & Solidarity – Interviews with Jürgen Habermas (ed. by Peter Dews), London: Verso. Habermas, J. 1987. Knowledge and Human Interests, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1988. Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Cambridge: MIT Press (reprint 2006). Habermas, J. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1996. Between Facts and Norms – Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Oxford: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1997. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society, Volume I & II, reprint, Oxford: Polity Press. Habermas, J. & Nielsen, H. N. 1990. Morality, Society and Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen, Acta Sociologica, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 93–114. Hall, R. 2010. Renewing and Revising the Engagement between Labour Process Theory and Technology, in: Thompson, P. & Smith, C. (eds.) Working Life – Renewing Labour Process Analysis, Houndmills: Palgrave. Hall, S. et al. (eds.) 1978. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order, London: Macmillan. Hampden-Turner, C. M. 1970. Radical Man, London: Duckworth. Hampden-Turner, C. M. 1971. Radical Man and the Hidden Moralities of Social Science, Interpersonal Development, no. 2, pp. 222–37. Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, vol. 162, pp. 1243–8. Harding, N. 2003. The Social Construction of Management – Texts and Identities, London: Routledge. Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hare, R. M. 1979. What is Wrong with Slavery, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 103–21. Hare, R. M. 1981. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hare, R. M. 1989a. One Philosopher’s Approach to Business Ethics, in: Cowton, C. & Crisp, R. (eds.) Business Ethics – Perspectives on the Practice of Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hare, R. M. 1989b. Essays in Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Harrison, M. R. 2005. An Introduction to Business and Management Ethics, Houndmills: Palgrave. Bibliography 311

Hart, H. L. A. 1958. Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, vol. 71, Harvard Law Review, pp. 593–529, 593; reprinted in: his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hartman, R. S. 1967. The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientiﬁc Axiology, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Hartman, S. J. et al. 2009. Correspondence between Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development and Subsequent Research in Business Ethics, International Journal of Management and Enterprise Development, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1–10. Harvey, G. 2006. Animism: Respecting the Living World, New York: Columbia University Press. Hatch, E. 1983. Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology, New York: Columbia University Press. Hawken, P. 1993. The Ecology of Commerce – A Declaration of Sustainability, London: Phoenix. Hayek, F. A. von. 1944. The Road to Serfdom, London: G. Routledge & Sons. Hayek, F. A. von. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hayek, F. A. von. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hayek, F. A. von. 1976. The Mirage of Social Justice, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hayward, T. & Gould, C. 2009. Special Issue: The Global Environment, Climate Change, and Justice, Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 133–295. Heath, J. 2003. Communicative Action and Rational Choice, Cambridge: MIT Press. Heathwood, C. 2010. Welfare, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Hechter, M., Friedman, D. & Kanazawa, S. 1992. The Attainment of Social Order in Heterogenous Societies, in: Hechter, M. & Horne, C. (eds.) 2009. Theories of Social Order: A Reader, Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences Press. Hechter, M. & Horne, C. (eds.) 2009. Theories of Social Order: A Reader, Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences Press. Hegel, G. W. F. 1803/4. System of Ethical Life, edited and translated by Knox, T. M. (1979), Albany: State University of New York Press. marxist.org/reference/hegel. Hegel, G. W. F. 1807. The Phenomenology of Mind, Mineola: Dover Publications (2003); see also: Phenomenology of Spirit, in: McNeill, W. & Feldman, K. (eds.) 1998. Continental Philosophy – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Hegel, G. W. F. 1821. The Philosophy of Right, in: McNeill, W. & Feldman, K. (eds.) 1998. Continental Philosophy – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Hegel, G. W. F. 1830. The Philosophy of History, Mineola: Dover Publications. Heller, A. 1989. Beyond Justice, Oxford: Blackwell. Heller, A. 2010. Radical Evil in Modernity: On Genocide, Totalitarian Terror and the Holocaust, Thesis Eleven, no. 101, pp. 106–17. Henderson, D. 2001. Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility, Wellington (N.Z.): New Zealand Business Roundtable. Henriques, A. 2007. Corporate Truth – The Limits to Transparency, London: Earthscan. Henry, S. E. 2001. What Happens When We Use Kohlberg? His Troubling Functional- ism and the Potential of Pragmatism in Moral, Education Educational Theory, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 259–76. Herman, E. S. & Chomsky, N. 1988. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books. Hettinger, N. & Throop, B. 1999. Refocusing Ecocentrism, Environmental Ethics, vol. 21, pp. 3–21. 312 Bibliography

Higgins, A., Power, C. & Kohlberg, L. 1984. The Relationship of Moral Atmosphere to Judgments of Responsibility, in: Kurtines, W. & Gewirtz (eds.) Morality, Moral Behavior and Moral Development, New York: Wiley. Hill, T. E. 2010. Kant, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Hinman, L. M. 2008. Ethics – A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory (4th ed.), Belmont: Thomson. Hirschman, A. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hobbs, T. 1651. Leviathan, London: Dent. Hobsbawm, E. J. 1968. Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain Since 1750, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (rev. ed. New York: New Press, 1999). Hoffman, M. W. & Moore, J. M. 1982. What is Business Ethics? A Reply to Peter Drucker, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 293–300. Hofstede, G. 1984. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values, Beverley Hills: Sage. Holbach, P. 2004. The System of Nature, in: Sample, R. et al. (eds.) Philosophy – The Big Question, Oxford: Blackwell. Honneth, A. 1991. The Critique of Power – Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press. Honneth, A. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition – The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict, Cambridge: Polity Press. Honneth, A. & Gaines, J. 1988. Atomism and Ethical Life: On Hegel’s Critique of the French Revolution, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 14. Horin, A. 2009. The Recession that Doesn’t Have to Hurt If We Share the Pain, Sydney Morning Herald, 3rd to 4th January 2009, p. 19. Horkheimer, M. 1937. Traditional and Critical Theory, in: Horkheimer, M. Critical Theory – Selected Essays (trans. by O’Connell, M. J. et al., 1972), New York: Herder. Horkheimer, M. 1947. The Eclipse of Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. Horkheimer, M. 1974. Critique of Instrumental Reason, New York: Continuum Books. Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, T. 1947. Dialectic of Enlightenment, London: Verso (1989). Hosmer, L. T. 2008. The Ethics of Management (6th ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill. Howard, R. A. 2008. Ethics for the Real World: Creating a Personal Code to Guide Decisions in Work and Life, Boston: Harvard Business Press. Howard, R. A. & Korver, C. D. 2008. Ethics for the Real World – Creating a Personal Code to Guide Decisions in Work and Life, Cambridge: Harvard Business Press. Hoy, D. C. 2009. The Ethics of Freedom: Hegel on Reason as Law-Giving and Law- Testing, in: Westphal, K. R. (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Blackwell. Humphries, J. 2010. Childhood and Child Labour in the British Industrial Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hunt, L. 2007. Flourishing Egoism, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Hursthouse, R. 2000. Ethics, Humans and Other Animals, London: Routledge. Hutchings, K. 2009. Global Ethics – An Introduction, Oxford: Polity Press. Hutchings, K. 2010. Global Ethics, Oxford: Polity Press. Hutchinson, A. C. (eds). 1989. Critical Legal Studies, Totowa: Roman & Littlefield. Hynson, C. 2010. New Global Economies, Mankato: Sea-to-Sea Publications. Inbar, D. E. 1990. The Organisational Boundaries of Responsibility: An Ethical Challenge, Journal of Educational Administration, vol. 28, no. 1. Itoh, M. 1988. The Basic Theory of Capitalism, London: Macmillan. Bibliography 313

Jackall, R. 1988. Moral Mazes – The World of Corporate Managers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackall, R. 2006. Moral Mazes – The World of Corporate Managers (20th anniversary ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jacoby, R. 1977. Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing, Hassocks: Harvester Press. Jacoby, R. 1997. Social Amnesia – A Critique of Contemporary Psychology, London: Transaction Publishers. James, D. 2007. Hegel – A Guide for the Perplexed, London: Continuum. James, S. M. 2011. An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell. Janis, I. L. 1985. Victims of Groupthinking, Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin Press. Jared, D. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, London: Penguin Books. Jay, A. 1967. Management and Machiavelli, London: Hodder & Stoughton. Jennings, W. S. & Kohlberg, L. 1983. Effects of a Just Community Programme on the Moral Development of Youthful Offenders, Journal of Moral Education, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 33–50. Jensen, D., Keith, L. & McBay, A. 2011. Deep Green Resistance – Strategy to Save the Planet, Toronto: Seven Stories Press. Jessop, B. 2002. The Future of the Capitalist State, Oxford: Blackwell-Press. Jessop, B. 2007. State Power, Oxford: Polity Press. Jex, S. 2002. Organisational Psychology – A Science-Practitioner Approach, New York: Wiley. Johnsen, R. 2010. ‘Is Your Manager a Psychopath? … Are You?’ – The Human–Animal Divide at Work, in: Muhr, S. L., Sorensen, B. M. & Vallentin, S. (eds.) Ethics and Organizational Practice: Questioning the Moral Foundations of Management, Northampton: Edward Elgar Pub. Johnson, A. 2008. Zˇizˇek’s Ontology – Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Jones, C. et al. 2005. For Business Ethics, London: Routledge. Jones, G. R. 2010. Organizational Theory, Design, and Change (6th ed.), Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Jones, G. R. & George, J. M. 2011. Essentials of Contemporary Management (4th ed.), Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. Jones, M. T. 1989. Ethics Education: Theoretical Considerations, Journal of Management Education, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1–18. Jorgensen, G. 2006. Kohlberg and Gilligan: Duet or Duel?, Journal of Moral Education, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 179–96. Kafka, F. 1919. In the Penal Colony, in: Kafka: The Complete Stories, New York (1971): Schocken Books. Kafka, F. 1925. The Trial (Der Prozess), Berlin: Verlag die Schmiede (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Kant, I. 1780. Duties to Animals and Spirits, in: Inﬁeld, L. (trans.). Lectures on Ethics (1963), New York: Harper and Row. Kant, I. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason, in: McNeill, W. & Feldman, K. (eds.) 1998. Continental Philosophy – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Kant, I. 1784. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, http://plato.stanford. edu/entries/kant/. Kant, I. 1785. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals or: Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (trans. by James W. Ellington, 3rd ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Kant, I. 1788. The Critique of Practical Reason, eBooks, Project Gutenberg. Kant, I. 1790. Critique of Judgement, Indianapolis (1987): Hackett Publishing Co. 314 Bibliography

Kaplan, R. S. & Norton, D. P. 1992. The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Performance, Harvard Business Review, January–February, pp. 71–80. Kaplan, R. S. & Norton, D. P. 1993. Putting the Balanced Scorecard to Work, Harvard Business Review, September–October, pp. 2–16. Kaptein, M. 1998. Ethics Management – Auditing and Developing the Ethical Content of Organizations, London: Kluwer Publishers. Karlins, M. & Andrews, L. M. 1972. Man Controlled – Readings in the Psychology of Behavior Control, New York: The Free Press. Kasser, T. 2002. The High Price of Materialism, Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT-Press. Katz, D. & Kahn, R. 1966. The Social Psychology of Organizations, New York: Wiley. Katz, E. 1997. Nature as Subject, New York: Rowman and Littleﬁeld. Katz, E. 2002. Understanding Moral Limits in the Duality of Artifacts and Nature: A Reply to Critics, Ethics & the Environment, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 138–46. Katz, E. (eds.) 2006. Death by Design: Science, Technology, and Engineering in Nazi Germany, New York: Pearson Longman. Katz, E. & Light, A. (eds.) 1996. Environmental Pragmatism, London: Routledge. Kavathatzopoulos, I. 1993. Development of a Cognitive Skill in Solving Business Ethics Problems: The Effect of Instruction, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 12, no. 5. Kazez, J. 2010. Animalkind: What We Owe to Animals, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Kedourie, E. 1995. Hegel and Marx – Introductory Lectures, Oxford: Blackwell Kelman, H. & Hamilton, V. J. 1989. Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility, New Haven: Yale University Press. Keller, D. R. (eds.) 2010. Environmental Ethics – The Big Questions, Oxford: Blackwell. Keller, M. et al. 1989. A Critical Note on the Conception of Preconventional Morality: The Case of Stage 2 in Kohlberg’s Theory, International Journal of Behavioral Develop- ment, vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 57–69. Kelsen, H. 1928. The Idea of Natural Law, in: his Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, eds. Weinberger, O. 1973. (trans. by P. Heath), Dordrecht: Reidel. Kelsen, H. 1945. General Theory of Law and State (trans. by Wedberg, A., 1961), New York: Russell & Russell. Kelsen, H. 1967. Pure Theory of Law (trans. by Knight, M.), Berkeley: University of California Press. Killen, M. & Smetana, J. G. 2006. Handbook of Moral Development, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. Kinicki, A. & Kreitner, R. 2008. Organizational Behavior – Key Concepts, Skills & Best Practices, New York: McGraw-Hill. Kinley, D. (eds.) 2009. Human Rights and Corporations, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. Kirchheimer, O. 1969 Politics, Law and Social Change, New York: Columbia University Press. Kirkeby, O. F. 2000. Management Philosophy: A Radical-Normative Perspective, Berlin: Springer. Kjonstad, B. & Willmott, H. 1995. Business Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering?, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 14, no. 6. Klein, S. 2000. Drucker as Business Moralist, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 121–8. Klikauer, T. 2007. Communication and Management at Work, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Klikauer, T. 2008. Management Communication – Communicative Ethics and Action, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Klikauer, T. 2010. Critical Management Ethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Klikauer, T. 2011. Ethics of the ILO: Kohlberg’s Universal Moral Development Scale, Journal of Applied Ethics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 33–56. Bibliography 315

Kohlberg, L. 1958. The Development of Modes of Thinking and Choices in Years 10 to 16, PhD Thesis at the University of Chicago (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981). Kohlberg, L. 1964. Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in: Hoffman, M. L. (eds.) Review of Child Development Research, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Kohlberg, L. 1969. Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in: Goslin, D. A. (eds.) Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, Chicago: Rand McNally. Kohlberg, L. 1970. The Moral Atmosphere of the School, in: Overly, N. V. (eds.) The Unstudied Curriculum: Its Impact on Children, Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. Kohlberg, L. 1971. From is to Ought, in: Mishel, T. (eds.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology, New York: Academic Press. Kohlberg, L. 1973. The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70, no. 18. Kohlberg, L. 1975. Moral Education for a Society in Moral Transition, Educational Leadership, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 46–54. Kohlberg, L. 1976. Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach, in: Lickona, T. (eds.). Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. New York: Holt. Kohlberg, L. 1980a. Moral Education: A Response to Thomas Sobol, Educational Leadership, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 19–24. Kohlberg, L. 1980b. The Case for Moral Education in Public Schools is Based on Democracy and Knowledge of Human Development, Educational Leadership, vol. 38, no. 1. Kohlberg, L. 1981 & 1984. Essays on Moral Development (vol. 1 & 2), San Francisco: Harper & Row. Kohlberg, L. 1985. A Current Statement on Some Theoretical Issues, in: Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (eds.) Lawrence Kohlberg – Consensus and Controversy, Barcombe: Falmer Press. Kohlberg, L. 1987. Child Psychology and Childhood Education – Cognitive-Developmental View, London: Longman. Kohlberg, L. 1990. Which Postformal Levels are Stages?, in: Commons, M. L. et al. (eds) Adult Development – Volume 2, London: Praeger. Kohlberg, L. et al. 1983. Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critics, London: S. Karger. Kohlberg, L. & Armon, C. 1984. Three Types of Stage Models Used in the Study of Adult Development, in: Commons, M. L. (eds.) Beyond Formal Operations – Late Adolescent and Adult Cognitive Development, New York: Praeger. Kohlberg, L. & Kramer, R. 1969. Continuities and Discontinuities in Child and Adult Moral Development, Human Development, vol. 12, pp. 93–120. Kohlberg, L., Scharf, P. & Hickey, J. 1971. The Justice Structure of the Prison – A Theory and an Intervention, Prison Journal, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 3–14. Kohlberg, L. & Turiel, E. 1973. Moralisation, the Cognitive Development Approach, New York: Holt, Rinehard & Winston. Kohn, A. 1999. Punished By Rewards: The Trouble With Gold Stars, Incentive Plans, A’s, Praise, and Other Bribes, Boston: Houghton-Mifﬂin. Kojève, A. 1947. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Ithaca (1969): New York: Basic Books and Cornell University Press (1986). Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 316 Bibliography

Korten, D. C. 1995. When Corporations Rule the World, West Hartford: Kumarian Press. Koslowski, P. 2002. Ethics of Capitalism, in: Zsolnai, L. & Gasparski, W. W. (eds.) Ethics and the Future of Capitalism (The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology, vol. 9), London: Transaction Publishers. Koslowski, P. (eds.) 2010. Elements of a Philosophy of Management and Organization, Berlin/London: Springer. Kothari, V. B. 2010. Executive Greed: Examining Business Failures that Contributed to the Economic Crisis, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kotter, J. P. 1999. What Effective General Managers Really Do, Harvard Business Review, March–April, vol. 77, no. 6, pp. 156–67. Krailsheimer, A. 1980. Pascal, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kraut, R. 2007. Desire and the Human Good, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Krebs, D. L. 2008. Morality: An Evolutionary Account, Perspectives on Psychological Science, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 149–72. Krebs, D. L. 2011. The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary Account, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krebs, D. L. & Denton, K. 2005. Towards a More Pragmatic Approach to Morality: A Critical Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Model, Psychological Review, vol. 112, no. 3, pp. 629–49. Krebs, D. L. & Denton, K. 2006. Explanatory Limitations of Cognitive-Developmental Approaches to Morality, Psychological Review, vol. 113, no. 3, pp. 672–5. Kreitner, R. 2009. Management (11th ed.), Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin Harcourt Publishing. Kropotkin, P. A. 1902. Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution (foreword by A. Montagu, The Struggle for Existence by Huxley, T. H., new introduction for Garland ed. by Kingston- Mann, E.), New York: Garland Pub. (1955 & 1972). Kumar, R. 2000. Defending the Moral Moderate: Contractualism and Commonsense, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 28, pp. 275–309. Kumar, R. 2001. Contractualism on Saving the Many, Analysis, vol. 61, pp. 165–71. Lachmann, R. 2009. States and Power, Cambridge: Polity Press. LaFollette, H. (eds.) 2000. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell. LaFollette, H. 2007. The Practice of Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell. LaFollette, H. (eds.) 2007. Ethics in Practice – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Lagerspetz, K. M. J. & Westman, M. 1980. Moral Approval of Aggressive Acts: A Preliminary Investigation, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 119–30. Laidlaw, S. 2003. Secret Ingredients: The Brave New World of Industrial Farming, Toronto: M & S Press. Lang, B. 1990. Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Langley, A. 1989. In Search of Rationality: The Purpose Behind the Use of Formal Analysis in Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4. Lanzmann, C. 1985. Shoah, New York: New York Films (released: 23 October 1985), 613 minutes, languages: English/German/Hebrew/Polish/Yiddish/French. Lapsley, D. L. 2006. Moral Stage Theory, in: Killen, M. & Smetana, J. G. (eds.) Handbook of Moral Development, London: Lawrence Erbaum. Lasch, C. 1978. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, New York: Norton. Latour, B. 2009. The Making of Law – An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat, Cambridge: Polity Press. Lavoie, D. & Culbert, S. A. 1987. Stages of Organization and Development, Human Relations, vol. 31, no. 5. Layard, T. 2005. Happiness – Lessons From A New Science, London: Allan Lane. Bibliography 317

Leap, T. 2007. Dishonest Dollars: The Dynamics of White-Collar Crime, Cornell: Cornell University Press. Leeman, L. W., Gibbs, J. C. & Fuller, D. 1993. Evaluation of a Multi-Component Group Treatment Program for Juvenile Delinquents, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 281–92. Legge, K. 2005. Human Resource Management-Rhetoric and Reality-Anniversary Edition, London: Macmillan. Lemos, N. 1994. Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lemov, R. 2006. World as Laboratory – Experiments with Mice, Mazes and Men, New York: Hill and Wang. Lennerfors, T. T. 2010. ‘The Sublime Object of Corruption – Exploring the Relevance of a Psychoanalytical Two-bodies Doctrine for Understanding Corruption’, in: Muhr, S. L., Sorensen, B. M. & Vallentin, S. (eds.) Ethics and Organizational Practice: Questioning the Moral Foundations of Management, Northampton: Edward Elgar Pub. Leonard, R. 2010. Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory: From Chess to Social Science, 1900–1960, New York: Cambridge University Press. Leopold, A. 1949. A Sand Country Almanac, New York: Oxford University Press. Leopold, J. & Harris, L. (eds.) 2009. The Strategic Managing of Human Resources (2nd ed.), Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall. Leslie, E. 2000. Walter Benjamin – Overpowering Conformism, London: Pluto. Levi, A. W. 1941. Language and Social Action, Ethics, vol. 51, no. 3. Levi, P. 1959. If This is a Man, New York: Orion Press. Lévi-Strauss, C. 1962. The Savage Mind, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Lévi-Strauss, C. 1966. The Savage Mind (La pensée sauvage), London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Lévi-Strauss, C. 1969. The Elementary Structures of Kinship, Boston: Beacon Press. Levinas, E. 1961. Totality and Infinity, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Levitt, T. 1958. The Dangers of Social Responsibility, Harvard Business Review, September–October, pp. 41–50. Levy, D. & Szander, N. 2004. The Institutionalisation of Cosmopolitan Morality: The Holocaust and Human Rights, Journal of Human Rights, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 143–57. Levy, N. 2002. Moral Relativism – A Short Introduction, Oxford: Oneworld Press. Lewin, K., Lippitt, R. & White, R. K. 1939. Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created Social Climates, Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 10, pp. 271–301. Lewis, J. S. 1896. The Commercial Organisation of Factories, in: Routledge (eds.) Classics of Modern Management Theory, London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press. Lifton, P. D. 1985. Individual Differences in Moral Development: The Relation of Sex, Gender, and Personality to Morality, Journal of Personality, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 306–34. Light, A. & Roston, H. (eds.) 2003. Environmental Ethics – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Lindstrom, M. 2005. Brand Sense: Build Powerful Brands Through Touch, Taste, Smell, Sight, and Sound, New York: Free Press. Lindstrom, M. 2008. Buyology: Truth and Lies About Why We Buy, New York: Doubleday. Linstead, S., Fullop, L. & Lilley, S. 2004. Management and Organization – A Critical Text, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Linstead, S., Fullop, L. & Lilley, S. 2009. Management and Organization – A Critical Text (2nd ed.), Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lloente, R. 2010. Reflections on the Prospect for a Non-Speciesist Marxism, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 318 Bibliography

Locke, D. 1980. The Illusion of Stage Six, Journal of Moral Education, vol. 9, no. 2. Locke, D. 1985. A Psychologist Among the Philosophers: Philosophical Aspects of Kohlberg’s Theory, in: Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (eds.) Lawrence Kohlberg – Consensus and Controversy, Barcombe: Falmer Press. Locke, J. 1690. Two Treaties of Government (10th ed.), Project Gutenberg. www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/trgov10h.htm. Locke, J. 1693. Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1902) Cambridge: University Press. Lockwood, D. 1964. Social Integration and System Integration, in Zollschau, G. K. & Hirsch, W. (eds.) Explanations in Social Change, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Lorenz, K. Z. 1966. On Aggression, London: Methuen. Lovejoy, C. O. 1981. The Origins of Man, Science, vol. 211, no. 4480, pp. 341–50. Lucas, J. R. 2003. The Responsibility of a Businessman, in: Shaw, W. H. (eds.) Ethics at Work – Basic Readings in Business Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Luhmann, N. 1985. A Sociological Theory of Law, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Luhmann, N. 1991. Paradise Lost: On the Ethical Reﬂections of Morality: Speech on the Occasion of the Award of the Hegel Price 1988, Thesis Eleven, no. 29. Luhmann, N. 1995. Social Systems, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Lukács, G. 1980. The Destruction of Reason, London: Merlin Press. Luke, B. 2007. Brutal: Manhood and the Exploitation of Animals, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Lukes, S. 1985. Marxism and Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lynch, T., Lynch, C. E. & Cruise, P. L. 2002. Productivity and the Moral Manager, Administration & Society, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 347–69. Lynd, R. S. 1939. Knowledge For What? – The Place of Social Science in American Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lyon, D. 2001. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life, Buckingham: Open University Press. MacCallum, G. C. 1967. Negative and Positive Freedom, Philosophical Review, vol. 76, pp. 312–34. Machiavelli, N. 1532. The Prince (trans. by Luigi Ricci; revised by Vincent, E. R. P., 1935), London: Oxford University Press. MacIntyre, A. 1983. Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insolvable?, in: Baumrin, B. & Freedman, B. (eds.) Moral Responsibility and the Professions, New York: Haven Publications. MacIntyre, A. 1989. A Short History of Ethics, London: Routledge. Mackie, J. L. 2007. The Subjectivity of Values, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Macklin, R. 2007. The Morally Decent HR Manager, in: Pinnington, A. et al., Human Resource Management – Ethics and Employment (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maclagan, P. 1990. Moral Behaviour in Organizations: The Contribution of Manage- ment Education and Development, British Journal of Management, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 17–26. Maclagan, P. 1992. Management Development and Business Ethics: A View from the U.K., Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 11, no. 4. Maclagan, P. & Snell, R. 1992. Some Implications for Management Development of Research into Managers’ Moral Dilemmas, British Journal of Management, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 157–68. Maffettone, S. 2010. Rawls – An Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press. Magretta, J. 2002. What Management Is – How It Works and Why It’s Everyone’s Business, New York: Free Press. Bibliography 319

Maier, C. 2005. Hallo Laziness – Why Hard Work Doesn’t Pay, London: Orion Press. Malachowski, A. R. (eds.) 2001. Business Ethics – Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, London: Routledge. Malti, T. et al. 2009. Aggressive and Prosocial Children’s Emotion Attributions and Moral Reasoning, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 90–102. Mandel, E. 1992. Power and Money: A Marxist Theory of Bureaucracy, London: Verso. Mandell, B. 2002. The Privatisation of Everything, New Politics, vol. 9, no. 1. Mander, J. 1991. In the Absence of the Sacred: The Failure of Technology and the Survival of the Indian Nations, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. Mander, J. 2001. The Rules of Corporate Behaviour, in: Goldsmith, E. & Mander, J. (eds.) The Case Against the Global Economy – and for a Turn Towards Localisation, London: Earthscan Press. Mandle, J. 2007. Global Justice – An Introduction, Oxford: Polity Press. Manning, F. V. 1981. Managerial Dilemmas and Executive Growth, Reston: Reston Publishing Co. Marcuse, H. 1940. An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy, Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 394–412. Marcuse, H. 1941. Reason and Revolution – Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Boston (1961): Beacon. Marcuse, H. 1964. Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber, republished in Negations, 1968. Marcuse, H. 1966. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies, Boston: Beacon Press. Marcuse, H. 1968. Negations – Essays in Critical Theory, Boston: Beacon Press. Marcuse, H. 1969. Repressive Tolerance, in: Wolff, R. P., Moore, B. & Marcuse, H. (eds.) A Critique of Pure Tolerance, London: Jonathan Cape. Marcuse, H. 1971. Studies in Critical Philosophy, London: New Left Review Press. Marglin, S. 1974. What Do Bosses Do? – The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production, Review of Radical Political Economy, vol. 6, no. 2. Maritain, J. 1951. Man and the State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Marsden, R. & Townley, B. 1996. The Owl of Minerva: Reflections on Theory and Practice, in: Clegg, S., Hardy, C. & Nord, W. R. (eds.) Handbook of Organisation Studies, London: Sage. Marshall, L. 1976. The !Kung of Nyae Nyae, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Martin, G. & Pear, J. 2007. Behavior Modification – What It is and How to Do It, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Martin, G. & Pear, J. 2011. Behavior Modification: What It is and How to Do It (9th ed.), Boston: Pearson Education. Martin, M. W. 2007. Everyday Morality – An Introduction to Applied Ethics (4th ed.), Belmont: Thompson Press. Marx, K. 1843. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Deutsch- Französische Jahrbücher, www.marxits.org. Marx, K. 1844. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in McLellan, D. (eds.) Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marx, K. 1846. The German Ideology, in: McLellan, D. 1985 (eds.) Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marx, K. 1890. Das Kapital – Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Capital – A Critique of Political Economy), Hamburg: 4th edited version by Engels, F., reprinted 1986: Berlin: Dietz-Press. 320 Bibliography

Maslow, A. H. 1943. A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review, vol. 50, no. 4. Mason, E. S. & Mudrack, P. E. 1997. Do Complex Moral Reasoners Experience Greater Ethical Work Conﬂict?, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 16, no. 12–13. Mason, J. & Singer, P. 1990. Animal Factories, New York: Harmony Books. Massey, G. 2009. Readings for Sociology (6th ed.), New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Massey, S. J. 1982. Marxism and Business Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 3001–312. McAlpine, A. 1998. The New Machiavelli – The Art of Politics in Business, New York: John Wiley. McAnany, P. A. & Yoffee, N. (eds.) 2010. Questioning Collapse: Human Resilience, Ecological Vulnerability, and the Aftermath of Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCalley, R. W. 2002. Patterns of Management Power, Westport: Quorum Books. McCloskey, D. N. 2006. The Bourgeois Virtues – Ethics for an Age of Commerce, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McDonagh, E. 1982. Social Exchange and Moral Development: Dimensions of Self, Self-Image, and Identity, Human Relations, vol. 35, no. 8. McGregor, D. 1960. The Human Side of Enterprise, New York: McGraw-Hill. McGregor, D. 2006. The Human Side of Enterprise (updated and with new commentary by Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld), New York: McGraw-Hill. McGregor, J. 1988–89. Bargaining Advantages and Coercion in the Market, Philosophy Research Archives, vol. 14, pp. 23–50. McLellan, B. N. & Shackleton, D. M. 1988. Grizzly Bears and Resource-Extraction Industries: Effects of Roads on Behaviour, Habitat Use and Demography, Journal of Applied Ecology, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 451–60. McLuhan, T. C. 1994. The Way of the Earth: Encounters with Nature in Ancient and Contemporary Thought, New York: Simon & Schuster. McMahon, C. 1981. Morality and the Invisible Hand, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 247–77. McMahon, C. 1995. The Political Theory of Organizations and Business Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 292–313. McNeill, D. 2009. Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights: The Role of Multilateral Organisations, London; New York: Routledge. McSwain, C. J. & White, O. F. 1987. The Case for Lying, Cheating, and Stealing- Personal Development as Ethical Guidance for Managers, Administration & Society, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 411–32. Mele, A. 1995. Autonomous Agents, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mendieta, E. 2010. Animals is to Kantianism as Jews to Fascism: Adorno’s Bestiality, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littleﬁeld. Menesini, E. 2003. Moral Emotions and Bullying: A Cross-National Comparison of Differences between Bullies, Victims and Outsiders, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 515–30. Metcalfe, H. 1885. The Science of Administration, in: Routledge (eds.) Classics of Modern Management Theory, London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press. Midgley, M. 1983. Duties Concerning Islands, Encounter, vol. 60, no. 2; reprinted in: Singer, P. 1994. The Oxford Reader on Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Milgram, S. 1963. Behavioral Study of Obedience, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, vol. 67, pp. 371–8. Bibliography 321

Milgram, S. 1972. Group Pressure and Action Against a Person, in: Karlins, M. & Andrews, L. M. (eds.) Man Controlled – Readings in the Psychology of Behavior Control, New York: The Free Press. Milgram, S. 1973. The Perils of Obedience, Harpers Magazine, no. 247, pp. 62–77. Milgram, S. 1974. Obedience to Authority, New York: Harper and Row. Milgram, S. 1979. Interview on Sixty Minutes on 31st March 1979 (www.cbsnews.com). Milgram, S. 1992. The Individual in a Social World: Essays and Experiments (edited by John Sabini and Maury Silver, 2nd ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill. Mill, J. S. 1859. On Liberty, New York: F. S. Crofts & Co. (1947). Mill, J. S. 1861. Utilitarianism, London (1985): Routledge & oll.livbertyfund.org/title/ 241. Miller, G. F. 2007. Sexual Selection for Moral Virtues, Quarterly Review of Biology, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 97–125. Miller, R. W. 2002. Moral Contractualism and Moral Sensitivity, Social Theory and Practice, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 193–220. Min, A. 1986. Hegel on Capitalism and the Common Good, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 11. Minkes, J. & Minkes, L. (eds.) 2008. Corporate and White-Collar Crime, London: Sage. Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B. & Lampel, J. 1998. Strategy Safari – A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management, New York: The Free Press. Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (eds.) 1985. Lawrence Kohlberg – Consensus and Controversy, Barcombe: Falmer Press. Monbiot, G. 2005. Manifesto for a New World Order, New York: The New Press. Monk, R. 1997. Just Managing, Sydney: McGraw-Hill. Montesquieu, C. de S. 1752. The Spirit of Laws (trans. by Nugent, T., 1914), London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. Moore, E. G. 1922. Pincipia Ehica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moore, M. 1989. Roger & Me, Warner Brothers (documentary), December 20, 1989 (USA), 91 min. English. Moore, M. 2007. Sicko (DVD-documentary), New York: The Weinstein Company Lionsgate (USA), release date: June 22, 2007. Moser, P. & Carson, T. (eds.) 2001. Moral Relativism – A Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Muchembled, R. 2011. A History of Violence, Oxford: Polity Press. Muhr, S. L., Sorensen, B. M. & Vallentin, S. (eds.) 2010. Ethics and Organizational Practice: Questioning the Moral Foundations of Management, Northampton: Edward Elgar Pub. Mumby, D. 1988. Communication & Power in Organisations: Discourse, Ideology, and Domination, Norwood (NJ): Ablex-Press. Mumby, D. 1997. The Problem of Hegemony: Reading Gramsci for Organisational Communication Studies, Western Journal of Communication, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 343–75. Mumby, D. 2000. Common Ground from the Critical Perspective, in: Corman, S. & Poole, M. (eds.) Perspectives on Organisational Communication, New York: Guilford Press. Mumby, D. 2001. Power and Politics, in: Jablin, F. & Putnam, L. (eds.) The New Handbook of Organisational Communication – Advances in Theory, Research, and Methods, London: Sage. Mumford, L. 1934. Technics and Civilization, London: Secker and Warburg. Mumford, L. 1944. The Condition of Man, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. Mumford, L. 1967. The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development, London: Secker & Warburg. 322 Bibliography

Munro, I. 2008. Murdoch’s World of Opportunity, Sydney Morning Herald, 6th December, Weekend Edition, p. 46. Murphy, J. B. 1993. The Moral Economy of Labor – Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory, New Haven: Yale University Press. Mysterud, I. 2000. Important Evolutionary Book with Relevance for Evolutionary Problems, Population and Environment, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 581–8. Nader, R. 1967. Business Crimes, The New Republic, July 1st 1967, pp. 7–8. Naess, A. 1973. The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement, Inquiry, no. 16. Naess, A. 1989. Ecology, Community, Lifestyle (trans. by Rothenberg), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nagel, T. 1973. Rawls on Justice, The Philosophical Review, vol. 82, no. 2. Nazer, M. 2005. Slave – My True Story, New York: Public Affairs. Negri, A. 1970. The Political Descartes – Reason, Ideology, and the Bourgeois Project, London: Verso. Neimark, M. K. 1995. The Selling of Ethics – The Ethics of Business Meets the Business of Ethics, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 81–96. Nelson, D. R. & Obremski, T. E. 1990. Promoting Moral Growth through Intra-Group Participation, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 9, no. 9. Neumann, F. 1936. The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society, Leamington Spa: Berg (1986). Neumann, F. L. 1942. Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, London: V. Gollancz Ltd. Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Newell, P. 2012. Globalisation and the Environment – Capitalism, Ecology and Power, Oxford: Polity Press. Newkirk, I. 2000. Free the Animals: The Amazing True Story of the Animal Liberation Front, New York: Lantern Books. Nietzsche, F. 1886. The Will to Power (trans. by Walter Kaufmann and Hollingsdale, R. J., 1968), New York: Random House. Nino, C. S. 1991. The Ethics of Human Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Norcross, A. 2002. Contractualism and Aggregation, Social Theory and Practice, vol. 28, pp. 303–14. Nowak, M. & Highﬁeld, R. 2011. Super Cooperators: Evolution, Altruism and Human Behaviour (or Why We Need Each Other to Succeed), London: Penguin Press. Nozick, R. 1969. Coercion, in: Morgenbesser, S., Suppes, P. & White, P. (eds.) Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books. Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nunner-Winkler, G. 1984. Two Moralities? in: Kurtines, W. M. & Gewirtz, J. L. (eds.) Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, New York: Wiley. Nussbaum, M. 2004. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, & the Law, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nussbaum, M. 2007. Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in: Shafer- Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Offe, C. & Wiesenthal, H. 1980. Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organisational Form, in: Zeitlin, M. (eds.) Political Power and Social Theory – A Research Annual, vol. 1, Greenwich: JAI Press. Olen, J. et al. 2005. Applied Ethics – A Text with Readings (9th ed.), Belmont: Thomson. Bibliography 323

O’Neill, O. 2003. Constructivism vs Contractualism, Ratio, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 319–31. Orwell, G. 1945. Animal Farm – a Fairy Story, London: Secker & Warburg. Orwell, G. 1948. Nineteen Eighty-four, London: Secker & Warburg. Owen, G. 1977. A Generalization of the Kohlberg Criterion, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 6, no. 4. Painter-Morland, M. 2008. Business Ethics as Practice: Ethics as the Everyday Business of Business, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Palmer, C. 2003. An Overview of Environmental Ethics, in: Light, A. & Roston, H. (eds.) Environmental Ethics – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Parker, M. 2002. Against Management – Organisation in the Age of Managerialism, Cambridge: Polity Press. Pascal, B. 1660s. Pensees – The Provincial Letters (section 6, note 343), Garden City: Doubleday (1961), Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. (1990), London: Penguin Books (1995). Passer, M. & Smith, R. 2007. Psychology – The Science of Mind and Behavior, Boston: McGraw-Hill. Passmore, J. 1974. Man’s Responsibility for Nature, London: Duckworth. Pateman, C. & Mills, C. 2007. Contract and Domination, Oxford: Polity Press. Patterson, O. 1982. Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pena, D. S. 2001. Economic Barbarism and Managerialism, Westport: Greenwood Press. Pereboom, D. 2004. Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism, in: Sample, R. et al. (eds.) Philosophy – The Big Question, Oxford: Blackwell. Perlmutter, D. D. 1997. Manufacturing Visions of Society and History in Textbooks, Journal of Communication, vol. 47, no. 3. Perry, R. B. 1926. General Theory of Value, New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Peter, L. J. & Hull, R. 1969. The Peter Principle, New York: W. Morrow. Peter, L. J. & Hull, R. 2009. The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go Wrong, New York: Collins Business. Petit, T. A. 1961. Management Ideology: Myth and Reality, California Management Review, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 95–103. Petrick, J. A. & Quinn, J. F. 1997. Management Ethics – Integrity at Work, London: Sage. Pettit, P. 2006. Can Contract Theory Ground Morality?, in: Dreier, J. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Oxford: Blackwell. Phillips, D. C. & Kelly, M. E. 1975. Hierarchical Theories of Development in Education and Psychology, Harvard Educational Review, vol. 45, no. 3. Phillips, R. et al. 2003. What Stakeholder Theory is Not, Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4. Piaget, J. 1928. The Child’s Conception of the World, London: Routledge & Kegan. Piaget, J. 1932. The Moral Judgment of the Child, London: Routledge & Kegan. Piaget, J. 1951. Psychology of Intelligence, London: Routledge & Kegan. Pinkard, T. 2000. Hegel – A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pogge, T. W. 1997. Is Kant’s Rechtslehre Comprehensive?, Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 36 (supplement), pp. 161–87. Pogge, T. 2007. World Poverty and Human Rights (2nd ed.), Cambridge: Polity Press. Pogge, T. 2010. World Poverty, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Pogge, T. & Horton, K. 2008. Global Ethics – Seminal Essays, St Paul: Paragon House Press. Pojman, L. P. 2007. In Defence of the Death Penalty, in: LaFollette, H. (eds.) Ethics in Practice – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. 324 Bibliography

Porter, M. E. & Kramer, M. R. 2006. Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, Harvard Business Review, December- Issue, vol. 84, no. 12, pp. 78–92. Powers, C. W. & Vogel, D. 1980. Ethics in the Education of Business Managers, Hastings- on-Hudson: The Hastings Centre. Priem, R. & Shaffer, M. 2001. Resolving Moral Dilemmas in Business: A Multicountry Study, Business & Society, vol. 40, pp. 197–219. Pritchard, M. S. 1984. Cognition and Affect in Moral Development: A Critique of Lawrence Kohlberg, Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 18, no. 1. Provis, C. 2004. Ethics and Organisational Politics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Puchala, D. J. 1995. The Ethics of Globalism, Providence: Academic Council on the United Nations System, Brown University. Puka, B. 1982. An Interdisciplinary Treatment of Kohlberg in Symposium on Moral Development, Ethics, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 468–90. Punch, M. 1996. Dirty Business – Exploring Corporate Misconduct: Analysis and Cases, London: Sage. Punch, M. 2001. Management Studies and Researching Business Deviance, in: Malachowski, A. R. (eds.) Business Ethics – Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, London: Routledge. Punch, M. 2008. The Organisation Did It – Individuals, Corporations and Crime, in: Minkes, J. & Minkes, L. (eds.) Corporate and White-Collar Crime, London: Sage. Punzo, V. A. 1996. After Kohlberg: Virtue Ethics and the Recovery of the Moral Self, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 9, no. 1. Quinn, T. K. 1953. Giant Business: Threat to Democracy, New York: Exposition Press. Rachels, J. 1975. Moral Problems: A Collection of Philosophical Essays, New York: Harper & Row. Rachels, J. 1989. Morality, Parents, and Children, in: Graham, G. & LaFollette, H. (eds.) Person to Person, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Rachels, J. 2003. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (4th ed.), Boston: McGraw-Hill. Rachels, J. 2007. Ethical Egoism, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Rahim, M. A. 2010. Managing Conﬂict in Organizations (4th ed.), New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Ramsay, H. 1977. Cycle of Control: Worker Participation in Sociological and Historical Perspective, in: Sociology, vol. 11, 1977, pp. 441–506. Rand, A. 1965. The Virtue of Selﬁshness – A New Concept of Egoism, New York: New American Library. Rashdall, H. 1891. The Theory of Punishment, International Journal of Ethics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 20–31. Rawls, J. 1972. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. 1980. Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 9, pp. 515–72. Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. 1999. The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge: Belknap Press. Raz, J. 1979. The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Raz, J. 2003. Numbers, With and Without Contractualism, Ratio, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 346–67. Reclus, E. 1882. The Earth and Its Inhabitants, New York: Appleton and Company. Reclus, E. 1901. On Vegetarianism, Human Review, January 1991, www.ivu.org/history/ europe19b/reclus. Bibliography 325

Reed, E. D. 2007. The Ethics of Human Rights: Contested Doctrinal and Moral Issues, Waco: Baylor University Press. Reed, R. C. 1997. Following Kohlberg – Liberalism and the Practice of Democratic Community, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Reed, T. 1987. Review: Developmental Moral Theory, Ethics, vol. 97, no. 2. Rees, S. & Rodley, G. (eds.) 1995. The High Cost of Managerialism, Sydney: Pluto Press. Regan, T. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Regan, T. 1985. The Case for Animal Rights, in: Singer, P. (eds.) In Defense of Animals, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Regan, T. 2006. The Case for Animal Rights, in: Cahn, S. & Markie, P. (eds.) 2006. Ethics – History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (3rd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Regan, T. & Singer, P. (eds.) 1976. Animal Rights and Human Obligations, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Reibetanz, S. 1998. Contractualism and Aggregation, Ethics, vol. 108, pp. 296–311. Reich, W. 1946. The Mass Psychology of Fascism, New York (1970): Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Reid, H. G. & Yanarella, E. J. 1977. Critical Political Theory and Moral Development: On Kohlberg, Hampden-Turner, Habermas, Theory and Society, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 505–41. Reilly, N. 2010. Women’s Human Rights, Oxford: Polity Press. Reimer, J. et al. 1983. Promoting Moral Growth – From Piaget to Kohlberg (2nd ed.), Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. Reiner, R. 2007. Law and Order – An Honest Citizen’s Guide to Crime and Control, Oxford: Polity Press. Rest, J. et al. 1999. Postconventional Moral Thinking – A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach, London: Lawrence Erlbaum. Reynolds, S. J. & Ceranic, T. L. 2009. Psychological Processes in Organizational Corruption, in: DeCremer, D. (eds.) Psychological Perspectives on Ethical Behavior and Decision Making, Charlotte: Information Age Pub. Ridley, M. 1996. The Origins of Virtue, London: Viking. Ritter, J. 1982. Hegel and the French Revolution, Cambridge: MIT Press. Rockmore, T. 1981. Human Nature and Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Ethics, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 8. Rockmore, T. 1992. Before and After Hegel – A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press. Rodin, D. 2010. Torture and Terrorism, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Roethlisberger, F. J. 1943. Management and Morale, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rohr, J. A. 1978. Ethics for Bureaucracy: An Essay on Law and Values, New York: Marcel Dekker. Rollin, B. E. 2007. Animal Mind: Science, Philosophy, and Ethics, The Journal of Ethics, vol. 11, pp. 253–74. Rolston, H. 1975. Is There an Ecological Ethic?, Ethics, no. 85, pp. 93–109. Rolston, H. 1988. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Ronel, N. 2006. When Good Overcomes Bad: The Impact of Volunteers on Those They Help, Human Relations, vol. 59, no. 8. Rosenfeld, P. et al. 1995. Impression Management in Organisations – Theory, Measures, Practice, London: Routledge. Ross, D. 1954. Kant’s Ethical Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rothbart, M. K. et al. 1986. Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning, Sex Roles, vol. 15, no. 11. 326 Bibliography

Rothbard, M. N. 1982. The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press. Rousseau, J. J. 1750. A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Science, Dijon: Academy of Dijon. Rousseau, J. J. 1755. Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, http://oll.libertyfund.org & www.libertarian-alliance.org.uk, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books (1984). Rousseau, J. J. 1762. Emile or On Education (introduction, translation & notes by Allan Bloom, 1979), New York: Basic Books. Rossouw, G. J. & van Vuuren, L. J. 2003. Modes of Managing Morality: A Descriptive Model of Strategies for Managing Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 46, no. 4. Rummel, R. J. 1994. Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 1–10. Sachs, J. L., Mueller, U. G., Wilcox, T. P. & Bull, J. J. 2004. The Evolution of Cooperation, Quarterly Review of Biology, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 135–60. Sade, Marquis de. 1787. The Misfortunes of Virtue (les infortunes de la vertu), in: Coward, D. (trans., intro. & notes), The Misfortunes of Virtue, and Other Early Tales, Oxford (2008): Oxford University Press; cf. Seaver, R., Wainhouse, A., Paulhan, J. & Blanchot, M. (compiled & trans.) Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom, and Other Writings, New York (1990): Grove Weidenfeld. Sage 2007. Management Ethics, Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society, London: Sage. Sample, R. et al. (eds.) 2004. Philosophy – The Big Question, Oxford: Blackwell. Samson, D. & Daft, R. 2009. Management (3rd Asia Paciﬁc ed.), Melbourne: Cengage Learning. Sartre, J. P. 1943/1992. Being and Nothingness, New York: Washington Square Press. Satre, L. J. 2005. Chocolate on Trial: Slavery, Politics, and the Ethics of Business, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005. Saunders, M. 2006. The Madness and Malady of Managerialism, Quadrant, March 1st, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 9–17. Sayer, A. 2008. Moral Economy and Employment, in: Bolton, S. C. & Houlian, M. (eds.) Searching for the Human in Human Resource Management, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Scanlon, T. M. 1982. Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in: Sen, A. & Williams, B. (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Scanlon, T. M. 2000. A Contractualist Reply, Theoria, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 237–45. Scanlon, T. M. 2003. Contractualism and What We Owe to Each Other, in: Pauer- Studer, H. (eds.) Constructions of Practical Reason: Interviews on Moral and Political Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Schaefer, D. L. 2007. Procedural versus Substantive Justice: Rawls and Nozick, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundations, vol. 24, no. 1. Schell, J. 2000. The Fate of The Earth, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Schrijvers, J. 2004. The Way of the Rat – A Survival Guide to Ofﬁce Politics, London: Cyan Books Schrijvers, J. 2005. The Monday Morning Feeling – A Book of Comfort for Sufferers, London: Marshall Cavendish. Schultz, D. & Schultz, S. E. 2010. Psychology and Work Today – An Introduction to Industrial and Organizational Psychology (11th ed.), New York: Prentice Hall. Schumann, P. L. 2006. The Role of Moral Development in Motivating Ethical Behaviour by Employees, in: Deckop, J. R. (eds.) Human Resource Management Ethics, Greenwich: Information Age Publishing. Schumpeter, J. 1956. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper and Row. Schütz, A. 1970. On Phenomenology and Social Relations: Selected Writings (eds. by Wagner, H.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bibliography 327

Schwartz, H. S. 1990. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay – The Theory of the Organisational Ideal, New York: New York University Press. Schwartz, M. 1998. Peter Drucker and the Denial of Business Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 17, no. 15, pp. 1685–998. Schwartz, M. S. 2002. A Code of Ethics for Corporate Code of Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 41, no. 1–2. Schweitzer, A. 1923. Civilization and Ethics: The Philosophy of Civilization Part II (trans. Naish, J.), London: A & C Black Ltd. Schweitzer, A. 1965. The Teaching of Reverence for Life (trans. by Richard and Clara Winston), New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech Acts – An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. R. 1996. The Construction of Social Reality, London: Penguin Press. Sedgwick, S. 2000. The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sen, A. 2001. Does Business Ethics Make Economic Sense?, in: Malachowski, A. R. (eds.) Business Ethics – Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, London: Routledge. Sen, A. 2009. The Idea of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University. Senchuk, D. M. 1990. Listening to a Different Voice: A Feminist Critique of Gilligan, Studies in Philosophy and Education, vol. 10, no. 3. Sewell, G. & Wilkinson, B. 1992. Someone is Watching Over Me: Surveillance, Discipline and the Just-in-Time Labor Process, Sociology, vol. 26, pp. 271–89. Shafer-Landau, R. 2007. Ethical Theory: An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Shafer-Landau, R. & Cueno, T. 2007. Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Shah, S. 2006. The Body Hunters: Testing New Drugs on the World’s Poorest Patients, New York: New Press. Shapcott, R. 2009. International Ethics – A Critical Introduction, Oxford: Polity Press. Shaw, W. H. (eds.) 2003. Ethics at Work – Basic Readings in Business Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shaw, W. H. & Barry, V. 2010. Moral Issues in Business, Belmont: Wadsworth. Shrage, L. 2007. Feminist Perspectives on Sex Markets, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (internet: First published Wed Feb 18, 2004; substantive revision Friday July 13, 2007). Sichel, B. 1976. The Relation Between Moral Judgement and Moral Behaviour in Kohlberg’s Theory of the Development of Moral Judgements, Educational Philosophy and Theory, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 55–67. Sidgwick, H. 1874. Methods of Ethics, London: Macmillan. Sidgwick, H. 1889. Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies, Mind, vol. 14, no. 56. Sigurdson, O. 1997. Silence Reigns! A Communitarian Critique of the Ethics of Lawrence Kohlberg, Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 5–13. Sikula, A. 1996. Applied Management Ethics, Chicago: Irwin. Silk, L. & Vogel, D. 1976. Ethics and Proﬁts – The Crisis of Conﬁdence in American Business, New York: Simon & Schuster. Simmel, G. 1907. The Philosophy of Money (trans. by Bottomore, T. & Frisby, D., 1978), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Simon, H. A. 1947. Administrative Behavior, New York: Macmillan Co. Simon, H. 1990. A Mechanism for Social Selection of Successful Altruism, Science, vol. 250, pp. 1665–8. 328 Bibliography

Simpson, E. L. 1974. Moral Development Research. A Case Study of Scientific Cultural Bias, Human Development, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 81–106. Singer, P. 1972. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 3. Singer, P. 1973. Democracy and Disobedience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singer, P. 1975. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, New York: Random House. Singer, P. 1978. The Fable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals, Ethics, vol. 88, no. 2. Singer, P. 1981. The Expanding Circle: Ethics & Sociobiology, New York: Farrar & Straus. Singer, P. 1983. Hegel, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singer, P. 1985. Ethics, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago: www.utilitarian.net/ Singer/ Singer, P. 1990. Animal Liberation, 2nd ed., New York: New York Review. Singer, P. 1993. Practical Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Singer, P. 1994. The Oxford Reader on Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singer, P. 2000. Writings on an Ethical Life, New York: Ecco Press. Singer, P. (eds.) 2005. In Defense of Animals. The Second Wave, Oxford: Blackwell Press. Singer, P. 2007. All Animals are Equal, in: Shafer-Landau (eds.) Ethical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell. Singer, P. 2008. The Future of Animal Farming: Renewing the Ancient Contract (with Marian Stamp Dawkins and Roland Bonney), New York: Wiley-Blackwell. Singh, K. 2005. Questioning Globalization, London: Zed-Books. Sinnerbrink, R. 2007. Understanding Hegelianism, London: Acumen Press. Sison, A. J. G. 2008. Corporate Governance and Ethics – An Aristotelian Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Sison, G. F. P. 1985. M*A*S*H: An Illustration of Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Develop- ment, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 83–90. Skinner, B. F. 1948. Walden Two, New York: Macmillan. Skinner, B. F. 1953. Science and Human Behaviour, New York: Macmillan. Skinner, B. F. 1971. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, New York: Knopf. Skinner, B. F. 1974. About Behaviourism, London: Cape. Skoll, G. R. 2010. Social Theory of Fear: Terror, Torture, and Death in a Post-Capitalist World, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Skyrms, B. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Slote, M. 2007. Agent-based Virtue Ethics, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Slote, M. 2010. Virtue Ethics, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Smith, A. 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, London: A. Millar Press. Smith, A. 1776. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Dublin: Whitestone. Smith, S. B. 1987. Hegel’s Idea of a Critical Theory, Political Theory, vol. 15, no. 1. Snell, R. S. 1996. Complementing Kohlberg: Mapping the Ethical Reasoning Used by Managers for Their Own Dilemma Cases, Human Relations, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 23–49. Snith, D. 2006. Globalisation – The Hidden Agenda, Oxford: Polity Press. Sober, E. 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bibliography 329

Soederberg, S. 2010. Corporate Power and Ownership in Contemporary Capitalism: The Politics of Resistance and Domination, London: Routledge. Solomon, R. C. 2004. Aristotle, Ethics and Business Organizations, Organization Studies, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 1021–43. Sonnert, G. 1994. Limits of Morality: A Sociological Approach to Higher Moral Stages, Journal of Adult Development, vol. 1, no. 2. Sonnert, G. & Commons, M. L. 1994. Society and the Highest Stages of Moral Development, Politics and the Individual, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 31–55. Sores, G. 2002. Against Market Fundamentalism: ‘The Capitalist Threat’ Reconsidered, in: Zsolnai, L. & Gasparski, W. W. (eds.) Ethics and the Future of Capitalism (The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology, vol. 9), London: Transaction Publishers. Soron, D. 2010. Road Kill: Commodity Fetishism and Structural Violence, in: Sanbon- matsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. South, C. R. & Wood, J. 2006. Bullying in Prisons: The Importance of Perceived Social Status, Prisonization, and Moral Disengagement, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 490–501. Speight, A. 2008. The Philosophy of Hegel, Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing. Spencer, H. 1880. The Principles of Biology, New York: Appleton & Co. Sridhar, B. S. & Camburn, A. 1993. Stages of Moral Development of Corporations, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 12, no. 9. Stanescu, V. 2010. ‘Green’ Eggs and Ham? The Myth of Sustainable Meat and the Danger of the Local, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Steiner, G. 2005. Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status Animals in the History of Western Philosophy, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Steiner, G. 2008. Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship, New York: Columbia University Press. Sterba, J. P. & Kourany, J. A. 2004. How to Complete the Compatibilist Account of Free Action, in: Sample, R. et al. (eds.) Philosophy – The Big Question, Oxford: Blackwell. Sternberg, E. 1997. The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 3–10. Sterrett, J. M. 1892. The Ethics of Hegel, International Journal of Ethics, vol. 2, no. 2. Stiglitz, J. 2003. Globalization and Its Discontents, New York: Norton. Stiglitz, J. 2004. Fair Trade for All, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stone, C. D. 1972. Should Trees Have Standing?, Southern California Law Review, no. 45, pp. 450–501. Stoops, D. 1913. The Ethics of Industry, International Journal of Ethics, vol. 23, no. 4. Storey, J. 2007. Human Resource Management – A Critical Text (3rd ed.), London: Thomson. Stratton, W. E. et al. 1981. Moral Development and Decision Making: A Study of Student Ethics, Journal of Enterprise Management, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 35–51. Styron, W. 1979. Sophie’s Choice – A Novel, New York: Random House. Subhabrata, B. B. 2007. Corporate Social Responsibility – The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Sullivan, E. V. 1977. A Study of Kohlberg’s Structural Theory of Moral Development: A Critique of Liberal Social Science Ideology, Human Development, vol. 20, no. 6. Svendsen, L. 2008. A Philosophy of Fear, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 330 Bibliography

Tannenbaum, R. & Schmidt, W. H. 1958. How to Choose a Leadership Pattern, Harvard Business Review, vol. 36 (March–April 1958), pp. 95–101. Tasioulas, J. 2010. Justice and Punishment, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Taylor, C. 1975. Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. 1991. The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Taylor, F. W. 1911. The Principles of Scientiﬁc Management, New York: Norton Press (reprinted in Handel, M. (eds.) 2003. The Sociology of Organizations – Classic, Contemporary and Critical Readings, London: Sage). Taylor, P. W. 1981. The Ethics of Respect of Nature, in: Sample, R. et al. 2004. Philosophy – The Big Question, Oxford: Blackwell. Taylor, P. W. 1986. Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Taylor, P. W. 2004. The Ethics of Respect for Nature, in: Sample, R. et al. (eds.) Philosophy – The Big Question, Oxford: Blackwell. Taylor, R. 2007. Determinism and the Theory of Agency, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (eds.) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. Ten, C. L. 1987. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford: Clarendon Press. tenBos, R. 1997. Business Ethics and Bauman Ethics, Organisation Studies, vol. 18, no. 6. tenBos, R. 2006. The Ethics of Business Communities, in: Clegg & Rhodes (eds.) Management Ethics – Contemporary Contexts, London: Routledge. Theodore, M. K. & Theodore, L. 2010. Introduction to Environmental Management, Boca Raton: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis Group. Thompson, E. P. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class, London: Victor Gollancz. Thompson, E. P. 1967. Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, Past and Present Society, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 56–97. Thompson, P. 2003. Fantasy Island: A Labour Process Critique on the ‘Age of Surveillance’, Surveillance and Society, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 138–51. Thompson, P. 2008. Making Capital: Strategic Dilemmas for HRM, in: Bolton, S. C. & Houlian, M. (eds.) Searching for the Human in Human Resource Management, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Thompson, P. & O’Doherty, D. P. 2009. Perspectives on Labour Process Theory, in: Alvesson, M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thompson, P. & Smith, C. (eds.) 2010. Working Life – Renewing Labour Process Analysis, Houndmills: Palgrave. Timmons, M. 2003. The Limits of Moral Constructivism, Ratio, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 391–423. Tisak, M. S. & Jankowski, A. M. 1996. Societal Rule Evaluations: Adolescent Offenders’ Reasoning about Moral, Conventional, and Personal Rules, Aggressive Behavior, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 195–207. Tocqueville, A. 1835. Democracy in America, New York: Modern Library (1981). Tofﬂer, A. 1990. Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century, New York: Bantam Books. Tomasello, M. 2009. Why We Cooperate, Boston: A Boston Review Book/MIT Press. Tönnies, F. 1887. Community & Society, New Brunswick: Transaction Books (1957 & 1988). Touraine, A. 1977. The Self-Production of Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bibliography 331

Touraine, A. 2000. Can We Live Together?: Equality and Difference, Cambridge: Polity Press. Townley, B. 2005. Performance Appraisals and the Emergence of Management, in: Grey, C. & Willmott, H. (eds.) Critical Management Studies, Oxford: University of Oxford Press. Trainer, F. E. 1977. A Critical Analysis of Kohlberg’ s Contributions to the Study of Moral Thought, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 7, no. 1. Trevino, L. K. 1986. Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation Interactionist Model, Academy of Management Review, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 601–17. Trevino, L. K. & Nelson, K. A. 2011. Managing Business Ethics – Straight Talk about How To Do It Right, Hoboken: Wiley & Sons. Trivers, R. 1985. Social Evolution, Menlo Park: Benjamin Cummings Press. Tsui, J. & Windsor, C. 2001. Some Cross-Cultural Evidence on Ethical Reasoning, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 31, no. 2. Tsujimoto, R. N. 1979. Kohlberg’s Moral Judgement Stages: Perceptions of Injustice, Journal of Psychology, vol. 101, pp. 79–82. Tumanov, V. 2007. Stanley Milgram and Siegfried Lenz: An Analysis of Deutschstunde in the Framework of Social Psychology, Neophilologus, vol. 91, no. 1. Turner, N. et al. 2002. Transformational Leadership and Moral Reasoning, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 87, no. 2, pp. 304–11. UN-Habitat 2010. State of the World’s Cities 2010/11, London: Earthscan. VanSandt, C. V. et al. 2006. An Examination of the Relationship Between Ethical Work Climate and Moral Awareness, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 68, no. 4. Velasquez, M. G. 2012. Business Ethics – Concepts and Cases (7th ed.), Boston: Pearson. Veneziano, C. & Veneziano, L. 1988. Correlates of Moral Development in Juvenile Delinquents, American Journal of Criminal Justice, vol. 13, no. 1. Victor, B. & Cullen, J. B. 1988. The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work Climates, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 101–25. Vogel, S. 1996. Against Nature – The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory, New York: State University of New York Press. Wagner, J. 1986. Political Tolerance and Stages of Moral Development: A Conceptual and Empirical Alternative, Political Behavior, vol. 8, no. 1. Wahba, A. & Bridgewell, L. 1976. Maslow Reconsidered: A Review of Research on the Need Hierarchy Theory, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 212–40. Waldron, J. 1993. A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 18–51. Walker, L. J. 1982. The Sequentiality of Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development, Child Development, vol. 53, no. 5. Walsh, A. & Lynch, T. 2008. The Morality of Money – An Exploration in Analytical Philosophy, London: Macmillan. Walsh, C. 2000. The Life and Legacy of Lawrence Kohlberg, Society, vol. 37, no. 2. Walton, R. E., Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J. E. & McKersie, R. B. 2000. Strategic Negotiations: A Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations, Ithaca: ILR Press. Walzer, M. 1983. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York: Basic Books. Ward, L. O. 1975. History – Humanity’s Teacher?, Journal of Moral Education, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 101–4. Warnock, M. 1967. Existentialist Ethics, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. Warren, M. 1988. Nietzsche and Political Thought, Cambridge: MIT Press. Watkins, C. (eds.) 2010. Child Labor and Sweatshops, Detroit: Greenhaven Press. 332 Bibliography

Watson, D. 2003. Death Sentence – The Decay of Public Language, Sydney: Knopf. Watson, D. 2009. Bendable Learnings: The Wisdom of Modern Management, Sydney: Knopf. Watson, G. 2002. Contractualism and the Boundaries of Morality, Social Theory and Practice, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 221–41. Watson, J. 1894. The Problem of Hegel, Philosophical Review, vol. 3, no. 5. Webb, B. & Webb, S. 1894. The History of Trade Unionism, London: Longmans. Weber, J. 1990. Managers’ Moral Reasoning: Assessing Their Responses to Three Moral Dilemmas, Human Relations, vol. 43, no. 7. Weber, J. 1991. Adapting Kohlberg to Enhance the Assessment of Managers’ Moral Reasoning, Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 293–318. Weber, J. 2008. Kohlberg, Lawrence (1927–1987), Encyclopaedia of Business Ethics and Society, Sage: Internet eReferences. Weber, M. 1904–05. The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Harper Collins (1930). Weber, M. 1924. Economy and Society, Berkeley: University of California Press (reprint in: Handel, M. (eds.) 2003. The Sociology of Organizations – Classic, Contemporary and Critical Readings, London: Sage). Weber, M. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weisberg, Z. 2010. Animal Repression: Speciesism as Pathology, in: Sanbonmatsu, J. (eds.) Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, New York: Rowman & Littleﬁeld. Weiss, D. S. & Finn, R. 2005. HR Metrics that Count: Aligning Human Capital Management to Business Results, Human Resource Planning, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 33–8. Weizenbaum, J. 1976. Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. Welch, M. 2009. Guantanamo Bay as a Foucauldian Phenomenon – An Analysis of Penal Discourse, Technologies, and Resistance, Prison Journal, vol. 89, no. 1, pp. 3–20. Werhane, P. H. 1999. Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wertheimer, A. 1987. Coercion, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Whetstone, J. T. 1998. Teaching Ethics to Managers: Contemporary Problems and a Traditional Solution, in: Cowton, C. & Crisp, R. (eds.) Business Ethics – Perspectives on the Practice of Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whyte, W. H. 1961. The Organisation Man, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Wicks, A. C. et al. 2010. Business Ethics: A Managerial Approach, Boston: Prentice Hall. Wiggins, D. 2006. Ethics – Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality, London: Penguin. Wilde, O. 1892. Lady Windermere’s Fan, New York: Collier Books (1962). Williams, B. 2006. A Critique of Utilitarianism, in: Cahn, S. & Markie, P. (eds.) 2006. Ethics – History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (3rd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, R. P. 1998. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley: University of California Press. Wilson, D. S. & Sober, E. 1994. Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 585–654. Witoszek, N. & Brennan, N. (eds) 1999. Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Næss and the Progress of Ecophilosophy, New York: Rowman and Littleﬁeld. Wolf, S. 1990. Freedom Within Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wolff, J. 2006. Libertarianism, Utility, and Economic Competition, Virginia Law Review, vol. 92, no. 7, pp. 1605–23. Bibliography 333

Wolff, M. 2008. The Man Who Owns the News: Inside the Secret World of Rupert Murdoch, New York: Broadway Books. Wood, A. 1990. Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wood, A. 2010. Respect and Recognition, in: Skorupski, J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ethics, London: Routledge. Wood, A. W. 1972. The Marxian Critique of Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 244–82. Wren, D. A. 2005. The History of Management Thought (5th ed.), Hoboken: Wiley. Wrong, D. H. 1994. The Problem of Order – What Unites and Divides Society, New York: The Free Press. Wronka, J. 2008. Human Rights and Social Justice, London: Sage. Young, I. M. 2011. Justice and the Politics of Difference (paperback reissue, with a new foreword by Danielle Allen), Princeton: Princeton University Press. Young, S. 2003. Moral Capitalism – Reconciling Private Interest with the Public Good, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. Ytsma, P. J., Hammond, S., Bailey, C. & Miskowiec, J. (eds.) 2009. Legacy of an Ecocide: Agent Orange Aftermath, Minneapolis: Aliform Publishing. Zengotita, T. 2005. Mediated – How the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live In It, New York: Bloomsbury. Zimmerman, D. 1981. Coercive Wage Offers, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 10, pp. 121–45. Zimmerman, D. 2002. Taking Liberties: The Perils of ‘Moralizing’ Freedom and Coercion in Social Theory and Practice, Social Theory and Practice, vol. 28, pp. 577–609. Zinn, H. 1968. Disobedience and Democracy: Nine Fallacies of Law and Order, Cambridge: South End Press. Zinn, H. 1990. Declarations of Independence: Cross-Examining American Ideology, New York: Harper Collins Publishers. Zˇizˇek S. 1993. Tarrying with the Negative – Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, Durham: Duke University Press. Zsolnai, L. (eds.) 2002. Ethics and the Future of Capitalism, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Index

5-Min-MBA, 6 behavioural scientists, 67 Abu Ghraib, 84, 258 behaviourism, 16, 17, 68–70, 89, 209, Adam Smith, 55, 57, 134, 239, 249, 291, 227, 252 294, 306 belief-systems, 105 adultery, 146, 249 benefits and rewards, 81, 92–95, 102, affluence, 137, 190 105, 108, 223 agri-business, 186 Bentham, 7, 60, 61, 63, 149, 152, 154, Alasdair MacIntyre, 86, 265 160, 162, 167, 204f., 227, 278, Albert Schweitzer, 186, 194f., 205 285f., 299, 305 Alfie Kohn, 89 Bhopal, 78, 124, 151, 167, 241, 257, Alfred Sloan, 90, 200, 249, 258, 269 263f., 269, 278, 291 altruism, 3, 30, 42, 57, 60, 62, 87, 117f., biospheric egalitarianism, 186, 190, 205 234f., 249, 262 blackmail, 24, 128, 272 American army, 84 Blaise Pascal, 62, 217 Amnesty International, 27, 226 blame, 21, 25, 31, 79, 103, 119, 124, anarchists, 40 166, 257 animal testing, 70, 188, 292 boot-camp, 34, 49 anti-corruption laws, 26 BP, 2 antitrust laws, 26 bribe-taking, 21, 24f. Aquinas, 7, 62, 109, 122f, 128, 236, 249, Buddhism, 123 269, 276, 285, 297 bullying, 18, 24, 71, 98, 292 Arendt, 7, 17, 22, 55, 57, 71, 202, bureaucratisation, 36 253–256, 258, 297 buzz-words, 6, 7 Arne Dekke Eide Næss, 190 Arnold Schwarzenegger, 87 Cain and Abel, 44 asbestos, 78, 173, 202, 224, 241, 257, call-girls, 24 269, 278, 291 cartels, 24, 98, 115, 169, 200 Asch, 55, 77, 297 categorical imperatives, 5, 7f., 37, 53, asylum seekers, 40 63, 168, 173, 177, 279 Auschwitz, 10, 49, 61, 82, 85, 231, 296, CCTV, 99 299, 310 CEO’s wrongdoing, 24 Austin, 140, 143, 273, 297 charity, 146, 249 authoritarian character, 134 cheating, 24, 246 chicken farming, 188 Babylonian Law, 4 child labour, 153, 240, 258, 262, 291 Bachelor of Business Administration, 6 child-labour, 2, 165, 213, 216, 224, 292 back stabbing, 24 chimpanzees, 3, 227 balance of power, 129, 142, 143 Christianity, 102, 104, 123 Balanced Scorecard, 86, 314 Colgate, 201 Banality of Evil, 17, 22, 57, 71, 254, 297 commodification, 157 barcodes, 99 communicative control, 106 Baron John Browne, 2 communicative ethics, 7, 27, 41, 45, Baudrillard, 121, 125, 181, 285, 298 47f., 50, 60, 63, 91, 96 behavioural manipulation, 46 communists, 40

334 Index 335 company car, 138 Émile Durkheim, 141 company policies, 26, 36, 45 Emmanuel Levinas, 61f., 109, 123 company-based management morality, employer federations, 220 26 end-of-the-year bonus, 165 consequentialism, 7, 53f., 62, 149f., 158, England, 165, 207 178, 247f. Enron, 103, 147, 158, 224, 229, 240, container shipping, 169 264, 269, 286, 290f. contractualism, 7, 96f., 248 environmental ethics, 7, 14, 17, 19f., 27, corporate culture, 11, 24–26, 31, 33, 33, 37–39, 41–43, 47, 50f., 53, 58, 45f., 101, 108, 282 60, 64f., 186–193, 195, 197, 199, corporate mass-media, 143, 148 202–205, 213, 218f., 221–224, 230 corporate social responsibility, 7, 101, Epictetus, 92, 98, 119 224, 234, 265, 269 Essentialism, 171, 225 cosmos, 15, 22, 27, 58, 213, 217, 221 Ethical Respect for Nature, 203 cost-beneﬁt analysis, 51, 98, 113, 172, evolution, 4, 8, 9, 16, 45, 117, 206, 226, 228 244, 249, 262, 264, 269, 275 cost-externalisation, 125 evolutionary ethics, 7, 16, 57, 60, 249, cruelty towards a dog, 187 263, 269, 275 culture of admiration, 147 existentialism, 7, 69 customer relations, 4, 193 customers, 24, 29, 31f., 78f., 86, 94, 111, faithfulness, 146, 249 121, 125, 152, 157, 167, 169f., fast food industry, 224 177f., 199, 226, 276, 279, 282 favouritism, 24, 36, 146, 249 cut-throat competition, 49 Fayol, 7, 49, 86, 126, 212, 215, 222f., 239, 247, 272, 291, 293, 306 Dark Ages, 8, 109 feudal lords, 72 Darwin, 8, 9, 226, 234, 236, 239, 244, FIFO, 35, 46, 127 249, 264, 279, 286, 303 Ford Pinto, 78, 111, 124, 151, 158, 167, David Ricardo, 134 224, 240, 257, 264, 269, 276, 278, day-to-day operations, 37 291 death camps, 73, 84 Fordism, 136, 208 deep ecology, 186, 190–192, 205 Ford’s assembly line, 165, 182 deontology, 7 Foucault, 9, 61, 143, 251, 253f., 275, Dickensian collieries, 215 294, 307 Dirty Business, 120, 268, 324 French Revolution, 11, 312, 325 discrimination, 24, 26, 36, 215, 224, Fromm, 7, 22, 49, 55, 57, 60, 74, 114, 240, 290, 292 135, 152, 230, 235–238, 243, 248, disobedience, 37f., 70 251–254, 260, 267, 269, 271f., Doctor of Philosophy, 9 274–276, 280, 283, 307 Dog-of-War, 61 downsizing, 23, 83, 104f., 109, 124f., Gas chambers, 73 151, 156, 167, 264 GATT, 27, 162, 290 Duties to Animals and Spirits, 187, 313 Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft, 214 genetically modiﬁed organisms, 186 Eastern Front, 84 George Orwell, 79, 181, 289 ecosystems, 186, 196f., 205 Germany, 10, 78, 84, 240, 287f., 291, egocentrism, 11, 18, 23, 25 314 Egyptian ruling class, 4, 234 global ethics, 32, 37, 50, 63 Eichmann, 49, 85, 202, 238, 258, 288, globalisation, 27, 187, 216, 231, 241, 297 244, 293 embezzling funds, 24 Golden Rule, 153 336 Index

Good and Evil, 104 ILO, 27, 314 good life, 3, 192, 195, 270 I-manage-you, 198 Greek antiquity, 92, 114, 128 Immanuel Kant, 3, 8, 64, 109, 168, Greenpeace, 27, 203, 213, 226, 288, 187, 296, 300 309 industrial espionage, 24, 99 Grievance procedures, 139 insider trading, 24, 240, 291 Guantanamo Bay, 84, 332 internet-ﬁrewalls, 99 intuitionism, 7, 88, 94–96, 105, 279 Hammurabi, 4 Isaiah Berlin, 134 harassment, 18, 24, 71, 98, 292 Islam, 123 Harvard Business Review, 6, 20, 34, 122, 198, 223, 225f., 228, 237, Jews, 40, 81f., 255, 320 243, 252, 261, 267, 270, 285, John Stuart Mill, 63, 109, 120, 124, 287, 294–301, 309, 314–317, 324, 149, 154, 167 330 John Wayne, 87 Harvard Business School, 113, 184, Judenrat, 81–83 195, 237, 252, 266, 293, 294, 303 junk food, 24 Harvard’s decision-making tree, 110, just-in-time, 6 118 hedonism, 12, 146, 249, 276 Kafka, 54–57, 144, 251, 313 Herbert Marcuse, 129, 246, 261, 265 Kansas City, 84 Herbert Spencer, 61, 141, 264 Key Performance Indicators, 118, 181 herbicides, 186 kickbacks, 24 Himmler, 49 Kingdom of Ends, 7, 23, 27, 32, 38f., Hippies, 40 60, 63, 137, 141, 157, 169, Hitler, 10, 245, 288, 309 174–180, 183–185, 187, 196, Hobbes, 7, 8, 43, 61, 65–67, 88, 91, 217f., 223f., 248, 274, 281, 290, 96–102, 108, 136, 138, 140f., 235, 315 251, 259, 263, 274f., 308f. kinship, 4, 60 Hollywood, 87, 208, 259 Kropotkin, 57, 62, 200, 236, 249, 263, Holmes Rolston, 189 316 Holocaust, 10, 49, 61, 67, 81–86, 231, 257f., 298, 309–311, 317 labour laws, 26 Homo Reciprocans, 4, 300 land ethics, 7, 14, 60, 64, 186, 189 Homosexuals, 81 leadership, 21, 28, 33, 39–43, 51f., Honda-Civic, 145 80f., 91, 103–105, 179, 244f., Houdini, 77 251, 255, 259, 261, 266, 282, HR managers, 72, 154 285, 291 HR policies, 46, 73 legal frameworks, 25, 32, 98 HRM, 4, 22, 46, 70, 73, 77, 91f., 98, legal positivism, 52, 57, 62, 140, 143, 105, 111, 133, 136, 160, 181f., 193, 271, 273 209, 211–214, 220, 222, 227, 242, legitimate authority, 72, 75, 143 254, 256, 262, 299, 304, 317f., 326, Lehman Brothers, 103, 224, 240, 329, 330 291 human behaviour, 16, 23, 46, 54, 57, Leibniz, 8, 62 66, 68, 93f., 127, 131, 134, 140, lion-dilemma, 3, 206 148, 181, 195, 222, 252 Locke, 7f., 58f., 62, 134f., 141, 151, Human Side of Enterprise, 209, 320 156f., 210, 232, 235–237, 246, Hume, 7, 8, 60f., 63, 65, 88, 94f., 109, 247, 250, 273, 318 119–121, 128, 132, 249, 273 love one’s neighbour, 163 hypothetical imperative, 168, 177 loyalty is a one-way street, 166 Index 337

Machiavelli, 54f., 66, 136, 138, 251f., nepotism, 24, 36, 146, 249 255, 259, 265f., 301, 313, 318, Network Organisations, 191 320 NGOs, 27, 37, 91, 105, 215, 226, macho-management, 29, 34 292 mad-cow disease, 224 nihilism, 7, 61, 108 MADD, 2, 78, 229 no-harm principle, 7 male-female wage gap, 24, 215 normative ethics, 7, 228 management schools, 6, 7, 68, 110–113, 164, 197f., 282 Obedience to Authority, 72, 202, 299, managerial forecasting tools, 1 321 managerial rights, 28, 33, 37 OECD, 27, 162, 239, 290 Manhattan, 96 Ohio State Model of Leadership, 39 marketing, 4, 24, 67, 74, 111, 136, 157, OHS, 151, 158, 190, 241 160, 183, 193, 198, 208, 211, 222, organisational behaviour, 16, 22, 46, 244, 254, 261, 282, 288, 293, 294 54, 67–70, 93, 98, 116, 126f., 131, marmalade-ethics, 160 134f., 139, 148, 160, 177, 181, Marx, 4, 6, 60, 63, 86, 132, 134, 140f., 195, 209, 212, 222, 237, 267, 142, 180, 182, 221, 225, 228, 241, 270, 282, 287, 293 243, 250, 253, 268, 275f., 281, organisational commitment, 28, 267 285, 287f., 295, 303, 314, 319 organisational happiness, 90, 116, Maslow, 68f., 252, 261f., 287, 303, 267 320, 331 organisational politics, 132 Master of Business Administration, 6 Oscar Wilde, 2 Max Weber, 7, 36, 48, 56f., 135, 255f., outsourcing, 2, 23, 78, 83, 96, 104f., 294, 319 109, 124, 151, 188, 202, 229, McDonald’s, 182, 240, 291 256, 264 Me-First Management, 30 overselling, 24 megamachines, 85 Menschenmaterial, 49, 82, 239 pain stimuli, 194 meta-ethics, 4, 7, 228 passion and reason, 119 Milgram Experiment, 22 peasants, 4, 72, 207, 219 Milton Friedman, 57, 85, 124, 197f., peer pressure, 35 204, 220, 264 Penal Colony, 54, 55, 251, 313 Money-lending, 123 pesticides, 186 monopolies, 98, 169, 171, 200 PETA, 188, 226, 284 monopolistic source of authority, 80 petty-bourgeois middle-class, 137 moral codes, 3,f., 9f., 18, 31f., 35f., 61, PhD, 9, 10, 252, 315 109, 138, 144, 206f., 214, 227f., Philosophy of Right, 137, 311, 319 234 Pinto case, 173 moral duty of rulers, 179 Plato, 7, 8, 43, 62, 96, 109, 111, 113, Moral Maze, 68, 115, 120f., 128, 132, 127, 132, 238, 266f., 274, 285 157, 159, 165f., 173, 180, 204, political parties, 37, 240, 291, 292 278, 281 pollution, 190, 234 Morally Decent HR Manager, 157, 278, polygenetic neighbours, 3 318 PR, 6, 20, 96, 159, 169, 220, 228 Mündigkeit, 60, 63, 69, 80, 126f., 270, practical wisdom, 113 296 primates, 3, 4, 60, 261, 262 professional associations, 37 Nabisco Corporation, 201 Profits over People, 94 Nazi terminology, 82 Protagoras, 60–63, 118, 189 neighbourhood watch systems, 35 Punished by Rewards, 89 338 Index racism, 24 Struggle for Recognition, 169, 280, 281, Rawls, 59f., 69, 91, 132f., 210, 229, 237, 312 246–248, 250, 260, 268, 283, 318, Student Processing Centres, 182 322, 324, 326 sub-humans, 49 reciprocity, 3f., 15, 24, 31, 40–43, 53, Sun Microsystems, 157, 278 60, 62, 210, 216, 234, 237, 244, suppliers, 4, 29, 31f., 34, 85f., 91, 121, 273 177, 199, 226 religious scripture, 168 sweatshops, 2, 85f., 96, 104, 115, 153, remuneration, 86, 91, 152, 158, 180, 165, 213, 216, 224, 244, 256, 262, 282 292 René Descartes, 8, 47 Swine-Principle, 154 resource depletion, 190 SWOT, 1, 6, 293 return of investment, 1, 6, 92, 149, 227, 284 taxi-driver, 176–178 rights to justice, 215 Taylor, 7, 22f., 48, 60, 64, 126, 160–163, Ritz crackers, 201 165, 167, 171f., 182, 203f., 208, Robinson Crusoe, 16, 30, 206, 236 212, 214, 220, 239, 243, 247f., 250, Rousseau, 8, 52, 60, 62f., 132, 235, 253, 269, 272, 289, 291, 294f., 330 237, 259, 273, 276, 284, 326 Ten Commandments, 44 Rupert Murdoch, 123, 264, 333 terrorists, 40, 245 textbook reinterpretation, 175 SARS, 224 The !Kung of Nyae Nyae, 117, 319 Satanic Mills, 207, 215 The Wager, 62, 217 scenario planning, 1, 6 Theodor Adorno, 144 Scientific Management, 23, 48, 160f., theory X to theory Y, 220 164, 171f., 220, 277f., 330 Thrasymachus, 105, 275, 298 Searle, 56, 58, 60, 63, 222, 327 tobacco industries, 173 sexist advertising, 24 Tom Regan, 195 Sidgwick, 7, 60, 63, 149, 153–157, 167, total quality management, 6 237, 276, 327 trade unions, 22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, Simulacra and Simulation, 121, 298 37, 40, 77, 79, 91, 98, 101, 105, 107, Singer, 4, 7, 56, 58, 60, 63f., 105, 117, 119, 123, 125, 126, 154, 158, 166, 149, 167, 203–205, 227, 231, 235f., 208, 215, 220, 226, 242, 259, 292 239, 241, 248, 250, 254, 264, 275, transaction-cost-analysis, 49 283f., 286, 289, 302, 304, 320, 325, TV-commercials, 96 328 Two Treaties of Government, 151, 156, Sittlichkeit, 7, 27, 32, 38, 60, 63, 118, 318 126, 135, 137, 141, 270, 274, 279 Skinner’s electrical shocks, 70 unfair pricing, 24 Skinner’s manipulation, 68 Unfinished Project of Modernity, 218f., Skinner’s maze-laboratories, 70 304 slush funds, 24 Union Carbide, 78, 241, 257, 291 social ecology, 186, 197–202, 205 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Socrates, 7, 8, 43, 62, 109–113, 123f., 11, 18, 32, 37, 45, 56, 58, 275 127, 155f., 236, 249 Untermenschen, 49 Sophie’s Choice, 34, 82f., 94, 107, 244, US Army, 84 329 USA, 10, 78, 282, 284, 290, 321 SS, 49, 78, 81, 83f., 86, 239, 246, utilitarianism, 7, 8, 42, 53f., 59, 63–65, 255–258, 288 68f., 91, 107, 145, 149, 150–152, stakeholders, 1, 22, 26, 31f., 85, 245 156, 158–160, 163, 165–167, 178, status quo, 2, 52, 231 194, 229, 260, 286 Index 339 vice and virtue, 119 workplaces, 77, 119, 130, 165, 209, voluntarism, 29 219, 272, 276 World War II, 10 Wal*Mart, 200 WTO, 162 Warsaw ghetto, 81 Warwick Fox, 196 You shall not kill, 44 Western Europe, 207 white-collar crime, 24, 272 zero-sum game, 49, 89, 98, 142, 149, Willing Executors, 77, 84 173, 200, 263, 278 workhouses, 23, 66, 215