1 Moral Philosophy Closely Relates to Value Theory Which Can Be Understood Inside the Philosophical Area of Normative Ethical Theory

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

1 Moral Philosophy Closely Relates to Value Theory Which Can Be Understood Inside the Philosophical Area of Normative Ethical Theory Notes 1 Moral philosophy closely relates to value theory which can be understood inside the philosophical area of normative ethical theory. This is of particular concern to consequentialists. In their understanding, value theory can be seen as being syn- onymous with axiology which is primarily concerned with classifying which things are good, and how good they are (Hartman 1967; Findlay 1970; Jones 1989:2; Koslowski 2002 & 2010). 2 In the context of this book management is not seen as the invented and dreamed- up version of affirmative textbook writers (cf. Alvesson & Willmott 1996:25; Klikauer 2007:90f. & 216f.) who more often than not are pure ‘Servants of Power’ (Baritz 1960; cf. Durkheim 1983:34). Instead, management is seen as outlined by Magretta (2002:7 & 196). In the following chapters all text that appears in italics is taken from her book if not otherwise referenced. The chapter is not designed as a negative view of management but as a realistic one as put forward by the former editor of the Harvard Business Review (HBR), Magretta, whose subsequent book truthfully divides the essential from the accidental (cf. Essentialism). There may be accidental articles in various journals and chapters in textbooks that contradict Magretta’s overview of management but her book does not rely on the occasional or accidental article but on the essence of ‘What Management Is’ (2002). Hence, this book seeks to represent her views as authentic as possible, even though some might argue that one cannot elaborate on the essence of management by relying on one single book. Firstly, the book relies predominantly on her work but also on a few other sources as well. Secondly, the HBR is, after all, the most widely read journal in management. Thirdly, the HBR and its editor strongly reflect mainstream views on management and with it the essence of management. Fourthly, Margretta’s book is not just ‘a book’ but combines years, if not decades, of experience in editing the HBR; and finally, there might be sources that con- tradict the HRB editor – even inside the HRB itself – but they, unlike Magretta (2002), do all too often constitute marginalised, accidental, isolated, etc. view- points that are not representative of mainstream management. 3 The former CEO of Standard Oil Company (Indiana) ‘called on big business col- leagues to run their business as they intended to and – for profit to stand up and fight, to talk about profits in terms of their central function, and to throw all sen- timents to the wolves’ (Levitt 1958:43; cf. Kothari 2010). In other words, the main game of management is profit-making just as Karl Marx (1844 & 1890) had out- lined 100 years earlier. Managers should not bother with ethics – ‘throw all senti- ments to the wolves’ – just as Marx predicted. Marx would have agreed with Standard Oil’s CEO that management’s No. 1 goal is profits (cf. Baumhart 1961:19 & 163; Carr 1968:143; Hawken 1993:10; Alvesson & Willmott 1996:23; Kirkeby 2000:3; McCloskey 2006:2; Crowson 2009:106). ‘Mit entsprechendem Profit wird Kapital kühn. Zehn Prozent sicher, und man kann es überall anwenden; 20 Prozent, es wird lebhaft; 50 Prozent, positiv waghalsig; für 100 Prozent stampft es alle men- schlichen Gesetze unter seinen Fuß; 300 Prozent, und es existiert kein Verbrechen, das es nicht riskiert, selbst auf Gefahr des Galgens. Wenn Tumult und Streit Profit bringen, wird es sie beide encouragieren. Beweis: Schmuggel und Sklavenhandel.’ (P.J. Dunning, quoted in Karl Marx: ‘Das Kapital’ (1890), vol. 1, p. 801, Berlin: Dietz-Publisher, 225 226 Notes 1961); translation: ‘With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10% will ensure its employment anywhere; 20% certain will produce eagerness; 50%, pos- itive audacity; 100% will make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300%, and there is not a crime at which it will scruple, nor a risk it will not run, even to the chance of its owner being hanged. If turbulence and strife will bring a profit, it will freely encourage both. Smuggling and the slave-trade have amply proved all that is here stated’ (cf. Hare’s What is Wrong with Slavery, 1979). The Harvard Business Review listed 939 articles on profit and 29 on morality between 1922 and 2009 which represents a 33:1 ratio and indicates the true state of morality as seen from a managerial perspective by the world’s foremost important management journal (cf. Cohen 1973; Chamberlain 1973:3; Clinard 1983:10 & 133; Sores 2002; Satre 2005). 4 For example, employees, staff, customers, suppliers, competitors, communities, trade unions, states, and even NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Greenpeace, PETA, etc. (cf. Lucas 2003:20; Campbell & Kitson 2008:17; Friedman 2008). 5 Charles Darwin (1871:129) even argues that our ability to anticipate the more remote consequences of [our] action is contributed to the development of moral- ity in human evolution. In other words, the better management anticipates con- sequences of [their] action, the more developed its morality is. This stands in sharp contrast to management’s reality of externalisation (Petit 1961:98; Fried- man 1970; Gintis 1976; Trevino 1986:603–4; Cornes & Sandler 1986; Alvesson & Willmott 1996; Mander 2001; Magretta 2002; Bakan 2004; Painter-Morland 2008; Archie 2009; Wicks 2010) and its focus on shareholder value i.e. profit maximisa- tion. For Korten (1995:9), it is ‘making money for the rich at the expense of the life of society and the planet’. In the words of Levitt (1958:49) ‘business will have a much better chance of surviving if there is no nonsense about its goals – that is, if long-run profits maximisation is the one dominant objective in practice as well as in theory’. According to McCloskey’s Ethics for an Age of Commerce (2006:1) externalities have been part of management’s virtues, ‘the American bourgeois organised official and unofficial apartheids. It conspired against unions. It sup- ported the excesses of nationalism. It delighted in red bating and queer bashing’. From ‘The Servants of Power’ (Baritz 1960) this sounds rather different: ‘by pro- viding jobs, investment capital, purchasing goods, and doing business every day, corporations have a profound and positive influence on society’ (Porter & Kramer 2006:91). The positive influence on society comes from investing. Unmentioned is that this is done in expectation of returns so that profits can be made. And finally, it is summed up as doing business. This leaves providing jobs as the only positive for society. And those jobs are, according to Porter’s only ideology, a cost- factor that needs to be reduced. In line with that, Drucker (1981:35) has argued that ‘business ethics might well be called “ethical chic” rather than ethics – and indeed might be considered more a media event than philosophy or morals’. This sentiment is echoed by an executive who complained ‘morality threatens to engulf us’ (Silk & Vogel 1976:229; cf. Powers & Vogel 1980:8). 6 Hence, a book on ethics – the philosophical study of morals – needs to be written in theory language rather than observation language. Theory language is abstract language. According to Marcuse (1966:138), ‘nobody really thinks who does not abstract from that which is given, who does not relate the facts to the factors which have made them, who does not – in his mind – undo the facts. Abstract- ness is the very life of thought, the token of its authenticity’. Observable science is often linked to a technical-scientific project that ‘tends to identify things and Notes 227 their function. As a habit of thought outside the scientific and technical language, such reasoning shapes the expression of a specific social and political behav- iourism. In this behavioural universe, words and concepts tend to coincide or rather the concept tends to be absorbed. The former has no other content that is designated by the word in published and standardised usage, and the word is expected to have no other response than the publicised and standardised behav- iour (reaction)’; cf. Feldman (1978); MacIntyre (1989); Singer (1994); Arrington (1998); Malachowski (2001); Calaco & Atterton (2003); Shaw (2003); Graham (2004); Campbell et al. (2005); Olen et al. (2005); Wiggins (2006); Driver (2007); LaFollette (2007); Shafer-Landau (2007); Shafer-Landau & Cueno (2007); Hinman (2008); Pogge & Horton (2008); Koslowski (2010); Muhr et al. (2010); Velasquez (2012:38–45). 7 Singer (1985:1); cf. www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1985. 8 Perhaps this is not so for management because management’s foremost existence is found in creating shareholder value i.e. profit maximisation, the bottom line, market shares, business growth, competition (cf. Kohn 1999:22; Kothari 2010), etc. Hence, standard textbooks on management rarely engage in moral philo- sophy, often not even at the level of pure tokenism. In Hegelian terms (cf. Klikauer 2010:88–125), the essence of management is shareholder value i.e. profit max- imisation while the essence of humanity is morality. Hegel would say that share- holder value and profit maximisation are not essential to humans, they are accidental while for management, it is the other way around: shareholder value and profit maximisation are essential, not accidental. Koslowski (2002:54) quotes a shareholder, ‘I do not want management to use the capital I have entrusted to it to impose its notions of international morality on the world’. ROI (return of investment), not ethics or international morality counts. 9 If this is an acceptable definition of ethics, then the Journal of Business Ethics is a tautology because it is not concerned with the ‘philosophical’ study of morality (Collins 2000). Instead it is concerned with empirical studies, sur- veys, business improvement, and ethical codes etc.
Recommended publications
  • Bridging Divides: New Pragmatic Philosophy and Composition Theory
    UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations 1-1-2007 Bridging divides: New pragmatic philosophy and composition theory Eric Wallace Leake University of Nevada, Las Vegas Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds Repository Citation Leake, Eric Wallace, "Bridging divides: New pragmatic philosophy and composition theory" (2007). UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 2124. http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/btlv-wtta This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BRIDGING DIVIDES: NEW PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY AND COMPOSITION THEORY by Eric Wallace Leake Baehelor of Arts University of Nevada, Las Vegas 2002 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in English Department of English College of Liberal Arts Graduate College University of Nevada, Las Vegas May 2007 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 1443772 INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
    [Show full text]
  • The Primary Axiom and the Life-Value Compass-John Mcmurtry
    PHILOSOPHY AND WORLD PROBLEMS-Vol . I-The Primary Axiom And The Life-Value Compass-John McMurtry THE PRIMARY AXIOM AND THE LIFE-VALUE COMPASS John McMurtry Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph NIG 2W1, Canada Keywords: action, animals, concepts, consciousness, dualism, feeling, fields of value, good and evil, God, identity, image thought, justice, language, life-ground, life-value onto-axiology, life-coherence principle, materialism, mathematics, meaning, measure, mind, phenomenology, primary axiom of value, rationality, reification, religion, truth, ultimate values, universals, value syntax, yoga Contents 6.1. The Primary Axiom of Value 6.2. The Fields of Life Value 6.3. The Unity of the Fields of Life 6.4. The Common Axiological Ground beneath Different Interpretations 6.5. The Thought-Field of Value: From the Infinite within to Impartial Value Standard 6.6. The Life-Value Compass: The Nature and Measure of Thought Value across Domains 6.7. Ecology, Economy and the Good: Re-Grounding in Life Value at the Meta-Level 6.8. Beyond the Ghost in the Machine and Life-Blind Measures of Better 6.9. Thought With No Object: The Ground of Yoga 6.10. Beyond the Polar Fallacies of Religion and Materialism 6.11. Concept Thought: From the Boundless Within to the World of Universals 6.12. Beneath Nominalism and Realism: Reconnecting Concepts to the Life-Ground 6.13. Concepts Construct A Ruling Plane of Life in the Biosphere 6.14. The Tragic Flaw of the Symbol-Ruled Species 6.15. How We Know the Internal Value of Any Thought System 6.16. The Core Disorder of Contemporary Thought: Life-Blind Rationality 6.17.
    [Show full text]
  • Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value
    Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Korsgaard, Christine. 1986. Aristotle and Kant on the source of value. Ethics 96(3): 486-505. Published Version http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292771 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3164347 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value* ChristineM. Korsgaard THREE KINDS OF VALUE THEORY In this paper I discuss what I will call a "rationalist" account of the goodness of ends. I begin by contrasting the rationalist account to two others, "subjectivism' and "objectivism.' Subjectivism identifies good ends with or by reference to some psychological state. It includes the various forms of hedonism as well as theories according to which what is good is any object of interest or desire. Objectivism may be represented by the theory of G. E. Moore. According to Moore, to say that something is good as an end is to attribute a property, intrinsic goodness, to it. Intrinsic goodness is an objective, nonrelational property of the object, a value a thing has independently of anyone's desires, interests, or pleasures. The attraction of subjectivist views is that they acknowledge the connection of the good to human interests and desires.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Philosophy.Pdf
    I N T R O D U C T I O N What Is Philosophy? CHAPTER 1 The Task of Philosophy CHAPTER OBJECTIVES Reflection—thinking things over—. [is] the beginning of philosophy.1 In this chapter we will address the following questions: N What Does “Philosophy” Mean? N Why Do We Need Philosophy? N What Are the Traditional Branches of Philosophy? N Is There a Basic Method of Philo- sophical Thinking? N How May Philosophy Be Used? N Is Philosophy of Education Useful? N What Is Happening in Philosophy Today? The Meanings Each of us has a philos- “having” and “doing”—cannot be treated en- ophy, even though we tirely independent of each other, for if we did of Philosophy may not be aware of not have a philosophy in the formal, personal it. We all have some sense, then we could not do a philosophy in the ideas concerning physical objects, our fellow critical, reflective sense. persons, the meaning of life, death, God, right Having a philosophy, however, is not suffi- and wrong, beauty and ugliness, and the like. Of cient for doing philosophy. A genuine philo- course, these ideas are acquired in a variety sophical attitude is searching and critical; it is of ways, and they may be vague and confused. open-minded and tolerant—willing to look at all We are continuously engaged, especially during sides of an issue without prejudice. To philoso- the early years of our lives, in acquiring views phize is not merely to read and know philoso- and attitudes from our family, from friends, and phy; there are skills of argumentation to be mas- from various other individuals and groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Full Text in Pdf Format
    Vol. 18: 49–60, 2018 ETHICS IN SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS Published September 18 https://doi.org/10.3354/esep00186 Ethics Sci Environ Polit OPENPEN ACCESSCCESS Can humanoid robots be moral? Sanjit Chakraborty* Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 700032, India ABSTRACT: The concept of morality underpins the moral responsibility that not only depends on the outward practices (or ‘output’, in the case of humanoid robots) of the agents but on the internal attitudes (‘input’) that rational and responsible intentioned beings generate. The primary question that has initiated extensive debate, i.e. ‘Can humanoid robots be moral?’, stems from the norma- tive outlook where morality includes human conscience and socio-linguistic background. This paper advances the thesis that the conceptions of morality and creativity interplay with linguistic human beings instead of non-linguistic humanoid robots, as humanoid robots are indeed docile automata that cannot be responsible for their actions. To eradicate human ethics in order to make way for humanoid robot ethics highlights the moral actions and adequacy that hinges the myth of creative agency and self-dependency, which a humanoid robot can scarcely express. KEY WORDS: Humanoid robots · Morality · Responsibility · Docility · Artificial intelligence · Conscience · Consciousness INTRODUCTION depend on the rationality and conscience of the par- ticular agent. Moral values are subjective, as they This paper begins with prolegomena on the claim differ according to the different intentions, motiva- of the interrelated nature of moral agency and ethical tions and choices of individuals. Subjective value is conscience. Who can be a ‘moral agent’? The simple reliant on our method of valuing or judging of it.
    [Show full text]
  • Trends in Value Theory Since 1881
    Munich Personal RePEc Archive Trends in Value Theory since 1881 Freeman, Alan London Metropolitan University 7 December 2010 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48646/ MPRA Paper No. 48646, posted 27 Jul 2013 04:31 UTC TRENDS IN VALUE THEORY SINCE 1881 Alan Freeman London Metropolitan University Abstract: This is a prepublication version of an article which originally appeared in the World Review of Political Economy. Please cite as Freeman, A. 2010. ‘Trends in Value Theory since 1881’, World Review of Political Economy Volume 1 No. 4, Fall 2010. pp567-605. The article surveys the key ideas and currents of thinking about Marx’s value theory since he died. It does so by studying their evolution, in their historical context, through the lens of the Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI) of Marx’s ideas, an approach to Marx’s theory of value which has secured significant attention in recent years. The article explains the TSSI and highlights the milestones which led to the evolution of its key concepts. Key words: theory of value; Marxian economics; TSSI; New Solution; temporalism JEL codes: B24, B3, B5, B50 Page 1 of 37 TRENDS IN VALUE THEORY SINCE 1881 Alan Freeman Introduction1 This article summarizes the key ideas and currents of thinking about Marx’s value theory since he died. It does so by studying their evolution, in their historical context, through the lens of the Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI) of Marx’s ideas, an approach to Marx’s theory of value which has secured significant attention in recent years. The article explains the TSSI and highlights the milestones which led to the evolution of its key concepts.
    [Show full text]
  • Just a Tool? John Dewey's Pragmatic Instrumentalism and Educational
    Just a Tool? John Dewey’s Pragmatic Instrumentalism and Educational Technology By © 2018 Mike Bannen Submitted to the graduate degree program in Social & Cultural Studies in Education and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Chair: Suzanne Rice, Ph.D. John L. Rury, Ph.D. Argun Staatcioglu, Ph.D. Heidi Hallman, Ph.D. Joe E. O’Brien, Ed.D. Date Defended: 31 January 2018 The dissertation committee for Mike Bannen certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Just a Tool? John Dewey’s Pragmatic Instrumentalism and Educational Technology Chairperson: Suzanne Rice, Ph.D. Date Approved: 31 January 2018 ii Abstract This dissertation examines how John Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge might be used to consider the aims of contemporary educational technologies. While significant scholarship exists examining the historical and philosophical importance of Dewey’s contributions to American progressive education, much less scholarship has focused on examining the relationship between Dewey’s theory of knowledge and his thoughts regarding the purposes and aims of educational technologies. I argue that because many of Dewey’s ideas were heavily influenced by the material and social changes of the industrial revolution, his theories about knowledge, technology, and education offer a unique perspective when considering the educational significance of digital technologies. This dissertation is guided by two central questions: (1) What is the relationship between Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge, his philosophy of technology, and his philosophy of education? (2) How might Dewey’s ideas about the relationship between knowledge, technology, and education help educators, students, and policy makers think about the aims and uses of digital technologies in contemporary educational contexts? I begin by examining Dewey’s pragmatically instrumental account of knowledge.
    [Show full text]
  • An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values Shalom H
    Unit 2 Theoretical and Methodological Issues Article 11 Subunit 1 Conceptual Issues in Psychology and Culture 12-1-2012 An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values Shalom H. Schwartz The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, [email protected] Work on this article was partly supported by the HSE Basic Research Program (International Laboratory of Sociocultural Research). Recommended Citation Schwartz, S. H. (2012). An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1116 This Online Readings in Psychology and Culture Article is brought to you for free and open access (provided uses are educational in nature)by IACCP and ScholarWorks@GVSU. Copyright © 2012 International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. All Rights Reserved. ISBN 978-0-9845627-0-1 An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values Abstract This article presents an overview of the Schwartz theory of basic human values. It discusses the nature of values and spells out the features that are common to all values and what distinguishes one value from another. The theory identifies ten basic personal values that are recognized across cultures and explains where they come from. At the heart of the theory is the idea that values form a circular structure that reflects the motivations each value expresses. This circular structure, that captures the conflicts and compatibility among the ten values is apparently culturally universal. The article elucidates the psychological principles that give rise to it. Next, it presents the two major methods developed to measure the basic values, the Schwartz Value Survey and the Portrait Values Questionnaire.
    [Show full text]
  • Consequentialism and Promises
    OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi chapter 15 Consequentialism and Promises Alida Liberman 1. Introduction: Framing the Debate It is widely assumed by both philosophers and ordinary folks that we are generally mor- ally obligated to keep our promises. A perennial worry about consequentialist moral theories is that they cannot account for the seemingly strict obligation to keep our prom- ises in a wide range of cases, including those in which better overall consequences would result from promise-breaking than from promise-keeping. Can consequentialism ade- quately explain and accommodate the moral force of promissory obligation? And what impact does the answer to this question have on the plausibility of consequentialism as a moral theory? Consequentialists (and their critics) will obviously care about the answers to these questions. But other ethicists have at least two reasons to be interested in this debate as well. First, assessing the relationship between consequentialism and promises sheds light on our understanding of promissory obligation more broadly. And sec- ond, it informs what approach we should take to moral theorizing from imagined cases. In this essay, I argue that the accommodation of promissory obligation raises serious challenges for consequentialist views of various kinds, but that this is simply one strike against them, which does not by itself entail that the views are implausible. In section 2, I explain straightforward act consequentialist accounts of promising. I discuss three important challenges for these accounts in section 3. I introduce and assess alternative act consequentialist theories in section 4. I outline rule consequentialist theories in sec- tion 5 and assess them in section 6, before closing with a brief discussion of the upshots of this debate in section 7.
    [Show full text]
  • Act-Consequentialist Options
    Consequentialist Options JUSSI SUIKKANEN University of Birmingham Final author copy; To be published Utilitas According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are less than satisfactory. I will then attempt to show that agents have more options on consequentialist grounds than the traditional forms of act-consequentialism acknowledged. This is because having a choice between many permissible options can itself have value. 1. INTRODUCTION Act-consequentialism is a combination of two elements.1 The first of these elements is axiological. In any given situation, there is a set of actions which an agent could do. Call these her options. According to the axiological element of act- consequentialism, the agent’s options can always be ranked in terms of how much value their consequences would have.2 Here the consequences of the actions include also the doings of the actions themselves. The second element of act-consequentialism is deontic. It states that an action is right if and only if it is ranked first in the evaluative ranking of the actions which an agent could do in the given situation. If there are many actions which are 1 all ranked first, then the agent is free to do any one of them.
    [Show full text]
  • Approaches to Deploying a Safe Artificial Moral Agent
    Olivier Couttolenc Approaches to Deploying a Safe Artificial Moral Agent The prospect of creating beings with intelligence far beyond our own is hugely exiting. It is also hugely worrying because we don’t yet know if the immense power that we believe these agents would possess is going to be wielded in a way that helps or hurts us. That is, we are unsure of our ability to control powerful AIs if they are created, and equally unsure if they will act in a way that benefits humanity should they be fully autonomous. A way of insuring that autonomous AIs promote human interests rather than infringe on them, is to make sure they are programmed with the right conception of moral value, as well right and wrong. In this essay, I will seek to show that virtue ethics is the most promising traditional ethical theory to be deployed by artificial moral agents (AMAs). I begin by describing what the behaviour of superintelligent agents could look like by drawing on the “basic drives” or “instrumental convergence values” that Stephen Omohundro and Nick Bostrom believe will be present in advanced AI systems. This will serve as a predictive tool for the efficacy of ethical theories, as I believe they should be designed in such a way that carefully counteracts some of these tendencies. I will then transition into an explanation and evaluation of what many consider to be the three major moral theories in Western philosophy based on whether their deployment by an AMA is feasible and whether doing so could pose an existential risk to humanity.
    [Show full text]
  • Early Forms of Metaethical Constructivism in John Dewey's
    JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY EARLY FORMS OF METAETHICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM IN JOHN VOLUME 4, NUMBER 9 DEWEY’S PRAGMATISM EDITOR IN CHIEF PIERRe-LUC DosTIE PROULX KEVIN C. KLEMENt, UnIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS EDITORIAL BOARD GaRY EBBS, INDIANA UnIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON This paper demonstrates the innovative character of the ap- GrEG FROSt-ARNOLD, HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES proach to metaethics underlying John Dewey’s pragmatism. HENRY JACKMAN, YORK UnIVERSITY Dewey’s theory of evaluation is contrasted with one of the SANDRA LaPOINte, MCMASTER UnIVERSITY most dominant contemporary metaethical theses: constructivism. LyDIA PATTON, VIRGINIA TECH I show that the insistence placed by metaethical constructivists MARCUS ROSSBERG, UnIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT on the actor’s practical point of view, on the rejection of the sub- MARK TEXTOR, KING’S COLLEGE LonDON jective preferences model, and on a specific form of ethical an- AUDREY YAP, UnIVERSITY OF VICTORIA tirealism and naturalism echoes some of the most crucial claims RICHARD ZACH, UnIVERSITY OF CALGARY made by Dewey. This argumentation leads to my main hypoth- esis: an analysis of Dewey’s conception of evaluation allows REVIEW EDITORS us to highlight the groundbreaking character of its metaethi- JULIET FLOYD, BOSTON UnIVERSITY cal approach—an approach that will be characterized as fairly CHRIS PINCOCK, OHIO STATE UnIVERSITY constructivist. ASSISTANT REVIEW EDITOR SEAN MORRIS, METROPOLITAN STATE UnIVERSITY OF DenVER DESIGN DaNIEL HARRIS, HUNTER COLLEGE JHAPONLINE.ORG © 2016 PIERRe-LuC DosTIE PROULX EARLY FORMS OF METAETHICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM in particular Theory of Valuation (1939)—allows us to interpret IN JOHN DEWEY’S PRAGMATISM Dewey’s pragmatic theorization as a response to logical posi- tivism, which had seized the American philosophical landscape PIERRE-LUC DosTIE PROULX in the early 20th century.
    [Show full text]