Private Equity and Financial Stability: Evidence from Failed-Bank Resolution in the Crisis Emily Johnston-Ross Song Ma Manju Puri FDIC Yale University Duke University, FDIC, and NBER and NBER Abstract This paper investigates the role of private equity (PE) in failed-bank resolutions after the 2008 financial crisis, using proprietary FDIC failed-bank acquisition data. PE investors made substantial investments in underperforming and riskier failed banks, particularly in geographies where local banks were also distressed, filling the gap created by a weak, undercapitalized banking sector. Using a quasi-random empirical design based on detailed bidding information, we show PE- acquired banks performed better ex post, with positive real effects for the local economy. Overall, PE investors had a positive role in stabilizing the financial system through their involvement in failed-bank resolution. JEL Classification: E65, G18, G21 Keywords: Private equity, Financial stability, Failed banks, Financial crisis This version: September 2021. Emily Johnston-Ross can be reached by phone: (202) 898-6841, email:
[email protected]. Song Ma can be reached by phone: (203) 436-4687, email:
[email protected]. Manju Puri can be reached by phone: (919) 660-7657, email:
[email protected]. For helpful comments, we thank Haelim Anderson, Christa H.S. Bouwman, Michael Ewens, Edith Hotchkiss, Filippo Mezzanotti, David Robinson, Paul Soto, James Weston, and Ayako Yasuda. We also thank seminar and conference participants at AFA Annual Meeting, Corporate Finance Conference