District KHUSHAB CRITERIA for RESULT of GRADE 5
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View Seeks to Shed Light on Factors That Cause Reli- Gious Parties to Traverse This Critical Line and Reject State Authority
Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan: Religious Party Responses to the Lal Masjid Crisis by Joshua T. White he year preceding pakistan’s february 2008 general elections was one of the most tumultuous in the country’s history. Along with the political upheavals associated with the judicial crisis, the military government’s suspension of the constitution and imposition of emer- gency rule, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the year brought Twith it an upsurge in violence following the Pakistan Army’s siege of the radical Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the capital city of Islamabad. More than any other event in recent years, the Lal Masjid crisis led to an important new debate amongst the coun- try’s various religio-political movements over the legitimacy and efficacy of vigilante Islamism—that is, over the permissibility of a non-state actor to take unilateral ac- tion, through violence if necessary, to enforce the sharia apart from the hand of the state. This debate is likely to have continuing implications for Pakistan’s internal stability, as well as the future shape of its Islamist discourse. Pakistan is home to a wide array of Islamist actors and movements, nearly all of which have a stake in this discussion about vigilantism. These actors fall roughly along a spectrum that extends from mainstream, right-of-center parties which place a strong emphasis on the role of religion in politics, such as Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N); to expressly Islamist parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI); 50 ■ CURRENT TRENDS IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY / VOL. -
Negotiating the Siege of Lal Masjid 1St Edition Ebook Free Download
NEGOTIATING THE SIEGE OF LAL MASJID 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Khuram Iqbal | 9780199400348 | | | | | Negotiating the Siege of Lal Masjid 1st edition PDF Book On his death, his sons, Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid , assumed responsibility for the entire complex. Authors Adam Dolnik and Khurram Iqbal have specialised in counter-terrorism and the former, in particular, is an internationally recognised authority on counter-terrorism, hostage negotiation and kidnap response. He claimed that the remaining students were willing to leave the mosque and lay down their arms, provided the government would grant them amnesty and not fire on them. Main article: Lal Masjid suicide bombing. On 3 July , a battle erupted between Pakistani security forces and students of Lal Masjid when Law enforcement agencies extended the barbwire around the Masjid precinct. Retrieved 11 May In January , the students of the radical Lal Masjid Red Mosque took over a childrens library in protest of the Government of Pakistans decision to demolish mosques and seminaries built illegally on government land. They blocked authorities from reaching the site and then occupied a nearby children's library building. Since the siege, militant violence, such as suicide bombings, has continued to escalate. Jamia Hafsa was a madrassa for women located near Lal Masjid. He proposed that if government would give him and his students safe passage to allow him to live a silent life in his home village, he would hand over Lal Masjid to government, Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Faridia to Wafaqul Madaris a federation of Madaris. Muhammad Shahab marked it as to-read Dec 26, Pakistani intelligence officials said they found letters from Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri , after taking control of Lal Masjid. -
Norsk Rapport
FFI-rapport 2008/01915 The Red Mosque operation and its impact on the growth of the Pakistani Taliban Qandeel Siddique Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) 8 October 2008 FFI-rapport 2008/01915 TERRA 106701 P: ISBN 978-82-464-1443-0 E: ISBN 978-82-464-1444-7 Keywords Terrorisme Jihadisme Pakistan Trusler Islamisme Approved by Brynjar Lia Project Manager Jan Erik Torp Director 2 FFI-rapport 2008/01915 English summary The objectives of the present report are two-fold: firstly, to appraise the alleged militancy associated with the Red Mosque, by examining the history of the mosque and its leading luminaries, and the possible links between the mosque and terrorist organisations. Subsequently, acts of terrorism to have taken place in Pakistan in the latter half of 2007 are delineated and analysed with a view to explain whether they represent direct responses to the military operation against Lal Masjid in July 2007. For this purpose, news items and journal articles were reviewed and pitted against inculpatory information found on the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa websites, as well as relevant jihadi audios and videos released in the tumultuous aftermath of the Lal Masjid incident. A few Pakistani analysts and journals were also interviewed via phone to further illuminate the linkages between the Lal Masjid episode and subsequent acts of terrorism in Pakistan. Finally, in light of all this, an attempt is made to determine where – if at all – Lal Masjid lies on the “militancy scale”, i.e. whether the institution itself can be seen as “militant”. The second part of this report revolves around the phenomenon of Talibanization which is defined here as the spread of Taliban activities – including both acts of terrorism (against Pakistani security personnel and politicians considered to be perfidious puppets of the West), as well as efforts to establish a parallel form for governance based on retrograde Islamic principles. -
International Human Rights Observer Pre-Report On
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVER PRE-REPORT ON OPERATION SILENCE STOREY OF LAL MASJID With reference to Extremism and Human Rights (With due acknowledgement to all local newspapers) International Human Rights Observer (IHRO) is registered human rights organization working together with Governments, United Nations and other International institutions to promote and protect the basic fundamental human rights of the masses declared in the universal charter of human rights of United Nations to build a global village of lasting peace, social, and economic justice and development for the 21st century. Background: The late father of the Ghazi Brothers 'maneuvered' to get the leadership (Khitabat) of Lal Masjid and Jamia Faridia. Equally interesting would be to know why Masjid and madrasah were respectively named as Lal Masjid and Jamia Faridia. It was the late Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the country's first military ruler, who got appointed late Maulana Abdullah as the prayer leader of Lal Masjid, on the advice of his spiritual guide, Pir Sahib of Deval Sharif. Jaafar Brothers, one of the leading industrialist groups of the country who had constructed Jamia Faridia, in order to show reverence to the great Sufi Saint Khawaja Ghulam Farid named the seminary after him. The then secretary CBR, Syed Hassan Akhtar, handed it over to the Maulanas. The land for Jamia Faridia was allotted during the late Gen Zia's regime. This was due to the blessing of Pirs that Lal Masjid Maulanas could manage to take over these religious seats. A graduate of Jamia Binnoria, Karachi, late Maulana Abdullah landed in Rawalpindi soon after President Ayub Khan took the decision to shift the capital to Islamabad. -
Understanding the Ghazi Force
SCHOLAR WARRIOR Understanding the Ghazi Force ADITI MALHotra Pakistan’s once feared terrorist group, the Ghazi Force is back in the limelight. This time for the reported revival of their funding sources and its resurrection to inflict greater damage on the Pakistani state. A recent report from the Pakistani intelligence agency obtained by BBC Urdu states that banned jihadi groups are reviving their local and international funding sources, after their affiliates started opening local and foreign currency accounts under pseudonyms.1 One such banned group is the Ghazi Force (GF) or Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade (GARSB). The intelligence agency has reiterated their fear of the group gaining momentum with renewed funding.2 Previously, there were reports of the Ghazi Force publically raising funds in the Punjab Province through religious and social welfare gatherings. Ghazi Force has been a nemesis for Pakistan in the recent past and is likely to haunt them further with greater funding and links. The rise of this group seems to be one of the side-effects of Pakistan’s policy of nurturing Islamic extremists and employing them to gain ‘strategic depth’. As a response to the Lal Masjid Seige, code-named Operation Sunrise, the group was formed in 2007. Figures compiled by the Federal Ministry of Interior show that a total of 3,433 people were killed in 215 suicide attacks across Pakistan during the three years since Operation Sunrise, between July 2007 and July 2010. Additionally, 2007 witnessed 54 suicide hits, killing 765 persons, mostly hailing from law enforcement agencies.3 While there are numerous terrorist groups responsible for the increase in attacks, a list of audacious attacks is being attributed to a previously unknown militant group called the Ghazi Force (GF). -
The Muslim World After 9/11 / Angel M
CHILD POLICY This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as CIVIL JUSTICE a public service of the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY effective solutions that address the challenges facing SUBSTANCE ABUSE the public and private sectors around the world. TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. ѮF.VTMJN8PSME "/(&-.3"#"4" ] $)&3:-#&/"3% ] 1&5&3$)"-, $$)3*45*/&'"*3 ] 5)&0%03&,"3"4*, 30--*&-"- ] *"/-&44&3 ] %"7*%5)"-&3 0REPAREDFORTHE5NITED3TATES!IR&ORCE !PPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASEDISTRIBUTIONUNLIMITED The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF.