Security Sector Reform in Central Asia: Exploring the Policy- Practice Gap of Police Reforms and the Civil Society Factor in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Master thesis Olivier Korthals Altes
Radboud University Nijmegen – School of Management MSc Conflicts, Territories and Identities Master thesis supervisor: Dr. H.W. Bomert Second reader: Dr. M. van Leeuwen Version August 14, 2018 Word count: 39336
MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master Thesis
Security Sector Reform in Central Asia: Exploring the Policy- Practice Gap of Police Reforms and the Civil Society Factor in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Olivier Korthals Altes
For the cover page, images have been used from the following sources, clockwise from top left: Yaroslavskaya (2011), Abibakir (2017), The Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Website (2016) and Flagpedia. The picture on the bottom left is taken by myself at the OSCE Conference on Security Sector Governance and Reform, Bishkek, December 19, 2017.
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Table of contents
Executive summary………………………………………...………………...……………………………………..v Preface……………………………………………………...……………………………..………………………..vii List of abbreviations……………………………………...………………………………………………………viii List of figures……………………………………………...………………...………………………………………x 1. Introduction………………………………………………...…………………………………..1 1.1 Background………………………………………………………………………………………………1 1.2 Research objective and research questions……………………………………………………………....4 1.3 Scientific and societal relevance………………………………………………………………………....5 1.3.1 Scientific relevance……………………………………………………………………………....5 1.3.2 Societal relevance……………………………………………………………………………...... 6 1.4 Research methodology and data collection …………………….……………………………………...... 8 1.5 Structure………………………………………………………………………………………………....10
2. Literature review and conceptual framework…………………..……………………….....12 2.1 The concepts of Security Sector Reform, democratic governance, police reforms and civil society...…12 2.1.1 Security Sector Reform………………………………………………………………………...11 2.1.2 Democratic governance of the security sector..……………………………………………...... 16 2.1.3 Police reforms………………………………………………………………………..…………18 2.1.4 Civil society……………………………………………………………………………………..20 2.2 Bridging the policy-practice gap…………………..…………………………………………………….23 2.3 SSR and state-building………….……………………………………………………………………….25 2.4 Towards the second generation of SSR………………………………………………………………….27 2.5 Conceptual framework…………………………………………………………………………………..29 2.5.1 Contextual analysis………………………………………………………………………………29 2.5.2 Policy formulations……………………………………………………………………………...32 2.5.3 Measuring the progress of SSR and introducing the indicators …………………..…………….33 2.6 Summary…………………………………………………………………………………………………37
3. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in context………………….………………………………….38 3.1 Regional context…………………………………………………………………………………………38 3.2 Kazakhstan……………………………………………………………………………………………….41 3.2.1 State, polity and society…………………………………………………………………………..41
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3.2.2 Conflict, security and the police…………………………………………………………………….43 3.2.3 Civil society……………………………………………………………………………………...... 45 3.3 Kyrgyzstan………………………………………………………………………………………………….49 3.3.1 State, polity and society…………………………………………………………………………….49 3.3.2 Conflict, security and the police……………………………………………………………….……50 3.3.3 Civil society…………………………………………………………………………………….…..52 3.4 Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………55
4. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz policies on police reforms, and the role of international organizations…………………………………………..………………………………………57
4.1 Kazakhstan………………………………………………………………………………………………….59 4.1.1 The role of international organizations……………………………………………………………59 4.2 Kyrgyzstan …………………………………………………………………………………………………63 4.2.1 The role of international organizations…………………………………………………………….65 4.3 Summary …………………………………………………………………………………………………...69
5. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz practices of police reforms, and the role of civil society…….…71 5.1 Kazakhstan………………………………………………………………………………………………….71 Indicator #1: Public oversight and monitoring…………………………………………..…………………71 Indicator #2: Integrity…..…………………………………………………………………………………..73 Indicator #3: Participation……..………………………………………………………………...…………76 Indicator #4: Transparency……..…………………………………………………………………………..78 Indicator #5: Upholding the rule of law and human rights……………….………………………………..79 Indicator #6: Responsiveness………………………………………………………………………………80 5.2 Kyrgyzstan……………………………………………………………………………..…………………...81 Indicator #1: Public oversight and monitoring…………………………………………..……………...... 81 Indicator #2: Integrity…..…………………………………………………………………………………..83 Indicator #3: Participation…..…………………………………………………………………...…………85 Indicator #4: Transparency……..…………………………………………………………………………..87 Indicator #5: Upholding the rule of law and human rights……………….………………………………..88 Indicator #6: Responsiveness….…………………………………………………………………………...89 5.3 Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………90
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6. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………92 6.1 Answers to research questions……………………………………………………………………………...92 6.2 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………..94 6.2.1 Policy implications………………………………………………………………………………….94 6.2.2 Suggested research directions………………………………………………………………………95 6.3 Reflections and limitations………………………………………………………………………………….95
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………….97 Appendixes………………………………………………………………………………………………………..104 Appendix I CMR Index……………………………………………………………………………………104 Appendix II Overview of SSR related indexes and datasets………………………………………………105 Appendix III Transcriptions of conducted interviews and surveys..……….……………………………..107 Appendix IV Freedom House Index………………………………………………………………………111
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Executive summary
Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a current dominant paradigm in security assistance programmes aims at (re)building and professionalising security institutions while creating and consolidating democratic control over these institutions. Democratically governed security institutions are accountable and transparent for public oversight and must guarantee citizens’ rights and freedoms while executing its primary tasks. While Security Sector Reform has enjoyed great successes in its conceptualisation and adoption in key policy documents of most international organisations working on security and democratisation, its impact remains limited and its empirical base rather weak. In many SSR programmes, a policy-practice gap can be identified, or a discrepancy between prescribed strategies and policies and the progress of SSR over time. While all-encompassing SSR fieldwork studies are usually conducted over an extended period of time, I have decided to focus on the policy-practice gap of democratising the police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The police forces are the most profound security institutions in Central Asia, originating from the Soviet period and hard to change. Without paying attention to the dimension of democratic governance, external security assistance to police forces might lead to tolerating politicised and corrupt security forces, which negatively affects the long-term political and economic stability. SSR programs need to be implemented carefully in the political and social context. Where institutional and legal frameworks to democratically govern the security forces (in this case, the police) could be installed in time, changing the actual culture and behavioural attitude towards democratic governance turns out to be more difficult, as human nature is impossible to manage according to fixed programme schedules. Based on the existing literature, a conceptual framework has been designed to analyse the regional and national context of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, their policy formulations, and progress or practice towards police reforms based six indicators: #1 Public oversight and monitoring; #2 Integrity; #3 Participation of citizens and civil society; #4 Transparency; #5 Upholding the rule of law and human rights; and #6 Responsiveness to local citizens. Furthermore, key literature on SSR, development and democratisation points at the important role of civil society, that has the necessary knowledge and skills to strengthen state-citizens relationships as well as guaranteeing local ownership. To test the important factor of civil society, I have identified a number of key CSOs involved in police reforms in both countries. Overall, one must be critical when analysing strategic and policy documents that refer to notions such as trust building, enhancing transparency or respecting the freedoms and rights of citizens. Such written commitments or statements are not always consistent with actual efforts, especially when analysed within an authoritarian or flawed democratic setting like the one in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. Rather, these documents must be read next to sources of relevant online databases, CSOs, (international) NGOs and research institutes that
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master Thesis approach the actual practice of police reforms on the ground more completely. Empowering civil society alone will not be enough, as long as the attitude of the government, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the broader public (especially in Kazakhstan) towards democratic reforms will not change. Based on this research, civil society could therefore be seen as an important but not the only essential factor in bridging the policy-practice gap of police reforms.
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Preface
One and a half year ago, I didn’t have any idea how I would conduct my master thesis research on security issues in Central Asia, leave alone within the framework of what internship as obligatory part of the Master’s specialization of Conflicts, Territories and Identities at Radboud University Nijmegen. It was out of historic interest that I wanted to pick out one or more Central Asian states, sharing the same Soviet past, as case studies for my master thesis research. In February 2017, the International Office suggested me to apply for a Central Asian European Universities (CASEU) scholarship, as Radboud University is linked in this exchange network between a number of European and Central Asian universities. In May 2017, I was gladly told to be selected for this scholarship to spend six months as an Erasmus Mundus exchange student at the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (KazNU) in Almaty, Kazakhstan, from September 2017 until March 2018. Next to working on my master thesis, I followed courses for one semester at the local Department of international Relations to keep my scholarship. My journey to speak to experts on my research topic of SSR brought me to multiple institutions that include KIMEP University in Almaty, Nazarbayev University in Astana, and the OSCE Academy and the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek. Moreover, I became associate research fellow at the OSCE Academy to make use of the academy’s expertise and facilities and presented the preliminary research findings on February 23, 2018. During my exchange period, I was glad to have met and exchanged views with so many international and regional students. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Bert Bomert for guiding me throughout the whole writing process of my thesis that had lasted over one and a half a year, and Mathijs van Leeuwen for grading my thesis as second reader. Furthermore I want to thank Marijke Delamarre for her support and enthusiasm to undertake this step of engaging in the CASEU exchange programme, and Evert van der Zweerde for sharing his experiences at KazNu before my departure. From KazNU, I want to thank my contact person Nazym Makhmutova, who always helped me out with all practical issues, and Zhulduz Baizakova and Fatima Kukeyeva, for their teachings and perspectives on my research topic. From the OSCE Academy I want to thank Alexander Wolters and Indira Saturkulova for offering me the associate research fellowship position, and Payam Foroughi for the discussions on my master thesis research. I also want to thank Nargiz Kassenova and Meruert Makhmutova from Kazakhstan, and Aida Alymbayeva and Raushan Bolataliyeva from Kyrgyzstan, for their recommendations on my research topic and indicating the civil society organizations engaged in SSR and police reforms.
Olivier Korthals Altes
Rotterdam, August 2018
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List of abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank AIPA Asian Institute of Poverty Alleviation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AU African Union BOMCA Border Management in Central Asia BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organization CADAP Central Asia Drug Action Programme CAT Coalition Against Torture CEE Central and Eastern Europe CiB [OSCE] Centre in Bishkek CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CMR Civil-Military Relations CPI Corruption Perceptions Index CSI Civil Society Index CSI Community Security Initiative CSO Civil Society Organization CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization DCAF Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCI Development Cooperation Instrument DFID Department for International Development EAEU Eurasian Economic Union ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights EPCA Enhanced Partnership Cooperation Agreement EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product KIBHR Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law ICG International Crisis Group IDB Inter-American Development Bank IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan LCG Local Self-Governance LCPC Local Crime Prevention Centre LPRC Legal Policy Research Centre MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OAS Organization of American States OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD ACN OECD Anti-Corruption Network OECD DAC OECD Development Assistance Committee OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe PAC Public Advisory Council PAP Police Assistance Programme PARP Planning and Reform Process PCA Partnership Cooperation Agreement
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PfP Partnership for Peace PMO Prime Minister’s Office PMP Police Matters Programme PRI Penal Reform International PRP Police Reform Programme SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SSR Security Sector Reform SSRI Security Sector Reform Index UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UN DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations VERLT Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism WGI Worldwide Governance Indicator
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List of figures
Table 2.1 Transitional category (Stojanovic 2009, p. 80)…………………………………………………………..31 Table 2.2 Contextual Analysis of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan……………………………...... 32 Table 2.3 Policy formulations towards police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan……………………………33 Table 2.4 Measuring the progress of democratic governance of police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan……36 Table 3.1 Civil society actors engaged in police reforms in Kazakhstan………………………….……………….48 Table 3.2 Civil society actors engaged in police reforms in Kyrgyzstan…………………………………………..54 Table 4.1 Kazakhstan’s policies towards police reforms………………………………………………...... 62 Table 4.2 Kyrgyzstan’s policies towards police reforms………………………………………………...... 69 Figure 5.1 Bertelsmann Transformation Index of Kazakhstan between 2006-2018……………………………….73 Figure 5.2 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kazakhstan between 2003-2011……………………………………..75 Figure 5.3 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kazakhstan between 2011-2017……………………………………..75 Figure 5.4 WGI Voice and Accountability of Kazakhstan between 2003-2016……………………………...……77 Figure 5.5 Bertelsmann Transformation Index of Kyrgyzstan between 2006-2018………………………………..82 Figure 5.6 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kyrgyzstan between 2003-2011……………………………………...84 Figure 5.7 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kyrgyzstan between 2011-2017……………………………………...84 Figure 5.8 WGI Voice and Accountability of Kyrgyzstan between 2003-2016 ………………………….…….....86
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1. Introduction 1.1 Background Law enforcement agencies in Central Asia are in urgent need of reform within the context of a dynamic, contrasting and changing environment. Since their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – have been confronted with political upheavals and security issues in response to the rapid transformations of their economies and political systems, from an authoritarian to a more democratic rule, and from a closed society towards further integration into the global economy. Simultaneously, these relatively young countries also have to deal with outdated and bureaucratic institutions, a lack of capital and knowledge, and laggard economies, due to their overdependence on natural resources or conditions of underdevelopment. Furthermore, important security challenges for all Central Asian countries are authoritarian governance, deeply-rooted state corruption, tensions over water and energy resources, and, to a certain extent, Islamist and regionalist insurgencies. In the meantime, Central Asian countries might be sensitive to security threats that spill over as a result of the ongoing war in Afghanistan, such as international terrorism, refugee waves and drug trafficking (Boonstra, Laruelle & Peyrouse 2014). While the military plays a more limited role in Central Asia, the police forces are at the forefront in tackling these (transnational) security threats and providing a secure environment, necessary for peaceful and stable political and economic development. Experts argue that Central Asian states could benefit from police reforms within a broader agenda on improving internal security and development, in line with the comprehensive approach of Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Faltas 2010, pp. 16-17). This concept of SSR, originating from the international fields of conflict, security, and development, generally entails the (re)building of state-centred security services, controlled by democratic governance. It is a process that should lead to more effective and accountable security forces while at the same time raising public trust, accountability, and legitimacy among the local population. Consequently, SSR could help Central Asian states in reaching their overarching targets of gaining and maintaining political and societal stability, developing and modernising its economy, and realising democratic reforms. Regarding stability, SSR supports modernising and professionalising the police forces, making them more effective in overcoming security challenges. In light of the stimulation of the economy, SSR promotes transparent and accountable governance of the security sector, which in turn encourages and attracts domestic and foreign investments. Finally, SSR instigates broader reform to improve democratic governance of the security sector. Compared to the initiatives of other major actors in the
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Central Asian region – in particular Russia, China and the United States, that all mainly focus on ‘hard dimensions’ of security, including the transfer of equipment and joint military training and exercises – EU and OSCE programmes tend to incorporate these softer elements or developmental dimensions of security, for instance general support for the rule of law and civilian institutes controlling and monitoring security services (Albrecht, Stepputat & Andersen 2010, p. 80; Boonstra, Marat & Axynova 2013, p. 6). SSR is considered to be the dominant paradigm of external security assistance worldwide. Many regional and international organisations and institutions – for instance, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC OECD), later followed by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – have adopted, used and mainstreamed SSR in their security assistance and development programmes. It is widely recognised that if security assistance is not directly linked to human security, (liberal) peacebuilding, development, and sustainability, it will most likely fail in the longer term (Edmunds 2004; Ball 2007; EU 2005; OECD DAC 2005, 2007; UN 2008). While external actors should limit themselves to a facilitator’s role, providing financial support, sharing knowledge and organising activities, SSR is mainly an internal process inherently linked to the principle of ownership. The sustainability of SSR depends on the willingness of major stakeholders and the active engagement of other (non-)state actors such as the judiciary, criminal investigation and prosecution services, parliament and civil society. Especially civil society actors – consisting of among others community representatives, research institutes, human rights groups and activists, as well as local offices of international organisations – are seen as essential actors in ensuring local ownership of SSR processes, due to their expertise, legitimacy and advocacy of local voices and needs (Caparini 2004, 2010; Gordon 2014; Mobekk 2010; Van Leeuwen & Verkoren 2015). As a result of its comprehensive approach, SSR impacts are beyond the security forces and its management, touching upon building relationships between people and the state. Although in policy papers and academic articles the notion of SSR is broadly formulated, pointing out the (alleged) comprehensive links between security, development, the rule of law and democracy, the impact of SSR programmes in Central Asia (and in a number of other regions and countries as well) remains rather limited. This discrepancy between the advocated policies on the one hand, and the actual outcomes on the other is referred to as the so-called ‘policy-practice’ or ‘concept-context’ gap. In much of the literature and policy documents dealing with SSR from an outsider’s perspective, “there is a tendency to approach particular settings of SSR assistance with a set of predetermined ideas
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis about what the security situation is and what needs to be fixed” (Ball & Hendrickson 2009, p. 39). Top-down approaches that mainly involve national stakeholders often overrule or ignore other voices, concerns, and needs, and might exclude local ownership during phases of policymaking, implementation, oversight, and evaluation of SSR programmes. Even though democratic control of the security sector brings stability and prosperity in the long run, one must be careful with being too optimistic about short-term prospects for change. In many cases, more lasting solutions for (re)building state and security structures emerge as (unintended) consequences of social processes of negotiation, contestation, and adaptation, rather than as a causal or direct outcome of clear inputs as formulated in policy briefs and strategy documents (Egnell & Haldén 2009; Andersen 2011; Jackson 2011). While institutional and legal frameworks for SSR can be created according to time schedules, changing the culture and behavioural attitudes towards security and people-state relations cannot be perfectly steered or managed given its highly political nature. This brings me to the focus of my thesis research, namely reforming the police forces within the dimension of democratic governance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. According to the principles of democratic policing, law enforcement agencies must perform their primary tasks, that include maintaining public order, preventing and combating crime, arresting and detaining criminals and suspects, and providing assistance and services to the public, while upholding the individual’s freedoms and rights and be being accountable and transparent (OSCE 2008b, p. 9). It is also agreed among (international) policymakers and experts that community-based policing could foster better relationships between police forces and the local people, so as to better address their concerns and cooperate in reducing crime and other public issues. However, the police institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain reluctant to any change, frequently accused of human rights abuses, unlawful killing of protestors or arresting and detaining suspects, and regarded as heavily corrupt and associated with organised crime (Lewis 2011a, p. 9). Apart from deficient funding and operational capacities, a lack of democratic governance results into police forces that are not held accountable for their actions, and often used as government’s instruments to unlawfully monitor, harass and arrest political opponents or targeted groups (International Crisis Group 2002, pp. i-ii). Critics, policymakers as well as researchers, therefore question whether SSR programmes and donor policies directed at police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan tend to strengthen the authoritarian regime’s oppressive capacities, rather than opening up chances for gradual, democratic reforms of security services. Compared with other SSR dimensions that include effectiveness and efficiency (Stojanovic 2009, p. 91), democratic governance requires deep, structural changes of policing culture and behaviour that should act on behalf of people’s
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis needs instead of regime security. Such structural changes mostly take place over a longer period of continuous contention and friction, while quick fixes may undermine the diversity of opinions and perspectives that could otherwise have offered alternative or more tailored solutions (Marat 2018). Therefore, this research analyses the policy formulation and progress (or ‘practice’) of democratic governance of the police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan over the past two decades. Within the region of Central Asia, these two countries are the most deeply engaged in cooperative projects and activities with external actors on reforming their police forces, or, at least, on familiarizing them with principles of democratic policing. Moreover, through my study exchange to the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and research fellowship at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, during the period of September 2017 until March 2018, I was able to consult and exchange perspectives with local academia and experts on these two case studies. Civil society actors that are (more or less) engaged in police reforms will be identified and included in this analysis as well. While I analyse the Kazakh and Kyrgyz contexts, policies and practices of police reforms separately, I provide space within my thesis to compare the different outcomes of police reforms and the salient factor of civil society. I will argue that genuine and strategic approaches towards comprehensive police reforms from above, as well as a vibrant and well-organised civil society are essential factors for change.
1.2 Research objective and research questions The main research objective of this master thesis is to analyse the policy-practice gap regarding police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, based on an in-depth analysis of the dimension of democratic governance and the involvement of civil society actors. The central research question of my master thesis is:
To what extent is there a policy-practice gap of democratic governance of the police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and what role could the civil society play in bridging this gap?
In order to be able to answer this central question, some sub-questions have been formulated:
- What is the essence of the (theoretical) notions of Security Sector Reform, democratic governance, police reforms and civil society?
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- What conceptual framework can be designed for the analysis of the progress of democratic governance of the police forces and the involvement of civil society? - In what context are Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan formulating and implementing their policies of reform of their respective police forces? - What policies are being formulated by the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as well as external facilitators regarding reforms of its police forces? - To what extent is progress being made of democratic governance of the police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? - How crucial is the role of civil society in democratising the police forces?
1.3 Scientific and societal relevance 1.3.1 Scientific relevance This master thesis research, focusing on democratic governance of the police forces and emphasising the role of civil society, might contribute new and interesting perspectives to scientific debates on SSR for a couple of reasons. First, while the literature on SSR has a normative emphasis, the empirical base remains rather limited. There are only a few systematic research publications available, where processes of SSR are embedded within a clear framework, with benchmarks or indicators to (qualitatively) measure the progress of SSR over time. However, such universal indicators or benchmarks have not been created yet. As a result, there is a lack of knowledge regarding whether or not SSR programmes have a long-term impact on peace, stability, and democratisation within recipient countries, including the question of whether or not international interventions have made a positive impact on (post-conflict) reconstruction processes. Policymakers might still overestimate the transformative abilities of external actors acting in very different socio-political structures (Etzioni, in Jackson 2011, p. 1813). There are a number of all-encompassing, extensive SSR field research projects going on, but it can take years before the necessary data for all indicators, actors, and contextual factors have been collected and processed. On the other side, there are many case studies of SSR, but they mostly lack a systematic approach. Overall, there have only been very few analyses looking beyond the immediate evaluation of existing security sector or police reform programmes. Second, the context-specific cultural and practical dimensions in particular settings where SSR programmes have been or are implemented, have made it difficult to harmonise international policies in the security domain or to synchronise these with the local needs and priorities. There are many different understandings and priorities of SSR by international organisations and local actors, especially since SSR is implemented in a broad range of
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis contexts, spread over various continents, ranging from states in transition to failed states. Just defining or assessing SSR policies on the basis of its performance in the most complex and conflict-ridden contexts provides an incomplete representation (Sedra 2010, p. 17). Conflict- ridden societies – for instance Afghanistan or the ones spread over the African continent, the region with the largest concentration of fragile, failed and post-conflict states with complex hybrid systems – get much attention of SSR policy analyses and discussions. On the other hand, Central Asian states are characterised by a strong, unitary, post-Soviet, and authoritarian state apparatus, which brings about other challenges in terms of transitions to democratic governance. It is wise to explore the particular socio-political setting of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as the successful transformations of security sectors in other former Soviet countries, for example the Baltic and Central and East European (CEE) states, can give false or unrealistic expectations of SSR policies and police reforms in Central Asia. State, society and polity are important contextual factors to be taken into account in planning and executing SSR activities. Third, studies regarding SSR programmes that integrate the perspectives from both academic researchers and local advocacy groups are lacking, which slows down the efforts to collect detailed research findings that bridge the gap between theory and practice, so as to better inform and influence (international) policy debates. In other words, there are significant discrepancies between the objectives of SSR as articulated by international organisations and foreign donors on the one hand, and the needs or perspectives of receiving countries on the other. From the perspective of civil society, there is some specific data available on the progress of democratising the police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; for example, on the transparency of police reports or citizens’ surveys on local policing. However, such data hasn’t been marshalled within the conceptual framework of SSR, or democratic governance more specifically, yet, and subsequently connected to broader scientific debates on SSR. Therefore, a specific SSR research focus on democratic governance, police forces, and civil society allows to go more in-depth and collecting more detailed information from local practitioners and experts, than it would be possible in extensive research with a broader focus on SSR. Using selected indicators makes it possible to measure actual progress over a longer period of time, all against the backdrop of the particular set of these two Central Asian case studies.
1.3.2 Societal relevance Perspectives and data from this research could also be applicable to discussions within the spheres of policymaking and society. First, no noticeable progress in police reforms will be made if the political sensitivity around democratic policing isn’t actively being addressed.
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Law enforcement agencies that aren’t accountable and controllable, continue to be used as repressive instruments by government officials or commit illegitimate and unlawful acts with impunity, which might have serious societal consequences for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As public trust of the police forces will not improve, local people will be more reluctant to cooperate with the police to resolve main security issues together. Corrupt police officers will keep accepting bribes or perform extortion practices, which in turn severely damages a secure and integer environment, suitable for economic development and business. Second, while concepts of SSR and democratic governance are adopted in key documents of international and regional organisations and have some successes in its applications in other regions and countries, these concepts are hardly known in Central Asia, where security is understood in protecting the regime interests rather than the people’s interests. There is hardly any independent research or analytical centre in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, specialised in the field of SSR, and, consequently, there are practically no institutions capable of providing decision makers with expertise on security policies and police reforms (Musabayeva 2013, p. 86). Although some individual experts are involved in specific issues regarding police reforms and civil society, with access to the necessary information, there are no local, institutional frameworks to bring forward significant problems in SSR or police reforms to the majority of citizens. Such institutional frameworks could be local media, or professional groups like associations of journalists or academic communities, to carry out reporting, investigations or research on SSR. Moreover, due to its historic, geographic position in bringing Europe and Asia together, Central Asia has sparked interest from neighbouring and international countries in cooperating within many policy areas that include security, economy and sustainable development. Secure environments, ensured by well-functioning and democratically governed police forces, are necessary to further improve these cooperation agreements. Political and economic developments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as transregional challenges, directly or indirectly impact interests of other countries and regions; see, for example, the dependency on the energy market or international terrorist threats. In addition to Chinese investments, Russian security cooperation and (recently decreasing) American geostrategic interests, the OSCE and EU are actors promoting good governance, rule of law, democratisation and human rights, including Security Sector Reform. Although Central Asian governments are initially averse to deep reforms, states like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have expressed interests in working together with the EU and the OSCE in areas such as development, education, and pressing security threats. It is clear that a long-term presence of the EU and OSCE in the region provides some opportunity to bring gradual changes in the security sector.
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Therefore, research on SSR and on democratising police reforms in particular, contributes to a higher amount of established (academic) literature for the research community, and offers useful perspectives for policymakers to tackle societal issues, necessary to build up and maintain a well-functioning society that is also attractive to foreign countries to invest or work together with. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the course of police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan brings up more realistic perspectives on the impact of SSR programmes in the foreseeable future.
1.4 Research methodology and data collection SSR is a complicated concept, encompassing a wide range of actors, policy areas, and dimensions, being implemented in many different socio-political contexts. Therefore, it has not been easy to delimit this research into a suitable master thesis subject and develop an appropriate conceptual framework, in order to formulate what objectives need to be analysed, which actors to select, what the ‘practice’ of SSR policies is, which indicators to select to measure progress, and, not the least important, where and how to retrieve the data to provide such an in-depth analysis. Clearly, I mostly rely on various qualitative research methods, including a review of the relevant academic and policy-oriented literature, documents, and reports, (semi-structured) interviews and surveys (through Skype or Google Forms), and consulting online available databases related to SSR. In line with the phrase ‘less is more’, I use a magnifying glass on police reforms within SSR, with civil society as the important factor. With respect to police reforms, I have decided not to analyse whether or not law enforcement agencies enforce their assigned tasks or are well equipped, trained or funded, but rather how law enforcement agencies are democratically governed, held responsible and are responsive to local people’s needs. Given this focus on police reforms, it is also relevant to sketch the broader political and regional contexts, how they affect police reforms. The secondary sources include academic studies on SSR and police reforms, official policy and legal documents of the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as media and online reports and policy briefs by international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs). A literature review gives insight into the theory and practice of SSR, but also in how SSR relates to theories of state building, and therefore the consequences for planning and implementing SSR programmes. From a number of assessment frameworks – providing a broad range of questions regarding political, societal and economic issues –I have selected the questions to develop and adjust the conceptual framework for the contextual analysis of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Section 2.5). A concise analysis of the historical development of state structures and society of Kazakhstan and
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Kyrgyzstan gives insight in how state and security structures of these two states actually function. Moreover, over the years, from 2003 on, the OSCE Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities provides a good overview of the programmes and activities related to police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, there are less detailed sources or systematic data available on the actual effects of police reforms on the ground, or on which civil society actors are exactly involved in these processes. Personal communication with experts from local institutes – including KIMEP University and the Legal Policy Research Centre (LPRC) in Kazakhstan, and the OSCE Academy and the International University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan – helped in identifying civil society actors engaged in police reforms. These civil society actors include academics, NGO workers, human rights advocates and media experts. To measure the progress of democratic governance of the police forces, I had to rely on qualitative data, derived from reports, interviews, and surveys with local civil society actors. Unlike other areas –such as human rights, democratisation or economic development – there are no general measuring methods established for SSR or police reforms. Based on personal communication with local experts and the main principles of democratic policing, as also put forward in the OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing (2008b), I have selected six indicators to measure the democratic governance of police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively:
#1 Public oversight and monitoring, concerning the oversight institutions and mechanisms of citizens and civil society to monitor the police and to cooperate with them; #2 Integrity, or battling corruption within law enforcement; #3 Participation of citizens and civil society in policymaking, implementing and evaluating police reform programmes (generally described as ‘local ownership’); #4 Transparency, or the degree of access to police reports and statistics; #5 Upholding the rule of law and human rights during policing, but also the freedom of press to report illicit police performances; and #6 Responsiveness and trust from local people.
There are a few reports and policy briefs from international organisations or civil society actors available to fill in the data for the respective indicators. Moreover, although not applied to police forces specifically, online databases such as the Transparency Corruption Perceptions Index or Voice and Accountability of Worldwide Governance Indicators (unfortunately, the Civil Society Index database could not be accessed) give some useful
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis information on more general, longer-term developments of democratic governance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Yet, such indicators measuring general patterns of democratic governance need to be complemented with other, more specific data to provide a better overview of the progress of police reforms. In Section 2.5, the selected questions and theoretical discussions regarding the indexes for SSR in the conceptual framework are addressed. For more information on the assessment frameworks consulted for this thesis, see the appendixes. Based on this research methodology, I hope to provide more specific data on democratic governance of police forces. On the other hand, I have not included other actors such as the judiciary, other security actors or political groups. Moreover, neither have I included other main issues with police reforms, such as their effectiveness in reducing crime, anti-drug smuggling activities or arresting suspects.
1.5 Structure After discussing the thesis subject, the research questions, the scientific and societal relevance and methodology, the next step is of course an extensive discussion of the relevant academic and policy-related literature. This issue is addressed in Chapter 2, which answers the first two sub-questions. The rise of the (comprehensive) SSR concept from the late 1990s within international development circles is discussed, as well as the essence of the dimension of democratic governance within SSR, followed up by the concepts of police reforms and civil society. I will also illustrate theoretic debates on overcoming the policy-practice gap and the essence of linking SSR to state building. At the end of this chapter, I present the conceptual framework, refined for this research. Chapter 3 sketches the regional, political, and security context of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Civil society actors involved in police reforms will be identified in particular as well as the legal and political framework in which they operate. Chapter 4 analyses key documents of Kazakh and Kyrgyz policies towards police reforms and civil society, as no kind of reform can be initiated without the consent of local authorities. This chapter also includes, based on the OSCE Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities (2003 through 2016), an overview of police reform programmes and related activities and events organised for government officials, police officers and civil society actors. Chapter 5 discusses the actual progress of SSR, using the six indicators within the dimension of democratic governance. I will compare the results of these indicators as well explain the results in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, based on the main factor of civil society.
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Finally, Chapter 6 will provide the answers to the research questions and make recommendations for both policymakers and academics. I will also reflect on the process of my master thesis, highlighting the limitations and points of improvement.
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2. Literature review and conceptual framework 2.1 The concepts of Security Sector Reform, democratic governance, police reforms and civil society In analysing theories of Security Sector Reform, one has to start with addressing the main (contested) concepts. In the context of this research, these are ‘Security Sector Reform’ as such, and ‘democratic governance’, ‘police reforms’ and ‘civil society’, respectively.
2.1.1 Security Sector Reform The concept of Security Sector Reform came prominently on the international policymaking agenda after the Cold War, during the 1990s, and is linked to debates on poverty reduction, human security, sustainable development, good governance, and democratisation. The UK Department for International Development (DFID 1998) was the first to develop a holistic understanding of SSR, aimed at providing and protecting a safe and secure environment for the local poor. This constituted a significant break from the Cold War era security assistance programmes by the major powers in both East and West, that rather aimed to protect their own ideological interests through regime security of allied and friendly countries. The end of the bipolar division of the world paved the way for development and security assistance agendas of the OECD and other international organisations. In addition, successful examples of reforming and democratising the military and other security forces in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Latin America and Southern Africa, further stimulated ways of rethinking security assistance (Ball 2007, p. 87; Ball & Hendrickson 2009, pp. 9-12; Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2009, pp. 21-22; Sedra 2010, p. 16). This new conceptualisation of security assistance implied that the effectiveness and professionalism of the security sector should not only be defined on the basis of its capacities (defence, police, border management, intelligence services, etc.), but also on how the security sector is controlled, managed, and held accountable by a well-functioning system of checks and balances. The various SSR concepts as defined by research institutions, donors, and international organisations during the late 1990s and early 2000s, focusing on establishing appropriate structures and mechanisms for democratic control over the security sector, are generally referred to as being the ‘first generation’. Despite a broad consensus among major international donor organisations, albeit essential for building the foundations of more coherent and integrated approaches to support countries in reforming their security sector, there is yet no universal definition of Security Sector Reform. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (2005, p. 20) and the EU (2005, p. 9) describe SSR as “the transformation of the ‘security system’, which includes all
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework”. The UN Secretary-General (2008, p. 6), in a comprehensive report on international security, defines SSR as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”. In addition, in its partnership programmes with friendly countries, NATO (2005, p. 24) focusses on (re)building effective and efficient state defence institutions under democratic control to meet domestic needs and international commitments, while the OSCE (2016c, pp. 13-14) strives to enhance security sector governance and reform through a cross-dimensional approach, by identifying and supporting links between the political and military, the economic and environmental, as well as the human dimensions. Moreover, these organisations also formulate the main goals of SSR. The OECD DAC (2007, p. 21) names establishing effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system, improving and sustaining the delivery of security and justice services, and developing local leadership and ownership of the reform process. The UN (2008, p. 13) advocates the development of effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all. Finally, Ball (2007, pp. 96-97) calls for strengthening the professionalism of security services, fostering capable and responsible civil authorities and civil society, according a high priority to the rule of law, and developing regional approaches to security problems. In spite of these differences, definitions of SSR contain at least two key normative elements. First, democratisation and civilian control are considered essential in any process of SSR. Second, the importance of effectiveness and efficiency in SSR are emphasised in all conceptualisations. While related, these two elements of SSR can have their own particular demands, rewards and problems (Edmunds 2004, pp. 65-66). It is also important to realise that SSR activities can focus on just but also on multiple institutions (in this research, the police forces) or policy areas (for example, counterterrorism or border management). Nevertheless, such focused activities shouldn’t neglect the overall SSR framework and must be conducted as part of a wider cooperation between different stakeholders and donors. The next important question is what groups are exactly the targets of processes of reforming the security sector. Clearly, not only forces delivering direct security such as the police, the armed forces, and intelligence services are involved, but also oversight, judiciary
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis and civil society actors should be engaged in SSR programmes. OECD DAC (2005, pp. 20- 21) distinguishes a middle range of four groups of actors involved in Security Sector Reform:
(1) Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias). (2) Security management and oversight bodies: the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (Finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions). (3) Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; Justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems. (4) Non-statutory security forces, with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerrilla groups; private bodyguard units; private security companies; political party militias.
Some scholars offer a rather minimalist approach, that only involves the armed forces, intelligence services, police, judiciary, paramilitary forces, border and customs officials (Fitz- Gerald, Yusufi & Greene, in Hernandez & Reyes 2011, p. 6), while others (Ball, Bouta & Van de Goor 2003, p. 32; Ball 2007, p. 91) argue, in line with the above distinction, that there are five major categories of local actors that influence the quality of democratic Security Sector Governance: (1) bodies mandated to use force; (2) justice and public security bodies; (3) civil management and oversight bodies; (4) non-state bodies; and (5) non-statutory civil society bodies. The first three groups constitute what is commonly called the security sector, while the last two categories refer to civil authorities that are required to play an active role in managing and monitoring this security sector. Furthermore, external assistance meant to strengthen democratic governance of the security sector will be more effective if external actors work coherently towards a common framework (Ball 2007; EU 2005; Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2007; OECD DAC 2005; UN 2008). This, therefore, requires building partnerships across government departments and foreign agencies. But above all, most experts stress the need for and importance of ownership of local actors; external actors and donors should be involved in facilitating the SSR process by delivering guidance and resources.
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It is also acknowledged that SSR programmes have by no means a ‘one size fits all’ model, and therefore have to be carefully implemented, depending on the specific contexts of recipient countries. The main criteria used for assessing the context for implementing SSR concern the type of political system (ranging from democracy, through a system in transition, to autocracy); the level of (socio)economic development; and the security situation. For example, Wulf (2011, p. 346) provides a table of various contexts, including categories of ‘developing’, ‘post-authoritarian’ or ‘transitional’, and ‘post-conflict’, each with its own specific issues and key priorities. Countries characterised by underdevelopment and weak governance more often than not have excessive military spending, poor management, and a general waste or lack of resources, while authoritarian states are characterised by democratic deficits, legacies of violation of human rights, and weak civil societies. Consequently, SSR programmes in developing countries should focus more on economic development in order to secure stable conditions for reform. It should be noted that post-conflict states suffer from legacies of violence, a level of mistrust among the major parties, and a perceived risk of renewed conflicts. While most SSR scholars acknowledge the importance of context in designing individual country programmes, in reality, donors tend to employ the same kind of tools, strategies, and ideas, often implemented by the same officials or contractors, moving from a previous setting to the next (Sedra 2010, p. 103). This lack of innovation and contextualisation in donor or external assistance approaches can partly be blamed for the problems the implementation of SSR confronts. Yet, one must be also careful in categorising recipient countries in too simplistic overviews. According to Ball (2004), countries can’t always be simply categorised along the lines of traditional groups, since every state has its own historical legacy of conflict and share of obstacles to reform. Therefore, she states that a contextual approach should focus on additional criteria, including political, psychological, normative, economic, institutional, societal and geopolitical dimensions. By understanding the political relationships between key actors and looking beyond formal legislation and organisational structures, the incentives for (changes of) SSR can be addressed. Hereby, Luckham (2000, pp. 17-18) argues that instead of one unified and coherent body, security sectors should rather be seen as a terrain of shifting security coalitions or factions, each with its own organisational culture and competing interests. Finally, fundamental principles have been set up regarding how SSR goals should be reached. In its handbook, Security System Reform and Governance (2005, pp. 22-24), OECD DAC has formulated some fundamental principles for SSR, including policy coherence by closer cooperation between donor and partner countries, and the so-called whole-of- government or holistic approach. In general, processes of SSR should be people-centred,
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis locally owned and based on democratic norms and internationally accepted ideas of human rights principles and the rule of law. Consequently, the three core values of a well-functioning security system are: (1) a nationally owned concept of security; while establishing (2) well- defined policies and strengthening governance of the security institutions; and (3) building institutional mechanisms for implementation and capacity throughout the entire security system. In accordance with this line of thinking, the UN (2008, pp. 11-12) formulates some important lessons learned from previous SSR experiences, dealing with how the transformation of the security sector is linked to national goals and relationships between various groups and institutions, while acknowledging that it is inherently a political process, based on realistic considerations of what is financially, operationally and logistically viable. Therefore, SSR should not just be a mere technical matter of making security forces more efficient, but it should be regarded as an integral part of making a society secure as well as democratically accountable.
2.1.2 Democratic governance of the security sector In policy documents, numerous overlapping definitions and descriptions of ‘Security Sector Reform’, ‘Security Sector Governance’, ‘civilian control of the security sector’ and ‘democratic governance of the security sector’ are used. While states have traditionally governed their security sectors in many different ways, SSR processes have always been linked to the concept of governance, which “denotes the overall setting, application, and enforcement of rules that guide the exercise of political authority. It is the process by which political decisions are made and implemented” (Schroeder 2010, p. 10). Governance of the security sector thus specifies the ways of governing the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force from the perspective of both state and non-state actors. According to Schroeder (2010, p. 11), good governance refers to democratic norms of accountability, transparent decision-making processes and a security apparatus that is completely subordinated to the control of civil authorities. For political reasons, the term Security Sector Governance (SSG) is sometimes used instead of SSR. This is mainly the case in societies where the leadership remains highly sensitive to the concept of ‘reform’. Governance refers to an entire system of structures, actors, processes, and functions by which a particular unit, such as a government agency or the state itself, is managed. ‘Reform’, on the other hand, refers to the process of changing an existing reality (Hernandez & Reyes 2011, p. 13). Generally, democratic governance could be seen as one of the three main dimensions inherent to SSR, next to efficiency (how well is the security sector financed and managed?) and effectiveness (how well are the security actors performing in their allocated functions such as reducing crime, bringing about a secure environment, decrease smuggling, etc.?).
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The emerging concept of democratic governance of the security sector can be linked to the post-Cold War paradigm of international security and global governance, encompassing international cooperation, democracy, human rights, and development. Yet, the 1993 UN Vienna Declaration, or any other similar document calling for the consolidation of democracy and human rights, made little or no specific references to the democratic governance of the security sector in particular (Hänggi 2003, pp. 12-13). Standards on democratic governance of the security sector were later adopted at conferences such as the 2000 Warsaw Conference of the Community of Democracies or the Club of Madrid (2001). The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Governance of Armed Forces (DCAF), the leading international think tank specialised in SSR/SSG, has supported policy development and guidance for regional and international organisations through a mapping study of its approaches to SSR since 2000. It has sustained and expanded its cooperation on research, policies, and practices of SSR with regional and other multilateral organisations, such as the EU, NATO, OSCE, OECD, but also the AU and ECOWAS in Africa. DCAF also conducted research on the UN’s approach to defence sector reform and finalised an integrated technical guidance note on monitoring and evaluation of SSR support. As a result, the adoption of the first stand-alone resolution on SSR by the UN was embedded in Security Council Resolution 2151 (2014), marking a watershed moment in international approaches to SSR (DCAF 2016, p. 34). It will also explore potential partnerships with the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in Latin America and the Caribbean, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asian Institute of Poverty Alleviation (AIPA) in Southeast Asia. It has become clear from these trends, that SSR and democratic governance are getting a central place in policies and practices of more multilateral actors and regional organisations around the world. There are good explanations for the prevalence of democratic governance in policies above other forms of security. In fact, it is acknowledged that democratic governance is crucial for the success of democratic consolidation and sustainable economic and social development. When it comes to the security sector, good governance includes the effective, efficient, participatory, accountable and transparent functioning of state institutions that have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. If people and states are not secure from fear of violence at a local, national or international level, development will not be sustainable (Ball, Bouta & Van de Goor 2003, p. 30; Born, Caparini & Fluri 2000, p. 8; DFID 1998, p. 1). According to Ball (2007, pp. 85-86), lacking democratic governance of the security sector not only leads to tolerance of politicised security forces, but also to war as a tool of resolving disputes, to disrespect for the rule of law by security forces and political elites alike, to serious human rights violations, to budget allocations skewed towards the security forces, or to a
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis diminished capacity of security forces to carry out their constitution-mandated tasks of protecting the people and communities. Finally, experts prefer the term ‘democratic governance’ over ‘civilian control’ of the security sector. The notion of democratic control makes more sense, as some rightly point out that civilian governments are not always democratic. Luckham (2000, p. 17) warns against stereotyping military and security bureaucracies as sole obstacles to Security Sector Reform, that “must be controlled by civilian structures”. Sometimes civilian administrations form an obstacle to democratic governance of the security sector when their professional interests lie more in partisan politics or corruption. A focus on civilian control might significantly impede understanding the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy and security forces. Democratic control of armed forces depends on the broader societal quality of democracy itself, that is shaped by institutions, national politics, and civil society. It also must give way to creating mechanisms and systems that enable voices from diverse actors to be heard to inform the process (Gordon 2014, p. 6). Scholars like Gordon acknowledge that the complexity of democratic governance of the security sector should be recognised, and that ignoring alternative voices or compromising sustainability in favour of quick results might be short-sighted, might pave the way for future failures or neglect dimensions that could otherwise lead to success.
2.1.3 Police reforms From all security institutions, the police are often the most visible and have the most impact on people’s daily lives. They are responsible for maintaining public order and are the guardians of the criminal justice system. According to the OECD DAC (2007, p. 163), “the definition of ‘police’ applies to all law enforcement agencies, such as the police and gendarmerie like constabulary forces, that exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest and detention”. Where over the past 50 years traditional security literature has focused on civil-military relations (CMR) and civil control of the armed forces in the context of national defence, the recent emergence of SSR in academic and policy circles gave more attention to a broader range of security actors, such as intelligence agencies, border guards and, in this case, police forces (Bruneau & Matei 2008; Lewis 2011a). The growing literature on SSR argues that a neutral and effective police force, under democratic oversight, is an essential element in processes of peacebuilding, democratisation, and state-building. In one of the first extensive literature reviews on experiences of foreign assistance to police reform and human rights organisations’ reports on police abuses, Bayley (2000, p. 75) puts forward some important lessons learned about the process of democratising the police. He argues that democratising the police abroad is a four-step process, namely (1) design of
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis assistance programmes, (2) implementation overseas, (3) incorporation by foreign police forces, and (4) impact on political democracy. This early evaluation research acknowledges that police reforms take a long time before implementation effects can be measured, and these programmes will not make police institutions of concerned settings more democratic, unless those programmes take place in a broader societal context of democratisation. A number of subsequent studies on police reforms confirm this (ICG 2001; Lewis 2011a, 2011b; UN Police 2011). When wrongly applied, police assistance programmes might even have negative effects on democratic development by strengthening the capacity for repression. Rather, as police reforms are no quick fixes to address and solve security issues of recipient countries, these programmes must also take into account the choices of local stakeholders with respect to programme objectives, the substance of assistance programmes, and the way they are administered. As a result, a number of international and multilateral organisations have adopted police reforms in their security assistance policy documents. While the UN Police, a specialised unit of over 10000 police officers from many member states, had its first tasks with institutional development in the 1990s, it has included police reform, restructuring and rebuilding in almost all mandates of new peacekeeping missions since 2003 (UN Police 2011, p. 3). In an assessment of the capacity of national police services, the UN Police can identify the services’ deficiencies and formulate plans to address them. In addition, also the EU (2005, p. 14) puts forward a list of possibilities to support police reforms specifically, such as defining objectives of comprehensive policing policies and strategies integrated according to the objectives of the rule of law sector, assessing the policing needs, training the police sector in principles of modern policing and police management, including respect for human rights and international law, launching public awareness campaigns in order to secure the trust and cooperation of the local community, and guiding and accompanying the police force in their tasks during transitional periods. Moreover, in its latest Guidebook on Democratic Policing, the OSCE (2008b, pp. 9-10) identified main principles on police reforms. First, the OSCE sets up objectives of democratising policing that include main duties as a visible manifestation of government authority (maintain public tranquillity and law and order, protect and respect the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms, prevent and combat crime and provide assistance and services to the public) and enhance the legitimacy of the state (responsive to public needs and expectations and use state authority in the people’s interest). Second, the police must uphold the rule of law and act in accordance with domestic and international law. Third, the police must show professional integrity and perform in accordance with human rights. Fourth, democratic policing requires accountability to the citizens, the state, and law,
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis and their activities must always be open to scrutiny by a variety of oversight institutions (transparency). Furthermore, international organisations emphasise the need for community-based policing approaches, where police officers are permanently assigned to specific geographical areas or neighbourhoods, responding locally and determining priorities in relationship with the local community (OECD DAC 2007, p. 167; OSCE 2008b, pp. 30-31; UN 2018, pp. 7- 10). Community police officers serve as contact points as well as guarantors for law and order, and need to remain in the same area for several years to build trust and enhance accountability. Community-based policing further promotes the concept of policing by consent and encourages the public to become partners with the police in preventing and detecting crime in their communities. Consequently, cooperation with the public will increase the reliability and respect of the police, and therefore support the police to perform its duties more effectively. Community-based policing also requires special communication and conflict resolution skills (including mediation), because neighbourhoods within communities can often be divided according to different lifestyles and views on appropriate forms of policing. Especially cooperation with minority groups proves to pose a challenging task for the police. The police does not only face cultural challenges when engaging with minority groups, but these groups can also be reluctant to cooperate with the police because of mistrust, especially when they previously were mistreated by the police. Re-building the trust of these minorities in the police is essential for preventing parallel societal or security structures.
2.1.4 Civil society Civil society too is a contested concept, in its definitions as well as regarding the question which actors should be included in the concept of civil society and its role in Security Sector Reform. Civil society can be defined as “the political space between the individual and the government, expressed by the membership of non-governmental organizations […], social groups, associations and other organizations and networks” (OECD DAC 2007, p. 224). Another analytical meaning of civil society refers to “the sphere of uncoerced collective actions of citizens that develop around shared interests, ideas and values. Civil society thus encompasses a broad variety of associational forms that mediate the space between the family (private sphere), the market (economic sphere) and the state (political sphere)” (Caparini 2010, pp. 244-245). Furthermore, civil society may contain a wide variety of actors, ranging from development organisations operating in an international environment, to very localised initiatives and traditional forms of association, community-based organisations, faith groups, as well as professional and special interest groups such as trade unions, the media, private business companies, bar associations, human rights groups, independent consultants,
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis universities and independent policy think tanks. In many cases, it is difficult to accurately identify civil society groups, generally associated with values of tolerance, inclusiveness, non- violence, non-partisanship, and pluralism, or to distinguish between state and society – for example, people relying on patronage networks or local institutions, organisations with strong local ties that are highly political or clan-based, NGOs that are state-owned or international and professional NGOs without local representation (Van Leeuwen & Verkoren 2015, p. 464). Most agree that the involvement of civil society is a necessity for the protection of society and the freedom of its citizens, for wider and more inclusive local ownership and, ultimately, for the sustainability of SSR programmes. A key idea is that civil society significantly affects the so-called ‘social contract’ between the state and its citizens, where the notion of a social contract assumes that the state authority is based on the consent of its citizens, who in turn expect to receive benefits of social order through the rule of law. A strong civil society forms an essential condition for good governance when participating in public affairs through a whole range of functions such as steering public opinion, reporting, legal aid, advocacy, research, consultancy, and education. Research indicates that throughout the course of history, such societal groups have vigorously strived for political reforms, challenging state control and emancipating citizens (Born & Fluri 2004, p. 103; Caparini 2004, pp. 172-176; Van Leeuwen & Verkoren 2015, p. 466). Moreover, a sole focus on political elites and state-level authorities may undermine the extent to which SSR processes are locally owned and, consequently, hinder the improvement of security and justice at a community level and, ultimately, whether or not SSR programmes and broader peacebuilding efforts are successful. In societies where the state is largely absent, lost legitimacy or touch with citizens’ main concerns and needs, or fails in providing basic security and services, civil society is seen as an alternative that is less corrupt and more responsive to local people. Therefore, for long-term sustainability a bottom-up approach to building peace, democratic governance and security should be prioritised (Gordon 2014, pp. 6-7; Van Leeuwen & Verkoren 2015, p. 463). In addition, external facilitators and donors often consider CSOs as engines that drive the process of opening up of political spaces for groups that previously had little or no voice. However, it must be acknowledged that the existence of these CSOs and their particular agendas are only the first step. What matters more, is the capability of civil society to fulfil its stated objectives and being truly representative of local needs (Mendelson- Foreman 2004, p. 198). Contrarily, civil society organisations that are not representative of the local population will often be doomed, as they no longer serve the intermediary function by which citizens negotiate with the state (Caparini 2010, p. 260; Gordon 2014, p. 15).
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According to the literature, civil society actors can have diverse tasks in democratisation and peacebuilding processes, and thus in SSR, including advocacy, service delivery, consultancy, education and training, negotiations and local mediation. It is assumed that these civil society tasks can be divided into, at least, three inter-related types of beneficial effects: ‘accountability’, ‘voice and participation’ and ‘democratic culture’ (Caparini 2010, p. 245). In addition, Ball (2007, p. 97) states that, in order for democratic governance to be established and maintained, civil society too must be capable of monitoring security sector policies and activities, while acting as a resource for the security community. In executing these activities, civil society has to avoid the pursuit of narrow, sectarian-like objectives but rather ensure that their operations are accountable. When it comes to police reforms, Caparini (2004, p. 186) sums up the expectations civil society may have from democratic policing and the roles civil society can play in oversight and accountability of the police. Among others, democratic policing requires that the police always operate within the rule of law, protect the public with full respect to human rights, have professional integrity, are under civilian control and their actions are transparent and accountable to multiple audiences and investigators. The roles of civil society in democratic policing could be divided in representation (ethnic or community associations, local or neighbourhood advisory boards) and technical expertise (human rights advocacy, police and criminal justice research institutes, bar associations, local branches of international NGO groups and neighbourhood watch groups). Furthermore, local ownership forms an essential and frequent concept related to Security Sector Reform and civil society. There is a broad consensus among experts that the success or failure of SSR greatly depends on the ownership of SSR programmes. However, the debate on the definition of what exactly ‘ownership’ is, and who should own the processes of SSR, is an ongoing one (Donais 2015, p. 229; Mobekk 2010, p. 231). Ownership should be viewed as a process that develops and changes over time and one that is politicised. Ownership, in essence, “is the influence, capability and responsibility of the different phases of planning, implementation, policymaking and execution” (Mobekk 2010, p. 232). Yet, civil society actors are often excluded from SSR because they lack the expertise perceived to conduct SSR programmes, or because they are not recognised by external facilitators, who maintain the common definition of civil society, fully separated from the state. On the other hand, a lack of willingness from the local people and civil society actors greatly hinders any prospective changes of SSR, or police reforms specifically. Moreover, local ownership is often reduced to consultation and engagement after the key decisions have already been made, or the involvement of just a few like-minded, state-level members of the security and political elite who accept the decisions previously reached by external actors. In other words, the engagement of civil society representatives tends to be limited and sporadic, more often than
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis not just involving initial consultation or infrequent dialogue (Caparini 2010; Donais 2015; Gordon 2014). Therefore, it is argued that the long-term effect of SSR requires the development of a popular, structural and vibrant local drive for change. Promoting and maintaining civil society engagement throughout all levels (from national to local) and during all stages of SSR programmes (formulation, implementation, and evaluation) could significantly enhance the security sector responsiveness, effectiveness, and legitimacy.
2.2 Bridging the policy-practice gap Whereas strategy documents and policy reports of various international and multilateral organisations have formulated the SSR concept in a more holistic way that has to be developed within the broader context of societal and economic developments, SSR implementation efforts in a number of developing (post-conflict) countries have so far delivered less positive results. In reality, SSR policies are often translated into small, piecemeal progress, characterised as rather typical train-and-equip programmes, with a primarily ad hoc nature, without any coherence or structural impact – more often than not even unrightfully marked as SSR. In some cases, the concept of SSR functioned as a disguise by donor states in conducting mere interest-based security assistance programmes. The basic explanation in the policy-practice or concept-context gap, can be found in the discrepancy between the supply and demand of SSR programmes (Sedra 2010, p. 17). While donor states and international organisations on the supply side have not developed long-term visions or political frameworks to undertake the transformative agenda as described in SSR, the recipient demands for SSR may be half-hearted or very variable in many contexts. In cases characterised by unfavourable conditions, such as political instability, institutional fragility, a regime lacking willingness and a large cultural gap with Western societies, a lower impact or pace of SSR has to be expected (Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2007, p. 32). Overall, many experts have criticised that externals have mostly relied on technical assistance in their programmes, rather than addressing the political nature of SSR necessary for structural change. When it comes to police reforms, there is enough experience to draw some important lessons (Bayley 2000, p. 77; ICG 2002, pp. 5-7; Lewis 2011b, pp. 116-117; UN Police 2011, p. 3). For example, genuine police reforms cannot take place if there is resistance of the host government or a lack of commitment from the law enforcement institutions. Furthermore, reforms must be adapted to local conditions and not install inappropriate institutional frameworks from other (Western) countries, which requires not only technical expertise but also a proper understanding of the local environment, the political system and the local
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis culture, and input and oversight from local law enforcement and government officials and civil society experts. Moreover, domestic support for reform often declines when it does not quickly improve justice and anti-crime measures, especially in regions where democratisation is associated with unpredictability, unrest, and violence. Again, when SSR programmes, and police reforms in particular, are not able to bring together supply and demand, they challenge the principle of ownership, held as crucial in the sustainability of SSR. Moreover, the literature acknowledges a lack of empirical research, or, at best, only a partial understanding of what international SSR assistance has actually achieved. Most international organisations and research institutions are aware of the inherently political nature of SSR, the need for local ownership and the fact that the receptivity of various societies to the SSR agenda is largely dependent on their internal context and external incentives for reform. However, some experts criticise the predominantly management- oriented approach to bridge the policy-practice gap, such as designing a more coherent strategy among donors and stakeholders alike, bringing together technical expertise with the necessary political change management, programme management and communication skills, and developing oversight and cross-government training (Andersen 2011, pp. 15-16; Egnell & Halden 2009, p. 47). Not even the most perfectly contextualised and coherent strategy of SSR can have complete influence on the course of socio-political processes that seek to transform societies from conflict to sustainable peace, or from strong autocracy to a well-functioning democracy. While the impact or progress of SSR is hard to notice within the shorter timeframes that characterise most donor programmes, the ongoing negotiations, contestations and adaptations between the government, civil society and other stakeholders within the concerned states will influence longer-term effects on the democratic governance of the security sector (Chanaa 2002, pp. 74-75). However, instead of bridging the gap, civil society itself can also be the reason for widening the policy-practice gap and hinder processes of SSR. For example, OECD DAC (2007, pp. 231-232) recognises numerous policy-practice gaps with regards to civil society. First, supporting CSOs without a broad domestic legitimacy may endanger reforms with the government and alienate the wider civil society, as some civil society actors may be more closely related to the government and national elites than local communities. Second, although CSOs tend to be strongly involved in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and democratisation efforts, a number of them may refuse to engage in SSR, because of a lack of knowledge or the oppressive nature of the security sector. Third, there can be a tension between the roles of civil society, between being a watchdog or rather a partner in the implementation of SSR. When CSOs move away from acting as a watchdog and begin to participate, their domestic audience may perceive them as no longer being neutral. On the
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis other hand, governments may not trust CSOs as partners if they publicly criticise the government. If a local CSO is perceived to be influenced by an international actor, this may compromise the autonomy of its contribution to SSR and taint it in the eyes of the government. As a result, supporting local CSOs could quickly become politicised. According to Gordon (2014, p. 17), it is also important to realise that some national governments or elite groups may not want an empowered and capable civil society, that can influence the decision- making of the security sector, and are even threatening to step out. Because of this fear for non-engagement, external actors sometimes do not promote or instigate local ownership on the community level. In addition, Caparini (2010, pp. 251-255) identifies main trends that threaten to undermine civil society’s role in SSR. First, in cases of state collapse, acute security threats or intense civil conflicts, international donors and organisations tend to prefer the immediate establishment of state stability and rule of law above democratic control, accountability, and transparency. This approach of putting stability before democracy, which might severely hinder long-term processes of democratic governance, is known as ‘sequencing’ and is further discussed and criticised by scholars such as Carothers (2007). Second, donor organisations may perceive local CSOs as too weak or lacking capacity, instead focusing to cooperate only with NGOs that speak a common language and work in common terms of log frames, monitoring, and evaluation, which mainly includes the more ubiquitous, international and policy and advocacy-focused NGOs. Third, the prominence of certain security interests in the agendas of donor organisations and states might divert from principles of local ownership as formulated in key SSR documents. For example, improving security capacities with a focus on counterterrorism or counter-narcotics may not serve the security and safety of local citizens. Such main trends that significantly hinder the role of civil society can be found in the contextual analysis of the case study.
2.3 SSR and state-building Because of its comprehensive approach that focuses on principles of good governance such as transparency, accountability, and integrity, state-building has become an extended main objective of SSR (Albrecht, Stepputat & Andersen 2010, p. 78). The SSR concept arose alongside the ‘fragile states’ agenda, during a period of a largely untempered enthusiasm for international interventionism in conflict zones and unstable regions. This understanding of the security-development nexus assumes that the absence or weakness of government control forms a direct threat to international security. Following this logic, developing or strengthening state institutions has emerged as the main solution to problems of both security and development from the 2000s on (Fukuyama 2004). Most multilateral organisations base
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis their SSR programmes on assumptions regarding a Weberian vision of the state, focusing on establishing a central government as the sole legitimate provider of security to its citizens, and institutional capacity-building as a key method of bringing more stability and reducing violence in countries marked by state failure. However, experts are concerned that this strong focus on creating and strengthening state institutions in SSR policy documents might be at the cost of (re)building relations between the state and the people. According to Brahimi (2007, pp. 5-7), the concept of state- building (and nation-building) as used within the international community is misleading, as nations and states cannot be built by foreign intervention during a specific timeframe, but instead, emerge through a rather unplanned historical evolutionary process. Consequently, he argues that a deeper and better understanding of the realities of the concerned state’s functionalities in political, security and social spheres is necessary for the international community in order to establish a state-building or reconstruction process. Some SSR studies acknowledge that the construction of security or political entities by external organisations may, at first sight, resemble state structures and services but in reality form a set of ahistorical institutions that lack legitimacy among the local population. Creating such ‘empty shells’, as a result of technocratic and prescriptive SSR efforts, potentially makes fragile situations even worse (Jackson, 2011, p. 1806). In contrast to the notion that institutions and capacity- building are necessary preconditions for stability and democratisation, state-building has historically been a coercive and sometimes violent process since it involves the imposition of political authority over its nationals (Newman 2014). As progress in the field of SSR is intrinsically linked to broader processes of state-building that cannot be fully predicted or managed, the international community has to tone down the common belief that mere technical-managerial solutions, for instance, larger budgets, more well-trained personnel or even further contextual understanding as a means to enhance successful SSR, are able to solve all problems of SSR programme implementations (Andersen 2011; Donais 2015; Egnell & Halden 2009; Jackson 2011; Sedra 2015). Thus, stakeholders and experts must not only track human and institutional capacities but also take into account the pace of social and political change in particular settings, rather than rely too much on arbitrary timetables established by international organisations or funding decisions (Ball, 2007, p. 101). A number of scholars criticise the mainstreamed, state-centred SSR approach, also known as the monopoly model, that is harder to apply in socio-political contexts that do not lend themselves to the Weberian state ideal. Contrarily, the ‘hybrid model’ of SSR emphasises working with informal institutions and powerholders outside the official central government, seeking to build upon the existing structures to improve local, everyday security conditions (Andersen 2011, p. 12; Sedra 2015, pp. 172-173). While the main shortcomings of
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis the monopoly school lie in strengthening the security apparatus of the central government without paying enough attention to boosting democratic accountability and civilian oversight, in contrast it is also a mistake to overly appreciate local non-state security solutions that may simply reproduce the existing unfair power structures that favour particular armed groups or local elites. Depending on the contextual setting and most urgent security matters of the concerned countries, experts and policymakers should make deliberate choices in applying one of these two competing approaches.
2.4 Towards the second generation of SSR Whereas the ‘first generation’ aims at creating legislative and institutional frameworks for democratic oversight and monitoring, the ‘second generation’ of SSR relates to changing behavioural attitudes, developing familiarity and expertise, and sharing the same democratic values between the security and citizens filling these frameworks (Edmunds 2004, pp. 50-52; Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2007, p. 33; Sedra 2015, pp. 175-177). This establishment of democratic control within the first generation of SSR includes a clear division of tasks and responsibilities between relevant actors, a parliament able to oversee and approve security sector budgets, and the creation of ministerial committees and advisory boards to monitor security sector policies. Furthermore, the groundwork that this first generation of SSR provides the reform and professionalisation of the security sector, must be outlined in key documents such as the national security concept. Yet, this ‘first generation’ is only the first step of full implementation of SSR. Challenges in key areas remain, not because of delayed consolidation of democratic oversight institutions but rather because there is an absence of civilian expertise to provide effective democratic oversight or a lack of understanding or willingness of security actors (Edmunds 2004, p. 52). The development of such a skilled civilian cadre or convincing main security stakeholders don’t happen overnight, and clearly require a long-term engagement, which the second generation fulfils. Consequently, both academics and practitioners have recently taken up the need to move to a ‘second generation’ of SSR, which must forge stronger links between the mainstream SSR concepts and local customs principles, and modes of behaviour. Globalisation and modern digital communication means have given civil society actors new agency to reach out more directly and broadly to donor organisations and their own citizens. As a result, they are better able to demand and assert their roles in changing behavioural attitudes towards SSR (Edmunds 2004, p. 51). First, CSOs provide an alternative, non-governmental source of information on security issues for both policymakers and the public at large through the media, non-governmental organisations, and academics. Second,
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis civil society gives an availability for debates, discussions, and criticism of important security issues. Third, civil society can serve as an important mechanism for holding security actors accountable for exposing malpractices, forming critical judgments, etc. Although SSR will be largely determined by society itself, reformers need to understand their moment of engagement when the opportunities arise and be flexible enough to anticipate unexpected factors and changes (Chanaa 2002, p. 76). Furthermore, a recent evaluation report of the Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute (Ball, 2014, p. 8) shows the increased importance of the ability of SSR programmes to work in a highly flexible manner, giving preference to processes of political change. Such a pragmatic, process-oriented SSR approach should provide space for innovation, place politics first and give attention to changing behavioural attitudes while transferring ownership to domestic actors that are significantly more involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of SSR programmes. Similarly, another SSR fieldwork in Timor Leste (Dewhurst & Greising 2017, pp. 13-18), urges to move beyond institution-building, that marks the ‘first generation’, to a ‘second generation’ of SSR by giving preference to national leadership, citizen engagement and adaptation to the local context. This preference would further imply decentralised and community-oriented approaches, better addressing the complex causes of societal tensions and insecurity, evidence-based assessments and surveys to adapt its policies from responses to what is working in the context, and, where needed, adopt non-traditional approaches to SSR instead of the orthodox or monopoly approach. In addition, Bayley (2000, p. 77) provides an essential point of view in his conclusion regarding human nature and changing attitudes towards reform:
“The most important lesson for police reform anywhere is that human nature – meaning the interests of the people through whom reform will occur – must be taken into account. For reform efforts to succeed, human interests, which reflect particularistic attitudes and traditions – must be understood and then explicitly accommodated, utilised, redirected, or overridden. Reform cannot be done by remote control, by people who are not intimately familiar with the local human context. Reform is fundamentally a political undertaking.”
A considerable part of SSR literature thus argues that the international community needs to actively incorporate local ownership into the social process and provide benchmarks for domestic stakeholders to consult, deliberate and negotiate. Overall, SSR initiatives should seek a middle path between unrealistic calls for sudden political openings, and tolerance for regime suppression and excessive praise for minor reforms.
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2.5 Conceptual framework Finally, how can one develop a conceptual framework for the analysis of the democratic governance of the police forces and the civil society’s role in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? Not only is the concept of SSR as such not completely clear and undisputed, no universal methods or indexes for a contextual understanding or for monitoring and measuring (the progress of) SSR in recipient countries has been developed yet. The scope and approach of the research depend on the type of assessment that is being conducted; from extensive, long- term assessments that include the full range of government, civil society, and security actors, to more specific assessments focused on one particular element or type of actors (OECD 2007; Stojanovic 2009). Therefore, as this research provides a more in-depth analysis of the SSR element of police reforms and civil society only, the conceptual framework is adjusted towards a more specific and less extensive one. From a number of available assessment frameworks presented by international (donor) organisations and research institutes (For example; Ball, Bouta & Van der Goor 2003; OECD DAC 2007; Stojanovic 2009), the questions are selected, and I have added some of my own, adjusted to the context of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regarding police reforms. These questions, processed in the following tables, further specify the sub-questions of this master thesis research as provided in Section 1.2. Furthermore, these questions have also been used as guiding principles in the interviews and surveys.
2.5.1 Contextual analysis Experts and analysts recommend starting with the analysis of the dynamics of the context of a given country in which SSR takes place. Such a contextual analysis requires an investigation of a whole range of security-related, political, economic and social factors, in order to identify the main (f)actors that facilitate or hinder democratic governance of the security sector. These assessment frameworks are presented in many variations. For example, Institute Clingendael proposes a mapping and analysis part to identify the main actors, needs and key priorities for democratic security governance by national and local stakeholders as well as by external partners. Yet, before starting this mapping and analysis of five entry points, including policy formulation and eventually professionalisation and oversight, Ball, Bouta & Van der Goor (2003, p. 43) stress the importance of examining a range of security, political, economic and social factors, in order to identify the main hindrances for SSR and how these factors have evolved over time. Moreover, OECD DAC (2007, pp. 50-56) proposes an assessment framework with four main groups in order to give a comprehensive overview of the local context and help in designing international assistance programmes. These four issue groups
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis are (i) political economy and conflict analysis, (ii) governance and capacity of security and justice institutions, (iii) security and justice needs of citizens, and (iv) other frameworks and programmes. In this case, SSR programmes should also include a firm analysis of the context, role, and position of CSOs, as their capacity, effectiveness and political space to engage differ by country (OECD DAC 2007, pp. 225-226). In addition, the framework as suggested by Stojanovic (2009, pp. 73-86) from the ongoing Mapping and Monitoring SSR research in Serbia, takes a contextual understanding on three levels into account: socio-political, the security sector, and the actors involved. According to her, the purpose of the security sector analysis could also be to identify and register differences among various units or factions with competing interests and visions that comprise it. Such contextual frameworks offer an overview of reforms, depending on the questions that are being asked, including events and turning points that have influenced the current context of reform. Most of these assessment frameworks take place on a national level, although sub- national, regional and local levels could be included as well. They also acknowledge the need to categorise the contextual settings in which SSR takes place, in order to identify main actors, issues, priorities, and strategies. Consequently, the implementation style of SSR programmes in the security sector and the rest of governmental institutions might differ, from development contexts to contexts of a weak state. Experts (Stojanovic 2009, p. 80; Wulf 2011, p. 346) provide such tables with different contextual categories. As Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are coping with similar issues from the Soviet past and transforming their economies and political systems into more open and democratic ones, they could be categorised as transitional or post-authoritarian (Table 2.1). It becomes clear from this category that SSR efforts in Central Asia, in particular democratic governance of security forces, should focus on issues of human rights violations, depoliticising the security forces and making them more accountable and controllable, and push for broader democratic reforms and the opening of the political system. Moreover, in Table 2.1, ‘Lustration’ refers to the former democratic governance experiences of the CEE states in 1989-91, when many government officials and administrators associated with abuses of previous Communist regimes were relieved of their duties during periods of political and social transformations.
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Table 2.1 Transitional category
Context Dominant Actors Threats Priorities Post- -Statutory actors that use -Danger of re- -Primary goal: authoritarian or force establishing the old democratisation of society transitional -Political parties or groups regime -Removal of statutory countries which participated in change -Illegitimacy of statutory actors from political of power and elite from the actors that use force influence or control: former regime -Systematic violation of primarily those that use -Actors that are less visible human rights force or developed -Development of -Statutory actors that do not institutions for control and use force (particularly those oversight in charge of control), e.g. the -Lustration and processing judiciary and other of human rights violations independent institutions, legislative bodies -Civil society Based on: Stojanovic 2009, p. 80
Although it can be relevant to identify and categorise contextual factors that influence socio- political processes, increasing contextual knowledge like this for policy implications is not the complete picture. Some experts warn for this kind of template-style understanding of finding methodological solutions for SSR implementation problems that prevail in a number of SSR policy documents and strategies. Egnell and Haldén (2009, p. 42) compare the two former Soviet, post-authoritarian regions of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, respectively, to show how such a broad categorisation has only limited value in explaining or evaluating the implementation of SSR. They suggest to also focus on state and society structures, on how the state and civil society have been established and to what extent they conform more to Western or European patterns of state, polity and society formation. As a result, Table 2.2 proposes a conceptual framework, adjusted to the research scope and focus on police reforms and civil society in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A compact analysis of the political systems and historically developed societal structures sheds more light on the degree of receptiveness towards police reforms. Moreover, I will explain the security situation and the role of the police as the main provider of internal security, and whether or not adequate institutional and legal institutions are in place to democratically govern them. Third, the historical origins and current position of civil society will be explained, and main CSOs involved in police reforms will be identified. Given the shared past with the Soviet Union that has ruled over Central Asia for most of the twentieth century, and the regional organisations and powers that might affect policies towards security and police reforms, a regional approach is included.
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Table 2.2: Contextual analysis of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Regional analysis -What is the Soviet legacy of Central Asia? -What are the potentials or obstacles for regional cooperation between Central Asian states on SSR and police reforms? -Are there any powerful influences over the Central Asian states and their ruling elites? -Which regional organisations are involved in SSR and police reforms in Central Asia? -How can regional trends and developments affect policies of police reforms? Country specific analysis of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Government, polity and -What type of political system and economic development is there? society -Who has been in power since independence? -Are there different and competing factions or interest groups within the political and security system? -How have polity and society historically evolved? -What is the role of (informal) power structures and relations? -What degree of political influence do the government or politicians have over the security sector? -To what extent is the government able to provide security and services to its citizens? Conflict, security and -Has the country enjoyed a long period of stability and peace or has it the police experienced conflicts recently? -What are the consequences of that conflict for society, is it likely to re- emerge? -Are there other, urgent security threats? -How can the police as main internal security provider and its main problems be described? -Are there legal and institutional frameworks to democratically govern the security sector in place? -What is the level of support in the government and in security institutions for police reforms? Civil society -How has civil society historically developed? -Does the government take an opposing or a partnering relationship with CSOs? -Which CSOs are involved or linked to SSR and police reforms (name, year founded, legal form, activities, linked to which indicator)? -To what extent is SSR a topic in universities and research institutes? -What are the political and legal frameworks in which civil society operates? -Are CSOs working efficiently enough (in terms of expertise, human and financial resources) to act according to its stated objectives? -What mechanisms exist for citizens and civil society to control and hold accountable the police forces? -Are there nation-wide CSO networks providing coordination and support for police reforms?
2.5.2 Policy formulation One of the main entry points for SSR assessment frameworks is mapping and analysing documents on the development, planning, and implementation of SSR policies (Ball, Bouta & Van der Goor 2003, pp. 51-52; Hernandez & Reyes 2011, pp. 26-28). Well defined policies push governments, security bodies (the police), civil society actors, international organisations and any other stakeholders to set priorities, develop clear and realistic plans and keep track of those developments. Security forces do not operate effectively in the absence of clear
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis understandings of their functions, capabilities, principles, and needs. Moreover, formulating, implementing and evaluating policies in a participatory manner encourages non-security actors such as the civil society to build confidence between security bodies and civilians, enhancing political legitimacy of government and its security institutions. Well-defined and managed policies, affirming norms and standards, can thus strengthen democratic governance. Therefore, I will analyse to what extent principles of democratic policing are included in key documents of the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These key documents are national strategy, policy and legal documents but also political statements and considerations, as well as evaluation reports of international organisations engaged in police reforms (see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Policy formulations towards police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Domestic policy formulations -Are there key documents such as national strategy documents, policy papers and/or legal concepts regarding democratic governance of police forces? -More specifically, what policies has the government formulated to commit itself to enhance professional integrity, transparency and accountability within the police forces? -Is there a code of conduct for the police? -Which local CSOs are involved in formulating and monitoring policies on police reforms? -Are there statements and considerations from domestic actors, such as ministers or police officers, regarding police reforms? International assistance -Have international organisations involved in police reforms created programmes and initiatives concrete policy outputs, such as reports or strategies? -Are there joint programmes between international organi sations and governments for police reforms? -Is there a coherent and coordinated approach by domestic stakeholders, security agencies, development agencies and embassies? -Do they organise training programmes or other activities, related to police reforms? -Which local CSOs are involved in these joint programmes and activities?
2.5.3. Measuring the progress of SSR and introducing the indicators It has been argued that not just less attention is given to measuring the actual impact or progress of SSR programmes within policy-oriented and academic circles, but also that the majority of available methods and instruments used to assess SSR are primarily designed to suit donors’ needs and interests (Stojanovic 2009, p. 70). Generally, qualitative indicators are used to measure abstract, not directly observable and often multidimensional concepts such as ‘development’, ‘innovation’, or, in this case, ‘democratic governance’. While quantitative indicators use aggregated macro-data, such as demographics or GDP data, qualitative indicators frequently use system-level (i.e. polity and regime type) or expert panel and survey- based data sources that collect many individual perceptions.
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Indicators specifically developed for SSR are necessary to measure the performance and quality of security services, track the progress of individual countries over time, and allow for country comparisons of state performance in the area of SSR. Yet, there are only a few case studies, where international and local experts cooperate in composing a Security Sector Reform Index (SSRI). For instance, the research team conducting fieldwork in Serbia uses the three-dimensional civil-military relations (CMR) indicator, measuring democratic governance, effectiveness, and efficiency of each security actor by grading it from 1 to 5; grades 1-3 indicate the existence of formal institutions or structures, while grades 4-5 imply that the respective actors are also practicing the new regulations which are perceived as positive changes. This indicator can provide useful insights, such as which security actors show the slowest pace of reform, or how the same criteria, applied to each security actor, can be used as standard tools for measuring the progress of SSR. Moreover, in the Philippines experts have, supported by UNDP, tried to design a SSRI by using two sets of variables (Hernandez & Reyes 2011, p. 17). The first set covers the dimensions of democratic principles of governance according to the Constitution and the laws; the extent of knowledge or awareness, and capacity of oversight institutions; performance record of the security sector; SSR programmes and initiatives of this sector; and contribution to conflict prevention and peace-building. The second set of variables labels the ‘attributes’ of democratic governance, including transparency; accountability; responsibility; participation; and responsiveness. Based on this framework, data could be filled in, gathered during numerous conferences, roundtables, and workshops. Such research projects strive to harmonise findings and needs between international experts and local stakeholders at the one hand, but also to further standardise tools and procedures for measuring SSR progress on the other. Schroeder (2010) takes a different approach in developing measuring tools for SSR, by selecting and providing an overview of relevant and available data about various aspects of the state of security and governance from online databases of other policy areas. She divides the concept of SSR into two overarching dimensions: the quality of security provision in a state, and the quality of Security Sector Governance. The first indicator set consists of data sources describing the delivery of security to the state and its citizens, including the Global Peace Index, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (which tracks the number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths), but also the International Crime Victims Survey and World Prison Brief. The second set describes some dimensions of the quality of the process of security delivery, consisting of state stability, rule of law and democratic control, and including data sources such as the Failed States Index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), the Civil Society Index (CSI) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). However, such
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis indicators do not specifically address SSR, and changes in the democratic governance of the security sector are surely influenced by more domestic and external factors. Therefore, one must be very cautious to make causal links between certain SSR policies and scores on these indicators (Schroeder 2010). Although some available datasets could be useful, it is wise to gather more data, retrieved from qualitative reports and interviews with engaged civil society actors and experts to analyse and explain the (limited) practice of police reforms. Furthermore, there is broad consensus among scholars, that one of the main indicators of democratic governance should focus on the rate of ownership, that describes the extent to which domestic actors and institutions control both the design and implementation of political change processes (Ball 2015; Caparini 2010; Donais 2015; Edmunds 2004; Gordon 2014; OECD DAC 2007). They rather see SSR as a process than an endpoint, whereby important structural changes are likely to be visible only after longer periods of time. Essentially, according to Bayley (2000, p. 76), “evaluation in police programmes must go beyond auditing accounts or counting activities that are undertaken, rather their ‘outcomes’ can be made through qualitative observations by independent experts. It doesn’t take long for experienced people to determine whether community policing programmes are real, abuses of authority minimal, patrol officers responsive, the public cooperative, management open, operational decisions based on adequate information, and police activities open to public inspection”. Whereas the security sector never has a fixed end but is constantly changing, these changes in processes need to be followed, based on observations of both independent observers and involved practitioners. That brings me to the framework of measuring the practice of democratic governance of the police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, through indicators of oversight and control, integrity, participation of citizens and civil society, transparency, rule of law and human rights, and responsiveness (Table 2.4). I will combine information from available datasets with qualitative data gained from interviews and surveys of civil society actors. First, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) describes the transformation to democracy and open markets and could be used to determine the quality of oversight and monitoring mechanisms as measured by Indicator #1. Second, the Transparency Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) can be more or less applied to measure the integrity of governmental services and, in turn, the police forces (Indicator #2). Third, the Voice and Accountability dimension of the Worldwide Governance Indicators captures perceptions of citizens’ degree to participate in choosing their government, as well as governmental trust. This broad dimension could be partly applied to Indicator #3. Finally, the Freedom House Index measures the rate of freedom and democracy, and can partly say something about the adherence of police officers to standards of human
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis rights, and how freely the media can operate in reporting misbehaviour by police officers (Indicator #5).
Table 2.4 Measuring progress of democratic governance of police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Indicators Core questions Indicator #1: Public oversight & monitoring -Bertelsmann Transformation Index -Are there oversight institutions and mechanisms that are able to work effectively and independently? -Has the Ministry of Internal Affairs decentralised its police institutions to make them accountable and controllable to local authorities and civilian mechanisms? -Does the police put recommendations and new perspectives from community-based advisory boards and fora in practice? -Are there effective cooperative mechanisms between local police forces and citizens? Indicator #2: Integrity -Transparency Corruption Perceptions Index -Does the police adhere to a professional code of conduct in practice? -Are there efficient measures taken against police corruption? Indicator #3: Participation -WGI Voice and Accountability -Do the relevant civil society actors have sufficient weight to participate in policymaking, implementation, assessment and evaluation phases of police reform programmes? -Is there consultation and review input from involved civil society groups and citizens? Indicator #4: Transparency -What is the quality, reliability and availability of official statistics (e.g. levels of crime, court records)? -Are police reports (behaviour of individual officers, operational strategies, budget management) accessible to the public and open to scrutiny by variety of oversight institutions? -Does the media have sufficient access to public information on the police? Indicator #5: Rule of law & human rights -Freedom House Index -Does the police demonstrate commitment to the rule of law in practice? -Does the police perform its duties in accordance with universally agreed standards of human rights, and civil and political rights? -Are police officers brought to justice for misbehaviour? -Are the media free enough to report misbehaviour of the police? Indicator #6: Responsiveness -How do people rate the police in terms of trust and effectiveness? -Which problems require action by local and central government? -Do national government and police take in account enough serious types of insecurity and injustice most experienced by local people?
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis
2.6 Summary The end of the Cold War paved ways for the rethinking of security beyond the traditional focus on a regime and its military. As a result, Security Sector Reform emerged as a new concept that strives for strengthening and professionalising the security services while improving their good governance, accountability and transparency. It rather focuses on human security and should be related to other policy areas such as democracy, development and peacebuilding. It is stressed that without regards to the dimensions of democratic governance, external security assistance might lead to tolerating politicised and corrupt security forces, which damages long-term stability and negatively affects other policy areas. SSR programmes also started to include police forces as one of the most visible security institutions for citizens. Community-based policing further seeks to improve mutual trust and accountability between law enforcement and local citizens. Literature on SSR, development, and democratisation puts forward the essential role of civil society, possessing the necessary knowledge and skills to strengthen state-citizens relationships as well as guaranteeing local ownership. However, SSR programmes need to be implemented carefully in the political and societal context. Where institutional and legal frameworks to democratically govern the security forces (the police) could be installed in time (known as the ‘first generation’ of SSR), changing the actual culture and behavioural attitude towards democratic governance (known as the ‘second generation’ of SSR) proves to be more difficult. As all-encompassing SSR fieldwork studies are usually conducted by a group of international and local experts over an extended period of time, it was very relevant to limit the scope of this master thesis to the democratic governance of the police forces and civil society’s role without losing links to the academic and policy debates on SSR. Based on existing SSR literature and assessment frameworks and the CMR index, I was able to design an appropriate conceptual framework to analyse the regional and national context of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, their policy formulations, and progress or practice towards police reforms.
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3. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in context
3.1 Regional context Just like the other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan share a common (pre-) Soviet history and post-Soviet identity. Scholars still debate what characterises Central Asia’s post-Soviet legacy over the past 25 years, and how this has shaped and influenced the state, its societal and security structures. The various Central Asian republics and their boundaries and organisational structures as we know them today, originate from the national delimitation between 1924-36, arbitrarily created by the Bolsheviks (Abashin 2014, p. 82; Rakhimov 2010, p. 126; Trenin 2011, p. 126). As a result, it can be said that all modern characteristics of Central Asia’s statehood, borders, institutions, and imagery were formulated during Soviet times. On the one hand, the term post-Soviet, as widely used in the literature and policy circles, may refer to a set of unique political, economic and social transformations that the former Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics underwent during the twentieth century. These include a highly centralised administrative and economic model, parliaments and a separation of powers that are no more than symbolic manifestations, security services that play a major role in internal politics, elites and authorities that preserve themselves as secular regimes, and a number of specific daily routines and identities which include the Russian language as lingua franca or public holidays such as Victory Day on May 9 (Abashin 2014, pp. 91-93). On the other hand, it is acknowledged that there are differences between Central Asian republics regarding national ideologies, state-building practices and dealing with the Soviet past. For example, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which include large Russian minority groups, had less interest in letting the issue of the trauma of the Soviet past be a cause of internal division compared to Uzbekistan, that has made the harshest stance against the Soviet past (Abashin 2014, pp. 83-89). Unlike most narratives of nationalism, the independence of the Central Asian states was not the result of preceding, popular struggles for national liberation. Rather, the Soviet Union collapsed and its republics seceded according to particular trajectories, where regional elites were bargaining with the centre in Moscow regarding its independence (Abashin 2014, pp. 82-83). To their credit, none of the five Central Asian republics had any former experience with or were prepared as modern, independent states, but have sought a new model of development and integration from the early 1990s on. The breakup of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in Central Asia without a clear geopolitical order or collective security structures on a regional level. Although a strong commitment to sustainable and economic reforms and cooperation is necessary in order to
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis tackle the shared regional issues that include organised crime, corruption, water management, terrorism, and border disputes, national interests still mostly prevail over regional ones. Factors that hinder necessary regional cooperation and integration are rivalries for regional leadership, mainly between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a lack of trust between states’ different national interests, and economic development (Rakhimov 2010, pp. 134-136; Swanström, Cornell & Tabyshalieva 2005, p. 4). Consequently, Central Asia hasn’t created any efficient unified security structure or strong, institutional framework on a regional level. Prospects of economic, security and political cooperation in Central Asia depend on the readiness of nations to work together in regional projects. This lack of constructive dialogue between the regional states has created opportunities for external influences and control through multiple security organisations over the region. Central Asian states have joined a number of regional security organisations such as the OSCE, the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO), the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Moreover, during the 1990s they engaged in Partnership for Peace (PfP) with NATO and the Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the European Union. Their effectiveness varies, but all these international organisations are faced with the difficulty of striking a balance between, on the one hand, the strategic and economic interests of their member states and, on the other, the long-term goals of promoting fundamental political reform in the region. Within Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are most open to external assistance, while Tajikistan is moderately involved, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are still very closed societies. The various states have developed so-called ‘multi- vector’ foreign policies, based on balancing among the major regional players – primarily Russia, China and the United States, but also the European Union, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Japan, and others, each of them with different degrees and spheres of influences. Yet, regional politics remain fluid and largely unpredictable, as external actors significantly control the policy direction of the regional security organisations, and value bilateral agreements rather than multilateral ones (Swanström, Cornell & Tabyshalieva 2005, p. 4). In principle, regional and international actors share the same interests in political stability, economic development and fighting security threats such as radicalisation and terrorism, and should, therefore, be interested in and pursue the mutual benefits of regional cooperation in Central Asia. There are some important factors that attract the international community to Central Asia; firstly, the availability of rich energy resources in Central Asia near the Caspian Sea and new markets; secondly, the strategic, geopolitical location of Central Asia in between regional powers as Russia, China, and India; and, thirdly, Central Asia’s
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis proximity to Afghanistan, that is seen as a source of possible regional threats because of the illegal drug trafficking and terrorism (Rakhimov 2010, p. 132). Seen from the perspective of the Central Asian states, they need good relationships with their neighbours and other states because of their lack of financial capital and expertise, necessary for developing and diversifying their economy, their relatively weak armed forces (especially in comparison to their neighbours) and their landlocked position. They can benefit from access to much-needed foreign investments, security assistance, and global integration (Akhtar 2010, p. 58). Of the four major outside actors in Central Asia, the European Union has been most open to creating mechanisms for regional cooperation, as for instance stated in the EU Strategy towards Central Asia (2007, pp. 3, 6). Like NATO and the OSCE, the European Union is especially interested in dialogue with local stakeholders and regional organisations in Central Asia, addressing the important issues of democracy and human rights. Overall, Central Asian states could benefit from partnerships and memberships of multiple international actors, working together on development and security, which, in turn, could positively affect policies of Security Sector Reform, in particular with respect to democratising the police forces. Yet, these aspirations for regional cooperation cannot always be reconciled with the geopolitical realities that significantly shape policy developments towards SSR. First, all these various (international) actors have different approaches and understandings of security issues in the region. With a strong focus on democratic governance and upholding human rights, external actors as the EU and OSCE are more value-driven than, for instance, the CSTO and SCO, that prefer an authoritarian presence in Central Asia, and are suspicious of so-called colour revolution-style movements and view democratisation mainly as destabilising (Ziegler 2016, p. 550). Furthermore, an increasing competition among external powers for access to natural resources and political influences might severely hinder regional cooperation. Second, ongoing trends and developments in, or bordering on, the Central Asian region have a large impact on domestic security policies. For instance, the American-led War on Terror starting in 2001 and the continuing wars and terrorist threats in the wider Middle Eastern region created incentives to build strong state and security structures with less political space for civil society to operate in (Olcott 2002). Moreover, the rising authoritarianism and assertive stance of neighbouring powers Russia and China, that actively resist democratic promotion and foreign assistance to their civil societies, have an indirect influence on Central Asian elites (Ziegler 2016, pp. 562-563). Third, Central Asia is no primary strategic interest of most external actors, which has consequences for supporting its progress of democratic governance of the security sector (Swanström, Cornell & Tabishalieva 2006, p. 18). American geostrategic interests and military presence in the region significantly declined after the termination of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 2014, when it withdrew
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis most of its troops from Afghanistan and from supporting air force bases in Kyrgyzstan, and in Uzbekistan already in 2005. The European Union has a stronger geopolitical focus on its ‘ring of instability’, ranging from North Africa around the eastern borders to the Baltic states, the target area of its European Neighbourhood Policy. China’s main security challenges are located in the East, with the Taiwan issue, relations to the Korean peninsula and Japan, and South Chinese Sea disputes covering much of its foreign policy. Moreover, Russia as a traditional main provider of security is slowly retreating from Central Asia and does little to influence internal policies, while being more concerned with the Caucasus and its relations with the West. Yet, its soft power in Central Asia remains strong and it wants to preserve the privilege of being the main influencer in the region as much as possible (Kassenova, personal interview, February 7, 2018). Finally, the OSCE seems to have only a modest focus on Central Asia. It spends 14 percent of its Unified Budget on field operations in Central Asia, which forms the second highest percentage of four regions (OSCE 2016b, p. 104). As a result, regional trends and developments of increasing authoritarianism, a growing economic and political influence and dominant soft power of neighbouring powers Russia and China, and a moderate influence of international organisations committed to SSR, are providing less positive prospects on the scale of local demand and effect of democratising the security forces in the foreseeable time.
3.2 Kazakhstan 3.2.1 State, polity and society Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has been ruled by Soviet-era leader Nursultan Nazarbayev. From the start of his presidency, Nazarbayev prioritised developing the economy and political stability of Kazakhstan. Its GDP has been growing steadily over the past two decades with an average rate of approximately 5 percent per year; it compromises over 60 percent of Central Asia. This is mainly due to the presence of natural resources such as oil and gas in the Caspian Sea area, which has attracted a great deal of foreign direct investment (Giffen, Earle & Buxton 2006, p. 36). Moreover, Kazakhstan’s stability is based on its relatively effective state and security governance, its structured and modernised elite, but also generally healthy interethnic relations in the country; about 65 percent is Kazakh, 20 percent Russian, followed by smaller groups of Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Germans, and Tatars (World Population Review 2018). After its independence, Kazakhstan still maintains strong ties with Russia, that sees Kazakhstan as a key partner of any development or security issue in the region (Trenin 2011, p. 126). While Kazakhstan is formally a democratic republic, it practically functions as a consolidated authoritarian state with only one political party in
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis power (Nur-Otan) and without any serious contenders or political opposition. It is criticised that Kazakhstan’s political regime is firmly grounded on the president’s monopoly and centralisation of power, a toothless parliament, a growing obscurity of public authority, and a refusal to accept the notion of transparency (Peyrouse 2010, p. 23). Apart from its transition towards a modern, effective and prosperous state, it’s the informal networks of regional elites and financial oligarchs that constitute an important, dominating political presence in Kazakhstan, like in other Central Asian countries. Whereas so-called ‘politics A’ describe the political struggle between authoritarian rulers and (weak) parliaments, where also civil society thrives, it is argued that the prevalent political arena in Kazakhstan (or any other state in Central Asia) forms ‘politics B’, or political struggles between rulers, power brokers and networks behind the official scenes (Starr 2006, pp. 6-8). These power brokers and networks consist of kinship systems, regional networks based on economic and political ties, and control of resources in certain economic sectors such as the textile, cotton or oil industry. Next to state structures as created by the Soviets, these networks, some of which originate from the pre-Russian period, have remained intact. They were tolerated or even reinforced by Soviet authorities as long as the Central Asian republics delivered the necessary production quota and social control. The current involvement of security and government agencies in collecting rents and corruption is also significant, which has manifested itself in multiple corrupt practices involving state budgets, extortion of legal business, and also links with organised crime. Even when political transitions or regime changes take place, these complex systems of corruption and patronage are resilient and are usually able to rapidly reconfigure themselves (Lewis 2011a, p. 16). The political elites and the related networks find it convenient to control the security sector, relying on a legacy of Soviet practice. Central Asian governments have routinely used domestic security and intelligence services to suppress dissent and to arrest, torture, and imprison political opponents. During a Skype interview, Yevgeniy Zhovtis, director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR), stated that Kazakhstan could be seen as a “hybrid authoritarian state that seeks to both modernise and control its society” (June 12, 2018). On the one hand, the Kazakh regime takes a somewhat positive stance towards institutional reforms, and could tolerate some space to open up for political advocacy and participation. As a result, it engages in joint commitments and programmes with international organisations and allows a number of CSOs working on human rights, public and legal reforms, to operate and receive funds from foreign donors. On the other hand, the ruling elite is holding the narrow vision of a society that needs to be controlled against possible risks and threats, and therefore will not cooperate for further reforms. It is in this political context of a
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis regime that actively tries to control society, that policy formulations and initiatives towards police reforms need to be analysed (Zhovtis, Skype interview, June 12, 2018). Facilitating civil society to actively strive for a more open participatory political system could be unproductive and confrontational for the national elite. The regime of Kazakhstan cannot dismantle the larger networks, given the involvement of powerful actors, without undermining its own position. Therefore, political openness, independent media, and civil society remain impeded in Kazakhstan, as any criticism or political challenge to legitimacy are perceived as dangers for the ruling regime.
3.2.2 Conflict, security and the police Unlike its neighbouring states, Kazakhstan has proven to be stable and has not experienced any civil wars or local conflicts over the past 25 years. However, Kazakh authorities are indeed aware of issues that might threaten the security of their country and its population; these include drug trafficking, covert Islamist networks, and international terrorism, a possible destabilisation of Kazakhstan’s neighbours Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, illegal migration, and food security. In 2011-12, Kazakhstan was hit by a series of extremist incidents and in 2016 by deadly terrorist attacks in Aktobe and Almaty. Furthermore, it is estimated that over 300 people left Kazakhstan to join the Islamic State, and could form a serious domestic threat when returning (Standish 2017). However, security threats like radicalisation and terrorism should not be overestimated; national authorities have great benefits in exaggerating or magnifying these threats to justify their policies of holding a firm grip on the political arena and society (Montgomery & Heathershaw 2014). Therefore, experts as Montgomery and Heathershaw argue that in the long term a larger security threat is the strengthening of authoritarianism, accompanied by more tightened security measures to spy on citizens, suppress any political dissent and discourage citizens from challenging government actions and political legitimacy. Kazakhstan inherited its strong security institutions from Soviet times, which have hardly permitted any significant democratic reforms and remain thoroughly and largely corrupt. The police forces (‘militsia’), like the prison services and other domestic security divisions, fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). Its main mission is to maintain public order and societal security, and fulfils a very broad array of tasks such as preventing, investigating and combating crime, protecting people, safeguarding public property, managing the prison systems, as well as those allocated to more specialised units such as counter-narcotics, traffic police, rescuing hostages and crowd management (Marat 2012, p. 8). Within Central Asia, the police forces in Kazakhstan have proven to be the most professional in solving and reducing crime, and are the least abusive. However, they are also
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis effective in repressing alternative political voices and factions in what is described as an “atmosphere of quiet repression” (Lewis 2011a, p. 23). The regime in Kazakhstan has become savvier in treating its political opponents by using defamation laws and secrecy restrictions, while the police carry out its orders of detaining and harassing these political opponents and carrying out raids of newspaper offices. In addition, the collapse of the Communist Party control and the replacement of Soviet state organs by less powerful government agencies have emboldened law enforcement agencies to pursue their own agenda of illicit practices and choosing their own civilian and political targets. Although local citizens generally perceive the police as corrupt, untrustworthy, and unable to fulfil their primary function of protecting the population, they also have their significant share in diminishing the accountability of police forces through a variety of personal connections, and surely bribery. In many everyday cases, such as traffic violations, paying small bribes is a better alternative to bureaucratic procedures (Lewis 2011a, p. 17). Consequently, it can be said that not only the original design of the police in Kazakhstan as a tool of the state, rather than a servant of the public, but also its entanglement with citizens form hard obstacles to overcome. Originally, the police forces and other security institutions of Kazakhstan were overseen by the so-called procuracy (‘prokuratura’), a powerful and multifaceted organ dating from the Stalinist period, responsible for implementation and observation of laws. In most cases, the procuracy was too deeply entangled with influential politicians, the police, and courts, to function as a true independent control agency (ICG 2002, p. 1). In the meantime, Kazakhstan has developed a number of democratic institutions and frameworks to govern its police forces. Important government and legal documents include the 1995 Constitution, the 1992 law On Troops of the Ministry of Interior and the Concept of Legal Policy for the Period 2010-2020, as well as many international treaties on human rights (Marat 2010, pp. 3-9). It also created democratic institutions and mechanisms such as national and deputy police committees, advisory boards, monitoring commissions and public councils (Knox & Janenova 2018). In 1992, Kazakhstan became a member of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), and its law enforcement agencies have worked closely with the UN, the SCO, Europol and other international organisations and law enforcement institutions. However, beyond the creation of these democratic institutions and frameworks, changes towards democratic attitudes in the particular context of Kazakhstan, characterised by entangled economic, political and strategic interests, a strong Soviet legacy, and the inconvenience to question the legitimacy of the regime and its security institutions, remain very complex, difficult and controversial (Peyrouse 2010, p. 19). Yet, police reforms are possible if some key persons within government or security institutions show a willingness to reform. For
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis example, in 2002-03, a former head of the penitentiary system was able to move its institutions from the MIA to the Ministry of Justice. After he left his position, however, the system was transferred back to the MIA, returning to the same deficiencies and problems (Zhovtis, Skype interview, June 12, 2018). Far from being a mere technical exercise, genuine police reforms should not only be carried out by the MIA, but should also take place within longer-term processes of political reforms, with a broad popular engagement and organised by civil society.
3.2.3 Civil society Both CSOs and NGOs are marked as non-profit organisations and greatly overlap each other in practice. Most of the active CSOs are concentrated in major cities such as Almaty and Astana and comprise of many forms such as public associations, research institutions, human rights and anti-corruption organisations, mass media, community associations, and public foundations. According to the Civil Society Index, between 2008 and 2010 civil society in Kazakhstan can be characterised as “moderately developed” (Makhmutova & Akhmetova 2011, p. 9). Although CSOs operate within a relatively well-developed legal framework and have adequate organisational structures and societal networks, they also have to deal with a lack of funds, human resources, and public relations skills. Before 1985, there was only a limited number of CSOs, all connected to the Communist Party. After independence, civil society became more organised, diverse, and robust (ADB 2015, p. 2). This development can be divided into three phases: the early 1990s, 1994-2001, and 2001-present. During the early 1990s, more than four hundred CSOs were established, most of them involved with the protection of human rights. In 1994, a new Civil Code recognised public associations and public foundations as non-profit organisations. As a result, the second phase (1994-2001) saw an increase in the diversity and quality of CSO activities. International donors also provided critical support for the emergence and institutionalisation of CSOs during that period. During the third phase (2001-present), CSOs gained greater recognition from state bodies and benefited from formal arrangements, including government cooperation, the establishment of a public financing mechanism for CSOs, and an increase in the number of registered public foundations and associations. Generally, CSOs in Kazakhstan are interested in participating in societal dialogue, and often have some degree of expertise to advance policies and contribute to the process of development. Their activities include raising public awareness, implementing programmes, assistance to vulnerable groups, legal aid, human rights and policy advocacy. The legal basis for CSOs to operate is set in the 1995 Constitution, which states that Kazakhstan has a peaceful “civil society following the ideals of freedom, equality, and
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis harmony”, and the Conception of Civil Society Development for 2006-2011, which defines civil society as that “in which the individual, with all his or her needs, interests and values, is at the centre of all processes and relations” (ADB 2015, p. 2). The Ministry of Justice and its regional offices have to approve the registration of CSOs, after the completion of formal procedures, based on the 2013 Law on State Registration of Legal Entities. Furthermore, the 2005 Law on State Social Contracts arranges the legal framework for the state financing of CSOs. As a result, government funding for CSOs increased from $450,000 in 2005 to $31,300,000 in 2012 (ADB 2011, p. 2). In addition, Art. 134 of the Tax Code recognises CSOs as non-profit organisations, that generate their income from membership fees, charity, government funding and foreign donors, and are therefore exempt from taxation. Although Kazakhstan put forward basic principles of democratic state- and civil society-building in its legislative frameworks, it has so far only undergone the initial stage of civil society development and, therefore, there are yet no established democratic traditions and well- developed civil society institutions (Saktaganova & Ospanova 2013, p. 1278). However, it can be said that some gradual steps in civil society formation are being made, as the quantity and quality of CSOs increase, and civil society actors are gaining more experience by participating in activities and developing their organisations. According to the mainstream approach of democratisation theories, the political stability, relatively high levels of tolerance, and a steady economic growth that led to an emerging middle class, are certainly forming favourable prerequisites for a vibrant civil society, that, in turn, could foster and consolidate processes of democratic governance. However, a number of scholars point out that relations between civil society and the state in Kazakhstan are different, characterised as being more cooperative than contesting (Giffen, Earle & Buxton 2006; Kabdiyeva & Dixon 2014; Knox & Janenova; Saktagonova & Ospanova 2013; Ziegler 2010). Most members of the new middle class in Kazakhstan turn out to be more concerned with maintaining political stability and its newly acquired wealth than with challenging the authoritarian political system, while civilian participation in social and political organisations is low and support for democratic values relatively small (Ziegler 2010, pp. 804-806). Actually, Kazakhstan’s rising welfare has resulted in an ever-growing influence and dominance of the presidential regime, associated oligarchic interests, and clan networks in the public sphere. They use their vast economic resources and powers of patronage to cooperate with CSOs and NGOs through multiple structures, aiming to promote their own agenda of social and infrastructural development instead of letting civil society develop independently from the state. They have actively established many state NGOs, the largest category of non-profit organisations in Kazakhstan, many of which serve to make Kazakhstan’s civil society democratic but, in reality, are advocating pro-government
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis engagement, or exist on paper only (Makhmutova & Akhmetova 2011, p. 20). Not only are CSOs and democratic institutions in their early phase of development, but their impact on government decision making threatens to be further limited by the powerful state apparatus in Kazakhstan. Overall, next to improving their lobbying skills and their understanding on exerting influence on policymaking, CSOs also depend on a much broader support and participation of citizens to challenge these complex systems of patronage and intertwined interests. Although there is some key literature available on civil society development in Kazakhstan, it doesn’t specify CSOs particularly involved in police reforms. Important CSO networks and umbrella organisations such as the Civil Alliance of Kazakhstan or the Union of Crisis Centers are not dealing with democratising of the police forces either (ADB 2010, p. 5). In addition, key research institutions in Kazakhstan, such as Nazarbayev University, KIMEP University, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, or the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, Research Policy Centre, hardly study SSR, let alone police reforms. Consequently, I had to identify myself those key CSOs particularly involved in one or more indicators of police reforms, based on the existing literature and put them together in a concise overview (Table 3.1). For example, a publication submitted by the NGO Coalition Against Torture (2014, pp. 3-4) addressing implementation issues of human rights standards during policing, lists all contributing CSOs. This coalition consists of thirty CSOs, including KIBHR, the International Centre for Journalism Medianet, and the Legal Policy Research Centre (LPRC), which are also linked to other indicators of democratic governance. Moreover, the OSCE Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities from 2003 to 2016 names a number of key CSOs closely involved with the OSCE Centre in Astana in monitoring police stations and organising activities for local police officers to familiarise them with democratic practices, including the Charter for Human Rights and Penal Reform International (PRI). I have also included these monitoring commissions, led by the PRI, and the Public Council of the MIA as civilian oversight and cooperation mechanism in this table. Finally, in an email interview project assistant Yevgeniya Karushina (June 19, 2018) pointed out that Adil Soz is actively involved in the freedom of reporting, paying attention to human rights violations by police officers concerning journalists. According to the interviews, most CSOs such as KIBHR and Adil Soz are able to work efficiently, although they are not funded by the government, given their political nature, neither by local citizens or businesses, out of their apparent concern for financially supporting politically motivated organisations in an authoritarian setting like Kazakhstan (Zhovtis, Skype interview, June 12, 2018). Instead, they get most of their finances from international donors such as the EU, the UN or the Soros Foundation. Moreover, Azamat
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Shambilov, director of PRI, pointed out civil society concerns that less and less donors are willing to fund police reform related activities and programmes, but instead focus on financing other policy issues, such as dealing with refugees and migration, or gender equality (Skype interview, June 18, 2018). While other policy areas certainly deserve the donors’ attention, CSOs working on democratising the police forces have to improvise more in getting enough funding to keep operating. It is important to note that Table 3.1 doesn’t provide an exhaustive overview of all CSOs; it might, however, be seen as a starting, initial framework for identifying additional CSOs (partly) involved in police reforms. I was able to collect relevant data from the CSOs indicated in bold, which is included in the analysis.
Table 3.1 Civil society actors engaged in police reforms in Kazakhstan
Civil society actor/organisation (Legal) form Activities Indicator (year founded) Kazakhstan International Public association Analysis, education, #1 Public oversight & monitoring Bureau for Human Rights and training, public #2 Integrity Rule of Law (1993) participation, legal #3 Participation reform, public #5 Rule of law & human rights awareness, policy and human rights advocacy International Foundation for Public foundation Public awareness, #4 Transparency Protection of Freedom of education, legal reform, #5 Rule of law & human rights Speech “Adil Soz” (1999) consultancy Penal Reform International NGO Legal reform, analysis, #1 Public oversight & monitoring (2001) services delivery, legal #2 Integrity aid, public participation, #3 Participation monitoring #5 Rule of law & human rights Medianet International Centre Institute Education, training, #4 Transparency for Journalism (2005) public awareness, #6 Responsiveness analysis Monitoring commissions Autonomous body Monitoring, advisory #1 Public oversight & monitoring (2005)
Public Council of the Ministry Autonomous body Consultancy, advisory, #1 Public oversight & monitoring of Internal Affairs (2016) public participation, #3 Participation oversight Charter for Human Rights Public foundation Public participating, #1 Public oversight & monitoring public awareness, #3 Ownership human rights advocacy, #5 Rule of law & human rights monitoring Legal Media Centre (2003) NGO Education, training, #4 Transparency consulting, legal reform, policy advocacy Legal Policy Research Centre Think tank Analysis, policy advocacy #2 Integrity (2008) #4 Transparency #5 Rule of law & human rights Coalition against Torture (2009) NGO coalition Public awareness, policy #5 Rule of law & human rights and human rights advocacy
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3.3 Kyrgyzstan 3.3.1 State, polity and society Compared to its regional neighbours, Kyrgyzstan is often being characterised as an ‘island of democracy’ or the ‘Switzerland of Central Asia’, thanks to its more liberalised political climate. However, it is also argued that Kyrgyzstan was one of the former Soviet republics “least prepared for its independence” (Engvall 2011, p. 18). As the Soviet-controlled economic and political functions decayed, the Kyrgyz government was confronted with great challenges in formulating its policies, creating institutions of political authority and lifting the country out of its poor economic state. Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan has gone through some ‘colour revolutions’, as it experienced two regime changes, in 2005 and 2010 respectively, and held its first more or less fair presidential elections in 2017 (BBC 2017). From its independence in August 1991 until the so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005, Kyrgyzstan was ruled by president Askar Akayev, who was responsible for the adoption of wide-ranging programmes of economic and political reforms, based on democratic ideals. In reality, his policies of transforming Kyrgyzstan towards a well-functioning democracy and market economy resulted in a decreased capacity of the state to provide basic service to its citizens, as well as increased levels of corruption and social tensions between ethnic communities (Akiner 2016; Engvall 2011; Wilkinson 2014). After Akayev was ousted, the presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010) meant a backlash of Kyrgyzstan’s democracy; Bakiyev centralised the political system, his extended family took over control of major economic sectors and financial flows, and he appointed loyal supporters as heads of key government and security institutions. After Bakiyev’s removal from office as a result of popular unrest in 2010, Rosa Ounbayeva was appointed the head of the interim regime until December 2011, when Almazbek Atambayev was elected president. Finally, after the elections of November 2017, Sooronbay Jeenbekov became the new president of Kyrgyzstan (BBC 2017). Similar to Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz were originally nomads organised in kinship systems, which remained significantly intact during the Soviet period. Consequently, these informal patron-client networks continued to play a dominant role in political power struggles in modern Kyrgyzstan. According to Engvall (2011, pp. 6-7), the political order in Kyrgyzstan can be, as a result of the power struggles between networks primarily based on family ties and money, characterised by three elements. First, societal success and legal protection depend on close relations with the ruling president and his family, also referred to as personality influence games. Second, private businesses in Kyrgyzstan, a system based on controlling and distributing rents, cannot thrive without connections to the state. Third, the state of
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Kyrgyzstan is effectively organised as a marketplace, in various ways. For example, holding a function in administrative and political offices is seen as an investment, where there are possibilities to pay for governmental positions and access to public services (such as police protection) through informal means. Instead of being a marketplace for ideas, parliamentary elections are rather seen as a tool for influential businessmen (many of whom are involved in organised crime) for securing a parliamentary seat and the benefits of immunity and influence over the legislative system (Starr 2006, p. 21). While Akayev started to accumulate power and wealth for his family during the second half of the 1990s, this trend continued and even increased under Bakiyev, who privatised the state for his own economic benefits. The power changes in 2005 and 2010 that removed these rulers from office may not be as revolutionary as perceived, as the new leaders continued or were tempered by these same dynamics of corruption and informal networks. The constitutional reforms of 2010, aimed at creating a more equitable balance between the power of the president and parliament, actually created new opportunities for corruption (Akiner 2016, pp. 119-121). As a result, it is argued that external efforts aimed at state-building, and Security Sector Reform in particular, should not overlook these dynamics or the ways in which development activities have contributed to it, in order not to enhance Kyrgyzstan’s state fragility (Wilkinson 2014, p. 155). Similar to Kazakhstan, understanding the political and economic context in which policies towards police reforms are formulated and implemented, matters once again.
3.3.2 Conflict, security and the police Despite its status as a relatively more open and democratic state, since its independence, Kyrgyzstan has experienced some instances of civil unrest and ethnic conflict. Together with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan shares the single most conflict-prone sub-region in Central Asia, the Ferghana Valley. In 1990, ethnic conflicts between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in the cities of Osj and Jalalabad, which resulted in the largest ethnically motivated killings Central Asia had seen for decades (Swanström, Cornell & Tabyshalieva 2005, p. 2). The reasons for such ethnic conflicts seemed to be rather localised, related to water issues, disputes over land ownership, and illegal border crossings. Nevertheless, hostile attitudes between ethnic groups have remained. Another point of friction in Kyrgyzstan lies in its north-south division, where the south is far more conservative Islamic than the north (Engvall 2011, p. 12; Swanström, Cornell & Tabyshalieva 2005, pp. 17). The complex kinship systems are also mostly divided according to this geographical division. The Tulip Revolution in 2005 meant a geographical power shift to the south, when Bakiyev appointed southerners to top positions at the expense of the long dominating elite from the north under the Akayev regime. Especially the second revolt, five years later, turned out to be very violent. In the aftermath of
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis this political upheaval, ethnic riots in June 2010 cost the lives of four hundred people in southern Kyrgyzstan and led to the displacement of more than 100,000 people. Kyrgyzstan’s security forces have often been the focus of political controversy, especially during such periods of political unrest, due to its inability to protect local citizens against the violence and its suspicious links with government officials or other persons in key societal positions. Like other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan inherited its security infrastructures from the Soviet Union, of which the police forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are the largest and least reformed parts (ICG 2002, pp. 7-10; Swanström, Cornell & Tabyshalieva 2005, pp. 36-37). The greatest problems of the MIA of Kyrgyzstan lies in its high level of corruption, the growing gap between police and society as result of lack of trust, its links with organised crime and the elite’s use of the police as a tool against its political opponents. There is also a lack of effective oversight of the police forces, and police officials are seldom held accountable for their malpractices (Musabayeva 2013, p. 72). MIA and law enforcement positions can often be bought and rank promotion is seldom based on merit, but rather on kinship networks and personal contacts. Many businesses have been faced with extortion practices by police officers, in order to complement their low wages. The situation worsened under president Bakiyev, who put the MIA under his direct control. He appointed his eldest son, Marat Bakiyev, as deputy head of the National Security Service, while his younger brother, Jnaysh Bakiyev, established his own elite security forces and it is claimed he was informally in charge of Kyrgyzstan’s law enforcement agencies. In addition, while the Bakiyev regime tried to fight organised crime by eliminating some criminal bosses, the organised crime groups grew into mighty financial and political forces and practically merged with law enforcement agencies to cooperate in particular cases (Engvall 2011, pp. 60, 70). Such malpractices are major obstacles to economic progress and societal trust, as local citizens perceive the police as the most corrupt state institution, in addition to the traffic police and the procuracy system (ICG 2002, p. 8). Against this background, it is clear that a sustainable society in Kyrgyzstan cannot be built without regards to the police forces. The legal and regulatory framework for the security sector and its democratic governance in Kyrgyzstan consists of a number of key documents, such as the laws On the Status of Servicemen and On National Security, both adopted in the early 1990s, and the 2010 Constitution (Musabayeva 2013, p. 71). From 1998 until 2013 various concepts on reforming the MIA, which is responsible for policing tasks, have been formulated. Furthermore, specialised Public Advisory Councils (PACs) have been created in 2013, in order to improve the supervision of government structures, including the MIA (Marat 2012, p. 21). More than in Kazakhstan or anywhere else in Central Asia, civil society has played an active role in putting the principles of democratic governance in practice through networks of human rights
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis and media groups, to monitor police actions against dissidents and a greater presence of international NGOs. However, their potential to influence processes of police reforms does not only depend on their capacities of performing their tasks, but arguably also on the attitude and political will of the MIA and the government to cooperate (Musabayeva 2013, p. 72). Where a large section of the police force remains corrupt and has few motives to change, just strengthening civil society could be futile.
3.3.3 Civil society Civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan are the best developed and most professional of all Central Asian countries; they are involved in many activities including research, cooperation with international institutions, activities through mass media, conducting joint events, lobbying or drafting of laws appeals, and participation in government advisory bodies. Media and civil rights are in a relatively good situation, the academic community is relatively free and corruption remains low within the civil society community (Swanström, Cornell & Tabyshalieva 2005, p. 23). Although there are no barriers for CSOs and registration is relatively quick and easy, their sustainability remains a grave concern because of their financial dependency on foreign donors, whereas the legal structure and living standards of Kyrgyzstan make donations from its own citizens difficult (ADB 2011, p. 3; Bayalieva- Jailobaeva 2014, p. 370). A historical milestone was the arrival of donor organisations in the Kyrgyz Republic during the early 1990s, which financed about 90-100% of NGOs and have played a major role in the development of civil society in Kyrgyzstan since its independence in 1991 (ADB 2015, pp.1-2). While during the first phase (1991-1994) active NGOs were financially unstable and were operating from grant to grant without any clear strategic objectives, during the second phase (1995-2004), characterised by qualitative and quantitative changes of NGOs, they strongly developed partnerships with other NGOs and international organisations and formulated common strategic objectives regarding the same issues (human rights, environmental issues, etc.). During the third, current phase of development (2005- present), NGOs are not only successfully carrying out their objectives with a societal impact, but are also more experienced with lobbying for social and political interests with the state. At the moment, there are approximately 15,000 NGOs registered in Kyrgyzstan, although just over 5,000 are really active (ICNL 2018). The main legal framework for civil society actors to operate in Kyrgyzstan consists of the 2010 Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Civil Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Law on Non-commercial Organisations, the Tax Code as well as international acts and agreements that include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (ADB 2011, pp.
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6-7; ICNL 2018). Registration of NGOs and CSOs follows the requirements of the 2005 Law on State Registration of Legal Entities. However, some legal efforts were made to limit the operation of CSOs in Kyrgyzstan. In 2009, president Bakiyev’s regime drafted amendments to the Law on Non-commercial Organisations, which essentially would prevent local NGOs from participating in political activities and oversee a number of measures to control the activities of NGOs. Nevertheless, the civil society sector gained enough political weight with their organised opposition against these amendments (ADB 2011, p. 4). Moreover, in 2014 members of parliament proposed a draft Law on Foreign Agents, but this law was voted down in May 2016, thanks to the strong advocacy efforts of CSOs once more (ICNL 2018). In addition, in May 2014, president Atambayev signed the Law on Public Councils of the State Bodies to regulate the newly formed PACs. Although the international community and Kyrgyzstan itself are praising this vibrant civil society, researchers such as Shirin (2016, pp. 75-77) explain why civil society isn’t always that much engaged or efficient in bringing change. First, a large part of the NGO community is related to government officials or headed by their family members, as they mean an extra source of influence, status, and income. Second, the other, independent NGOs are usually smaller, poorly managed, and exist on paper rather than in reality. Third, the group of NGOs supported by foreign sponsors may follow their own agenda rather than local concerns. Moreover, Bayalieva-Jailobieva (2014, pp. 371-372) nuances the understanding of the organisational capacities of CSOs in Kyrgyzstan, by stating that these can be categorised as either professional or non-professional, with external funding as a determining factor of placing CSOs in one of these two categories. While Bayalieva-Jailobieva argues against the idea that professional CSOs with liberal values often alienate themselves from local society and are incapable to incorporate local needs and perspectives, she warns for the sustainability of CSOs, rather serving as temporary platforms for young professionals to move on to other, financially more stable sectors. Just like in the case of Kazakhstan, I have identified CSOs engaged in police reforms in Kyrgyzstan, depicted in Table 3.2. As I previously mentioned in the Introduction, and similar to the case of Kazakhstan, SSR and police reforms remain an understudied topic at local universities and research institutions. Kyrgyzstan has a rich civil society, most NGOs and CSOs are active in environmental issues, democratisation, social development and women’s rights, but relatively little on SSR or police reforms in particular. Those CSOs engaged in police reforms are mostly human rights oriented organisations that are well organised through both national and local networks. However, during a Skype interview (June 18, 2018), Bektur Osmonbaev, a senior lawyer at Adilet, stated that the political space for these organisations has become more fragile under former president Atambayev, who in 2017 limited cooperation
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis possibilities with international organisations. As a result, CSOs working on police reforms and human rights in Kyrgyzstan are having to cope with decreasing funds; donors are focusing more on educational and cultural programmes. Email interviews and Google Forms surveys conducted with Dinara Oshurahunova, head of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (June 20, 2018) and Timur Shaikhutdinov, coordinator of the Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” (June 23, 2018), further show that, despite their abilities to strengthen the voice of civil society and citizens regarding police reforms on a national scale, these NGO networks are mostly struggling to find new possibilities of getting enough funds and updated knowledge to operate. I have also included the Public Council of the MIA at a national level, and the Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs) and reported meetings between local police officers and citizens at a local level as public oversight and cooperation mechanisms. Again, I was able to collect relevant data from the civil society actors and organisations indicated in bold.
Table 3.2 Civil society actors engaged in police reforms in Kyrgyzstan
Civil society actor/ (Legal) Form Activities Indicator organisation (year founded) Coalition for NGO coalition Public awareness, #3 Participation Democracy and Civil monitoring, education, #4 Transparency Society (1998) policy advocacy #6 Responsiveness Human Rights Public association Analysis, monitoring, human #2 Integrity Movement “Bir rights advocacy, civil #3 Participation Duino” (2000) participation #5 Rule of law & human rights Legal clinic “Adilet” Public Foundation Human rights advocacy, #4 Transparency (2002) legal aid, education, #5 Rule of law & human rights training, public awareness, analysis, consultation Local Crime Autonomous and Consultancy, public #1 Public oversight & monitoring Prevention Centres independent participation, oversight #3 Participation (2013) body Reported meetings Cooperation Public participation, public #1 Public oversight & monitoring (2014) mechanism oversight, monitoring #3 Participation Public council of the Autonomous and Consultancy, public #1 Public oversight & monitoring Ministry of Internal independent participation, oversight #3 Participation Affairs (2014) body Civic Union ‘For NGO network Policy advocacy, public #1 Public oversight & monitoring Reforms and Results’ awareness, analysis, #3 Participation (2015) advisory, public #6 Responsiveness participation, monitoring National Democratic Institute Analysis, policy advocacy, #1 Public oversight & monitoring Institute (1991) monitoring #4 Transparency
Independent weekly Independent Public awareness, reporting #4 Transparency ‘Res Publica’ (1992) media journal #5 Rule of law & human rights
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‘Kylym Shamy’ (2003) Public foundation Human rights advocacy, #5 Rule of law & human rights public awareness
Voice of Freedom NGO Advocacy human rights, #5 Rule of law & human rights (2005) legal support, monitoring
ANPO Human Rights NGO Human rights advocacy, #5 Rule of law & human rights Advocacy Centre legal support (2005) Coalition against NGO Coalition Public awareness, policy and #5 Rule of law & human rights Torture (2011) human rights advocacy
Media Policy Institute NGO Public awareness, legal aid, #4 Transparency legal reform support, mediation, monitoring ‘Our Right’ (Nashe Public foundation Human rights advocacy, #5 Rule of law & human rights Pravo) legal support Association of Civil NGO network Participation, services #1 Public oversight & monitoring Society Support delivery #3 Participation Centres
3.4 Summary Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan share important traits from their Soviet past that include their current state borders and structures, security institutions, and Russian as lingua franca of various ethnic groups. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 these states have followed their own path of development. Since Central Asian states have not created their own internal structures for regional cooperation, major powers such as China and Russia are able to increase or maintain their influence through regional organisations. Although Central Asian states like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have high stakes in maintaining cooperation agreements with different international players to develop their economies and societies and to preserve stability, it doesn’t mean they will accept full implementation of democracy or SSR in the near future. Multilateral organisations involved with democratic governance, such as the EU and OSCE, do not focus primarily on Central Asia, while increasing authoritarianism in and around the Central Asian region further limits the political space for civil society to operate. On the one hand, Kazakhstan has been ruled by the same political regime since 1991, that actively tries to control its society against any perceived threats or risks. Moreover, a steady economic growth, a growing middle class in the major cities and lasting political stability haven’t resulted in a vibrant civil society; civil society is still moderately developed while civilian participation on societal and political issues in Kazakhstan remains low. On the other hand, over the past two decades, Kyrgyzstan has experienced a turbulent period with some interethnic clashes and two presidents driven out of office. Given the underdeveloped economy, it is difficult for the Kyrgyz government to provide basic services to its citizens,
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis while its corrupt state and security institutions don’t positively contribute to citizens’ trust. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan has made some important steps towards democratic governance, thanks to its well-organized and engaged civil society, although its political situation remains fragile. Overall, both these countries have established a complete monopoly over the use of force, without any identifiable separatist or otherwise politically significant group challenging it seriously. The description of relevant developments in both countries ended with an overview of civil society actors and organisations, as well as oversight and cooperation mechanisms, that are involved in police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. Respondents that have been interviewed point out that their CSOs are able to work efficiently, although they largely depend on financial assistance from foreign donor organisations. In particular, when their respective governments decide to limit their collaboration with these international organisations, local CSO are facing difficulties to keep active. Against this background, the role of these CSOs in policymaking and the practice of police reforms is analysed next.
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4. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz policies on police reforms, and the role of international organisations
4.1 Kazakhstan Since the 1990s Kazakh authorities have produced a number of key documents addressing the policy priorities towards reforming the economy, as well as judicial and governmental structures, and, in particular also, the law enforcement agencies. The so-called 100 Precise Steps towards Realisation of the Five Institutional Reforms articulates concrete measures to implement the National Strategy to 2050 to become a strong and consolidated nation, among the world’s top 30 of most developed countries. In Section II, Rule of Law, step 14 entails “the adoption of a new law on public service in all government agencies, including law enforcement”, step 30 “the accountability of the police to local executive authorities and communities”, and step 31 “the establishment of a public review board by law to consider complaints against the police officers who violate ethical standards” (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies 2015). In Section V, Transparent and Accountable State, steps 94 and 96 deal with the enhancement of transparency by the introduction of Open Government and an online availability of statistical databases of central government bodies, step 97 is about public participation and inclusion through self-governance at a local level, while step 99 deals with the instalment of public councils “to promote the discussions on such issues as the strategic plans and regional development programmes” (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies 2015). Another strategic document, the Concept of Legal Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the period 2010 to 2020, addresses significant updates of main branches of national law that correspond with essential principles of accountability, integrity, professionalism, respecting citizens’ rights and transparency. It also states that “the main qualitative indicator of law enforcement, should be the level of citizens’ trust in its services” (Supreme Court of Kazakhstan 2009). Similarly, the Concept of Personnel Policy of Law Enforcement Agencies acknowledges the need for raising the police personnel’s effectiveness and discipline, while reducing violations and corruption in order to safeguard its citizens’ constitutional rights, freedoms and legitimate interests (Government of the Republic Kazakhstan 2013). Most legal documents and policies are in line with the roadmap of these national strategic plans. The latest amendments to the law On Internal Affairs Bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan, originally adopted in 1992, entail the same essential principles of democratic policing, such as transparency, competency, integrity, and protection of human rights and freedoms. It also states that, “to implement the public control in accordance with the
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the public monitoring commissions and the public council are established” (Adilet 2014). In turn, the law About Public Councils allowed the establishment of public councils as of January 1, 2016, to hold government institutions accountable at both national and local levels through a broad representation of NGOs and CSOs. As a result, until June 2017, 229 active public councils with more than 4,000 members from civil society were observed (Knox & Janenova 2018, pp. 311-312). According to this law, public councils only have an advisory and consultation function, but present council members are allowed to practice these in various ways, including discussing, approving, and evaluating strategic plans, state and local budgets; developing and introducing proposals to public institutions; and checking and improving the governance and transparency of state bodies in accordance with professional ethics and standards of rule of law and human rights. In addition, during a Skype interview (June 18, 2018), Shambilov stated that Kazakhstan is the first country in Central Asia to have installed monitoring committees, that have been operating since 2005 throughout the country. To tackle corruption, the government of Kazakhstan adopted the laws On Combating Corruption, On Civil Service, and the Ethical Code of Civil Servants in 2015. Based on this legal framework, the MIA created, in cooperation with the PRI, a Program of Action to be applied in the prison systems, that includes the fostering of an anti-corruption attitude amongst personnel, improving the efficiency of anti-corruption activities, and the introduction of societal oversight and control (Amaechi 2017, pp. 6, 8). In addition, Kazakh authorities have implemented an Open Government policy to enhance its transparency and accountability by enabling citizens to online consult and discuss with state agencies. This electronic platform of the Open Government initiative includes various elements such as Open Data, Open RLA (that most likely stands for Remote Level Access, for discussing draft bills, draft standards of public services and permits), Open Budgets, and an Assessment of the Effectiveness of Government Agencies (Egov 2018). In a recent interview, the Deputy Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Agency for Civil Service and Anti-Corruption, Alik Shpekbayev, further highlighted Kazakhstan’s ambitions to become a modern, transparent and accountable state, based on the best international practices, but also acknowledging its national peculiarities (Kenshebayev 2017). Talking about law enforcement, Shpekbayev dealt with some important ongoing changes, including the creation of local police services that are accountable to local executive authorities and improving transparency by creating online maps, which provide a better overview of all crime statistics in each region. Moreover, criminal proceedings by the police and prosecutorial authorities are being made more humane and liberal, with the abolition of the general procuracy as a leftover from the Soviet past as the most important
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis measure. Crimes of corruption by high-level officials, including the ones from defence and law enforcement agencies, will result in prosecutions. Overall, Kazakhstan’s key strategic and legal documents acknowledge the need for building trust and legitimacy among citizens, of creating oversight mechanisms and online data platforms to hold the Kazakh police forces accountable and transparent, of decentralising mandates and functions of the overburdened MIA to local police offices, and of having law enforcement personnel live up to a professional code of conduct. However, these documents, rules, and regulations mean little if the principles of democratic policing are not put into practice. Furthermore, as oversight mechanisms like public councils have only been created recently, it is less likely that these already function very effectively.
4.1.1 The role of international organisations While Kazakhstan maintains and balances different international partnerships as part of its multi-vector diplomacy, it demonstrates some goodwill towards multilateral institutions like NATO, the EU, and OSCE in terms of security cooperation and, in turn, commitments to democratise its security forces. In 2006, Kazakhstan adopted the full spectrum of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). This entails an enhanced version of the Partnership for Peace for NATO’s partner countries, directed at reforming its security structures, according to the host country’s needs, ambitions and priorities (NATO 2014, p. 5). In addition, in 2007 Kazakhstan also agreed to participate in the Planning and Review Process (PARP), a key instrument for helping NATO partner countries with specific technical reforms. However, NATO’s partnership programmes mostly focus on reforming the armed forces and Ministry of Defence, rather than the police forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs. On December 21, 2015, Kazakhstan also signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with the European Union, replacing the original 1999 PCA. The EPCA promotes bilateral trade and investments but also aims to strengthen the political dialogue on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Yet, some experts and NGOs are very sceptical and question the meaning of such political dialogues (Emerson 2015, p. 1). Since 2002, the EU has financed ongoing regional programmes on border management (BOMCA) and anti-drug trafficking (CADAP) in Central Asia, as well as a number of temporary civil society driven projects through its Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in Kazakhstan. Such projects were implemented by local organisations like PRI, KIBHR or LPRC, aimed at, for example, strengthening the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of civil society representatives or assisting state agencies in drafting and adopting new Human Rights
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Action Plans (Delegation of the EU to Kazakhstan 2016). However, just like NATO, the European Union has not conducted any joint programmes to directly address the democratisation of the police forces in Kazakhstan. Finally, in 1992 Kazakhstan joined the OSCE and as chairman organised the OSCE Summit in Astana on December 2-3, 2010. At this summit, the 56 OSCE member states reaffirmed their shared vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, committing themselves to the OSCE principles and agreements, including the maintenance of peace, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic and environmental development and interstate cooperation (OSCE 2010b, pp. 1-2). Based on this Astana Commemorative Declaration, the OSCE formulated its Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities to ensure that police reforms are implemented in accordance with democratic principles and in full synergy between involved member states. This framework also calls for the full engagement of civil society stakeholders, “which allows law enforcement agencies to take into account the widest possible range of views within societies; an extensive global network of experts from both the public and the private sectors; and long-standing and effective channels of cooperation with international and regional organisations” (OSCE 2012b, p. 3). Of all international and regional organisations, the OSCE conducts most cooperative programmes with the government of Kazakhstan, specifically dealing with reforming its police forces. The OSCE established its centre in Almaty in 1998, then moved it to Astana in 2007, renaming it to the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in January 2015. It has focused its efforts on organising events and activities with local CSOs in order to acquaint Kazakhstan’s law enforcement agencies with best practices in democratic policing in many important areas, such as fighting organised crime, violent extremism, and radicalisation leading to terrorism (sometimes referred to as VERLT), drug trafficking, cybersecurity, and public order management. Nevertheless, according to the Annual Report by the Secretary-General on Police-related Activities from 2003 until the most recent one, 2016, the OSCE has not launched any all-encompassing police reform programmes in Kazakhstan yet. While the first annual reports hardly provide more detailed information about police-related activities, the latest reports from 2015 and 2016 give more insights into the budget and assigned staff. In 2015, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana has conducted 14 specific activities (11 training programmes and 3 information exchange/institution and capacity-building activities), and 18 activities (12 training programmes, 6 information exchange/ institution and capacity-building activities) in 2016 (OSCE 2015; p. 108; OSCE 2016a, p. 114). Over the past years, the OSCE budget on police-related activities in Kazakhstan amounted to just €46,000, 11% of the total budget on Politico-Military Activities (OSCE 2016a, p. 111). The OSCE has no particular
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis department for these activities but has organised them under the Politico-Military Dimension. In addition, Table 4.1 provides a compact, albeit far from exhaustive overview of key programmes and initiatives of the OSCE and the Kazakh government on police reforms. From 2006 to 2007, the Kazakh MIA conducted its Police Development Cooperation Activities Project in close cooperation with the OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), an OSCE focal point supporting all police-related field operations. As part of this project, visits to the United Kingdom and Spain were organised for MIA representatives and involved NGOs, in order to study oversight programmes of the police and the use of video surveillance to familiarise them with ways for improving public trust and cooperation with the police (OSCE 2006, p. 20). Following up these study tours, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana organised, in close cooperation with the CSOs Penal Reform International and Charter for Human Rights, a roundtable on public oversight and prevention of torture in pre-trial detention centres, further promoting closer cooperation between the police and civil society on public monitoring of the police (OSCE 2007, pp. 56-57). Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 provided an opportunity to pay attention to the democratic reform of its security structures, including the police. This might explain Kazakhstan’s slightly more open attitude towards law enforcement issues from 2008 on. For example, the MIA, the LPRC, and the Charter for Human Rights organised a regional roundtable on the Operationalisation of the (OSCE) Guidebook on Democratic Policing in View of Police Powers and Oversight Mechanisms, focusing on three essential elements of democratic policing: police powers; police ethics and human rights in the context of arrest, detention, custody, public order management; and mechanisms and instruments for controlling and measuring police activities. In the same year, they also organised a conference in Astana on the Improvement of Activities of Interior Bodies: Democratic Principles and the Role of Civil Society. This event was attended by representatives of Kazakhstan’s law enforcement agencies, NGOs, international experts and diplomatic missions (OSCE 2008a, p. 72). In the meantime, Kazakhstan’s authorities also allowed the PRI and the Charter for Human Rights to monitor police stations and pre-trial detention centres, so as to prevent torture and other inhumane treatment of prisoners. From the annual OSCE reports, it becomes clear that CSOs in Kazakhstan have actively (co-)organised and participated in multiple police-related events to promote democratic principles such as integrity, human rights, and community policing. The OSCE has facilitated, together with the SPMU, the Charter for Human Rights and other CSOs as well as various embassies, training seminars on public safety and public assembly management in Aktobe and Almaty (OSCE 2015, p. 106; OSCE 2016a, p. 112). These seminars were held so as to prepare the police forces for the EXPO 2017 in Astana. Legislative and practical
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis recommendations were introduced to local and national authorities to ensure that they would follow rules on limiting the impact of firearms and the application of physical force during public safety management, according to international human rights standards. PRI co- organised three expert meetings on criminal justice reforms, focusing on detainee rights and conditions of early release during criminal proceedings (OSCE 2013, p. 128). In addition, KIBHR regularly facilitates activities on human rights including so-called Master Class seminars for some 30 police instructors from across the country (OSCE 2014, p. 137). According to Mr. Zhovtis, KIBHR is also responsible for providing courses on human rights as part of police training curricula (Skype interview, June 12, 2018). While the OSCE annual reports only show a series of police-related events and projects organised between the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, local authorities and the MIA, they hardly deal with the issue of their actual impact on police reforms. Obviously, these reports merely measure the progress of democratising police forces by the sheer number of activities organised and the size of allocated budgets. It remains unclear, however, how these events attended by only a handful of officers or the curricula on best practices and international standards of democratic policing, could impact the MIA police institutions as a whole. Despite Kazakhstan’s open attitude displayed to the outside world, being the 2010 chair of the OSCE and the host of EXPO 2017, there is hardly any direct proof of a change of the regime’s actual stance on reforming its security and justice sectors. Neither are there signs that the OSCE Programme Office in Astana has structurally worked with key CSOs over a longer period of time, rather than just a number of ad hoc projects. This at least implies there are possibilities for a better synchronisation of the OSCE and civil society efforts within the same area of police reforms.
Table 4.1 Kazakhstan’s policies towards police reforms
Domestic policy Strategy documents formulations and initiatives - Concept of Legal Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Period 2010 to 2020 (2009) - Concept of Personnel Policy of Law Enforcement Agencies (2013) - 100 Precise Steps towards Realisation of the Five Institutional Reforms (2015)
Policy and legal documents - On Internal Affairs Bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2014) - On Combating Corruption (2015) - On Civil Service (2015) - On Ethical Code of Civil Servants (2015) - About Public Councils (2015) - On Access to Information (2015) International assistance OSCE key documents programmes and initiatives - OSCE Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities (2003-2016) - Astana Commemorative Declaration (2010) - OSCE Policing Strategic Framework (2012) OSCE joint projects and activities
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- Police Department Cooperation Activities Project (2006-2007) - Conference on Improvement of Activities of Interior Bodies: Democratic Principles and the Role of Civil Society (2008) - Roundtable on Operationalisation of the Guidebook on Democratic Policing in View of Police Powers and Oversight Mechanisms (2008) - Expert meetings on criminal justice reforms (2013) - Master Class seminar on human rights (2014) - Seminars on community policing (2015, 2016) - Seminars on public safety and public assembly management (2015, 2016)
4.2 Kyrgyzstan Just like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan has formulated a number of key documents to commit itself to reform its security services, in particular its police forces. The National Sustainable Development Strategy for the Period 2013-2017 put forward the “restoration of confidence of citizens in the institutions of government as the main objective with regard to public administration” (National Council for Sustainable Development 2013, p. 16). This main objective should be further realised by increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of government institutions while overcoming negative effects such as corruption and a lack of professionalism and accountability. Increase in public confidence in the government also has to be ensured by increased collaboration between government, state agencies and civil society at both a national and local level. When it comes to law enforcement agencies, their “reform is expected to be based on the (following) principles of increased transparency, their accessibility for external public and social control, and concentrated efforts on protecting individuals, citizens and society from criminal infringements” (National Council for Sustainable Development 2013, p. 24). On a policy level, the respective regimes of Kyrgyzstan have reformulated and adopted various concepts to reform its Ministry of Internal Affairs and police forces to make them more effective in facing post-Cold War security challenges and adhere to democratic principles. After prime minister Shamil Atakhanov visited Georgia to study its police reforms, the Kyrgyz government under president Akayev in 1998 adopted the Concept of Development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic (Marat 2010, p. 24). After its inauguration in 2005, the new government under President Bakiyev reformulated and approved the Concept of Reforming the Bodies of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic for the period till 2010. It also established a National Coordination Council on Reforming the Law Enforcement System as a focal point for courts, CSOs, parliament, and the Public Prosecutor’s office. Yet, it has been stated that all of these police reform programmes did not entail an overall strategy, and, above all, there is no genuine political commitment of the government or MIA to reform its services (Lewis 2011a, p. 33). After the civil unrests that
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis resulted in the ouster of Bakiyev in 2010, the interim government under Otunbayeva tried to reformulate a concept for police reform. In response, a group of activists, that would later organise themselves as the NGO network Civic Union “For Reform and Results”, initiated civil campaigns to formulate ideas and collect signatures on reform, which eventually became the cornerstones of The Alternative Concept on Police Reform (USAID 2014). After more than 10,000 signatures were collected, a meeting was held with both government officials and civil society on February 13, 2013. As a result, the government of Kyrgyzstan adopted all suggestions and recommendations for civic participation in the Measures on Police Reform on April 30, 2013. These recommendations included establishing an oversight council on the reforms and development of law enforcement bodies; strengthening cooperation between the police and civil society. The legal NGO Adilet contributed input in relation to adapting and reforming the criminal proceedings code (Osmonbaev, Skype interview, June 18, 2018). From the Kyrgyz government’s side, Prime Minister Djoomart Otorbaev stated that “civil society’s opinion on the ongoing police reforms is the most important for us as, without the support of active citizens, we cannot achieve the desired results,” and marked ‘the increase of public confidence in the authorities as the main criteria for evaluating the work of the government’ (USAID 2014). Following the recommendations adopted in the Measures on Police Reforms, the Civic Union also put forward the essence of ensuring public security and civilian trust through local self-governance (Kazakbaev et al. 2015, p. 4). This notion of local self- governance (LSG) is closely related to community policing, where civilians actively cooperate with law enforcement and local legislative and administrative bodies have sufficient mandates to oversee the police. LCPCs and meetings between police officers and citizens are two prime examples of LSG in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Kyrgyzstan has adopted various documents supporting the concept of police reforms. It introduced a number of anti-corruption laws and policies, specifically applied to government officials and state services (Jorupbekova & Kachkynbayeva 2011, pp. 55-56). The main laws on fighting corruption are On Fighting Corruption, adopted in 2003 and amended in 2009, and On Public Service of 2004, amended in 2010. Furthermore, in 2014 president Atambayev ratified the Law on Public Advisory Councils (PACs), regulating the founding and activities of PACs at all state structures (Marat 2010, 21-22). This law also guarantees the formation of a selection committee responsible for the creation of these new PACs, consisting of 10 members from CSOs and 5 from various state agencies. As a result, the Public Advisory Council of the MIA has been established to ensure citizen participation in the oversight of police reforms, by taking into account public opinions and inputs in formulating, implementing and evaluating state policies. Moreover, in July 2015, the document on Mechanisms of Interaction and Cooperation between the Law Enforcement
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Bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic and Civil Society Institutions was adopted and later processed into police reform and education materials.
4.2.1 The role of international organisations In contrast to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan hasn’t signed any deepened partnerships with international organisations, such as the EPCA with the European Union or EPAP with NATO. Although the European Union has engaged with the Kyrgyz Republic in political dialogue and has organised activities and supports local programmes through instruments such as DCI and EIDHR, it has not initiated any programmes specifically aimed at SSR or police reforms (Delegation of the EU to the Kyrgyz Republic 2015, pp. 4-6). However, the 2004 OSCE Annual Report on Police Matters mentions one case where the EU and the OSCE signed a financing agreement for a total of €1,000,000 in support of the implementation of the OSCE’s police assistance programme (OSCE 2004, p. 33). Like Kazakhstan, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (CiB) seems the sole provider and facilitator of police reform assistance programmes. According to the latest OSCE Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities, in 2015 and 2016 a budget of €433,500 and €550,000 respectively was allocated to police related programmes in Kyrgyzstan (OSCE 2015, p. 109; OSCE 2016a, p. 116). The OSCE has organised a total of 62 police-related activities (21 trainings, 30 information exchange/institution and capacity building and 11 analysis of lessons learned, assessments and guidelines) in 2015, and 59 activities (18 trainings, 24 information exchange/institution and capacity building and 17 analysis of lessons learned, assessments and guidelines) in 2016, all managed by a combined staff of local and international professionals (OSCE 2015, p. 115; OSCE 2016a, p. 121). The OSCE Centre in Bishkek was established in 1998, and it has initiated a Police Assistance Programme (PAP) from 2003 until December 2005. This programme had a total of 8 goals: (1) improving the quality of police investigations; (2) improving police capacity for drug interdiction; (3) setting up a modern and efficient police emergency call-response centre; (4) establishing a national criminal information analysis system; (5) providing a radio- communication system for police crime investigators; (6) improving the police’s capacity to prevent, resolve or manage public conflict and disorder; (7) introducing community policing methods at a pilot site; (8) expanding the curriculum of the National Police Academy (OSCE 2003, p. 30). Oversight of the programme was managed by an Executive Steering Committee, chaired by the Head of the Centre, and including the First Deputy Minister, the Head of Defence and Security Matters within the Presidential Administration, the Head of the Police Academy, Ambassadors of the donor States and representatives of NGOs.
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The CiB also facilitated the drafting of the 2005 Concept of Reforming the Bodies of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic for the period till 2010 and its implementation plan by hiring two external consultants to give expert advice to the MIA (OSCE 2004, p. 35). Despite a shortage of staff and funds of the first PAP, the OSCE police-related annual report of 2005 addresses how the politically turbulences in Kyrgyzstan resulted in a certain political will and need to embrace police reforms for achieving and maintaining stability and security, while better protecting human rights of its citizens. This report confirmed that the police developed its attitudes regarding its role in a democratic society (2005, p. 38). Moreover, community policing was introduced in the district of Osh, one of the main centres of civil unrest, and extended to other areas such as Bishkek and its surrounding districts. These community policing projects emphasised the engagement of local community and NGOs in its implementation, the organising of outreach activities such as Police Open Day, meetings with local self-government departments, as well as building skills of law enforcement officials in policing in a democratic society and relations with the media. In January 2007, the Police Reform Programme (PRP) became a separate part of the United Budget of the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan, which helped to increase the programme’s sustainability and effectiveness in the planning, implementing and monitoring of its activities. Where the PAP activities used to be additional tasks of the Politico-Military Dimension staff, in 2007 the PRP was implemented by its own 2 international and 4 national staff members (OSCE 2007, p. 57). Thanks to the increase of its financial resources, the PRP was also able to expand and consolidate the community-based policing projects to a nation-wide scale. In many areas, community policing and modern styles of police management were introduced and taught in a great number of local educational institutions, governments, and police schools and stations. Consequently, this would promote organisational change within Kyrgyz police, raise awareness of community policing among the general public, and evaluate local opinions and concerns (OSCE 2007, p. 58). An example of this awareness-raising was the international conference on Community Policing Development in Kyrgyzstan: Three Years’ Experience and Future Prospects (November 2007). Another way to increase police- community partnership was the CiBs support for media projects to inform a wider public on various police-related themes to promote public trust and mutual understanding (OSCE 2010a, p. 91). Until 2010, the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, specialised in holding dialogues between government institutions and civil society, actively cooperated with and participated in these OSCE-led activities on various issues of police reforms. Later, the coalition changed its focus on issues and oversight mechanisms within parliament (Oshurahunova, email interview, June 20, 2018). Despite favourable preconditions, such as a more professional development and education, increased partnerships between police and
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis public and local capacity-building in order to ensure sustainability, the implementation of PRP still suffered from a lack of financial, technical and human resources at all levels. The renewed civil unrest in 2010 challenged the implementation of the PRP in so far that police officers were no longer able to participate in all activities organised by CiB. As a result, in 2010 the PRP focused its work on trust and confidence-building between the police and population through community-based policing and maintaining its education and training programmes to professionalise the police services. It acknowledged that the success of the police reform primarily depends on sustainable guarantees and commitment of the Kyrgyz authorities, the involvement of civil society and assistance from the international community (OSCE 2010a, pp. 88-89). Based on their experiences in the turbulent year of 2010, police officers had growing concerns about using their force to prevent any future escalations. Therefore, the CiB insisted to provide assistance to the police in developing a better legal policing framework. It provided the MIA recommendations from several meetings with civil society and government officials to draft a new law to include international policing standards into the domestic legislation. However, this draft law was not finished until December 2010 (OSCE 2010a, p. 89). Actually, it would take until 2013, when the final version of the Police Reform Measures by the Kyrgyz government was approved and adopted as the new police reform plan. The CiB was also involved in facilitating a number of discussions and evaluation events, engaging a broad range of stakeholders of parliament, law enforcement bodies, civil society as well as embassies and international organisations, during the process until the adoption of this new law on police reforms in 2013 (OSCE 2013, p. 133). In addition, in November 2010 the Permanent Council of the Kyrgyz government approved the Community Security Initiative (CSI), meant to support the police in providing human security for all communities after the 2010 violence while simultaneously promoting bottom-up changes in policing behaviour. By December 2013, the CSI project had expanded to a total of 15 locations, which allowed Community Safety Working Groups, consisting of local police officers and local authorities and civil society representatives to discuss the most urgent safety concerns and resolving them to prevent any other conflicts (OSCE 2013, p. 138). As a result, these Community Safety Working Groups and local governments successfully reinstalled LCPCs throughout Kyrgyzstan, which had stopped its activities after the April 2010 violent incidents (OSCE 2010a, pp. 90). These public bodies provide an additional infrastructure for community-based policing projects to address the prevention of crime and conflicts. Moreover, the CSI contributed to the formation of draft laws on Civil Oversight over the Local Police and the New Criteria for Evaluating the Performance of the Police. The CSI project ceased its activities and was officially closed down by the end of 2015. Overall, the Community Security Initiative was well received by the MIA, the
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis government of Kyrgyzstan, and the donor community as well given its impact on improving public-police relations and raising awareness on tolerance within a multi-ethnic society (OSCE 2015, p. 115). In 2014, the PRP underwent a partial restructuring and rebranding to become the Police Matters Programme (PMP), as part of the Unified Budget of the CiB. With this restructuring, the CiB strived for a more comprehensive approach of addressing law enforcement support and reform through supporting the platform for cooperation of all relevant stakeholders, including the MIA, Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), parliament, civil society, embassies and international organisations. The CiB concluded that the MIA had lacked action plans for implementing any of the previous concepts and strategies to reform law enforcement bodies over the previous 10 years. Furthermore, successive governments failed to fully support changes within the MIA. This lack of political will of the Kyrgyz authorities and the MIA’s resistance to reform resulted in a lack of transparency and accountability and a decreased trust in the police (OSCE 2014, p. 140). From 2015 on, the PMP was incorporated into the Politico-Military Dimension, so it would not only assist the MIA but all law enforcement and security-providing institutions in Kyrgyzstan as well. Furthermore, in February 2015, the government of the Kyrgyz Republic ratified the Decision on the New Police Performance Evaluation Criteria, formulated with the help of OSCE experts. The adoption of this new law is a significant milestone in the police reform process because it enables citizens to assess and evaluate the quality of the work of the police with the purpose of improving police performances to better respond to their needs (OSCE 2015, p. 110). Throughout the years, the CiB has also given much attention to train and educate police officers on principles of human rights, such as roundtable discussions and seminars on Human Rights as a Way to Increase the Professionalism of Police Officers (OSCE 2007, p. 63), a series of training-of-trainers courses on human rights and crowd psychology (OSCE 2010a, p. 96), and diverse courses on human rights and mediation skills, gender issues, police ethics and detainee rights (OSCE 2013, p. 141). To conclude, Table 4.2 provides a compact but not exhaustive overview of key police-related programmes and initiatives between the OSCE and the Kyrgyz government.
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Table 4.2 Kyrgyzstan’s policies towards police reforms
Domestic policy formulations Strategy document - National Sustainable Development Strategy 2013-2017 (2013) Policy and legal documents - Concept of Development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic (1998) - On Fighting Corruption (2003) - On Public Service (2004) - Concept of Reforming the Bodies of Internal Affairs for the period till 2010 (2005) - Measures on Police Reform (2013) - Code of Ethics (2010) - Law on Public Advisory Councils (2014) - Mechanisms of Interaction and Cooperation between the Law Enforcement Bodies and Civil Society Institutions (2015) - Decision on the New Police Performance Evaluation Criteria (2015) International assistance OSCE key documents programmes and initiatives - OSCE Annual Reports of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities 2003-2016 - Astana Declaration (2010) - OSCE Policing Strategic Framework (2012) OSCE Joint projects and activities - Police Assistance Programme (2003-2007) - Interim Police Assistance Programme (2005) - Police Reform Programme (2007-2014) - Community Security Initiative (2010-2015) - Police Matters Programme (2014-) - Conference Community Policing Development in Kyrgyzstan: Three Years’ Experience and Future Prospects (2007) - Roundtables Civilian Oversight and Police (2008, 2010) - Conference Security Sector Governance and Reform (2017)
Overall, it can be stated that the tumultuous events in 2005 and 2010, as well as the active involvement of CSO networks such as the Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” influenced Kyrgyz policy formulations on police reforms. Civic unrest and the incapability of local police officers to anticipate made the Kyrgyz government realise that its law enforcement agencies were in urgent need to reform. Similar to the case of Kazakhstan, the various OSCE Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in Kyrgyzstan only show the number of organised activities and budgets as ‘progress’ of police reforms.
4.3 Summary Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have formulated all main principles of democratic policing in their key documents as part of a broader strategy of developing and modernising their countries. From all international (donor) organisations, only the OSCE has facilitated activities and programmes directly related to police reforms, which can be found in their police-related annual reports. The government of Kazakhstan hasn’t allowed any comprehensive police reform programmes yet, although it shows some openness towards cooperation with the OSCE and local CSOs including KIBHR in organising activities on
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis democratic policing in light of its chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 and being host to EXPO 2017. The Kazakh government also has allowed the PRI to lead monitoring commissions in police stations and detention centres since 2005, and created numerous oversight mechanisms for CSOs to consult and participate in law- and policymaking discussions. Kyrgyzstan in its turn has allowed police reform programmes with bigger budgets and more staff members to operate since 2003, but constantly renamed and restructured these programmes under the various political regimes. While the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society was actively involved in OSCE police-related activities until 2010, the Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” was the main driver of drafting Kyrgyzstan’s latest law on police reforms in 2013. In addition, this CSO network promotes the essence of local self- governance, that should result in the creation of effective local oversight and cooperation mechanisms such as the LCPCs and reported meetings. The continuous civil unrests urged the Kyrgyz government to some extent to reform, although the government and MIA remain hesitant for full-scale changes of its institutions. Overall, one has to be critical when reading official documents that contain terms such as ‘trust building’, ‘enhancing transparency’ or ‘respecting the freedoms and rights of citizens’. Written commitments or statements are not always consistent with actual efforts, especially when analysed within an authoritarian or flawed democratic setting. Rather, these documents have to be seen in conjunction with sources of CSOs, (international) NGOs and research institutes that approach the actual practice of police reforms on the ground in a more complete way.
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5. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz practices of police reforms, and the role of civil society
5.1 Kazakhstan In this paragraph, I will continue with the actual practice or progress of police reforms in Kazakhstan, measured based on the following six qualitative indicators: #1 Public oversight and monitoring; #2 Integrity, or battling corruption within law enforcement; #3 Participation of citizens and civil society (or local ownership); #4 Transparency; #5 Upholding the rule of law and human rights, and; #6 Responsiveness and trust from citizens.
I also bring up the role of selected civil society organisations and actors – including KIBHR, PRI, Adil Soz, Medianet, and the Public Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and monitoring commissions as public oversight mechanisms – in bridging the policy-practice gap.
Indicator #1: Public oversight and monitoring For this indicator, it is relevant for public oversight and cooperation mechanisms, established by central and local executive bodies, to be able to work (largely) independently from the state, being represented by citizens, civil society actors, and other stakeholders. Yet, according to the Bertelsmann Foundation (2018), between 2006 and 2018 Kazakhstan’s position regarding institutional reforms decreased: the Status Index from 5.48 to 4.7 and the Democracy Status from 4.18 to 3.8 (Figure 5.1). Whereas the BTI Status Index tracks the overall transformation towards democracy and open market, the Democracy Status focuses on the political dimension, including criteria of state-ness, political participation, stability of democratic institutions, as well as the political and social integration of citizens and civil society. This means that president Nazarbayev and his close oligarchic and patronage networks still dominate all government branches, while checks and balances, supposed to control the executive powers, remain very weak. As a result, Kazakhstan’s political regime effectively prevents the rise of any new political opposition; other state institutions such as the national parliament and local administrations are still dependent on decisions and approvals by the central government, while bottom-up initiatives are mostly ignored or considered irrelevant.
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Figure 5.1 Bertelsmann Transformation Index of Kazakhstan between 2006-2018
BTI Kazakhstan 6 5 4 Index (1-10) 3 Status Index 2 Democracy Status 1 0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Year
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation (2018c)
In the recently established public councils, including the one of the MIA, two-thirds of its members are supposed to be representatives from NGOs and CSOs and one-thirds from state or local authorities (Know & Janenova 2018, p. 313). For instance, KIBHR and PRI are member CSOs of the Public Council of the MIA. While these public councils are in their early stages of development, the engagement of civil society representatives in these public councils still has to develop. It has been criticised that the roles within public councils are still too broadly defined, while state representatives are able to put pressure on other council members through their high status and better institutional knowledge. Furthermore, a number of civil society representatives are actually installed by the government, which makes it easier for government officials abuse (Knox & Janenova 2018, pp. 314, 318). Consequently, state representatives effectively prevent an autonomous functioning of these public councils and, in turn, the accountability of governmental ministries or other executive bodies to these public councils. Mr. Shambilov of PRI also stated in a Skype interview (June 18, 2018), that public hearings and consultations of the MIA Public Council are still being held at its central location in Astana. Due to Kazakhstan’s large territorial size, for many CSOs and citizens from other cities, it is impossible to attend these public hearings and consultations because of the high costs and travel distance. According to Mr. Shambilov (Skype interview, June 18, 2018), Public Council meetings should be held more openly and possibly be organised at various locations throughout the country. Furthermore, although monitoring committees have been long in place as oversight mechanisms for CSOs like PRI to visit police custody centres and prisons, they are not always
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis able to work effectively, according to Mr. Shambilov (Skype interview, June 18, 2018). Although a new chapter of Kazakhstan’s most recent Penal Execution Code (2014) provides legally binding rights for monitoring commissions to oversee pre-trial detention centres and prisons, the government still limits their ability to operate. The monitoring commissions have to state in advance that they wish to visit such pre-trial detention centres they want to visit; at the same time, numerous reports of activists indicate a rather limited progress in the functioning of detention centres and prison systems as a result of these monitoring activities. The OSCE Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities (2015, pp. 18-19; 2016, p. 112) and the PRI (Aitykova 2017) both promote community-based policing, or, more specifically, the active cooperation between local citizens, CSOs and law enforcement agencies on important issues such as crime prevention, maintaining law and order, and community outreach activities (for instance, searching operations for criminal suspects or missing people), or forging links between ethnic groups. In addition, citizens and CSOs should be able to work with the police in full confidence through local advisory, consultative, and expert mechanisms. However, there is still a very clear gap between declarations on cooperation during forums and seminars, and actual practice. So far, no effective mechanisms for local cooperation between local governments, CSOs and police stations have been established yet (Aitykova 2017, p. 5). For example, local cooperation is often one-sided. While the local population is eager to engage in community outreach activities, the local police remain unaffected or only begin cooperating a couple of days later. Moreover, police officers aren’t familiar enough with the rule of law and, another example, often do not allow citizens to videotape their actions, although this is not forbidden. There are more concrete steps needed to force police officers in creating a more open attitude towards society. Without public support or trust, police forces won’t be able to effectively fight crime or address other needs of the local people.
Indicator #2: Integrity In light of this indicator, we look at the practice of a decrease or total abolishment of levels of corruption within the police forces, one of the largest problems of Kazakh society. Transparency International developed the Corruption Transparency Index to measure the (perceived) levels of corruption within the public sector, according to teams of both international and local experts and businesspeople. Data for this index is gathered from surveys and assessments that include questions related to bribery of public officials, misappropriation of public funds, and the effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts. Between 2003 and 2011, Kazakhstan made a limited progress from 2.4 to 2.7 (Figure 5.2). In 2012, Transparency International updated its research methodology to a 0-100 scale,
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis because it was considered to provide a much better overview. Regarding this rescaled range, Kazakhstan also made small improvements, from 28 in 2012 to 31 in 2017 (Figure 5.3). Moreover, the 2016 Global Corruption Barometer report by Transparency International contains an infographic summarising the results for 5 key corruption questions answered by local citizens from European and CIS countries. According to this infographic, in 2016 citizens in Kazakhstan still perceive corruption as a large problem and perceive the reporting of corruption crimes as high social risks (Global Corruption Barometer 2016, p. 33). In addition, at the 4th round of monitoring under the OECD Anti-Corruption Network Action Plan in Istanbul at September 2017, experts and NGO workers reviewed the implementation of Kazakhstan’s anti-corruption policies and laws, and share recommendations on preventing corruption within public services as well as the enforcement of criminal liability for corruption. Amongst all ratings, they consider recommendations from the previous monitoring round on political will, integrity of public service, and anti-corruption prosecutions as partially compliant (OECD ACN 2017a, p. 8). It came forward that the Kazakh government failed to demonstrate any concrete evidence of how civil society’s contributions towards the anti-corruption strategy and policy forming was systematic and significant, or whether the activities listed in its policies have any anti-corruption thrust at all. On the other hand, it was reported that not all members of civil society could contribute to the development of anti-corruption strategies and policies, as their access to the preparation process was heavily restricted and their feedback, comments, and suggestions were not sufficiently taken into account sufficient (OECD ACN 2017a, pp. 19-20). Moreover, the laws On Civil Service and the Code of Conduct fall short of specifying conditions and procedures of merit-based recruitment and promotion of police officers, and don’t contain a proper definition of personal interest, which should include both asset-wise and interests derived from family, friends or any other personal connections and networks, and conflicts with professional work (OECD ACN 38, 45). Finally, this monitoring round welcomes Kazakhstan’s high degree of criminal prosecution of corruption crimes, including those committed by high-ranking officials, and its provision of the requested detailed statistics and analysis of the application of the criminal proceedings. Simultaneously however, experts concern about the emphasis of Kazakh prosecution offices on applying financial sanctions instead of deprivation of liberty for severe corruption crimes (OECD ACN 2017a, p. 168).
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Figure 5.2 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kazakhstan between 2003-2011
CPI Kazakhstan 3
2,5
2 Score 1,5 (1-10) 1 Anti-Corruption Index 0,5 0 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Year
Source: Transparency International (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011)
Figure 5.3 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kazakhstan between 2011-2017
CPI Kazakhstan 31,5 31 30,5 30 29,5 Score 29 (1-100) Anti-Corruption 28,5 Index 28 27,5 27 26,5 2012 2014 2016 2017 Year
Source: Transparency International, 2011
While Transparency International and the OECD ACN have collected data on the perceived levels of corruption from local experts, civil society, and citizens, Nurgaliyev, Ualiyev & Simonovich (2015) collected data specifically from police officers for their analysis on the effects of different measures to fight corruption within law enforcement in Kazakhstan. According to their (preliminary) findings, police officers from different ranks and ages mostly gave answers with an (slightly below) average value in response to questions about whether repressive measures, including disciplinary actions, filing criminal charges, providing evidence related to the offense of an officer, are applied on a regular basis against corrupt
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis police officers. The study concludes that the respondents from Kazakhstan don’t believe in the effect of these anti-corruption measures, nor in the potential complete eradication of corruption within law enforcement (Nurgaliyev, Ualiyev & Simonovich 2015, pp. 144-145). This research also states that higher ranked police officers enjoy more immunity against anti- corruption measures. Without a doubt, the prevention or reduction of corruption starts with strong leadership from the top, based on zero tolerance for corruption practices within the force. Such studies, specifically aimed at researching corruption levels and anti-corruption measures within law enforcement or any other security institutions, are only conducted recently. Nurgaliyev, Ualiyev & Simonovich (2015) indicate that police corruption in most CIS countries like Kazakhstan is not an incident, but rather takes place on a mass scale and in a systematic way. Law enforcement agencies not only engage in everyday corrupt practices – for instance bribes of ordinary citizens – but they are also deeply rooted in informal ties with government officials, illegal business activities, and organised crime. As Mr. Zhovtis stated in a Skype interview (June 12, 2018), current measures are certainly able to solve petty, everyday corruption practices by individuals, not protected by these informal ties. However, there is no radical breakthrough in fighting police corruption to be expected soon in a setting like Kazakhstan, where the rule of law is subject to the elite rather than the people and corruption goes all the way up, actually starts at the top of society. Moreover, with the reestablishment of the penitentiary systems under the MIA in 2011, the risks of corruptive abuses by police officers have inevitably become even higher. A PRI policy brief puts forward two main factors that are especially associated with police corruption in penitentiary institutions (Salamatov 2017, pp. 5-10). First, the closed nature of the prison system makes it harder for civil society, or monitoring committees in particular, to get an objective picture of the prison system. Second, mutual interests in corruption between prison staff and convicts, such as bribes and favoured treatment, further corrode the integrity of the penitentiary and criminal justice systems. From the interview conducted with Mr. Zhovtis and analyses of by Nurgaliyev, Ualiyev & Simonovich (2015) and PRI (Salamatov 2017), it can be concluded that civil society efforts of addressing and fighting police corruption will not be very effective unless there is a change of attitude from the top of the MIA.
Indicator #3: Participation While the Kazakh government formally considers public participation of citizens and civil society at both national and local level essential, the public councils are key mechanisms that allow them to influence decision-making processes throughout all phases, from formulating and amending to laws on all executive offices and ministries, including the MIA. During
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis public hearings and consultations of these councils, involved parties must be able to share their opinions, expertise, insights, and recommendations that, in turn, should be taken into account and implemented in further policymaking. Related to the notion of public participation, the Worldwide Governance Indicator Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as the freedoms of expression and of association. According to this indicator, Kazakhstan decreased from a percentile rank of 18 in 2003, to 13 in 2016 (Figure 5.4). This means that over time, citizens’ possibilities and freedom in participating on societal issues have actually become more limited.
Figure 5.4 WGI Voice and Accountability of Kazakhstan between 2003-2016
WGI Voice and Accountability 20 18 16 14 12 Percentile Rank 10 (0 to 100) 8 Kazakhstan 6 4 2 0 2003 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Year
Source: World Bank (2018)
Initially, the Kazakh government tries to give the impression of being open, as there is some space for the involvement of CSOs in policy- or decision-making processes through public councils or other public oversight mechanisms. In reality, the influence of citizens and CSOs in these processes through public participation is very limited, however. As the latest version of the law On Internal Troops of the Ministry of Interior was adopted in 2014, two years prior to the official establishment of public councils, civil society has effectively hardly been able to give its input on any police reform concepts yet. Mr. Zhovtis (Skype interview, June 12, 2018) gave another example: the Vice Minister of Interior Affairs presented a draft law (that had already been passed by the Parliament) on counter-extremism at a public hearing in 2016; once CSOs representatives began criticising and raising issues whether this draft law offered the right means to fight terrorism, the Vice Minister said he appreciated their input but insisted that there were no better alternatives to this law. In other words, major decisions had
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis already been made outside the public council, and critical remarks were only seen as mere suggestions. Moreover, on behalf of KIBHR, Mr. Zhovtis attended a hearing of the MIA Public Council on December 8, 2017, discussing current issues and challenges of police forces and public assembly management. On the one hand, the proceedings of this public hearing went very well, as Mr. Zhovtis was able to present the High Commissioner of the Ministry of Internal Affairs his views on the series of problems caused by police performances at peaceful assemblies, but, on the other hand, Kazakh state officials didn’t allow too much opposition during this meeting and became protective once the Public Council became too critical (Zhovtis, Skype interview, June 12, 2018). From the perspective of the Kazakh government, granting too much ownership to its citizens would create risks and lead to calling their political legitimacy into question.
Indicator #4: Transparency It is essential that citizens, media, and oversight institutions have sufficient access to publicly available and reliable information and official statistics (e.g. levels of crime, court records) and police reports (behaviour of individual officers, operational strategies, budget management). Mrs. Karushina from Adil Soz responded in an email interview (June 19, 2018) that such online data portals and statistics as part of the Open Government policy are indeed created. Furthermore, she confirms that citizens are able to leave online comments or questions to the authorities in accordance with the law On Access to Information and the responses by the Deputy Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Agency for Civil Service and Anti- Corruption, Mr. Shpekbayev. However, it is important to note that this Open Government policy has been in effect for a couple of years only, and it certainly takes more time before these online portals will function more efficiently. At an OECD Anti-Corruption Network forum in 2017, a group of NGO experts already identified some major defects of the application of the law On Access to Information. According to them, this law doesn’t explain the principles on which state information is freely accessible or restricted, or for internal use only (OECD 2017, p. 99). As a result, government bodies and other authorities can use this law to hold back crucial information, thereby hindering the main objective of transforming into a culture of openness and transparency. These NGO experts also pointed at other defects, including lacking measures for establishing an independent administrative body to handle complaints over illicit actions by public officials, a lack of measures to protect whistleblowers, as well as no obligation for information holders and government authorities to put the law into practice (OECD 2017, p. 99). As the Law on the Access to Information was implemented in 2016, it may be too early to measure effective changes. Given the predominant culture of secrecy and the closed nature of
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis government and security institutions in Kazakhstan, it is unlikely any immediate and radical changes in the culture of transparency will take place.
Indicator #5: Upholding the rule of law and human rights In respect to this indicator, it is important that police officers in Kazakhstan are getting more familiar with internationally agreed standards of human rights in performing their main tasks. Moreover, when they limit the citizens’ rights and freedoms, the MIA should be obliged to restore these rights and make sure that justice will be brought by prosecuting guilty police officers in accordance with domestic laws. Yet, a number of CSO reports and interviews contradict these stated policies on upholding the rule of law and human rights. For example, the Freedom House Index measures the level of political rights and civil liberties of citizens, ranging from Free, through Partly Free to Not Free. According to these scores, from 2003 to 2018 Kazakhstan has remained the status of Not Free, with an average score of 6 to 5.5 (7 being the worst possible score) (Freedom House 2018). This status is based on numerous factors. Kazakh authorities have consistently marginalised or imprisoned genuine opposition, there is hardly any independent media, and criticism of the state or its policies is hardly permitted (Freedom House 2017). While Freedom House emphasises the rights and freedoms enjoyed by citizens, it is also relevant to consult additional sources that capture more accurately the practice of legal guarantees of citizens’ and human rights by police officers. While the Kazakh government has developed a code of conduct within its security institutions, Mr. Zhovtis stated that human rights are still not at the core of policing tasks, neither have the regular KIBHR and OSCE-led events and seminars resulted in putting human rights in practice (Skype interview, June 12, 2018). On the one hand, both Zhovtis and Shambilov state that there is some progress when looking at current developments in the law system, such as the creation of a national preventive mechanism and zero tolerance measures to tackle torture-related crimes. As a result, more police officers have been put in prison for torture compared to the situation 10 to 15 years ago (Shambilov, Skype interview, June 18, 2018; Zhovtis, Skype interview, June 12, 2018). On the other hand, there is still a lot of work to do to improve the police behaviour in accordance with internationally agreed standards of human rights. The so-called Zhanaozen massacre – named after the oil town of Zhanaozen, in the western region of Mangystau, where in December 2011 police officers killed 14 protestors during nonviolent assemblies – illustrates the low record of human rights in Kazakhstan (NGO Coalition Against Torture 2014, p. 4). Moreover, while the number of police officers convicted for torture might have increased, so has the number of political prisoners jailed for expressing their opinions (Zhovtis, Skype interview, June 12, 2018). Experts fear that with the
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis absence of an independent judiciary, activists and human rights defenders encounter an increasing amount of threats and harassments by the police. Finally, it is important to realise that most media in Kazakhstan are either owned by the state or by government-related businessmen. Nevertheless, journalists are to a certain extent able to report on police misconducts, as long as their news reports are based on irrefutable evidence (Karushina, email interview, June 19, 2018). For example, Mrs. Karushina referred to an article published two years ago by one of Kazakhstan’s main journals, which described over 10,000 citizens’ complaints on the misbehaviour of police officers. In result, 65 officials engaged in illicit practices were fired according to this news article (Urankayeva 2016). However, there always remains the risk that journalists are attacked or sued by accusations of breaking defamation or libel laws. Over the past years, a number of independent and opposition newspapers and media outlets have been suspended. After the Zhanaozen events, the government tightened regulations regarding public demonstrations, leaving no room for any form of protest, assembly or demonstrations (NGO Coalition against Torture 2014, p. 24). Once again, government and security institutions allow media to report on police behaviour to a certain extent only, until it clearly goes against their interests or questions their authority too much.
Indicator #6: Responsiveness Last but not least, it is relevant that people rate the police high in terms of trust, confidence, and effectiveness, and that the government of Kazakhstan and its law enforcement institutions take feelings of insecurity and injustice as experienced by local citizens seriously. The Bureau for Express Monitoring of Public Opinion and Medianet are regularly conducting public opinion polls to find out whether or not people in Kazakhstan put trust in law enforcement bodies. According to the latest poll (Demoscope 2017), about 55% of Kazakh citizens responded that they do trust law enforcement bodies, although they sometimes make mistakes and violate the law. Only 16% don’t have trust in the police, due to their lack of professionalism or corrupt behaviour. Within this survey, Kazakh citizens also responded overwhelmingly positive that the law enforcement actually protect their tights and provide general security, although they ignore human rights, while only 8 % responded that the police don’t protect their rights. It is remarkable that compared with this survey people’s trust in the police has increased significantly compared with an earlier series of surveys conducted during 2004-2012 by the Levada Centre (Nurgaliyev, Ualiyev & Simonovich 2015, p. 141). According to these surveys, only 25 to 30% of the people more or less trusted the police; more than 80% noticed lawlessness on the side of the police, over 70% did not feel protected from arbitrary police actions, while 60% noticed a degradation of the system that can’t be
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis concealed. Similarly, the Global Barometer (2016, p. 33) shows that over two-thirds of the households perceived the police as the most corrupt institution in Kazakhstan. Experts and research institutions warn that these different national opinion polls on Kazakh society and law enforcement are generally unreliable (Bertelsmann 2018a). It is difficult to gauge sincere opinions or the degree of consent in a setting that punishes dissent. The absence of civilian protests doesn’t also automatically mean consent. In addition to the quantitative results above, Zhovtis (Skype interview, June 12, 2018) provided a qualitative insight into the everyday distrust between police officers and citizens. Within the (post- )Soviet context of Kazakhstan, the state is screening and looking at people as potential threats, while its police forces consider themselves as investigators rather than servants to their citizens. Based on everyday examples, Zhovtis told how people on the street avoid police patrols out of distrust and uncertainty how they would react. In the aftermath of terrorist incidents in 2016, the local government put a three-meter high fence around the police station, but wasn’t thinking about the consequences for people, who now face more difficulties in reaching the police (Zhovtis, Skype interview, June 12, 2018). Overall, more work surely needs to be done to improve mutual trust between the police and local citizens, and to better identify and respond to citizens’ security needs and issues. Hereby, especially the culture of silencing and suppressing dissent must be challenged.
5.2 Kyrgyzstan Similar to Kazakhstan, I present here findings of the practice of democratising Kyrgyzstan’s police forces through the same six selected indicators. Again, I bring up the role of civil society and how it relates to other factors that explain the policy-practice gap. CSOs that have been analysed in the Kyrgyz case are the Civic Union “For Reforms and Results”, the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, the Human Rights Movement “Bir Duino”, the Legal Clinic “Adilet”, and the Public Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Crime Prevention Centres and reported meetings as public oversight and cooperation mechanisms.
Indicator #1: Public oversight and monitoring Again, it is essential that oversight and cooperation mechanisms are able to work effectively, independently from the state, and are represented by citizens, CSOs, public officials and other stakeholders such as business organisations. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation, Kyrgyzstan’s position rose from a Status Index of 4.76 to 5.9, and from a Democracy Status of 4.08 to 6.15 between 2006 and 2018 (Figure 5.5). Generally, it can be said that Kyrgyzstan’s government branches and political system have been meeting better standards of democratic stability and legitimation. Yet, the Kyrgyz Parliament is still perceived, by both
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis the people and civil society, as the weakest performing democratic body, that has become a focal point serving the interests of party patrons and fails to meet its constitutional responsibilities (Bertelsmann Foundation 2018b). Meanwhile, civil society has been gradually on the rise, although civil society cooperation on longer-term issues such as improving community security or crime prevention need to be improved.
Figure 5.5 Bertelsmann Transformation Index of Kyrgyzstan between 2006-2018
BTI Kyrgyzstan 7
6
5
4 Index Status Index (1-10) 3 Democracy Status 2
1
0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Year Source: Bertelsmann Foundation (2018c)
The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society was one of the initiators to hold several meetings with the MIA and other CSOs until 2010, when this CSO network demanded the creation of a platform for a systematic dialogue on the protection of citizens’ freedoms and rights (Oshurahunova, email interview, June 20, 2018). After this process had ended, the April Revolution of 2010 made that the new leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs resumed a new series of dialogues that resulted in the creation of the PACs. According to Mr. Shaikhutdinov (Google Forms survey, June 23, 2018), a member of the MIA Public Advisory Council between 2014 and 2016, this platform has positive as well as negative aspects. On the one hand, due to its legislative framework, state bodies are obliged to respond to the suggestions and opinions of NGOs and CSOs. On the other hand, the PAC of the Ministry of Internal Affairs remains underdeveloped and too dependent on the state bodies, in terms of finances and planning meetings or hearings. In addition, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Internal Affairs thinks that it is their right not to interact with civil society organisations through other oversight or cooperative mechanisms outside of this PAC. Furthermore, Mrs. Oshurahunova believes that the frequent leadership changes within government institutions haven’t ever
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis given, and still don’t provide sustainable opportunities for civil society actors to form effective oversight or cooperation mechanisms (email interview, June 20, 2018). In 2013, the Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” conducted field research on the practical implementation of two of the most widespread cooperation mechanisms on a local level, namely LCPCs and reported meetings between neighbourhood police officers and the public. The analysis brought up a number of important research findings (Papiyeva et al 2014, pp. 7-10). First, the reported and LCPC meetings of neighbourhood police officers aren’t held regularly, while instructions of the MIA state these meetings should be held every quarter. A majority of respondents from the public or CSOs are not always informed about these meetings being held, so they were given no opportunity to participate. The vast majority of neighbourhood police officers report mainly statistics of those meetings and perceive these meetings as merely about informing people; they don’t use these meetings as a platform for improving dialogue with the local public. Moreover, the senior management or heads of territorial units of law enforcement agencies are not obliged to monitor reported meetings, while not being engaged deeply in those reported meetings as the only means to evaluate their policing work on community level. On the side of the MIA and local police departments, there are quite a lot of organisational issues to address in order to make these local cooperation mechanisms between citizens and the police more effectively and efficiently. Higher ranks above the local neighbourhood officers should be more engaged in registering, regulating and monitoring public opinions and views on the policing work. From the side of civil society, there is enough desire and enthusiasm to cooperate, but they lack expertise and resources (time, volunteers, practices, and experiences from other countries) to function to its fullest potential (Oshurahunova, email interview, June 20, 2018). It can be said here, that mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation between the population and (local) law enforcement agencies remain underdeveloped in Kyrgyzstan.
Indicator #2: Integrity Again, it is relevant that police officers are adhering to a professional code of conduct and don’t lend themselves to corrupt practices, including taking bribes from local citizens or businessmen and government officials. According to Transparency International, the CPI in Kyrgyzstan made little progress and remains at 2.1 between 2003 and 2011, with the lowest score of 1.9 in 2009, when president Bakiyev reached its highest level of corrupt practices (Figure 5.6). After, 2012, when Transparency International changed its research methodology, the CPI in Kyrgyzstan made some limited progress from 24 to 29 in 2017 (Figure 5.7). In addition, the 2016 Global Barometer reveals how Kyrgyz citizens have negative perceptions of anti-corruption policies of their government. While it’s only moderately risky to report
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis corruption, corruption and bribery are seen as very big problems in Kyrgyzstan (Global Corruption Barometer 2016, p. 33).
Figure 5.6 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kyrgyzstan between 2003-2011
CPI Kyrgyzstan
2,5
2
1,5 Score (1-10) 1 Anti-Corruption Index
0,5
0 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Year
Sources: Transparency International 2003; 2005; 2007; 2009; 2011
Figure 5.7 Corruption Perceptions Index of Kyrgyzstan between 2011-2017
CPI Kyrgyzstan 35 30 25
Score 20 (1-100) 15 Anti-Corruption Index 10
5
0 2012 2014 2016 2017 Year
Source: Transparency International 2017
The OECD organised its 18th Anti-Corruption Network (ACN) Action Plan meeting in Istanbul on September 12-14, 2017, attended by both governmental and civil society representatives from Kyrgyzstan to discuss the progress of its anti-corruption measures. The meeting concluded that since the previous update, progress was made regarding 20 out of 25
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis recommendations to fight corruption at all state and security institutions, while for 5 recommendations no progress was noted (OECD ACN 2017b, p. 6). From all institutions, the law enforcement bodies seemed the hardest to reform and, in turn, the least likely to show any progress in its anti-corruption recommendations. These recommendations include strengthening law enforcement bodies’ capacities to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption. This OECD meeting further concluded that the information provided by Kyrgyz representatives on reviewing the functions of law enforcement agencies does not indicate any progress in the implementation of the recommendations as set up by the previous ACN meeting. The information provided was perceived as being too general, while it didn’t show whether there had been any improvements in fighting corruption within law enforcement agencies, such as statistics on detection of corruption facts, based on the methods described and provided in OECD policy documents (OECD 2017b, pp. 37-39). It seems that corruption in the police forces is still perceived by citizens, experts as well as stakeholders as a high risk in Kyrgyzstan.
Indicator #3: Participation In regards to this indicator, the Kyrgyz Republic’s central and local authorities must include initiatives from citizens and CSOs in the policymaking, implementation, assessment and evaluation phase of police reform programmes, and listen to their input that has to be integrated into the work of public authorities. The CSO network Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” has worked with the MIA over the past years in developing a strategy for reforming the police forces and has conducted research on the essence of active participation of LSG in the maintenance and provision of law and order. From a broader perspective, Kyrgyzstan’s score on the World Governance Indicator Voice and Accountability increased from 21 in 2003 to 33 in 2016 (Figure 5.8). This indicates that citizens in Kyrgyzstan have enjoyed relatively more freedom to participate, assemble, and raise their voices during political processes.
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Figure 5.8 WGI Voice and Accountability of Kyrgyzstan between 2003-2016
WGI Voice and Accountability 35 30
25
Percentile Rank 20 (0 to 100) 15 Kyrgyzstan 10 5 0 2003 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Source: World Bank (2018)
In accordance with the progress of this indicator on Voice and Accountability, the efforts of the Civic Union are considered a significant victory for local ownership of engaged civil society organisations in formulating and evaluating police reform programmes (Oshurahunova, June 20, 2018). As mentioned before, this NGO coalition successfully collected a large number of recommendations from local citizens that include establishing public oversight councils and deeper cooperation between the police forces and local citizens. The efforts of the Civic Union formed the basis of the draft law Measures on Police Reforms that was adopted in 2013. Furthermore, the Civic Union has prepared independent reports on the situation of police reforms for several years (Kazakbaev et al. 2014; Papiyeva et al. 2014). On the other hand, Mr. Shaikhutdinov states in the Google Forms Survey (June 23, 2018), that there has been less success in the implementation phase of this latest law on police reforms. Factors that contributed to the rather meagre results were a weak political will and understanding from the side of the government and parliament, a strong MIA dominance during the decision-making processes, the lack of mechanisms for assessing and monitoring reforms in the country, and weak expertise among civil society actors. CSOs need more expert assistance for sustainable cooperation with state bodies in initiating and promoting reforms. Where the government and parliament lack a vision or political will, it is more up to civil society what police reform should be and how to conduct it. Moreover, although civil society considers the important role of local self-governance to increase its accountability towards citizens and awareness of problems, the active involvement of citizens and CSOs remains rather limited. The report concluded that local self- governance bodies don’t always assume their active role in the maintenance of public
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis security, and sometimes limit their functions to only assisting law enforcement bodies (Kazakbayev et al 2015, p. 8). Furthermore, the report puts forward a number of important factors that hinder the active involvement of citizens and CSOs organised through self- governance bodies in providing public security (Kazakbayev et al. 2015, p. 17). These are, on the one hand, a lack of funds, tasks, and roles of participation in the provision of public security that aren’t specified enough, as well as a lack of knowledge and skills among most LSG representatives. On the other hand, the police forces in essence remain an isolated structure with a vertical hierarchy that hinders horizontal cooperation with LSG representatives. Just like in the case of public councils on a national level, in an interview Mr. Osmonbaev (June 18, 2018) pointed out that the government doesn’t seem to be interested in listening to inputs from engaged citizens and civil society. While a number of CSOs try to raise their interests in public councils, most decisions in these councils are mere recommendations, while the government maintains control of real mechanisms for change.
Indicator #4: Transparency The government of Kyrgyzstan is also attempting to make its public institutions more transparent to enhance its accountability. However, as recent as 2012, the topic of transparency of security agencies in Kyrgyzstan was still politically sensitive. In line with its (post-)Soviet mentality, the security sector is traditionally unwilling to disclose state information to citizens (Musabayeva 2013, pp. 70-71). One of the key aspects of state information that attracts the attention of civil society is the budget of security agencies. As Kyrgyzstan remains a poor state with limited public resources, this increases the essence of effective and efficient use of available resources in accordance with maintaining domestic security. Above all, transparency of state information is an important dimension of SSR and democratising society, but it must balance between the interests of citizens, the state and society. According to Musabayeva (2013, pp. 75-76), civil society in Kyrgyzstan should have put more combined efforts, demanding and achieving a higher degree of transparency from the security services. Individual efforts are laudable, but they are not efficient enough to change the legal framework and behavioural practice of security agencies in enhancing an openness to state information. More recently, it turned out that transparency of law enforcement has not been improved, as police reports are still not available to the public, journalists, human rights activists or other civil society actors, unless the police make them available in the way they want (Osmonbaev, Skype interview, June 18, 2018). Whereas transparency of governmental statistics has possibly improved, the police still don’t release many detailed statistics even if applying directly to the Ministry.
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Indicator #5: Upholding the rule of law and human rights Furthermore, it is important that law enforcement agencies are acting more in accordance with the rule of law and human rights. It is essential that police forces only use force when necessary, when there is no alternative, and that they do not violate the citizens’ political rights and freedoms. Kyrgyzstan has scored an average Freedom House Index of 4.5 (1 being the best, 7 the worst) until 2009, in 2010 the score was 5.5, and since then the average score has been 5. Based on this, Kyrgyzstan can consistently be considered as ‘Partly Free’ (Freedom House 2018). Since Kyrgyz citizens have experienced a steady decline of their political rights and civil liberties from the late 1990s on until 2010, it will probably take a number of years before their political rights and freedoms are restored and improved to their old levels. In settings of a flawed democracy, like Kyrgyzstan, political authorities and police officers are still often able to act above the law, which, in turn, results in continuous suppression and harassment of political opposition and dissenters, human rights activists, and, particularly, minority groups like the Uzbeks (Freedom House Index 2017). Human right advocates such as Bakishbekov (2012, p. 115) point out that Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with human rights norms seems to be more like initiatives or political statements from individual police officers rather than a genuine, comprehensive strategy from the government and the MIA. According to him, in Kyrgyz society human rights and public order are seen as two contradictory terms; police forces justify the means of violating essential citizen’s freedom or assumptions of innocence-until-proven to reach their main objectives of public order and safety. In line with Bakishbekov, during an OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in 2016 the Human Rights Movement Bir Duino pointed out that over the past 25 years of independence, the Kyrgyz government had not fulfilled its obligations to protect citizens’ rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. Bir Duino presented several problems faced by human rights activists in all parts of Kyrgyzstan, including a lack of protection, discrimination, pressure, and harassment by state bodies, local administrations, national security and law enforcement officers (Bir Duino 2016, pp. 16-17). While human rights defenders experienced psychological pressure, threats of violence, personal attacks as well as attacks to their families because of the work they are involved in, local police were too passive in offering security – in some cases they were even part of those threats and attacks. A few years later, Bir Duino presented another report about the situation of ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan, including the role of law enforcement, at the UN meeting on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (April- May 2018). According to Bir Duino, despite a number of provisions in national strategy plans, aimed at ensuring all Kyrgyz citizens’ rights, ethnic minorities are still facing problems of
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis discrimination and unequal treatment by police officers. For example, police officers disproportionally extract money through bribery or disputable fines from Turkish minorities, the result of a common stereotype about their wealth, or continue to profile and harass Uyghurs, commonly perceived ‘untrustworthy’ and suspected of sympathy for separatism and radical Islamist movements. Moreover, Bir Duino has included cases where police officers confiscated mobile phones and forced people to give their passwords of social media accounts for no clear reasons (2018, pp. 6-14). Their respondents claimed such police’s failures to act according to the rule of law and human rights standards while not being punished, could turn into factors that might transform everyday conflicts to larger societal tensions between different ethnic groups, comparable to previous riots (Bir Duino 2018, p. 26). In a 2016 report, Bir Duino identified some important factors that could explain the gap of democratic policing between policy and practice. Among others, it pointed at the absence of a specialised database of human rights defenders, a lack of knowledge on the provision of security to CSOs under threat, as well as an insufficient number of legal professionals, human rights defenders and other civil society actors (Bir Duino 2016, p. 11). Although human rights defenders are still facing severe problems as a result of a lack of protection or, contrary, harassments of police officers, some do notice progress (Osmonbaev, Skype interview, June 18, 2018). Like Kazakhstan, the numbers of police officers prosecuted for torture have increased lately, and officers are no longer left with impunity. According to some human rights activists in Kyrgyzstan, there is a justified belief that real behavioural changes of police officers and governmental institutions could take place over the course of the next 15 to 20 years.
Indicator #6: Responsiveness Finally, it is important that the Kyrgyz government increases trust from its citizens in its police forces. Based the Decision on the New Police Performance Evaluation Criteria, the Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” has regularly conducted research on citizens’ perceptions of trust and feelings of safety towards the police, and whether their security concerns are rightly taken into account. According to Shaikhutdinov (Google Forms survey, June 23, 2018), these local residents’ opinions about the law enforcement sector can be divided into two types. The first type of opinions concerns the support of the selection of police officers based on competency rather than linkages of patronage or connections, a system of police accountability to the communities, as well as further development of the LCPCs. The second type of opinions concerns crimes and direct security problems: manslaughter, road accidents, school racketeering, extremism, and burglary. Recent surveys conducted in Kyrgyzstan reveal that a majority of the respondents considered police officers as inactive and lacking an open attitude towards local cooperative
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis mechanisms that include the reported meetings and LCPCs. On the other side, neighbourhood police officers indicated that the public is ‘closed’ to cooperation and not willing to assist the police, sometimes even ignoring them (Papiyeva et al. 2014, p. 5). One year later, in 2015, the Civic Union held a national Public Safety Survey through face-to-face interviews. It came forward from this survey, that Kyrgyz citizens have experienced relatively low levels of violent crime (Civic Union 2015, p.8). Moreover, the people’s perceptions of local police are more positive (35%) than negative (24%). Citizens also positively rate their daily interactions with the police, as the majority said that they were treated fairly and respectfully during their last encounter with the police (Civic Union 2015, p. 9). However, this survey also shows how a large percentage of victims don’t report crimes to the police, particularly when it comes to assaults, thefts, and briberies (80 to 97 %). The most important given reasons were that the crime was not serious enough, the police wouldn’t have been able to do anything, and the police wouldn’t have done anything (Civic Union 2015, pp. 36-40). Through consulted reports from and interviews with the Civic Union, it is necessary that law enforcement agencies and decision makers at different levels draw more on these public opinion results to understand their citizens’ needs, and base their work and policies on the people’s demands.
5.3 Summary In this chapter, the practice of police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been analysed, based on six indicators of creating public oversight and monitoring mechanisms, making the police less corrupt, inclusion of citizens and civil society in policymaking processes, enhancing transparency, introducing the police with best practices of human rights, as well as gaining trust with local citizens. According to online databases – such as the ones from Bertelsmann Foundation, Freedom House, and Transparency International – Kyrgyzstan has made some notable progress in reforming its institutions and guaranteeing basic freedoms and rights to its citizens over the past fifteen years, certainly in comparison with Kazakhstan. However, this progress is only relative, as both country performances in these indexes are still low on a global scale. Additional qualitative data from reports, policy briefs and interviews of local CSOs show how the MIA and law enforcement agencies are harder to reform in comparison to most other government institutions. On the one hand, the respondents from civil society acknowledge the rather brief existence of public oversight or cooperation mechanisms, or a lack of expertise and finances as valuable explanations why civil society cannot operate at its fullest potentials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, respondents admit that strengthening civil society will not be enough, as long as the attitude of the government, the MIA and the broader public (especially in Kazakhstan) towards
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6. Conclusions 6.1 Answers to research questions In this master thesis research, I have strived to answer the central question: to what extent is there a policy-practice gap of democratic governance of the police forces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and what role could civil society play in bridging this gap? Related to theories of Security Sector Reform, I have focused my analysis on the dimension of democratic governance by means of the selected indicators of creating public oversight and monitoring mechanisms, battling corruption within law enforcement agencies, public participation in police reform programmes (or ‘local ownership’), transparency to police reports and statistics, upholding the rule of law and human rights during policing, and being responsive to local people. With this demarcation of my research, I was able to overcome some main analytical problems of SSR. These problems are, among others, the broad range of the concept of SSR due to its comprehensive approach, and the lack of universal analytical tools developed to measure progress of SSR. This research also shows that while policies and external reform programmes directed at democratic governance of the security sector can be formulated within a relatively short period of time, actual progress as the result of changes towards democratic behaviour takes a lot longer – and is difficult to predict, given the human nature. Referring to the theoretic notions of Security Sector Reform, this characterises the transition from the ‘first generation’ to the ‘second generation’ of SSR. To answer my central question, I have been able to identify clear discrepancies between formulated and included democratic principles in key documents and the OSCE Annual Reports of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities, and the practices of police reforms on the ground. Even though both governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have formulated their commitments and engage in externally-sponsored programmes and activities to democratise their law enforcement agencies, they and their Ministries of Internal Affairs, mainly responsible for implementing police reforms, have proven to be resistant to any deep changes. I have also put forward the hypothetically crucial factor of civil society, which academic literature describes as the main driver of societal change throughout history. There is certainly enthusiasm for police reforms on the side of civil society actors in both countries, although they mostly struggle with finances, cooperation, and insufficient expertise or experience. Moreover, as a number of laws and oversight mechanisms to monitor the police forces have been created only recently, it will take some time for these instruments for civil society to really function more effectively. While civil society and oversight mechanisms are surely in need of further improvement improved, it came forward in my analysis that civil society doesn’t form the only essential factor, responsible for the progress of police reforms.
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There are some important differences to be noticed between the progress of police reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the role civil society plays in it. On one hand, the best-developed economy in Central Asia, a stable society with hardly any past conflicts, and an upcoming urban middle class haven’t resulted into well-organized civil society networks to effectively address police reforms in Kazakhstan. Instead, the Kazakh political regime and associated networks have used the plentiful economic resources to create and control public institutions and oversight mechanisms, effectively limiting space for opposing factions or dissent voices. Some small improvements could be noticed such as the online availability of police statistics, monitoring activities in detention centres, and anti-corruption measures, as long as they don’t go too much against the interests of the ruling establishment and the MIA. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan as one of the least developed countries in Central Asia experienced a highly liberalized economy and political system in the early stage of its independence. Since 2003, the Kyrgyz presidential regimes have allowed OSCE-facilitated police reform programs to operate, mostly due to better cope with the repeated outbursts of anti-government and inter-ethnic riots. In this environment, well-organized CSO umbrella organizations and networks have been actively involved in police reforms, conducting evidence-based assessments at the local population and seeking dialogue and cooperation between citizens and the police at both national and local levels. Yet, in a fragile and conflict- affected setting like Kyrgyzstan, hard-fought progress could be as quickly reversed. Finally, there is stronger popular support towards democratizing the police forces in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan, where local citizens mostly prefer to a police that provides stability and security. It becomes clear that the local context offers essential insights, also in analysing policy formulations of SSR and the consistency of major stakeholders acting according to these policies. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities give the impression of showing willingness to a certain extent to cooperating with police reform programmes and activities, while at the same time trying to keep dominating the political and public sphere, afraid of losing control or receiving criticism that delegitimizes their power and legitimacy. Based on the literature and interviews with CSOs, this urge for societal control can be explained in various ways. It can originate from the former Soviet mentality, from the heavy involvement of informal ties of patronage links and oligarchic interests, or even from a deep fear of change and the direction society is going when given more political power. If the reluctance to change of political actors is mainly rooted in the perceived uncertainty of losing control over society, more frequent discussions on SSR in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan could result in more confidence of higher government levels in taking a more favourable approach towards democratising the police forces. Furthermore, while the literature on civil society praises bottom-up approaches,
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MSc Conflicts, Territories & Identities 2016 – 2017 Master thesis one can’t easily ignore or reject the need for top-down initiatives to embrace a more open and democratic culture within security institutions. Change of culture and behavioural attitude cannot be achieved overnight, but further developing research methods to keep up progress over time would provide more, essential data from which policymakers, programme managers, and any other stakeholders could draw for creating more realistic policies.
6.2 Recommendations 6.2.1 Policy implications Based on the interviews with local CSOs from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a number of important policy implications can be formulated:
1. The concept of Security Sector Reform needs to be introduced and studied at research institutes, police academies and universities in the Central Asian region, so more (empirical) studies can be done on this topic and more practical recommendations can be formulated. 2. Police reforms are dependent on decisions from the top. In that respect, the international community could be more effective in convincing the local elites that it is in their own interests of political stability to trust citizens to address security issues problems in a more effective way. 3. It is also recommended that the government and parliament develop a genuine and comprehensive vision of what police reform should be and how to conduct it. 4. Public oversight and cooperation mechanisms, such as public councils and monitoring commissions, need to be strengthened further, so they will be equipped with more knowledge and procedures to bring necessary changes. 5. While politicians and academics are known for their value-based language, police officers better understand practical and pragmatic language related to problems they have to face every day. More cooperation agreements between police and intelligence officers from Central Asia and other regions of the world would stimulate a climate of exchanging a common language of pragmatism and best practices. 6. The coming generations of politicians, government officials, and security officers should be equipped with the right knowledge and skills to effectively use the institutions and reform them. 7. CSOs must organise themselves in better and broader associations, while defining a mutual agenda and strengthening interaction with parliament. 8. Finally, CSOs must engage themselves more in local police support. With the help of the international community, they need to finance and develop themselves better to enhance the
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6.2.2 Suggested research directions Within the broad topic of SSR, this master thesis has a strong focus on just one security actor (law enforcement agencies), just one dimension of security (democratic governance), and the role of civil society. Furthermore, the main research question has been formulated in terms of the policy-practice gap of police reforms. Yet, during the research phase, I have touched upon other dimensions and elements of police reforms that deserve more attention and could form new research topics on their own: - Theoretical discussions of composing a Security Sector Reform Index, compromising one or more dimensions of SSR. - Deeper, contextual understanding of the state and security sector: What is the role of power struggles between various factions within the security sector, or what is the role of informal structures during SRR processes? - More research on the involvement of civil society actors, their roles, functions, potentials, and constraints to form an important bottom-up factor of change. - How do the geopolitics of international organisations affect programming and funding to particular areas? How do geopolitical trends and developments affect internal policies of SSR? - Finally, there should be more research focus on behavioural changes towards democratic attitudes; when are ruling elites or security institutions really opening up, what opportunities should external facilitators engage in?
6.3 Reflections and limitations During my master thesis research, I have stumbled upon a number of obstacles. First, it took a lot of consideration of refining the topic of SSR, which is mostly conducted as extensive fieldwork projects by large groups of experts for years, into a fitting research scope for my master thesis. As a result, I spent most of my study exchange semester in Central Asia in developing my conceptual framework and exchanging perspectives with local academia and civil society actors, rather than doing research itself. Second, although much literature on Central Asian security issues is available, SSR is an understudied topic at most local research institutions or universities. Nevertheless, some individual lecturers and researchers from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek were very helpful in discussing my master research topic.
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Third, my narrow focus on democratic governance of the police forces within SSR more or less ignores the practice of the effectiveness and efficiency, and how the police forces are related to other security sectors or actors such as the parliament and the judiciary. Although civil society actors were relatively eager to participate in this research, I have left out the perspectives from other actors, such as the police itself, who could provide additional and perhaps more balanced information for my analysis. Fourth, there are only a few CSOs specialised in police reforms. A number of CSOs mentioned in the analysis are partly, certainly not exclusively engaged in SSR or police reforms. As a result, some CSOs couldn’t provide much detailed information in response to interview questions. There was also a language barrier in gathering data, as much of this information is available in Russian only, while some contacted CSOs didn’t understand English. Last, but not least, the six indicators that have been selected for this analysis are arguably not absolute but open to subjective interpretation and variation, which makes it hard to make reliable measurements. Developing such indicators is based on perceptions by a large number of individuals, and it takes long assessments to reach consensus in developing such indicators. Just a handful of civil society actors from both countries, on which my analysis is based, cannot be seen as very representative, although I have accompanied these qualitative data with established and internationally recognised indicators form online datasets. However, looking back at all these limitations of this master thesis research, only motivates me more to learn from these problems so as to improve future writing and research projects.
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OSCE (2008b, May). Guidebook on Democratic Policing. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/23804?download=true. OSCE (2010). Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/spmu/108393. OSCE (2010, December 3). Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/mc/74985?download=true. OSCE (2012, July 26). OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities (Plenary meeting decision No. 1049). Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/pc/92559?download=true. OSCE (2013). Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/122942?download=true.. OSCE (2014). Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/174686?download=true. OSCE (2015). Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/255921?download=true. OSCE (2016a). Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/333161?download=true. OSCE (2016b). OSCE Annual Report. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/annual-report/2016. OSCE (2016c). Security Sector Governance and Reform: Guidelines for OSCE Staff. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/231176?download=true. Papiyeva, S. et al. (2014). Trust through Public Accountability (Policy briefing). Retrieved from Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” website: https://reforma.kg/post/trust-through-public-accountability/. Peyrouse, S. (2010). Security Sector Reform in Kazakhstan. In M. Hartog (Ed.). Security Sector Reform in Central Asia: Exploring Needs and Possibilities (pp. 19-26). Groningen: CESS. Pring, C. (2016). People and Corruption: Europe and Central Asia. Retrieved from Transparency International website: file:///C:/Users/korthalsalteso/Downloads/2016_GCB_ECA_EN.pdf. Rakhimov, M. (2010). Historical Transformations and Regionalism in Central Eurasia. Retrieved from Eurasia Hub of Hanyang University website: http://www.eurasiahub.org/data/ftproot/2010%EA%B5%AD%EC%A0%9C%ED%95%99%EC%88%A0 /Mirzokhid.pdf. Saktaganova, Z.G. & Ospanova, D.K. (2013). Non-Governmental Organizations in the Republic of Kazakhstan: Principle Stages of Formation and Development. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 15(9), 1277- 1284. DOI: 10.5829/idosi.mejsr.2013.15.9.11543. Salamatov, Y. (2017). Importance of Prevention of Corruption among Prison Staff (Briefing paper #1, 2nd edition). Retrieved from Penal Reform International website: https://www.penalreform.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/03/Briefing-paper-1-Second-edition.pdf. Schroeder, U. (2010). Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators (Occasional paper No. 20). Retrieved from DCAF website: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/115302/OP_20_SCHROEDER_FORM.pdf. Sedra, M. (Ed.). (2010). The Future of Security Sector Reform. Ontario: CIGI. Sedra, M. (2015). Transitioning from first to second generation security sector reform in conflict-affected countries. In Jackson, P. (Ed.), Handbook of International Security and Development (pp. 165-180). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc. Standish, R. (2017, August 1). Our Future will be violent extremism. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/01/central-asia-kazakhstan-eurasia-terroris m-extremis m-isis-al-qaeda/. Starr, S.F. (2006). Clans, Authoritarian Rulers and Parliaments in Central Asia. Retrieved from Central Asia- Caucasus Institute: http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2006_starr_clans -authoritarian-rulers-and- parliaments-in-central-asia.PDF. Stojanovic, S. (2009). 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UN Police (2011, December 2). Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (Report of the Secretary General). Retrieved from UN website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/SG_report_december11.pdf. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2018). Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peace Operations (Manual). Retrieved from: https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/manual-community- oriented-poliicing.pdf. Urankayeva, Z. (2016, June 14). In 2016, 10 thousand complaints were received about unlawful actions of policemen. Kazakhstana Pravda. Retrieved from: http://www.kazpravda.kz/news/obshchestvo/v-2016- godu-postupilo-10-tis-zhalob-na-nepravomernie-deistviya-politseiskih--glava-mvd/. USAID (2014, October). Kyrgyz Civil Society advances Police Reform. Government supports citizens' role in revamping law enforcement. Retrieved from: https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/results-data/success- stories/civil-societys-singular-contribution-police-reform-recognized-highest . Verkoren, W. & Leeuwen, M. van. (2015). Civil Society in Fragile Contexts. In M. Kaldor & I. Rangelov (Eds.), The Handbook of Global Security Policy (pp. 463-481). Chichester: Wiley & Sons Ltd. Wilkinson, C. (2014). Development in Kyrgyzstan: Failed State of Failed State-building?. In A. Ware (Ed.). Development in Difficult Sociopolitical Contexts. London: Palgrave Macmillan. World Population Review (2018). Kazakhstan Population 2018. Retrieved from: http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kazakhstan-population/. Wulf, H. (2011). Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries Revisited . Retrieved from Berghof Foundation website: https://www.berghof- foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/wulf_handbookII.pdf. Ziegler, C.E. (2010). Civil Society, Political Stability, and State Power in Central Asia: Cooperation and Contestation. Democratization 17(5) 795-825. DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2010.501172. Ziegler, C.E. (2016). Great Powers, Civil Society and Authoritarian Diffusion in Central Asia. Central Asian Survey 35(4), 549-569. DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2016.1228608.
Online databases consulted Bertelsmann Foundation (2018c). BTI 2006-2018 scores. Retrieved from: https://www.bti-project.org/en/data/. Freedom House (2018). Aggregate Category and Subcategory Scores, 2003-2018 (Downloadable Excel format). Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. Transparency International (2003, October 7). CPI 2003: Results. Retrieved from: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2003/0. Transparency International (2005, October 18). CPI 2005: Results. Retrieved from: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2005/0. Transparency International (2007, September 25). CPI 2007: Results. Retrieved from: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2007/0. Transparency International (2009, November 17). CPI 2009: Results. Retrieved from: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009/0. Transparency International (2011). CPI 2011: Results. Retrieved from: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results. Transparency International (2018, February 21). CPI Results Table 2012-2017. Retrieved from: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017. World Bank (2018). Worldwide Governance Indicators: Voice and Accountability (Interactive data access). Retrieved from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports .
Interviews and surveys conducted Kassenova, N. (2018, February 7). Personal interview. Zhovtis, Y. (2018, June 12). Skype interview. Osmonbaev, B. (2018, June 18). Skype interview. Shambilov, A. (2018, June 18). Skype interview. Karushina, Y. (2018, June 19). Email interview. Oshurahunova, D. (2018, June 20). Email interview. Shaikhutdinov, T. (2018, June 23). Google Forms survey.
Images used for cover page Abibakir, B. (2017, March 25). Kyrgyz Police Detain 68 At Protest Over Jailing Of Ex-Lawmaker. Retrieved from: https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-opposition-japarov-supporters-protesters- arrested/28390782.html. Flag of Kazakhstan. Retrieved from: http://flagpedia.net/kazakhstan. Flag of Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved from: http://flagpedia.net/kyrgyzstan. The Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Website. (2016, September 2). Photoreport: Prime Minister’s Working Visit to Astana on September 1, 2016. Retrieved from: https://primeminister.kz/en/news/all/fotootchet-premer- ministr-rk-oznakomilsya-s-rabotoi-mestnoi-politseiskoi-sluzhbi-12931.
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Yaroslavskaya, O. (2011, December 18). Police fire on Rioters in Kazakhstan, 1 killed. Retrieved from: https://www.deseretnews.com/article/700208150/Police-fire-on-rioters-in-Kazakhstan-1-killed.html.
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Appendixes
Appendix I CMR Index This index was used by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations team within the Mapping and Monitoring Security Sector Reform in Serbia project (Stojanovic 2009, p. 91).
DIMENSION CRITERIA SUB-CRITERIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Representativeness Representation of women Representation of ethnic minorities Transparency General transparency Financial transparency Participation of citizens and civil Participation in policymaking society organisations Participation in implementation and evaluation of policy Accountability, democratic civil Control by the executive control, and public control and Parliamentary control and oversight oversight Judicial control Public control and oversight Rule of law Legal state Protection of human rights EFFICIENCY Good governance Human Resources management Financial resources management EFFECTIVENESS Integratedness of system Legitimacy of the sector and actors The ratio between aims, resources and outcomes
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Appendix II Overview of SSR related indexes and datasets State-centred security: Indicators for international peace and security (Schroeder 2010, p. 17)
Dimension Indicators Data Sources War and violent conflict Involvement in internal and -Uppsala Conflict Data Programme / PRIO external violent conflicts Armed Conflict Dataset and Battle Death Data Foreign policy and military crisis -CIDCM International Crisis Behavior Battle deaths -HIIK Conflict Barometer Militarisation Military expenditure -Global Peace Index Proliferation of arms -IISS Military Balance -SIPRI military expenditures -Small Arms Survey Weapons systems in use -Global Peace Index Culture of peace Level of structural and cultural -Global Peace Index violence
People-centred security: Indicators for individual safety and fundamental rights (Schroeder 2010, p. 23)
Dimension Criteria Subcriteria Civil liberties State of freedoms of expression -Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ and belief -Economist Democracy Index State of free association and assemble rights State of social and economic freedoms Political rights State of freedom to participate in -Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ the political process -Economist Index of Democracy State of electoral process Deprivation of liberty Level of prison population -World Prison Brief -Economist Index of Democracy
Indicators for the quality of Security Sector Governance (Schroeder 2010, p. 26)
Dimensions Indicators Sources State stability and Characteristics of political -Polity IV dataset democratic institutions authority -Economist Democracy Index Level of institutional and political -Bertelsmann Transformation Index stability -Failed States Index -Political Terror Scale Competitiveness of political -Worldwide Governance Indicators participation -Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger Constraints of executive power
Process of executive recruitment Civilian control and Judicial and parliamentary -Political Risk Service ‘International accountability oversight institutions and -Country Risk Guide’ accountability mechanisms -Worldwide Governance Indicators Voice State of civil society and public and Accountability access to information -Global Integrity Report -Failed States Index Role of state monopoly on -Open Budget Index violence in politics -Civil Society Index
Rule of law Institutional integrity -Bertelsmann Transformation Index Existence of anti-corruption -Worldwide Governance Indicators
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mechanisms -Global Integrity Report Perceived corruption levels -Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
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Appendix III Transcriptions of conducted interviews and surveys
For access to recorded interviews conducted through Skype and personal communication, I would like to refer to the external disk delivered with this master thesis.
1. Transcript email interview with Yevgeniya Karushina (June 19, 2018)
1) International foundation "Adil Soz" To what extent is “Adil Soz” involved in monitoring and reporting the police forces in Kazakhstan? Only if cases concern journalists. We do not conduct special monitoring of human rights violations by policemen.
Is “Adil Soz” working effectively (in terms of reaching their objectives) and efficiently (in terms of expertise, human and financial resources) enough? Based on the results of work with international organisations, the efficiency of the fund is high.
2) Transparency Has the quality, reliability, and availability of official statistics (e.g. levels of crime, court records) and police reports been improved over the past 5-10 years? The level of access to judicial documents has increased, there is an official website (http://sud.gov.kz/eng). According to statistics, the fund has no data.
Have police reports (behavior of individual officers, operational strategies, budget management) become more accessible to the public, and open to scrutiny by a variety of oversight institutions and media lately? We have no any information about the police reports.
Kazakhstan has undertaken important steps in establishing an open and accountable government by adopting the Law on the Access to Information and creating an open government electronic platform consisting of five open data portals. When it comes to law enforcement, online maps have indeed been created to provide an overview of crime statistics in each region and citizens are made possible to leave comments or questions on the police? That’s right, any citizen of the country can write an interesting question to the authorities in accordance with the law on access to information.
However, according to you, Adil Soz has no data on the transparency of police statistics and reports. You mean that except from the legal documents or draft laws, that citizens and media and other civil society actors still have no (good) access to police statistics on, for example, crime, budgetary expenses or police performances ? I meant that Adil soz does not keep statistics on the police work, because this is not our mandate.
3) Upholding human rights and the rule of law Are media (and Adil Soz) free to report on policing actions? Have there been any improvements in that over the past 10-15 years? Yes, journalists write about illegal actions of policemen, if this information is supported by evi dence. There are no improvements in the situation.
You answered that journalists are able to write about illegal actions of policemen, but probably also on levels of crime in certain areas and voicing concerns of the public in police forces? Could you giv e some examples of illegitimate actions of policemen or public concerns journalists have been able to report about? And do you mean that over the past 10-15 years, journalists in Kazakhstan have always been able to freely report about the police? Journalists have always had the right and still have the right to write about police misconduct, most importantly, that this information was backed up by irrefutable evidence. Otherwise, journalists can be sued. Information about the articles you can find on the Internet, such information is in the public domain. http://www.kazpravda.kz/news/obshchestvo/v-2016-godu-postupilo-10-tis-zhalob-na-nepravomernie-deistviya- politseiskih--glava-mvd/.
4) Finally, what do you think civil society organisations involved in police reforms should improve to have a greater impact? Or are there other important factors why the progress of police reforms is limited in Kyrgyzstan? If the government is making reforms, then most often the society does not inform about it.
Could you agree that empowering civil society organisations and a broader engagement of citizens can challenge the ruling, complex system of intertwined political and business interests, in order to advance democratic governance and police reforms in Kazakhstan? Or does this progress mostly depend on other factors, such as the willingness and openness from the side of the Government and Ministry of Internal Affairs to reform?
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It is necessary to work not only civil society and the media, but also with the government to expand the rights in the country.
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Transcript of email interview with Dinara Oshurahunova (June 20, 2018)
1) Public oversight and monitoring The government of Kyrgyzstan created a number of specialised public advisory councils (PACs) in 2013 to improve the oversight of numerous state structures, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police. Is the Coalition involved at one of more of these PACs? And do you know whether are civil society organisations are able to effectively monitor and oversee policing activities through these PACs? The Coalition was not part of the public advisory council, established in 2013. But the Coalition was one of the initiators of starting a conversation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs about creating mechanisms for interaction between civil society and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Until 2010, together with other leaders and activists of civil society, we held several meetings with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in wh ich we demanded the creation of a platform for a systematic dialogue on the protection of rights. However, the Ministry of Interior filed this process, expanding our group of former employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, introducing them as part of civil society. However, after the April Revolution of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the new leadership again resumed this process, as a result of which these councils were created. The coalition was a member of the Government's commission for reforming the road safety service together with Kalicha Umuralieva (PF "Our Right"). We worked for six months in the commission and conducted the certification of the employees of this service. But then the commission was disbanded and the process was not completed. I believe that the frequent change of leadership and those representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for this process has not given and now does not provide a sustainable opportunity to bring to the end the actions initiated by the state or civil society to create mechanisms for sustainable and successive cooperation. In addition, there are problems with the lack of the capacity of both state bodies and civil organizations to control the activities of the police. There is a desire and enthusiasm, but there is not enough expertise and resources (time, volunteers, practice and experiences from other countries.
2) Local Ownership The government of Kyrgyzstan adopted the ‘Measures on Police Reform’ on April 2013. Did the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, or other civil society organisations and activists involved, get sufficient political weight and voice in formulating and implementing this concept? I cannot exactly answer to this question, because I was not involved in this process. Our mission and direction of activity is monitoring of elections and parliament. Nevertheless, I will say that the civil group "For Reforms" for a long time worked with the Ministry of Internal Affairs to create a strategy for reforming the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What are the results for now, I cannot say. But I note that the civil group experienced difficulties in moving its ideas to the Ministry of Internal Affairs because of the frequent overt raining of personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They also lacked the support of civil organizations, which were also engaged in work with other state bodies.
3) Transparency Does the Coalition engage itself to demanding more transparency and openness to police statistics and reports? Has the quality, reliability and availability of official statistics (e.g. levels of crime, court records) and police reports been improved over the past 5-10 years? Have police reports (behavior of individual officers, operational strategies, budget management) become more accessible to the public, and open to scrutiny by a variety of oversight institutions lately? As I noted above, the Coalition was the initiator of creating mechanisms for ongoing interaction and t he transparency and openness of police statistics and its reports was also a point of demand. But since the Coalition does not deal with police reform and was mainly engaged in electoral processes and monitoring the parliament, it simply did not have the opportunity to participate in this process and I do not know what the results of the quality and reliability of official statistics in the police are at this stage. I am sorry, but I cannot answer to this question, because I do not have this information.
4) Are there any other activities the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society is involved to improve dialogue between citizens and the police? The Coalition as a whole stands for a permanent dialogue between government institutes and civil society, implying all state bodies. It further cooperates actively with the OSCE on various issues. On issues of police reform, the Coalition actively participated in the OSCE's police reform activities until 2010. After 2010, we worked more with the OSCE on election monitoring issues. Now, together with other civil society leaders, we are trying to work with the parliament to improve mechanisms for parliamentary control in the security sector, and the OSCE starts support this process in parliament.
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5) Finally, are connected NGOs and CSOs working more effectively (in terms of reaching their objectives and gaining more political weight) and efficiently (in terms of gathering and sharing expertise, human and financial resources) thanks to the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society? What do you think civil society organisations involved in police reforms should improve to have a greater impact? Or are there other important factors why the progress of police reforms is limited in Kyrgyzstan? We are working with the parliament and now we are starting, together with other organizations, cooperation with the committees of the parliament. However, there are problems of understanding in parliament the importance and need s for reform. However, we will lead this process. Civil society organizations need expert assistance, which is not enough. I would like to note that we need trained national experts for sustainable cooperation with state bodies in initiating and promoting reforms. One of the most important factors is the la ck of a vision from the government and parliament - what police reform should be and how to conduct it.
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Transcript of Google Forms survey with Timur Shaikhutdinov (June 23, 2018)
1) Could you name some nongovernmental and civil society organisations the Civic Union “For Reforms and Results” consist of? And are those NGOs and CSOs working more effectively (in terms of reaching their objectives) and efficiently (in terms of gathering and sharing expertise, human and financial resources) thanks to this coalition? The Civic Union "For Reforms and Results" includes such organizations as "Civic Union" (our NGO), Interbilim, Insan Diamond, various grass-root organizations which work in all regions. the ground. Thanks to the network, we managed to strengthen the voice of civil society in the issues of police reform, an alternative vision of the police reform was prepared (Alternative Concept on Police Reform). In addition, for us as initiators of the network, the association gave an opportunity to rely on the opinion of the inhabitants of the regions. We use it in developing recommendations and advocacy. regarding financial issues, the network did not create new possibilities
2) The government of Kyrgyzstan created a number of specialised public advisory councils (PAC's) in 2013, to improve the oversight of numerous state structures, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police. Through which PAC's is the Civic Union overseeing the police? Are civil society organisations able to effectively monitor and oversee policing activities through these PAC's? I was a member of the first composition of the Public Supervisory Board under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but left it two years later. This institute has both its positive and negative aspects. Positive is about legislative framework. State bodies, under which the public councils exist, are obliged to respond to their suggestions and opinions. To the negative sides, I would note the dependence of public councils to state bodies. In addition, the existence of public councils gives ministries the moral right (as they believe) not to interact with other civil society organizations. We work independently. Only in some cases we interact with the public council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
3) As a result of your campaigns and a number of working meetings, the government of Kyrgyzstan adopted the Measures on Police Reform on April 2013. Did the Civic Union, and other civil society organisations and activists involved, get sufficient political weight and voice in formulating and implementing this concept? Has the Civic Union conducted an evaluation of this concept yet? Yes, we have been preparing independent reports on the situation with the reform of the police for several years. You can find them on the website: https://reforma.kg/analytics/2/ In general, we think that the government failed to implement the police reform because of weak political will and domination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in decision-making processes.
4) In 2011, activists that would later found the Civic Union collected ideas from local citizens and started a petition campaign one year later that resulted into more than 10000 signatures. From both these campaigns, what were the most important issues and local needs citizens thought the police must address? And are there more recent surveys from citizens on police performances? Regarding the opinion of local residents about the law enforcement sector, they can be divided into two types. First, it is reform itself. People support selection of police officers in competitive base, system of police accountability to the communities, development of crime prevention institutes. Secondly, these are security problems, which people pay attention to. This is slaughtering, road accidents, school racketeering, extremism, burglary. Closeness of the police is also a problem for most communities. I suggest you to read the findings of ICVS: https://reforma.kg/media/post/postpdf/2018-06-19-1814619482.pdf
5) Finally, what do you think civil society organisations involved in police reforms should improve to have a greater impact? Or are there other important factors why the progress of police reforms is limited in Kyrgyzstan? I'd like to start with the answer to the last question. The factors that impede the implementation of the police reform in Kyrgyzstan are: dominance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in decision -making processes, lack of
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Appendix IV Freedom House Index
From the Excel format Aggregate Category and Subcategory Scores, 2003-2018, downloaded from the Freedom House website, I have used the following data for the analysis within my master thesis:
Kazakhstan Year Status Political Rights Civil Liberties Average Score Aggregated Score 2006 Not Free 6 5 5,5 32 2007 Not Free 6 5 5,5 32 2008 Not Free 6 5 5,5 30 2009 Not Free 6 5 5,5 30 2010 Not Free 6 5 5,5 28 2011 Not Free 6 5 5,5 28 2012 Not Free 6 5 5,5 22 2013 Not Free 6 5 5,5 26 2014 Not Free 6 5 5,5 25 2015 Not Free 6 5 5,5 24 2016 Not Free 6 5 5,5 24 2017 Not Free 7 5 6 22 2018 Not Free 7 5 6 22 Kyrgyzstan Year Status Political Rights Civil Liberties Average Score Aggregated Score 2006 Partly Free 5 4 4,5 47 2007 Partly Free 5 4 4,5 46 2008 Partly Free 5 4 4,5 45 2009 Partly Free 5 4 4,5 39 2010 Not Free 6 5 5,5 36 2011 Partly Free 5 5 5 37 2012 Partly Free 5 5 5 41 2013 Partly Free 5 5 5 39 2014 Partly Free 5 5 5 39 2015 Partly Free 5 5 5 38 2016 Partly Free 5 5 5 38 2017 Partly Free 5 5 5 37 2018 Partly Free 5 5 5 37
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