This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 68—2989

GORSUCH, Edwin Noah, 1939- THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF ENGLISH MONASTERIES IN THE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1967 History, medieval

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF ENGLISH MONASTERIES

IN THE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY

DISSERTATION

Presented In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Edwin Noah Gorsuch, B.S., M.A.

The Ohio State University 1967

Approved by

Ady^patr Department of Hl^ory VITA

August 28, 1939 Born - Wauseon, Ohio

1962 ...... B.S., Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio

1962-1963...... Teaching Assistant, Department of History, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio

1964 ...... M.A., Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio

I96A-I967...... Teaching Assistant, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OP STUDY

Major Field: History

Medieval History. Professor Franklin J. Pegues

Ancient History. Professor William P. McDonald

Renaissance and Reformation History. Professor Harold J. Grimm

Recent American History. Professor Robert H. Bremner

ii TABLE OP CONTENTS

Page

VITA ...... 11 LIST OP ABBREVIATIONS...... Iv

INTRODUCTION...... 1

Chapter

I. THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND...... 5

II. MONASTIC ECONOMIC BURDENS...... 26

III. METHODS FOR IMPROVING AND PROTECTING MONASTIC ECONOMIC RESOURCES ...... 61

IV. MISMANAGEMENT AND VISITATION...... 103

V. CONCLUSION...... 136

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 14?

Ill LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

OCR Calendar of Close Rolls. 1302-135^» vols. London: Eyre & Spottlswoode, 1698-I906.

CER Calendar of Patent Rolls. 1301~1350. 14 vols. London: Eyre and Spottlswoode, 1898-1905*

Carus-Wilson, Essays Carus-Wilson, E.M. (ed.). Essays in Economic History. Vol. II. London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., I962,

Dugdale, Monasticon Dugdale, William, Monasticon AnKlieanum. J. Caley, H. Ellis, and B. Bandinel (eds.). London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1817-30.

Pinberg, Tavistock Abbey Finberg, H.P.R. Tavistock Abbey. Cambridge: University Press, 1931. Hilton, Leicestershire Estates Hilton, È.H. The Economic Development of Some Leicestershire Estates in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries! Oii^ord: University Press, 194?.

Knowles, Religious Orders Knowles, David, ÿhe Religious Orders in England. Cambridge: University Press, 1948.

Knowles and Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses Knowles, David, euid Hadcock, R. Neville. Medieval Religious Houses. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953»

Miller, Abbey yid Bishopric of Ely Miller, Edward. The Abtey and Bishopric of Ely. Cambridge: University Press, I951.

Morgan, English Lands Morgan, Marjorie. The English Lands of the Abbey of Bee. Oxford: University Press, 1946,

Raftis. Estates RaftRaftis, is, J.J . ---Ambrose.---- The- Estates — of Ramsey - Abbey, - Toronto: Pontifical Institute_ of - -Mediaeval -- ii Studies,-• -- 1957*

iv Register of Ade de Orleton Bannisier, A.T. (ed.). Registrum Ade de Orleton. Episoopi HereferdonsIs. 1317-27. London: Canterbury and York Society, I908,

Register of Archbishop Corbrldge Brown. W. (ed.). Register of Thomas of Corbridge. 2 vols. London: Surtees Society, 1925-^d.

Register of Archbishop Greenfield Thompson, A.H. (ed.). Register of William Greenfield. 4 vols. London: Surtees Society, 1931-37*

Register of Henry Woodlock Goodman, Â.¥. (éd.). Registrum Henriei Woodlock. 2 parts. Oxford: Canterbury and York Society, 1934-36.

Register of John of Pentissara Deedes, Cecil, (ed.). Registrum Johannis de Pontlssara. 2 vols. London: Canterbury and York Society, 1915-24.

Rogers, Agriculture and Prices Rogers, James E. ïherold. A History of Agriculture and Prices in England. Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1866. ■ -- ---

Smith, Canterbury Cathedral Priory Smith, Reginald Anthony London. Canterbury Cathedral Priory. Cambridge: University Press, 1945.

8nape, English Monastic Finances Snape, R.H. English Monastic Finances in the later Middle Ages. Cambridge: University Press, 1926.

VCH Page, William (ed.). The Victoria History of the County of York. Vol. III. London: Constable and Co., lÿlj. INTRODUCTION

The three forces that contributed to the economic prob­ lems of English monasteries during the early fourteenth century were the agricultural depression, the unusual eco­ nomic burdens they carried, and the ever present specter of mismanagement. The agricultural depression began In earnest during the third decade of the fourteenth century and resulted in monasteries abandoning the "high farming' management procedures earlier In vogue. A precipitous drop In the prices of agricultural commodities led monasteries to lease their lands, for properties rented out produced more in revenue than those exploited through 'high farming' manage­ ment. Demesne holdings were broken up and lands were re­ divided among the agricultural population for prosperous peasants were able and willing to pay high rents for lands that monasteries no longer cared to exploit directly through the use of oustomary labor. Resentment and hostility created among those adversely affected were directed against relig­ ious houses in the form of theft, violence, and other illegal activities, but high rents could be collected be­ cause of the pressure of population on agricultural resources.

One result of the leasing procedure was reduced monastic in­ vestment in capital improvements on their lands, and this had

1 2 long term effects that reinforced the economic dislocation.

Along with the process of demising lands to tenants, monas­ teries adopted the policy of either commuting permanently or selling on a yearly basis customary labor services that were no longer needed since lands were not cultivated through the use of this labor. Through these means they attempted to stabilize income and avoid the worst effects of the fourteenth century agricultural depression.

Monasteries carried economic burdens both as a result of royal and other pressures present in fourteenth century society. Obligations to the monarch included not only giving sustenances to favored retainers and offering hos­ pitality to royalty, but also relinquishing control of the house to a royal official during periods of voidances and providing extraordinary loans and taxes during wartime. Ad­ ditional burdens weighing on monasteries included the expense of lawsuits, damages resulting from the illegal actions of their neighbors, and outlays occasioned by extravagant building programs and natural disasters.

If monasteries performed various functions for the crown and were exploited by the monarch, insurmountable problems were not created for them as a result. Although the king tried to extend his rights to request corrodies, he was unwilling to drive a monastery into economic ruin to achieve his ob­ jective. The monarch rather was interested in diverting to his own purposes as great a portion of monastic revenues as was possible while stopping short of driving a house into 3 complété bankruptcy. Where a priory was in serious financial difficulty the king was willing to assist in resolving Its problems. Not only were royal officials appointed as custo­ dians for depressed houses, licences permitting the alienation of property In mortmain were Issued, and other economic sus­ tenance was proffered to houses truly distressed. The same kind of attitude was manifested In reference to royal demands for hospitality, for custody during voidances, and for aide during war. Probably the most devastating burdens carried by monasteries resulted from the combined effects of expensive lawsuits, the depredations of neighbors, and natural disasters.

The third force contributing to monastic economic dis­ tress during the period under consideration was mismanagement.

Administrative Incompetence was more the rule than the excep­ tion, for monastic leaders were not trained to perform their duties effectively. Poor management led to lax discipline, dissension, and Indebtedness. Accounting procedures suffic­ iently sophisticated to permit the adequate supervision of monastic finances were lacking, usually, as monks did not control their expenditures effectively and weigh them against revenues due.

Incompetent priors contributed to the excesses of mis­ management for Inept leaders not only would waste the goods of the priory, they would also alienate Its lands, sell Its resources, and otherwise Imprudently manage the revenues of the house. Many shortsighted managers saw the sale of corrodies as a means of Improving economic conditions, but, unless done 4 dlaorlmlnately, It was a dangerous procedure and often had disastrous consequences, A prior lacking the moral require­ ments necessary for effectively governing a house likewise contributed to monastic economic problems, for even the neg­ ligence of a prior in correcting the abuses and excesses of resident monks led to economic difficulties. If the canons of a house were guilty of alienating monastic property, and

If discipline was lax, a monastery soon could find itself on the road to dilapidation. The discipline provided by a strong and exemplary prior was required if a house was to keep Its financial affairs on an even keel.

In the face of these three forces contributing to eco­ nomic dislocation, monasteries had some methods available to them for Improving and protecting their economic position.

To Improve their financial capability they could not only appropriate advowsons, they also could demise lands, obtain debt reductions, and secure grants of economic value. To protect their position they could request the assistance of governmental officials, acquire documents confirming rights and possessions already held, and undertake defensive lawsuits. Such procedures, however, were ultimately In­ adequate weapons In fighting the economic problems confronting them. There were limitations upon the exercise of all alternatives, and it cannot be expected that monasteries, simply because the. felt themselves to be in need of more revenue, could utilize any and all of these expedients. CHA.PTER I

THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Fourteenth century monastic history is related directly

to economic developments of the period, for medieval mon­

asteries were deeply involved in the contemporary economic world, and were directly affected toy the changes in economic

currents. During the fourteenth century these changes had a demonstrable effect on the fortunes of the monasteries

of England and, in order to understand the full significance

of changes in monastic life and administration, it is neces­

sary to have a familiarity with the prevailing tides of

economic change. In surveying what has been written on the economic his­

tory of the first half of the fourteenth century, one im­

portant generalization concerning the way this change and

development affected English monasteries is apparent. One

notes that the prevailing mode of agricultural exploitation—

•high fsœming*— gave way to a rentier kind of management.

The great era of *high farming• seems to have been the last

quarter of the thirteenth century. Gradually, during the

course of the fourteenth century, compelling economic ^

forces were at work to force a change from the direct 6 management, supervision, and direction of agricultural operations by monks themselves, to a less direct system of management. Introduction of the new system varied In time and place, emd was introduced gradually, for In certain districts the process had begun as early as 1300 mhlle In other areas elements of 'high farming' management remained as late as the early sixteenth century. Usually, however, by mid-fourteenth century the process of leasing our lands was well advanced, Edward Miller, for example, argues In his work dealing with the lands belonging to the abbey and bishopric of Ely that the tendencies apparent In the second quarter of the thirteenth century— to expand the demesne and to exploit these augmented holdings directly— were In a period of stabilization. If not reverse, during the latter half of the century,^ He points out that leaseholds al­ ready were being carved out of the demesne in a few places.

At the same time, H,P,R, Pinberg, In discussing the agri­ cultural policies of Tavistock Abbey, points out that It was not till well Into the sixteenth century that all of the lands of Tavistock were granted on leaseholds,% In at least one Instance, however, rent incomes formed the largest portion of monastic receipts by mid-fourteenth century,

R, H, Hilton, in discussing Leicestershire estates belonging

^Miller, Abbey and Bishopric of Ely„ pp, 100-101

^Pinberg, Tavistock Abbey, p, 258, 7 to Owston Abbey, points out that in 13^8 the greater part of the rent income flowing into the house's treasury was derived from competitive and adjustable leasehold arrange­ ments The import of all of this is that the process of granting leases and of moving away from 'high farming' was not a sudden development, striking all of England at once, but rather constituted a slow evolution characterized by wide divergences in time and place. The tendency was, how­ ever, general enough to have affected much of England by mid-fourteenth century.

There were good economic reasons for abandoning 'high farming' techniques in favor of the leasehold method of management— the changes do not seem haphazard. The innova­ tions were general enough, too, to indicate the operation of profound economic forces. The period before 1315 seems to have been characterized by declining prices for agri­ cultural commodities. In this kind of a situation land­ lords were likely to find that the direct exploitation of lands was not as profitable as it had been in the thirteenth century, when agricultural prices and productivity had tended to be high. This, perhaps, accounts for the initial impetus to begin the process of leasing out lands, for rent paying tenants were to be found in abundance, and high rents could be demanded and collected. It is possible to illustrate this process by referring to the economic statistics collected

^Hilton, Leicestershire Estates. p. 122. 8 by J, E, Thor old Rogers.^ The conclusions to be drawn are that agricultural prices were depressed from 1301 through

1313I and that the depression which developed in earnest after 1330 was already present in a nascent form before 1315»

After 1330 the agricultural depression reached crisis proportions, and clearly had an effect on the way that monastic establishments exploited their holdings. That the average prices for wheat in the score of years after 1330 were below the 1301-10 average, already a low one, indicates the depression's severity. These economic developments

Rogers, Agriculture suid Prices. I, pp. 24$, 228, 230, 197-198. The decennial averages for the prices of wheat are informative. They are as follows % 1261-70, 4s, 8 5/8 d., 1271-80 5s. 7 3/4d.; 1281-90, 5s. 7/8d.; 129I-130ÏÏ, 6s. 1 l/8d.; l300-10,~5s. 7 l/4d.; Î311-2ÏÏ, ?s. 10 l/4d.;~ 1321-30, 6s. 11 5/8d.; 1331-^0, 4s. 8 3/43.; and 1^41-50, 52» 3 l/8dT If the^prices of wheat can be taken as indica­ tive of what was happening to agricultural prices in gen­ eral, and with qualifications this seems to have been true, one can conclude that a hint of a developing agricultural depression is present in the period 1301-15» The prices paid for wheat are lower between I30I-IO than they were in the periods I27I-8O and I29O-I30O. It should also be noted that the decennial average for the period 1311-20 is dis­ torted by the unusual conditions that existed in the latter part of the decade. The average wheat prices in 1311» 1312, 1313, and 1314 which were 4s. 5 l/4d., 4s. 11 3/8d., 5s. 6 3/8d., and 8s. 4 3/8d. are illustrative. With the ex­ ception of 1314, they are lower than the average for the period I30I-IO which itself was low. The rise in 1314 is attributable to the fact that the prospects for an abundant harvest in 1315 were not good. Indeed, in 1315 and I316, in the midst of the great famine and pestilence, wheat prices average 14^. 10 7/8d. and 152» H 7/8d, respectively. The highest prîoes paid^for wheat in these two years were 262. 8d. for 1315» and 20s.for I316. The decennial price averages for peas were 1261-70, 3s. Od.; 1271-80, 3s. 10 3/8d.; 1281-90, 3s. 2 5/8d.; 129I- 1500,~4s. 4 3/8d.; T30I-IO, fs. 9 l/8d,; 1^11-20, 3s. 2 l/2d.T 1321-30, 4s. 8 5/8d.T 1331-40, 32* Od.; 13^1-50, 9 help explain the tendency on the part of monastic houses to move away from 'high farming* methods of agricultural management•

The gradual abandoning of direct agricultural manage­ ment techniques meant that monastic establishments had to augment their income in a variety of ways. One of the most usual methods of accomplishing this objective was to lease out— for high rents— lands formerly cultivated under direct supervision. It was possible to do this because there was sufficient population pressure on agricultural resources to make high rents collectable.3 in some respects, however, the practice of granting leaseholds worked to the dis­ advantage of religious corporations. The leasehold system contributed directly to the disintegration of the villeinage system, for holdings formerly retained on a customary basis often were subdivided. Once this happened, it was difficult to reinstitute the system of labor services.&

The manner in which the leasing out process gained cur­ rency in the second quarter of the fourteenth century can be

^Population does not appear to have declined markedly before the Black Death. E.M. Halerow, in "The Decline of Demesne Farming on the Estates of Durham Cathedral Priory," Economic History Review. 2nd Series VII (195^-55)i PP. 3^5- ^6, shows how rural overpopulation made the leasing system of agricultural exploitation possible. M.M. Postan and J. Titow, in "Heriots and Prices on Winchester Manors," Economic History Review. 2nd Series, XL (1958-59)» pp. 392- 410, also conclude that rural overpopulation was endemic to fourteenth century England before the Black Death.

^Miller, Abbey and Bishopric of Ely, p. 104. 10 observed on the estates of the abbey and bishopric of Ely.

The manor of Great Shelford seems to have been a rather conventional manor, for the processes of leasing demesne lands and of commuting labor services had not reached wide proportions before 1325. After I325 the agricultural de­ pression was felt severely at Great Shelford. In the six years before 1325 agricultural returns had hovered near the

80 1. mark, while in the eight years after 1325 income dropped more than one-half, to less than 40 1. annually.

This was not the extent of the crisis, however, for in the

13 years after 1333 income reached a nadir of 10 1. annually.7

In order to compensate for the précipiteras fall in agricultural prices two expedients were attempted. First,

50 acres of the 350-400 acre demesne were leased, and second, investment in capital improvements on the manor was con­ tracted. The net revenue from the manor was salvaged at the expense of the condition of the manor. Because of reduced capital expenditures the future productive capability of the manor was hampered. To avoid being trapped by the de­ clining economic spiral, the overlord's only alternative seems to have been to extend the policy of leasing out demesne lands. The effects of reduced capital expenditures would not be apparent immediately, and would not come home to rest for a number of years. The Wisbech Barton manor in the Fenlands exhibited the same economic pressures. Between

^Miller, Abbey and Bishopric of Ely, pp. 105-112. 11

1333 and 1348 manorial income there dropped to a level two- thirds below the 1319-1333 averages. If, however, the second quarter of the fourteenth century was a critical period eco­ nomically, a concerted attempt was in progress even earlier to Increase contractual incomes. This involved the procedure of leasing lands, on a competitive basis, anno in annum O ad voluntatem domini. * This tendency again can be il­ lustrated by referring to the lands of the abbey and bishopric of Ely.

On the manor of Somersham in Huntingdonshire the process was well advanced as early as 1299. Then contractual rents made up one-half of the income from the manor. The percentage increased thereafter to 37% in 1342, and to 79% in I38I. Even this does not tell the whole story, for at the same time the sale of labor services on a yearly basis at the pleasure of the lord had increased. This had the effect of more than doubling the yield of contractual rents, from 33 1. to 70 1., during the first half of the fourteenth century. Edward Miller, in commenting on the administrative changes effected by the bishop of Ely, observes that he avoided bearing the brunt of the economic depression with­ stood by most commercial farmers by leasing out demesne and villein land at high rents.9 The fact that demesne lands were leased out and labor services commuted on a yearly

^Ibid.

9l b i d . 12 basis at the will of the lord had an important effect as far as the distribution of lands among the peasant popula­ tion was concerned.

This land redistribution among peasant tenants is ap­ parent on the manor of Weedon, one of the English manors belonging to the abbey of Bee. In 130^-05 the net income from the manor amounted to 19 1. 6s. 5d. and, because leas- ing was increased, the monastery was able to maintain its financial position until 1365. By I305 the manor*s,:5popula- tion had risen to 1*0, up from 81 in the thirteenth century, and holdings were divided so that the increased population could be accommodated. Most holdings were reduced in size, for in the thirteenth century most holdings had been virgates or half-vlrgates, while early in the fourteenth most tenants held half or quarter virgates. As the femrteenth century wore on, the size of the average holding decreasisd still further. If, however, the size of the average holding was declining, there were certain individuals and families who were profiting by Increasing their holdings at the expense, in effect, of their peasant neighbors rather than the lord.

By 1305 at Weedon the trend had begun, and it continued to develop during the first half of the fourteenth century.

It would seem that the more prosperous within the peasant class were better able to pay the high rents which were demanded by the lords who were leasing out their lands.^^

l%organ, English Lands, pp. IIO-II3. 13 Throughout the first half of the fourteenth century, at least until the Black Death, there existed a land hunger that was capable of being exploited by lords and religious corporations who had lands to lease. Because of the pressure of population on agricultural resources it was possible to collect high rents even in a period of agricultural depres­ sion. Marjorie Morgan, in discussing the agricultural his­ tory of the English lands belonging to the abbey of Bee, argues that a redistribution of land among the peasant classes was effected. Within the manorial population there existed individuals who had developed both administrative ability and agricultural competence. When moneustic admin­ istrators abandoned the tasks of agricultural administration, these men who had not only served as bailiffs, but who also had worked actively in cultivating the soil, were willing to lease demesne land. Further, they paid high rents for the privilege. A large outlay of capital was not necessary, for stock as well as lands were demised to such tenants.

It was possible, then, for religious corporations to protect themselves, at least for a period, from the full effects of the agricultural depression. The means of accomplishing this objective, as has already been suggested, involved among other things, a contraction in capital investment on manorial properties.

lllbid. Ultimately, monastic administrators were forced to deal with the consequences of reducing expenditures for capital

improvements. Rents derived from the leasing of lands seem to have reached an apex in mid-fourteenth century. As late as 13531 on the estates of Durham, revenue derived from rents was increasing for the bursar's account contains an

entry headed 'Incrementum red* in which it is pointed out that for four properties rents had been augmented by a total

of 12£, 6d, After this apex economic conditions became tighter as rents which had been agreed to by tenants fell

into arrears, and ultimately had to be pardoned by the mon­ astery's auditors. Monastic management was forced to re­ trench again by pardoning entry fees, rents in arrears, and building improvements which had not been made. Eventually

monasteries were forced to grant long term leases, offering a lower level of return, in an attempt to stabilize i n c o m e , 12

This development, however, usually falls outside the first half of the fourteenth century.

The complicated economic developments which were being

felt by religious corporations can, perhaps, best be viewed by looking at the financial history of a single house for the

period beginning in the late thirteenth and continuing through

mid-fourteenth century, Tavistock abbey is located in Devon

and its history exhibits many of the problems that plagued

l^Halcrow, Economic History Review, 2nd Series, VII, pp. 352-353. 15 religious houses during the period under consideration. Not only did It suffer the economic dislocations characteristic of the period, it also enjoyed Its periods of prosperity.

Just as It was ruled during certain periods by capable ab­ bots, It suffered on other occasions from mismanagement.

During the periods when It was ruled well, many of the de­ vices available to the competent administrator were ex­ ploited for the economic benefit of the house. Likewise, when It was ruled by Incompetents, many of the excesses that characterized other badly managed religious houses were present.

During the third quarter of the thirteenth century

Tavistock had suffered economic distress, but entered upon a period of slow recovery during the rule of Robert Colbern extending from 1270 to 1285. During his abbacy the Statute of Mortmain was enacted and this created obstacles which prevented the easy acquisition of new lands. A license had to be purchased after the monastery had withstood an Inquest, but this does not seem to have been a particularly formidable restriction. Indeed, In the Calendar of Patent Rolls for the fourteenth century one is struck by the number of licenses that were Issued permitting the alienation of prop­ erty In mortmain. The king used this as a means for aug­ menting royal revenues. Colbem seems to have managed the house capably, but no great advances were made, for there 16 was no great financial reserve when he died,^3

The next abbot was Robert Champeaux who ruled for al­ most forty years, from 1285 to 1324^. As well as being lengthy his rule is notable for its quality, for not only did he recover lands which had been alienated, he also consolidated and enclosed the agricultural lands around

Tavistock, undertook mining ventures, and leased various properties. In addition he secured a charter from the crown which limited the royal rights during fututeevoidances,

Among other accomplishments he founded a house of studies at

Oxford, constructed churches for both the abbey and the parish, and established a chantry at Whitchurch, All of these works redounded to the economic well-being and the spiritual stature of the abbey. After having been forced to borrow two hundred pounds when he began his rule, he raised the economic condition of the house to the extent that he left over twelve hundred in the treasury upon his death.

In 132^ Tavistock suffered a disputed election which resulted In an appeal to Rome and the eventual appointment of Bonus, a man from Aqultane unfamiliar with local condi­ tions, as abbot. He soon became Involved In a dispute with

Bishop Grandisson over the appropriation of a church and ultimately he"was deposed by the bishop. Thereupon Grandisson

13pinberg, Tavistock Abbey, pp, 249-2 5 0 , 260-2 6 2 . l^ibid. 17 appointed his cousin, John de Courtenay, who, within four years, borrowed thirteen hundred pounds from Florentine and

London bankers. He was rewarded for this mismanagement with a directive from his bishop cousin commanding that he re­ move himself, together with his chaplain, from the monastery to suitable lodgings elsewhere. He was given 80 pounds a

year for support while the monks themselves were allowed

only 100 pounds annually for their maintenance. Even so, the questionable tolerance of excesses often associated with neopotism only went 6o far with Bishop Grandisson,

for in 13^5 he chastized his cousin for keeping a pack of hounds. In 13^5 and 13^8 the bishop chastized other less

flagrant instances of negligence by pointing out that the reeves of Leigh and Milton had not returned accounts, that

tithes were being sold to disadvantage, that buildings were

left unrepaired, and that the property of the house was

being mortgaged and sold by the abbot. It is also during

the abbacy of John de Courtenay that we find the leasing

out of lands beginning on a grand scale at Tavistock. The

abbot and convent decided in 1339 to demise extensive hold­

ings. Involved were "89O acres of arable, 418 acres of

meadow, and 46o acres of pasture in Tavistock, Hatherleigh,

and Werrington, a house in Exeter, and 86 acres of arable

and meadow in their Cornish estate of Anteny.”^^ The

leases were to be for life or an extended term of years.

^^Ibid. 18

Under current methods of exploitation the estates returned forty shillings, but at least ten pounds* return was ex­ pected through leasing.

Bishop Grandisson attributed the troubles which beset

Tavistock and other houses in his diocese completely to mis- manatgement, H.P.R, Pinberg, in his discussion of Tavistock abbey, feels that this was somewhat shortsighted. Although there was mismanagement and incompetence, the economic dis­ tress was too widespread to be attributable merely to these shortcomings, and this is what seems to have escaped

Grandisson as well as other fourteenth century bishops.

Pinberg suggests that aocleslaatical superiors charged with the task of visitation were oblivious to the profound eco­ nomic changes that were taking place. They were too willing to blame mismanagement and incompetent administration for the depressed condition of many religious houses.

The movement away from *high farming* was thus a road filled with chuckholes, and it required an administrative competence only infrequently found in monastic management for the way to be negotiated successfully. The course was tortuous and the dangers of failure great, especially for men whose ideal was to reject the complexities of the mun­ dane world for a higher vacation. \

Even though the granting of leases was the most popular way a monastery could improve its financial position during

l^Ibid. 19 this period of agricultural depression, it was not the only one possible. Other management devices could be applied to the eigrlcultural system to Increase Income. The commutation of labor services for a money payment was such a method of augmenting revenue. Commutation might be allowed upon the payment of fixed contractual rents variable, perhaps, at the pleasure of the lord from year to year. This method was not completely satisfactory as far as the rentier was concerned.

Even though the safeguard of retaining the right to revise rent schedules was Incorporated In the system, the rights of the lord tended to be eroded, the payment potentially could become fixed, and, with Inflation occurring, become 17 nominal. ' It thus was not the most desirable arrangement for a religious corporation. An alternate and more satis­ factory way of exploiting surplus labor rights was to sell these labor surpluses on a yearly basis.Through the yearly renegotiation of the amount to be paid by the villein for the commutation of his labor obligations, although It was undoubtedly time consuming, the rentier could protect his relative economic position.

Leasing out lands and commuting services were not the only means by which monastic Income could be augmented.

l^Mlller, Abbey and Bishopric of Ely, p. I09. The bishop of Ely, as early as 1&9?, commuted, on a contractual basis, the services of the tenants of the manors of Pulham and East Derehem.

^Qjbld. The bishop of Ely sold, on a yearly basis, services due from the tenants of the Great Shelford and Wisbech manors at an accelerated rate In the period between 1319 and 1345. 20

In addition, a monastery often could grant short-term, precarious contracts allowing the exploitation of mills, fisheries, pastures, and other prerogatives.^9 This could contribute quite considerably to receipts. All of these devices pertain to land already held by a monastery. Other expedients connected with agricultural management and In­ volving the acquisition of new lands were sometimes tried.

A canny administrator could make astute investments In land by either purchasing land outright or taking up leases at low figures preliminary to releasing them at higher compet­ itive rates. Sometimes, too, where reclamation had been ceirrled on In the thirteenth century it was continued Into 20 the fourteenth. In the latter period, however, reclaimed land was leased competitively rather than exploited directly.

When the leasehold system became the prevailing method of agricultural administration, the monasteries still required

9jbld., p. 109. In 1251, the bishop of Ely had leased the fisheries of Stretham for 8 1. 12s. The value of the right grew rapidly, for In 13^5 the same fisheries, ex­ ploited under the same kind of arrangement, were returning about 24 1. per year.

^®Smlth, Canterbury Cathedral Priory, pp. 116-118. Canterbury Cathedral priory, under the vigorous leadership of Henry of Eastry, leased out both lands which had been purchased and lands that had been reclaimed. In the late thirteenth century the priory expended considerable effort In reclaiming lands on the manor of Cliffe In North Kent, and such efforts continued In the fourteenth century. After reclamation lands were leased on a competitive basis to the advantage of the priory. In 129I rents derived from the leasing of marshland so reclaimed produced 119 1. Os. 1 l/2d. In 1328 rents received from this source amounted"to T39 1. ” 13s. 8d. 21 grain for their own use. In the earlier period of 'high farming* a portion of that produced by the manors was re­ tained for their own use while the rest was sold. Under the leasehold system this was not possible for rents replaced revenue in kind. As a result, a monastery needed to assure itself of a sufficient supply of grain at reasonable prices.

The means of achieving this end was to restrict and control the sale of grain produced on demised manors, smd control usually took the form of a preemptive right to purchase any surplus grain produced bythe leaseholders. Peasants some­ times attempted to circumvent the restriction by selling their crops while they were still standing in the field. To combat this practice the unauthorized sale of growing crops, too, could be prohibited.21

Aside from the fact that economic trends existed which made it desirable to lease out lands, there were certain administrative problems inherent in 'high farming' management.

There was always the problem of dishonesty on the part of the reeves who were in direct charge of each manor. Indeed, dishonesty or actions bordering on it were quite commonplace, among such officials. The apparent advantages an individual might derive from acting as a manorial reeve were not inducing

Iflalcrow, Economic History Review. 2nd Series, VII, p. 352. Evidence of monastic control over the marketing of agricultural products is apparent at Durham priory. There the priory enforced the right to purchase, if it so desired, any surplus grain that its tenants might have. Later in the fourteenth century, in 1370, the sale of growing crops was likewise controlled. 22 but yet individuals did not have to be coerced into filling this vital position. Men served for year after year in the capacity of reeve, and there must have been economic ad­ vantages coming to them that are not immediately perceivable.

J. S. Drew has suggested that the reeve on both ecclesiasti­ cal and secular estates was afforded plentiful opportunities to profit at the expense of his overseers. Auditor and reeve were attempting constantly to profit at the expense of the other. The reeve was often successful in his en­ deavors, for his advantages in the contest were considerable.^2

One might even suspect that the shrinkage in profits attributable to reeves* actions explains the fact that the leasing out of lands replaced *high farming* exploitation.

By eliminating a middle man, profits might have been increased.

The problem of satisfactorily controlling manorial adminis­ tration at the lowest level in order to maximize agricultural returns, thus, seems to have been considerable. Administra­ tive difficulties within the *high farming* management system occurred not only at the lowest stratum of administration, but also at higher levels. Just as the reeves were some­ times too wily, so were the auditing officials frequently lacking in administrative wisdom and skill.

It seems that it was an absolute necessity for monas­ teries to utilize a centralized accounting system if they

^^Garus-Wilson (ed.), Essays. II, J.S. Drew, "Manorial Accounts of st.Smithuns* Priory, Winchester,** pp. 28-29. 23 were to control adequately Income and expenditures, and ef­

fectively govern the financial affairs of the h o u s e . ^3 This

kind of a system was instituted and exploited for maximum

benefit all too infrequently.

Generally, there were three types of accounting systems

in use in the English Benedictine monasteries during the

fourteenth century. The first, and most efficient, of these

systems involved the existence of a central receiving office

through which all receipts passed and were audited, and

through which all expenditures were authorized. The great

merit in this system lay in the fact that a general survey

of the monastery's entire financial position was accomplished

easily. The second method of auditing accounts also pro­ vided for a receiving office, but the auditing functions of the responsible officials there were limited to these reven­ ues that were not assigned for the use of the various monas­ tic officials who made expenditures regularly while per­

forming their duties. Under the second system most revenues were assigned for specific purposes and the auditors' authority was limited strictly. In an era of rapidly chang­

ing financial conditions this left the opportunity for serious

inequities to develop. The auditors, under this system, in

effect had control of a surplus fund to be drawn upon in time

of crisis. R.H. Snape has suggested that this was the system

most prevalent in the English Benedictine monasteries in the

^3smith, Canterbury Cathedral Priory, pp. 25-28. 24 late medieval period.Finally, some monasteries had no central treasury whatsoever. At Norwich cathedral priory it was stated that 'there is no intermediary between the prior and the officers * The dangers of allowing the officers free reign are patent. With ao, or relatively little fiscal supervision at best, the ubiquitous temptations to expend revenues in frivolous ways could not only lead the house to financial ruin, but also undermine both monastic discipline and morale. Had not, then, the economic currents put landlords in a difficult position during the first half of the fourteenth century, astute management would have been necessary still, if financial problems were to be avoided. This, in part, accounts for the fact that some monasteries were in financial trouble even before economic changes had altered their eco­ nomic position for the worse. It was the rule rather than the exception for a monastic house to be burdened with debts.

Even the most efficiently run houses had their financial problems. Canterbury Cathedral priory had adopted the completely centralized accounting system and maintained it continuously for two centuries in its essential features.

Even this house had financial difficulties, however. R.A.L.

Smith has suggested that the monks at Canterbury were accustomed to extravagance, for they not only maintained a

^^Snape, English Monastic Finances, pp. 119-142.

^%mith, Canterbury Cathedral Priory, p. 28. 25 large number of servants, but also ate and drank beyond their income. Henry of Eastry was able to keep expenditures in check and finances sound, but even his administration did not weather completely the agricultural crisis of the p ^ 1320*8. Mismanagement was, thus, a constant threat to the economic well-being of a religious house. All too infre­ quently were men of the quality of Henry of Eastry to be found, and the dearth of well qualified administrators certainly contributed to financial Instability. More will be said later about mismanagement and the measures taken by various ecclesiastical superiors to combat its deleterious effects. For the moment it is enough to keep in mind that it contributed to, but was not the fundamental cause of, the economic problems that plagued the English religious houses during the first half of the fourteenth century.

26Ibid.. p. 5^. CHAPTER II

MONASTIC ECONOMIC BURDENS

Even though the economic changes that were taking place in the fourteenth century created great and sometimes un­ manageable problems for religious houses, this was not the extent of the economic burdens carried by monasteries. They were, in addition, requested, commanded, and cajoled into performing economic services for their contemporaries. In many instances these services were performed for the king, or other officials, both lay and ecclesiastical, who were in a position to exploit religious corporations. Sometimes, too, wartime conditions created circumstances in which added economic woes plagued religious houses. In other instances the exploitation was cloaked with the draperies of legality^

Frequently monasteries became involved in lawsuits which cost them money. Often the intent of these suits was to deprive the religious house of rights that it lawfully possessed. In other situations the exploitation of religious houses was not even this thinly veiled. Illegal actions on the part of many individuals and groups were directed towards monasteries with the result that the monasteries suffered economically. Not only was property destroyed through 26 27 vandalism, but religious houses were also deprived of rents, relieved of their property, and forced to entertain unwelcome guests. Closely related to the legal problems that fre­ quently beset abbots and priors was the necessity of obtain­ ing copies of legal proceedings that had been decided In favor of a house. A monastery, after It has been Involved

In a legal process, found It desirable. If the monastery had emerged victorious, to maintain among Its own records a copy of the proceedings. In numerous Instances the religious house, for various reasons, would discover that It had lost these documents. Not only might they be destroyed by fire, they also suffered from devastation at the hands of hostile or enemy action, disappeared to clandestine thieves, or were lost, simply, through negligence. In this kind of situation the monastery was forced to go to the chancery and secure, for a fee, copies of the original proceedings. Extravagent building programs and natural disasters such as murrain, floods, and fires were also burdensome economically.

A common method used by the king to exploit the monas­ teries for his own purposes was to request them to provide a corrody or sustenance for an Individual he favored. In many Instances the monarch had every right to make this kind of request for a traditional royal prerogative was Involved,

The king, in the case of some monasteries, had the right to nominate and appoint whomever he wished to fill such vacan­ cies when they occurred. The number of such appointments 28 that the king might make was defined usually, and originally had accrued to the monarch because of his patronage of the particular house involved. It was a different matter, how­ ever, when the king attempted to extend these patronage rights.

It is not at all uncommon to find that monasteries were coerced into accepting more than the traditional number of king's men,l

On other occasions the monarch would prevail on relig­ ious houses to grant a sustenance to a particular individual even though he had no prerogative to request such a favor.

Monasteries found it wise to humor the king as much as pos­ sible so they often accepted such pensioners, albeit unwil-

^It would appear that the obligations owed the crown in the form of sustenances were quite widespread. Early in the fourteenth century the monasteries of St, Frideswide, Gloucester, Leicester, Furness, Bardney, St, Peter's, Ipswich, Coventry, St. Augustine, Bristol, Dunstable, Selby, Messendon, St, Osyth, St. James, Bristol, and Norwich were each requested by the king to provide sustenance for one of the king's servants, OCR, I302-I307, pp. 76-77, Of the religious houses suffering from serious enough economic de­ pression to be taken into the king's hands during the several years on either side of this request, only Furness abbey was requested to receive a pensioner on this occasion, Furness abbey had been taken into the king's custody because of its debts on March 18, I305. c m , 130I-I307, p, 320, A bit later, apparently in response to reluctance on the part of houses to provide sustenance, a group of men were sent to a variety of monasteries. Eight men were involved and each was sent to a different house, OCR, 1302-1307» pp. 85-86, In this instance none of the houses to which pensioners were sent appear to have been in serious financial difficulties. The Calendar of Close Rolls abounds with such entries, but, as was suggested earlier, the mere obligation to provide sus­ tenances was not a burden that could not be carried without financial ruin. On certain other occasions sustenances took the form of yearly payments. The prior of St, John's, Stoke near Clare, for example, acknowledged that he owed 6 m, yearly in the form of a pension to Gilbert de Clare. CCR, 1^02-1307, p. 352. 29 llngly, and usually with the disclaimer that their willingness to provide this sustenance should not constitute a precedent prejudicial to them and favorable to the king.^ in other circumstances the houses resisted the king's wishes, often pleading poverty. This resistance was usually of little avail for the king pushed his demands, and, unless the monas­ tery was in truly difficult financial straits, his wishes prevailed. If a monastery had demurred accepting a pensioner a number of times while the royal officials felt that there was no substance to the position taken by the monastery, the king simply ordered the man involved to the monastery and

2 The abbot and convent of Growland were asked to provide a sustenance for an appointee of the king. They complied, but in complying secured the king's promise that the pro­ viding of a sustenance on this instance should not be re­ garded as precedent, CPR, 1338-40, p, 82, They were trying to prevent the extension of the king's rights through this means. The hospital of Holy Innocents without Lincoln was a foundation that was in financial difficulty frequently. In 1335 the hospital provided for two brothers and nine sisters of whom one was a leper, Knowles and Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses, p, 284, In economic difficulties repeatedly in the 1330's and 1340's to the extent that it attracted the attention of the king, the last two decades of the first half of the fourteenth century were difficult ones for the house, CPR, 1334-38, p, 275; 1340-43, pp, 92 and 444; 1343-45, pp, 422 & 578, Even so, the hospital was requested during this period to receive a pensioner. They agreed to do so, again including the disclaimer that their willingness to do so should not establish a precedent prejudicial to their interests. CPR, 1338-40, p, 318, 30 oommanded the house to accept him,3 if the use of sustenances was one manner of exploiting monasteries at the royal will, it was not the only one, for the king's right to hospitality was also used to royal advantage.

3in a rather typical situation, the king asked that the abbey of Burton-upon-Trent provide a corrody for one of his men. The abbey decided not to honor the king's request citing poverty. The royal officials apparently were not im­ pressed by this plea for the king refused to accept the ex­ cuse, and orders were given that the abbey admit the indi­ vidual in question, GÇH, 1307-1313, PP. 331, 335, 343, Il­ lustrative of the fact that the king was not without compas­ sion for religious houses that demonstrated genuine poverty when he requested that they provide a pension is a case in­ volving the abbot of Stanley, The abbot had been requested to provide a pension for one of the king's men, and had re­ fused, carrying his case-to the king's justices. The abbot apparently demonstrated to their satisfaction that mitigating circumstances existed for he was not required to provide the pension, CPR, 1334-1338, p, 328, Stanley was consistently in financial trouble for lit was taken under the king's pro­ tection, and custodians were appointed for reasons of poverty twice in the 1320's, once in the 1330's, and twice during the 1340's, CRR, 1321-24, 350; 1327-30, n, 335; 1334-38, p, 325; I34ÔZ43, pp, 351-2; 1348-50, p, 199. The troubled financial condition of the abbey, it might be surmised, was the reason for the finding favorable to the monastery. Another instance that shows an interesting vari­ ation is the case of the abbey of Wilton which was ordered to appoint a king's clerk to the next vacancy in the house. This clerk was to be the benefactor of a pension due the king upon the creation of a new abbess, CPR, 1338-40, p, 330. Apparently part of the rights held by the king during the voidance of the abbey involved the prerogative of ap­ pointing someone to hold this pension. Another example that illustrates the interest monasteries exhibited in limiting the king's right to appoint men to pensions relates to the abbot and convent of Chertsey;;, This house was able to secure an exemption from providing pensions. CPR. 1345-48, p, 431. Abbot Simon Eye of Ramsey complained to the monarch in 1331 that his house was burdened with four annuities and pensions amounting to 10 m., 6m., 6m., and 100 s, respec­ tively. In addition the house had to provide four sus­ tenances. The abbot went on to say that the house's cellar was so exhausted that it did not even suffice for the monks, and that the number of monks in the house and the amounts set aside for alms would have to be reduced unless these heavy burdens were mitigated, Raftis, Estates, p, 320, 31 Many monasteries held a portion of their lands on feudal tenure, and, because of the feudal relationship, the monarch had certain obligations owing him from religious houses. Hospitality, of course, was one of these rights and could be exploited by the monarch. Indeed, even the ordinary exercise of the right to collect hospitality could be onerous to the religious house upon which the demands were made.

Sometimes it happened that the king had reason to be in one particular part of the country for extended periods of time off and on. An extended military campaign in a particular area might require the king's attention from time to time, and he would be forced to return to the scone of operations again and again. Other circumstances, perhaps, could force the king's personal attention to be turned to a particular area of the country. In these instances religious houses in the vicinity that held lands on feudal tenure would be requested to offer hospitality, or at the very least, to contribute food and other necessaries to the king for the maintenance of his party. In these circumstances monasteries could be reduced to poverty by the consistent use of the right to hospitality.^ The obligations to provide sustenance

Tynemouth, in the fourteenth century, was a priory of under twenty monks, and it was visited frequently by the royal family. Knowles and Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses, p. 79. A possible explanation for this is that it was in the north and thus was a convenient place for the king to stop while he was prosecuting his wars against the Scots, Edward I, for example, stopped there in 1298 after a victory over his northern opponents, in 1303 the queen resided at the monastery for a period, and in 1322 the same was the case. Tynemouth does not appear to have suffered as a result of 32 and hospitality were, thus, two rights rooted in tradition that enabled the king to exploit the religious houses of the realm. A third right similarly rooted in custom, tradition, and law was the king's right to have custody of a house when it became void following the death of a prior or abbot.

Just as the granting of sustenances and hospitality could be onerous, so also could voidances be burdensome for the economic well-being of a monastery. The royal rights that were exercised during voidances, too, are related to the fact that frequently a monastery held lands on feudal tenure. The conditions prevailing during voidances repre­ sent the application of the principle of the feudal incident of relief to religious corporations. Before succeeding to a fief the heir had to pay a fee to the overlord before he was installed in his feudal office. In the case of religious corporations there was, of course, no heir in the same way that there was in the case of lay vassals. The religious these burdens placed upon it by the royal family. Indeed, the ultimate result was probably to the benefit of the priory, for the house received several favors from the monarch that were of economic value. Dugdale, Monastioon. Ill, p. 305» One might suspect that the monks ingratiated themselves to the royal visitors, and prevailed upon them, ultimately, to bestow upon them grants, confirmations, and favors. In a similar situation the prior and convent of Southwick, in Southampton, had been depressed by invasions and visits from the king. CPR, 1343-48, p. 153» To deal with this problem they received a promise from the king that they would be granted lands. In the fourth decade of the fourteenth century the abbot of Ramsey spent 216 ly4s. in gifts to the children and relatives of the queen, and in diverse expenses made when the queen visited the house. Raftis. Estates, p. 250. 33 corporation continued to exist even though the prior or ab­ bot had died. Even so, some specific person had to accept responsibility for the performance of the feudal obligations*

These were the rights owed the overlord by virtue of the fact that the temporalities were held, on feudal terms, from him.

When the prior or abbot died there was no one to take this responsibility until a new head was elected, and, as a re­ sult, the king's escheator formally took custody of the temporalities* This was a potentially hazardous situation for the monastery for the escheator, either on royal orders or on his own behalf, sometimes administered them during the period of the voidance, not for the benefit of the house, but for the king's or his own advantage. If voidances oc­ curred frequently In a monastery, the situation could become disastrous.

This was the way the system worked In principle, but In practicality the monasteries were consistently pressing for the attenuation of the king's rights during voidances. To achieve this end an established prior or abbot, before a voidance occurred, would go to the king and attempt to pur­ chase the right that the king's perogatlves during future voidances should be strictly limited, defined, and of a ceremonial nature. If this was done a considerable ex­

penditure was involved, and. In certain circumstances, could redound to the disadvantage of the priory. If a voidance did not occur for forty years, the monastery could stand the 34 temporary depredations of the escheator as an alternative to so large an expenditure. If, however, voidances were frequent, as in many cases they were, the limitation of royal rights during voidances was virtually a necessity if financial ruin was to be a v o i d e d . 3 Even though the very existence of a voidance created these problems for a relig­ ious house, this was not the extent of the hazard. When voidances occurred it was frequently quite difficult to secure the unanimous election of a new head of the house.

The problems following upon dissension within a monastery could lead a house along the path to financial

^In certain circumstances monasteries would be fined a lump sum on the occasion of a voidance in order to allow the house to retain custody during the voidance. This seems to have been the situation when St. Augustine's, Canterbury was void, for the abbey was ordered to pay 200 m. of a fine of 600 m. to the constable of Dever castle. CCa, I307-I3 , p. 275. The fine was levied for permitting the monks to retain custody during the period of the voidance. J. Ambrose Haftis in his work, The Estates of Ramsey Abbey, shows that voidance charges in the case of this house were extraordinarily burdensome. In I3I6 when Simon Eye was elected abbot the house paid 660 m. in voidance fees. "By the fourteenth century the vacancy fine was set at 2,000 m. for the year, with proportionately less to be paid for shorter periods, 'and the king also receives fees, escheats, advowsons, etc.'." In the late thirteenth century abbot John of Sawtrey owed 700 m. from voidance fees 5 years after he became abbot. Total income of the house amounted to 2^25 m. 10s. in the late 13th century, and thus the voidance charges amounted to almost 4/5 of a year's income. Raftis. Estates, pp. 232 and 233. 35 ruln.^ The existence of disagreement often prolonged the

period of the voidance so that, if the house had not pur­

chased a limitation on the king's rights during these

periods, the evils associated with the escheator*s custody

would likewise be prolonged. In instances where this

occurred appeals could be carried all the way to the papal

curia, with the attendant delays, so that it would be years

sometimes before a new prior would be installed. These

legal suits, in and of themselves were expensive, and, added to the exploitation of the house by the escheator, portended

%!he priory of Lanthony by Gloucester had become void because the la6t prior had resigned. CPR. 1321-24, pp. 419-20. Discords amongst the canons concerning the election of the next prior created a hazardous situation, for the goods of the priory were being dissipated, and a custodian was ap­ pointed to protect the interests of the priory during the interval. It seems to have been rather unusual for a prior to resign. There was the possibility, of course, that he resigned in order to accept a higher responsibility, but this does not seem probable. When a prior resigned it usually was under duress, and the suspicion might be held that in this case he was somehow lax— guilty, perhaps, of not en­ forcing proper discipline. Should this have been the case a possible explanation for the cause of the dissension might be suggested. The monks interested in continuing an uncanon- ical life would have favored one candidate while the pious members of the house would have favored another. Thus a disputed election would have been the result. Tavistock abbey suffered from a double election, and appeals threatened to impoverish the house. As a result, John Everard was appointed custodian to manage the resources of the house to prevent this eventuality. OPR, 1324-27. In the case of the abbey of Lilleshull debts and poverty had resulted from a quarrel between the present abbot and the man who had previously been abbot. OPR. 1330-3^, p. I63. Again, it might be surmised that the late abbot had been re­ placed for malfeasance. In this instance Richard de Hampton sund Roger Carles were appointed custodians to retrieve the financial position of the abbey. 36 ill for the economic well-being of the house,^ Even in situations where the royal rights during voidances had been limited, the problem could still be serious.

When there was no abbot or prior the quality of admin­ istration was likely to fall off. With no one in authority offering guidance and directions, mismanagement was likely, if not probable. Apart from this, however, during periods of voidance these owing revenues, rents, and services to the monastery seem to have been less willing to perform their obligations.G The agricultural population during the late medieval period was capable of sustained resistance to the economic demands made of them by their lords, and, during

7 In the case of the abbey of St. Augustine, Canterbury, the house was in a state of great want that had been created by frequent voidances and a suit to the court of Rome in which the abbey had become involved. In order to aid the house during this time of crisis, the king pardoned it of part of the money owed him because of the current voidance. CPR, 13^5-^8, pp. 3^5 and 288, The important point to be made about voidances is that they were potentially dangerous, and, if the monks of a particular house could not agree on who should become abbot, the house could become impoverished. Through wise leadership, however, the perils associated with voidances could be avoided, and the house could retain its financial respectability.

®At the hospitals of Northgate and Harbaldon by Canter­ bury poverty resulted when they had trouble during the period of a voidance collecting revenues owing them. The king ordered that during future voidances they should receive the monies due them, and that the keeper's of the see or the king's ministers should not interfere. CPR, 1334-38, p. 184. 37 periods of voidance, this capability would have been likely to have manifested itself in its fullest vigor. R. H, Hilton has pointed out that peasants resisted, both legally and illegally in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the economic demands made of them.^ There was, thus, a well established tendency towards resisting what the peasant population felt was economic exploitation. The apparent cause of this resistance is the tight economic situation that existed in the late medieval period—an agricultural depression that was especially acute during the second quarter of the fourteenth century. Although the legal right of these revenues belonged to a privileged monastic class, the peasant population probably felt, eind with some reason, that they were an exploited group. The feeling is summed up in the well knotm couplet: *When Adam delved and Eve span who was then the gentleman.*10

Beyond the possibilities of exploiting religious houses through the rigorous application and extention of extant rights and prerogatives, the monarch could exploit monas­ teries in another way. During periods of warfare, the king

% . H. Hilton, "Peasant Movements in England Before I38I," Economic History Review. 2nd Series, II (19^9)» passim. See also Marjorie Morgan's discussion of peasant opposition to economic exactions in The English Lands of the Abbey of Bee., pp. 106ff.

l^According to C. Edmund Maurice in his English Popular Leaders in the Middle Ages. London: Henry S . King and Co., 1875, p. 169, John Ball7 one of the leaders of Wat Tyler's rebellion, used this as a text for a sermon. As we have seen, the tradition of peasant resistance to the economic demands made of them antedated 1381. 38 frequently found it desirable to take custody of religious houses. This was particularly true with houses belonging to orders that had foreign connections, and this offered the king a fruitful opportunity for taking advantage of religious houses.

During the periods of warfare the monarch needed to ensure himself that resources from his own realm were not flowing to the lands of his enemies to be used by them against him. It was, therefore, necessary to take certain precautions that this would not happen, and the most usual manner in which this was done was to take the houses in question into the king's hands. This involved management of monastic finances by an official of the crown, and offered convenient opportunities for exploitation. As has been sug­ gested earlier, administration by the king's representative was less to the interest of the monastery involved than if they could keep administration in their own hands. It is not at all unusual to find monasteries complaining that they are on the brink of financial ruin because they cannot pay the farm demanded of them while the religious house is being administered by representatives of the crown.

The problem became especially serious after the out­ break of the Hundred Years' 'War, for then a ll the Cluniac houses were taken into the king's hands, at least for a period of time. If the king could satisfy himself that the ruler of the house was loyal, then he was usually not 39 unwilling to make an arrangement more to the economic inter­ est of the house involved. The existence of war conditions, thus, created a problem for at least a number of the English monasteries, for they were likely to be taken into the king's custody to their own economic detriment,This, however, was not the only problem that resulted from the involvement of the monarch in a military conflict. The king required additional revenues during wartime, and this, too, created certain economic problems for religious houses.

Monasteries, as one of the groups within fourteenth century English society that controlled extensive lands.

1 This situation applied usually to religious estab­ lishments that had foreign connections such as houses of the Cluniac order. The monarch needed to be certain that the resources of English monasteries were not flowing to his enemies, and for this reason he found it necessary to take control of the finances of certain houses. The tendency became pronounced after the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War in 1337» for then most houses that had French connections were taken into the king's custody, at least for a period. These conditions were hazardous, potentially, for the relig­ ious houses involved, but as in the case of voidances, where a house was in danger of bankruptcy or true economic dis­ tress, the king manifested a willingness to protect Its interests, Edward Ill's main concern was to ensure that the heads of the monasteries so taken into the hands were loyal to him, and that they would not send valuables to Prance to aid his enemies. The priory of Lewes was one of those houses taken into royal custody because of the war, and, as a result, it found itself in difficult financial circum­ stances, Because of this embarrassed economic position the king agreed to pardon the house of 500 1_, that was owed him, CPR, 1338-40, p. 305» It : .'is Marjorie Morgan's opinion that the farms required during periods of royal custody because of war were exorbitant. Had they been paid in full the monks would have had to live on their capital. Only in the first year was it fully paid, but even so the crown collected 5,000 from the order of Bee, When the arrears mounted it was pardoned, Morgan, English Lands, pp. 120-23. 40 would be, naturally enough, one of the groups upon which the king would call for additional revenues of one kind or another. This took the form of not only increased taxation, but also of loans to the crovm. With almost astonishing frequency there are entries in the Close and Patent Rolls that indicate that the king has levied tenths on the movable property within the realm. These exactions fell not only on the religious corporations, but also on all others who owned movable property, but in numerous instances monastic offic­ ials, usually the abbot or prior, were named as collectors of the tenth for their particular region. This, of course, created administrative problems for the house involved, and, although the burden was not great perhaps, it nevertheless was a service that was performed.

Not only were religious houses taxed and given the ad­ ministrative responsibility for collecting revenues demanded of others, they also were called upon by the crown to offer loans to the monarch that were sometimes quite substantial.

In numerous instances these loans took the form of wool which was collected by a royal official and for which the king agreed to pay at a later d a t e . ^3 in instances where

1 During the rule of abbot John of Saiftrey at Ramsey late in the thirteenth century, the monarch took one-half of the abbey's income in taxes, Raftis, Estates, p, 234, 13 One manner in which the monarch could exploit relig­ ious houses was to collect wool from them in the form of a loan, and then sell the wool at a price significantly higher than the price ultimately paid the monasteries for the wool. The Calender of Patent Rolls is filled with notes of such 41 the loans were actually repaid, this involved not only the use of the wool for a period of time that approximated the modern equivalent of interest, hut also masked a means by which the king exploited the whole wood growing industry for his own benefit. The monarch had an advantageous bargaining position as far as the sale of wool was concerned, and could sell it dearer than could the individual house or order. Thus he profited from the control of the wool trade, and in effect ranked off the profits of the enterprise for himself. In other

Instances the loans to the crown took the form of money transactions. In a space of ten pages the monarch acknow­ ledged that he owed no less than thirty houses a variety of sums for wool that had been collected from them. The abbot of St. Mary's, York was owed 120 1, for wool received, to cite one such example. CPR. 1388-40, pp. 288-98. The abbey of St. Mary's, York, it might be mentioned, was a house frequently in financial difficulties.

l^ln 1347 the prior of Tynomouth lent the king 20 m. in order to assist in defraying the costs of prosecuting the seige of Calais. A promise of repayment was not included, and it might be surmised that the loan was never repaid, Dugdale. Monastioon. Ill, p. 305. Numerous examples of un- conditional loans to the monarch could be given, but to do so would be tedious. One entry in the Calendar of Patent Rolls that is typical states that loans of 40 1, each have been made to the king by the monks of the houses of Oseney and Abyndon. No stipulation of repayment was included, and one again might well wonder whether the loans were ever re­ paid. cm, 1313-17, p. 270. On other occasions those who had been called upon to make loans to the crown took precautions to secure some kind of an understanding with regard to repayment. Either repay­ ment would be made out of a grant from a tenth that was due, or the monaroh made a specific promise that he would repay the loan. An example of the first alternative can be found in a loan made to the king by the abbot of St. Mary's, York. Repayment of the sum was authorized out of a tenth to be oollected. CPR. 1317-21, p. 29, Illustrative of the second alternative is the loan made to the king by the abbot of 42 or valuables,Again the king agreed to repay the value of the loan, but the king still had the use of the resources for a period of time.

Other royal economic problems characteristic of the first half of the fourteenth century were solved by recourse to the resources of monasteries. In order to effectively conduct a military campaign, for example, adequate supplies 16 had to be available. All of these burdens on monasteries.

Chester, He had loaned the monarch 100 m,,and, in return, had secured the king's promise that he would repay the obli­ gation, CPR, 1334-38, p, 306, Sometimes when a loan was made to the crown the monastery involved did not secure a promise of repayment, but yet was able to secure its own interests at least somewhat. At a later date they often were able to secure a royal acknowledgment that the crown was in debt to the particular house in question. The king, for example, acknowledged a debt of 59 I.» that was owed the abbot of Battle, and promised repayment, CPR, 1338-40, p, 81.

^^It was possible for loans to the crown by religious houses to take forms other than hard money. In one such case the king acknowledged that he had received certain valuable objects from the abbot and convent of St, Edmunds, and promised either to restore the items involved at a later date or pay for them, CPR, 1338-40, p, 122, The suspicion might be held that the king intended to use these valuables as security for loans with foreign bankers, for the loan occurred just shortly after the outbreak of the Hundred Years* War, It seems probable that the royal requirements for revenue would have been increased in these circumstances, and the use of the valuable objects belonging to St, Edmund's to raise a loan seems not unliekly,

l^To secure sufficient foodstuffs for the expedition against the Scots undertaken in I3IO, the king requested the prior of Boulton, along with a number of other heads of religious houses, to loan him victuals, A promise of reim­ bursement on the part of the king was not recorded, and in the absence of such a commitment, one might surmise that the religious houses involved were never repaid for their contributions. CCR, 1307-I3 » p. 26l, In a similar situation, the monarch requested the abbot of St, Augustine's, Canter- burty to deliver foodstuffs to the constable of Dover castle to be used by the king. Here, however, the king promised to pay for the supplies requisitioned, CCR, I307-I3 , p, 535» ^3 the granting of sustenances, the providing of hospitality, the surrendering of custody during voidances, and the in­ creasing financial demands during wartime created economic pressures on religious houses. These pressures, however, should not be exaggerated, and must be placed in proper perspective.

Even though monasteries performed these various functions for the crown and were, in some instances, exploited by it, the impression should not be given that the problems thereby created were insurmountable for they were not. The obliga­ tions to provide sustenances were, as has already been sug­ gested, somewhat rigidly defined, and although the king tried to exploit and extend these rights, he seems to have been unwilling to be so ruthless as to push a monastery into economic ruin to achieve his objective. What usually seems to have been involved was the king's interest in extending these rights where a religious house could, without serious ^ retrenchment, provide the sustenance requested.

Indeed, in the case of houses that were in serious financial difficulties the king was willing to aid in re­ solving their difficulties. He appointed royal officials as custodians for houses that were on the brink of financial ruin, and as well granted licenses permitting the alienation of property in mortmain, gave outright grants to monasteries, and proffered other forms of economic sustenance in times of true distress. Much the same kind of thinking prevailed as 44 far as demands for hospitality, for custody during voidances, and aids during war were concerned. Indeed, in the case of voidances,the monastery had what amounted to a ready made means of protecting their economic interests through the purchase of a limitation on royal rights. Even when the house did not possess such privilege, the king lent a sympa­ thetic ear where genuine economic distress existed, and was willing to mitigate the harsher potentialities of the sys­ tem. Exploitation, too, during wartime was not pernicious or vindictive, and the king was concerned only with raising enough money to prosecute his campaigns successfully. This, of course, involved taxation, and, if the monasteries bore more than their share, and this seems dubious, the king probably reasoned that it was for the benefit of the whole realm including the religious corporations.

The king's thinking seems to have been that monasteries, as part of the establishment in English society in the fourteenth century, should provide their shares in prosecuting the interests subsumed under the common good of the realm.

By being a part of a privileged class they had also the privilege of being taxed. The king recognized that the per­ sonnel of religious houses could perform certain functions for him, and that it was not desirable that they succumb to the omnipresent danger of bankruptcy. Prom all of this the conclusion must be drawn that, although monasteries were ex­ ploited, they were exploited with a Judiciousness character- 45 Istic of English kings grounded in concerns of law. This seems to have been the case with all of the English monarchs of the first half of the fourteenth century— Edward I,

Edward II, and Edward III. The fiscal requirements of the first three Edwards, however, were high, and the taxes needed to support the military campaigns bore heavily on the whole realm, the monasteries included.

Another means by which religious houses could be forced into poverty was by becoming involved in expensive lawsuits.

On some occasions it was through no fault of their own that this occurred. Rather, they were subjected to harrassment by individuals who thought they could profit unjustly from the working of the legal process.1? In other instances, as we have seen, lawsuits and appeals could be the outcome of voidances and other disputes within a particular house.

^Adam de Osgodby seems to have been one of those indi­ viduals who was willing to profit and take advantage of the working of the legal process, for he initiated suits against the abbeys of Furness and Sawley, Adam was parson of the church of Redgrave, and he charged that each of the two abbeys involved was liable to him for tithes of 100 s, yearly. Neither abbey was able to stop the suit against it, and Adam was able to orosecute his suit effectively, GCR, 1302-07, pp. 170-172. Legal processes of one kind or another were quite usual during the fourteenth century, and certain safeguards existed to protect the interests of those involved. The abbot of Hyde became involved in a suit over a debt of 260 m, When he had been due to appear in court, he had been in the king's service. To protect his Interest in the suit he secured a royal order that commanded that he not be judged in default because he did not appear. The reason for essoin in this instance was the activity that he had undertaken on behalf of the king, OCR, 1302-07, p. 409, 46

In 1327 the abbey at Bury St. Edmunds became Involved in a quite violent dispute with the townsmen. The violence, attacks, and devastation suffered by the abbey eventually became the subject of a lawsuit prosecuted by the abbey against the o f f e n d e r s . 18 The abbey, thus, through no fault of its own, was forced to undertake the expense of a law­ suit to obtain redress for the wrongs it had suffered at the hands of the malfactors. Monasteries were subjected to legal actions Involving their tenements. The prioress of

Thicket, for example, was so harrassed, but the outcome of the suit was not recorded, and whether or not the litigant had a valid claim is undetermined.1? Presentation rights were the subject of litigation quite frequently, and quite often the king and an abbot or prior were the litigants.

l^Dugdale, Monasticon. Ill, pp. IO8-O9 . The abbey of St. Mary’s, York was the object of similar attacks by the citizens of York. Here, too, the lawlessness led the abbey to undertake pleas to protect its liberties. The animosities were not settled easily, however, and disturbances continued until 1353 when an agreement between the abbey and the town was negotiated with the help of Archbishop Theresby. Dugdale, Monasticon. Ill, p. 538. In mid-fourteenth century, probably during the rule of Abbot Robert, head of Ramsey abbey between 1342 and 13^9, the house spent at least 452 yd. in prosecuting law suits against Harvett Bonum over a corrody, and against the houses of Thorney and Ely.

^^CPR, 1317-21, p. 81. Nevertheless, the prioress had to defend the rights of the house, and a certain percentage of the cases religious houses were subjected to were unwar­ ranted, and of a harassing nature. In just such a case the abbot of Beaulieu was the object of a number of suits brought for harassment purposes. The king seems to have recognized the problem for the bailiffs of Cornwall county were directed to recognize certain individuals who were to be attorneys for the abbot. OPR, 1330-34, p. 537. ^7 In one such case the king brought suit against the abbot of O Thorney over who had the right to make a presentation.

The obligation to provide pensions was a constant sub­ ject for disagreement and law suits. In a rather conventional kind of action, the abbey of Battle was subjected to such an action that involved providing a pension, and in this in­ stance emerged victorious. Even so, the house had been put to the expense of defending its interests, and this involved expenditures. Sometimes lands that had been illegally alienated, sold, or otherwise lost by a particular house were the subject of litigation. The Austin Friars of near Oxford were involved in such a case, and through the use of a law­ suit were able to recover possession of certain lands that had been lost.^l. in another case where new burdens for a

era, 133^-38, p. 161. In some instances the king held a presentation right, but found that other individuals thought that they too held the right. If the monarch had reason to suspect that such would be the case, he sometimes proscribed any litigation on the subject. In one such case he prohibited anyone from contesting his presentation to a prebend that recently had been the subject of litigation with the abbess of Wilton. GPR, 133^-38, p. 164.

^^Cra, 133^-3 8 , pp. 30O-OI. In another instance the right of the priory of St. Martin’s, Dover, to tolls was challenged in a legal action, and the priory again was able to successfully meet and overcome the challenge. CPR. 1338-40, p. 17. In a similar action, this time over the right to profits from woods, the abbot of St. Peter’s, Gloucester, was able to protect the interests of his house. CPR. 1338-40, p. 215. Another variation on the same theme occurred when the abbess and convent of Shaftesbury sustained their right to take brushwood, GPR. 1338-40, p. 549. In a case involving the abbot of Goggeshall the responsibility for the repair of a bridge was at issue. Here the abbot was able successfully to avoid being saddled with this duty. GPR, 1340-4 3 , pp. 288-2 9 9 . 48 religious house were contemplated, the abbot of Crowland aborted an effort on the part of the king to tax him at an n p unprecedented rate,^^ On occasion administrators of relig­

ious houses could be the aggressive party in a law suit.

This occurred when the king complained that the abbot of

Quarr was trying to disinherit him of a manor.^3 work

obligations, too, were sometimes at issue as in the suit prosecuted by the abbot of Tintern abbey where he upheld his right to collect services from certain of his tenants,24

Lawsuits, thus, could work to both the advantage and dis­ advantage of a monastery. The important point to remember about the involvement of religious houses in such actions, however, is that they were expensive. The very necessity of having to defend prerogatives that the house held by recog­ nized legal right could constitute a substantial drain on the house's economic resources.

Just as legal actions were a potential danger for re­ ligious corporations, so also were the illegal actions of a variety of individuals who were in a position to take ad­ vantage of a monastery. Acts of theft, violence, and des­ truction were common complaints of religious houses, and they seem to have suffered quite considerably by the hands of their neighbors. One explanation for this circumstance is the fact

22çra, 1340-43, pp. 337-38,

23cra, 1340-43, p. 367,

24çra, 1345-48, pp. 162-63. 49 that in medieval society monks constituted a privileged class. The properties and the rights held by religious corporations were held to the economic disadvantage of the peasant classes surrounding the monastery, and, as a result, the monasteries were envied by their neighbors.

An unwillingness on the part of tenants to pay the rents that they owed to a monastery was common,Complaints of attempts to avoid the payment of sums owed to a house were made not only to the monarch, but also to ecclesiastical superiors.26 in other instances malefactors relieved relig­ ious establishments of their tithes. Included in Adam de

Orleton's register are threats of excommunication issued by the bishop of Salisbury against anyone who should despoil the churches of Woottoon Aivers and of Petuey of their tithes,2?

one such instance the priory of Bermondsey com­ plained that it was unable to collect rents from the manor of ,/Wytherflat, As a result of the complaint, the king ordered the keeper of the Templar's manor there to pay the usual rent with 10 m. that were owed in arrears, COR, 1307-13» p. 393*

2^1he abbot and convent of Tintern made such a complaint in 1323 to Adam de Orleton, bishop of Hereford, They said that John de Walewere, until his death, had been guardian of the fisheries of the convent, and that after he died many of those who owed debts to the monastery repudiated them. The bishop, reacting to this situation, instructed the deabh jCîf the Forest periodically to threaten with excommunication those who persisted in refusing to pay their debts. Begistrum Ade de Orleton, pp. 256-57* He, thus, was using ecclesiastical weapons againstuhhe insubordination of the peasants involved. The debtors felt, apparently, that, with the death of the men charged with the administration of the fisheries, the con­ vent would be unable to enforce payment of those debts, and that the debts themselves amounted to exploitation which should be avoided whenever possible,

27Registrum Ade de Orleton, pp. 314-15* 50 Sometimes in dealing with recalcitrant debtors it was necessary for the priory to be taken under the king's pro­ tection, for custodians to be appointed, and for these men to apply their considerable talents and powers in collecting po the debts owed. The problem of collecting revenues owed a house could be compounded because of a lack of geographical proximity to the source of these revenues. This was a dif­ ficulty that faced the prior of Gwisborough whose house was located in the north riding of Yorkshire, Guisborough owned the issues from certain churches located in Scotland, and the prior complained to the monarch that he was unable to collect these revenues.^9

On other occasions those who had obligations to religious corporations were more subtle in their attempts to obviate collection efforts, A fairly common practice involved carrying off the deeds, charters, and other documents that recorded the lands the monastery controlled, the obligations of the tenants, and other like information that the tenants of a house would like to see lost,30 Wanton violence seems.

28 This was so with the prior and convent of Bermundesey, for the king's clerks— Master Henry de Clif and Adam de Brom-- were appointed keepers and the house was put under royal pro­ tection, The apparent reasons for this action were not only that the house was in debt, but also that rents owed the priory from the city and suburb of London were in arrears, CPR, 1317-2 1 , p. ^57» The guardians thus were to collect the arrears and straighten out the tangled finances of the house,

^^CER, 1324-27, p, 299.

3^The practice was so widespread that bishop Adam de Orleton of Hereford included in his register the form of a 51 likewise, to have been quite common during the fourteenth

century. Complaints of a variety of houses were recorded to

the effect that they had been subjected to the vandalism of

not only their neighbors, but also to the violence of

strangers,31 On occasion the harassment could be so severe

that a monastery would be abandoned for a period. This was

the case at Abingdon, for it was recorded that the abbey had

been so devastated by rioters that monks could no longer live

there. In this instance Gilbert de Ellesfeld and Thomas de

mandate to be used against those who had carried off these kinds of documents. The tenor of the mandate is that the bishop had received continual reports that unknovm individ­ uals had carried off charters, letters, and other diverse records in an unjust manner and were retaining them illegally. The prelate applied the remedy provided by ecclesiastical law for such offenses by threatening excommunication against the guilty parties if the documents in question were not returned within a specified -period. Aegistrum Ade de Orleton, pp. 292-93. 3^Abingdon abbey, during the abbacy of John de Canynges in 1327, was destroyed by malefactors coming from both Oxford and Abingdon. In this instance at least some of the evildoers were apprehended and convicted, for twelve were hanged and sixty were condemned. Dugdale, Monasticon, I, p. 509. In another instance the priory of Tynemouth was sub­ jected to the depredations of people of the neighboring area who had taken up arms originally to defend against the Scots, but who had used the occasion to undertake general and wanton plunder. Dugdale, Monasticon, I I I , p. 305» One expedient that was available to individuals who had been the object of illegal actions of others was to secure a commission of oyer and terminer. Such commissions directed several of the king's justices to hear allegations that il­ legal acts over which the king's law had jurisdiction had been committed, determine whether in fact a violation had occurred, and settle the matter. Such wa.s the case with the abbot of Whalley, for he complained of depredations that had been made against the abbey and obtained the appointment of a commission of oyer and. terminer to investigate and settle the matter. GPR, 1327-30, p. 8 5 . 52 Goudry were appointed custodians in order that conditions might be rectified.32

The occurrence of a voidance could provide an excellent opportunity for acts outside the law. This was the situation at the abbey of Bindon where the abbot had been removed.33

Harassment could affect not only the abbey together with its residents, but also the servants of the house. The ab­ bot of Whalley, for example, complained that his servants were terrified to the extent that they were unwilling to cul­ tivate the lands of the house,3^ A motive for these harass­ ment tactics directed against the servants can be suspected.

During the second quarter of the fourteenth century peasants already holding lands on leases were interested in extending their lands still further. They perhaps were encouraging the servants of the house to cease their cultivating activities in order to induce the abbot to lease out the lands involved to them. Another manner in which monasteries could be il­ legally exploited was to badger them into paying taxes that were not owed. The abbot and convent of Stanley complained that they were being harassed to pay a tallage that was not

32çm, 1327-3 0 , p, 159. 33 ^Here a mob carried away diverse goods belonging to the house, many of the monks were forced to withdraw, and a variety of services owed the abbey ceased to be performed. To remedy the deplorable condition the abbot of Beaulieu, Hugh de Courtenay, and Hugh Poyng were appointed custodians. c m , 1327-3 0 , p. 3 9 1 . 3^cm, 1327-30, p. 478. 53 due from them. In this Instance the king ordered the harass- 35 ment to cease. Poaching could detract significantly from a house's economic assets, and occasionally complaints of this kind of illegality were recorded. The abbot of

Waltham Holy Cross was concerned sufficiently about activ­ ities of this nature that he obtained a commission of oyer and terminer to punish offenders.

Just as men of the surrounding area committed acts of theft and violence against religious houses, so were monks of other houses capable of similar activities. The abbot of

Earnsey, complaining of depredations committed by the monks of Thorney among others, obtained a commission of oyer and terminer to deal with t h e m . 37 The violence was perhaps mu­ tual, for a bit later the abbot of Thorney complained of depredations too, and similarly obtained a commission of oyer and terminer.3® The various rights a monastery held over its tenants by virtue of the fact that it was overlord were significant economically, and attempts to deny them were not unusual. The prior of Daventry, for example, complained that he was being deprived of the right to grind malt.39

35cpfl, 1330-3 4 , p. 3 7 4.

3®gh, 1334-3 8 , p. 145.

37cm, 1334-3 8 , p. 146.

3®CPE. 1334-38, p. 202.

39cpr, 1334-38, p. 4 4 9 . 54

Economic conditions in the second quarter of the four­ teenth century made it desirable for religious houses to lease out more of their lands. The abbey of Selby was not unusual in this respect and leased out certain lands to new tenants. This practice could prove to be hazardous and was so for Selby, for the abbot and convent complained that, after they had leased out these lands, the leasees had been disturbed during a recent voidance. In this instance the abbey was able to secure an indemnification to compensate for the trouble that they had s u f f e r e d . 40 The impositions strangers made on religious houses could result in economic burdens for the monastery. Such was the case with the abbey of Littele, for the abbot complained that the house was im­ poverished as a result of the frequent comings of mariners Al-I together with other causes.^

The right to dispense justice was one of the rights frequently held by a religious corporation, and the revenues derived from justice could be considerable. In the case of the prior of Hayling they amounted to enough that he complained to the king that he was unable to collect his customary

Llq CPR. 1338-^0 , p. 9» The suspicion might be held that the disturbances were related to the changed method of land holding. Some peasants profited from the new terms while others were in a less advantageous position. Those suffering from the altered conditions, perhaps, were responsible for the breach in law and order, 111 To remedy this condition the abbot sought and received the king's license that permitted the house to lease out certain lands, GPR, 1338-40, p, 5 9 , 55 judicial fees. Both the conditions under which the depri­ vation took place, and whether he obtained redress were not r e c o r d e d . ^2 in any case this was another manner in which a religious house could be subjected to illegal acts that re­ sulted in economic detriment to the monastery in question.

Acts against monasteries that were outside the law were not reserved for private individuals. Not only did people with no governmental responsibilities damage the interests of monasteries, royal officials, too, were sometimes accused of this kind of activity,The point to be made in this dis­ cussion is not that monasteries were burdened to the extent of insolvency by these actions, but rather that illegal acts against religious houses were one of a variety of economic problems that together pressed upon the financial resources of the corporations.

^^CPR, 1338-40, p, 65.

^^The complaint brought by the prior and convent of Llanthony by Gloucester against the escheator is illustrative, for they maintained that he had unjustly seized their lands. Fortunately for the interests of the priory they were able to secure redress. CPR, 1340-43, pp. 393-94. Other houses were not perhaps so fortunate, for the abbess of Nherwell complained that she was deprived of her rights by the king's men, and it was not recorded whether she received satisfac» tion, GPR, 1343-4 5 , pp. 386-8 7 . On occasion the king could be quite generous to those who had suffered at the hands of criminals. The prior and convent of Mattersey enjoyed such royal favor when the king pardoned them of 8 that were owing on a tenth. The reason given for this generosity was that the prior had been plundered of money, horses, and harness, CPR, 1345-48, p, 45. The examples of the ways in which religious houses suffered from the illegal actions of others could be multiplied, but this would result in needless repetition. 56 If the performing of services for the king, the involve­

ment in lawsuits, and the suffering from the illegal actions

of others all contributed to monastic economic decline, so

also did the necessity for securing copies of records that

had been lost, stolen, or destroyed. Indeed, as a conse­

quence of the depredations that often were involved in

vandalism, religious houses found that they had lost valuable

documents and were compelled to secure copies of them from the royal chancery.44

Because monasteries performed services for the king,

because they became involved in lawsuits, and because they

suffered from the illegal actions of their contemporaries,

the stability of their economic position suffered. Because

The prior and brethern of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem in England secured a confirmation and inspeximus of a land lease contract that they had made. CPR. 1334-38, p. 150. The probability in this case is that the lease in some manner had been questioned and the house therefore had found it necessary to confirm the validity of the lease through an inspeximus of the royal records. Alternately, the hospital's copies of the documents in question might have been lost, and the hospital, in order to protect itself against actions that might crop up in the future, needed to have these records readily available. In another situation the prior of Launceviton had been involved in a legal process where, fortunately for the priory, he was able to uphold the rights of the house. As a matter of precaution the prior obtained an exemplification of this process so that on future occasions should another lawsuit be undertaken against the house on the same matter,he would be able easily to protect the interests of the monastery. GPR, 1340-4 3 , p. 537 . In another variation on a rather common theme, the abbot of Chertsey had undertaken and won a novel disseisin inquisition. Again as a matter of ensuring and protecting the interests of the abbey, the head of the house secured a copy of the proceeding to be retained in the archives^ of the monastery. GPR, 1345-48, pp. 155-56. 57 also, as a result of these Illegal actions, they were forced, very often, to secure copies of records that had been lost, destroyed, or stolen during periods when vandalism raged rampant. This too contributed to the weakened position that characterized religious corporations in the fourteenth century. Not only did these factors contribute to a less stable monastic economy, there were other elements in fourteenth century religious and economic life that had a detrimental effect on a house's financial position. Houses could very easily find that they had undertaken building programs that were too ambitious, and that this had a deleterious effect on its economic resources.Through developments removed from their control such as natural disasters, too, they could suffer appreciable economic dislocation.^^ Fire resulted not

^^Illustrative is the situation in which the prior and friars of the order of Mount Carmel found themselves, for they had acquired a substantial debt while they were engaged in the process of enlarging their dwelling. In order to be able to satisfy their obligation they were forced to go to the king and acquire a license that permitted them to secure rent to the amount of 13 s. 4 d. Apparently they had become indebted to a parson in this instance, for the license stipulated that the rent, after it was obtained, be transfer­ red to the parson in mortmain in satisfaction of the debt involved. GPR. 1327-30, p. I70. Apparently the prior and friars had begun a remodeling project that was not warranted by the state of their exchequer. Fortunately they were able to acquire the additional revenues that were necessary to satisfy their debts.

^ ^ h e dwelling belonging to the rather large house of Benedictine nuns at Barking had been burnt, and the church and houses were in ruins. The king demonstrated his generos­ ity in this instance by giving the abbess a grant to facilitate the rebuilding of the destroyed properties. CPR. 58 only from natural causes, but also from induced ones such as attacks on the part of the king's enemies.^?

Natural disasters do not seem unusual, and could, as the other conditions previously mentioned, materially weaken the financial position of a monastery, A monastery could withstand the drain on its resources caused by one, or even by several of these conditions, but it could not withstand the constant pressure of all of these forces without financial collapse. At the same time a proper perspective concerning the effect of these forces must be maintained.

1317-2 1 , p, 3 2 7 . The abbot and convent oi Croxton, too, suf­ fered from devastation caused by fire, but they were not so fortunate as the nuns of Barking, Rather than giving them a grant to repair the damage, the king extended his protec­ tion and safe conduct to them for two years so that they might seek alms to rebuild their abbey which had been burned by accident, GPR, 1327-30» P» I63 . In another situation in­ volving destruction by fire, the prior, canons, and nuns of Catteley were pardoned of 111 s. 3 3/^ d. that was owed from the last tenth that had been granted to the king. The pardon was intended to relieve impoverished conditions resulting both from a variety of fires that they had suffered and a murrain that had afflicted their animals. GPR, 13^3-^5>P« I6 . According to R,A,L. Smith in his work, Canterbury Cathedral Priory, the peak period in wool production was from 1319 to 1321, Sheep farming declined thereafter because of a long period of drought and flooding between 1324 and I326, At least 4585 sheep were lost to this series of natural dis­ asters, and the decline in wool production borne by the Christ Church priory. Smith suggests, was typical of what was happening to sheep farming throughout England, The number of sheep on one property, Lyden declined from 722 in 1331--after this series of calamities— to 509 in 1345, and to 324 in 1357* Smith, Canterbury Cathedral Priory, p. 156.

^?In the case of the hospital of St, Mary Magdelène by Portsmouth the house was impoverished by fire resulting from attacks of this nature, and the king granted protection to the master and brethern of the establishment, CPR, 1345-48, p. 209. 59 The services required of monasteries on behalf of the monarch do not appear to have been required of houses that were In true and deep financial difficulty. Sustenances, hospitality, and voidance fees were collected rigorously from those houses that could afford to provide the services and make the payments required. It Is true that there were complaints on the part of the monasteries Involved, but these objections seem to partake more of rhetorical and ritualistic obstruction than of anguished outcry. At the same time the king seems to have exhibited an almost unexpected willingness to aid these houses that were In true economic trouble. Not only through pardons of taxes, the granting of licenses to acquire rents, and outright gifts to monasteries, but also through the appointment of custodians to manage a depressed house's affairs did the monarch safeguard the monasteries'

Interests, In situations resulting from wartime conditions

It Is true that the king wanted monasteries to contribute to the financing of royal projects, but even so he was Inter­ ested In their welfare. The fact that In wartime he was sympathetic to the pleas of economic distress coming from houses with foreign connections Is Illustrative, The Import of all of this Is that the effect of the king's exploitation of religious houses must not be overestimated. Perhaps most damaging to the economic Interests of monasteries were the combined effects of lawsuits, the Illegal activities of neighbors, and natural disasters. The wide variety of 60 examples that have been cited to illustrate these tendencies seems Indicative in Itself of the intense effect that these elements indigenous to the fourteenth century had on relig­ ious life.

Beyond these considerations, however, one wonders why two of these tendencies existed to the extent that they did in the first half of the fourteenth century. One wonders whether or not the sentiments that resulted in both vandal­ ism and lawsuits could have been better controlled by monastic administrators. The exploited peasant population seems to have been the source of much of this difficulty, and the suspicion might be held that a considerable amount of these difficulties could have been avoided by wise ad­ ministration. The economic conditions facing religious corporations during the fourteenth century were depressing, but the state of agricultural administration as they prac­ ticed it during the period, too, was inefficient. Had more

enlightened management policies been in effect, monasteries

could have avoided, perhaps, many of the problems resulting

from peasant discontent that they did, in fact, have to face.

Mismanagement, indeed, seems to have been more the rule than

the exception, and had better management practices prevailed

many of the economic burdens carried by monasteries would not have been necessary. CHAPTER III

METHODS FOR IMPROVING AND PROTECTING MONASTIC ECONOMIC RESOURCES

Even though the economic position of religious houses during the first half of the fourteenth century was burden­ some to their inhabitants there were means by which a mon­ astery could enhance its economic position. Despite the problems associated with mismanagement and with the gloomy economic conditions, measures could be taken to alleviate these conditions. Not only could monasteries appropriate advowsons that they owned, they could demise their lands, obtain debt settlements, and secure grants that had economic value. Besides all of these actions that could be taken to enhance the economic position of a monastery, a house also could adopt other expedients designed to protect financial resources already held. There were three important measures a monastery could take to preserve its financial position, for not only could it secure the assistance of governmental officials, it also could secure documents confirming its rights and possessions, and undertake legal proceedings to protect revenues currently in hand.

In order to achieve some perspective on these capabil­ ities, mention of the sources of revenue available to a

61 62 particular monastery together with the methods used by that house to augment its income might prove useful. The resources of Canterbury Cathedral priory have been outlined by H.A.L.

Smith and they can be grouped under the three rubrics of landed endowments, oblations received at the shrine of St.

Thomas Becket, and miscellaneous payments derived from the ownership of adcvowsons, tithes, and pensions. Approximately two-thirds of the revenue coming into the monastery’s treasury issued from landed endowments, and the bulk of the lands held by the house had been acquired before 1300. Ap­ parently the Isuxds acquired later were small plots that en­ abled the monastery to enhance its economic position only enough to maintain the number of monks already endowed. The acquisitions were not extensive enough to permit the ad­ dition of new members to the house. Even though licenses were granted for such acquisitions on several occasions, large ad­ ditions to the house’s endowment were not received. The right acquired in 133^ permitted the house to obtain lands and rents to the yearly value of 6 1, 13£« 4d. With total receipts of approximately 25^0 1^. the proportional size of the increase in endowment was not great.

Canterbury Cathedral priory was unusual for it could count on revenue from the local shrine, and perhfps one- fourth of its receipts came from this source. Late in the fourteenth century when oblations reached their highest level such gifts averaged 5^5 !.. 8s. lOd. annually. The greater 63 portion of the remaining receipts were probably the result

of the ownership of advowsons and the appropriation of churches

The house owned the advowsons of numerous London churches and collected pensions from their rectors. By the late fourteenth century the priory had appropriated some fourteen

of these and thus Increased Its returns still further.

During the rule of the unusually competent Henry of

Eastry In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries the revenues of Canterbury Cathedral priory were augmented

through astute agricultural management, for they were In­

creased from the 1292 level of 2062 1, 16£. 11 3/W. shortly after Henry took office to a high for the period of 2^40 1»

In 1331» the last year of his rule.

Several means were used by the monastery during this

period to Increase revenues. First, the monks purchased or

leased land at low figures and regranted these lands at

higher competitive rates thus enabling them to augment their

receipts by the difference. The second method was to utilize

competitive leaseholds In granting out land that recently

had been reclaimed. The priory was quite active In asserting

marshlands, and they leased these lands to good financial

advantage•

A third means used by the house to improve Its financial

position was the commutation of certain labor services for

money rents. These payments were fixed, and became a part

of the regular and recurring revenues coming to the house. 64 This was not the most desirable method to transform labor services into money payments, for it was more satisfactory that the monks retain more control over the amounts received for the sale of labor services. They should not have es­ tablished the payment that was to be rendered, but rather should have preferred to reserve the right of changing it as conditions warranted. The fourth method used by these clerics to increase their revenues was to commute labor services at the pleasure of the house so that they could either demand labor services or commute them for a money payment on a year to year basis.

With the rise in price of labor during the early part of the fourteenth century the house would have been better off, and did in fact derive considerable revenues from the commutation of labor services on this year to year basis. Through these means the annual returns to the house were increased by ap­ proximately one-fourth. It should be mentioned, however, that after the death of Henry of Eastry receipts failed to rise further until the end of the century.1

A major means of enhancing the economic position of a religious house was for it to appropriate an advowson that it held. The ownership of an advowson involved the right to appoint members of the clergy to their position in the church to which the advowson pertained and the rectors of such churches were forced, normally, to pay a pension annually to

%mlth, Canterbury Cathedral Priory, pp. 9-13. 65 the house owning the advowson. In appropriating an advowson the monastery appointed a vicar to perform the pastoral duties In the church, and paid him a lower stipend than the rector had received and augmented its own revenues with the difference. A variety of conditions manifested themselves In ap­ propriation proceedings. For example, licenses were granted which allowed a house to appropriate a church In frank p almoin. In an appropriation under these circumstances the religious house performed devotions for the welfare of the soul of the depsirted benefactor. It might happen that a monastery would suffer losses as a result of disputes with townsmen or other neighbors. A house might pardon the transgressors of damages resulting from such hostile action and, because they agreed to do this, they could be granted the right to appropriate avowsons.3 Sometimes only a part

An Illustration of one way In which this occurred Is the case of the abbotand convent of Croxton. They acquired a license to appropriate a church whose advowson they had re­ ceived In frank almoin. CIR. 13^5-48, p. 157» The advowson that they had originally received was predicated on the ob­ ligation to perform certain religious rites for the donor, and they appropriated the church under these terms. This kind of appropriation did not occur as regularly as appropri­ ation in mortmain, but It was used from time to time.

^The abbot and convent of St. Edmund’s secured a license to appropriate churches of their advowson and these licenses were given In consideration of the fact that the abbey had suffered grievous losses at the hands of the townsmen. As a result of legal proceedings that had followed the attacks made by the townsmen upon the abbey, the house agreed to pardon the townsmen of a considerable part of the damages that had been levied against them. In consideration of this fact the king agreed to grant the abbot and convent of the house a license to appropriate these churches. PER. 1327- 30, p. 546. 66 of an advowson was allowed to be appropriated. The appropri­ ation of a moiety of an advowson, for example, frequently appeared and involved one-half of the advowson privileges.^

Complicated financial transactions could be connected with appropriation proceedings. A house could be granted a license to alienate an advowson to another house and that house could be given the right to appropriate the advowson.

This, however, would leave the original house in a decreased financial state, and it could happen that another license to appropriate another advowson would be granted to the original house.^ Compensation for losses that the house had suffered

4 The abbot and convent of Rufford were given a license to appropriate a moiety or one-half of a church that was in their advowson. This gave them the right to nominate one- half of the officials of the church whose advowson was being appropriated. CPR, 1330-3^» P* 523* ^An illustration of this kind of situation occurred with relation to the prior and convent of Lewes. The priory acquired a license to alienate to the prior and canons of Shulbred the church of Upmerden in the county of Sussex, and, after having secured this license to alienate, the Shulbred priory secured the right to appropriate the church. At the same time the priory of Lewes acquired a license to appropriate a church of their own advowson so that in the end the priory of Lewes came out no less satisfactorily, and perhaps more favorably, than in the beginning, CPR, 1338- 4o , p. 5 2 3 , It might be suspected that the motivation for this transaction was to pay off some obligation that the priory of Lewes had owed to the priory of Shulbred, or alternately, perhaps, the priory of Shulbred was favored by the monarch, or by another high ecclesiastical official. The priory of Lewes might have been pressured into making this transaction which would perhaps have benefited Shulbred. 67 in the past was the usual reason for allowing the appropria­ tion of an advowson.^ Such misfortunes were the results of numerous causal factors. In other Instances licenses for the appropriation of advowsons were granted simply because the house itself had a very slender endowment. The resources available were not requisite for the support of the number

of monks or nuns living in the house.7 The appropriation

of advowsons might be associated with other transactions

for monasteries could, while appropriating an advowson, also acquire a license to alienate lands in mortmain. The alien­ ation of lands and the appropriation of the advowson were both part and parcel of an effort to increase the financial O resources immediately available to the monastery.° Monasteries

In another situation where extenuating circumstances contributed to the granting of a license to appropriate an advowson, the priory of Ledes acquired the right to ap­ propriate a church whose advowson they held. The considera­ tion involved here was the fact that the priory had suffered immense losses the causes of which were not recorded. The license was granted so that the priory might have some re­ lief in view of the fact that such reverses had been borne. CPR, 1340.43, p. 346.

7The inadequacy of the economic resources that were available to a house contributed to the willingness of the monarch to grant a license to appropriate a church. The abbot and convent of Oselveston complained that their house was very slenderly endowed, and that they needed additional revenues in order to support the religious life of the con­ vent, A license for the appropriation of a church whose advowson they held was granted. C|R, 1338-40, p. 546. Q This kind of situation occurred in the case of the prior and convent of St. Katherine without Lincoln, The priory acquired the right to appropriate a church whose ad­ vowson they held, and also to alienate land in mortmain. Apparently the economic circumstances of the house were such that it was necessary to not only appropriate an advowson. 68 also could acquire licenses to grant both lands and advowsons

to outside individuals for a chaplain might receive such

gifts to celebrate divine services for a patron. The re­

sponsibility for these divine services previously would have rested with the granting house, and such action would seem to constitute an attempt to reduce some of the ritualistic

responsibilities carried by the grantor. Thus, it would be

possible to reduce the size of the house to a number more

appropriate for the resources available to the priory,9

It could happen that advowsons would not be available

Immediately for appropriation or that there would be delays

in appropriating advowsons. In certain cases monasteries would apply to appropriate the advowson of a substitute

church after they had already paid for a license to appropriate

another advowson.^® Monasteries, too, would grant advowsons

but also to acquire further lands in order that enough eco­ nomic resources should be available to support the monks who were living in the priory. CPE. I327-30, p. 137.

^This, it would seem, was the intention of the prioress and nuns of Campesse, for they acquired a license to grant land and advowsons to a chaplain who was to celebrate divine services for a patron. CIS. 1345-48, p. 415. It would seem that the nuns were interested in reducing the number of divine services that they had to say. They would, thus, have to maintain a smaller number of nuns, and the economic re­ sources of the house would be spread over a smaller number of individuals, enhancing the overall economic position of the house,

^^So it was with the abbot and convent of Selby when they acquired a license to appropriate a church of their advowson in substitution for another church, a license for which they had already obtained. They had already paid the license fees, and presumably there was little or no charge for the new license. CPE. 1348-50, p. 45. 69 to religious houses pertaining to the king for the purpose of attenuating royal obligations. Monasteries sometimes granted advowsons to free chapels belonging to the king for the support of their wardens, A bargain with the monarch could be the object of such action for monasteries could be granted the privilege of not being charged with pensioners nominated by the king.

Just as religious houses could appropriate the advow­ sons they owmmd, so also could they demise their lands In attempts to Increase revenues. During the first half of the fourteenth century economic conditions In England changed for the worse making It more desirable for monasteries to lease out their lands thus abandoning the direct management of their agricultural resources. Direct exploitation of these resources through the use of customary or hired labor became Impractical because of changed economic conditions.

An agricultural depression created pressures that economically squeezed those cultivating the soil, and monasteries, as well as others dependent on agriculture, suffered.

Normally, at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century the usual method of cultivating lands had been through direct administration and exploitation of these resources, for agriculture was managed by the monastic officials themselves. This changed as the fourteenth century progressed, for a more profitable method of agricul­ tural management was prevailing In which lands were leased 70 out for a term of ye«rs at a fixed rent. The probably ex­ planation for the success of the demising procedure is that, under the system of direct exploitation of agricultural re­ sources, a certain shrinkage occurred between the time that the bailiffs collected their revenues, and the time that the accounts were settled with the monastery. Long-term leases tended to lessen the deleterious effect of the bailiff or the other local manorial officials who might be in competi­ tion or conflict with monastic administrators. As the fourteenth century progressed religious houses found that they could rent out their lands— demise them— on both long­ term leases and on an ad voluntatem basis at very advantag­ eous rents. The reason that this was the case was the fact that England suffered from a pressure of population upon the available resources. Peasants thus were willing to pay high rents and monasteries could lease their lands out for high returns.

Terms appropriate for local conditions prevailed when demises were granted. A demise might be written to provide that a return should be given to the value of the manor.

11 The abbot and convent of Stanley, for example, ob­ tained a license to demise a manor to a grantee who would render the value of the manor. CER. 1317-21, p. 3^3» The abbey of Stanley was not probably making the best kind of bargain that could be made. It did not assure them of a predictable profit or return from year to year, and they were betting, in effect, that agricultural profits would in­ crease, and that they would be able to collect higher rents in subsequent years. As it turned out this was not the case for the agricultural depression deepened as the fourteenth century wore on. The abbey of Stanley, incidentally, was 71

Presumably the amount returned In a pattloular year under these conditions would vary with the demand for land from year to year. On other occasions the rent to be returned from the manor was specified clearly, A manor, for example, could be rented for a specified amount per year for the life­ time of the lessee,12 Demises varied in length, for a demise could be for life, for 80 years, or any other con­ venient period of time appropriate to the parties of the contract,13 in financial difficulty consistently during the second quarter of the fourteenth century, and it is perhaps because of such transactions as the one noted that they were unable to enhance their economic position to the degree necessary to keep them out of economic difficulty, 12 The leasing out of lands for long periods of time was the most desirable kind of agreement for a monastery. In one such instance the hospital of St, John rented out the manor of Hothele for life for the amount of 2 1» per year, CIS, 1317-21, p, 80, This was a method of guaranteeing an annual income for the hospital, and provided protection not available in short-term leases. Another example of a long­ term lease was that granted by the abbot and convent of Bordesley who acquired a license to demise their manor of Holeweye to Henry de Hamburg and his heirs for the term of 80 years, CPR, 1321-24, p. 239, The amount to be returned was not specified, but it might be suspected with a relative amount of certainty that a minimum annual return was contem­ plated by the monks or Bordesley, Thus they would be able to assure themselves of an annual profit from the manor that was being demised. Perhaps the most desirable arrangement included both assurance of a minimum return and the capa­ bility of higher rents should agricultural profits be high. The great demand for land on the part of certain elements within the present population permitted such advantageous leasehold agreements. 13 H, H, Hilton in his work on the economic development of Leicestershire estates has documented the increased popu­ larity of leasing out lands formerly cultivated in demesne, "We find that in 1254 there had been demesne land in Humber8ten which was not cultivated by the abbey in 1341, In Enderby there was a virgate of church land which was in 72

Monasteries were required to purchase licenses for the privilege of renting out their manors, and the reasons given for requesting such permission tended to reflect the pained economic conditions in which they found themselves. Debts, for example, are cited as a reason for attempting to secure a license to rent out a manor,A pious donor might have wished to assign the proceeds of a demise to a monastery just as a bishop wanting to aid a depressed priory could assign a house rents to a certain v a l u e , Normally, the

13^1 held by tenants,” Hilton goes on in listing properties leased in 13^1 that, had been held in demesne earlier. Hilton, Economic Development, pp, 89-90, Illustrative of the fact that it was m'ore profitable to lease out lands than to cultivàte them in demesne is the decision of the monks of Tavistock. In 1339 they decided to demise various lands to tenants for long periods, and ex­ pected to receive ten pounds annually for properties that had formerly returned only forty shillings, Finberg, Tavistock Abbey, pp, 249-30, As the leasing out of lands continued monastic adminis­ trators found that they could also sell customary services no longer required, Edward Miller in discussing the manage­ ment practiced by Ely makes the following statement, "But as more of the denesne was leased, so the amount of service sold rose too. At Great Shelford average sales amounting to 2 1^, in 1319-31 had risen to 12 1, by 1340-42; at Somers hem income from this source rose by about the same amount between 1327 and 1342," Miller, Abbey and Bishopric of Ely, pp, 103-104,

^^Such was the case with the abbot and convent of Stanley who complained that they were oppressed by debts, and for this reason sought to secure a license to let to farm their manors. 1324-27, p. 11. By farming out their manors they wouîïï be able to be assured of a regularized in­ come, higher probably than the income that would be realized should these manors be exploited directly,

one such instance the bishop of Worcester demised rents to the amount of 112 s, 8 d, to the prior and convent of Worcester, CEB. 1327-30% p, Î75» It might be suspected that the priory of Worcester was in a depressed financial 73 most desirable period of time for a demise to run was an ex­ tended one. A life lease was an appropriate arrgmgement If the financial returns to the monastery were to be maximized.

However, as the fourteenth century progressed and as the agricultural depression deepened still further, monasteries were unable sometimes to secure such long-term leases, and they would be forced perhaps to accept leases for shorter periods. After mid-century demises for as short a period as one or two years occurred with Increasing regularity and reflected another period of adjustment that was taking place

In the agrarian economy.

On other occasions one finds monasteries having dif­ ficulty In cultivating their lands themselves. If they could not do this they utilized the expedient of renting out their condition and that the bishop wished to make It possible for more resources to be made available to the convent In order that the monks might be supported more adequately. Alter­ nately, perhaps, the priory of Worcester had In the past given the bishop economic resources for which It was being reimbursed with the rents that now were being granted,

l^As the fourteenth century progressed It was sometimes Impossible to demise lands on a long-term basis. Rents that were due on long-term leases could not be paid, and lessees were unwilling to commit themselves for long periods of time. Thus, It might be Impossible to grant a lease for longer than a year or two. Frequently, too, monasteries had to pardon entry fines that normally were collected when a tenant took possession of a manor so leased. As conditions worsened It could also be necessary to parHon rent that was In arrears. In one such case the abbot of Glastonbury was fcro9d?.te demise out lands for as short a period of time as two years. In addition to the granting out of a manor In this case he also demised out an advowson, and for those properties and rights so demised he received a return of 200 1. cm, 1327-30, p. 160. 7k

lands on a leasehold basis.1? Just as monasteries might not

be able to cultivate their lands, so also might other mechan­

ical problems of agriculture force monks to attempt to lease

out their holdings. Occasionally a monastery secured the

privilege of leasing out its lands in preference to under­

taking the task of draining them.^®

Other kinds of conditions could contribute to an inter­

est on the part of religious houses in leasing out their

lands. A monastery, if impoverished by the frequent comings

of mariners and other unfriendly guests, could be put in a

difficult financial situation. Leasing out lands proved, at

l^This was the case in the situation of the rector and brothers of Asherugge who sought a license to lease out their lands because they could not till them properly. CPH. 1334- 38, p. 239, The abbot and convent of Lilleshall, likewise, sought a license to lease out their lands because they were unable to cultivate them adequately. CPR, 1334-38, p. 248. The reason that licenses were sought for these reasons of inability to exploit agricultural resources was because of changed monastic attitudes. During the latter part of the Middle Ages, and, particularly, during the fourteenth century, the preoccupation of monks was not with direct agricultural aetttttgr, but rather was with the administration of properties. The earlier preoccupations of monks in this area of direct agricultural activity were altered, and now monks devoted themselves to different pursuits. As a result they were unable to prosecute profitably agricultural activities that formerly had been pursued. 1A The deepening agricultural depression could make mon­ asteries unwilling to undertake the expense of making capital improvements on lands that they held. In one such case the prior and convent of Bilsington sought É license to lease out lands rather than going to the expense of draining them. CPR. 1334-38, p. 555* They were interested in avoiding the expense that would be involved in making what amounted to this capital improvement to their lands. They preferred, it would seem, to lease out the lands and allow the lessees to undertake the task and stand the necessary expense. 75 least during the second quarter of the fourteenth century, an easy or practicable means of solving economic problems of this nature.19 In other cases a license to exchange proper­ ties was obtained In order to consolidate holdings that a monastery owned In a particular area. It would be much easier to administer a property In an area close to the monastery Itself than to have to collect rents, tithes, and other revenues far from the house Itself. A monastery might accept a demise from one party and demise out other holdings as compensation. Again, it would seem that this kind of a situation would reflect an Interest In making a more manage- 20 able kind of endowment.

The existence of a voldance could contribute to the leasing out of lands, for If a religious house was In the king's hands because of a voldance, additional burdens were placed on that house. Sometimes monastic officials would seek a license to demise out lands In order to raise the farm required under these conditions, and they were able to

^The abbot and convent of Llttele complained that they had been Impoverished by the frequent comings of mariners to­ gether with other causes. Because of their Impoverishment they sought a license to lease out their lands. CPR. 1338-40, p. 59»

one such case the abbot and convent of Paversham secured a license to exchange properties. CPR. 1338-40, p. 528, The objective was to consolidate their holdings so that travel would not be necessary In order to collect revenues that were owed them. In a related Instance that Illustrates the same point the prior of Bermondsey accepted one demise and demised out another holding. CPR. 1340-43, p. 432. The reason for this transaction was not recorded, but It might be suspected that the objective was to consolidate hold­ ings, thus making It easier to collect revenues owed the priory. 76 Improve their economic position significantly.Certain

rights could be reserved for the religious house making a

demise. Demises could be made for a lifetime, with rents

being specified, but with legal rights being reserved for 22 the ranking monastic official.

Debts are the most obvious indication that a monastery

suffered economic crisis. Debts could be acquired in a

variety of ways, for in the medieval period. Just as today,

it was not at all difficult for individuals, monks included,

to find ways of spending more money than they had. As we

have seen, monasteries carried certain economic burdens which

?1 The prior and convent of Lenton sought a license to demise lands because of the fact that their priory was in the king's custody as a result of war. In these circumstances a high farm was exacted from the moneustery, and the monks of Lenton felt that the farm was onerous to the extent that they would not be able to pay it unless they were allowed to demise lands to raise the revenues required. They were allowed the license, and presumably were able to raise the necessary funds. CPR. 1340-43, p. 475* In this case it might be suspected that the monks of Lenton had already pursued other alterna­ tives in an attempt to enhance their economic position. They perhaps had already attempted to appropriate the advowsons of churches, had attempted to secure lands in mortmain, and had attempted to secure other grants of revenue. It perhaps was the case that the monarch was unwilling to allow these alternate methods of raising revenue because Lenton was an alien priory, and, during a period of wartime, he was unwill­ ing to strengthen to this extent the economic position of such a priory. Thus the only alternative left to the prior and convent of Lenton was to secure a license to demise out their lands.

^^The abbot of St. Edmund's had acquired the right to demise lands, and, in the third decade of the fourteenth century, secured a confirmation. He had demised out a manor for life at a yearly rent of 26 1. 13 s. 4 d. and reserved for himself the right to receive tïïe property"of felons together with the other rights and profits of Justice. CPR. 1321-24, p. 218. 77 tended to have an adverse effect on their eoonomlo position.

The performing of services for the monarch drained very heavily, on occasion, on the resources of religious houses.

Not only the providing of sustenances, and hospitality for the king, but also the situations resulting from voidances could contribute to a less healthy economic climate. Warfare, too,had its effect on the economic stability of religious houses for in many instances, not only were monasteries taken into the king's hands, they were also taxed heavily to support the king's programs and as well, were asked to proffer loans to him.

Lawsuits, likewise, constituted a threat to the eco­ nomic well-being of a religious corporation. Lawsuits re­ sulting from voidances in which appeals would be carried to

Home, with all the attendant delays and expenses that could occur, created undesirable drains on revenues. On other occasions lawsuits could be brought, as we have seen, by individuals in an attempt to profit from the workings of the legal process to the disadvantage of a monastery.

Illegal actions of neighbors as well as strangers could create considerable economic problems for religious houses which resulted in debts. The destruction of property was one of these kinds of activities, while another was the carrying away of property and records. The securing of re­ placements rectifying the damages that had resulted cost monasteries money, and sometimes they would have to go into debt in order to secure their ends. Monasteries, too. 78 undertook building programs that were too expensive for their means, and often they would be forced to borrow money In

order to be able to complete programs that had already been started. Finally, natural disasters could create stn In­ debted situation for a religious house. Not only fire, but also murrain, floods, and other such occurrences could create situations In which monasteries would have to borrow money. Whatever the causes of monastic Indebtedness means were available to a religious house for fighting, at least to some degree, the omnipresent danger of Insolvency.

Monasteries adopted numerous expedients to deal with the problem of the unmanageable debts that they hhd acquired.

Not only could they secure a debt moratorium, they also were able to secure the remission of rents that were owing, they were able to secure an Installment method of paying their debts, and sometimes debts even more p a r d o n e d . ^3 Debt

moratoriums ctiftl'd last for different periods of time, and

such periods of suspension could last for two years emd

^An Illustration Is the respite that the abbot of St. Albans secured from the monarch that pertained to all the debts that were owed the king. He secured this moratorium for a period of two years, and thus the economic pressures on the abbey were relieved temporarily In an attempt to en­ hance the economic position of the house. CPR. I32A-27, p. 193* In another situation the prior and convent of Newstead In Shlrewoode secured a remission In frank almoin of a rent of four 1, that was due. They secured this remis­ sion In consideration of the fact that the house was Impoverished. CER. 1330-34, p. 3* Installment payments of debts were utilized frequently In attempts, by monasteries, to set their finances In order. An example of this kind of situation occurred with reference to the prior and convent of Lenton. They received a grant from the monarch that they might settle the debts owed the crown from a tenth In Installments. CPR. 1330-34, p. 159. 79 longer. In addition to these methods of securing some kind of alleviation of their economic problems, there were other methods that could be adopted. Monasteries could easily get behind In their payments of the farm that was owed the king, and, when they did this, they went to the monarch and com­ plained that the house was so impoverished that they were unable to pay the farm that was still owing. Frequently the king lent a sympathetic ear to these complaints and would pardon the arrears that was owed,^^

Normally the king collected a fine from religious houses

Interested In acquiring custody of the house during patlods of voldance. When a monastery was In difficult financial PC circumstances the king might agree to pardon this fine.

Revenues owed the king from tenths, also could work financial 26 hardships on a house. In these circumstances some or even

Such was the case with the abbot and convent of Burn­ ham who complained that they were In an Impoverished con­ dition, and that they could not raise enough money to pay the arrears of the farm that was owed. The house was par­ doned 57 1» 6s. 4d. of the arrears. CPR. 133^-38, p. 424,

^^An instance of this kind of pardon Is the case of the prior of Cogges who was pardoned a part of the flntt assessed In order that the prior might acquire custody of the house. CPR. 1334-38, p. 522. A bit later the priory of Cogges was still having Its economic problems for again revenues owed the monarch were pardoned. A rent of 10 1^. together with an arrears of the farm was forgiven because of the poverty of the house. CPR. 1338-40, p. 55* 26 The very frequency of tenths created economic problems for monasteries, for the very fact that tenths were assessed and collected so often made It extremely difficult for those houses that were not munificently endowed. The assessment and collection of tenths could create so great a financial burden on a monastery that It was In danger of becoming bank- 80 all of the monies due the king from the tenth could be par­ doned. In some instances a combination of payments seemed to depress a religious house, and here too, a priory might be able to persuade the monarch to pardon these payments.

Rent as well as arrears of farm, perhaps, could be pardoned if the house was truly poverty-stricken.

In situations where the king took custody of a relig­ ious house during a wartime period, the payments that were made by the house would normally increase. Again, the king might be willing to pardon debts that arose from these causes.^?

One way in which these payments could be increased would be through the payment of a heavy farm if the priory were in the king's custody because of war, or for other reasons. A fine would be levied for allowing the monks to regain custody of their house. Even this fine would constitute a forbidàble rupt should such taxes be collected. In one such instance the abbot of Barlings was pardoned of 20 1. 8 s. 8 1/2 d. that were owed from a tenth. CPR. 133^-3H, p. 322.

^?After the outbreak of the 100 Years* War the monarch took custody of all of the alien priories within the realm, and one of the houses so taken into the king's hands was the priory of Lewes. When the crown took custody the amounts collected from the house in the form of farm were greater than they would have been had the prior himself had custody and monasteries might find it difficult to raise these revenues. Such was the case with the priory of Lewes, for 500.1^. that was owed the monarch because he took control of the priory during this wartime period was pardoned. CPR. 1338-40, p. 305« The priory of Tutbury was another house taken into the king's hands because of war. Here the priory had accumulated a debt of 40 m. that was owed the monarch because of farm resulting from the fact that the house had been taken into the king's hands. The priory complained that it was grievously depressed because of poverty, and, here too, the house was forgiven the 40 m. debt that was due. CPR. 1338-40, p. 232. 81 burden, and it, too, could be pardoned for reasons of poverty.

Invasions were an excuse often given by a monastery to secure the pardoning of debts and taxes that they owed.^® A prior could perform valuable services for a monarch, for he was capable of acting as his envoy or otherwise In an administra­ tive or diplomatic capacity. These services might be re­ warded, and, when a prior was In governmental service, bene­ fits In the form of pardoned debts and taxes could redound to the benefit of his house,^9

A common method adopted by a monastery for enhancing Its economic position was to appropriate a church. It was cus­ tomary for a fine to be paid to the monarch for the license to permit this appropriation, but. If the monarch was Inter­ ested in aiding the religious house, he might agree to pardon the fine that was collected under these circumstances,30

If the house was In serious economic difficulty, this conces­ sion might be made, but it was not something that would ordinarily be allowed.

®The prior and convent of Southwlck In Southampton suf­ fered from a depressed condition as a result of Invasions that had been endured. The priory was pardoned of taxes owed because of losses suffered during these Incursions, CPR, 1345-48, p. 125.

^^The prior of Lewes had acted as an envoy for the monarch without receiving any compensation for his efforts and, as a reward for the prior and the monks of Lewes, the king patdoned the priory of taxes that were owed, CPR, 1345-48, p. 272,

^®The abbess and convent of St, Mary's, Marham were pardoned of a fine that had been levied when a license t>0 ap­ propriate a church had been acquired, CPE, 1345-48, p, 347. 82

Occasionally a monastery was in such a difficult finan­ cial position that it could not make the necessary repairs to its buildings and holdings. A house might be unable to accomplish these housekeeping activities and pay its rent both. In these kinds of circumstances the king could take pity on the house and pardon some of its debts, A half of its farm, for example, might be pardoned,

Frequent voidances could create serious debts, as we have seen, for religious houses, ‘^'he king could recognize the seriousness of the problem confronting a monastery, but yet be unwilling to pardon all that was owed arising from these causes. He would, perhaps, make some kind of settle­ ment with the house by pardoning part of the monies owed, or, alternately, allowing the debts that were owed to be paid in installments,

^ The prior of Arundel complained that the priory was so impoverished that the church and house had fallen into ruins, and that the income of the priory was insufficient to make both repairs and payrithe rent. The king was sympa­ thetic, for the prior was released of 20 m, of 40 m, that was due the monarch from the farm assessed because"of war, CPH, 1348-50, p, 258,

^^The abbey of St, Alban’s had suffered from frequent voidances, and, as a result, had accumulated considerable debts. In consideration of the intolerable charges that had been sustained by the abbey as a result of these voidances, the payment of 1000 m. owed from the most recent voldance was allowed to be macEe in installments, thus relieving to some degree the economic burdens carried by the house, CER, 1348-50, p, 4?6, One observation about all of these arrangements that were made for the settlement of debts might be made. It would seem that the monarch was interested in collecting as much revenue from a religious house as was possible. At the same time he was unwilling to exploit monasteries to 83

One of the most usual ways adopted "by religious houses for improving their financial position was to secure grants of one king or another.33 This took a variety of forms for a religious house could not only receive lands, but also produce other resources of economic value. A religious house might receive not only lands but also livings and revenues. such an extent that they would be so grievously burdened with debts that there would be no chance whatsoever that they might pay their debts and at the same time maintain a reasonably satisfactory religious life. The monarch was milking the religious houses as much as he could while still demonstrating a willingness to stop short of driving them into complete financial ruin. As a result, he frequently assessed more taxes and charges against monasteries than they could pay. When it became evident that the payment of such charges would constitute a grievous burden on the house, he was willing to pardon those debts, and to take other measures that would relieve economic burdens carried by monasteries as a result of these charges.

33The prior and convent of St. Peter's, Ispwioh re­ ceived a grant from the monarch that they would not be bur­ dened with the task of supporting a man of gentle birth in their house. CPB. 1327-30, p. 510. In a situation related to the providing of pensions the abbot and convent of Cirencester were able to secure an exemption from the mon­ arch relieving them of the responsibility for supporting most pensioners. CPR. 1327-20, p. 540. They were able to enhance their economic position by b&ing able to avoid these charges. An example of a rather usual kind of grant to a priory is one obtained by the Austin Friars of Cambridge. They received a grant of properties from a private donor, and this was the customary add resources should the house be able to meet the mortmain requirements established by the monarch. CER. 133^-38, p. 150. Ecclesiastical officials, for one reason or another, granted lands or revenues to a monastery. Such was the case with the bishop of Winchester, for he granted to the prior and convent of St. Swithun's, Winchester, certain monies that traditionally had been given the priory by the bishop of Winchester, c m , 1334-38, p. 154. 84

These grants came from private Individuals for the most part,

but also from the king and other religious officials such as

bishops and archbishops. Benefices we»e another kind of

gift that could redound to the economic benefit of an es­

tablishment. If benefices were received or held, it in­ volved the economic sustenance of at least one individual.34

Grants took other forms also for a religious house could se­

cure a license to freely elect its prior when the house be­

came void. This was a valuable right, for, if an individual

became prior who was unfamiliar with the monastery, he could

exploit the resources of the house for his own benefit, dis­

sension would result, and the house would become depressed.

King's visits, and invasions were causes of monastic de­

pression, and when such situations occurred, the monarch could

promise the house land grants to compensate for the burdens

it had already suffered. Religous houses could be depressed.

34^he prior and convent of the chapel of Durham re­ ceived the grant of either a benefice or an equivalent sum. CER. 1334-38, pp. 467-68. Benefices were a usual means of supporting clerics during the medieval period, and the ac­ quisition of a right to a benefice was a significant means of enhancing the economic position of a monastery.

35pressure could be put on a monastery to receive one as prior who perhaps would not be completely acceptable to the monks of the house. Thus, the right to freely elect the prior in times of voldance could be a significant right that could enable a priory to avoid a considerable amount of dissension, and, as a result of dissension, a drain on resources. This was the interest of the priory of Tutbury who secured a license from the monarch that they might freely elect a new prior in times when the house was void. CER. 1343-45, p. 215. 85 too, because of pestilence, and sometimes in this kind of situation concessions would be made.

A monastery might receive a grant of the issues and profits of the temporalities of the priory that would normally go to the monarch during the period of a voldance. Custody rights were thus of considerable importance, and one of the ways a religious house could improve its economic position was to secure from the monarch a grant of custody of the house during periods of voldance. These grants could be of a blanket nature, for a house could receive a grant of cus­ tody on voldance whenever it occurred, or perhaps custody rights might be limited. Custody might be granted for the next voldance, for the present voldance, or a fine might be pardoned which had been levied on the house for acquiring custody during the period of voldance.37

3&The prior and convent of Southwlck in the county of Southhampton, for example, had been depressed by both inva­ sions and by visits of the king. In consideration of their depressed condition, the monastery received a promise from the monarch that grants of lands would be forthcoming. CER. 1345-48, p. 153» Another illustration also pertaining to the priory of Southwlck was a grant received by them of the issues and the pfofits of the temporalities of the priory during a recent voldance. This grant was made out of com­ passion for their estate which had been depressed by the deadly pestilence imminent. CER. 1348-50, p. 495,

37custody rights, as we have seen, were important in preserving the economic position of a religious house. It has already been shown #hat could happen to a monastery should custody of the house be entrusted to someone other than the prior for extended periods of time. A drain on resources would be the likely outcome in such a situation, and custody rights constituted a valuable advantage. Thus an unqualified grant of custody was made to the convent of Coventry intended, apparently, to apply to any voldance 86

Normally some cause Impelled the king to grant custody

of the house during voldance to the monks of the place. Des­

truction during past voidances by esoheaters or other royal

officials could be sufficient cause to persist the acquisi­

tion of custody.If a religious house had been taken Into

the king's hands because of war the house might be permitted,

after a short period of time, to regain custody. Again, a

variety of reasons could persuade the king to take such

action. The resources of the house, for example, might not

that might occur. CfB. 1327-30, p. 193» As a result of this grant, presumably, the functions of the escheator or other royal officials, who would be designated normally to take custody of a void priory would be purely ceremonial. Another variation on the theme of custody rights was the grant made to the abbey of St. Albans which was given custody during the present voldance. CBS.. 1327-30, p. 165. Normally, when a monastery acquired custody of Its house during periods of voldance or warfare, a fine would be assessed against the house In order to compensate the monarch for revenues that would be lost as the result of his not having custody of the house. In cases of poverty these fines might be pardoned. The prior of Cogges, for example, was pardoned a part of a fine that had been assessed, thus enabling the prior to acquire custody of his house. CBS. 1334-38, p. 522.

^^The activities of royal officials could contribute to a willingness on the part of the monarch to grant custody of an abbey to the monks of the house. This was the case with the abbey of Chertsey which acquired custody of Its house when It became void because of the fact that great destruction had taken place during past voidances. CPR. 1340-43, p. 379. The destruction apparently was the result of actions taken by escheators and other royal officials. 87 be sufficient to support the monks should the house remain

In the king's hands, Monasteries could complain that they were being taxed at an unfair rate, that their assessment was Inequitable,

etnd they might ask the monarch for a reassessment of what

they owed. If they were successful, they could Improve their financial position significantly.^0

Not only could a monastery take measures to enhance Its

economic position. It also could take actions designed to

protect the resources It already held. One of these avenues was to seek the assistance of government In preserving the

OQ As we have seen. It normally was the case that the monarch would not place burdens on a monastery that were so onerous that they could not be borne by the religious cor­ poration, The monarch usually stopped short of driving a house Into complete bankruptcy. This Is Illustrated by the situation In which the hermitage of Stratfleld Saye found Itself, The house was restored to a monk of the hermitage when It had been In the king's hands by virtue of the fact that war was taking place. The reason given for the restor­ ation was that the hermitage's resources were not sufficient for the maintenance of the monks of the house If the hermi­ tage was kept In the king's hands, CfS, 1340-43, p, 46?, This action on the part of the monarch In a situation where a religious house was In really serious economic trouble Is typical. He was willing, usually, to aid the monastery when Its resources were so slender that It could not stand royal exploitation. In contrast, however, the fines collected by the monarch when an abbey wished to have custody of Its house during voidances could be quite considerable. An Illustra­ tion of this Is the fine paid by the abbot and convent of Hamsey for custody rights where they paid the sum of 600 m, to have this privilege, CIS, 1340-43, p, 564, 40 The abbot and convent of Louth Park apparently suf­ fered from taxation at an elevated rate, for they secured a reassessment. Upon re-evaluatlon of their resources they were given a lowered rate of taxation, CPR, 1338-40, p, 8, 88 rights and properties belonging to the house. This could mean securing the king's protection, his aid, or the aid of other government officials. Monasteries often held pro­ perties far from their own location, and they could go to the king to secure royal protection for monks who were going to these distant holdings in order to collect revenues,

On other occasions directions were given by the monarch to a specific official to aid a religious house in collecting rents or other revenues. Sheriffs were officials so desig­ nated as were bailiffs who, too, could be appointed to the task of aiding in the collection of rents. When a relig­ ious house was in serious debt a simple statement of the king's protection over that house could be made. This put the religious house in a privileged position, for a hostile action

In numerous instances religious houses owned prop­ erties that were distant from the home house, and it was necessary for someone to travel to the properties and col­ lect the revenues that were owed to the monastery. This could be dangerous for it might involve the transport of considerable sums of money, and individuals could take ad­ vantage of monks who were going to and from these distant places. The king's protection thus was extended in num­ erous instances. One such case involved two monks of the abbey of Hailes who were going to Cornwall to collect the profits of churches there that were owned by their monastery. CER. 1327-30, p. 8.

^^Monasteries also might secure the aid of the sheriff in collecting rents and other revenues. The sheriff of Lincolnshire, for example, was ordered to collect rents for the prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. CER. 1327-30, p. 354. The b ailiffs of Scardburgh like­ wise were ordered to aid the Friars Minor in collecting rents. CIS, 1330-34, p. 394. 89 against those so protected would become the concern of royal j u s t i c e s .

The administrative affairs of a monastery, If they had become disturbed, could become the subject of the king's

Interest. Not Infrequently did monasteries grant leases to properties, and not Infrequently were the people who had re­ ceived these leases disturbed while conducting their business, but even so through recourse to the king, redress could be obtained. On other occasions the king would extend his protection to priories who would be In the king's hands be­ cause of war. This would put the house In a privileged position and serve as a warning to those who might undertake

Illegal actions against thehouse.Governmental o f f i c i a l s

^The king's protection was extended to the Cistercian Abbey of Stanley because of poverty and a miserably depressed state early In the fourth decade of the fourteenth century. The abbey of Stanley was consistently in financial dif­ ficulty, and It was never able during the first half of the fourteenth century to satisfactorily arrange Its financial affairs, cm , 1340-43, pp.3 5 1 - 5 2 .

^^It was usual as the fourteenth century wore on for monasteries to lease out lands under long-term agreements. In one such Instance the abbot and convent of Selby leased out lands, but sometime later complained that those having accepted the leases were disturbed by neighbors who perhaps formerly had had the right to cultivate these lands. The disturbances occurred during the period of a voldance, a time when one might readily expect certain upheavals to take place. Through the use of the royal courts the abbey and convent of Selby were able to secure an Indemnification for the dis­ turbances and dislocations that had occurred. CHI. 1338-40, p. 9» It should be noted that this disturbance occurred early In the second third of the fourteenth century, at a time when the agricultural depression of the fourteenth century was gathering momentum, and that disturbances and resistance on the part of peasants In situations such as these should not be regarded as unusual. 90

Illegal actions against the house. Governmental officials could be unjust, and, here, too, a remedy was available to an abbey. An escheater could take unwarranted and illegal actions against a monastery, and if this was done, the relig­ ious house could go to the monarch, request his intervention, and perhaps obtain redress,The tenants of monasteries could be recalcitrant in providing services that were owned the monastery. Again, the monastery could ask governmental officials for aid in protecting its interests.4?

It was usual for the monarch to take alien priories into his hands when war was undertaken. The king did not want revenues flowing into the hands of his enemies to aid them against him. Numerous priories were taken into the king's hands after the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War, The monarch found it desirable to extend the royal protec­ tion to these houses in order that individuals who felt that they might be able to profit from such a situation might be dissuaded from any attempt at predatory activity against the resources of these houses, CIE, 1340-43,pp, 388-89.

^^The escheator was one of those officials who, either for his own benefit or for the advantage of the monarch, undertook to make unwarranted use of the resources of mon­ asteries, The prior and convent of Llantheny by Gloucester complained of such an action on the part of the escheator when they asserted that he had unfairly seized their lands. They were fortunate for they were able, through recourse to the courts, to maintain their rights, GEH, 1340-43, pp. 393-94,

^7a s has been suggested it was not at all unusual for tenants of monasteries to resist the economic exactions that were made against them during the first half of the fourteenth century. Peasant resistance was traditional during the latter part of the Middle Ages, and it should not be regarded as an unusual situation when we read of the ab­ bot of Tintern complaining that tenants have withheld services that were owed the monastery. The abbot was successful in protecting the interests of his house, for he was able to uphold the right of these services by resorting to the aid of the king's officials, in this instance, the royal justices, CPH, 1345-48, pp, 162-63, 91 In some instances the monarch had a very real interest in providing his aid or protection for an abbey. The king's aid in collecting revenues could be extended so the house J[| Q that was owed revenues could pay its farm. The monarch also could involve himself in matters that were of a strictly religious nature. Privileges obtained by a relig­ ious order from Rome might not be recognized and the monastic corporation might go to the crown to secure aid in enforcing these privileges.The king's actions could be challenged by a religious house using the machinery of the royal ad­ ministrative system. The king, perhaps, might have made an unjustified collation or otherwise exceeded the privileges that were normally exercised over religious houses. A com­ mission of inquiry here could be utilized to establish the

®When the payment of taxes and other financial obli­ gations was at stake the king readily extended his aid. In one such instance King's men were appointed to collect the arrears that was owed the prior of Ware in order that he might be able to pay his farm. He was unable to pay the farm without such aid, and thus the king stood to benefit as a result of the aid his men would extend to the priory. c m . 1345-48, p. 303. 49on occasion the monarch involved himself in cases that were designed to protect the interests of a religious order when they were threatened by lay individuals. The Premonstratensian order represented by the abbot of Newhouse had secured privileges from Home that were designed to secure the common defense of the order in England. These privileges had not been honored, and the abbot of Nevrtiouse went to the monarch in an attempt to secure his aid in en­ forcing these privileges. The aid was obtained, and pre­ sumably after this the Premonstratensians enjoyed the privileges obtained from Rome. CPR, 1345-48, p. 3?4. 92

true right and protect the economic interests of the house from such encroachment,50

Just as securing governmental action could protect

economic advantages belonging to a religious house, so also

could less formal procedures which led to sustaining or con­

firming rights similarly have a favorable economic effect.

Confirmation from the royal chancery that a house held rights

of potential economic value could protect the future exer­

cise of those rights, A religious house might have secured

the right to acquire more lands, but might not have used the

right teeadlately. Confirmation was a means of ensuring

that the right could be exploited profitably in the future,51

Another means by which religious houses could protect

their interests was to secure an inspeximus of pleas that

had been heard before royal justices or other business in­ volving royal officials. It was desirable for a monastery

to have copies of these proceedings in their archives?, for

^®The prior of St. Andrew's, Northampton obtained a commission of inquiry asserting that the monarch had made an unjustified collation, CHI. 13^8-50, p, 24?, The report of the commission of inquiry was not recorded, but, should he have been correct in his assertion, he would have been able to protect the interests of his house,

51in one such instance the abbot and convent of St. Mary's, York, were able to secure confirmation of a right that they had earlier received to acquire more lands. They had received this right initially for the relief of the estate of their house which was much reduced. Apparently St, Mary's York had suffered economic reverses, had gone to the king, and had acquired rights to obtain more lands. These rights had not been exercised within the period im­ mediately following the acquisition, and, as a result, they found it necessary later to secure confirmation of these rights, cm, 1307-13, p. 134, 93 rights of economic value were often the subject of such pleadings. Usually sin inspeximus would be undertaken when the original copy of the document that had been Issued to the monastery had been lost, and inspeximus proceedings could relate to a variety of matters.5% a monastery, for example, could secure an inspeximus of previous grants that had been made to the house. Grants and charters that were held by a monastery could be called into question not only by the king, but'/ialso by a variety of other individuals who would find it to their economic advantage to exploit the rights held by a monastery. Put simply, they would attempt to encroach upon the prerogatives held by a religious house, and to preserve its rights a prior would find it desirable to secure a confirmation of the grants and charters that it held.53 Monasteries acquired property in a variety of ways.

^^Monasteries often lost records that were of consider­ able Importance to them. These losses could result from not only fires, but also from theft, from destruction as a re­ sult of invasion, and from negligence. In such a case the abbot of Furness secured an inspeximus of a plea that had been undertaken by the abbot against Edward I. C Æ . 1334-38, pp. 50-52. Apparently in this plea the abbot had been the winner for it was he who secured the inspeximus, and it would not be usual for an abbot to secure an inspeximus of a plea that he had lost. Other information besides legal proceedings could be*~ the subject of inspeximus investigations. Not only could pleas^be ascertained, but grants also, and other information that it would be desirable to have in the archives of a priory were copied and documented. In one such Instance the provost and chaplains of the chapel of St. Nicholas, Stoke under Hameldon, secured an inspeximus of previous grants that had been made in the chapel. CER, 1334-38, p. 254.

^^Confirmation of rights and grants could be requested by monasteries in the same way they asked for inspeximus 9^ and acquisition through a grant in frank almoin was one of these methods. Just as in the case of other rights that be­

longed to monasteries, inspeximus proceedings of such grants

could be valuable should the grants be challenged.

Inspeximus proceedings could also relate to taxation

for if a favorable taxation rate had been in existence for a monastery, an inspeximus of these tax rates could prove

advantageous to the house when new levies were made.5^ In­

dentures, too, could be the subject of inspeximus proceedings,

for a donor could have given certain properties to a monastery,

and an inspeximus of the proceedings before the royal of­

ficials could help to enhance the monastery's position should the indenture ever be challenged. 55

investigations. The house of Brustlesham in Berkshire county secured a confirmation of earlier grants that had been made. CPR, 133^-38, p. 432. It might be suspected that the documentsthat had been granted to the monastery initially had been lost, misplaced, burnt, or stolen, honks of the house were compelled to go to the royal chancery in order that they might secure royal confirmation of the grants that they held.

5 ^ h e rate of taxation that was assessed against eui abbey could be favorable for the interests of the house. In such an instance the abbot would be interested in securing a similar rate of assessment in the future. This might lead the head of the house to secure an inspeximus of taxation that earlier had been made against the house for purposes of future reference. The abbot of Woburn secured an inspeximus of taxation that had been paid by the house in the past to aid in maintaining, apparently, the favorable rate of taxation. O m , 1334-38, pp. 492-93. ^^The abbot and convent of Halesowen secured an inspeximus of an indenture that was made between the house and a donor. CER. 1334-38, pp. 495-96. Apparently the donor had given properties to the monastery and the house had lost the original indenture. They found it necessary to go to 95

The right to appropriate an advowson involved the ac­ quisition of a license, and sometimes these licenses were not utilized for considerable periods of time. In this kind of situation, when the rights provided by the license were about to be utilized, an exemplilAcation of the granting of the appropriation license could be helpful enabling the con­ summation of the right and thus in protecting the monastery's

Interests. Pious benefactors from time to time donated en­ dowments for the support of individuals living within the confines of a monastic establishment, and these gifts were challenged. If this had been the case, if an inquest had been taken that redounded favorably for the monastery, it would be desirable for the house to secure an exemplification of the proceedings to facilitate receiving theg if t .56

The archives of a religious house often were destroyed, stolen, or otherwise m islaid, and it was very important for a religious house that it have a record of its revenues, endowments, and rights. Should these have been lost, an the royal chancery in order to secure an inspeximus of the document so that it might be kept in their archives to aid in maintaining their right to the grants.

^ ^ h e abbot and convent of Barlings secured an exemp­ lification of a license that they previously had acquired to appropriate a church of their advowson. CIR, 13^3-^5» P* 261. The abbey of Louth £*ark was the recipient of the gift of a donor who had added an endowment for ten monks. Apparently, there was some reason for the abbey to secure exemplification of the inquest where it had been established that such a grant had been made. Perhaps they had lost their copies of the original inquest, or for some other reason they were inter­ ested in protecting the endowment that had been added. In any case they secured an exemplification of the inquest and thus had a copy of the document available to them should they need it in the future. OPR. pp. 1-?. 96 exemplification of the royal records could be a means by which they could protect their interests.57 presentation prerogatives were another of the valuable rights often held by religious houses, and these rights could be challenged by someone seeking to encroach upon the legal monastic rights.

A plea would usually be the result, and again, an exempli­ fication of such a plea in which the monastery had emerged victorious could provide a means of protecting monastic interests,58 Likewise, a religious house would make agree­ ments with other clerical officials to perform certain services, and would establish an endowment for the performance of these services. A chaplain could be employed to celebrate services thatoriginally had been the obligation of the monastery. It was in the interest of hhe monastery, if they had struck a favorable bargain with the chaplain, to secure an inspeximus of such an obligation which usually involved an indenture agreement.59

5?The prioress and convent of Ellerton obtained an ex­ emplification of an inquisition that earlier had been made which listed the revenues and endowments of the convent. The reason given for securing this exemplification of the inquisition was the fact that the original documents had been carried away by the Soots during one of their hostile cam­ paigns against the monarch. CPH, 1345-48, p. 453. In such a situation it was necessary for the convent to have available to them a document recording the revenues and endowments pertaining to the house,

58rhe abbot of St. Mary's, York secured the exemplifi­ cation of a plea that had upheld the abbot's right to present to a church. CPa. 1348-50, p, 222.

5^An example of the use of inspeximus proceedings to the advantage of a religious house was the inspeximus that was acquired by the prior and house of Shelford with a chaplain 97 &egal proceedings were likewise a means by which relig­ ious houses could protect their Interests, The assize cf novel disseisin was one of these expedients that could work to protect the resources of monasteries. The assize of novel disseisin was the legal procedure to be followed when an Individual or a corporation was newly and unjustly dis­ possessed of properties. When this assize was requested and granted a panel of judges took an Inquest to determine who had recently possessed the property that was under question.

In other Instances more formal legal proceedings were utilized to protect the economic Interests of monasteries.

For emample, a house could Involve Itself In litigation with the king when the king would request that the house provide a pension for a retainer of the klng.^O who had agreed to celebrate services which, apparently, earlier had been the responsibility of the priory of Shelford. The indenture provided that the chaplain should be endowed with a perpetual rent in return for which he would celebrate divine services. CPE, 13^8-50, p. 289. Apparently the In­ denture had been to the advantage of the house of Shelford for otherwise It Is dubious whether they would have secured an Inspeximus of the agreement.

^®The assize of novel disseisin determined who had held the property In the recent past, but It did not settle questions of ownership, and thus was a swift procedure to prevent the unjustified seizure of property by malefactors. In this kind of circumstance the abbot of Selby requested an assize of novel disseisin early In the third decade of the fourteenth century. CPE. 1330-34, pp. 480-81. It was a means by which he could protect the financial Interests of his priory by preventing property from being carried away. In another Instance Involving the use of royal Offic­ ials to protect an abbey, the king himself was Involved In the proceedings. The king frequently attempted to obtain more pensions for his men than had been customary. In one such situation the abbot of Battle took a case to the royal 98

A variety of économie prerogatives were held by mon­

asteries In their position as overlords, and one of these was the right to profits from woodland areas. Such rights

were challenged by those finding It to their economic ad­

vantage to encroach on the prerogatives legally held by a

religious house, and a monastery would have to sustain Its

right through a legal process.Lands were Illegally taken

from religious house by encroaohers, and through legal

processes lands so taken In an unjust manner could be recovered.62

Just as rights could be maintained so could new respon­

sibilities be avoided through legal proceedings. The

courts, and was able to win a decision which stated that his house did not have to provide a pension for the nominee of the king, ç m , 1334-38, p. 261.

6l%n one such Instance the abbot of St. Peter's, Gloucester, was able to take legal action which sustained the rights of the abbey to profits from woods. CPR, 1338-40, p. 215. These profits were no small matter during the medieval period, for the right to firewood, timber, and other products of the forest could enhance the economic position of a religious house quite significantly. By so sustaining the right of the abbey to these economic re­ sources the abbot was pursuing one of a number of actions that could be undertaken on the part of an abbot to main­ tain the position of his abbey.

62Rellglous houses were the object of Illegal actions undertaken by neighbors and other Individuals who were In­ terested In exploiting the economic resources of the mon­ astery Illegally for their own economic benefit. The abbot and convent of Selby had had lands unjustly taken from them. In this situation the abbot went to the royal justices and was able to recover, through the use of a legal process, lands taken Illegally, CPR. 1340-^3» PP. 426-27, 99

obligation to repair such Items of public use as bridges and

roads could constitute a very significant drain on economic

resources. Legal proceedings would have to be undertaken

to determine who had the responsibility of performing these

services, and a monastery could uphold Its position by tak­

ing legal action.63 Another Illustration of a legal process

that could work to sustain the rights of religious houses related to pension payments, for It might be necessary for a monastery to undertake legal proceedings to uphold Its right to refuse to pay a pension when such a pension was requested,Similarly the monarch might allege that the monastery owed rents that it actually did not owe, and In these circumstances a religious house would be forced to undertake a legal action to protect Its Interests, Legal proceedings, although expensive, could prevent such an un­ warranted Increase In rents,

^3'rhe case of the abbot of Coggeshall Illustrates how a religious house could undertake legal proceedings to protect Itself against unwarranted or unusual exactions. He prose­ cuted a legal action against the monarch over the responsi­ bility for repairing a bridge located In the vicinity of the abbey. In this Instance he was able to win his case and a- vold the outlay of economic resources necessary for maintain­ ing the bridge In a usable condition, CHH, 13^0-^3» pp.288-89* ^\)he right of the king to request pensions from a mon­ astery was a frequent subject of litigation. The abbot of St, John's, Colecestre, was able to protect the economic po­ sition of his house by upholding the right of his abbey to refuse to pay pensions that had been demanded of the house, CPR, 1338-40, pp, 67-68, abbot of Newhouse, undertook legal proceedings against the monarch and was able to uphold his position with regard to rents that the king alleged were owing from the abbey. OPR, 1345-48, pp. 48-49, In a related case the 100

Monasteries were frequently called upon by the king to aid the king financially, and the amounts that could be re­ quested were rooted In custom. These kinds of obligations would be defined and thus limited by a religious house. The

Increase of these obligations could be evaded by a religious house through, again, a legal process. Some monasteries were exempt from making such contributions In an extraordinary way. If the monarch attempted to enforce contributions a . legal action could be the only means a monastery could use to protect Its Interests. There were thus a variety of expedients available to the monastery that was Interested In improving or protecting

Its economic position. Not only could a priory appropriate advowsons, demise Its lands, and fund Its debts. It also could secure grants In attempting to Improve Its financial abbot of Newbo likewise undertook a case against the monarch only this time It was over taxes that the king argued were due from the house. The abbot of Newbo, too, was able to win his case and was able to avoid paying the taxes the king had attempted to collect, GIB. 1345-48, pp. 49-50. In another situation related to taxes the Âugustlnlan monastery of Thomholme went to the royal chancery to secure an Inspeximus of a process through which the monastery in the past had secured lowered rates of taxation. GIB. 1345-48, pp. 357-58. ^^Gontrlbutlons to the monarch could drain very heavily on the financial resources of a religious corporation. Where extraordinary or augmented demands were made of a religious order for contributions to the king, the order would resist, and such resistance normally would take the form of a legal action. In one such cause the master and brethren of the order of St. Lazarus of Jerusalem undertook such action and through It were able to uphold their right to be exempt of contributions to the monarch. GIB, 1343-45, p. 224. 101 position. To protect its position it could secure govern­ mental assistance, obtain documents confirming its rights and possessions, and, finally, prosecute law suits. All of these expedients could be used either to enhance or preserve the economic position of a religious house, but it must be pointed out that they were not used with as much frequency as perhaps might be assumed. There were limitations upon the exercise of all of these rights, and it cannot be expected that a monastery, simply because it felt itself to be in need of more revenue, could utilize any and all of these devices.

Perhaps the most usual one, the oneiopen to most efficacious use was the procedure of demising lands. Even here, however, the monastery wishing to demise lands had to secure the ap­ proval of the monarch. Thus, while a monastery could do many things to protect its financial position, it could not act with complete freedom in soliciting bequests. Even the most assiduous and careful prior was likely to have difficulty in keeping his house out of economic difficulty for, not only were the economic trends threatening, he also easily might be faced with situations that he could not control, and these situations could detract significantly from the financial stability of a priory.

Most that could be done to enhance a monastery's eco­ nomic position was of the nature of a defensive action. If a prior attempted to secure governmental protection for the interests of his house, the action usually was precipitated 102 by a threatening move on the part of the monarch or another neighbor. If a house was forced to take action to sustain

or confirm Its rights, exemptions, or prerogatives. It was

likely that someone had Challenged Its position. Finally,

It should be pointed out that the procedure of demising

lands to Improve a monastery's financial position was In the

end self-defeating. Most of what a priory gained by leasing

out lands was derived from the fâct that the monastery no

longer accepted the responsibility for making capital Im­

provements on Its holdings. The effects of these conditions

eventually manifested themselves In the situations where

abbeys could not find Individuals to whom they could demise

their lands for long terms at high rents. All things con­

sidered, then, monasteries did not have enough feasible

alternatives at their command to deal with the economic

problems with which they were faced. Beyond the fact that

poor management was the rule rather than the exception In

monastic administration, the economic dislocations caused

by the agricultural depression of the first half of the

fourteenth century were too much to weather successfully. GHA.PTEH IV

MISMANAGEMENT AND VISITATION

Although monasteries carried considerable financial

burdens for their neighbors, it should not be suspected that

this was the cause of all their economic difficulties. Per­

haps even more pervasive in its financial results for

religious houses was the problem of mismanagement. As we

have seen, the administrators of religious houses were not usually trained for the complexities of their tasks, and

mismanagement was usual, if not almost universal, in its

appearance. The official records of the royal chancery are

filled with notices that monasteries have been suffering

from mismanagement, and the entries in these records follow

something of the pattern for a variety of charges are re­

peated time and time again. It is usually stated, for ex­

ample, that a monastery had been wasted and impoverished by

indiscreet rule. Perhaps it had been suffering from dis­

sension which had contributed to the economic difficulties

of the house and, with this dissension, mismanagement and

indisorett rule would have been likely. Not only were com­

plaints made of indebtedness, it also was asserted that a

lack of discipline prevailed, that the goods of the house

were wasted, and that lands were alienated illegally.

103 104

Finally, the unwarranted sale of oorrodies and the grants

of pensions were mentioned frequently as contributing to the

depressed state of a religious house.

To Illustrate some of these charges or observations with

regard to the defects In monastic administration, reference

to specific examples Is needed, Bermondsey priory, for

example, was wasted and Impoverished by the Indiscreet rule

of former heads. There was dissension In the house. It was

taken under the king's protection, and two of the king's

clerks were appointed as custodians.^ This was normal pro­

cedure when a house was seriously depressed, for someone was

called In who had administrative ability to set the finances

of the house In order.

In another situation, the Cistercian abbey of Blndon/dn

the Salisbury diocese was grlevlously burdened with debts

for want of good rule and a variety of other causes. In this

Instance, again, custodians were appointed to set the fi­ nances of the house straight, to pay off the debts, and to

Insure that the monks would live more within their means and

according to monastic precepts.^

Sometimes It happened that a change of abbot or a dis­

agreement over the removal of an abbot created dissension.

Such apparently had been the case with the abbey of Beaulieu

and this contributed to Its debt and the problem of securing

^CPB 1327-1330, p. 136.

2cra 1327-1330, p. 384. 105 good rule. Dissension had arisen there because an abbot

had been removed, and after the removal of the head of the

house it was asserted that a mob in the area, neighbors of

the monastery, carried away goods of the abbey and this con­

tributed to the depressed state of the house. Also be­

cause of this lack of discipline, it was asserted that many

monks withdrew from the house, that religious life was there­

after for a period impossible, and that divine services that

normally were celebrated ceased.3

A lack of discipline is often associated with debts,

impoverishment, and decay. This was the case with the

Cistercian abbey of Bruern which was loaded with debts be­

cause of a lack of good rule, and, as a result, was reduced

to decay. Good discipline was lacking in this situation and

this likewise contributed to the depressed and decayed con­

ditions of the house. Again, an outsider was appointed

custodian to set the affairs of the house in order,^

In another situation illustrative of problems associated with mismemagement, the hospital of St. John without the east

gate of Oxford was decayed for a variety of reasons, and a commission of visitation was appointed. The hospital man­ ifested many of those evils that are associated with the worse excesses of mismanagement, for it was decayed because

of misrule, disobedience, quarrels, and dissoluteness. The

3cpr 1327-1330, p. 391.

^CES 1327-1330, p. 525. ^CPR 1334-1338, p. 211. 106 report of the commission for visitation was not recorded and what action was taken by the moneiroh to combat the sit­ uation at the Oxford hospital was not recorded. However, it might be suspected that the monarch would have appointed custodians when it had been established that the house in­ deed was suffering these excesses of mismanagement.

Sometimes it happened that mismanagement was not the fault of the monks or the prior of the monastery which was suffering from the evil. Mismanagement could take place when the priory was in the king's custody or in the custody of a royal official. Such was the case with the priory of

Carisbrooke on the Isle of Wight, where the king ordered an inquisition relating to reported evils. It had been asserted that the wartime custodian had dissipated goods, alienated lands, and taken other action that ultimately damaged the interests of the priory.& Apparently, the charges had suf­ ficient basis in them for the king to order an inquisition, and it well might be suspected that the wartime custodian was guilty of exploiting the monastery for his own benefit for this kind of action was not at all unusual.

In another rather typical situation illustrating how mismanagement could take place, a commission of visitation was established for an examination of the hospital of St.

Leonard, Derby. There it was charged the warden had ne­ glected his duties, and had both dissipated and consumed the

^CPR 13^5-13^8, p. 391. 107 goods of the priory. In addition, he had Illegally alien­ ated the lands belonging to the hospital, and this had con­ tributed to the decay and depressed conditions prevailing.

An examination of the warden, the brothers and the sisters of the hospital, and the men of the county of Derby was ordered In order that the defects of the hospital might be ascertained.?

One of the most usual methods of mismanagement was to

Illegally alienate lands pertaining to a religious house.

Lands belonging to a monastery were properly sold only In unusual cases, but prescriptions forbidding alienation were disobeyed by an unscrupulous prior who enhanced the economic position of his friends or his family by Illegally disposing of monsistlc lands. The sale of servants' positions involv­ ing maintenance, too, could work to Impoverish a monastic foundation. The hospital of Newton suffered from such ex­ cesses, for there a commission was named to survey and certify the condition of the house which It was said had been

Impoverished by the sale of oorrodies, grants of pensions, and other charges to be received from the house so that it was In a depressed condition. Alienations of lands had been made so that the resources with which the house had been en­ dowed Initially were being Illegally dissipated. The O custodians, therefore, were charged with serious negligence,°

13^8-1350, pp. 175-76.

8cra 1330-1334, p. 579. 108

It also could happen that individuals might be admitted to a monastery contrary to the precepts that had governed the establishment of the house. Such admissions could work to foster a depressed, decayed, and unhealthy economic sit­ uation, This kind of practice had taken place at the King's

Hospital of Holy Innocents without Lincoln, for a commission of visitation was named which was to Investigate charges that the hospital had been greatly wasted In lands, rents, and goods by not only the keepers, but also by brothers and sisters who had been admitted to the hospital contrary to the foundation rules,9

Considerable Insight Into the effects of mismanagement and Incompetence on the part of religious administrators can be gained by looking at the observations made by the eccles­ iastical superiors charged with the responsibility of main­ taining good discipline and administration In monasteries,10

Usually these ecclesiastical officials were bishops or arch­ bishops and preserved In their registers are records of their reactions to the problems facing religious houses.

The register of Thomas of Corbrldge gives some such

Information, For example. In the case of Newstead priory which had been plagued with mismanagement, he gives these re­ actions, Upon visiting the priory In his capacity as

^CPR 1340-1343, p, 444,

iPsee Knowles, Religious Orders, for a discussion of mismanagement. 109 ecclesiastical superior, he found that unwarranted and friv­ olous expenditures had been made that had put the priory In a seriously depressed and Indebted condition. In order to rectify this situation he gave the Injunction that no ex­ penditures should be made by either the prior or other mem­ bers of the house except with the assent of a committee that was to be established for supervising the expenditure of monies.In addition to placing restrictions on the outlay of revenues, other measures designed to produce better management were prescribed by Archbishop Thomas. He sug­ gested that accounts of all the revenues of the house should be made once at least, but preferably twice, during the course of a year.

Apparently contributing to the depressed financial con- dltlon/of the house was the fact that lax disciplinary con­ ditions had prevailed, for the archbishop complained that the Injunctions that he had given after his recent visitation had been disobeyed. They had been more honored In the breach

Register of Thomas of Corbrldge. I, pp. 228-230, 280- 282. The prior, together with two canons of Newstead— two of the wiser monks In the house— suid the prior of the house of Pelley were to constitute this committee for overseeing the finances of the house at Newstead. No expenditures were to be undertaken without the knowledge, assent, counsel, and wishes of these Individuals. After expenditures had been decided upon by this committee, the proposed action of the four should be explained, discussed, and agreed to In the chapter of the monastery. Thus, all monks of the house would have an opportunity to voice their opinions on how revenues should be spent. 110 than In the observance, for he repeated In his letter that no one was to leave the house without securing the assent of 12 the prior. The archbishop also established a limit on the number of horses that could be kept by the priory and even the food that they should be fed was stipulated* They were to live on hay during most of the year with the exception that during periods of labor they were to be fed grain, and only two horses were to be maintained by the priory. The number of servants that the house might keep was likewise strictly limited, for there were to be two stable servants and two servants who were to take charge of the infirmary.

The problem of guests was treated by the archbishop, and he said that no guests were to be admitted to the priory except that it redound to the good of the house. When guests were to be received, they were to be allowed to enter only with the assent of the prior. The archbishop also con­ cerned himself with the disposition of timber resources be­ longing to the monastery, for he prescribed that no wood was to be sold without the license of the Archbishop or his representative. A final complaint made by the archbishop

Ibid.. pp. 228-230 and 280-282. Travel outside of the house by monks was to be thus severely restricted, and the prior was not to give his assent to any monk to leave the house without good reason. The archbishop suggested that perhaps the only justifiable reason for allowing a monk leave to withdraw himself from the priory for a short period of time was to prosecute business that was to the advantage of the house. Such assent should be given not only by the prior himself, but also by the convent and custodians of the house should there be any. Ill

was that. In contradiction and In disobedience of his

earlier Injunctions, a novice had been admitted Into the

house. The admission of new novices, when adequate economic

resources were not available, was a practice which could

contribute to a depressed financial condition.13

Several observations about the Injunctions given by

Archbishop Thomas of Corbrldge might be made. First, It

would seem that the problem of extravagance was not at all

unusual, for monks were all too ready to live beyond their

means, and some procedure of limiting the expenditure of

revenues was not only desirable, but also necessary If

financial ruin was to be prevented. Also, the absence of

an accounting system seems to have been a lack that was all

too typical of religious houses. Very frequently they did

not know how much revenue they had coming to them, and could

only with difficulty control the activities of those who

were In charge of the treasury. The prescription that ac­

counts be rendered periodically was well given not only to

Newstead, but also to other houses to which similar recom­

mendations were made.

The problems Involved In maintaining proper discipline

within a monastery were great, and lax discipline could con­

tribute to the economic problems that were borne by monas­

teries. Religious houses frequently were guilty of keeping

not only horses In an excess number, but also other animals

l^Ibld.. pp. 228-231, and 280-282. 112 that were maintained for sporting purposes. Thus, the limi­ tation on the number of horses which could be kept by

Newstead Priory was designed to insure that they would not be used for frivolous purposes. Also during the fourteenth century, servants were frequently to be found in excess in monasteries, and they contributed to the drain on revenues.

The servants were kept to make life leisurely for the monks themselves, and in the opinion of eoclesiastical superiors served no purposes other than questionable ones.

Another problem that frequently led religious houses into financial difficulty was the problem of hospitality, for frequently monasteries were subjected to the burden of maintaining guests who had no right to demand hospitality.

Usually, hospitality was granted only to nobles who maintained a certain retinue, and even in these cases the burden could become onerous for a monastery. Houses might easily find themselves in difficult financial circumstances when a large party of nobility, perhaps following the monarch, demanded hospitality from them. Such demands could place unusual and crippling financial demands on a monastery. Finally, the illegal alienation of resources on the part of a monastery could contribute quite significantly to a depressed financial condition. This was the reason that the archbishop commanded that no timber should be sold without his assent.

In another situation the priory of Worksop found itself in a depressed financial condition, and Archbishop Thomas 113 allowed the appropriation of the Church of Sutton-upon-

Trent to compensate the priory for extraordinary outlays that it had made. The reason given for the creation of the burdensome economic condition at Worksop was the fact that the priory had suffered unusual burdens in the recent past which had resulted from the necessity that they provide continued hospitality to individuals who were passing through their area of the country,

The priory of Worksop again found itself in economic difficulty in March, 1313» At that time. Archbishop

Greenfield removed the prior of Worksop because he was in­ competent, and had disposed of the goods of the house in an extravagant kind of way. He was guilty of unoanonical be­ havior and was thoroughly unfit to rule the house in the position of prior.

The case of Bridlington priory demonstrates the detailed accounting procedures and other economic restrictions that could be prescribed for a depressed house by a visiting ecclesiastical superior. After Archbishop Greenfield's

Ibid.. pp. 230-231. The provisions that were es- tablished by the archbishop for the appropriation of the church were that upon the death of the present rector a vicar was to be appointed. The vicar was not to be oomf pensated to the degree that the rector had been, for the resources of the church were to be divided between the vicar and the priory of Worksop in such a manner that approximately half of the revenues of the church would go to each party to the agreement. Worksop priory, thus, was able to acquire more revenues as a result of the appropriation.

egister of Archbishop Greenfield. IV, pp. IA9-50. 114 visitation of Bridlington in 1314, the archbishop found that the house was gravely burdened with a variety of debts, pensions, and oorrodies. He ordered that moderation in ex­ penditures be effected in order to attenuate in the future the burdens that were carried from these charges. He also established an accounting system that was to be followed by the monks of the house. All revenues coming into the priory were to be paid into the hands of two men designated as bursars, and all expenditures were to be sanctioned by these two monks,Further, no new canons or conversi were to be admitted, no new grants of pensions, oorrodies, or liberties were to be made, and no possessions or temporal revenues of the house were to be alienated without license from the archbishop, A final prescription given by the archbishop ordered the elimination of any useless or super­ fluous retainers,17

1A Ibid,, III, pp, 223-26, All of the accounts of the house were to be explained annually by these bursars to four or five discreet monks of the house and the prior both that the bursars would be responsible for any irregularities and that the finances of the priory would be put under the scrutiny of others besides the bursars. In addition, an inventory of the property belonging to the house was to be made annually so that the monastery would be in a position to assess its resources adequately. The inventory was to be undertaken approximately at Easter and the final report was to have bean rendered by All Saints' Day, l^Ibid, 115 Pour years later, in 1318, Archbishop Melton visited

Bridington priory, and the situation was little improved.

In his injunctions he pointed out that debts weighed heavily against the house and enjoined that no superfluous dogs or horses should be kept, but he did not go into as much detail as had the visitor four years earlier. The house was visited again in 1321, and then the priory had undergone another petiod of serious difficulty. This is the case because both the subprlor and the cellarar had been re­ moved from office in the intervening period and the prior resigned sometime later. An order was addressed to the subprior and convent in September of 1321 which stated that because of the fact that the prior, Peter of Wynthorp, had resigned his office, and because his resignation had been accepted by the archbishop, that his seal of office ought not to continue in his possession. In consideration of this fact the prior was to summon the former prior to chapter where they were to receive the seal from him and in the presence of the whole convent, destroy it.l®

Apparently a considerable part of the economic dif­ ficulties that had burdened the house were the result of the incompetence of Peter of Wythorp, the former prior. He had been guilty of expenditures that were unwarranted, and perhaps had continued to make such outlays after he had re­ signed his position thus obligating the priory to pay debts

^%CH, III, p. 202. 116 that were not contracted with the full loiowledge of the 19 house. Once again a visitation was concluded in 1324, again by Archbishop Melton, At that time the archbishop enjoined that the subcellarer was to give weekly accounts of daily expenses, that no strangers were to be invited into the house, and that the priory was not to make any superfluous or extravagant expenses. The condition of the house seems to have suffered from long enduring excesses, and marked improvement between the visitation of Archbishop Greenfield in 1314 and that of Archbishop Melton in 1324 is not apparent,^0

The case of the priory of Thurgarton likewise demon­ strates the problems faced by a religious house when it got itself into debt. The exchange of letters between Archbishop

Thomas of Corbrldge and the monks of the house illustrate the different Interpretations that could be made as far as the causes of the depressed condition of the house were con­ cerned, The archbishop wrote the prior of the house that the prior had been builty of borrowing monies unwisely and ordered that the prior be deposed. He asserted that upon his earlier visitation to the house, he had given the prior a chance to reform the priory, but that no significant progress had been made, and that, as a result of this, he

l^Ibid,

^®Ibid, 117 was now removing the prior from his office.The monks were ordered to elect a new prior who would both be able to restrict expenses within the house and be capable of paying off the debts that had been acquired.

The subprlor and convent replied to the archbishop's letter by saying that they were burdened with debts and hounded by their creditors and that they had no money with which to pay their obligations. The only means available to the priory by which they might be able to meet their obli­ gations would be to put out their holdings and possessions at farm, but they thought that this would be an undesirable expedient. The subprlor and convent requested further aid and advice from the archbishop In the hope both : that con­ ditions could be rectified and that they perhaps might re­ ceive a grant of revenues from the archbishop In order that they might settle their accounts. In a later letter from the subprlor to the archbishop, the subprlor maintained that the condition of the house had worsened In the Intervening period. Their fortunes had taken such a turn because the prior had been removed, and now the monastery's creditors

^ Register of Archbishop Corbrldge. I, pp. 272-79, Indeed, the archbishop maintained he had taken steps which would have made It easier for the prior to undertake reform, for he had found during his visitation that there had been living In the priory certain brethren who were contumacious and refractory, and that he had sent them away to other houses In order that the prior might have a better chance to Improve conditions at Thurgarton. Conditions, however, had not Improved and the archbishop found It necessary to remove the prior and gave orders to the convent to elèct a more Judicious monk to the position of head of the house. 118 were pressing for payment even harder than they had been In 22 the past. The subprlor went on to say that the causes of the

Indebtedness of the house were not mismanagement, but rather followed upon developments that could not be controlled by the monks of the house. The priory in the first place had suffered burdensome expenses resulting from pleas and liti­ gation, both ecclesiastical and secular, that the house had been forced to undertake. Second, the subprlor maintained that the payment of tenths to the monarch had put the house in an unenviable financial position. Finally, the subprior asserted that the house had been forced to give an unwarranted amount of hospitality, and that this too had worked to depress the economic position of the priory. Nothing, the subprior argued, could be done about these things, and the former prior had not been responsible for the submerged economic condition of the house. He suggested that the former prior should be reinstated and that this would help alleviate, to some degree, the condition of the house.

In response to these letters of the subprior, the archbishop sent a return letter in which he complained both that there were contradictions in the recent letters received from the subprior and that the reasons given for the de­ pressed condition of Thurgarton were inadequate. The archbishop was unable to accept the explanations given by

Z^Ibid. 119 the monks of Thurgarton for the indebtedness of their house.

The subprior and the convent once more wrote to the arch­ bishop, and again sorgued that they were limited because of the removal of Prior Alexander. They said that they had suffered innumerable wrongs at the hands of their enemies and that they were severely compromised because of the fact that writs taken out by the former prior seeking legal redress were no longer effective because he had been removed. Ap­ parently, illegal actions had been committed by neighbors against the house and the former prior had undertaken legal action to obtain satisfaction. After having been removed, the writs, seemingly, were no longer effective.

The subprior continued his letter by saying that the house had been dispossessed of properties to which they had a legal right, and because the prior had been removed, the house had no remedy available to it. He also maintained that large and new expenses would be incurred should a new prior be elected and that the house was in no position to withstand these expenses. Indeed, he said the house would be unable to raise the sums required immediately without resorting to the undesirable expedients of putting out to farm the revenues of lands and churches and selling corrodies.

In addition, he complained that the house had suffered at the hands of royal officials who had taken the goods of the house both for the use of the monarch and for the satisfaction of the creditors of the house. 120

Continuing the exchange of letters, the archbishop wrote once more to the subprior and convent and said that he had said before about the condition of the house, and added further that no new advice could he give. The final letter in the sequence ceune from the archbishop, for the priory, apparently, had eventually decided to elect another man as prior. They elected John of Hickling to the position, but the archbishop quashed this election because he felt that the monk elected was not only inept, but that he also had sinned in many ways and thus would not be satisfactory as p r i o r .23

Several years later conditions at the priory of

Thurgarton apparently had improved to some degree for Arch­ bishop Greenfield made a visitation, and the decree issued after his examination is usual in most respects, but it does have some information with regard to the financial con­ dition of the priory. The house was still heavily burdened with various debts, pensions, and oorrodies, but it does not seem to have been in such a depressed condition as it was three years earlier upon the occasion of Archbishop

Corbridge's remarks. Archbishop Greenfield ordered that the priory adhere to moderate practices as far as expendi­ tures were concerned in order that they might reduce their economic burdens to some degree. Likewise, he ordered that a treasury be established under the administration of

23ibid. 121 two bursars and that a survey of the possessions of the house should be undertaken annually. Finally, no new canons were to be admitted, no new pensions were to be granted, and no extra servants were to be maintained,It might be suspected, however, that some improvement had taken place in the financial condition of the priory in the intervening period even though the house was still heavily burdened.

Certain observations can be made with regard to the whole condition of the priory of Thurgarton. Both the inference made by the archbishop that the woes suffered by the house were caused by mismanagement and the complaints of the Thurgarton monks that their troubles resulted from con­ ditions beyond their control seem dubious if taken at face value. The archbishop seems to have closed his eyes to the economic situation confronting the house, but at the same time certainly, the priory seems to have been guilty of making unwarranted expenditures. In cases where the eco­ nomic evils of religious houses were attributed to mis­ management, it would seem that the archbishops and other ecclesiastical officials charged with the task of visitation were not sufficiently perceptive to understand the burden­ some economic conditions that were being faced by monasteries

It seems plausible that the house of Thurgarton did, indeed, suffer unusual outlays in the form of legal expenses, taxes, and hospitality. Perhaps all of their economic woes could

Z^Begister of Archbishop Greenfield, IV, pp. 28-31, 122 not be attributed to this cause, but part of it could. At the same time the archbishop in his correspondence with the priory seems to have been unwilling to recognize this as a legitimate source of economic complaint.

The state of Blyth priory which was visited by Arch­ bishop Greenfield also gives insight into the kinds of prob­ lems that could face a monastery. The archbishop in a decree that he promulgated after his visitation suggested that the prior &ive both an account of his expenditures and an eval­ uation of the state of the house to the archbishop or to his representative yearly on approximately All Saints* Day. In addition, the care and the administration of the goods and the possessions of the house, both external as well as in­ ternal, were to be placed under a cellarer so that there would be adequate control over the priory’s property. A bursar was to have charge of the receipts and payment of all monies, and was to account, at least annually, for his ad­ ministration. On numerous occasions inadequate accounts were given by monks in positions of financial responsibility, and this opened the way for extravagance on the part of these individuals thus contributing to an indebted condition for many houses. Again, Archbishop Greenfield directed that hospitality was not to be given to everyone who sought it, but rather only to those who were entitled to it by custom.

In addition, no new corrodies were to be sold or pensions 123 granted without the special license of the archbishop,

The sale of corrodies, it would seem, was a seemingly attractive expedient often adopted by monasteries to temp­ orarily improve their economic condition. As has been earlier pointed out, however, the sale of corrodies was a dangerous practice to pursue for it could lead to complica­ tions when adequate forethought had not been given to the amount that should be collected for the sale of these positions

Six months after Archbishop Greenfield had visited the house in 130?, he wrote a letter concerning Blyth priory to the abbot of the house of Holy Trinity at Rouen. The abbot of Holy Trinity had sent several monks to Blyth priory ap­ parently to reside there while working off a penance. The archbishop protested this action on the part of the abbot of Holy Trinity for Blyth priory had been unusually burdened in the recent past with debts. This was the case because they had been forced to provide hospitality to large numbers of individuals who were going to Scotland with the king.

Thus a serious drain on their resources had occurred, and to add to this burden the necessity of supporting the two monks from Prance, the archbishop thought was unreasonable. As a 26 result, he sent the French monks back to their homeland.

Blyth priory continued to concern Archbishop Greenfield, for in June, 1309» he again sent a letter to the abbot of

Z^Ibid.. pp. 11-12.

Z^ibid.. II, p. W . 124-

Holy Trinity, Houen stating that the prior of Blyth was aged and ill and should be removed. He said, however, that he himself had not replaced the prior immediately because of the fact that the house would suffer because of the voidance that would result. He suggested that steps be taken to replace the infirm prior in a manner which would a- void the necessity of the priory withstanding a gcoLonged voidance. The house, as we have seen in the past, had en­ dured oonaiderable expenditures and was in no condition to withstand the expenses that would occur should the house be taken into the king's hands as a result of a voidance. Thus the archbishop was working to protect the interests of the

priory and to prevent an undesirable situation from develop­

ing.^7

In another instance where Archbishop Greenfield visited a priory, this time the house of Worksop, he again wrote to

the members of the house giving them his report of the visi­

tation. The visitation occurred in 1314-, and he suggested

in his report that the prior, John of Tykhill, had been re­

sponsible for a number of evils that had harmed the priory,

and ordered the house to elect a new prior in his place,

John of Tykhill, the archbishop maintained, had led the

house into deterioration. He had been responsible for wasting

the goods of the monastery to no good use, and as well he was

morally unfit to lead a religious house. He was clearly

Zflbid.. IV, pp. 67-68, 125

Incompetent for he had demonstrated a negligence in cor­ recting excesses that were found in the house, and so was completely unsuited both for his position as prior and also probably for religious life.^B

Archbishop Greenfield, also in 131^, visited the prior of Newstead. There, too, the prior was removed because of actions which were contrary and derogatory to the religious nature of his office. The injunction given by the arch­ bishop against the keeping of hunting dogs would seem to illustrate the rather lax attitude toward monastic dis­ cipline prevailing at Newstead.^9

At Newburgh, the archbishop against removed a monastic official, this time the subprior, John of Soton. In ad­ dition a number of other officials were suspected of economic activities which were contrary to the interests of the house.

Humphrey of Hoton, the cellarer for thirty years, was ordered to account for his administration. Accounts had not been rendered apparently in a long time, and the cellarer was suspected of, at the very least, incompetence, and perhaps of theft. Roger of Kepwyk who had held the position of thresher for the grain of the house of Newburgh seemed to have acquired more than the amount of wealth that would be expected from a man in his position. Thus, the archbishop ordered an examination of his activities in an attempt to

28ibid.. pp. 149-50,

Z^Ibid.. p. 154. 126 ascertain whether he had been guilty of exploiting the re­ sources of the priory for his own use,

Sometime later the archbishop came back to Newburgh, and again found a considerable number of items with which he found fault. The prior, John of Foxholes, had been guilty of adultery and incest but, interestingly enough, was al­ lowed to remain in his office because of the fact the house was burdened with debts and he seemed to be a relatively competent administrator who could lead the priory to a better financial condition even though his morals were not above reproach.31

The priory of Selby likewise suffered from mismanage­ ment, and, as a result, economic burdens. In April of 1322, the abbot, John of Wystow II, sent Archbishop Melton a full account of the state of the monastery as of I320 when the former abbot had died. He noted that the debts of the house were 551 1, 8s, while pensions and fees were owed by the house to the amount of 4^ 1, 16 s, 8 Fifteen corrodies of food and drink were the responsibility of the house, and food and drink were to be given daily to the recipients for the period of their lifetimes. In addition, eightiof those who held corrodies received food not only for themselves, but also for servants who were in their employ while eleven re­ ceived clothes yearly at the expense of the monastery. An

30lbid,, III, pp. 71-72. ^^Ibid,, pp. 80-81, 127

Indication of the depressed state of the house was the fact that revenues and rents had depreciated at least 100 m. annually. Thus it would seem that careful supervision and administration of properties held by the monastery had waned, and, as a result of this laxity, the house suffered a loss of revenues.^

In 1324, the house was visited by Archbishop Melton when he commented that the house was burdened by debts and pensions and that the inhabitants should take care to live within their means so that these charges might be reduced.

The house again was visited by the archbishop eleven years later.when he reported that discipline in the house was ex­ tremely lax, and that six monks especially were guilty of infractions. Various charges were levelled against these refractory Individuals, for not only were they accused of immoral relations with women, drunkenness, and the spreading of goesip that created discord, they were also responsible seemingly for theft from the monastery, riotous behavior, and the alienation of property belonging to the monastery to women that they favored. As a result of their misbehavior and extremely uncanonical behavior, penances were imposed and presumably conditions improved to some degree after this 33 visitation.

^^VCH, III, pp. 97-98.

33lbid. 128

In 1301 John of Pontlssara visited Newark priory and his report indicated the house could Improve its methods of handling Its finances. He enjoined, for example, that no oorrodies were to be sold or pensions granted without license.

With regard to more specific points of administration an office of external cellarer or seneschal was to be es­ tablished. The seneschal thus created was to control the receipts while the regular cellarer was to control expendi­ tures while another monk was to be associated with these two

In supervising the finances of the house. Accounts were to be explained to all the monks of the priory at regular

Intervals so that all would have knowledge of the financial affairs of the house, would be able to discuss them, and thus would be able to exercise more control over adminis­ trative officials.

Eight yemrs later Newark again was visited by an arch­ bishop, this time by Henry Woodlock. He reported that the house continued In debt, that the prior was old and unable to rule effectively, and that, as a result, two canons of the house were to be given administrative responsibility.

One of these was to act as receiver and the other disperser of revenues so that the finances of the house would be taken out of the hands of the aged and Idecrepit prior. No one besides these two Individuals was to receive any goods of the priory, and they were to have complete authority over

3^Heglster of John of Pontlssara. I, pp. 119-21, 129 the financial affairs of the house. In addition he referred to the injunctions that had been given earlier by John of

Pontissarà and confirmed them to the monks of Newark for the obedience.35

Henry Woodlock also visited Tandridge priory and there found conditions which warranted a complete reform as far as administrative techniques were concerned. After his visi­ tation, he sent members of his staff there to correct some of the abuses that he had found. They reported that from the time of foundation of the house, no accounts whatsoever had been returned, and that the administrative officials had no knowledge whatsoever of the value of the house's annual revenue, the returns from their granges, or the amount of seed sown per year. None of these things were available and other information that normally would be in the hands of administrators who were doing an effective job was likewise lacking.

In the face of these conditions the bishop's repre­ sentatives decided that they would request the cellarer to give account for his administration of the revenues of the priory from the first year of his occupation of the office.

When they did this they found negligence and falsification in his accounting and within a few days they terminated the investigation as being futile. They decided rather to begin from the last part of his administration and work backwards.

35Register of Henry Woodlock. pp. 423-2A. 130 but again they found, to their frustration, detestable fals­ ifications in his records for the cellarer, Simon of Schirford, was caught recording revenue that had been collected one year as due at a future time, thus forging the records to his own benefit. The priory apparently had some timber re­ sources that were valuable, but these had been sold by the cellarer to the disadvantage of the house in order to pur­ chase grain needed for food. In order to correct these con­ ditions the representatives of the bishop established a receiver and a dispenser of monies, the one to supervise the external affairs, the other the internal of the priory.

One would wonder, however, how effective these injunctions were, considering the earlier negligence manifested in the administration of the affairs of the h o u s e , 3^

In the case of the house of Chertsey, the bishop found conditions that were considerably more commendable. This was the case because the administrator in charge of Chertsey was the distinguished "high farmer," John of fiutherwyk who was regarded by his contemporaries as one of the more capable and efficient abbots.3? Thus it might be suspected that the injunctions found in the register of Henry Woodlock with regard to Chertsey are intended as em example for others rather than as criticism.

3^Ibid.. pp. 316-17.

^^Knowles, Religious Orders, p. 104. 131 In his recommendations, the bishop stated that accounts should be rendered beginning on the morning of All Souls' Day and that they should be continued without interruption until all had been completed. To the task of hearing these matters four monks were to be assigned, and every account was to be heard by at least two of them should the others be detained for some reason or another. After all of the records had been examined, settlement was to be made by Christmas, In addition to the four monks who had been designated to hear the returns, two clerks were to be assigned to record all of these matters, and then, after all of this was completed, the accounts were to be checked against the extent and rental of every manor so that a comparison could be made with ex­ pected revenues. A report then was to be given in chapter in the presence of the whole abbot and convent. This having been done, the effectiveness and the competence of the ad­ ministrators were to be examined and poor ones were to be removed so that the priory would not have to suffer from the continuation of incompetent service. Finally, the ad­ ministrative officials of the house were to estimate the expenses that would be incurred in the following year, and calculated so that they would not exceed the income expected.

Thus a very complicated set of financial procedures was in effect at Chertsey and the house seemingly prospered as a result of these procedures.^® At least this was the case

3^Register of Henry Woodlock. pp. 533~37« 132

during the period that leadership was given by John of

Rutherwyk, and the house never attracted royal attention as

being depressed during the period under consideration.

Several generalizations can be made about the problems

associated with mismanagement. Numerous difficulties seemed

' btr follow upon inadequate financial organization, and many

monasteries seemed to be lacking in effective auditing pro­

cedures, This had the result of leaving individuals in con­

trol of revenues without any effective check, and they were

in a position to exploit the resources of a monastery in an

unwarranted and extravagant fashion. Also, there seems to

have been in many cases negligence in explaining the finan­

cial affairs of the house to all the monks that resided there.

As a result, the affairs of the house were not open to dis­

cussion and examination by all of those concerned. Again,

this offered the considerable opportunity for extravagance,

mismanagement, and corrupt practices to occur. One of the

most frequent injunctions encountered in the bishops' reports

after visitation is the fact that periodic accountInfeoahduld

be rendered. This would seem to constitute an attempt to

put a check on the activities of administrators who other­

wise would have an opportunity to mismanage the resources of

the house.

In addition to auditing procedures, the explaining of

the financial affairs of the house to everyone, the periodic

accounting, surveys of the resources pertaining to the 133 house likewise were often lacking. A set of good accounting procedures would specify that the revenues expected from the lands and rentals belonging to the house should be evaluated periodically. Thus an opportunity would exist to insure that full returns were being received.

Besides the inadequate financial organization that seems to have been present in a large number of houses, monks seem to have been guilty of extravagance. One^notes in bishops * reports that monks were maintaining dogs, horses, and were expending resources in other frivolous ways.

Very frequently they maintained servants and retainers who were not needed and this likewise was a manifestation of extravagance. There were a variety of manifestations of poor manage­ ment related to, but distinct from, inadequate accounting procedures. A monastery might, for example, admit novices when its finances were not sufficient to support another new resident. Incompetent priors likewise seem to have con­ tributed considerably to the excesses of mismanagement.

Priors who had no business being in office would waste the goods of the priory, would alienate its lands, would sell its resources, and otherwise manage the revenues of the house in such a way as to lead it into economic difficulties. Fre­ quently, also, incompetent priors would see the sale of cor­ rodies and the granting of pensions as means by which they could improve the economic condition of the house. This, as 13^ we have seen, was a dangerous procedure and again could de­ press the house even further,

A lack of the moral requirements necessary for governing a house effectively could contribute to the economic woes of a monastery, for incompetence and immorality on the part of the prior could lead the house to conditions of dissension, and dissension itself could lead to an indebted and depressed condition. Even negligence in correcting abuses and excesses by resident monks could contribute to economic difficulties.

If the canons of the house were guilty of alienating the property of the house and other uncanonical activities the house could soon find itself in difficult economic straits.

It required the discipline provided by a strong and ex­ emplary prior to keep the house in line so that its financial affairs would stay in order.

One notes finally that a lack of planning on the part of administrative officials frequently contributed to the need to borrow and take other measures that would help the financial condition of a monastery temporarily at the expense of its long-term interest. Monks did not plan their ex­ penditures so that their revenues would exceed their outlays and frequently they were forced into the position of needing extra revenues. Under these conditions they would take undesirable courses of action that would ultimately lead the house into economic difficulties. Finally, it might be mentioned that visitations were not as effective in correcting 135 the abuses thus Illustrated as might be expected. Visi­ tations were infrequent and it was difficult for an ec­ clesiastical official who was charged with this kind of responsibility to get around to all of the houses under his control at frequent intervals. Thus sometimes it was as long as forty years between visitations, and in these circumstances abuses would not be controlled with effective­ ness. CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The thesis of this discussion has heen that three factors contributed to the economic woes suffered by monas­ teries during the first half of the fourteenth century.

These forces can be subsumed under three categories. First, the effect of the agricultural depression that England suffered during the first half of the fourteenth century certainly was of significance in adding to and compounding the economic problems of religious houses. The second major factor contributing to depressed economic circumstances was the burdens that monasteries carried not only for the monarch, but also as a result of relations with their neighbors and other outsiders. The third basic problem or force contribut­ ing to the monastic depression during this period was mis­ management. Mismanagement, as we have seen, was widespread, for monastic administrators were not particularly well-trained in effective management techniques, and, as a result, mis­ management was more the rule than the exception.

The significance of the first of these forces that con­ tributed to the economic difficulties of monasteries— the agricultural depression of the first half of the fourteenth century— merits some additional discussion. We have seen

136 137 that there were a number of methods adopted by religious houses to meet the problem of a depressed agricultural economy. Monasteries, by and large, during the first half of the fourteenth century abandoned the high farming tech­ nique In favor of demising their lemds. As we have seen, the Introduction of leaseholds varied In time and place, but by 1350 the process was well advanced. This has a certain significance beyond the fact that It was the only method not dependent on gifts or legal proceedings for Improving the financial position of a religious house. It was the easiest management alternative that could have been adopted by monasteries to Improve their economic condition.

Abandoning the hlgh-farm technique of management was significant because monasteries restricted the amount of

Investment they made In their demesne lands. Thus capital

Improvements In their holdings were reduced, and this ul­ timately redounded to the disadvantage of religious houses.

A final economic result of the agricultural depression on monasteries was the fact that land redistribution occurred within the peasant classes, and that this created peasant unrest. The prosperous peasant farmers were the ones who took up the leaseholds that were offered by monasteries, for they were capable of paying high rents and they had had the administrative and agricultural experience that made them capable of working the land profitably, at least during the period before the agricultural depression deepened still 138 further. The rest of the agricultural population was more submerged, however.

There is a certain significance in the approach that monasteries took to their economic problem which was really the problem of the agricultural depression. Their approach indicates a certain lack of vigor and vitality in monastic life. Cor the solution that they adopted for their problem was not a particularly imaginative one and they did not go to the root of the problem. They attempted rather to ex­ ploit a temporary dislocation of the economy for their own benefit, and as a result, resorted to demising procedures, but even then, only ineffectively. What monasteries might have done had more imagination been in evidence was to under­ take to exploit the agricultural resources that they held more directly. In times past monks and monasteries had been very active in improving agricultural techniques, developing new means of exploiting agricultural resources and in mod­ ernizing farming methods. By the fourteenth century, this interest on the part of monks had waned and in all areas of life, not just agriculture, the religious houses showed them­ selves to be of waning influence. The preoccupations of monks generally were twofold. During the high farming period, they seemed to be preoccupied with the administration of their estates. They were then committed to the exploita­ tion and managenaht of agricultural resources to the benefit of the house to be sure, but monks were not involved in 139 agricultural labor as perhaps might have been desirable.

After the abandoning of the high farming- management methods, monks tended to emphasize the ritualistic aspect of monastic life. There existed a preoccupation, for example, with the saying of divine services, and the other activities associated with the strictly religious aspect of religious endeavor.

It would seem that time had passed the monks by, and con­ ventual religious life no longer was in the forefront of the affairs of the day.

Another aspect of the agricultural depression is the hostility that it created toward monasteries by their neighbors. As we have seen, monasteries frequently were the object of hostile action, depredation, and other illegal activities undertaken by their neighbors who envied them perhaps because of the wealth that was in their hands. The monastic population in the fourteenth century was a very privileged class and held resources that were the envy of the submerged peasant population surrounding them. The agricultural depression worsened the ill feeling that was held by these groups of peoples, and as a result monasteries suffered from the acts of resistance and violence that were perpetrated by their neighbors. Because of the fact that monasteries by and large abandoned the high farming technique

in favor of demising out lands, because they restricted their

investment in capital improvements because of the fact that

land distribution took place, and because of the hostility 140 of the neighbors, the agricultural depression had a demon­ strable effect on the economic condition of religious houses.

The methods used by monasteries in meeting their problem were not imaginative and, as a result, did as much as any­ thing else to put them in a situation that was not very hopeful.

The second major factor contributing to the economic problem suffered by monasteries during the first half of the fourteenth century were burdens that they carried by virtue of their relationship with the monarch. The services ren­ dered the king could be onerous, and in assessing the sig­ nificance of these obligations, two stand out as being of considerable significance. First of all, the policy of the monarch requesting sustenances for his retainers. As we have seen, a game of wits was being played between the mon­ arch and the religious houses, for the monarch was constantly trying to increase the number of sustenances that he could demand from monasteries. On the other hand, monasteries were interested in reducing the number that it should have to provide. When the king requested sustenances to a degree that the religious house could not support the monastery found itself in economic difficulty. The overwhelming evi­ dence as far as sustenances are ccmcemed was that they were used by the monarch to drain off resources for his own pur­ poses at the expense of the economic position of the monasw teries. 141

The second significant obligation owed the king was that associated with his rights during voidances. Monas­ teries, as we have seen, had the obligation of surrendering their house during voidances, if this right of the monarch had not been limited. Because of this situation, the king was in a position to collect more revenue from the monastery than ordinarily would be the case. Beyond this, however, certain problems arose resulting from the fact of voidances.

Exploitation could take place not only by the king but also by other governmental officials charged with administering monasteries during these periods. Most noticeably, of course, the escheator would be the person most likely to damage the interests of religious houses. Also during voidances there was a greater likelihood for dissension to develop within the religious house itself. No one was in effective control of the house to enforce religious discipline, and, as a result, disputes over who should become the next prior and the proper procedures for the house to follow in its business could become the subject of disagreement.

If dissension continued for a long enough period, legal action would result, and hereto , there existed a danger.

Legal proceedings were expensive and, as a result, could work to depress a monastery quite significantly. The exis­ tence of a legal action could be especially dangerous if this was continued for a long period of time and eventually found its way to the papal curia. This would involve ad- 142 dltlonal expense and delay which monasteries could not normally afford if they were to protect their economic posi­ tion. In addition during voidances declining administration would be likely to follow upon dissension, A,dequate super­ vision of the business affairs of the house would not be effected probably and this too could contribute significantly to a depressed condition. A final problem resulting from voidances would be the fact that tenants would be much more unwilling to perform their obligations to the house than they otherwise would be. Thus the existence of a voidance could contribute to a loss of revenues and rents that the tenants normally rendered. All of these problems associated with voidances contributed to the attenuation of economic capa­ bility.

In addition to these obligations that were rendered the monarch, lawsuits likewise could, and did, work to depress the economic position of monasteries. Most monasteries, however, do not seem to have been particularly aggressive in

legal actions. Most of the legal cases that were undertaken by religious houses were those that it found necessary to

prosecute as a result of an infringement upon its rights.

We have noted several disputes between monasteries and their neighbors. These could result in extended legal proceedings and monasteries could suffer economically as a result of the expenses involved in prosecuting these cases. 14-3

The very existence of such lawsuits is indicative of the status of monasteries in the fourteenth century society.

Â.S has been suggested, monks were in a privileged position and had more economic resources than many of their neighbors.

As well, they held political rights sometimes over those surrounding them in society. These rights and resources were not managed in a way to attract admiration but rather hostility. As a result, one sees monasteries becoming in­ volved in expensive legal proceedings. Because of the fact that monasteries were in this privileged economic position, individuals who thought that they could profit through the exploitation of the properties of religious houses often undertook legal actions against them to acquire monastic rights and properties. Thus, again, monasteries were put in the position of having to stand the expense of defending themselves. Legal actions occurred for other reasons also, for presentationrights, pensions, increased taxation, and other such matters could become the subject of legal action and add to the economic problems of monasteries.

A third economic burden that was carried by monasteries was that resulting from the illegal actions undertaken by their neighbors. As we have seen, monasteries were envied for their possessions and hostile action on the part of neighbors was devastating in many instances to the property, the records, and the revenues pertaining to religious houses.

As a result, this too must be considered as contributing to 1 # the depressed economic condition endured by numerous relig­ ious foundations.

A final burden that was of significance in contributing to the strained economic circumstances of many monasteries was that carried by religious houses as a result of wartime conditions. The existence of warfare forced the monarch to search for new sources of revenues, and monasteries, because they were extensive property hblders, and thus controlled considerable amounts of wealth, were the object of many royal demands. Not only were loans requested and collected from monasteries, religious houses also were taxed, and were forced to contribute in both of these ways to the prosecution of royal aims. Monasteries, it is true, could secure promises that loans made to the monarch would be repaid, but in num­ erous Instances such promises do not appear to have been demanded. Also because of wartime conditions, many houses were taken into the king's custody and as a result were

forced to contribute to the monarch more than ordinarily would have been the case. Thus these factors also were of

significance in creating a drain on monastic resources, and they contributed to the depressed economic condition that

so many houses suffered during the period under consideration.

The third major force contributing to the depressed

condition of monasteries was the fact of mismanagement.

Mismanagement certainly was widespread for too few monks

were adequately trained in administrative procedures. This 145 fact contributed to not only a lack of adequate accounting methods, but also to the existence of lax discipline within many religious houses. We have seen time and time again that the inadequacy of accounting methods in religious houses made it very difficult for the administrators in control to determine their revenues and gauge their expenses against them. Thus monasteries were in no position to determine how best to expend their revenues to keep from going into debt.

This lack of effective administration contributed to the economic woes of monasteries very significantly.

The lack of adequate administration also could con­ tribute to a decline in the discipline that was maintained within a particular house. The lack of accounting for all of the revenues that pertained to a house offered numerous opportunities for monks to appropriate property belonging to the monastery for their own purposes. We have seen how monks alienated property belonging to monasteries for the purpose of frivolous activities. Not only did they keep packs of hounds, they also gave gifts to both their families and their favored lady friends. This certainly demonstrates how a relaxation of discipline could result from inadequate economic control.

Finally, mention must be made of those alternatives available to monasteries to improve their economic position.

The generalization that can be made in this regard is that most seemed to some degree at least parasitic. The normal 146 procedures that were adopted by religious houses to achieve this end were to appropriate advowsons, to secure debt settle­ ments, to secure grsuits of land or other economic resources, and to acquire custody rights of their house during periods of voidance. The appropriation of advowsons was a means of adding resources to a house, but it involved reducing the stipends paid to the rectors of churches whose advowsons were thus being appropriated. Thus the practice must be viewed as parasitical. The securing of debt settlements likewise is a practice which required the indulgence of the monarch usually, and was in essence a gift to the religious house requesting such action. The monasteries contributed very little except for the performance of religious services for their benefactors for the considerations that they re­ ceived, The same is the case in grants of lands that were received by monasteries. It was the indulgence of those surrounding them in society who were interested in the well­ being of their souls that enabled monasteries to secure these bequests.

Monastic depression and indebtedness during the first half of the fourteenth century resulted from not only the agricultural depression, but also from the economic burdens carried by religious houses, from mismanagement, and from a lack of imagination which, had it been present, could have enabled the achievement of enduring solutions for monastic economic problems. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Printed Sources

Bannister, A.T. (ed.). Registrum Ade de Orleton. Episcopi Herefordensls. 1317-27% London: Canterbury and York Society, 1908,

Brown, W. (ed. ). Register of T h oms of Corbrldge. 2 vols. London: Surtees Society, 192$-28.

Calendar of Close Rolls. 1302-5^. 14 vols. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1890-I906.

Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1301-50. 14 vols. London: Eyre and Spottlswoode, 1898-1905.

Deedes, Cecil, (ed.). Registrum Johannls de Pontlss^a. 2 vols. London: Canterbury and York Society, 1915-24.

Dugdale, William. MonastIcon Anglloaum . 6 vols. J. Caley, H. Ellis, and B. Bandlnel (eds.). London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, I8I7-30.

Goodman, A.W. (ed.). Registrum Henrlel Woodlook. 2 parts. Oxford: Canterbury and York Society, 1934-56.

Thompson, A.H. (ed.). Register of William Greenfield. 4 vols. London: Surtees Society, 1931-37*

Secondary Works

Carus-Wilson, E.M. (ed.). Essays In Economic History. Vol. II. London: Edwaœd Arnold Publishers Ltd., I962.

Plnberg, H.P.R. Tavistock Abbey. Cambridge: University Press, 1951» Hilton, R.H. The Economic Development of Some Leicestershire Estates In “bhe Fourteenth ana fifteenth Centuries. Oxford: University Press, I947.

Knowles, David. The Religious Orders In England. Cambridge: University Press, 1948.

147 148

Knowles, David, and Hadcock, R, Neville. Medieval RelAJclous Houses. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 19^3»

Maurice, C. Edmund, English Popular Leaders in the Middle I . London: Henry S. King and Co., 1875.

Miller, Edward. The Abbey and Bishopric of Ely. Cambridge; University Press, 1951•

Morgan, Marjorie. The English Lands of the Abbey of Bee. Oxford: University press, 1946.

Page, William, (ed.). The Victoria History of the County of York. Vol. n i l London: Constable and Co., I913.

Raftis, J. Ambrose. The Estates of Ramsey Abbey. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1957*

Rogers, James E. Thorold, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England. Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1866,

Smith, Reginald Anthony London. Canterbury Cathedral Priory. Cambridge: University Press, 1943.

Snape, R.H. English Monastic Finances in the Later Middle Ages. Cambridge : University Press, I926,

Periodical Literature

Halerow, E.M. "The Decline of Demesne Farming on the Estates of Durham Cathedral Priory," Economic History Review. 2nd Series VII (1954-55), PP. 345-46.

Hilton, R.H. "Peasant Movements in England Before I38I," Economic History Review. 2nd Series II (1949), pp. 117-36.

Postan, M.M., and Titow, J. "Heriots and Prices on Winchester Manors," Economic History Review. 2nd Series XI (1958-59),pp. 392^:41^: