Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: CHN30726 Country: Date: 6 October 2006

Keywords: CHN30726 – National Peoples Congress, – Employment in Beijing hotels – PSB corruption

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions 1. Could you please find out for me where the National Peoples Congress of March 2005 in Beijing was held, how many days it ran, and how many delegates there were and if possible what hotels they stayed at? 2. Can we find out who were the deputies for Haikou or Fuqing city or Fuzhou city or Fujian province? 3. Could you find out if you wanted to get a job in a hotel in Beijing and you were from Fujian how you would go about doing this, do you have to register with the police, what requirements are there for employment and whether there are any reports about the security situation for the hotels where the delegates are staying? 4. Can you also locate information about the action that the Chinese government is taking about corrupt PSB officials and whether it is possible to lodge a complaint or court proceedings against the action of PSB officials?

RESPONSE

1. Could you please find out for me where the National Peoples Congress of March 2005 in Beijing was held, how many days it ran, and how many delegates there were and if possible what hotels they stayed at?

The Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress (NPC) was held in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. It began on 5 March 2005 and ran for nine and a half days, closing on 14 March. Security measures were put in place for a few days either side of this period, and lasted for about sixteen days. There were about 3000 deputies to the NPC from around China. Names of the particular hotels where they stayed were not found; deputies apparently stayed in a number of hotels around Beijing and were shuttled to and from the sessions along secured routes in a massive security and logistics exercise. A Xinhua report from 2 March 2005 describes the extensive preparations for the NPC and the arrival of thousands of deputies, advisors and journalists in Beijing for the “political season”:

Beijing, as host city of the high-profile political events, has beefed up traffic management by restricting trucks and cars from entering the city as of Tuesday. Sedan cars with a pass to the capital will be permitted to stay for only three days instead of 30 days.

Yet the city has also vowed to avoid significant traffic slowdowns during the parliament season. The traffic police bureau has worked out faster routes for deputies to shuttle between their hotels and the Great Hall of the People where the meetings will be held.

Police cars equipped with global positioning systems will lead the motorcades to monitor real-time traffic flows and minimize inconvenience for ordinary residents, according to a spokesman with the bureau on Tuesday.

He said a halt of normal traffic flows will occur every 40 seconds instead of every 30 seconds last year, and more scientific traffic manipulation will reduce an average motorcade ride to 30 minutes from 35 minutes reported in 2004.

The security work has also been tightened in China prior to the major political events. Last week, Beijing pronounced a ban on all air sports involving paragliders, model airplanes and hot-air balloons between March 1 and 16 to guard against possible terror attacks in the political fortnight.

China’s public security authority said it will enforce 24-hour monitoring over chatrooms and forums of major Chinese Internet portals during the parliament fortnight. Any messages submitted by Internet users will go through strict censoring and filtering before they appear on the Internet…

…Officials said a thorough-going examination was kicked off in the fields of transport, coalmines, public places, communities, construction sites and business districts.

Zhou Yuqiu, head of the Beijing Production Safety Supervision Bureau, said his bureau has got fully prepared for the meetings and will work harder still to uproot any possible threats to production safety.

The bureau’s deputy chief Li Jianwei said that security examination has already begun in January covering over 4,000 sites, enterprises and organizations.

Five inspection teams will go to almost every corner in the city hunting for hidden troubles that may be turned into various mishaps or disasters, he said.

Meanwhile, at least 650,000 volunteers wearing red armbands will join the police to patrol lanes, roads and streets throughout Beijing to help tighten security during the meeting period (‘China enters annual political season’ 2005, , 2 March – Attachment 1).

A Reuters report states that most of the 3000 parliamentary delegates were ferried by bus from their hotels to the Great Hall of the People, which is “four storeys high and covering roughly four football pitches”. The buses were then parked in Tiananmen Square (Beck, Lindsay 2005, ‘Great Hall of the People a throwback to Mao’s China’, Reuters News, 5 March – Attachment 2).

A February 2005 Reuters report states that the hotels where the deputies were to stay would be patrolled by police, in order “to watch for petitioners, who travel to Beijing to air grievances over issues such as unemployment and unpaid wages” (Kang Lim, Benjamin 2005, ‘Focus on ties at China parliament session’, Reuters News, 27 February – Attachment 3).

A report from the NPC website states that the 2005 NPC session ran for nine and a half days; that the NPC had 2,988 members; and that its annual full session was generally held in March. When the legislature was not in session, the NPC Standing Committee served as the executive body (‘People’s Congress closes annual session’ 2005, website of the Third Session,10th National People’s Congress and ’s Political Consultative Conference, 14 March, http://www.10thnpc.org.cn/english/2005lh/122750.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 4).

The website of the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/120271.htm contains numerous reports from the March 2005 session.

A tourist website contains a list of hotels in Beijing which may be of some use http://hotel.china.org.cn/ehotel_list.asp?Nes_user_id=100019&session_areainfo_city=01010 0.

2. Can we find out who were the deputies for Haikou or Fuqing city or Fuzhou city or Fujian province?

Only a few names were found for deputies from Fujian Province in 2005, and none were from the particular areas in Fujian Province which are mentioned above. It is worth noting that reports indicate that there were over 350 deputies from Fujian at the NPC.

A report from the NPC website mentions three Fujian deputies: Lu Zhangong, the secretary of the Fujian provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC); Dai Zhongchuan, an associate professor of law at Huaqiao University; and Chen Qingyao, the political commissar of the Chinese Armed Police Fujian Division (‘Fujian deputies discuss Anti-Secession Law’ 2005, website of the Third Session, 10th National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 14 March, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Mar/122371.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 5).

A BBC Monitoring report mentions further deputies from Fujian: Zheng Daoxi, the mayor of Quanzhou; and Luo Gan. Another name is mentioned, but it is not clear whether he is from Fujian: Xie Guoqiang from the Armed Police Headquarters (Lin Guorui, 2005, ‘China’s Fujian officials urged to ensure social harmony’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, sourced from Chinese news agency Zhongguo Xinwen She, 7 March – Attachment 6).

A report mentions the name of a woman delegate from Fujian, Chen Huizhu (Daozu, Bao 2005, ‘Vision for developing ties hailed’, China Daily, 5 March, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/05/content_421939.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 7).

A 2006 report was found which mentioned the recent expulsion of NPC deputies from Fujian for corruption. They may have been at the 2005 conference:

Zhou Jinhuo, former director of Fujian’s Bureau of Industry and Commerce, was accused of graft in the relatively wealthy coastal province. The 57-year-old official tried to flee overseas in June while being investigated for corruption by the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. He was caught in Yunnan after police traced a call he made to one of his three mistresses informing her of his whereabouts.

On August 2 the Standing Committee of the Fujian Provincial People’s Congress in east China decided to sack him…

…Former publicity minister of the provincial committee of the Communist Party of China of east China’s Fujian Province, Jing Fusheng, had his membership of the NPC terminated earlier this month for receiving bribes (‘Three NPC Deputies Expelled’ 2006, Xinhua News Agency, 28 August, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=179327&p_qry=deputies – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 8).

Information reports from the China.org website state that the base number of deputies from any province is 350, with one more for every 150,000 people. A proportion must be from minority ethnic groups, women, and returned (‘How are deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) elected?’(undated), China.org.cn website, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/56452.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 9; ‘How is the number of deputies to local people’s congresses, at various levels, defined?’(undated), China.org.cn website, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/56429.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 10).

3. Could you find out if you wanted to get a job in a hotel in Beijing and you were from Fujian how you would go about doing this, do you have to register with the police, what requirements are there for employment and whether there are any reports about the security situation for the hotels where the delegates are staying?

Specific information was not found among the sources consulted on how a person from Fujian would go about getting a job in a hotel in Beijing.

The following reports provide some useful information.

A 2004 report by Kwan states that in recent years there has been a mass exodus of labour from rural areas to the cities, including Beijing. Migrant workers “take jobs in such sectors as construction (26.1%), manufacturing (24.3%), restaurants (9.3%), retailing (7.7%) and transport (7.7%)” (Kwan, Chi Hung 2004, ‘How to Solve the Three Agriculture-related Problems – Labor Mobility Holds the Key’, China in Transition, 25 August, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/04082501.html – Accessed 14 September 2006 – Attachment 11).

A travel website discusses hotels in Beijing, and states that there are two main types of hotels: those which are a joint venture with a foreign company; and those which are wholly Chinese-owned. In the Chinese-owned hotels, it is common for employees to use their position to make extra money. The human resource manager at the hotel may accept bribes in exchange for employing people, especially if there is a relative already at the hotel. They may even reject “applicants whose experience may be threatening”. The report also states that the government requires hotels to employ “far more people then they need”. Since it is nearly impossible to find staff with experience in hotel work, the Chinese-owned hotels tend to poach staff from the joint-venture hotels, as the latter have staff training programs (‘Beijing (Hotels)’ 2006, Frommers website, sourced from Frommer’s Beijing, 4th Edition, http://www.frommers.com/destinations/beijing/0201010027.html – Accessed 6 October 2006 – Attachment 12).

A 2002 report by states that in 1998 Beijing’s municipal labour bureau tried to restrict migrant labourers to jobs of the most unpopular kind, such as in slaughterhouses, cleaning, mining and construction. Employers were “barred from hiring migrants for a range of jobs, such as secretaries, hotel clerks, bus drivers” as well as management positions. However, many employers ignored these restrictions since they were able to pay migrants less money, and they tended to work harder and longer (Human Rights in China 2002, Institutionalised Exclusion: The tenuous legal status of internal migrants in China’s major cities, 6 November – Attachment 13).

A recent research response by the Canadian Research Directorate examines the current state of the household registration system in China. It states that migrant workers coming to the city are supposed to register with the authorities for a Temporary Residence Certificate (or Permit), which is legally required for a number of purposes, including obtaining an employment certificate. However, many migrant workers do not register as they do not want to pay the fees and do not wish to be under scrutiny by the police. Enforcement of the system has relaxed in recent years, and unregistered migrant workers are less likely to be detained, fined or repatriated (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN101198.E – China: The ; whether there remains a distinction between urban and rural hukou; social services available to persons holding an urban or rural hukou; the temporary hukou; and whether a person who is not registered in an urban area can obtain social services, including a hukou (2005 – 2006), 26 April http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/ndp/ref/?action=view&doc=chn101198e – Accessed 27 September 2006 – Attachment 14).

As is mentioned in Question 1, reports indicate that the hotels where NPC deputies stayed were secured to protect deputies from petitioners who travel to Beijing during the political season to air their grievances. The reports do not indicate how complete this security was, or whether a person working in one of the hotels could still gain access to delegates.

[A 2005 Human Rights Watch report (not attached) may of interest. It discusses in general the tradition of petitioning politicians in China. There has been a huge increase in petitions in recent years, partly due to corruption among local officials, as is discussed in the following question. Thousands of petitioners travel to Beijing to file their petitions and are perceived to be a social order problem; they are sometimes detained or removed by Beijing police or security officers.]

4. Can you also locate information about the action that the Chinese government is taking about corrupt PSB officials and whether it is possible to lodge a complaint or court proceedings against the action of PSB officials?

Reports indicate that there is widespread corruption amongst government officials and party cadres in China. In recent years, the Chinese government has taken a number of measures to deal with official corruption, and there have been numerous arrests and various punishments given out, but application of the law seems to be uneven. Theoretically, the government encourages public scrutiny of officials, and it is possible for people who have been victims of official corruption to lodge a complaint. However, officials at local level hold a great deal of power and may intervene in law enforcement, so victims may not get legal redress. Some petitioners take their cases to Beijing.

According to the 2006 Global Corruption Report on China by Transparency International, there is widespread corruption amongst government officials and party cadres in China; the report does not mention PSB officials in particular. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) since 2004 has adopted various legal and institutional changes that are designed to combat corruption, although it is not yet clear how successful they will be, or how willing people will be to investigate their own employers:

Planned improvements to the strategic system against corruption Shenzen, the site of China’s first special economic zone, is to be the test-bed for the CPC’s blueprint for checking internal corruption before it is rolled out to the rest of the country by 2010. The ‘implementation guideline for the establishment of a national system of punishing and preventing corruption’, unveiled in January 2005, calls for further development of democracy and legal institutions with the goal of bringing power to closer public account. Among the guideline’s targets are more dynamic anticorruption tactics; broader channels for public oversight and civil society monitoring; protection of whistleblowers and citizens’ rights to criticise; and increased transparency of public policy. Five ordinances were introduced in 2004 with the aim of increasing the accountability of high-ranking officials, including two designed to promote greater meritocracy in the selection and promotion of party and government officials, and another that specifies complaints procedures for party members.

The guideline calls for improved responsibility systems for the administrative and judicial sectors, and a three-pronged programme of ethics , institutional accountability and civil monitoring. Ethics education will be incorporated into general school curricula; the Central Commission of Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) will be responsible for accountability capacity building; and the Party Congress will encourage whistleblowing by party members, accountability in the public administration and a code of conduct for the judicial sector.

In particular, it prioritises enhanced auditing in targeted sectors and ministries, and introduces efficiency auditing for highranking officials. All audits will be published, building on an existing trend towards more active and open auditing processes. Notably, in June 2004, the state audit office publicly released a report on central government spending that disclosed that 41 out of 55 central departments audited were suspected of embezzlement and appropriation of public funds, including funds earmarked for the China Olympic Committee and disaster relief fund. The report led to disciplinary action against 545 people and more than 80 judicial hearings, including cases against the former director of the Beijing Municipal Power Supply bureau and against two vicepresidents of the Agricultural Development Bank. In July 2004, the state audit office announced plans to audit all CPC central committee departments and all central government ministries, commissions and departments that receive funds from central government.

The guideline foresees the creation of a checks-and-balances institution to ensure the accountability of investment decisions by state companies and agencies, and to monitor their projects. Those responsible for investment policies will be held accountable. In a similar vein, it proposes introducing a ‘real name’ bank accounts system to limit cash transactions, a warning system for high-volume cash movements and improved information sharing to contain money laundering. Whether the guideline’s grand designs will translate into action is debatable. Beijing has tended to advocate mostly administrative measures to combat corruption. Moreover, party investigators will find it difficult to investigate their own bosses (Transparency International 2005, ‘China’ in Global Corruption Report 2006 – Countries A-K, 8 November, Part 2, p.141 http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/report_gcr – Accessed 1 September 2006 – Attachment 15). The report goes on to state that there have been numerous measures taken to stamp out corruption amongst party cares, including sending out five teams on “inspections tours to monitor senior leaders at provincial and ministerial level” which have “exposed the extent of corruption at all levels of administration”. Xinhua and China Daily reported “almost daily” on incidents of corruption in the provinces, and lack of accountability seemed “endemic” among officials. One 2005 survey of village officials indicated there had been “an increase in officials’ abuse of power and related economic crimes” (Transparency International 2005, ‘China’ in Global Corruption Report 2006 – Countries A-K, 8 November, Part 2, p.141 http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/report_gcr – Accessed 1 September 2006 – Attachment 15).

The US Department of State report on China for 2005 states that safeguards against corruption in the courts were “vague and poorly enforced”. Of government corruption in general it states:

Section 3…Government Corruption and Transparency Corruption remained an endemic problem. The National Audit Office determined that approximately $400 million (RMB 3.21 billion) from the central government’s 2004 budget was misused or embezzled, nearly triple the amount reported in 2003. Corruption plagued courts, law enforcement agencies and other government agencies. In 2004 economists estimated that the cost of corruption might exceed 14 percent of gross domestic product.

The courts and party agencies took disciplinary action against many public and party officials during the year. According to the SPP, in the first 11 months of the year, prosecutors filed and investigated 33,821 cases of embezzlement, bribery, or dereliction of duty, including 22,503 that were prosecuted. In 2004, 30,788 officials were prosecuted for corruption, resulting in the government recovering more than $500 million (RMB 4.02 billion) in economic losses. From 2001 through July, prosecutors investigated 152,440 such cases, involving over 170 thousand persons. In Guangdong Province alone, 32 senior officials and 295 mid-level officials were arrested for taking bribes or dereliction of duty, some related to coalmine accidents. The CCP’s Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC) reported that 164,831 officials were disciplined for breaking laws and party discipline in the 12 months ending November 2004. During the year at least seven current or former high-ranking officials were executed or given suspended death sentences on corruption-related charges. Of those, 4,775 lost CCP membership and were prosecuted, only half as many as in the previous year. In some cases the CDIC reportedly acted as a substitute for sanctions by the courts and other legal agencies.

The country had no national freedom of information law, but many local jurisdictions continued to enact freedom of information regulations, aimed at improving the public’s communication with and supervision over local government initiatives. ’s local freedom of information process was viewed as particularly well developed. Some 95 percent of government ministries, provincial governments and prefecture-level cities had Web sites, providing some, albeit controlled, public information. However, citizens, local media, and foreign journalists found it difficult to get information about government decision-making, especially before decisions were formally announced.

The government experimented with various forms of public oversight of government, including telephone hot lines and complaint centers, administrative hearings, increased opportunity for citizen observation of government proceedings, and other forms of citizen input in the local legislative process, such as hearings to discuss draft legislation. Citizens continued to file administrative lawsuit to seek legal redress against government malfeasance. According to official statistics, 92,192 administrative lawsuits were filed against the government in 2004, slightly more than in the previous year. Over one-third of the cases related to individual rights and economic interests, an increase of 19 percent over 2003. Petitioning officials directly and outside the court system was also a common avenue used by citizens to redress grievances (US Department of State 2006, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 – China, 8 March – Attachment 16).

A September 2006 report on human rights by the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China contains some references to corruption:

• An activist named Guo Qizhen reportedly was detained by the PSB on 12 May “as he was preparing to join a hunger strike…to protest human rights violations in China…” Guo had been previously detained and arrested in the mid-1990s after he exposed corruption by a local official. On 6 June, Guo was arrested on a charge of “inciting subversion of state power” (p.3).

• According to a Chinese publication, many local leaders “fear that too many prosecutions against corruption, among other abuses, may adversely affect their political record or ability to attract investment to the locality. As a result, they have intervened in the work of local law enforcement and judicial agencies” (p.4).

• The Supreme People’s Procuratorate has issued new provisions that detail the criteria for prosecuting official abuses. The new provisions “provide guidance for prosecuting 42 offenses, including 35 ‘dereliction of duty’ crimes under Part II, Chapter 9 of the Criminal Law and 7 ‘rights infringement’ crimes under Part II, Chapter 4. They omit guidance on ‘embezzlement and bribery’ crimes under Part II, Chapter 8 of the Criminal Law, even though standards for prosecuting these crimes were included in the 1999 provisions” (p.4).

• Chinese authorities have reportedly allocated large amounts of funds to improve rural compulsory education. National authorities “have attempted to address problems of corruption and misuse of rural educational funds by establishing a system of special central funds” (p.12) (United States Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2006, China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/files/CECCnewsletter200609 06.pdf – Accessed 5 October 2006 – Attachment 17).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/ Website of the Third Session,10th National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

Databases: FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIMA Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. ‘China enters annual political season’ 2005, Xinhua News Agency, 2 March (FACTIVA).

2. Beck, Lindsay 2005, ‘Great Hall of the People a throwback to Mao’s China’, Reuters News, 5 March (FACTIVA).

3. Kang Lim, Benjamin 2005, ‘Focus on Taiwan ties at China parliament session’, Reuters News, 27 February (FACTIVA).

4. ‘People’s Congress closes annual session’ 2005, website of the Third Session,10th National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 14 March, http://www.10thnpc.org.cn/english/2005lh/122750.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006

5. ‘Fujian deputies discuss Anti-Secession Law’ 2005, website of the Third Session, 10th National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 14 March, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Mar/122371.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006

6. Lin Guorui, 2005, ‘China’s Fujian officials urged to ensure social harmony’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, sourced from Chinese news agency Zhongguo Xinwen She, 7 March

7. Daozu, Bao 2005, ‘Vision for developing ties hailed’, China Daily, 5 March, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/05/content_421939.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006

8. ‘Three NPC Deputies Expelled’ 2006, Xinhua News Agency, 28 August, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=179327&p_qry=deputies – Accessed 3 October 2006

9. ‘How are deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) elected?’(undated), China.org.cn website, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/56452.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006

10. ‘How is the number of deputies to local people’s congresses, at various levels, defined?’(undated), China.org.cn website, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/56429.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006

11. Kwan, Chi Hung 2004, ‘How to Solve the Three Agriculture-related Problems – Labor Mobility Holds the Key’, China in Transition, 25 August, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/04082501.html – Accessed 14 September 2006.

12. ‘Beijing (Hotels)’ 2006, Frommers website, sourced from Frommer’s Beijing, 4th Edition, http://www.frommers.com/destinations/beijing/0201010027.html – Accessed 6 October 2006

13. Human Rights in China 2002, Institutionalised Exclusion: The tenuous legal status of internal migrants in China’s major cities, 6 November 14. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN101198.E – China: The hukou; whether there remains a distinction between urban and rural hukou; social services available to persons holding an urban or rural hukou; the temporary hukou; and whether a person who is not registered in an urban area can obtain social services, including a hukou (2005 – 2006), 26 April http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/ndp/ref/?action=view&doc=chn101198e – Accessed 27 September 2006

15. Transparency International 2005, ‘China’ in Global Corruption Report 2006 – Countries A-K, 8 November, Part 2, p.141 http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/report_gcr – Accessed 1 September 2006

16. US Department of State 2006, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 – China, 8 March

17. United States Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2006, China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/files/CECCnewsletter200609 06.pdf – Accessed 5 October 2006