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1848-5782 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China for significant financial support, as well as to the European Union European the to as well as support, financial significant for China of Republic the of Affairs Foreign of Ministry the Centre in Taiwan for providing the necessary logistical arrangements. This paper is the result of a research project supported by the Taiwan Fellowship program. I owe a debt of gratitude to by the Taiwan Fellowship program. I owe a debt of gratitude project supported This paper is the result of a research

1 cross-strait relations, power politics, strategic ambiguity, U.S. “pivot” to Asia cross-strait relations, power politics, strategic ambiguity, KEY WORDS: While both Beijing and Washington often emphasize positive engagement and dialogue, divergent engagement and dialogue, divergent often emphasize positive While both Beijing and Washington in East for domination their contest with along Taiwan, interests of China and the United States over that could send the two powers on a collision course. Asia, have remained a focal point of contention States in order to avoid submission or destruction. Although the U.S. supports a “one-China” policy, States in order to avoid submission or destruction. Although the U.S. supports a “one-China” policy, Strait by force. change the status quo in the Taiwan it is strongly opposed to any move that could the relationship between the two powers as long and as fierce as any. China considers Taiwan an an China considers Taiwan long and as fierce as any. the relationship between the two powers as integral part of its territory and has been unwilling to reject the use of force to settle the Taiwan United with the aligning itself to balance China by has chosen these conditions, Taiwan issue. Under This paper examines the complex issue of the triangular relationship between China, Taiwan and and China, Taiwan between the triangular relationship This paper examines the complex issue of burdened has importanceto its Taiwan Due United States. States, United the the China and to both Abstract

Dario Kuntić The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan- Triangle: The Ominous States relationship the United ISSN ISSN UDC 327(510:529:73) DOI 10.1515/cirr-2015-0008 CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280 XXI (72) 2015, CIRR yet had no choice but to adjust to the international system dominated international the adjust to to but choice had no yet by the United States. Meanwhile, it focused on economic growth, With the end of the Cold War, the United States positioned itself as the sole superpower in the world. China was not satisfied with the outcome, economic, social, and political transformation and rose to the position of a respectable member of the international community. that would demonstrate U.S. determination to continue military support to its informal ally. Under U.S. protection, Taiwan began a process of to the PRC and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979, Taiwan remained deeply integrated in the U.S. sphere of influence. Moreover, a few months later the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act stability in the Far East. Under this paradigm, Taiwan became a deflector Sino- the Although general. in communism and China” “red against shield Soviet split spurred the United States to switch recognition from the ROC in East Asia. U.S. President Harry Truman considered Taiwan, along with the Philippines and Indo China, important for U.S. security and general As the Cold War divided the world into two spheres of influence, Taiwan became an important link in the U.S. anti-communist alliance system possible, by force if necessary, cross-strait relations remained strained and threats, and military crises.characterized by animosities, tensions, not agreed upon was the claim which government was the rightful ruler was the claim which government not agreed upon of the whole country. Since Beijing has never dropped its claim that ifpersuasion by fold the into brought be to territory its of part a was island the of the whole of China, have shared a common stance that there is only havethey What of that China. part a was Taiwan that and China” “one remained divided in two separate political entities, the People’s Republic of Republic People’s the entities, political separate two in divided remained on Taiwan. and the Republic of China (ROC) mainland the China (PRC) on government legal sole the be to claiming each governments, rival two The fought with the Chinese Communist Party for control of China. Despite U.S. were Nationalists the support, logistic and assistance material and financial defeated and forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Since then, China has The origin of today’s “Taiwan problem” dates back to the days of the dates back to problem” of today’s “Taiwan The origin Kuomintang) Party (the the Chinese Nationalist Civil War when Chinese Introduction

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 240 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 241 in Burchill and Linklatter 2013: 32). (egoism) and the absence of international government (anarchy), which (anarchy), government international of absence the and (egoism) Donnelly require the primacy of power and security in all political life (see human nature and believe that the international system is anarchic. international the believe that and nature human Under these conditions, each state struggles to ensure its security. In sum, selfishness human by imposed politics on constraints the emphasize realists No state can ever be certain another state will use its offensive military another not state can ever be certain No capabilities. Realists have a subordinate assume that law and morality place in international relations, share a generally pessimistic view of seek power, calculate their interests in terms of power and are motivated are and power of terms in interests their calculate power, seek basic motive driving states is survival. The interests. national primarily by their realists constitute a diverse group, they share the core assumption that international politics is defined as a struggle for power. According to the that politics world in actors important most the are states paradigm, realist Realism is the oldest paradigm of international relations. Although relations. international of paradigm oldest Realism is the Taiwan relationship relationship Taiwan Realism as a theoretical approach to the U.S.-China- to the approach Realism as a theoretical thus send the two powers on a collision course. thus send the two Taiwan is an informal U.S. ally makes the island a highly sensitive issue in Sino-American relations, because a sharp escalation of tensions in Taiwan the Strait could provoke a U.S. show of force in support of its ally and Moreover, Taiwan is still threatened by Beijing, which claims it may to retain the island of China. The fact that as an “integral” part force use China. The same is true for Taiwan. Although the relations between Taipei relations between the Although Taiwan. for true is same The China. and Beijing are currently on the highest level in decades, longstanding political divergences overshadow beneficial cooperation in other fields. anxious and concerned of China’s future moves and true intentions in true moves and future of China’s and concerned anxious the region, despite increased economic and political cooperation with power. power. Eventually, China’s self-confidence increased rapidly and Beijing has began to influence the regional affairs from its assertiveness along power. Its many Asian nations has made periphery a position of a great modernization, modernization, and international cooperation, buying time to restore its . It refers It . World Politics World . The term “power transition” “power term . The power-transition theory on the international system, especially on the hegemonic position of the a significant increase of national power in a big size) as rapid territorial and demographic a result of its genuine and nation (in terms of its economic development. Second, it is the impact of this growing power comes from Kenneth Organski’s classical work, to several important aspects of international relations. First, it is about ascent to primacy would challenge the international the system becomes highly existing unstable. This is international known in neo- order, as realist thinking When a major power is gradually displaced by a new rising power, whose power, rising new a by displaced gradually is power major a When pathway pits a rising great power against the status quo leading state andpathway pits a rising great power it expects that conflict –and perhaps war – will be generated as the rising lead state (Ikenberry 2008: 111). state reaches parity with the declining Realists identify major powers that constitute the system’s poles in theRealists identify major powers that international system, as well as middle powers and smaller states that seek to define their relations with the major powers. The classic power transition inevitable. Realists only disagree over the degree of its intensity. inevitable. Realists only disagree term the intrinsic imperative of survival drives states into prolonged – prolonged survival drives states into imperative of intrinsic the term and dangerous – competition (Shambaugh 2013: 82). Since the is composed world of opposing interests, conflict among competing states is Some realists believe that a conflict canpeer competitor deterred in the short to medium be postponed,term, but in the longer and a rising can do so without undue penalty because their circumstances simply circumstances their undue penalty because can do so without Shambaugh 2013: 82). permit it (Tellis in necessity, continuous and relentless, with all political entities, whether they whether entities, political all with relentless, and continuous necessity, be individuals or states, seeking to expand their power whenever they and anticipate conflicts of interests between the established major power major established the between interests of conflicts anticipate and Thucydides and rising challengers. that and Machiavelli demonstrated the quest for dominance in any competitive political environment is, by 1985). In their view, a gain to one party means a loss to the other. Regardless Regardless other. the to loss a means party one to gain a view, their In 1985). of variations, all realists tend to view power politics as a zero-sum game authority and are in constant conflict with other states. Hans Morgenthau Morgenthau Hans states. other with conflict constant in are and authority conflict a enters relations international in operates who anybody that writes (Morgenthau interests by force to achieve their who also strive with others In the international system, realists argue, states answer to no higher

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 242 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 243 with with approaches parity approaches strategy to serve as insurance against uncertain current and future and current against uncertain as insurance serve to strategy possible for a dominant state to engage with a rising power. containment balancing or either based on be can engagement This in Robinson and Shambaugh 1994: 119). Already Thucydides wrote It isa state must care of its security by making alliances with other states. that (formal and informal) agreements (Donnelly in Burchill and Linklatter 2013: 38). Morgenthau observed that alliances constitute “the most important manifestation of the balance of power” in international systems (See Tow balancing, which reallocates resources from other purposes to security, national from external balancing, carried out through alliances and other To confront a rising power, the dominant state can sustain its primacy through primacy its sustain can state dominant the power, rising a confront To tactics. Realists differentiate internal“balancing” and “strategic hedging” races and other types of hostile reactions (Holsti 2004: 54). As a result, a arises in the international system. vicious circle of spiraling (in)security for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries system in the absolute security leaves all others for that strives any nation insecure, absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms “structural anarchy,” or the absence of disputes, is the essential a feature of the central contemporary system, and authority gives to settle rise to the “security dilemma”: in a self-help system one nation’s search strength and weakness upsets the balance of security in the international security in the balance of upsets the and weakness strength system and results in a security dilemma. According to classical realists, As a new rising entity challenges the existing balance of security in the entity challenges the existing balance As a new rising system, the established power has to deal with the issue whether and to what extent this is a peaceful shift or a conflictual transition. The sense of politics in ways acceptable to the new hegemon (Weiz 2013: 9). to the new hegemon politics in ways acceptable rising country’s efforts to strengthen its military, seize territory and colonies, and territory seize military, its strengthen to efforts country’s rising and otherwise remake its region into a sphere of influence in which the foreign and sometimes domestic countries must constrain their other 2013: 10-11). Historically, such great power transitions have been fertile ground for confrontation, since the established power typically resists the theory holds that the period when a rising power a rising when period that the holds theory the established power is the most unstable and prone to conflict –what Shambaugh (see point “crossover” the as described Kugler and Organski dominant dominant nation in this international system (Lai 2011: 5). Power transition power or one that seeks to revise the that seeks to revise one or power status quo alike … Scholars who examine the consequences of China’s rise through the policy that enhances its military capabilities, the United States feels China’s rise will be less Whether secure and consequently threatened. statesmen scholars and preoccupies that is a question violent peaceful or international system has become a critical issue in Sino-American relations. Sino-American in issue critical a become has system international As China’s rise includes not only economic and political power, but also That China might already be on the way prospect to overtake of the a US raises power a transition China is a whether within the international system. Thus, China would result in a loss for the United States. China would result in a loss for the this trend, if it continues, could undermine the U.S.-dominated unipolar international system and even dethrone the United States a from position for gain a paradigm, realist the to According superpower. global sole a of challenge this rise poses to the global domination of the United States. As States. United the of domination global the to poses rise this challenge enabled China modernization technological and growth rapid economic to expand its political and military power, some observers argue that Realists use a concept of power shift to explain the rise of China and the explain the rise of China and shift to of power Realists use a concept Realists argue that stability and order in the international system are in the international Realists that stabilityargue and order the result of skillful manipulations of flexible alliance systems (Evans and Newnham 1998: 466). can increase its stake in the balance of power game and preserve its preserve and game power balance of the in its stake increase can power. absorption by a preponderant from and independence freedom aligning itself to another great power to avoid submission or destruction. or avoid submission to power great another itself to aligning external on rely to it forces security its own for provide inability to state’s A assistance. Maintaining close relations with a powerful ally, a small state to either neutralize the threat or benefit from the spoils of victory (Kang 2007: 51). Conversely, a weaker state can balance a major power by With respect to middle powers with or against (balancing) to align (bandwagon) power. a superior and smaller states, they Bandwagoning means seek that a state aligns itself with a threatening power either distributed to limit or curb the quest for hegemony. to limit or curb distributed of power is the only way to ensure international peace. In other words, gain to allowed be system should international the within single entity no predominance over others. Thus, security is enhanced when power is intentions intentions of a rising power. Henry Kissinger emphasizes that the balance

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 244 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 245 century, China is also growing also is China century, th power or one that seeks to revise the power or one status quo has written that “like Germany in the late 19 has written international system has become a critical issue in the United States. In recent years, a number of analysts argued that the rise of modern China resembles the rise of Wilhelmine Germany a century ago. Fareed Zakaria Whether China is a Whether anticipated that a strong China could seriously challenge U.S. interests be much more tempted to resolve the issue of and might in the region attitude (Brzezinski 1997). Taiwan by force, irrespective of America’s the long term to challenge America’s position as the dominant power dominant position as the America’s challenge to term long the in the world (See Dou in Peng Er and Wei 2009: 12). Zbigniew Brzezinski States and China are locked in a “contest for supremacy” (Shambaugh 2013: 11). Robert Kagan emphasizes that China aims “in the near term, to replace the United States as the dominant power in East Asia and in the United States and its own hegemonic position in Asia and the world. Aaron Friedberg essentially shares Mearsheimer’s view that the United expounds his “iron law”: that all powers seek hegemony, are discontent with balance of power, and therefore the United States and China are no exceptions. This presents, in his view, a grave and future danger to the preeminent power in the Western Pacific; and second, to consolidate to second, and Pacific; Western the in power preeminent the to Chinese economic and foreign Asia into an exclusionary bloc deferring policy interests (Kissinger 2012: 499). In his writings, John Mearsheimer highlights that some American strategic thinkers argue that Chinese policy highlights that some American strategic pursues two long-term objectives: first, to displace the United States as China’s strategic ambition is to push the United States out of and East become the Asia dominant regional hegemon, akin to the Sino-centric Kissinger Henry 125). 2006: al at (Bergsten period imperial China’s of order superpower accompanied by an aggressive foreign policy contradicting policy contradicting foreign accompanied by an aggressive superpower U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Some U.S. observers suspect that Many realists treat China as an assertive destabilizing power. From a regional From destabilizing power. China as an assertive Many realists treat interests Washington’s challenging is Beijing that argue many perspective, in East Asia. They see China as a country that could become a global the United States on a collision course. States on a collision the United future future of conflict (Fravel 2010: 505). Under assumptions,these China’s favor will of power in existing distribution the raise the to change the push send China and that this could powers so high the two stakes between the lenses of either power transition theory or offensive realism predict a a predict realism offensive or theory transition power of either lenses the “hegemonism of the superpower(s) is still the long term threat to national“hegemonism of the superpower(s) is still the long term threat to Xinjiang (Nathan and Scobell 2012). Some leading strategists of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believe that see evidence of this intent in Washington’s calls for democracy and itssee evidence of this intent in Washington’s calls for democracy support for what China sees as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and its capabilities permit. According to this theory, the United States cannot be satisfied with the existence of a powerful China and therefore seeks to make its ruling regime weaker and more pro-American. Chinese analysts policy analysts embraced the theory of offensive realism which holds thatpolicy analysts embraced the theory thatextent full the to environment security its control to try will country a This residual Marxist-Maoist legacy theory relations international Western of to compatible is struggle and conflict viewing international relation as of realism (Dou in Peng Er and Wei 2009: 12-13). Many younger Chinese of forces. Simply put, the generation of leaders schooled in Marxism and conflict.and power of reality and notion the to sensitive is China in Maoism are doomed to collide still persists in the minds of many Chinese leaders whoare doomed to collide still persists assuch notions Marxist with imbued and socialized been have youth their in hegemony, imperialism, exploitation, struggle, conflict, and the correlation 7). It has also remained attached to the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought that thought Marxist-Leninist-Maoist the to attached remained also has It 7). Althoughwar. to lead inevitably would powers great among competition powers great that perception the era, post-Mao the in waned has Marxism abandoned Marxist socialism or Leninist authoritarianism – and certainly has certainly and – authoritarianism Leninist or socialism Marxist abandoned not abandoned the ideology of being a great power (Shambaugh 2013: its military establishment as well. This concept stems from ideologicalfrom stems concept This well. as establishment military its orthodoxy of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought. China may have discredited not definitely has (CCP) Party Communist Chinese the but ideology, Maoist The realist paradigm has its protagonists among Chinese scholars and scholars Chinese among protagonists its has paradigm realist The as the ruling hegemon, some scholars and policy advisers argue that the perceived decline of U.S. power could encourage China to challenge the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. hegemony in expanding, expanding, have-not power seeking its place in the sun” (Krauthammer 2010). As Wilhelmine Germany seized the opportunity to confront Britain more attention and honor. China’s military is a powerful political player, as player, political powerful a is military China’s honor. and attention more was the Prussian officer corps” (Zakaria 1996). Charles Krauthammerhas written that “modern China is the Germany of a century ago – a rising, rapidly but uncertainly into a global system in which it feels it deserves deserves feels it which it in system a global into but uncertainly rapidly

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 246 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 247 People’s Unrestricted http://www.reuters.com/ As insecurity can easily As insecurity can 2 , published in 1999 by two colonels in the PLA. InPLA. the in colonels two by 1999 in published , stressed that China needed to beef up its defenses stressed that China is that the United States is an implacable enemy of China and that and China of enemy implacable an is States United the that is Unrestricted Warfare Unrestricted article/2013/04/16/us-china-defence-idUSBRE93F03P20130416 “China points finger at U.S. over Asia-Pacific tensions”, Reuters, April 16, 2013, 2 in the Taiwan issue as interference in its internal affairs equal to the injustice the affairs equal to its internal in Taiwan issue as interference the in imperialism. western of period the during suffered humiliation China and perspective, incorporating Taiwan to the motherland is justified, while the an existence of Taiwan as a separate administrative represents authority power foreign any by intervention considers Beijing Accordingly, injustice. As a Beijing’s tangible From powers. reminder foreign by of inflicted China’s injustice of division sense and a evokes its Taiwan national humiliation, nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth century (Camilleri century part of the twentieth a good century and nineteenth 1985: 3). and Western imperialism. The widespread discontent experienced by widespread discontent experienced The imperialism. and Western memory of the attributable to the continuing China is largely modern the powers throughout of foreign humiliation it suffered at the hands For China, Taiwan is an island that has a deep symbolic meaning. It is a intervention by foreign of humiliation” characterized vestige of the “century Why Taiwan maters to China maters Taiwan Why central question in a Sino-American great power game.in a Sino-American great power central question to deal with a hostile West, bent on undermining it. undermining on bent West, hostile a with deal to give rise to hostility, whether Chinese leaders will translate perceived U.S. provocations in an aggressive policy toward the United States remains the In a clear reference to the United States, in April 2013, the official Daily Liberation Army addition to the military analysis, the underlying assumption of Warfare someday the PRC must confront its adversary militarily (Carpenter 2005: 3). toward Washington. One prominent example of this assertive policy is apolicy is assertive example of this prominent One toward Washington. book, that these superpowers are a “competing United States and Japan” (See Wang 1996: 45). Thus, hard-liners in the CCP and within the People’s ranks Liberation of Army the urged Beijing to adopt a more assertive policy security” which may pose new security challenges to the PRC. It is implied the PRC. to challenges security pose new may which security” independent de jure 3 independent state, Beijing also fears, Taiwan indirectly Taiwan fears, also Beijing state, independent de facto China’s Independent Policy of Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 18, 2003, 3 Taiwan could become a serious crack in Chinese sovereignty and territorialin Chinese sovereignty and crack a serious could become Taiwan integrity. China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity China’s fundamental policy goals. are because secessionist movements, for would example be further encouraged (Ross in 2002: 55). Thus, Tibet and Xinjiang, encourages separatist tendencies in regions on the mainland. If it declares If mainland. the regions on in encourages separatist tendencies independence, Taiwan could set a dangerous precedent. Under circumstances, these China’s existing minority problems are likely to intensify Acting as a as Taiwan remained under a separate administrative authority receivingas Taiwan remained under a separate foreign and military assistance, the project of founding 2012:140).would remain incomplete (Kissinger a “New China” to the mainland has been a matter of cohesiveness of the Chinese nation.to the mainland has been a matter This fixation on the cyclelong so view, Beijing’s In 2001). (Klintworth mission of Chinesesacred a like seem Taiwan history has made the recovery of while division and disunity are associated with its lowest points of weaknesswhile division and disunity are associated Taiwan of recovery the Thus, 118-119). 2006: al. et (Bergsten humiliation and change, national division, and violations of its sovereignty, but China’s in equated is result a as “unity” Chinese state. unified a to reverted it always prestige, and power country’s the of height the with consciousness national Since the first emperor Qin Shi Huang formed the nucleus of united China dynastic invasions, experienced China ago, years thousand two than more of the conflict, and is what differentiates Taiwan categorically from China’s from categorically Taiwan differentiates what is and conflict, the of East Asian states (Kang 2007: 80).relations with other whether, in fact, it is an independent nation-state, or whether it is merely a identity lies at the heart This disagreement over Taiwan’s part of China … Chinese sides agreed that Taiwan and the mainland were part of the same that Taiwan and the mainland Chinese sides agreed Chinese government disagreement was about which political entity. The was the rightful ruler (Kissinger 2012: 140). The key question about Taiwan is For more than six decades, Taiwan has remained an issue of nation building nation of issue an remained has Taiwan decades, six than more For and competing conceptions of identity between Beijing and Taipei. Both and torn asunder by imperialists serves as the foundation for its modern its modern for foundation by imperialists asunder as the serves torn and 2013). purpose (Wang identity and China’s China’s memory of this period as a time when it was attacked, bullied,

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 248 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 249 independent Taiwan independent de facto de http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm lack of social care, rural-urban imbalance, and growing wealth disparities disparities wealth growing and imbalance, rural-urban care, social of lack Despite Chinese people. the disaffection among sense of amplify the being acknowledged for China’s overall economic growth, there is little economic conditions also serve as a source of legitimacy for the PRC. the legitimacy for of as a source also serve conditions economic However, lack of political liberalization, strict party control, corruption, the emotion of resentment in order to strengthen the Party and the state. the emotion of resentment in order National stability, a strong voice in world affairs, and improved domestic enhances the sense of weakness, humiliation, and disgrace. It is on draws Beijing in also regime the Thus, leadership. PRC a the to reproach living was a major event that greatly enhanced national self-confidenceand power the has also boosted mainland. It the on people Chinese the of prestige of the CCP. On the other hand, a in Beijing played up themes of Chinese nationalism to support their rule (Sutter 2010: 18). The return of Hong Kong and Macao to the motherland Since few believe in Marxism-Leninism, the CCP also seeks legitimacy by that communist ideology was invoking nationalist sentiments. Realizing not popular enough to support their continued monopoly of power, leaders northwest (Tian 2006: 2). of Taiwan would threaten its nationalist credentials to govern and would govern credentials to its nationalist threaten of Taiwan would deal a severe blow to China’s prestige and self-confidence, especially Muslim in Tibet and the separatist movements with its implicationsthe for specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explains national to equated is nation the of unity the psyche, Chinese the for that greatness (Mitchell according to Marquand 2004). In this context, a loss to the CCP’s accountability to lead and, arguably, essential of elements regime survival itself (Bergsten et al 2006: 119). Derek Mitchell, Asia unifying ideology, boosting China’s prosperity, restoring its prestige and stature as a great power, and unifying the nation – that is returning Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan to the “motherland” – became critical issues not capable to keep all of its territory under its control, confidence in the and as a credible declined Communism As undermined. be would Party Communist Party. The downfall of Communism held major implications for implications major held Communism of downfall The Party. Communist China. The regime in Beijing has lost its ideological foundations and tied is CCP that the out If it turned “whole”. keeping China to its legitimacy The Taiwan issue is also a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese Chinese the of legitimacy the to a challenge is also issue Taiwan The the advantage to settle on its own terms longstanding territorial and longstanding territorial terms settle on its own advantage to the important for the PLA’s control of Japan’s southern flank and the Luzon Strait, the waterway connecting the South China Sea to the Sea. Philippine Controlling the northern and southern waterways, China will have Thus, Taiwan will provide the People’s Liberation Army with naval and air bases and give it a strategic depth that it currently lacks. The island is also advantage over any country that could strive for power projection in the projection power could strive for that any country advantage over region. As a rising power, China believes that it must be able to maintain strategic advantage over anyone seeking to operate close to its shores. Finally, there is the controlled question the of mainland and Taiwan’s Taiwan, geostrategic Beijing would position. have If a strategic it PRC government is often purported to “use business purported to steer politics” or to PRC government is often “use economics to promote unification”. trade dependence on the Chinese mainland and the attractiveness of attractiveness the and mainland Chinese the on dependence trade China’s enormous market for Taiwanese entrepreneurs and investors, the purpose of attracting Taiwanese investment is to use economic strength Taiwanese investment is to use economic purpose of attracting enhancing for conversation civic using and reunification political urging for official communication’ (Chun-Yi Lee 2012: 8). Taiwan’s Given growing with Taiwan is intended to promote unification (Roy 2004: Chinese of principle main 1). This…can ‘the statement: official’s central one in seen be government is “Peaceful reunification: One country, two systems” … the as well as create disincentives to independence (See Bush in Shambaugh in Bush (See independence to disincentives create as well as 2005: 172). PRC officialshave explicitly stated that economic interaction government, using that Taiwanese investors hoped to always achieve has their political Beijing goal 118). of 2012: (Lee aim ultimate the is unification Taiwan’s investment in China would improve the climate for reunification cooperation will lead to negotiation with Taipei on the future status of with Taipei on the future will lead to negotiation cooperation Taiwan and, eventually, end with reunification. For the central Chinese also plays an important role in Beijing’s Taiwan policy. China is Taiwan’s and also the island’s one destination for number largest trading partner foreign direct investment. Beijing hopes that the benefits of economic Greater economic interaction between the mainland the mainland between economic interaction Greater island and the social tensions that this growth is creating (Westad 2012: 448). Thus, party- Thus, 448). 2012: (Westad creating is growth this that tensions social domestic China’s in role important an plays which nationalism, sponsored people. of the Chinese for discontent serves as a catalyst stability, indication that the CCP as a party is capable of dealing with some of the of some with dealing of is capable party as a CCP the that indication

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 250 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 251 http:// A provision on setting up a special administrative regionA provision on setting up a special

4 www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18027.htm A policy of “one country, two systems” on Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, the Affairs of two systems” on Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign country, “one A policy of 4 the one that China has. One of the reasons why Taiwan matters to the to why Taiwan matters reasons the China has. One of that one the United States is certainly an ideological one. The Americans deeply The U.S. perception of the Taiwan issue is fundamentally different from Why Taiwan matters to the United States matters Taiwan Why ties with foreign countries would not change under the “one country, two systems” policy. the PRC in 1982. was added to the Constitution of and would keep its military forces. Beijing also upholds that Taiwan’s current Taiwan’s that upholds also Beijing forces. military its keep would and culturaland economic its and life, of way its systems, economic and social motherland under the Hong Kong model, namely, under the “one country, “one the under namely, model, Kong Hong the under motherland become would Taiwan concept, that to According concept. systems” two would enjoy a high degree of autonomya special administrative region. It peace overtures. However, China is aware that military action will prompt a reaction from other states, the United States in particular, peaceful and reunification. Beijing prefers proposed that Taiwan should return to the Under these conditions, Beijing is more than eager to reunite Taiwan with the mainland. Thus, it has adopted a policy of mixing military threats with China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future oceans the of out and go oceans pass through must China Dillon 2007: 2) development” (See blockade against China’s maritime security. … Only when we break this China’s maritime security. … Only blockade against blockade shall we be able to talk about China’s rise. … To rise suddenly, China to expand its sphere of influence and strengthen its position in East and Southeast Asia. According to forces’ international one the breaking to senior significance reaching “far Chinese has Taiwan military theorist, power onto the major trade routes through which half of the world’s total half of the world’s which routes through the major trade power onto allow would region in the strategic positioning Advanced trade passes. Asian countries. All parties involved involved All parties territories disputed the consider countries. Asian important due to rich fishing areas and possibleoil, gas naturaland mineral resourcesdeposits. Finally, like this could enable China to project sovereignty sovereignty disputes with Japan, the Philippines and other Southeast For the United the For

6 http://www.chinapost.com.tw/ The United States often 5 , March 12, 2012, 12, March , The China Post The Taipei, Taiwan, November 2012. taiwan/foreign-affairs/2012/03/12/334339/AIT-stresses.htm “AIT stresses Taiwan’s ‘undoubted’ importance to US”, to importance ‘undoubted’ Taiwan’s stresses “AIT Interview with Lu Yeh-chung, assistant professor on the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, 6 get into the Pacific Ocean, China’s naval vessels must go through one of 5 proximate chain of islands extending southward from Japan, through the through Japan, from southward extending islands of chain proximate Ryukyu’s, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. To from its shores deeper into the Pacific. from its shores deeper into the Pacific. a by is “contained” China now for that emphasize strategists Many locks the Yellow Sea, South China Sea and East China Sea. China East and Sea China South Sea, Yellow the locks expansion potential China’s obstructing means arc the controlling States, to secure a “higher ground” in the region. The geostrategic value of The geostrategic in the region. ground” to secure a “higher Taiwan is in the fact that the island is part of the “first islandarc chain”,stretching from an the Aleutians in the north to Borneo in the south that The relevance of Taiwan to the United States lies also in its geostrategic strategic asset for any power that wants position. Taiwan is an important contentious, bilateral economic relations between the United States and Taiwan have been generally positive. population of 23 million, in 2011 partner, Taiwan the 15th was largest export the destination for the 10th United proved that States issues largest few and a are there its Although imports. trading of source largest 10th There is also the question of economic interests. Despite having a is also the question There democracy. Since it is rich, liberal, as it mainland China for model be a role and island could the believe that democratized, some analysts alternative model to Chinese communism. demonstrates an – democracy, human rights and liberal to authoritarianism from successful transition emphasize Taiwan’s freedom.” community. The United States praise Taiwan for “Taiwan that. is the For only place Washington, among Chinese-speaking people that enjoys true democracy and realizes the values that the U.S. also stands for foreign policy. Introducing market economy and liberal democracy to its to democracy liberal and economy market Introducing policy. foreign society, Taiwan has become a respectable member of the international economic economic expansion and promotion of its values, such as free market, freedom, human rights, and liberal democracy abroad. To sustain these and ideology American in is deeply rooted world the values throughout believe that democracy and prosperity at home depend on continued on continued depend home at prosperity and democracy that believe

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 252 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 253 independent Taiwan enables the United States United the enables Taiwan independent de facto credible economic and strategic commitments”, abandoning is Taiwan Asia. East in interests its to counterproductive be certainly Taiwan would an important link in the network of U.S. security alliances. other allies in East Asia, would suffer grievous harm (Art 2008: 276). Since the United States is willing to “remain engaged” in the region and “keep as it was towards Taiwan. If the United States reneged on this commitment this on reneged States United the If Taiwan. towards was it as then China, into forcibly Taiwan reintegrate to mainland the allowed and America’s commitment to Japan, as well as reliability in the eyes of its its other allies that it will stay committed to their security as well. Cutting their to it will stay committed allies that its other off an old U.S. ally would transform the calculus of other allies who might plausibly wonder whether the U.S. commitment to their security is flexible Finally, by supporting Taiwan the United States sends a clear message to control of strategic waterways important for the free flow of commerce and naval maneuvers in the case of unexpected crises. Thus, the United its influence in this dynamic region. States can much more easily secure waterway linking the South China Sea to the East China Sea. In this way, the United States can keep China locked on its shores and maintain communication that run from the Straits of Malacca to Japan, South Korea South Japan, to Malacca of Straits the from run that communication a eastwards, and to maintain control of East Asian waterways, as well as China’s domestic Moreover, due to its proximity to the Western Pacific sea-lanes of Taiwan, they would be able to quickly get into deep water American west coast to and could proceed to the could not be detected where they Cooper 2011). and threaten the United States (see show their wares further, which could threaten its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan’s region. Asia-Pacific the in interests its threaten could which further, east-coast ports would give China’s submarines a huge benefit. From The United States is concerned that in the hands of China Taiwan would in the Asian waters and harbor for its naval expansion serve as the main Pacific – not much of a barrier (Cooper 2011). Thus, Taiwan enables the gates. virtually at its to block China United States part part of China, this would change. island “second the to reach its extend to able be China’s would and in, hemmed navy would no longer be chain” – Guam, the Marianas and some other small islands in the central the various choke points between these islands. these islands. points between to become were If Taiwan choke the various proposed “one country, two systems” model. Interference of the Chinese the of Interference model. systems” two country, “one proposed the made years few past the in life Kong Hong of aspects many in officials for how long the PRC is prepared to exercise self-restraint, as well as how Beijing’s Taiwan. of enclave capitalist proposed the manage could it well jurisdiction over Hong Kong made the Taiwanese pessimistic about the Taiwan may keep the existing capitalist Taiwan may keep the existing capitalist and its way of life “for a system long period of time”. Taipei is cautious about Beijing’s promises, namely, within the last three decades. Under these conditions, Taiwan is not willing not is Taiwan conditions, these Under decades. three last the within even not Beijing, in government central the of rule supreme the accept to that implies it although systems”, two country, “one of concept the under rights are incompatible with the political rights are incompatible with the system of China. Taiwan has abjured authoritarianism and moved from martial law to the rule of law, liberalization political and growth economic impressive experiencing Taiwanese values and principles of democracy, freedom and human Communist party leadership, devotion to socialism, guidance by Marxist- Leninist-Maoist thought, and rule by a dictatorship of the proletariat (See Yu 1990: 197). which implies that the central government for the reunified China be under be China reunified the for government central the that implies which four so-called cardinal principles, namely, complete adherence to the mean reunification under Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People – nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood (or social welfare). systems” two country, “one of concept Beijing’s to contrary is concept This and Beijing since 1949. Taipei does not oppose the possibility of unification, of possibility the oppose not does Taipei 1949. since Beijing and but it supports the idea of a country unified in itsown image. That would Taipei claims that the ROC is the sole legitimate representative of that that of legitimate representative sole is the ROC the Taipei claims that sovereignty, not the PRC. Whether the ROC or the PRC is the legitimate Taipei between main disagreement the has been Chinese government about Taiwan more than anyone else does. In the first place, there is the remain ROC the and PRC the both Although legitimacy. issue of political firm to the concept that there is one, undivided sovereignty of China, It would be senseless to discuss the Taiwan issue without emphasizing the emphasizing the issue without discuss Taiwan be senseless to It would the importance of Taiwan to the Taiwanese. After all, the Taiwanese care Why Taiwan matters to the Taiwanese the to matters Taiwan Why

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7 http://thediplomat.com/china-power/one-country-two-systems- ; and Ted Gallen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Many observers believe that the only condition under which Many observers believe that the

8 Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 78-79. by Emily Lau, The Diplomat Blogs, March 12, 2013, human-rights-in-hong-kong/ For examples of Beijing’s interference in Hong Kong life see “One Country, Two Systems: Human Rights in Hong Kong” expert”, Taipei Times, April 28, 2013, p. 3 unification: US “Chinese threats impede 8 7 A series of polls taken over the last two decades by the Election Study center Study Election the by decades two last the over taken polls of series A at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University shows the sense of Taiwanese the number of people who identify themselves as Taiwanese has been themselves as Taiwanese has identify who people of number the years. increasing steadily in the last twenty as Chinese. However, a demographic shift on the island resulted with the decades, six nearly of passage the With identity. Taiwanese, new, a of birth most members of the émigré generation have died. Consequently, Another important factor is the issue important factor of national identity. The mainlanders Another themselves regarded 1949 in War Civil Chinese the after Taiwan to fled who democratization, a prospect not immediately (Bergsten et al. 2006: 137). visible on the horizon opposed. mainland’s the of basis the on be would unification accept could Taiwan 77 percent of respondents opposed unification andin favor. 14 percent However, if were there were little difference in Taiwan conditionsand China, 33 percent would support unification, with 58 percent between University in 2012 showed that while there remains a significant difference significant a remains there while that showed 2012 in University conditions, social and economic political, China’s and Taiwan’s between between China and Taiwan. between China A poll taken by the Election Study Center of Taiwan’s National Chengchi the Chinese government highlighted the true nature of the Communist nature the true highlighted the Chinese government differences was clear evidence of insurmountable regime. The massacre Finally, the Taiwanese still remember the Tiananmen Square of massacre 1989. For many Taiwanese, brutal repression of peaceful protests by free and direct elections, breaks any illusion that Taiwan would one day systems” arrangement. country, two agree to the “one willingly Beijing’s Beijing’s recent decision to restrain universal suffrage for the election of the Hong Kong’s chief executive, which largely ignored the demands of for calling protests large several staged have that groups pro-democracy Taiwanese Taiwanese less enthusiastic about the one country, two systems formula. 10 9 http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm “Chinese threats impede unification: US expert”, Taipei Times, April 28, 2013, p. 3 unification: US “Chinese threats impede (1992-2012), Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU

10 decades, Taiwan and China have built one of the most intertwined and 9 to controlling the pace of cross-Strait economic positive gestures from interactions Beijing (Tian pending 2006: 3). Nevertheless, in the last two Finally, there is the issue of its economy. Taipei economic initially muscle intended to resorted increasingly it to failed, this When status. sovereign its of recognition use gain political concessions from Beijing for attack, 70 percent would favor it, while 20 percent would not. attack, 70 percent would favor it, declaration of independence if it caused China to attack Taiwan, nearly 30 percent of respondents said “yes”, while nearly 60 percent said “no”. However, if a declaration of independence would not cause China to of polling data from Taiwan, Duke University political independence, science deters threat China’s while that professor concluded Niou Emerson it also decreases the chances of unification. Asked if they would favor a with the PRC (Carpenter 2005: 76). Under these conditions, favoring the In an analysis Taiwanese. the of most for choice status quo seems a right place. They fear (with good reason) that seeking formal independence seeking formal independence reason) that good fear (with place. They impressive the lose might island the that further, and crisis, a provoke would quality of life that it has painstakingly decades in a war built up over the The reluctance to unify with the mainland lies in the fact that for most of the with the mainland lies in the fact that for reluctance to unify The Taiwanese, especially for the young, China is an alien, even threatening population increases on the island, the trend towards independence is greater. likely to become mean that a majority of Taiwanese support immediate independence; most of them still favor the status quo. However, as the Taiwan-born The increased sense of Taiwanese identity significantlychances decreased of the unification with the mainland. Nevertheless, that does not decreased decreased to 38.5 percent. The “Chinese only” faction fell to a miserable 3.6 percent. last poll taken in December 2012, shows that the number of respondents who consider themselves as Taiwanese reached 54.3 percent, while the and Chinese as both Taiwanese themselves of those who regard number identity identity is growing, while the sense of Chinese identity is declining. The

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 256 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 257 development on the Chinese mainland as an economic opportunity that production efficiency has provedThose 67). 2006: (Tian parties invested successfulthe and investing the both to returns and promises significant economic interaction with the mainland rapid who support stronger see through networks outside the mainland. This strategy of capitalizing on of mainland. This strategy the outside networks through mainland China and Taiwanese of cheap labor the of a combination arrangements with firms relocated to the mainland, parent firms in Taiwan in firms parent mainland, the to relocated firms with arrangements and pay provide intermediate materials processing fees to subcontractors only for qualified final products, which they then export to world markets independence for Taiwan simply because the economic importance of importance economic Taiwan simply because the for independence subcontracting traditional Utilizing 97). 2007: Kang (see strong too is China China’s increase in relative strength vis-à-vis Europe and the United States United the and Europe vis-à-vis strength relative in increase China’s (Rosen and Wang 2011: 95 in Burdekin, Shen and Whited 2013: 7) Thus, increasingly opposed to the idea of the business community has become increasingly important as a source of final demand as well – a trend that has only intensified with the coming of the global financial crisis and its surplus with the mainland. Although exports to mainland China to exports Although mainland. the its surplus with traditionally involved taking advantage of cheap labor for final assembly and re-export to the west, the mainland Chinese market has become It is evident that cross-Strait economic interaction has proved beneficial surplus largely because of trade a large Taiwan runs island. the for ECFA with China was aimed at helping the Taiwanese to do business and business do to Taiwanese the helping at aimed was China with ECFA (Liou 2011:173). thus strengthen Taiwan’s competitiveness more opportunities for participating in regional economic affairs East in ongoing the East from isolated and marginalized being avoid to as so Asia that signing the out Ma pointed President integration. Asian economic term mechanism that allows Taiwan to continuously expand lucrative that allows Taiwan to continuously term mechanism cross-Strait business opportunities, but also a hope for Taiwan to have the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in November Framework Cooperation Economic cross-Strait controversial the and 2009 long- a merely not is ECFA the Taipei, For 2010. June in (ECFA) Agreement liberalized liberalized and normalized cross-Strait is inauguration since Ma’s documents signed most important years. The economic relations in recent the presidential elections in 2008, the restrictions on cross-Strait economic and political exchanges disappeared rapidly. Taipei and Beijing further have that agreements and technical economic string of signed a have important important economic relationships in Asia. Since Ma Ying-jou of KMT won Taiwanese security security Taiwanese

11 For a detailed analysis see Denny Roy, “Cross-Strait Economic Relations: Opportunities Outweigh Risks”, Occasional Paper Series, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, April 2004.

11 weak (See Bush in Shaumbaugh 2005: 174). is the “hollowing-out effect”, or the concern that economically Taiwan leave will the Strait Taiwan the across manufacturing movement of is about the “fifth column effect”. According to this view, Taiwanese will become a lobby for the PRC and businessmen on the mainland third a tool that will help China accomplish its political agenda. The will become so dependent on the mainland that the island will become mainland that the island will become will become so dependent on the vulnerable to economic leverage from Beijing. The second concern capabilities (Carpenter 2005: 80). economic interdependence Bush concerns take summarizes companies Taiwanese three that believing effect”, forms. “hostage that the about worry First, some growing a potential threat to Taiwan’s national security. national Taiwan’s to threat potential a planners are concerned that Taiwan’s business – particularly its high- tech firms – may be indirectly helping to strengthen the PRC’s military Many also fear that it would increase the island’s political vulnerability. the island’s political vulnerability. Many also fear that it would increase Some analysts argue that deepening cross-Strait economic ties is subjectivity” in order to keep the Taiwanese people away from the Taiwanese people away from subjectivity” in order to keep again (Tian 2006: 153). identifying with China or the Chinese to seek permanent separation from the mainland. Accordingly, they to harden a sense of “Taiwanese have been intensifying their efforts it within the global trading system. For advocates, Taiwan’s deeper pro-independence cross-Strait economic integration is viewed as a window of opportunity may deprive them of the serious threat that speedy integration with the mainland emphasize that the integration, if if integration, the that emphasize mainland the with integration speedy marginalize and economy domestic the endanger would uncontrolled, Despite an active policy of rapprochement with the mainland, many integration economic deeper toward cautious been have Taiwan in of warn who Those consequences. negative possible to due China with supporting Taiwan’s independence. Taiwan’s independence. supporting the government should take on measures facilitating the growth of cross- of growth the facilitating measures on take should government the Strait economic interactions (Wang et al. 2010: 160-161). business everything by much to risk has invested too community actively After all, the may enrich individuals as well as Taiwanese society. Thus, they argue that argue they Thus, society. Taiwanese as well as individuals enrich may

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12 “Chinese threats impede unification: US expert”, Taipei Times, April 28, 2013, p. 3 unification: US “Chinese threats impede

12 Sates and focused on economic growth, domestic stability, and global economic interchange, especially with the developed Asia and the economies West. Beijing recognized that of its economic and diplomatic bide its time while it modernizes and strengthens itself 103). China (See accepted a Ding new, unipolar system 2009: dominated by the United Following the end of the bipolar, Cold War world, Chinese leaders, scholars leaders, Chinese world, War Cold bipolar, the of end the Following China Xiaoping’s dictum that Deng and policy advisers have embraced should strategically adopt a low profile in international relations and China’s ascent and the security of the Taiwan Strait Taiwan of the ascent and the security China’s 2010: 309). of all, the fear that integration will endanger Taiwan’s sovereignty and encourage Chinese military adventurism in the strait (Keng and Shubert The major concern of those in Taiwan who warn against speedy of those integration The major concern is not linked only to economic considerations. It is also, and maybe most in March and April 2014 revealed Agreement with China. proposed Cross-Strait Service Trade intense popular opposition to the products because signing the ECFA also means tearing down the tariff for tariff the down tearing means also ECFA the signing because products importing mainland products to Taiwan (Lee 2012: 116). The occupation happened that protests mass related the and Yuan Legislative Taiwan’s of people were afraid that the signing of ECFA denoted the end of Taiwanese of end the denoted ECFA of signing the that afraid were people product competitiveness with mainland products, especially agricultural then Beijing might use its economic leverage to coerce Taipei into making into Taipei coerce to leverage economic its use might Beijing then political concessions. made great efforts to explain the ECFA to Taiwanese people. Taiwanese with China. Although 56 percent thought Taiwan should economic strengthen and trade its relations with China, a clear majority – 67 percent – believed that if Taiwan’s economy was overly dependent on China, The public is also cautious about the course of economic integration integration of economic course about the is also cautious The public However, what had worked for the rest of Asia has not worked not has Asia of rest the for worked had what However,

13 Quoted by Dominic Ziegler in his special report for theEconomist on China and its region, “Reaching for a Renaissance,” Renaissance,” a for “Reaching region, its and China on theEconomist for report special his in Ziegler Dominic by Quoted March 31, 2007, inBill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade (Orlando: Harcourt, 2008), p. 43.

13 As rapid economic growth and technological modernization enabled modernization and technological growth As rapid economic accommodate Beijing’s growing influence as its neighborsBush in Shambaugh 2005: 179). have (See and more. and the between interdependence economic Taiwan. Despite growing for island and the mainland, in most other respects Taiwan has refused to neighbors did not fear it and increasingly, as aid, trade and investment began to be added to the smiles, that its neighbors welcomed it more China and its neighbors. Using what a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Asian its Beijing, that sure making on focused China 1990s the during diplomacy”, Shi Yinhong, has nicely called “smile enabled it to establish a new framework of cooperation with most of its with most of cooperation of enabled it to establish a new framework opportunity has provided China a strategic This policy Asian neighbors. to enhance its regional position and create economic benefit for both China’s policy of gradual accommodation with as many states as possible accommodation gradual China’s policy of the country will seek peace, cooperation, harmonious a world”, win-win situation Chinese and President a Xi 2014). China’s national security goals (Tiezzi Jinping said when defining ensure that China’s rise is peaceful and that its economic development its economic China’s rise is peaceful and that that ensure and military growth is not a threat to the region or the world. “Externally, to principles of peace, openness, development, equality and democracy democracy and equality development, openness, peace, of principles to win-win and justice, consultation, dialogue, cooperation, nations, among to seeks approach security new China’s 128). 2006: al. et (Bergsten results settlement of disputes as its core interests (Kang 2007: 84). Beijing’s foreign Beijing’s 84). 2007: (Kang interests core its as disputes of settlement policy documents and statements repeatedly affirm China’s adherence (Kissinger 2012: 458). In 1997, China unveiled a “New Security Concept” emphasizing peaceful coexistence, contacts, dialogue among mutually states to beneficial increase trust, and economic the peaceful Leaving behind the low profile in theto international portray system, itself as China tries a responsible global player. formulations, Its goals, are in a the official “harmonious society” and a “harmonious world” within regional and world affairs (Sutter 2010: 103). 2010: (Sutter affairs and world regional within success placed it in a more prominent position to operate more actively actively more to operate position prominent a more it in placed success

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 260 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 261 mainland a lingering legacy of its “century of humiliation”, return of the island to the “motherland” has become crucial to China’s self-identity, honor, power, and prestige. restive western autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet (Bergsten et al. 2006: 119). As China considers Taiwan’s continued separation from the the “motherland”. Having recovered Hong Kong and Macao, China’s (re) is most associated with the integrity” over its “territorial concern the of control continued Taiwan and over control sovereign claiming of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In doing so, it vestige has of its to “century wipe of humiliation”, out namely, the to bring back Taiwan to security, preserving territorial integrity, and gaining prestige, power, and However, 7). 2010: Sutter in (Christensen stage international the on respect as a great power, it has to demonstrate it is capable of preserving its Thomas J. Christensen summed accepted by up other specialists China’s and strategic commentators, to goals, include regime widely to restore its great power status and in doing so has been, intentionally or intentionally been, has so doing in and status power great its restore to not, moving toward regional hegemony. China seems to be engaging in a broad-based push to lay claim to the strives China that evident is it activities, recent China’s Given region. entire assert its vast claims over the oil and gas rich areas, important waterways and Parcel, Spratly and Sea, China East the over Zone Identification defense Air Senkaku/Diaoyu an of declaration Islands, including a recent military budget (nearly US$ 132 billion for 2014) and military modernization military and 2014) for billion 132 US$ (nearly budget military into hard power, Beijing has been creating conditions that will serve its own interests. Using its growing naval and aerial might to more forcefully accentuating its growing military power (although the region is clearly is clearly the region power (although military its growing accentuating aware of this development) (Bergsten 2006: 127). Translating its growing its interests. China has leveraged the obvious power of an economically an economically of obvious power the has leveraged its interests. China ensure to a billion people than more of nation vibrant and growing that its interests are met with due respect by regional states, without advancing advancing its military capabilities, and adopting new strategies in order capable of ensuring power as a great and stature its prestige to restore increasingly increasingly confident that trends in national power comprehensive building up China has been the last decade favor. During are moving in its national power, expanding its role within the international system, China China to amplify its political and military power, Beijing has become in the Strait. In addition The escalation of threats to threats of escalation The 14 status quo http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm The full text of the anti-secession law is available at: The full text of the

14 the legislation was designed to eliminate any lingering ambiguity in any lingering eliminate legislation was designed to the Beijing’s position. The Taiwanese people would be put on notice that if they continued to resist reunification and persisted in “fiction”the that force should its leaders challenge the force to being part of a campaign of psychological warfare against Taiwan, more than 1,200 ballistic and cruise missiles poised just across the Taiwan Strait ready to punish any move toward formal independence has been Taiwan back by take China was ready to Taipei that to explicit warning The menacing tone of the legislation and white paper, accompanied by that constitutes a major incident of ‘Taiwan independence’, the Chinese any it at crush and thoroughly will resolutely forces people and armed cost” (see Carpenter 2005: 111). and a determination to halt them. The white paper “Should the warned Taiwan authorities explicitly: go so far as to make a reckless attempt 2005). In December, the Chinese government sent another warning to the to warning another sent government Chinese the December, In 2005). government of Taiwan, issuing a defense white paper that underscored the PRC’s growing agitation about Taipei’s pro-independence activities secession, the law is designed to clear up any uncertainty over whether (Lieberthal integrity territorial preserve to peace sacrifice to willing is China namely, promoting a new constitution, pressing for referendums on issues Nations United for application an filling and sovereignty, Taiwan’s to related prevent to force of use the legally mandating By Taiwan. for membership “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect integrity”. territorial and China’s sovereignty use force was a clear response to President Chen Shui-bian’s initiatives, any possibility of formal secession. In March 2005, the National People’s Congress passed the anti-secession law that gives the PRC the right to in order to stop Taiwan from declaring independence (Kang 2007: 93). To 93). 2007: (Kang independence declaring from Taiwan stop to order in show that it is decisive in defending its policy of “one-China”, Beijing took from dissuade Taiwan to its resolution codify would that step crucial a has steadfastly been unwilling to do so in the case of Taiwan and indeed and indeed the case of Taiwan to do so in been unwilling has steadfastly possible doing everything has been force its threat to use to make credible claim claim the island to retain force may use it as part of China. an “integral” of use the reject willing to formally publicly and been has While China force to settle other regional issues, such as the Spratly islands dispute, it China’s China’s resolute posture toward Taiwan is evident in Beijing’s persistent

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 262 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 263 de independent state. Thus, Taiwan has been careful not to neglect its neglect to not careful been has Taiwan Thus, state. independent U.S. military analysts believe that Taipei political ties may with Washington seek and to to acquire develop additional U.S. closer related military assistance (see Murray with Churchman 2013: 4). arms and Chinese power. In doing so, Taiwan has placed its trust in perceived U.S. preparedness, military declining its with struggles Taiwan As benevolence. upper hand, even when the stronger side (i.e., the PRC) is weakened by some internal and external disturbances (Wu and Huang 1995: 214-215). Thus, Taiwan relies almost completely on the United States to balance protect the island fully. From the rational actor perspective, the asymmetry the perspective, actor rational the From fully. island the protect very is it that preponderant so is Strait Taiwan the of sides two the between the get to alone maneuver to ROC) the (i.e., state weaker the for difficult Considering the huge gap between Taiwan and China in terms of overall of in terms China and Taiwan between gap huge the Considering national power and military strength, there is not much Taipei can do to facto States as a guarantor of its survival. informal alliance with the United Despite economic interaction, and faced with a much stronger power across the Strait, Taiwan’s main concern has become its survival as a current level of US$ 10.5 billion sufficient with the mainland. China’s efforts to force reunification to defend the island against weapon left for Taiwan. As cross-strait relations Taipei significantly has cut improved, its military spending to 2.1 percent of GDP, judging the improve cross-strait relations and strengthening “soft power” approaches approaches power” “soft strengthening and relations cross-strait improve already has Strait Taiwan the across balance military the As deterrence. to tipped in China’s favor, Taipei believed that soft power is the only real candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the to continuing on has focused Ma administration The landslide victory. 2008 presidential elections with a Realizing that the risks of provoking Beijing were too great, voters and the and voters great, too were Beijing provoking risks of the Realizing that a pragmatic policy toward embraced have Taiwan in business community China fostered by the KMT. Under these conditions, KMT presidential to curb Taipei’s separatist tendencies. separatist to curb Taipei’s violation of Chinese law (Ibid: 109). Due to prevalent opinion in Beijing that that Beijing in opinion prevalent to Due 109). (Ibid: law Chinese of violation China’s independence, Taiwanese encourage to sought has Washington House White the to message direct a sent also Taiwan toward policy harsh the island was a country separate from the PRC, they were now in direct http://www.ait. in the Strait status quo status , October 10, 2010. Taipei Times In October 2008, a statement from then-presidential 16 U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” kept both China and On 21 September 2011, Washington announced an arms 15 17 “Xi urges US to cease Taiwan arms sales”, Taipei Times, June 10, 2013. “Xi urges US to cease “Obama welcomes arms package”, See “Taiwan Relations Act”, American Institute in Taiwan, Policy and Documents, available online at org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html

16 17 policymakers in China’s intentions toward the island. 15 and cooperation, the rapid growth of China’s military budget and buildup and budget military China’s of growth rapid the cooperation, and of its missiles opposite Taiwan resulted with concern among many U.S. of the long defined U.S. policy that holds defenses is that strengthening Taiwan’s crucial to the Although Washington security had welcomed the resumption of and cross-Strait talks stability of the Taiwan Strait. Besides arms sales, the United States also continued training and military counsel to Taiwan’s armed forces. These moves are a clear reflection sale package to Taiwan. It was the second deal in Obama’s presidency second deal in Obama’s presidency Taiwan. It was the to sale package 2013: 153). after 2008, worth US$ 5.3 billion (Tseng to Taiwan’s of a healthy balance in the defense and the maintenance Taiwan Strait” more than US$18 billion in defensive weapons systems since President Ma took office in 2008. contribute to “helps sale arms the that stressed Obama Barack candidate interests in the region, resulted with a continuation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan’s capabilities. to According its defense strengthen to order Taiwan in Ministry of National Defense, the United States has provided Taiwan with Meanwhile, deepening distrust of China’s foreign policy, accompanied by the buildup of Chinese military forces and the threat they pose to U.S. Taiwan on a tight leash, deterring both Beijing and Taipei from provocative from Taipei and Beijing both deterring leash, tight a on Taiwan impasse. the of resolution peaceful eventual an against work that actions and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concernUnited States”. to the support to the island. The TRA codified U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity”, “strategic of policy U.S. codified TRA The island. the to support of Taiwan by other future the to determine “any effort emphasizing that a threat to the peace … would be considered as than peaceful means according according to President Obama, “fully supports a one-China policy”, the provide to determination U.S. demonstrated 1979 of Act Relations Taiwan aid of its allyaid the to change decided if China by force. Although the United States never specified it wouldcome defend to Taiwan, does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country and, Taiwan Taiwan has always hoped that the United States would come to the

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 264 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 265 article by then-U.S. Foreign Policy Foreign (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, six components. The TPP is the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s regional trade initiative that reflects U.S. trade interests in the Asia-Pacific region. As of June 2013, 12 countries are participating in TPP negotiations growing region in the world, the pivot has been followed by the push for the of one into incorporated was which (TPP), Partnership Trans-Pacific the and rules” (Glaser 2012: 22). Taking into consideration that the Asia-Pacific area remains the fastest- “attempting to cooperate with China on global problems to pushing global problems to on China with cooperate to “attempting law and challenges to international back against China’s assertiveness is a direct threat to its security, its strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region has become a necessity represents a swing of the pendulum from administration, the pivot to Asia for Washington. Under the Obama efforts to reshape the world order by the use of force or intimidation. As or force of use by the world order the reshape to efforts the United States likes to think that everything that happens everywhere world order, deep distrust and military policy in the region. Washington to respond to its muscular in Beijing’s foreign policy Thus, the pivot to Asia is a security has switch aimed at discouraging China’s prompted Although the U.S. seeks to integrate China more fully within the current regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging forging investment; and expanding trade multilateral institutions; regional a broad-based military presence; human rights. and advancing democracy and sustain America’s global leadership”. Clinton emphasized six key lines of lines of six key emphasized Clinton global leadership”. sustain America’s action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening U.S. working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with the Asia-Pacific region to America’s future, Clinton said that “a strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and behind the rebalance is the Secretary 2011 Hillary Clinton where she described the Asia-Pacificof importance the global politics”. Given of as “a key driver importance region’s rebalance rebalance strategic, diplomatic, and economic priorities to preserve its logic and rationale the of articulations clearest the of One hegemony. and and resources to the Asia-Pacificregion. Seeing the Chinese achieve diplomatic to power economic levering China’s as potentially initiatives and security gains in the region, the United States has decided to The rise of China’s power has incited Washington to shift its attention its attention shift to Washington incited has power China’s rise of The , there was not much 18 per se “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Time for Some American Hustle“, The Diplomat, March 11, 2014. American Hustle“, The Diplomat, March 11, Time for Some “Trans-Pacific Partnership:

18 back to Taiwan. U.S. military personnel are spread throughout the island, trying to gain an understanding of the fighting capabilities and fighting They adjustments. necessary make to in order army standing the will of Professor I Yuan emphasizes that the United States fears a rising China and China rising a fears States United the that emphasizes Yuan I Professor a military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. Hence, it has decided to move that wants to exercise regional hegemony. Its geostrategic position gives position geostrategic Its hegemony. regional exercise to wants that Taiwan a special role in defining access to important areas in the region and allows it to act as a defensive shield (See Brzezinski 1997: 40-48). in the Asia-Pacific included Taiwan as well. As a regionalpivot, geostrategic Taiwan’s sensitive location is potentially vulnerable for any power Although Clinton did not specify Clinton did Taiwan Although doubt that redefiningand deepening old U.S. alliances and partnership array of military bases is Washington’s best hope to rebuild its position in rebuild its position to hope best bases is Washington’s militaryof array hegemonic aspirations. the region and to curb China’s perceived to India, and expansions of existing airports and rebuilds of abandoned facilities. As alliances play a large role improving in ties with U.S.’ allies in foreign the Asia-Pacific policy region accompanied success, by an China despite shrinking U.S. defense budgets (Tucker 2013: 44). The shift also involved the stationing of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, plans Australia deployments to bases ranging from to send aircraft to regular it meant giving more visibility to troop deployments, including stationing seas around in the exercises navy on the sending in Australia and forces naval presence in the region. The so-called “pivot” away from the Atlantic the from away “pivot” so-called The region. the in presence naval world, Middle East, and terrorism sparked political and security initiatives to reassure friends and deter potential adversaries. Among other things, Under the new course, the Obama administration has focused more on the on more focused has administration Obama the course, new the Under U.S. expand and neighbors China’s with ties defense U.S. bolster to region draft the blueprints for increased Asian integration and economic growth, economic and integration Asian increased for blueprints the draft leadership in the region. cementing American U.S., but also complements the grand strategy of American rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific. It will enable the Obama administration to help is an example of “open regionalism”, meaning that willing TPP standards will to meet countries the be able to join eventually other Asia-Pacific the to advantage clear economic a only offers not TPP The agreement. New New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam). The TPP

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 266 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 267 ; de jure de if not de facto de Thus, the United States most 19 )” China … Beijing’s concern extends concern Beijing’s … China )” 20 xihua increased U.S. engagement in the region has ) and Westernize ( Westernize and ) fenhua Interview with professor I Yuan, research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Chengchi National Relations, International of Institute the at fellow research Yuan, I professor with Interview and an adjunct professor at National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, December 2012. Ibid.

20 for development of anti-China blocs led by United States (or others) that 19 “split ( to the U.S. influence along China’s periphery, in particular the potential depriving China of an adequate supply of energy for its development; or inducing change in China’s political system. Indeed, Chinese internal documents commonly refer to suspicions that the United States seeks to to slow or block China’s emergence as by to slow or block China’s a great power – whether emergence mainland, the from Taiwan separating permanently to block China’s rise and, ultimately, undermine its one-party system of government (Friedberg 2012: 2). As Bergsten and Chinese others officials and elites are convinced that the United States will argue, seek many regime in Beijing is deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions in the Asia-Pacific deeply fearful of encirclement and ideological and remains region subversion. Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States aims Increased U.S. engagement in Asia initiated a security dilemma in China as well. However, this dilemma has a different dimension in China. The never gave up its military objectives, i.e. military conquest of Taiwan, Taipei Taipei Taiwan, of conquest military i.e. objectives, military its up gave never is not in a position to trust China. 2, 5). Despite recent good relations between Taiwan and China, Beijing since Taipei Yuan, I professor to According Beijing. by threatened feels still affirmed as a partner, is supported as a strategic democracy, has received received has democracy, strategic a as supported is partner, a as affirmed arms sales from the U.S., has expanded its international space and has improved its chances of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Chen 2013: Chen concluded that as a result of increased U.S. activity in the region, Taiwan has been relieved from China’s political pressure, has been As for Taiwan, it seems that proved useful for the island. Tamkang University professor Edward I-hsin certainly will not abjure Taiwan. It is most likely that Taiwan will become a will become Taiwan likely that is most It Taiwan. abjure will not certainly Beijing and Washington. between a great power game pawn in survive the very first round of shelling, especially to preserve the aircrafts. In aircrafts. the preserve to especially shelling, of round first very the survive this way, the United States is trying to help Taiwan to absorb the first strike mainland. the invasion from an case of in advise Taiwan’s fighting forces on how to harden the bunkers to be able to able be to bunkers the harden to how on forces fighting Taiwan’s advise http://www. http://www.reuters.com/ In Beijing’s view, Beijing’s In 21 , November 17, 2011, Moreover, for Beijing 22 The Washington Times “Beijing is wary of Obama’s assertive China policy”, “China points finger at U.S. over Asia-Pacific tensions”, Reuters, April 16, 2013, washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/17/beijing-wary-obama-assertive-china-policy/?page=all article/2013/04/16/us-china-defence-idUSBRE93F03P20130416

22 suspicious of the TPP that includes not only trade and investment, but areas but investment, and trade only not includes that TPP the of suspicious 21 economic front. Although China recognizes greater interdependence greater recognizes China Although front. economic and need for closer cooperation between the two countries, it is deeply and Glaser 2011: 23). the on evident also is Asia East toward policy U.S. in distrust Chinese Deep intentions in its neighborhood. Beijing firmly divided China’s rise (Tucker seeks to keep the PRC weak and obstruct to believes that Washington interest in Taiwan is not ideological, but geostrategic: it wants to ensure 2010). (Gilley China threaten and encircle to used be cannot Taiwan that Under that assumption, China has become increasingly suspicious of U.S. its formal and informal allies to encircle China and contain its rise. With its rise. contain and China encircle allies to informal and its formal respect to Taiwan, scholar Bruce Gilley argues that Beijing’s fundamental Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other neighbors in territorial disputes with China. Finally, the shift of U.S. attention and resources to the with relations strengthening as interpreted widely been has region Pacific Asia- eastward is aimed in practical terms at pinning down and containing China at pinning down and containing eastward is aimed in practical terms China’s development.” counterbalancing and this strategy is further evidence of the United States’ encouragement of rejected the American “pivot”, stressing that “the U.S. threat sees to its hegemony from a China. Therefore, America’s growing strategic move the ministry said in a clear reference to the United States. United the to reference clear a in said ministry the political China’s curtail to move strategic a is strategy rebalancing U.S. the influenceand harm interests.its China’s official Xinhua News Agency strengthening their Asia Pacific militaryalliances, expanding their military presence in the region and frequently make the situation there tenser”, said that China had faced “multiple and complicated security threats” threats” security complicated “multiple and faced had China said that despite its growing influence,which are are some countries “There region. the changes” for “profound adding that the U.S. strategy meant After the Obama administration announced the pivot, Beijing revealed its discomfort with the planned increase of U.S. military presence in the paper in its annual white Defense The Ministry of National wider region. minority regions (Bergsten et al. 2006: 123-124). 123-124). al. 2006: et (Bergsten regions minority may may seek to contain Chinese power or infiltrate anddestabilize China’s

XXI (72) - 2015 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 268 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(72) 66 - 2015 - 2012 269 cooperation between the two powers. Beijing and Washington are odds over economy, ideology, politics, at sovereignty, security, and foreign a “responsible stakeholder” eclipse issues contentious highly of in clusters Nevertheless, order. diplomatic the existing security, economic and The administrations of both China and the United States often emphasize understanding mutual lead to that dialogues and positive engagement and trust. The United States still wants to encourage China to become Conclusion against Taiwan as China’s top military priority.against Taiwan as China’s top military check China’s rise” (Nathan and Scobell 2012). Under these assumptions, Chinese defense officials have continued to depict armed preparations a world power (see Sheng Lijun 2001). In the words of Luo Yuan, a retired general and deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Society of Military Science, the United States has long used Taiwan “as a chess piece to internal Chinese dispute. Moreover, some hardliners in Beijing support the theory that the United States embraced the Taiwan issue not out of some high principle, but rather as one way to prevent China from emerging as and a fundamental obstacle to unification (Bergsten et al. 2006: 138). From 138). 2006: al. et (Bergsten unification to obstacle fundamental a and Beijing’s viewpoint, this policy represents a provocative interference in an seeks to permanently separate the island from the mainland. China views separate the island from the seeks to permanently U.S. involvement with Taiwan, particularly its arms sales and defense ties with the island, as an encouragement to Taiwanese independence forces armed forces continue to frustrate Beijing’s efforts Taiwan. Many to Chinese officials and elites gain are convinced that control Washington over Increased engagement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, military region, Asia-Pacific the in States United the of engagement Increased assistance to its allies, and ongoing U.S military consultations with Taiwan’s work through the existing global trade architecture like the World Trade World the like architecture global trade existing the through work Lye 2013: 52). (Zheng and Organization relatively relatively weak. China regarded this as an attempt by the United States In a seeming the bar for China. game by raising the rules of the to change rebuff of the TPP, President Hu reportedly stated that China prefers to like labor, intellectual property rights and environment in which China is separation from the mainland. the separation from de jure encircle and threaten China. The fact that Taiwan is a strategic U.S. ally restore national greatness. Moreover, Beijing wants to ensure that the island cannot be used to building, integrity, identity, political legitimacy, and national stability, the a critical measure to has become of Taiwan to the “motherland” return Beijing considers Taiwan an integral part of China, its sovereign territory, and thus its “core interest”, similar to Tibet elite or feels that China’s status Xinjiang. as a great power As depends on unity, nation the Chinese necessarily economic coincide with political other interests. Trade and its China has shown relations. cooperative of element one are relations Taiwan’s prevent to determination closer economic, cultural, and social ties with Taiwan in order to promote to order in Taiwan with ties social and cultural, economic, closer peaceful reunification. However, increasing economic interests do not may only increase. its willingnesscultivate to has demonstrated China last decade the In and East China seas have raised next do will it what about uncertainty stronger, grows China as Moreover, deep mistrust in China’s intentions. The large-scale buildup of Chinese military forces directed to means forceful use to its determination of by China threats periodic at Taiwan, prevent Taiwan’s independence, and China’s assertiveness in the South to a more assertive regional policy and that it could quickly change its change it could quickly policy and that regional assertive a more to one. toward a more confrontational declared policy of “peaceful rise” the United States and China (Bergsten at al. 2006: 135). and China (Bergsten at al. 2006: the United States China’s recent behavior fostered a perception that Beijing was shifting and Taiwan is not inevitable. Were it to occur, likely however, lead it to would serious very political, and potentially military, conflict between that case, only a slightest miscalculation could end in a militarized dispute militarized a in end could miscalculation slightest a only case, that powers. While the political between the two the Taiwan situation across Strait remains far from being resolved, military conflict between China interests over the island put Beijing plagued with perplexities. Moreover, a sharp escalation of tensions in the and Washington in a relationship Taiwan Strait could provoke a U.S. show of force in support of its ally. In As Taiwan is important to both China and the United States, conflict of policy. One of the most complex issues in that cluster is certainly Taiwan. Taiwan. is certainly cluster in that issues complex of the most One policy.

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http:// de facto de Therefore, it seems that 23 See “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces”, Information Office of the State Council, April 2013, April Council, State the of Office Information Forces”, Armed China’s of Employment Diversified “The See news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm

23 as well. Washington will stay committed to the peaceful resolution of the as well. Washington will stay committed to the peaceful resolution either by actions unilateral to opposed staying simultaneously issue, Taiwan Pacific, it will continue to frustrateengagement with the Beijingregion, but with the informal alliance with Taiwan not only with its increased trade, and military ties between the two powers. trade, and military ties between As the United States seems resolute to retain its hegemony in the Asia- that increased geopolitical rivalry, military competition, or divergence ideological could overshadow the enmeshing bonds of commerce, suspicion, contest for domination and conflictingflourishing relations and that could drive interests them towards an open conflict. undermine Both historical experience and contemporary politics have shown but they are preparing for an emergency. The United States and China are not only rivals, but also mutual states their However, that conflict. are over cooperation deeply choose interdependent likely more and would It is certain that China and the United States do not intend to go to war, action, regardless of the potential political or economic price (Bergsten et et (Bergsten price economic or political potential the of regardless action, al. 2006: 138). Given the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, that would be the worst-case scenario. independence. Should it military become take clear would Beijing that doubt little Taipei is there has unification, foreclosed future of the possibility Finally, given China’s questionable is it capabilities, military and power, political and increasing economic self-confidenceabout itsfor how growing long Beijing will be willing to tolerate Taiwan’s over the island” (Carpenter 2005: 118). over the island” China is ready to prevent Taiwan’s independence at all costs. Michael D. Michael D. at all costs. independence Taiwan’s prevent China is ready to Swaine stresses that although China would prefer to avoid conflict over Taiwan, “this does not mean that it would be unprepared to go to war that China will that China take all “resolutely its measures to safeguard necessary integrity”. and territorial sovereignty national Thus, it is not likely that Beijing will accept the resolution of the Taiwan issue issue Taiwan the of resolution the accept will Beijing that likely not is it Thus, any time the mainland separate the island permanently that would from soon. A Chinese defense white paper, released in April 2013, declared armed with advanced weaponry is weaponry advanced with armed interests. China’s to deep contrast in in the Taiwan Strait. Although the policy of status quo status as the United States (Wu and Huang 1996: 223). as the United States (Wu and Huang order to control its own fate, Taiwan has no alternative but to maintain its ties with major powers such its strategic military readiness and strengthen for caution. Taiwan confronts the most basic threat to its security: a (Cole very sovereignty its of it deprive to determined is neighbor powerful large, In necessity. a thus is States United the with alliance informal The 32). 2006: As for Taiwan, the normalization of cross-Strait relations will strategic objective. However, a more confident and remain decisive China calls the actions that work against peaceful resolution of the impasse (Bergsten et al. 2006: 138-139). Taiwan Strait – encouraging decision makers in both Beijing and Taipei to remain patient, flexible, and constructive, and to avoid provocative “strategic ambiguity” ambiguity” “strategic ideal an is allows and solution not miscalculation, a new U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue is not in sight. Thus, the United States across the “dual deterrence” a policy of exercise to continue to will need side the change to

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, , 11 , , 10 June http://www. [accessed 3 The Diplomat The , 10 October 2010. The Washington Post Washington The Taipei Times , U.S.-China Economic and http://www.washingtonpost. Taipei Times [accessed 10 June 2013]. [accessed 5 July 2012]. [accessed 5 July Taiwan’s Declining Defense Spending Taiwan’s Declining Defense www.thediplomat.com/2014/03/trans- http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/ , February 18, 1996, Available at: could Jeopardize Military Preparedness Jeopardize could Security Review Commission. 12 November 2010. Available com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/11/AR2010111106072.html at: [accessed 17 February 2012]. 2013. Available archives/2013/06/10/2003564416 at: March 2014. Available at: pacific-partnership-time-for-some-american-hustle/ October 2014]. speak-softly-carry-a-veiled-threat.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 23 March 2013]. [accessed Available archives/2008/10/10/2003425462 at: The New York Times York New The nytimes.com/1996/02/18/magazine/china-appease-or-contain- Murray, C. with Churchman, K., 2013. K., Churchman, with C. Murray, Reports “Why President Obama is right about India”, “Xi urges US to cease Taiwan arms sales”, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Time for Some American Hustle, American Some for Time Partnership: Trans-Pacific “Obama “Obama welcomes arms package”, ) is a doctoral candidate candidate a doctoral ) is [email protected] ( coordinator of the international academic course “Politics academic course international of the coordinator Science Political of Faculty the at Asia” East of Economy and in Zagreb. “Taiwan: Challenges and Achievements” at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb. In 2014, Dario Kuntić became a Iran and Taiwan. He spent seven months as a visiting fellow at the European Union Centre in Taiwan, University. National In Taiwan 2013, he organized an international seminar Dario was a speaker and participant at numerous international and participant at numerous Dario was a speaker conferences and workshops in Canada, the United States, in the area of international relations, diplomacy, and security. and diplomacy, relations, international of area the in response to U.S. global supremacy. Dario earned his bachelor bachelor his earned Dario supremacy. global U.S. to response master and Zagreb in Science Political of Faculty the at degree degree at the University of Bologna. His research interests lie at the Faculty of Political Science, University of doctoral Zagreb. thesis His deals with the problem of global Jihad as a Dario Dario Kuntić

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