Russia: Parliamentary Elections to the State Duma 7 December 2003

RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA 7 DECEMBER 2003

Report by Jeremy Franklin

NORDEM Report 2/2004 Copyright: The Norwegian Center for Human Rights/NORDEM and Jeremy Franklin.

NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a project of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the project is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments which promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The project is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment and reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Gry Kval Series consultants: Hege Mørk, Christian Boe Astrup

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ISSN: 1503 – 4003 ISBN: 82 – 9085 - 68 -5 NORDEM reports are available online at http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/publikasjonsliste.html Preface

Upon receipt of an invititation from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation to observe the 7 December Parliamentary Elections to the State Duma, the OSCE/ODIHR conducted a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) in Moscow from 8 to 10 October to assess conditions and preparations, and to advise on the level of ODIHR involvement in these elections. It advised on deploying a standard election observation mission (EOM) to monitor the elections. The decision was taken to deploy an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) to Russia in early November. The IEOM to the 7 December Parliamentary Elections officially opened on 3 November. It was headed by the former Speaker of the German Parliament, Professor Rita Süssmuth. The core team based in Moscow was made up of 18 election related experts. Thirty-eight long-term observers (LTOs) were recruited from the OSCE participating states, representing 16 OSCE participating states. Four LTOs were recruited through a voluntary fund established to diversify the national composition of election observation missions. Shortly before Election Day, the ODIHR deployed some 450 short-term observers (STOs) across Russia. On Election Day, they were supplemented with an additional 50 STOs, making the total number of STOs more than 500 representing 42 countries. A number of parliamentarians from the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and the Council of Europe participated in the Mission as STOs. As for domestic observers, the Golos (Voice) NGO partnership was the most active. They conducted monitoring prior to Election Day, as well as on Election Day itself. The Golos had representation in most major cities in the Russian Federation. On Election Day, domestic observers were present in one out of four polling stations. In parallel with the State Duma elections, other electoral contests were to take place in various parts of the Russian Federation. The IEOM did not observe these contests, except to which extent they impacted on the Duma elections in the affected locations. Two LTOs, Ragnhild Hollekim and Jeremy Franklin, were recruited to the mission by NORDEM. They were deployed to Volgograd and Novosibirsk regions respectively. Their areas of responsibility (AoR) also included neighbouring regions and territories. The LTOs’ main tasks included observing and assessing the pre-election campaign, Election Day observation, and the immediate post-election phase. Also, they were responsible for making all practical arrangements in front of the STOs’ arrival. Additionally, NORDEM recruited two STOs to observe on and in front of Election Day. They were Erlend Hvoslef (deployed to St. Petersburg) and Indra Øverland (deployed to Kazan). The information in this report is both based on the IEOM’s reports and on the observations of the Norwegian observers. All opinions expressed in the report are the authors’ responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights.

NORDEM/ Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo December 2003

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 2. POLITICAL BACKGROUND ...... 1 3. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ...... 4 4. THE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ...... 4 5. VOTER AND CIVIC EDUCATION...... 7 6. VOTER REGISTRATION...... 7 7. PARTY AND CANDIDATE REGISTRATION ...... 8 8. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ...... 9 9. THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT...... 11 10. OBSERVATION ON ELECTION DAYS ...... 12 11. THE REVIEW OF COMPLAINTS PROCESS ...... 18 12. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 19 13. COMMENTS ON THE ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION...... 19

APPENDICES...... 20 1.OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions 2. Results proportional contest (Federal List) 3. Election Day observation from. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 1

1. INTRODUCTION

The 7 December State Duma elections were the first to be held since the March 2000 presidential elections when Vladimir Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation. These elections were the fourth of its kind to the State Duma. The previous parliamentary elections took place in December 1999 and the OSCE/ODIHR then stated in its preliminary statement that, “The 19 December (1999) election of deputies to the State Duma marked significant progress for the consolidation of democracy in the Russian Federation”. However, in 1999 the pre-election campaign was marked by a campaign in which candidates and the media waged negative attacks on their opponents. The International Election Observation Mission to the 26 March 2000 Presidential election stated in it preliminary statement that it ”[...] marked further progress for the consolidation of democratic elections in Russia”. However, at that time, the independent media was coming under increasing pressure and as during the previous State Duma elections, important segments of the media, both state-controlled and private, failed to provide impartial information about the election campaign and candidates. As the above as a backdrop, the IEOM to the 7 December Parliamentary Elections said in its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions that the Central Election Commission (CEC) was to be credited for its high level of professionalism in arranging the elections, which were generally conducted in a calm and peaceful manner. It was also emphasized that a legal framework had been created, which provided the potential for genuine democratic elections. However, a number of shortcomings were pointed out, including the non-enforcement of important safeguards in the domestic legislation, which created unfair conditions for certain parties and candidates. The prime example given was the extensive use of the state apparatus and media favouritism to the benefit of United Russia. The aim of this report is to present the findings of the Norwegian observers. They cover key areas of the election process and also include observations done by the STOs on Election Day. The findings presented in this report in most cases corroborate with those in the EOM’s preliminary statement. Where this is not the case, due to for instance regional differences, this will be pointed out.

2. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The 7 December 2003 State Duma elections are the fourth parliamentary elections to be held since the Russian Federation proclaimed its independence in 1991. The largest number of deputies in the outgoing parliament belonged to the Communists Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). In 1999 the party won all together 113 seats. On second place came the Unity (Medved’) bloc with 73 seats followed by the Fatherland- All Russia bloc (68 seats), Union of Right Forces (SPS) (29), Zhirinovskiy bloc (17), Yabloko (20) and Our Home is Russia (7 seats). Most deputies in the outgoing parliament belonged to factions, of which the KPRF had the biggest single standing with 95 members. However, in front of these elections, attempts to erode its support base took place by creating alternative, pro-presidential parties led by ex-Communists (e.g. Rodina [Motherland] bloc and Rebirth of Russia). However, the KPRF has inherited an effective countrywide organization from the Soviet times and has a large disciplined base of supporters. In 2001 the Unity and the Fatherland-All Russia blocs merged into United Russia. The merger made it the biggest party in the Duma, although the two entities remain separate identities as factions. United Russia is RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 2 referred to as the “party of power” since it strongly supports President Putin. The latter publicly announced his support for the party in September 2003. This, United Russia exploited for what it was worth in their campaigning, not the least because the President is looked upon as being an able and strong leader and he consistently scores high in public opinion polls. In front of these elections, the prominence of key state officials on United Russia’s proportional list caused controversy. Apparently, many of the front-runners clearly had no intentions to take up post in the State Duma if elected since they already were occupied or were running for other influential positions. In 1999, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) lead by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy had to run as Zhirinovskiy bloc after its registration as LDPR was refused. When it first contested the Duma elections in 1993, the leftist-nationalist LDPR polled highest, giving it the largest faction in the Duma. Results since that time have somewhat waned, especially in the previous Duma elections. Although it appears as being a “protest party” appealing to disaffected voters not supportive of the presidential programme, it has generally supported the government, hence the term “pseudo-opposition”. The Union of Right Forces (SPS) is one of the main two liberal opposition parties. One of its front-runners on the proportional list was Anatoly Chubais, who heads the state monopoly electricity supplier United Energy Systems. SPS was the only major party having a woman as one of their top nominees (Irina Khakamada, no. 2 on prop. list). The other main liberal party is Yabloko headed by one of its founders - Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. It is one of the oldest parties in Russia and one of few which has a comprehensive political programme and platform. The arrest of Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorovskiy prior to the elections negatively impacted on Yabloko since he was one of the party’s main financial backers. Apparently, he also financially backed SPS and the KPRF. For the 2003 State Duma elections, a total of 18 political parties and five blocs were registered by the CEC in the federal proportional contest. In all, 3,400 candidates were competing for the 225 proportional seats in the Duma. The most important parties/blocs contesting the 2003 Duma elections include:

RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 3

Pro-presidential/government

Party bloc Chairperson

English name Russian name United Russia Edinaya Rossia Boris Gryzlov (Minister of Internal Affairs)

Peoples Party of the Narodnaya Partiya Gennadiy Raykov Russian Federation Rossiskoy Federatsii

Party of Russia’s Rebirth/ Partya Vozrozhdeniya Rossii/ Gennadiy Selenyov (State Russian Party of Life Rossiyskaya Partiya Zhizni Duma Chairman) & Sergey Mironov (Federal Council Chairman)

OPPOSITION

Communist Party of the Kommunisticheskaya Partya Gennadiy Zyuganov Russian Federation Rossiskoy Federatsii Union of Right Forces Soyuz Pravykh Sil Boris Nemtsov & Irina Khakamada (Deputy-Chairwoman of State Duma) Yabloko Yabloko Grigoriy Yavlinskiy

POLITICAL ORIENTATION UNCLEAR/AMBIVALENT

Liberal-Democratic Party Liberal’no-Demokraticheskaya Vladimir Zhirinovskiy of Russia Partiya Rossii Motherland Rodina Sergey Glyazev & Dmitriy Rogozin Agrarian Party of Russia Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii Mikhail Lapshin

In the single-mandate districts (SMD), approximately 2,000 candidates were contesting the 225 seats distributed through single-member constituencies. Of these candidates, around 730 ran as independent. The highest number of candidates to be fielded in a SMD was in # 161 where there were 25 contestants for one seat. The largest number of candidates running in the majoritarian races belonged to LDPR (171), KPRF (169) and United Russia (141). Otherwise, two constituencies only had two candidates (# 129 & 224) and in Chechnya only three candidates participated in the single-mandate race.

1 Karachayevo-Cherkessya RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 4

3. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

The EOM stated in its preliminary statement that the legal framework complies with both OSCE commitments and other international standards relating to democratic elections, but that the length and complexity of the legislation makes the law unduly complicated for ordinary citizens. The elections are governed by several detailed laws, most notably the Duma Election Law (DEL) and the Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights Law (‘the Basic Guarantees Law’ or BGL). The present Duma Election Law was adopted in 2002 in order to implement the Basic Guarantees Law. Other laws of relevance for the Duma elections include the Law on Political Parties (2001), the Law on the Mass Media and the Law on the State Automated System (GAS Vybory) (2003). Regarding the DEL, the EOM pointed out that the law fails to make a distinction between serious and minor violations as a basis for refusing or cancelling registration of a candidate. The EOM was also concerned about the rules restricting media coverage of the election since they appeared to be excessively strict (see also Media chapter). The Parliament of the Russian Federation is the Federal Assembly, divided into two chambers: the upper Federal Council and the lower State Duma. The Federal Council represents the 89 federal subjects and has 178 members, two from each subject. The State Duma consists of 450 members and they are elected through a mixed electoral system where 225 deputies are divided among parties that manage to pass the 5 per cent threshold. The other 225 seats are allocated single-mandate constituencies on a first-past-the-post basis. The legal framework covers all aspects of the elections and elaborates upon issues such as formation of constituencies and precincts, voter lists, transparency measures, nomination and registration of candidates and parties/blocs, obligations of state apparatus and officials, campaigning in the media, funding of the campaign, voting and counting, and complaints and appeals. In this report, the most relevant legal provisions will be outlined in accordance with the subject matter of each chapter.

4. THE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

It was the EOM’s assessment that despite logistical and geographical challenges, the CEC ensured that all levels of election commissions were well prepared and coordinated for Election Day. This was also confirmed by the LTOs. The election administration of the Russian Federation consists of a five-tier system. On the top is the Central Election Commission (CEC), followed by 89 Subject Election Commissions (SEC) (one for each federal subject). There are 225 District Election Commissions (DEC), 2,800 Territorial Election Commissions (TEC) and some 94,000 Precinct Election Commissions (PEC). The CEC, SECs and TECs are permanent commissions, while the DECs and PECs are formed specifically for the elections. However, in cases where federal subjects (39) only have one single-seat electoral district, the DEC coincides with the SEC. The CEC has 15 members: five members are appointed by the presidential administration, five by the Federation Council and five by the largest factions in the State Duma. In reality, this means that a majority of the CEC members are biased towards the president and his administration. It is the CEC that nominates the SEC chairperson, plus one more SEC member. The main responsibilities of the CEC are the following: RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 5

• Directs activities of lower level election commissions • Exercises control over observance of electoral rights of citizens and ensures uniform application of the law • Defines election districts for Duma consideration • Issues binding instructions regarding application of law and provides technical assistance to election commissions • Registers electoral blocs and federal lists, and certifies candidates and lists nominated in SMDs by parties and blocs • Oversees and ensures compliance with campaign finance, media access and financial disclosure rules • Designs forms of ballots, protocols, voter lists, petition forms, etc. and standards for technical equipment • Guides activities of commissions in use of state automated system (GAS Vybory) • Hears complaints and overturns decisions of lower commissions • Distributes funds for elections and oversees their distribution and use • Establishes and publishes results of the election

The number of members in the SEC is determined by the Federal Subject’s laws, but from what the LTOs observed in their areas, SECs would typically have 15 members. Half of them are appointed by the Subject legislature and the other half by the executive body. One-third of the members must be selected from nominees of political parties having factions in the State Duma and/or in the Subject’s legislature. No more than one-third of the members can be state officials. The SECs’ main duties are as follows: • Co-ordinates activities of the commissions within the Subject • Liases between the CEC and bodies of state power in the Subject’s territory • Prints and distributes ballots in accordance with CEC’s directives • Distributes funds to DECs and oversees their use • Establishes TECs and the numeration of precincts within the Subject • Ensures uniform use of state automated system (GAS Vybory) • Arranges delivery of absentee certificates and other documents to lower commissions in the Subject • Monitors compliance with vote counting and tabulation procedures within the Subject • Considers complaints and adopts decisions regarding actions and decisions of lower commissions

The DEC has from eight to 14 members. The members are recruited on the same basis as for the SEC. DECs are appointed in each single-mandate district. Below are listed the main responsibilities of the DEC: • Exercises control over compliance with electoral law within the district • Coordinates activities of TECs and hears complaints and adopts decisions regarding their actions and decisions • Registers candidates for the single-mandate elections who are self-nominated or nominated by voters • Ensures that campaign laws are observed by candidates, parties and blocs within the District • Approves text for single-mandate ballot and upon approval, arranges for printing • Controls provision of transport communications and logistical support to TECs and PECs • Monitors compliance with vote counting and tabulation procedures within the District • Determines results of single-mandate election and transfers data contained in lower commission protocols to the CEC

The TECs may have from five to nine members – the number being determined by the Subject’s laws. The territory usually corresponds to a rayon, city or other administrative unit. The members are appointed by the elected body of local self-government based on proposals of civic associations and no more than one-third of the members can be government or municipal employees. The TECs’ main responsibilities include: • Co-ordinates activities of precincts within the Territory • Organizes delivery of ballots and voting documents to precincts • Compiles voter lists for each precinct • Distributes funds to precinct commissions and oversees their use RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 6

• Together with DEC, the TEC ensures campaign laws are observed by candidates, parties and blocs within the territory • Issues absentee certificates to voters requesting them • Provides organizational and technical assistance to PECs • Monitors compliance with vote counting and tabulation procedures within the Territory and ensures compliance with procedures with procedures for use of the state automated system technologies • Establishes the results of the voting within the Territory • Delivers completed precinct protocols and tabulated results to the DEC • Ensures local results are given to the mass media

All depending of the number of voters in each precinct,2 the numbers of members in the PECs vary from three to 15 members. For instance, a polling station with fewer than 1,000 voters will have a PEC consisting of three to seven voting members. The members of PECs are appointed by legislative bodies of local self-government based on proposals from parties, blocs, public associations, meetings of voters at their residences, work place, etc. At least one-third must be appointed based on proposals from parties and blocs with factions in the Duma, Subject legislative body, or representative body of local self-government. Parties/blocs or public associations can only appoint one member each to the PEC and no more than one-third of the members can be government or municipal employees. The PEC conducts the following activities: • Notifies voters of name, address, phone number and hours of operation of the commission and time and place of voting • Updates the voter lists, provides opportunity for public inspection of the lists and hears complaints about corrections needed • Prepares the voting premises, ballot boxes and voting equipment • Informs voters about candidates on the basis of information provided by higher commissions • Exercises control of compliance with campaign rules in area of the Precinct • Issues absentee certificates • Organizes early voting and voting on election day • Organizes mobile voting for voters unable to come to the polling station due to age, illness or disability • Counts votes and determines voting returns for the precinct and delivers protocols to TEC • Within competence, hears complaints about violations of the election law and takes decisions • Ensures safekeeping and transfer of voting documents in accordance with procedures dictated by CEC

LTOs met with the SECs, DECs and several of the TECs within their areas of responsibility. Their general impression was that the various election commissions were well prepared in front of Election Day. All TECs had been supplied with new computers to be used to enter results into the GAS Vybory automated database and the staff operating the computers had received extensive training. The LTOs in Novosibirsk observed the SEC conducting a training session for TEC chairs and deputy-chairs, and were impressed by the professionalism of it. It was reported to LTOs that the SECs also trained their DECs, who in their turn would train the TECs within their constituencies. Most electoral commissions were very cooperative towards the LTOs, and the observers did not experience any particular problems in obtaining information and documents they requested. However, several interlocutors reported to LTOs that they had experienced cooperation problems with SECs and DECs. For instance, campaign staff of the SPS in Kemerovo told LTOs that the SEC had refused to accept complaints they had submitted regarding electoral violations. In Altai Krai, the local branch of Golos NGO told LTOs that in the more rural areas of the district, the composition of PECs was not according to the law because political parties were not orientated towards smaller settlements. The lack of political representation resulted in that PECs were made up of members of local administration and businesses only .

2 Each precinct may have up to 3,000 voters. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 7

5. VOTER AND CIVIC EDUCATION The July 2003 provisions regulating coverage by the media during elections dramatically limited the media’s possibilities to fully cover the campaign (see also Media chapter). Not until 30 October 2003 did Russia’s Constitutional Court clarify the law by limiting the most restrictive legal provisions on the media’s activities. However, the damage had probably already been done since many journalists refrained from covering activities of political parties to avoid being penalized. Consequently, up until 30 October, voters were more or less deprived of any in-depth political analysis of parties and blocs contesting the elections. Only for a limited time period before Election Day were voters able to get a more diversified picture of the political situation. It was the LTOs’ impression that voters were well aware of the upcoming elections and that they had good knowledge of election procedures. However, LTOs sensed a great deal of apathy among the electorate and many interlocutors expressed their concerns about low voter turnout. The CEC was encouraging people to vote on E-day, both through the national media and well as using visible material, such as billboards and banners. On a regional basis, the SECs would have spots on local TV-outlets informing viewers about the elections and voting procedures.

6. VOTER REGISTRATION

There were around 108,000,000 voters registered to participate in the elections. As previously mentioned, voter lists are compiled by the TECs using the GAS Vybory automated database system from information supplied by local authorities and branches of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). From 16 November, voter lists for all polling stations were available for inspection and amendment and voters who could prove their residence could be added to the lists until 16:00 on Election Day. While the public could access the lists, there was no legal requirement for them to be posted or displayed. Voters living in rural and inaccessible areas can conduct early voting. It is the DEC who organizes early voting and for the purpose mobile ballot boxes are used – the number of which is determined by the PECs. Those voters who wish to vote by mobile ballot may do so on the grounds of health and/or immobility. A written or oral request to vote in this manner must be submitted to the PEC no later than 16:00 on Election Day and the requests are noted down in a special mobile voting register. Russian citizens living abroad are entitled to vote in a SMD allocated to the country in which they reside. They participate in both the majoritarian and the proportional contests. For instance, around 100,000 Russian Jews living in Israel were allocated SMDs in the Tula region to cast their vote in. Voters unable to attend polling stations where they are registered may apply for an Absentee Voting Certificate (AVC) that can be issued by a DEC or a PEC prior to Election Day. Voters voting outside their district (i.e. SMD) may only participate in the proportional contest. LTOs noticed, however, that practises varied among PECs on how voters obtaining and using an AVC were registered. PECs who had issued AVCs either crossed out the voter’s name in the voter list or just left it open (i.e. without signatures). Special ledgers were however kept where voters who had received AVCs were entered. Voters using an AVC on Election Day were either added on the regular voter lists or entered into a separate list. On Election Day, there were instances were voters had gone to the incorrect polling station or did not find their name on the voter lists. As for the latter, this usually did not prevent them from voting as their name RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 8 was just added on to the list upon presentation of sufficient documentation proving their place of residence. LTOs were told by PECs that generally few voters had come check whether their name and correct address was on the voter list.

7. PARTY AND CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

The EOM noted that there were relatively few complaints and appeals submitted to electoral commissions and that most of them related to non-registration or de-registration of candidates. Of 24 CEC rulings on DECs’ refusals to register candidates, half were resolved in the candidate’s favour. The Duma Election Law stipulates that candidates may either be self-nominated or nominated by a registered political party or bloc. A party-affiliated candidate may both run in a SMD and be on the party’s proportional list, but a party or bloc may only nominate one candidate for each SMD. In order to successfully register as a candidate in the single mandate races, a candidate must either collect signatures of at least one percent of the registered voters within a single-mandate constituency (with a minimum of 1,000), or pay an electoral deposit at the level of 15% of the maximum permitted amount of the candidate’s electoral fund (RUR 900,000). The deposit is returned if a candidate receives at least 5% of the votes in the SMD. The Law on Political Parties (LPP) regulates the formation, structure, rights and obligations of political parties in the Russian Federation. In order to be registered as a political party, the party must have regional branches in more than half of the subjects of the Federation. It must also have at least 10,000 members with at least 100 members in more than half the subjects of the Federation. To run in the elections, a party/bloc must collect at least 200,000 signatures, with no more than 14,000 from any one federal subject, or pay a deposit of RUR 37.5 m. The sum is returned if the party or bloc receives at least 3% of the votes on a federal basis. Generally, only minor problems regarding candidate registration were reported to the LTOs. Mainly technicalities prevented candidates from being registered, such as insufficient/inaccurate signatures or not presenting sufficient documentation regarding campaign funds. As was also pointed out by the EOM, and also witnessed by the LTOs, some candidates initiated de- registration proceedings in order to remove rivals from the contest. In SMD # 125 – Novosibirsk, one of the main contestants initiated de-registration proceedings against one of the other front-runners. As long as court proceedings were taking place, the candidacy of the affected candidate was pending. Although the candidate won his case in the Supreme Court and had his candidacy upheld, the incident most likely harmed his campaign and he did not do well on Election Day. In Volgograd SMD # 71, the court overruled the DEC’s decision to refuse to register a United Russia affiliated candidate, although the DEC had received a large number of complaints regarding violations of the election law, including use of black PR and violation of budget regulations.

8. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

According to the EOM, there was no uniform pattern to the issues noted during the long-term observation of the pre-election campaign. The main problems observed were unequal treatment of certain parties and candidates at the hands of the state administration. The most widespread complaints concerned the use of administrative resources by the state apparatus on behalf of United Russia and its candidates. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 9

The official election campaign began on 7 November, although extensive activity had already been taking place for several weeks. The political campaign ahead of the opening of the campaign was dominated by speculation over the arrest of Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorovskiy, who was an important donor to certain political parties (e.g. Yabloko) and public associations. Prior to the official campaign opening, a lot of visible campaign material was on display in Russia’s larger cities. LTOs did not, however, notice a particular increase in campaigning after 7 November. The LTOs’ impression of the pre-election campaign was that it was rather quiet and low-key. This was also confirmed by many of their interlocutors. Only one week prior to Election Day did parties/blocs and candidates really become more active and visible.

Modes of campaigning Campaigning by parties/blocs and candidates running for the State Duma was carried out in the following ways: 1. Political advertising in the form of posters and billboards 2. Having information stands in the street 3. Door-to-door campaigning 4. Advertising in local newspapers or buying air time on local TV outlets 5. Meeting directly with voters by staging public meetings

Regarding the first point, a lot of campaign material was on display, particularly in Novosibirsk and to a lesser degree in Volgograd. This had the effect of highly visualizing the fact that elections were to take place. Basically all major parties/blocs and those majoritarian candidates who could afford it had bought advertising space in the streets. In Novosibirsk, the LTOs did not notice any campaign material on public buildings, while the Volgograd LTOs saw campaign posters for United Russia at the regional state-controlled TV station. Furthermore, LTOs noticed that those shops which had put up campaign material promoting a certain party would additionally have United Russia posters on display, “just to be on the safe side” as one interlocutor reported the LTOs. In Novosibirsk oblast’ (county), elections for Governor were to take place simultaneously with the Duma elections on 7 December, and that election added to the volume of street advertising. The use of visible campaign material was fairly balanced in Novosibirsk, while in Barnaul (Altai Krai) United Russia, followed by SPS, completely dominated the street picture. As for point two, LTOs noticed that the SPS, Yabloko and Narodnaya Partiya were seen having street stands in Kemerovo, Novosibirsk and Barnaul. Party activists could thereby meet voters and hand out election material. Some activists had also placed out a letterbox where the public could submit complaints and questions to the party or candidate running for election. Door-to-door campaigning was mainly conducted by the KPRF and LDPR and was an efficient way in reaching out to the voters. Such campaign methods were mainly conducted by those parties who had sufficient manpower. For instance, the LDPR told LTOs that they had over 800 party activists in Novosibirsk oblast’. Those parties/blocs and candidates who had sufficient funds employed the local media in their campaigning. The rates for political advertising in local TV outlets were high and ranged from 125,000 - 150,000 (approx. 5,000 USD) pr minute. Parties and candidates with lower budgets, such as KPRF, stated that they seldom advertised in local media. Rather they would rely on their vast network of party activists to propagate their ideas. Candidates running in the majoritarian races would have very busy schedules, often having as many as seven public meetings a day. The meetings would typically take place in ‘cultural houses’, schools or at various enterprises where candidates met with the employees and informed them about their candidacy and afterwards took questions from the audience. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 10

On a federal level, the LTOs’ areas of responsibility were visited by prominent candidates on the proportional list representing all major parties and blocs. Although LTOs received several allegations of abuse of administrative resources on behalf of United Russia, it was difficult for LTOs to substantiate the claims. In many cases it seemed that the alleged violations were not in direct conflict with the law, but committed in a way that circumvented the legal framework.

Campaign atmosphere Generally, the electorate seemed to be rather disinterested in the ongoing campaign, especially in those areas where the outcome already seemed to be clear. Interlocutors told LTOs that the reason for this was that the electorate had received far too little information about the candidates in their constituency from electoral bodies. Furthermore, LTOs were told that many people were reluctant to vote since they felt that their vote would not change anything. Although pre-election campaigning did not appear to be particularly active, tensions between candidates in certain SMDs were running high. An attempt at deregistering candidates upon the initiative of others has already been mentioned. Also prevalent in these elections was the abundance of “black PR” material. In Volgograd, however, there was reportedly less black PR this time compared to the mayoral election that took place in last September LTOs were given several examples of anonymously printed publications slandering certain candidates. These publications would typically have a very similar appearance to those officially issued by the affected candidate. Other black PR techniques included plastering leaflets (of a rival candidate) on cars and buildings without the owner’s permission – thereby sponsoring a reaction from that person that could create negative publicity around that candidate. As for other obstacles experienced, SPS candidates running on both the proportional list and in the SMDs of Kemerovo and Novokuznetsk had their billboards taken down only hours after they had been put up. A Yabloko candidate in Kalmykia experienced a similar fate. In Novosibirsk, posters of two candidates were defaced or destroyed in other ways. As for the defacement, LTOs were told from two independent sources that the rumour said it was the work of the candidate’s own campaign staff - thus to achieve sympathy and support for their candidate. And indeed, very surprisingly this candidate went on to win his constituency! In Volgograd oblast’, a Rodina campaign car was stopped and the activists detained for 3-4 hours. Apparently the police had received an anonymous phone call where it was claimed that the car was distributing “unknown material”. The police referred to an ongoing anti-terror campaign when asked why they undertook such drastic actions. Several candidates experienced more serious intimidation during their campaign. In Barnaul, unknown culprits paid the Party of Life/Rebirth of Russia’s candidate a threatening visit. Also, three of her candidate staff were attacked while putting up campaign material. In Novosibirsk, a close relative of the Rodina bloc’s candidate in SMD # 125 was beaten up. In addition, the candidate was offered money by activists of the United Russia candidate to withdraw his candidacy. In Elista (Kalmykia) the public meeting of a self-nominated candidate for the Regional Duma was stormed by security forces (OMON) upon receiving a call where it was claimed that fighting was going on. The candidate was seriously injured - having been severely beaten to the head and stomach.

RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 11

9. THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

The EOM’s general assessment of the media was that, “While Russia has a pluralistic media environment […], there is widespread concern over media independence.” Furthermore, the EOM observed through their media monitoring that state-funded television broadcasters failed to comply with their legal obligation to provide balanced and unbiased reporting on candidates and political parties. For instance, the state-owned channels (e.g. First Channel) exhibited clear bias in favour of United Russia and against the KPRF. Upon complaints on this point, the CEC instigated their own examination and came to the same conclusions, but failed to properly reprimand those channels that had breached the rules of equal treatment of participants in the election. As for the printed media, the coverage was more balanced. The state-funded newspaper Rossiskaya Gazeta was overwhelmingly pro United Russia, while the private Novaya Gazeta clearly opposed United Russia and gave a more balanced picture of the KPRF. In the regions, considerable pressure was exerted on media outlets not to provide voters with a wider range of opinion. The EOM noted that out of 24 regional media outlets they monitored, 19 gave clear support to United Russia. The Law on the Mass Media (LMM) regulates the media’s activities. The most contentious legal issue related to the media provisions adopted in July 2003. The intention behind these provisions was to prevent a repetition of the media situation that prevailed during the last Duma elections in 1999. At that time, much of the campaign rhetoric that forged public opinion was created by the media rather than by parties/blocs and candidates competing in the elections. However, the amended law had the effect of seriously restricting journalists’ opportunities to provide the audience with political analysis and led many into practising self-censorship. The Constitutional Court lifted the restrictions in October 2003, only five weeks prior to Election Day. The above situation, together with the recent closure of TV 6 and TVS - the last independent television channels with a national outreach - and credible reports of intimidation targeting independent news outlets, created unfavourable conditions for certain media bodies, especially those who had adopted a oppositional stance. The Duma Election Law (DEL) otherwise guarantees candidates, parties and blocs equal access to the mass media for election campaigning (DEL 8.4). Journalists are permitted to inform voters about the election but not to campaign. Journalists only campaign if their proven intention is to persuade their audience to vote in one way or another (LMM). Furthermore, all media and other costs of campaigning are to be met from the campaign funds (DEL 66.9). Participants are entitled to free air time (including TV debates) and print space in the state media to pursue their campaign. The allocation of free air time in state media is decided by lot. Some candidates complained to LTOs that ‘their’ spots were aired at unfavourable times, i.e. not prime time viewing. Others were exasperated about not being able to afford to advertise in the media. Although this situation is not particular for Russia only, calls were made for local authorities to “smooth out the economic differences between candidates” (sic). In Kemerovo oblast’ it was reportedly difficult for opposition parties and candidates to access local media outlets since the United Russia affiliated governor allegedly controlled everything in that county. Especially SPS had problems conducting their campaign through the media; apparently the Kemerovo proportional list candidate had been refused without explanation to utilize all his free air time on one of the regional state- controlled TV channels. In Novosibirsk, the local branch of state-owned TV station Rossiya was clearly in favour of United Russia and critical towards the KPRF. This was also the case in Volgograd and Kalmykia. Interestingly enough, in Novosibirsk the largest local TV outlet NTN4 was very critical towards United Russia and its affiliated candidates. They were more positive towards the KPRF candidates in the oblast’ and very strongly supported the incumbent governor Tolokonskiy, who was running for re-election. It is likely to believe that NTN4’s support of the governor contributed to keeping the channel on air. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 12

10. OBSERVATION ON ELECTION DAY

The EOM reported that in 95 percent of the polling stations, voting was positively assessed by STOs, and that the conduct of voting generally followed the established procedures. However, in around 30 percent of the stations, group and/or family voting was observed, greatly compromising the secrecy of vote. Problems regarding the completion of summary protocols were also widely reported.

Election day procedures Before Election Day, each PEC receives election material no later than four days in advance. Prior to E-day PEC members ensure that there are no campaign materials within 50 metres of the polling station. On Election Day opening procedures before opening of a polling station include that: • Unused Absentee Voter Certificates (AVCs) are cancelled and a protocol signed • At 08:00 (local time), the polling station is declared open by the PEC Chairperson • All stationary ballot boxes and mobile ballot boxes to be used on E-day are shown to be empty and then sealed. Also mobile ballot boxes used for early voting are shown to be sealed and their protocols displayed • The voter lists are shown to all present by the PEC Chairperson who hands them over to the responsible PEC members, who sign for them, after which voting then may proceed

Persons authorized to be in a polling station include: • Voters • Voting and non-voting members of PEC • Members of higher election commissions • Candidates, their agents or financial advisors • Party or bloc observers (e.g. proxies) holding a party authorization document • Journalists with media authorization • Domestic non-partisan observers holding an authority document • International observers with CEC accreditation

The following voter identification documents are accepted: (i) A valid Russian Federation passport; (ii) An official ID document replacing a passport (e.g., military ID); (iii) A Soviet Union passport with an inserted document certifying RF citizenship of holder.

Voting procedures include that: • The voter states his name and presents ID document to a PEC member upon which the PEC member checks whether (a) the voter is not recorded as having ’early voted’ (b) has not applied for mobile voting on election day and (c) is not recorded as having already voted. If not so recorded, the process continues • The voter enters his number of their ID document next to their name on the voter list and signs to receive ballot papers. The PEC member then issues two* ballot papers, one for the Federal Proportional contest and one for the SMD contest within that district. • The voter votes by putting any mark in the box next to the name of the candidate, party or bloc they support. Voters may also choose to vote ’Against All’. The voter then places the marked ballots in the ballot box. • A voter who makes a mistake may be issued with new ballot papers by a PEC member. The voter list is marked to indicate the event and the spoiled ballot(s) is signed and cancelled by the PEC member by snipping of its lower left corner.

*In areas where elections for mayor or governor where taking place simultaneously, voters would receive an additional ballot, resulting in a total of three ballots to be cast

The polling station closes at 20:00 (local time) at which time the PEC Chairperson announces that only voters already present in the polling station can receive ballot papers and vote. The closing and counting procedures at polling stations should be continuous and must be completed as soon as possible with no definite time limit. However, preliminary results should be ready within 24 hours after closing of the polling station in order for the data to be entered into the GAS Vybory automated counting system. In each polling station, results of the voting should be made public on a large white poster. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 13

Before opening the ballot boxes, the following procedures apply: • Unused ballots are counted and cancelled and the number is added to the number of spoiled and cancelled ballots. The total figure is announced and entered into the results protocol. Also the number of unused, cancelled AVCs, and number of received ballots is announced and entered into the protocol (all in this order). • Voter lists are reviewed by PEC members and, on each page, the following data is entered for both the proportional and single mandate contests: - Number of voters who voted - Number of voters issued ballots for voting inside polling station (PS) - Number of voters issued ballots for mobile voting outside of PS - Number of voters who voted early - Number of voters from PS issued AVCs by PEC - Number of voters from PS issued AVCs by TEC - Number of voters who voted using AVCs at PS • Each page is signed by each PEC member and the data is aggregated and announced by the PEC Chairperson and entered on the last page of the voter list, which is then sealed. Then the data is entered into the protocol.

No one except for the PEC Chairperson, Deputy Chair and Secretary is allowed to hold a pen during the whole process of sorting and counting and no more than two PEC members may be allowed to process the counting of ballots at any time. All persons present must have an unobstructed view of the whole process. After the mobile ballot boxes have been opened and the ballots sorted into the different contests, the stationary ballot boxes are opened. The ballots are taken out and placed with the ballots from the mobile boxes.

The sorting and counting procedures include that:

• The ballots are sorted into piles according to candidate, party, bloc or ’Against All’ or non-standard (i.e. unofficial or without signatures) or invalid • The voter’s choice as marked on the ballot is read out aloud separately • The standard ballot papers from the mobile ballot boxes are then placed with the ballot papers from the stationary ballot boxes • Once all the ballots have been sorted into piles, the number of ballots in each pile is counted. Counting ballots from different piles at the same time is prohibited. The results are announced and entered into the appropriate protocol. • Voting PEC members count the number of standard ballots in the stationary ballot boxes, announce the figure and enter into the protocol

After the control calculations have been carried out and the sums add up (if not, the PEC should conduct a recount), all election material is packed and sealed. Then all PEC voting members sign the results protocol and certified copies are given to all entitled to have it. Finally, the PEC Chairperson takes the protocol to the TEC.

At the TEC, the following procedures are to be observed: • Receiving of the PEC protocols, tabulation of results and compilation of the TEC protocol is to be done in the same room so that all actions can be observed. There should be an enlarged tabulation form displayed in the room and all incoming results are entered onto it immediately upon receipt of PEC protocols. • The TEC Chairperson receives the PEC protocol and goes through the tabulation together with the PEC chairperson. If serious mistakes or inadequacies are discovered, the TEC may take the decision to recount votes. • A TEC member brings the PEC protocol to the GAS Vybory computer and enters the data on it. The PEC chairman receives a receipt for each protocol.

Election Day Observation report from STO Erlend Hvoslef General information STO team 403 was based in the city of Pushkin, outside St. Petersburg. In the region the population was mostly Russian. The STOs had 38 polling stations (PECs) in their Area of Responsibility. Of these, the team visited 16 stations. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 14

The general tendency in the region was that the two parties supporting Putin (i.e. United Russia & Rodina) and the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia did very well, while KPRF, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces were the losers. Also the Party of Life/Rebirth of Russia and the Agrarian Party of Russia received a lot of votes. Pre--Election days The day before the election the STOs visited approximately 15 polling stations and spoke to the committee members. The team visited the TEC, but were not able to speak to the chairman. The STOs also spoke to people in the street in Pushkin. Most of the persons the team spoke to expected that quite few would vote (ranging from 40 to 50%). Several interlocutors criticized the media for using to much space on Rodina and United Russia. However, none expected major problems to occur on Election Day. STOs noticed that in the days before Election Day there were many persons handing out material from the different parties. Observation of opening The STO team spent 45 minutes in the first polling station where it observed the final preparations before opening and the procedures when the first voters arrived and voted. The team found nothing to complain about. Observation of polling During the day the STOs visited 15 more polling stations. All of them were situated nearby the city of Pushkin. The team did not notice any deliberate wrongdoings in any of the polling stations. Even non- deliberate faults were few. Upon arrival at a polling station, the PEC Chairperson would typically control the STOs’ accreditation and afterwards help them in any way they needed. Approximately 70% of the visited polling stations requested to see the STOs’ accreditation cards. The persons in charge at the polling station did not try to hide anything from the STO team. Except from peak hours, the polling stations were seldom too crowded and the two policemen,3 who were present in all stations the team visited, observed the situation in a calm and quiet way and did not interfere. As far as the STOs could see, there were not any (other) unauthorized people present in the polling stations. The PECs conducted their work quite efficiently and there were few instances of, e.g., family voting. In all the polling stations the STO team visited there were observers present representing the biggest parties. Interestingly enough, some observers, especially those from Rodina and United Russia, were wearing party badges. The observers had quite good vision from where they were seated. They did not address STOs with any complaints. Observation of counting The STO team observed the closing and counting at a rural polling station (PS # 1569) outside Pushkin and stayed there from 19:30 until the counting of ballots was finished and all the results had been entered into the protocol. At 20:00 the policemen were asked to leave the room and the door locked. The counting procedure started immediately. When the counting was completed, the results were written by hand into the protocol and signed by nine PEC members. The results were also written down on a board on the wall. Each STO received a hand written copy of the protocol signed by nine members of the PEC. Upon request, the domestic observers were given a hand written copy as well. The counting process was done in a calm, quiet and efficient way. The PEC Chairwoman controlled the whole process from behind her desk. The STO team checked the numbers and could not find any irregularities. The results showed that in the Federal Proportional contest, United Russia was the clear winner, followed by the Party of Life/Rebirth of Russia and LDPR.

3 Police officers are not specifically authorized to be present in polling stations unless they are (a) voting or (b) have been requested to enter to maintain law and order, but it is possible that separate authority may exist in each region. There were also reports of other uniformed personnel being present, such as firemen. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 15

Observation at TEC The STOs followed the protocol to the Territorial Election Commission (TEC) at about 01:45. The team stayed there until all the numbers in the protocol were verified and entered into the computer and electronically transmitted to the CEC in Moscow. There were quite many people at the TEC at this time of the night, but nevertheless the control and the computer work was done quite efficiently and in a calm and quiet way. Local observers were present and had a good view of the process. As far as STO team could see, everything was done according to the prescribed procedures. The team left the TEC at about 03:30. Generally speaking, it is the STO team’s impression that the elections in the region were carried out in a highly professional way with a professionally trained staff. Regarding composition of election commissions, they were made up of equal representation of the main parties and non-partisan members.

Election Day Observation Report from STO Indra Øverland General information Kazan is the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, which is located in the eastern part of European Russia. Most inhabitants of Tatarstan (Tatars) are Muslim. President Mintimer Shaimiev has led Tatarstan since the Soviet period. During the 1990s Tatarstan was one of the most independently-minded subjects of the Russian Federation, consistently pushing for increased independence from Moscow. Some commentators thought Tatarstan might eventually follow Chechnya’s example with an armed struggle for independence. Several factors have, however, hindered such a development – including the bloodiness of the conflict in Chechnya and the fact that Tatarstan is surrounded by Russian territory. Since 2000, Shaimiev has toned down the Tatar nationalist rhetoric and aligned himself as closely as possible with President Vladimir Putin Tatarstan had some of the highest voter turnouts and rates of support for the ruling parties during the 1990s, and the Tatar electorate is known for its loyalty to the existing powers. The picture during this parliamentary election was similar. Observation of polling Polling stations were well equipped and well organised. STOs did not observe any problems with queuing or crowd control. The voting lists seemed accurate and there were marginal numbers of voters who needed to register on the separate lists. There were no problems with campaign material around polling stations or family voting. Police were present inside all polling stations, though they were never observed trying to influence voters, interfering in the voting process or maintaining a threatening posture. There were few party observers and domestic observers. The party observers that were present were passive. Especially in rural polling stations there were disproportionately many observers from United Russia and two of the party’s predecessors - Unity and Our Home is Russia. The STO team was well received by all PECs and TECs. In one remote rural area, a PEC member claimed that local leaders had bribed voters with sausages, sugar or tea to vote for United Russia - the party associated with Shaimiev and Putin. He said that this activity also had an intimidating effect on locals: although no threats were made explicitly, they were worried about being excluded from small and transparent village communities. In the same area, there had previously been a conflict between candidates about the right to use municipal buildings for campaign meetings, but it was not possible to establish a direct link between the issues. Observation of counting The team observed the closure and count in a polling station in an urban part of Kazan. In this polling station, numerous formal procedures were skipped in order to speed up the count. The total number of ballot papers should have been counted before they were separated and counted according to party. Protocols should have been filled in with pens, the numbers read out loud and the protocols subsequently locked in a safe before the RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 16 count continued. None of this happened. When numbers failed to add up, they were simply altered in the protocol. This involved only a handful of votes and was not done in favour of any particular party, but nonetheless constituted a serious breach of the rules. The team accompanied the protocol and ballot papers to the TEC. The TEC was competent, well equipped and strict. The electronic transmission of results to Moscow seemed to work smoothly. Conclusions The Kazan LTOs mentioned in their debriefing that Tatarstan was considered by the EOM in Moscow to be one of the parts of the Russian Federation where the election was least democratic, although Tatarstan was not mentioned explicitly in the preliminary OSCE/ODIHR statement. To the extent that the LTOs’ comments were correct, the team’s experience does not support the EOM’s conclusions. Overall, the team felt that the result in the elections in Kazan reflected the will of the electorate - give or take a few per cent.

Election Day Observation Report from LTO Ragnhild Hollekim General information LTO team 6 was based in Volgograd and the team also covered the Republic of Kalmykia. The region of Volgograd is a densely populated area, counting approximately two million inhabitants, located along the lower part of the river Volga. The region has traditionally been a communist stronghold, also called “the Red Belt.” The traditional power structures have been seriously challenged the last few years though and a young, dynamic United Russia affiliated mayor now heads the town. The two parties fighting for power were United Russia and KPRF. Also visible was Rodina, while SPS and LDPR more or less openly co-operated with United Russia. Compared to Volgograd oblast’, the Republic of Kalmykia is much more sparsely populated and a little less than half of the population is made up of ethnic Kalmyks. Kalmykia borders on to Dagestan and is affected by the situation in Checnya by frequent and visible safety measures from the police and MVD. Ethnicity still plays a significant role in politics and there is said to be distinct power struggle between different ethnic groups and clans. The republic’s president - himself an ethnic Kalmyk - is allegedly trying to balance these forces to stay in power. The president openly supported United Russia and the party was expected to do well in Kalmykia.The LTOs were responsible for 6 STO teams, of which five were deployed to Volgograd city and one to Elista in Kalmykia. In all, the teams visited 53 polling stations. Observation of opening The STO teams reported that opening procedures were followed at all polling stations identified for the opening and that the process was good. Observation of polling In general, procedures were followed and with few exceptions, commission members appeared to be competent and diligent. STOs reported that they had observed family/group voting and open voting in a number of polling stations. Some teams reported cases of long queues and/or overcrowding due to regional elections taking place the same day and/or insufficient polling station premises. At the polling stations, no particular problems regarding the voter lists were reported. Proxies were present at every polling station visited by the STOs, but no domestic observers were seen. As for the composition of PECs, it turned out in several cases that all the non-partisan members belonged to the same company or institution. Some teams also reported that partisan members of PECs in several instances seemed uncertain about which party they were representing. The STOs did not observe any misuse of administrative resources on behalf of a particular party/candidate. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 17

Observation of counting and aggregation of results Out of 5 STO teams, only three were able to follow the whole process right up to observing at the TEC. The general picture of the counting was satisfying. No particular problems or disputes were reported and observers were given all relevant protocols.At the TEC, the designated STO TEC team reported that all procedures were followed and that the staff was competent.

Election Day Observation Report from LTO Jeremy Franklin General information LTO team 15 was based in Novosibirsk, but also covered Kemerovo oblast’ (east) and the city of Barnaul in Altai Krai (south). Novosibirsk is the third largest city in Russia, administrative capital of Novosibirsk oblast’ and the “capital” of Siberia. Novosibirsk town and Kemerovo oblast’ are highly industrialized areas. In Kemerovo oblast’ is situated the Kuzbass coal and iron ore basin that provides large industrial plants in towns such as Kemerovo, Leninsk-Kuznetskiy and Novokuznetsk with raw materials. The territory of Altai Krai is less urbanized and has strong agrarian traditions. Consequently, the territory is poorer and less developed than its neighbouring oblasts in the north. Incidentally, Mikhail Lapshin - leader of the Agrarian Party of Russia - is from Altai Krai. LTOs were told that all three areas had traditionally been communist strongholds, but that things had changed in the past few years. For instance, one interlocutor described Novosibirsk as “having turned pink.” Until recently, the governor of Kemerovo oblast’ Aman Tuleev was the ”second most famous communist in Russia” (sic) until he decided to support United Russia in 2002. Consequently, the governor publicly embraced and gave his support to all United Russia candidates running in Kemerovo county’s four single mandate districts. Allegedly, the governor of Altai Krai had done the same in his territory. Although United Russia certainly was very visible, neither LTOs, nor STOs observed any examples of abuse of administrative resources on that party’s behalf. The outcome of the single mandate races in Kemerovo oblast’ and in Altai Krai seemed relatively clear. In comparison, the contests in three SMDs (nos. 125, 126 & 127) within the boundaries of Novosibirsk town were much more undecided. The LTOs were given nine STO teams who were deployed throughout the AoR. In all, the STOs covered eight SMDs: three in Novosibirsk, four in Kemerovo oblast’ and Barnaul SMD in Altai Krai. On Election Day the teams visited in all 109 polling stations. After receiving the regional briefings on 5 December, the STOs were immediately deployed to their respective areas of responsibility. The STOs spent the next day familiarizing themselves with their AoR, locating TECs and polling stations in front of Election Day, which was on the following day. Observation of opening The STOs reported back to their LTOs that all opening procedures were followed and that they had not observed any irregularities. The opening process took place in a calm and orderly atmosphere. Observation of polling According to the STOs, the voting process seemed to be well organized, orderly and according to the procedures. No cases of intimidation or fraudulent practise were reported, neither were there any problems with the voter lists or mobile voting. However, in 55 out of 109 polling stations visited, cases of group/family voting were reported. In 35% of the visited polling stations, open voting was observed. The LTO team also noticed this tendency when they towards the end of the day visited a few polling stations. Both LTOs and STOs noticed that there was a lack of incentive for voters to vote by secret ballot since there in most polling stations were strategically situated tables with pens affixed to them, encouraging voters to fill in the ballots outside the voting booth. LTOs RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 18 furthermore noticed that in several polling stations there was no strict control over the ballot paper once it had been handed out and it seemed easy to just take the ballot and leave the station. Party observers (proxies) were usually present at the polling stations, the numbers sometimes reaching 9-10. Very rarely did they approach STOs and when they did, the complaint was not of a serious nature. In some cases, it was reported that proxies were sitting very close to the ballot box evidently trying to see how people had voted. STOs reported that electoral commissions seemed to be well prepared, trained and up to the task. Political parties were generally not strongly represented in the PECs, with the exception of United Russia and KPRF. Observation of counting and aggregation of results. In most cases, STO teams reported that the counting process was completed in accordance with prescribed procedures. Generally, completing the protocols took a long time - in some instances up to 2.5 hours. There was one instance where a PEC chairperson calculated the control figures to make them ‘fit’ into the protocol. Although some teams had to wait a long time for the completion of protocols and the subsequent transfer of voting material to the TEC, all nine STO teams were present at their TECs during verification, transmission and aggregation of results. At several TECs there were queues of PEC Chairpersons waiting to submit their protocols to the TEC Chairperson. However this did not cause any problems and generally the TECs faithfully observed electoral procedures. Neither did domestic observers present report any violations to the STOs.

11. THE REVIEW OF COMPLAINTS PROCESS

The EOM noted that there were relatively few complaints and appeals submitted to electoral commissions and courts during the campaign period, as compared to the number of complaints not pursued through formal channels. Complaints against electoral commission decisions and appeals to the courts were generally handled promptly. The Basic Guarantees Law (BGL) states that the acts and omissions of electoral commissions may be appealed to the next higher commission (BGL 75.6) or to a court (BGL 75.1). Furthermore, the BGL sets out clear deadlines for the consideration of complaints by courts and electoral commissions. There is now a broad range of administrative sanctions and/or criminal penalties covering election-related malpractice, including interfering with or obstructing the work of electoral commissions and observers, failing to provide election results to observers, and failure to fulfil the decisions of electoral commissions. In the LTOs’ AoR a number of complaints were forwarded and usually settled at the level of either the DEC or the SEC. Most of the complaints dealt with registration/de-registration of candidates, distribution of black PR and media campaigning. As also stated in the EOM’s preliminary statement, many of the candidates and parties the LTOs met with were reluctant to submit formal complaints to electoral bodies. There may have been several reasons for this. For instance, one campaign activist told the LTO team that his candidate no longer had any dealings with the DEC or SEC since they were so late in addressing complaints filed by the candidate. On the other hand, judging by the nature and amount of complaints filed to the commissions, it is reasonable to believe that electoral commissions were overworked, especially during the last days leading up to the election.

RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 19

12. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the Election Observation Mission recognized some positive trends, it noted that in comparison to the 1999 elections, the increased concentration of executive power at the central levels of government contributed to an electoral environment in which there was less possibility for equal competition. In most cases the findings of the Norwegian observers, especially those of the LTOs, correspond to those of the EOM, the major exception being the issue concerning misuse of administrative resources, which LTOs were not able to verify directly. Although there were certain shortcomings, the legislative framework for these elections was comprehensive and updated – having been amended in 2002. The election administration conducted its activities in a professional and efficient manner. However, composition of lower level electoral commissions was often politically unbalanced. Therefore, a more stringent practise for appointing members to electoral bodies with the aim of preventing one company/institution having a majority of members in electoral bodies is to be recommended. No particular problems were reported concerning voter registration. As for candidate registration, eligible candidates were usually successfully registered by the DECs. Where there were de-registrations, these tended to involve opposition candidates and often upon grounds that would appear to be relatively trivial. Consequently, non-registration and de-registration should be permitted only on the grounds of serious violations of candidacy rules and they should have an opportunity to remedy errors in their nomination papers. The election campaign was generally calm and low-key and political parties and candidates reported relatively few problems to the LTOs. It was mainly opposition parties that experienced obstacles in their campaigning and some violent episodes took place - targeting candidates running in single mandate districts. During these elections, the media situation was unbalanced. The televised media tended to favour the president-supported United Russia, while it was most negative towards KPRF. In addition, legal provisions restricting the activities of the media induced journalists to practice self-censorship - thus limiting the amount of election information reaching the public. The international observers generally had a positive impression of Election Day and polling took place in an orderly and calm atmosphere. However, numerous examples of open voting and family/group voting were observed – compromising the secrecy of vote. It is therefore recommendable that in the future, polling station officials are instructed to enforce prohibition against group voting. Observers also noted that there were more problems during the counting of the votes than the voting procedures.

13. COMMENTS ON THE ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

The LTOs found the core staff located in Moscow very competent. They supplied LTOs with all relevant information and were attentive towards the LTOs needs and wishes. Upon arrival, the LTOs received a quite comprehensive briefing. During the pre-election period, LTOs were twice summoned to Moscow and although it was very useful to meet individual members of the core team, the LTO meetings could have been more constructive and informative. For instance, the core team’s questions to the LTOs very often resulted in LTOs just repeating information they had already submitted to Moscow in their weekly reports. The unfortunate decision regarding the arrival and return date of STOs and the consequences it had for them should also be commented upon. It was decided by core-team that STOs should only fly Aeroflot because of security considerations. This implied that they from some places (e.g. Volgograd), STOs would have to catch a very early flight back to Moscow. Consequently, some STO teams were not able to stay and observe the count to the end at the polling stations, let alone to go to the TEC. RUSSIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, 2003 20

APPENDICES 1. OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions 2. Results proportional contest (Federal List) 3. Election Day observation form