ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, pp 267± 285, 1997

Political change,democracy, and humanrights in

IVELAWLGRIFFITH

Theannals of Guyana’ s politicalhistory will surely record 1992 as anhistoric year,for that year was amilestonein thetransition from authoritarian politics to democraticpolitics. Also signi® cant was theemergence from the political wildernessof Cheddie Jagan. Having ® rst enteredpolitics in 1946, Jagan was oustedfrom power by the British in 1953, and again in 1964, in collusion with theUSA, becauseof his communist orientation. Ironically, though, it was the USAitselfthat helped to engineer his return to power in 1992. The circum- stances thatled to the re-emergence of Jagan, and his re-emergence itself, have usheredin a newera inGuyanese politics, one which spotlights the triumphs andpitfalls of democracy and human rights in South America’ s onlyEnglish- speakingrepublic. Politicalanalysts accept that the status and conduct of both democracy and humanrights in various parts of the world are in¯uenced by the nature and operationof the political regime governing a particularsociety. With this in mind,this article examines the relationship between regime change and democ- racyand human rights in Guyana. The analysis shows that there has beenboth changeand continuity over the past decade; change in regime and regime politicsand policies, and continuity in regime policies that conditioned the environmentto pursuedemocracy. In Guyana, the constitution and the approach ofpolitical elites incorporate civil and political rights as wellas economicand socialones. However, given the link between the attainment of the latter set of rightsand the economic health of society on the one hand, and Guyana’ s economicdoldrums on the other, it is unreasonableto expect any major near-termadvancement in economic and social rights.

Democracyand human rights in context FollowingSchmitter and Karl, democracy is usedhere to mean a system of governancewhere rulers are heldaccountable for their actions by citizens, acting throughcompetition and cooperation of their elected representatives. 1 This approachgoes beyond the formalistic, institutional approach, which de® nes democracyessentially as electoraldemocracy. 2 Electionsare centralto democ- racy.But because they are periodiccontestations where interest aggregation and representationare centredaround individual candidates or political parties, it is

IvelawL Grif® this attheDepartment of Political Science, Collegeof Arts andSciences, DM483University Park, Miami,FL 33199,USA.

0143-6597/97/020267-19$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 267 IVELAW LGRIFFITH importantto extend the de® nition of democracy to participation and policy choiceon a continualbasis andoutside parties, through interest groups and other socialmovements. Electionsconstitute a criticallegitimising mechanism in democracies. Hence, theyare necessary,and they need to be free andfair. But as LarmanWilson noted,` Toooften there is apreoccupationwith elections and ª procedural democracyº, andthe assumption that if theyare free,that is tantamountto being democraticor havinga democracy’. 3 Itis unrealisticto use electionsas thesole measure ofdemocratic strength. Douglas Payne, formerly the top Latin America andCaribbean analyst at Freedom House, is quiteright in observing:` Toassume thatelections alone are anaccurate gauge of the health of democracy is naive at best’ .4 Thus,for this writer democracy must provide for the exercise of civil andpolitical rights unencumbered by instrumentsof state coercion, whether with force,such as throughmilitary or police agencies, or without force, such as throughpartisan or corrupted judiciaries. A democraticenvironment must, therefore,re¯ ect the following: scope for political participation, central to which are free andfair elections; access todecision makers andinstitutions of government;responsiveness by political rulers; functionalcourts; and uncen- soredmedia. Humanrights thinking in Guyana, as re¯ected in domestic legal instruments, statementsby political leaders, and charters of human rights non-governmental groups,has beenin¯ uenced by both liberal and communalist thinking. 5 More- over,the approach to human rights is aninclusive one, encompassing civil and politicalrights as wellas economicand social rights. As mightbe expected,over theyears sinceindependence in 1966, there have been changes in emphasis amongthe various categories of rights, re¯ ecting shifts in the focus of the internationalcommunity, and domestic political and economic struggles. Central tothe nature and conduct of these struggles has beenthe nature and scope of politicalchange.

Political change Onetypology of political regimes that explains political change in developing countrieslike Guyana is thatused by Joe Hagan.It describes ® vekinds of regimesalong a spectrumof close cohesion through to high fragmentation: dominanceby a singleindividual; dominance by a singlecohesive party with established,autonomous bureaucracies and institutions; dominance by a single partywith factional divisions; power sharing by arulingparty with one or more minorparties or groups; and no clear dominant group or a coalitionof autonomousgroups. 6 Irrespectiveof which regime typology is used,though, regimechange can be detected by observing the dynamics of the various domesticpolitical arenas, among them the cabinet, the legislature and the politicalparty of the regime leader(s). Alongwith his typology of regimes, Hagan developed a typologyof regime change.Under his schema, a TypeI regimechange is limitedto the removal or resignationof a toppolitical leader, but one who is notthe effective .A TypeII changeinvolves a changein the effective head of state, but no 268 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA changein thebasic political composition of theruling group. Regime change of thethird type involves adjustments in the mix of groups or factions that comprisethe ruling coalition, but that do notalter the essential political make-up ofthe regime. Type IV changeis whereone political group or set ofgroups is replacedby another, through routinised, constitutionally sanctioned procedures. The® naltype of regime change is wherethe entire ruling group is forcedfrom of®ce byanother group through illegal or irregularmeans, such as a coup d’ Âetat.7 Overthe past 12 years Guyanahas experiencedthree sets ofregime change. Usingthe Hagan approach, the death of ForbesBurnham on 6 August1985 led toa TypeII change,involving change of the effective head of state, but no changein thebasic composition of theruling People’ s NationalCongress ( PNC). HughDesmond Hoyte, Burnham’ s PrimeMinister and First Vice President, was identi®ed as successor toBurnham by a jointmeeting of the PNC’ s Central Committeeand the Cabinet within two hours of Burnham’s death.Hoyte became simultaneously PNC leaderand state president, passing over , deputyleader and a formerprime minister, as wellas RandiChandisingh, PNC GeneralSecretary. The new regime pledged continuity at the party congress held twoweeks after Burnham’ s death,with Hoyte declaring ` Theleadership of the partyis pledgedto continue his [Burnham’ s] work’. 8 Withpresidential and parliamentary elections constitutionally due within sevenmonths of his accession to the presidency, Hoyte took the opportunity to `renew’the mandate of the PNC underhis stewardship, in elections held on 9 December1985. Guyana went through the motions of legitimacy without any realcorrelation between popular choice and political empowerment. As Perry Mars explained,Guyana’ s post-independenceelections have been less about choiceor changeof governmentthan a kindof nationalritual where contending partiesdramatise their particular mobilisation strategies. In that context, the rulingparty demonstrates its peculiar style of `neverloosing’ , ifnot necessarily `winning’, popularelections; opposition parties generally experiment with differ- entcombination tactics designed to demonstrate their popular appeal based on voterturnout at campaign meetings, rather than at theusually controversial polls. Inthis situation, ` thecampaign is thething, the elections a predictableanti- climax’ .9 UnderGuyana’ s electoralsystem, presidential and parliamentary elections are combined,and the leader of theparty with the largest parliamentary representa- tionbecomes president, having been earlier designated the presidential candidate andhead of the party list of candidates. There are 65seats inthe unicameral legislature,but only 53 are contesteddirectly. This is doneusing the list system ofproportional representation. Each of the 10 Regional Development Councils (RDCs) electsone representative for the Assembly, and the remaining two are identi®ed by the National Congress of Local Democratic Organs ( NCLDO). Electionsfor regional representation in the National Assembly and within the RDCsare alsoheld at the same time. 10 The1985 elections were contested by sevenpolitical parties, and according to the Elections Commission, the agency establishedunder the constitution to supervise national and local elections, the PNC won42 of the 53 directly contested National Assembly seats. The PNC was thus` returned’to power. 11 269 IVELAW LGRIFFITH

Thecircumstances described above would seem ostensiblyto constitute continuityrather than change. However, for reasons explainedbelow, those circumstancesset thestage for a typeof regime change, which, modifying the Hagantypology, could be called Type VI regimechange: where the dominant individualruler alters the composition of the cabinet and key government agenciesas partof a politicaladaptation of his regime. This change is not immediate;it takes place over a periodof time. The length of time would vary dependingon such factors as theamount of personal authority the ruler possesses, theorganisational strength or weakness of his party, the ideological matrixof the party, and local and foreign economic and political pressures. In anycase, thechange alters the political character of the regime, and in Hoyte’ s case, itsideological character as well. Thefailure of so manyof Burnham’ s prescriptionsand initiatives presented Hoytewith strong demands for change. Generally, the demands were for democratisationof the polity, respect for human rights, arrest andreversal of the economicdecline, renewal of con® dence in the general society, and foreign policyconduct commensurate with the then dramatically changing climate of internationalpolitics. Hoyte responded to all these areas, introducingboth substantiveand symbolic changes. These included privatisation, attraction of foreigninvestment, rapprochement with the USA, Venezuela,the UK andthe InternationalMonetary Fund, electoral reforms, an end to the harassment of the politicalopposition, and the removal of restrictionson themedia. He engagedin challenging,often dangerous, balancing acts inan effort to accommodate domesticand foreign pressures. Essentially,Hoyte engaged in what elsewhere I havecalled ` thepolitics of preservative adaptation’ . 12 Amongthe political reforms undertakenin the quest for preservative adap- tationwere the abolition of overseas voting,access byoppositionparties to state mediafor campaigning, the sanitising of thetainted voters list, reconstitution of theElections Commission, tabulation of the vote at the place of voting, and scrutinyof theelections process byforeign observers. Hoyte also reshuf¯ ed his cabinet,cut government bureaucracy by reducingthe number of ministriesfrom 18to 11, and clipped the political wings of some politicianswho were wedded toBurnham’ s agenda.In the latter respect, he reduced the authority of Prime MinisterHamilton Green, assigning him speci® c responsibilityfor little more thansports, and he removed Randi Chandisingh from his powerful party and governmentpositions. Chandisingh, then General Secretary of the party and a vicepresident of the government, was givena diplomaticassignment in Moscow. Inaddition, Hoyte engineered the resignation and exiling of the powerful Ministerof Health, Richard Van-West Charles, a son-in-lawof Burnham, who was knownin politicalcircles as `BabyJesus’ .(This,of course,was anindirect andsardonic reference to Burnham; he was God.)Moreover, Hoyte also rede®ned the relationship between the ruling PNC andthe government, abandon- ingthe principle of `paramountcyof theparty’ . Thiswas aprincipleintroduced byBurnhamin 1973,whereby the legislative, executive and judicial branches of thegovernment and all organisations and institutions in the country were made subordinateto the PNC.Hoytealso reorganised the party structure, ending 270 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA

TABLE 1 Results ofthe 1992Guyana Elections

Presidential PoliticalEthnic Votes PercentageSeats candidate partybase won oftotalawarded

CheddieJagan PPP-CivicIndian 162 058 53.5 28 1 8 5 36 HDesmondHoyte PNC African 128286 42.3 23 1 3 5 26 CliveThomas WPA Mixed 6 068 1.7 1 1 1 5 2 ManzoorNadir TUF Mixed 3 183 1.2 1 1 0 5 1 PaulTenassee DLM Indian 1 557 * 0 1 0 5 0 JosephBacchus NDF African 68 * 0 1 0 5 0 RobertGangadeen NRP Indian 114 * 0 1 0 5 0 LlewelynJohn PDM African 298 * 0 1 0 5 0 LindleyGeBorde UGI Mixed 134 * 0 1 0 5 0 Leslie Ramsammy URP Indian 1 343 * 0 1 0 5 0 WinstonPayne UWP African 77 * 0 1 0 5 0

Notes: * 5 Less thanone percent Figuresafter 1 inthe last columnrepresent allocationsbased on regionalelections PPPÐPeople’s ProgressiveParty PNCÐPeople’s NationalCongress WPAÐWorkingPeople’ s Alliance TUFÐTheUnited Force DLMÐDemocratic LabourMovement NDFÐNationalDemocratic Front NRPÐNationalRepublican Party PDMÐPeople’s Democratic Movement UGIÐUnitedGuyanese International URPÐUnitedRepublican Party UWPÐUnitedWorkers’ Party

Source: Councilof Freely Elected Heads ofGovernment, ObservingGuyana’ s Electoral Process, 1990±1992 ,Atlanta,1993. governmentfunding of partyoperations, by abolishingthe notorious Ministry of NationalMobilization. The party’ s bureaucracywas alsodownsized. All these actionsnot only constituted Type VI regimechange, they were also central to the democratisationof society.Ironically, they also set thestage for Hoyte’ s political demise,and the third regime change in a decade. Thethird regime change was aTypeIV change.It involved the replacement ofDesmond Hoyte and the ` new’ PNC byCheddie Jagan and the Progressive PartyPeople’ s ( PPP)ÐCivicby constitutionally sanctioned means. Following electionson 5 October1992, where 11 political parties competed, Jagan was swornin as presidenton 9 October1992. After the 7 December1992 meeting of the 10 RDCsandthe 12 December 1992 meeting of the NCLDO, part of the process ofconstituting the National Assembly, the parliamentary power distri- bution was: PPP-Civic36 seats, the PNC 26seats, theWorking People’ s Alliance (WPA)twoseats, andThe United Force ( TUF)lseat (see Table1). 13 The1992 regime change is signi®cant for several reasons. As the® rst timein 28years whenboth the international community and all political parties in the 271 IVELAW LGRIFFITH countryagreed that the elections were free andfair, it is avitalstep along the roadto democratic reconstruction. Moreover, with these elections Guyana joined therest ofSouth America in holding internationally accepted elections. In addition,the elections demonstrated the maturity of the Guyanese electorate in eschewingthe politics of violence despite efforts in some quartersto promote this.However, they also indicated a continuationof racial politics, since voting occurredmainly along racial lines. As RalphPremdas pointedout, ` the PPP-Civic victoryas wellas the PNC supportand indeed the entire election was animated bycommunal sentiments that suffused and shaped voter preference’ . 14 The1992 elections are alsotestimony to how dogged persistence, persever- anceand commitment to ideals can pay off. Cheddie Jagan was ®nallyable to rise fromthe ashes ofthe past and secure theposition he long sought: political controlover Guyana. At his inauguration he remarked: After Ihadbeen declared the winner of the Central Constituencyat the 1947General Elections, I said` We,the People, have won!’ Fourty-® ve yearslater, lcannow say once again: ` ThePeople have won.’ ¼ After Guyanagained independence,I wrotein 1966, at the end of my book, TheWest on Trial : `The strugglewill be longand hard, and sacri® ces will be many,but time and history are onour side, and win we shall.’ 15

Beyondregime change Asnotedearlier, elections are keyto regimelegitimacy in a democracy,but they donot constitute democracy. Hence, in assessing thedemocracy± human rights nexusin Guyana, we needto go beyondelections and examine participation and policychoice in thecontext of otherinstitutional and behavioural aspects ofcivil society.In this respect attention will be paid to constitutional reform, the military,the media and the courts. Awellestablished principle of democraticgovernance is thatsuch governance mustbe carriedout under the rule of law. In thatrespect, the precept and practice ofdemocracyare oftenjudged, and correctly so, against a nation’s fundamental lawÐits constitution. Guyana’ s constitutionpledges ` torespecthuman dignity andto cherish and uphold the principles of freedom, equality, and democracy andall other fundamental human rights’ . Italso resolves ` toestablishthe State onfoundations of social and economic justice, and accordingly by popular consensus,after full, free, and open discussion, debate, and participation’ . But formost of the years between1980, when the constitution was adopted,and 1992,when the party that introduced it was vanquished,this pledge was honouredmainly in the breach. Mostof the concerns about actual and potential power abuse under the constitutioncentred around the presidency. Two respected Guyanese scholars expresseda viewshared by many people within and outside the country: ` Ina realsense thePresidential system, as indeedthe Constitution of whichit ispart, is aproductof the political and economic crises [now]existing in Guyana. As such,it is morelikely to beaninstrument for the exercise of absolutepower than oneof social cohesion and for solving the many problems facing the nation.’ 16 ThusGuyana observers have seen theneed for constitutional reform, both to 272 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA removethe structural basis forthe subversion of democracy and human rights, andto make the constitution more consonant with changing domestic realities, especiallyin relation to the pursuit of socialism, which failed miserably in Guyanaand elsewhere. Constitutionalreform was alsoon thelocal political agenda. Both the PNC and the PPP-Civicmade it a keyaspect of their 1992 electioneering. The PNC manifestopromised that ` oneof the® rst tasks ofaHoytegovernment would be toreview the constitution of our country’ . Itargued that ` thepolitical and economicpolicies which have been pursued since 1985 are so diametrically opposedto those which were followed in the past that there is nowan obvious needto reconsider and fashion together the kind of constitution that Guyanese needfor their further evolution’ . 17 Forits part the PPP-Civicoffered some fairlyspeci® c propositions:

The PPP/CivicGovernment recognizes the urgent need for constitutionalreform. We proposethat (a) theFundamental Rights Section of our Constitution be preserved and strength- enedwherever possible; (b) theDirective Principles be reviewedand abandoned where irrelevant, inapplica- ble,or inappropriate; (c) thepowers of theElections Commission be moreadequately and unambiguously de®ned and its composition reviewed. The PPP-Civic,if elected,will propose that the powers of thePresident be reduced sothat both the President and the Of® ceare more accountable to the people. Inaddition to the above, the PPP-CivicGovernment will invite the views of all political,cultural, social, and other organizations and the community as a whole,to joinin a meaningfulway in fashioning a Constitutionwhich will serve Guyana. 18 PresidentJagan sent mixed signals about his commitment to constitutional reform.At one time he declared that nothing was basicallywrong with the constitution’s provisionsrelating to the presidency; it was justthe manner in whichthey were used, he said. At another time he announced that a consti- tutionalreview commission would be created, even mentioning the name of constitutionalscholar Harold Lutchman as acommissionnominee. 19 The com- missionwas neverappointed. However, a parliamentaryresolution was adopted inlate1994 endorsing reform and creating a ParliamentarySelect Committee on theConstitution to pursue it. Curiously, in September 1996 the Committee announcedthat it did not anticipate presenting a reportand a draftrevised constitutionbefore May 1997 less thana yearbefore the elections were due, and toolate to take effect before the elections. Thisfoot-dragging on constitutional reform is agreatdisappointment to peoplewho invested trust and con® dence in the new regime, counting on it to createthe structural and functional mechanisms for the furtherance of democracy andhuman rights? And what better place to havebegun but with the fundamen- tallaw that is botha symbolof democratic ideals and the instrument that guaranteesa wholerange of humanrights? However, it wouldappear that, after the PPP-Civichad secured power, Jagan was comfortablewith the range of powersand immunities attached to the very ` imperialpresidency’ he had condemnedwhen in opposition, and was reluctantto take concrete measures to 273 IVELAW LGRIFFITH changethem. One assessment ofhis ® rst twoyears inof® ce concluded:` If the Guyanasociety is tomove from its present uneasy calm to a cohesiveand dynamicentity constitutional change remains the prime item on the agenda and itsabsence the major failure over the last two years’ . 20 Thisis stilla credible proposition. A1994controversy that centred around a constitutionalguarantee highlights theneed to reformthe constitution. As mentionedearlier, the approach to human rightsin Guyana has beenin¯ uenced by both liberal and communalist views. Underthe present constitution, which was adoptedin 1980 when Guyana was ¯irtingwith socialism, human rights guarantees extend to civil and political rightsas wellas socialand economic ones. Chapter 2 ofthe constitution addresses severalmatters in the latter category, providing for rights to work, medicalcare, leisure, housing and free education.On the question of education, Article27 proclaims:` Everycitizen has theright to free educationfrom nursery touniversity as wellas atnon-formal places where opportunities are provided foreducation and training’ . Free educationfrom primary to university level was introducedin 1975. The PNC was therebyable to give expression to its belief about education and its placein society,even before the 1980 constitution was adopted.The government was ableto absorb the full cost of education. But that was initiallyat a timeof relativeeconomic buoyancy. As thepolitical and economic crises thatlater grippedthe country worsened, the provision of free educationbecame a huge burden,such that in the latter years ofthe Hoyte government partial abandon- mentof this social rights venture was nolonger in doubt. TheUniversity of Guyana ( UG)®nallyannounced in 1993 that from the 1994±95 academic year there would be ` costrecovery’ . Studentswould be requiredto pay the Guyana dollar equivalent of betweenUS$1000 and US$1500 annually,depending upon their programme of instruction.As mightbe expected, thisannouncement was metwith condemnation, protests, hunger strikes and litigationby student groups. Students moved to the High Court, which has originaljurisdiction on constitutional matters, claiming that the government was violatingtheir constitutional rights under Article 27 oftheconstitution by having UG,astateinstitution, charge them for education. 21 Afterconsiderable delay, the courtrendered a decisionin 1996, rejecting the students’ contention. Thisoutcome notwithstanding, the case callsinto question the issue ofthe meaningand value of rights under the constitution. It is wellrecognised that, whilerights such as thoseto life,assembly, privacy and property are fundamen- taland judicially enforceable, the economic and social ones identi® ed in Chapter 2ofthe constitution are akinto expressions of societal desire, and their ful®llment is dependenton a society’s levelof economic development. This matteris acleardemonstration of theincongruity between the existence of social rightsin the constitution and the patent inability of the society to ful® l those rights.22 Itis amatterthat needs attention by way of constitutional review. Guyanahas beenone of the few Anglophone Caribbean countries to use the militaryas aninstrument of political rule and an agent for the subversion of humanrights. It is thereforeimportant to examine how this institution ® ts into thecontemporary political matrix. It should be remembered that the militaris- 274 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA ationwhich Guyana experienced in the 1970s and the early 1980s did not occur inthe sense ofFiner’ s de®nition of militarisation, as `thearmed forces’ substitutionof their own policies and or their persons, for those of the recognizedcivilian authorities’ . 23 Rather,the Guyana case was akinto Nordlinger’s, where` civiliangovernors obtain loyalty and obedience by pene- tratingthe armed forces withpolitical ideas and political personnel’ . 24 Conse- quently,the military, used here to refer tothe Guyana Defense Force ( GDF), the GuyanaNational Service ( GNS),theGuyana People’ s Militia( GPM) and the GuyanaPolice Force ( GPF),becamepractically an arm oftheruling PNC, and was compensatedwith accretions of money, equipment and personnel. 25 The ruling partyused the military to helpsubvert elections, harass critics,and often as scab laborwhen there were politically-motivat edindustrial disputes. The military pledgedloyalty to the PNC andBurnham, not to the constitution or to the state. Duringthe Burnham era therewas littleif any distinction between the security ofthe state and the security of the regime, and hence the military was usedfor both. AfterDesmond Hoyte took power in 1985he adopteda differentapproach to therole of the military in society. The military continued to have political, militaryand economic security mandates, but there were appreciable policy and operationaldifferences in these areas, inaddition to the assignment of a new role:that of diplomaticsecurity. 26 Trendswere such that the following view was expressed: `Guyana’s newdirection offers hopethat it will merely be a matter oftime before those interested in full depoliticization of the military and the democratizationof society win over those dedicated to Burnham’ s agendaand initiatives’. 27 Thattime has come.There is nopossibility of a returnto the Burnham approach.Although Hoyte had adopted a differentapproach to the military, and despitepronouncements from the military high-command that the army would notmeddle or be co-opted in politics, there was stillconcern in some quarters locallyand abroad that the military had not been fully depoliticised; that they woulddisplay praetorian tendencies and perhaps declare martial law during the 1992elections, in orderto guarantee a PNC victory.That fear didnot materialise. Moreover,since the elections the army has reachedout to the government, promisingto honourtheir pre-election pledge to abide by thepopular choice, act accordingto their constitutional mandate and be aprofessional,apolitical force. 28 Neitherthe army nor the police has qualmsabout working with a government formedby a partythat once hurled scurrilous and vitriolic remarks atthem. The headsof the military and paramilitary agencies are fullyconscious of the dramaticchanges domestically and internationally and of the implications for theirinstitutions and the nation of workingoutside the popular and constitutional frameworks.Hence the pledge to uphold democracy and human rights in the country.29 Theright to free speechis so centralto the preservation of democracyand the exerciseof humanrights that scholars often invoke Voltaire’ s famousassertion: `Idisapproveof what you say, but I willdefend to the death your right to say it’. TheMacBride Commission on theStudy of CommunicationProblems called thefreedom of expression ` oneof democracy’ s mostprecious acquisitions’ , 275 IVELAW LGRIFFITH notingthat, ` Thepresence or absence of freedom of expression is oneof the mostreliable indications of freedom in all its aspects inany nation’ . 30 In the Guyanesecontext, as elsewhere,it was acceptedthat this freedom extended to freedomof the press andfreedom of citizens to criticise their government. The preceptalso included the right to holdopinions and to receive and impart ideas. However,the reality in Guyana during most of the early post-independence years was onewhere government dominance of the media, currency controls, restrictionon press importsand judicial decisions combined to create an environmentwhere these freedoms were curtailed rather than permitted or encouraged.Not only did this suppress politicaldebate, it also affected several contingentfreedomsÐ association, assembly, and the right to demonstrate for redress ofgrievance, among other things. Moreover, it contributed to the developmentwithin society of what one observer called ` asortof intellectual paralysis’. 31 As mentionedearlier, expression, speech and the media bene® ted from the substantiveand symbolic changes introduced after 1985 as DesmondHoyte pursuedhis politics of preservative adaptation. Not only was onebusinessman emboldenedto establish an independent and critical newspaper, StabroekNews , inNovember 1986, but he was ableto say afterwards:` Theatmosphere of repressionlightened perceptibly and the style and language of politics were noticeablymore responsive and less threatening¼An independent newspaper was allowedto open and there has beenno interference with it.’ 32 Inits report tothe US Congressin 1991, the State Department reported: ` Inpast years the Government¼maintained varying degrees of control over the media. This control,however, has beeneasing since 1987.’ 33 Thechanged political climate that began under Hoyte continued under Jagan, beinggenerally conducive to theexercise of rightsrelated to expression and free press. Forexample, during 1993 Guyana Publications Limited, publishers of StabroekNews ,extendedpublication of the newspaper from twice weekly to sevendays a week,having gone earlier from a Sundayedition only. Later that yearthey started publishing StabroekReview ,aweekly.Also in 1993 ’s formerNational Security Adviser, David Granger, teamed up with an attorneyto launcha monthlypublic affairs magazine, GuyanaReview , which has sincebecome a highlyrespected source of balanced news and analysis. Thatyear also witnessed the launching of Caribbean±Indian American News , BusinessMonthly , GuyanaGuardian , GuyanaTimes , and Insight.However,the lastthree newspapers mentioned ceased publicationwithin a year.In 1994 the majorinitiative in this area was theestablishment of two book publishing houses: Hughesand Thorne Limited, and Roraima Publishing Company, the latterestablished by the owners of thefailed Times.Theyear 1996 saw thebirth ofthree newspapers: The Vision,organof apartycalled For a Goodand Green Guyana (GGG)formedby former Prime Minister, , who was expelledfrom the PNC shortlyafter the 1992 elections; The Sun,revivedorgan of TUF; and TheTaj Mahal Times .Therealso was adevelopmentof signal importancein 1996: on 6November StabroekNews wenton-line with a website maintainedthrough the TrinidadExpress .Withthis, the media in Guyana® nally enteredthe age of electronic publishing. 276 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA

Forall this, the PPP-Civic,which had proclaimed in its election manifesto that, `Inthe process ofreconstruction and the development of a pluralistdemocracy, free mediawill facilitate wide and open debate on the choice of path for recovery’and promised an ` opening[of] the media to different shades of opinion’34 underits rule, now seems indisposedto close scrutiny and strident criticismby thepress. Thesame StabroekNews whichJagan had once hailed as achampionin the search fortruth and a bulwarkin thepursuit of democracyand theprotection of human rights in the country is nowridiculed as subversive. Jagan’s mostscathing remarks followedthe newspaper’ s reporton the PPP congresswhere he had af® rmedhis commitment to Marxism/ Leninism.Later, thepaper also carried an editorial on the subject. Jagan excoriated Stabroek News,callingit ` unpatrioticand anti-national’ , andbent on ` witch-hunting’his government.He expresseda totallybefuddling view: ` Despiteall its disclaimers, StabroekNews is tryingto destabilize this government. They probably didn’ t wantthis party to be elected to the government in the ® rst place.’ 35 More than this,though, in a moveaimed ostensibly at cost-cutting, in December 1994 Ministerof Finance Asgar Ally (who resigned in May 1995 over political and policydifferences with President Jagan and in July 1996 announced his presi- dentialcandidacy for the 1997 elections) ordered Bank of Guyana of® cials to cease advertisingin StabroekNews .Bankof Guyana advertising is notonly signi®cant in volume but also lucrative for the print and electronic media. 36 Comingon the heels of the paper’ s battlewith the government, this move smacks ofdiscrimination against StabroekNews ,sincethe new directive, which was notrescinded after Ally’ s departure,does not affect the government-owned GuyanaChronicle , or the Mirror,whichis ownedby the PPP,PresidentJagan’ s party. Oneof the criticisms made of the Jagan government, by both the press and politicalanalysts, was overits abandonment of the pledge to consolidate democracyand racial harmony by establishing a governmentof national unity. The PPP-Civichad made a boldand laudable offer in its election manifesto:

The PPP/CIVIC isconvinced that the true interests of all Guyanese lie in working towardsnational unity and the eventual elimination of ethnic insecurity. The proposalfor amulti-ethnic,multi-class, broad-based national PPP/CIVIC list to contestthese elections re¯ ects the PPP’sunendingsearch of [sic] andmeans to promotenational unity. The commitment of the PPP/CIVIC towinner-does-not-take- allpolitics and to theformation of agovernmentof nationalunity after winning the elections,attests to our belief that national unity and ethnic security form the cornerstoneon which a trulydemocratic system will be built in Guyana. 37

Apartfrom the search forpolitical renewal that existed within society at the time oftheelections, it was thispledge that made the PPP-Civican attractive prospect tomanysections of theelectorate. However, as isoftentrue with parties seeking power,the pledge, once made, becomes subject to subtle amendment or plain abandonment.In this case itwas thelatter. Having won 53.5% of thevotes and 36of the seats inthe National AssemblyÐ 28 in the national contest and the othereight through regional mechanismsÐ the PPP-Civicdecided to exercise powerexclusively. True, after some delayand some politicalhistrionics, it 277 IVELAW LGRIFFITH offered the WPA onecabinet positionÐ the Ministry of Planning and Pro- duction.38 But,given the authority constraints expected to accompany the person holdingthis position, that move seemed partof a PPP-Civictactic to make an offerthey knew the WPA couldonly refuse. TheMinistry of Planning and Production was nevercreated. Hence the PPP-Civicwere able to retain full and absolute control, a totalabout-face from theelection commitment. Even one scholar who is usuallysympathetic towards the PPP observed:` Its protestationsnot withstanding, the stark elementary fact remainedthat the new Jagan-led government was essentiallyan Indian-backed regimeand that power was notshared but monopolized by one partisan group alone’ .39 Alliedto this is whatone newspaper editorial called the ` far moreworrying tendencywhich seems tobeclearlyestablishing itself to remove good Guyanese professionalswho served in public positions before this new Government came topower. This line seems tobe notvery subtly changing from ª winnerwill not takeallº to ª winneris perfectlyentitled to take allº .’ 40 Itis truethat any new government,especially one formed by a partyin opposition for 28 years, will harboura certaindistrust for the bureaucrats in the government once run by its politicalnemesis. It will therefore want to bring its own trusted cadre into the executiveand judicial branches. It is alsotrue that in the context of patronage politics,which is acceptedin Guyana and the Caribbean as awhole,this is expected.But there has beena certaincallousness by the new government in dealingwith some ofthe professionals of the former administration, often re¯ected in short termination notices, reassignment to positions of lesser re- sponsibility,and suspension from duty, in many cases violatingtheir administrat- iveand constitutional rights. Some have sued and won, including Dr Cedric Grant,former Ambassador to Washington and later Foreign Affairs Advisor to DesmondHoyte, and James Matheson,former Ambassador to Brussels. Inmost cases thecompetence of these of® cials was notquestioned; their politicalloyalty was suspect.Worse than the administrative and management implicationsof this action, given the dearth of managerial skill in the country, are theracial ones, since the action is pregnantwith racial overtones, giving rise tocharges of ` ethniccleansing’ by the opposition PNC.Whilethose charges exaggeratedthe reality, in most cases thepeople removed were Afro-Guyanese andtheir replacements were Indo-Guyanese. Although some topnon-black functionariesin the former government were also removed, here again, there replacementswere almost all people of Indian descent. 41 Thisis notto say thatsome ofthereplacements were not necessary, given the corruptionand mismanagement that had existed in some quarters.However, indelicatemanagement in this area couldbe dangerous, given the country’ s historyof ethnic con¯ ict. I agreecompletely with anthropologist Raymond Smith,that ` Whateverracial antipathies exist in Guyana today are notthe same asthoseof the1960s’ . 42 However,there is justi®able reason for concern, for as Smithhimself has correctlyobserved, ` If thecauses ofthe violence of 1962, 1963,and 1964 was anupsurge of racialantipathy rooted in primordialidentities andexpressing itself in the struggle over political power, then it is logicalto assume thatthe very same racism willassert itselfonce again’ . 43 Itis clearto 278 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA thiswriter that the combined effects oftwo factors will serve as thebasis for politicaldiscontent and racial animosity: one, the fact that Indo-Guyanese now controlthe authoritative allocation of political resources and,because of the country’s demographics,are likelyto doso forsome timein the future; two, the factthat Indo-Guyanese continue to own signi® cantly greater economic re- sources thanAfro-Guyanese, a situationnot likely to change in the foreseeable future. Inrecognition of the critical role of the judiciary in democratic governance andthe exercise of human rights, a formerOmbudsman of Jamaica once asserted: `Therule of law is thefulcrum around which justice revolves; the catalystfrom which emerges trueprotection and promotion of human rights’ . 44 Thisstatement is as relevantto Guyana as itis toJamaica. In Guyana’ s case, unlikesome years agowhen the independence of thejudiciary was compromised bythe precept and practice of party paramountcy, the judiciary now exercises greaterindependence. It must be remembered, though, that the practice of the ruleof law involves much more than an independent judiciary, and in this respectGuyana does not fare well. Thedispensation of justice in Guyana is nowaffected by a shortageof criminaljustice personnel, including magistrates and court of® cers, lowsalaries, inadequatetraining, poor facilities, and to crown it all, inef® ciency in many quarters.Indeed, it has beenreported that, ` Theinef® ciency of the judicial system is so greatas toundermine due process’ . 45 Itis commonto have people detainedfor three and four years awaitingtrial. And as outrageousas itmay appear,there are peoplewith murder indictments who have been awaiting trial foreight and 10 years. This problem was broughtinto the public spotlight during 1993,when several prisoners held public protests on the roof of the country’ s mainprison in Georgetown over their prolonged remand for trial. 46 Onecomplicating factor is severe prisonovercrowding, as theformer Om- budsman,Justice Clifford Baburam, noted in his 1992 report to the National Assembly.The Director of Prisons himself has indicatedthat, for example, the GeorgetownPrison, which had been built to house 350 prisoners, was forcedto holdover 800 in 1994, and had accommodated as manyas 1000during early 1992.47 Moreover,the Guyana Human Rights Association has citedinadequate medicalservices andsanitary facilities, food shortages and poorly paid and trainedstaff as additionalfactors. 48 Theprotection of allhuman rights in anysociety involves the possession and use ofsome set ofeconomic assets bygovernment, even if only to run decent policeforces andcourts to protect civil and political freedoms, and to hold elections.But the ful® lment of economic,social and cultural rights is dependent oneconomicfactors in waysthat maintenance of civiland political ones are not. Thereis variationin both the nature of the economic linkage and the degree of dependencyon economic factors. Asnotedearlier, human rights concerns in Guyana extend to civil and political rightsas wellas socialand economic ones. In referring to the issue, President Jaganonce observed: ` Somestates emphasizecivil and political but fail to note thecentrality of economic, social, and cultural rights. Both sets ofrights are essential.’ 49 However,despite the economic growth average of 7%overthe years 279 IVELAW LGRIFFITH

1992±96 and a wealthof natural resources, Guyana’ s poorsocioeconomic conditionwill make attainment of economic, social and cultural rights a Herculeantask. Onegets a sense ofthe magnitude of the task of pursuing such rights when itis recognisedthat, according to Finance Minister Asgar Ally, ` Recentstudies haveestimated that approximately 70 percent of the population is nowliving belowthe poverty line’ . 50 Inexplainingthe country’ s socioeconomicdilemma to members ofthe Caribbean Group for Cooperation and Economic Development inJanuary 1994, President Jagan indicated: ` Everyman, woman, and child in thiscountry is indebtedto the tune of $US2600Ð this in a countrywhere more thanhalf of thepopulation lives below the poverty line and per capita GDP hovers around$US430’ . 51 Moreover,the country’ s roads,schools, power supply, seweragesystem, health services andother social infrastructure are invirtual collapse,partly the result of neglect, mismanagement and the economic crisis thatthe country experienced under the PNC watch.Guyana now has thedubious distinctionof being the second poorest country in the Caribbean, after Haiti. The PPP-Civicgovernment has some boldplans to promote economic democ- racyand ful® l some ofthe economic, social and cultural rights speci® ed under Chapter2 ofthe Constitution. These include promoting private sector develop- mentand public sector reform, rehabilitating the social and economic infrastruc- ture,searching for maximum debt relief, and offering incentives for investment andproduction. But, as mightbe expected, these plans will take massive ®nancialinjections and time. Meanwhile, to use aGuyaneseadage, ` Whilethe grass is growing,the horse will be starving’ . Andgiven the country’ s demo- graphics,where some 40%of thepopulation is 15years andunder, children and womenwill continue to feel the greatest impact of the crisis. One source has evenindicated that ` thesevere deteriorationof the public education and health care system has stuntedchildren’ s futuresand often cut short their lives’ . 52

Conclusion Theabove discussion suggests that there has beenboth change and continuity regardingregime and democracy and human rights in Guyana over the last decade.Change has occurrednot only in terms ofregime, but also in terms of regimepolitics and policies. Curiously though, there has beensome continuity inrelation to regime policies despite regime change, for President Jagan had continuedsome ofhis predecessor’ s economicreforms, and built on the democraticenvironment that Hoyte had begun to create, under domestic and foreignpressure, as hepursued his politics of preservative adaptation. Hoyte deserves recognitionfor his stage-setting role in the political and economic reconstructionof Guyana; for being the Mikhail Gorbachev of Guyana. Theimportance of economicand social rights is notto be gainsaid. But their statusas fundamentalrights is bothdebatable and subject to economic vicissi- tudesin ways that civil and political rights are not,since their ful® llment is intimatelybound up with the economic capability of a society.Consequently, it is easier togive tangible meaning and institutional expression to civil and politicalrights in Guyana than to do so foreconomic, social and cultural ones. 280 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA

Indeed,we saw thecountry’ s dilemmain relationto the constitutional provision forfree education.While political elites and interest groups in Guyana will surelycontinue to do what is `politicallycorrect’ and pay homage to the importanceof economic, social and cultural rights, and to their symbiotic relationshipwith civil and political ones, it is unrealisticto expect any major near-termadvances in the former area. Guyanais nowin the political campaign season, as thenext presidential and parliamentaryelections are dueconstitutionally by March 1998. The triumphs andpitfalls of democracy and human rights there will, therefore, command the attentionof concernedpublics both within and outside the country. These publics willseek toensure the transparency of the elections in particular and the wholesomenessof political democracy and civil and political rights in general. Yetit must be emphasisedthat political democracy and civil and political rights are necessary,but not suf® cient.There are otherparts of the democracy and humanrights equationsÐ economic democracy and economic and social rights. Dif®cult though these are, they should also command the attention of publics nearand far thatare concernedwith political change, democracy and human rightsin Guyana.

Postscript March1997 witnessed a fourthregime change in Guyana. It was aTypeII changeÐwhere the head of state is changedbut the basic composition of the rulinggroup is otherwisethe same. Thatchange was precipitatedby the death ofPresident Cheddie Jagan. PresidentJagan suffered a heartattack on 14 February, four hours after presidingover a session oftheNational Defense Board. Given the severity of the heartattack and the limited medical facilities at the state-owned Georgetown Hospitalwhere he was taken,foreign medical attention became necessary. He was takento the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, spending a nighton the way at the Gorgas Army Community Hospital in Panamato reduce thestress ofa direct¯ ightfrom Georgetown to Washington. For a shortwhile inWashington President Jagan’ s medicalcondition seemed hopeful,but the situationsoon deteriorated with the collapse of his lungs. He died early in the morningof 6March.A statefuneral was heldon 10Marchand his remains were crematedon 12 March. Theregime change was consummatedon 6March,within six hours of Jagan’s death.Following a 5 ; 00am specialmeeting of the Cabinet, at 6 ; 00 am Prime MinisterSamual A Hinds,a Canadian-trainedchemical engineer, was swornin as Presidentby the Chancellor of the Judiciary, Justice Cecil Kennard, in the presenceof theSpeaker of theNational Assembly, ministers of thegovernment, andthe heads of the army and the police force. The ease ofthe succession itself is atributeto several things: the maturity of the political opposition in not exploitingthe medical crisis forpartisan political gain; the acceptance by politicalactors in the countryÐ both within and outside the ruling groupÐ of the needto honour the spirit and the letter of the constitution in relation to political succession; andthe relative democratic maturity of the polity overall. 281 IVELAW LGRIFFITH

Thedeath of President Jagan, of course, raises severalissues. Andalthough thispostscript is notthe place to examine them fully, some ofthemmust at least bementioned. One is thematter of party leadership successionÐ within the PPP andwithin the PPP-Civiccoalition. A secondpertains to possible realignments amongpolitical parties, especially since the nation is nowin a politicalseason. Indeed,up to mid-March 1997, 21 political parties had announced their entry intothe electoral fray. A thirdmatter, and one directly related to the two previousitems, relates to what Dr Jagan’ s deathportends for politics overall in Guyana.The poignancy of a remarkby WPA co-leader,Dr Rupert Roopnarine, isnotlost on anyclose observer of theGuyana scene: `Hisnot being here really doesopen an entirely new situation. I meanwe are literallyat the end of anera withthe passing of Dr Jagan’ . CheddieJagan was bornon 22March1918 in PortMourant in easternGuyana ofparentswho had migrated from Uttar Pradesh, India in 1901to becomesugar plantationidentured workers. He liveda fulllife. It was alsoa controversiallife attimes,one that tested his endurance for struggle, his ideological commitment, andhis skills as diplomatand politician. The circumstances of his birth, the possessionand use ofpower that he beheld, the age in which he lived, his knowledgeof history, and much else allpropelled him into becoming not just a complainer,but a tireless,charismatic champion of the cause ofthe underdog, andan activist for change. Jaganplayed many roles during his nearly 79 years onlife’s stage.Profession- ally,he was adentist,his doctorate in dental surgery having been obtained in 1942at Northwestern University in Illinois in the American mid-west. He was alsoa husbandfor close to 54 yearsÐ and to the same spouseÐhaving married JanetRosenberg in August 1943 in Chicago, IL. Shewas notonly his life-long maritalpartner, but also his companion in struggle. Cheddie and Janet had two childrenand ® vegrandchildren. But for Cheddie Jagan, while profession and familywere necessary, they were not suf® cient.For he saw howhistory, the natureand use ofpower, and politics at home and abroad had served to visit unjusticeon the poor and the dispossessed inGuyana, and he vowed to secure justice,both political and economic. Hence there were additional roles: labour leader,teacher, revolutionary, reformer, scholar and statesman, all towards pursuinga politicsof change. As heremarkedin TheWest on Trial , one of the fourbooks he wrote, ` Minewas therole of ª politicsof protestº within the weaponsof exposure and struggle. If thelegislature was myforum, the waterfront,the factories, plantations, mines, and quarries were my battle ground.’ Understandably,there was naiveteand idealism along the way. He recounted, also in TheWest on Trial ,that` At®rst Iwas rathernaive as aparliamentarian anda debater.I spokewith tremendous enthusiasm and force, thinking that the logicof myarguments would convice my colleagues¼But I soonlearnt.’ Some ofJagan’ s idealismÐand, indeed, his principled standsÐ brought him into con¯ict with political forces inGuyana and elsewhere against which he could neverprevail. Jagan was, however, also a pragmatist.And this pragmatist itself helpedto reveal some ofthe ironies of his life of struggle and change. For instance,he was oustedfrom power twice as Premierof hisnation, once in 1953 282 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA bythe UK andthen in 1964 by the UK incollusion with the USA, allbecause hewas atthe extreme left of theideological spectrum. That was duringthe Cold War.Yet it was theUSA thatwas instrumentalin his return to power in 1992, thistime as Presidentof Guyana. That was afterthe Cold War. And it was the USAÐnotCuba, his erstwhile ideological and political allyÐ that played the criticalrole in attempting to save hislife. Indeed, he died in the USA. Jagan’s entirepolitical career, which began in 1946 with the formation of the PoliticalAffairs Committee in Guyana, testi® ed to the fact that for him gaining politicalpower was notan end in itself, but an opportunity to right wrongs, to secure justice.And although Guyana was themain arena for his politics of protest,.he was botha regionalistand an internationalist, for he correctly understoodthe indivisibility of thestruggle for justice. His death, then, is aloss notonly to those engaged in the pursuit of political and economic justice in Guyana,but also in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Shakespeareonce wrote: ` Alltheworld’ s astage,And all the men and women merelyplayers: They have their exits and their entrances; And one man in his timeplays many parts¼ ’ Ofcourse, all men and women are notequal players onthe world’ s stage; some playmore, and more signi® cant, parts than others. Thegreat players have every reason to have their exists noted and a recordmade forposterity of the roles they played, especially when those roles sought and securedjustice for a segmentof mankind.Undoubtedly, Cheddi B Jaganwas one suchgreat playerÐ aman with a mission,not merely to complain about the age inwhich he lived, but to strive to improve it.

Notes 1 See PCSchmitterand T LKarl, `Whatdemocracy is andis not’, inLarry Diamond & Marc FPlattner(eds), TheGlobal Resurgence ofDemocracy ,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,p 40. 2 See, forexample, EHuber,` Thefuture of democracy inthe Caribbean’ , inJorge I Dominguez et al, (eds), Democracy inthe Caribbean ,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,pp 74± 75. 3 LWilson,` The OAS andthe transition to democracy inHaiti: the effort to restore PresidentAristide’ , paper deliveredat the18th Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Jamaica, May1993, p 11. 4 DWPayne,` Ballots,neo-strongmen, narcos, and impunity’ , FreedomReview ,Vol26, No , 1995,p 27. 5 Liberalism andcommunalism, along with conservatism, are consideredthe three basic philosophicalschools ofhuman rights analysis. For a fulldiscussion of them,see DPForsythe, HumanRights and World Politics , Lincoln:University of Nebraska Press, 1983,pp 158± 175. 6 JHagan,` Regimes, politicalopposition, and the comparative analysisof foreign policy’ , inCharles Hermann et al. (eds), New Directionsin the Study of Foreign Policy ,Boston:Allen & Unwin,1987, pp 345±346. 7 Ibid,pp347± 348. 8 HDHoyte,Address to the Sixth Biennial Congress of thePeople’ s NationalCongress, Sophia, Georgetown, 19August 1985, p 7. 9 PMars,` The1985 Guyana elections in retrospect’ , Bulletinof Eastern Caribbean Affairs ,Vol13, No 4, 1987, p 29. 10 Fora discussionof proportionalrepresentation systems, see DRae, ThePolitical Consequences of Electoral Laws,New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1967;and E Lakeman, HowDemocracies Vote ,London:Faber, 1970.For more ontheelectoral system ofGuyana, see Constitutionof the Cooperative Republic of Guyana (1980)hereafter GuyanaConstitution ,Articles 60±80, 160± 162, and 177; and R James &HLutchman, Law andthe Political Environment in Guyana ,Turkeyen:University of Guyana, 1984, pp 75± 87. 11 Forassessments ofthe 1985 elections, see Mars,` The1985 Guyana elections in Retrospect’ ;British Parliamentary HumanRights Group and Americas Watch, InterimReport on the Joint Mission to Investigate 283 IVELAW LGRIFFITH

PoliticalFreedom in Guyana ,New York:Americas Watch,1985; and Americas Watch, Electoral Conditionsin Guyana ,New York:Americas Watch,1990. 12 See ILGrif® th,` Themilitary and the politics of change in Guyana’ , Journalof Interamerican Studies and WorldAffairs ,Vol33, No 2, 1991, pp 141± 173. For other assessments ofthe Hoyte regime’ sadaptation, see DdeCaires, `Guyanaafter Burnham:a new era oris PresidentHoyte trapped in the skin of the old PNC?’ , CaribbeanAffairs ,Vol1, No1, 1988,pp 183±198; F Long,` Thenew internationalpolitical ’ , TheRound Table ,No317, 1991, pp 73± 80; US Congress,House Committee onForeign Affairs, Transitionto Democracy inthe Caribbean: Haiti, Guyana, and Suriname ,Hearing,Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 102ndCongress, 1st Session, 26 June 1991; and D Watson& CCraig(eds), Guyanaat the Crossroads ,New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers, 1992. 13 Forreports on the elections, see ` PPP-Civicenters housewith 3-seat majority’, GuyanaChronicle , 10 October1992, pp 1,6;G Brana-Shute,` Guyana1992: it’ s abouttime’ , Hemisphere,Vol5, 1993,pp 40±44; RPremdas, `Guyana:the critical electionsof 1992and a regime change’, CaribbeanAffairs ,Vol6, 1993, pp111± 140; and Council of FreelyElected Heads ofGovernment, ObservingGuyana’ s ElectoralProcess, 1990± 1992,Atlanta:Carter Center,1993. 14 RPremdas, `Guyanaone year after the PNC’ , CaribbeanAffairs ,Vol7, No 3, 1994, p 157. 15 Textof the Statement made byDr CheddieB Jagan,, at hisSwearing in Ceremony at State Houseon Friday, 9 October1992, p 1. 16 James &Lutchman, Lawand the Political Environment in Guyana , p 117. 17 Development,Social Harmony, and Prosperity with Hugh Desmond Hoyte: TheManifesto of the People’ s NationalCongress , 1992, p 3. 18 PPP-Civic, Time forChange, Time toRebuild: Manifesto± Elections 1992 , 1992, p 4. 19 Lutchmanis alawyer anda politicalscientist who once served as Head ofthe Department ofPolitical Science andLaw at theUniversity of Guyana, and as aDean at thesame institution.At thetime hewas mentionedby President Jagan he was Professorof Public Administration and Director ofthe Graduate Programin Public Administration at theUniversity of the Virgin Islands, where hehad been since 1986. Lutchmanreturned to Guyana in August 1996 to become Vice Chancellorof the University of Guyana. 20 `Constitutionalreform stilla priority;faster economicprogress essential’ , StabroekNews (Guyana),10 October1994, p 13.See alsoHarold Lutchman’ s thinkingon the constitutional reform issue,in ` A contributionto public education on constitutional reform’ , StabroekNews ,21June 1994, p 8;`Substantive changes:the presidency’ , StabroekNews ,22June 1994, p 8;and ` Removalfor violation and misconduct’ , StabroekNews ,23June 1994, p 15. 21 See GCave,` Universityfees’ , GuyanaReview ,No18, 1994, pp 28± 29; and A Hassim, `Nobreach of naturaljustice law byintroduction of fees at UGÐ[Keith]Massiah contends’, StabroekNews ,22September 1994,pp 4, 12; and A Hassim, `Massiah arguesthat ª naturaljusticeº was served’, StabroekNews , 29 September1994. Massiah, an Attorney General underthe Hoyte Administration, was Universityof Guyana Counselin thecase. Fora briefexamination of theconstitutionality of the right to education,see JBranche, `Tertiaryeducation: free forall?’ , GuyanaReview ,No15, 1994, pp 26± 27. 22 If Ministerof Health Gail Texeira has herway, what little is left offree medical attentionwill also be abandoned.See GPersaud,` Costrecovery to be carefully scrutinized in health sector’ , StabroekNews , 30 September1994, p 4. 23 See SFFiner, TheMan on Horseback ,Boulder:Westview Press, 1988,p 20. 24 ENordlinger, Soldiersin Politics ,EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977, p 15. 25 Fora discussionof militarisationin Guyana, see GDanns,` Militarizationand development: an experiment innation-building’ , Transition,Vol1, No 1, 1978, pp 23± 41; Danns, Dominationand Power in Guyana , New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers, 1982; I LGrif® th,` Guyana:the military and the politics of change’, inGrif® th(ed), Strategyand Security in the Caribbean ,New York:Praeger, 1991;and J EGreene, `Cooperativism,militarism, partypolitics, and democracy inGuyana’ , inPaget Henry & Carl Stone(eds), TheNewer Caribbean ,Philadelphia:Institute for the Study of Human Studies, 1983. 26 See Grif® th,` Themilitary and the politics of change in Guyana’ . 27 Ibid, p 167. 28 See `Army aims at feedingitself’ , StabroekNews ,16February 1993, p 10;` GDF tobe service orientedÐ [Chiefof Staff] Singh’ , StabroekNews ,29October1993, p 4;L Harvey,` Markingtime ondefense policy’, GuyanaReview ,Nos10 &11,1993, p 7;and` [Commissionerof Police] Lewis urgesmore payfor police’ , StabroekNews ,21December 1993,p 1. 29 Thiswas quiteclear frommy interview with Brigadier Joseph Singh, Chief of Staff of the GDF, at Army Headquarters,Camp Ayanganna,Georgetown, Guyana, 30 June 1994; and with Commissioner of Police LaurieLewis at PoliceHeadquarters, Eve Leary, Georgetown, Guyana, on 1 July1994. 30 UNESCO, ManyVoices, One World ,London:Kogan Page, 1980, p 19. 31 AChase, `Freedomof expression’ , GuyanaReview ,No2, 1993, p 13. 32 deCaries, `Guyanaafter Burnham’, pp194, 195. For a short,but useful commentary onthe travails of StabroekNews inthe context of press freedom inGuyana, see AGraham-Yooll,` Guyana:the newspaper StabroekNews ’ , TheRound Table ,No332, 1994, pp 447± 454. 284 POLITICAL CHANGE INGUYANA

33 USDepartment ofState, CountryReports on Human Rights Practices for1990 ,Washington,DC, 1991, p 649. 34 See PPP-Civic, Time forChange , p 6. 35 Jaganrepeats destabilizationcharges againstStabroek News’ , StabroekNews ,22August 1993, p 24;and `PPP is Marxist,not GovernmentÐ Jagan’ , StabroekNews ,26,1993, p 1.The Guyana Press Associationcalled PresidentJagan’ s remarks `inappropriateandintemperate inthe prevailing circumstances ofthe government’ s stated commitment topress freedom.’Interestingly, in the section of the PPP-Civicmanifesto that deals with democracy thepromise is made that:` The PPP/CIVIC willencourage constructive political debate, education, andactivity, instead of abuse and denigration of political opponents’ . 36 Governmentdiscriminating against Stabroek NewsÐ deCaires’ , StabroekNews ,7December 1994,pp 1,3; and` Allyincommunicado over Bank of Guyana ads’ , StabroekNews ,9December 1994,p 1. 37 PPP-Civic, Time forChange, Time toRebuild ,p7.See alsoA Persaudand R Naraine, `Democracy willbe participatory’, StabroekNews ,18December 1992,pp 1, 2.Participatory democracy was thetheme ofJagan’ s speech at theinaugural session of the post-elections National Assembly. 38 See `WPA todiscuss participation in government’ , StabroekNews ,28October 1992, p 1;and L Harvey,` Civic pride:cabinet making in 1992’ , GuyanaReview ,No1, 1993, pp 10± 11. The United Force party was also supposedto be offered a cabinetposition. That deal fell throughlargely because TUF wantedthe Ministry ofForeign Affairs inreturn for its support in the National Assembly, something to which the ruling party obviouslycould not agree, especially since TUF has onlyone seat inthe National Assembly. 39 Premdas, `Guyanaone year after the PNC’ , p 169. 40 `WinnerTakes All?’ , StabroekNews ,26June 1993, p 6. 41 One Caribbeanambassador basedin Washington made theobservation to me inMarch 1994 that while Hoyte was Presidentone saw aconsiderablenumber of Indo-Guyanesein the Guyana diplomatic corps, which was predominantlyAfro-Guyanese. However, since Jagan’s entryinto power, the latter are conspicuousby their absence. Upto autumn 1996, except for the High Commissioner in Canada, the Ambassador inBrazil and theAmbassador inBelgium, the heads of all Guyana’s 10foreign missions were ofIndian descent. 42 RTSmith` ªLivingin the Gun Mouthº : race, class andpolitical violence in Guyana’ , New WestIndian Guide,Vol69, Nos 3 &4,1995, p 225. 43 Ibid,pp224± 245. For more onethnic con¯ ict inGuyana, see PNewman, BritishGuiana: Problems of Cohesionin an Immigrant Society ,London:Oxford University Press, 1964;L ADespres, CulturalPluralism andNationalist Politics in Guyana ,Chicago:Rand McNally, 1967; J EGreene, Race vs Politicsin Guyana , Kingston:Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1974;and P Mars,` State interventionand ethnic con¯ict resolution:Guyana and the Caribbean experience’ , ComparativePolitics ,Vol27, No 2, 1995, pp 167±186. 44 EGeorgeGreen, `Therole of governmentsin strengthening human rights machinery’ , inAngela D Byre& BeverlyY By®eld (eds), InternationalHuman Rights Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean ,Dordrecht: MartinusNijhoff, 1991, pp 309± 310. 45 CountryReports on Human Rights Practices for1993 , p 462. 46 See `Prisonercaused hisown dilemma’ , StabroekNews ,6May1993, p 1;and B Henry,` Prisoneron the Roof’ , GuyanaReview ,No5, 1993, pp 14± 15. 47 `Prisonproblems’ , GuyanaReview ,No10, 1994, p 16. 48 Onthe Ombudsman report, see `Ombudsmancomplains’ , GuyanaReview ,No8, 1993,p 4.The government of®cial responsiblefor the police and the prisons, Home Affairs MinisterFeroze Mohamed,acknowledged theexistence ofseriousovercrowding and the other problems in an interview with this author at theMinistry ofHome Affairs, Georgetown,on 1 July1994. See also,B Henry,` Whyproblems persist in our prisons’ , GuyanaReview ,No8, September 1993, pp 19± 20. 49 CJagan,` TheCaribbean community: crossroads to the future’ , CaribbeanAffairs ,Vol7, 1994, p 31. 50 Governmentof Guyana, Parliament, BudgetSpeech by theHonorable Asgar Ally, Senior Minister of Finance , SessionalPaper No 1 of1994,Sixth Parliament, 1st Session, 7 March1994, p 27.Three differentpoverty-line ®guresexist. The government uses G$6080per month; the CatholicStandard ,asympatheticindependent weekly,uses G$15000 per month, and C YThomas,a respected economist,who was alsothe WPA presidentialcandidate and later parliamentarian fromOctober 1992 to March 1995, cites G$10644 per month.During 1996 the US± Guyana currency exchange rate ¯uctuatedbetween G$138to US$1 and G$146 toUS$1. For a goodanalysis of poverty in contemporary Guyana, see CYThomas,` Lessonsfrom experience:structural adjustment and poverty in Guyana’ , Socialand Economic Studies ,Vol42, 1993, pp 133±184. 51 CJagan,` Guyanais afree countrywhere democracy prevailsand the economy is open’, Thunder (Guyana), Vol26, No 1, 1994,p 11.In his 1996 budget speech theFinance Minister told the National Assembly that, `At theend of 1995, Guyana’ s externaldebt stock amounted to US$2.06 billion, or a 3percentrise over theprevious year’ .See Governmentof Guyana, Parliament, BudgetSpeech by the Honorable ,Senior Minister of Finance ,SessionalPaper No 1 of1996, Sixth Parliament, 1st Session, 19 January 1996, p 25. 52 USDepartment ofState, CountryReport on Human Rights Practices for1993 ,WashingtonDC, p 464. 285