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Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Origin and Evolution of Culture

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Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Origin and Evolution of Culture Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Origin and Evolution of Culture DOCTORAL THESIS Liane Gabora Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies Vrije Universiteit Brussel Krijgskundestraat 33, B1160 Brussels, Belgium http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/liane/ [email protected] Promotor/Doctoral Advisor: Prof. Dr. Diederik Aerts Faculty of Science Free University of Brussels, 2001 THE Liane Gabora TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents............................................................................................................................................iii Detailed Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................iv Dankwoord....................................................................................................................................................... x Preface.............................................................................................................................................................xi Bijstelling......................................................................................................................................................xiii 1 The Need for a Theory of Cultural Evolution .............................................................................................. 1 2 Current Evolutionary Approaches to Culture............................................................................................. 13 3 Unresolved Issues and Potentially Fruitful Directions............................................................................... 29 4 A Computer Model of Cultural Evolution ................................................................................................. 47 5 Mind: The Culture Evolving Architecture ................................................................................................. 63 6 Creativity and Cultural Novelty ................................................................................................................. 83 7 What Sparked the Origin of Culture?......................................................................................................... 97 8 Autocatalytic Closure in a Cognitive System .......................................................................................... 109 9 Embryology of One and Many Worldviews ............................................................................................ 135 10 What is Missing in Current Evolutionary Theory ................................................................................ 145 11 Potentiality, Context, and Change of State........................................................................................... 153 12 Toward a General Theory of Evolution................................................................................................ 181 13 Contextualizing Theories of Concepts and Culture.............................................................................. 191 14 Summary and Synthesis of Main Points................................................................................................211 References.....................................................................................................................................................233 ii TOC, Dankwoord, Preface, Bijstelling DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 The Need for a Theory of Cultural Evolution ......................................................................................... 1 1.1 Terminology........................................................................................................................................ 2 1.2 Aim and Objectives............................................................................................................................. 4 1.3 Culture is Not just a Natural Extension of Biological Evolution........................................................ 5 1.4 Analogy or Another Form of Evolution? ............................................................................................ 7 1.5 Chapter by Chapter Outline................................................................................................................. 8 2 Current Evolutionary Approaches to Culture ...................................................................................... 13 2.1 Darwinian Approaches to Culture..................................................................................................... 13 2.1.1 Diffusion and Coevolutionary Studies......................................................................................... 14 2.1.1.1 An Example: Individuation in Families and Social Groups ................................................. 15 2.2 Neo-Darwinian Aproaches to Culture............................................................................................... 15 2.2.1 Approaches Inspired by Population Genetics.............................................................................. 16 2.2.2 Epidemiological Models of Culture............................................................................................. 17 2.2.2.1 A First Example: Conceptual Linkage Disequilibrium ........................................................ 17 2.2.2.2 A Second Example: A Cultural Analog to Genetic Hitchhiking.......................................... 18 2.2.2.3 A Third Example: A Possible Explanation for Cognitive Redundancy ............................... 20 2.2.3 Universal Darwinism, Second Replicators, and Memes.............................................................. 20 2.2.3.1 A First Example: A Potential Explanation for Human Altruism.......................................... 21 2.2.3.2 A Second Example: Runaway Cultural Selection ................................................................ 22 2.2.4 Interactors and Lineages .............................................................................................................. 23 2.3 Complexity Theory and the Genetic Algorithm................................................................................ 23 2.3.1 A First Example: Emergence of an Interconnected, Culture-evolving Worldview..................... 25 2.3.2 A Second Example: A Cultural Analog to the Pre-Cambrian Explosion .................................... 25 2.4 Selectionism and Evolutionary Epistomology .................................................................................. 25 2.4.1 An Example: Vicarious Selection................................................................................................ 27 2.5 Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 27 3 Unresolved Issues and Potentially Fruitful Directions ......................................................................... 29 3.1 Evolution without Replicators........................................................................................................... 29 3.1.1 Self Description versus Instructions for Self Replication............................................................ 29 3.1.2 Representation versus Expression of Cultural Entities................................................................ 30 3.1.3 Non-replicator Transmission Results in Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics....................... 30 3.1.4 Replacing Replication with Retention ......................................................................................... 31 3.1.5 Substrate Neutrality ..................................................................................................................... 32 3.2 Culture is not Limited to Imitated Entities........................................................................................ 32 3.2.1 Consequences of Excluding Individual Learning........................................................................ 32 3.2.2 Consequences of Excluding Non-imitative Social Exchange...................................................... 34 3.2.3 Humans are not Passive ‘Meme Hosts’ ....................................................................................... 34 3.3 The Need to Merge Transmission Studies with Studies of Creativity .............................................. 35 3.4 Blending versus Particulate Inheritance............................................................................................ 36 3.5 The Generation of Cultural Novelty.................................................................................................. 37 3.5.1 Can Variation in Evolution be Nonrandom? ............................................................................... 37 3.5.2 Parallel versus Heuristic Search................................................................................................... 37 3.5.3 What Enables Novelty to be Strategically Generated?................................................................ 38 3.5.4 Does Creativity Yield to Mathematical Description?.................................................................. 38 iii Liane Gabora 3.6 Is Thought a Darwinian Process?...................................................................................................... 40 3.6.1 Selection Theory works with Distinct, Actualized States............................................................ 43 3.6.2 Selection Theory Cannot Describe Intrinsic Contextuality ......................................................... 44 3.7 Summary
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