Sir John Latham, a Political Biography, 1902 to 1934

Antipodean Imperialist:

Michael Kilmister BA(Hons)(Newcastle)

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

August 2018

This thesis was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship

Abstract

This dissertation examines Sir John Latham’s imperial ideology from the turn of the

twentieth century, and traces how it shaped his political outlook and actions in the course of

his parliamentary career, 1922-1934. Latham emerged as a very important political figure at

a pivotal period for Australia and the British Empire. In response to emergent national

sentiment in Australia and other settler societies before the First World War and after, British

policymakers and intellectuals developed an overarching ideology that recast the British

Empire as an interdependent yet loosely organised Commonwealth. Latham worked to

translate and cement this liberal imperial worldview for Australian politics and diplomacy,

lending it a conservative inflection in the process. Drawing on overlooked archival material,

this thesis demonstrates that he developed and tested his antipodean pro-British imperialism

in the exclusive meeting places of like-minded conservatives and applied its core tenets

consistently in the making of national and imperial policy. Even though the British Empire rarely demonstrated the cohesion Latham desired, he remained committed to its causes.

This dissertation retrieves Latham from a nationalist narrative, revealing that he

pursued national interests within a British imperial framework. By re-establishing the all-

encompassing importance of the British Empire to his political behaviour, I argue pro-British

imperialism permeated the positions Latham took on domestic politics and international

issues, notably the Australian Eastern Mission (1934). This thesis also contextualises and

examines in detail, for the first time, Latham’s contribution to the canon of interwar imperial

thought, using his book, Australia and the British Commonwealth (1929). Overshadowed by

the prime ministers under whom he served, this thesis demonstrates that Latham was in many

important respects the driving force behind Australia’s interwar imperial orientation.

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby certify that the work embodied in the thesis is my own work, conducted under normal supervision. The thesis contains no material which has been accepted, or is being examined, for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made. I give consent to the final version of my thesis being made available worldwide when deposited in the University’s Digital Repository, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 and any approved embargo.

Michael Kilmister

Table of Contents

ABBREVIATIONS ...... I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... II

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER I

THE MAKING OF A BOOBOOKS’ MAN:

LATHAM’S SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL MILIEU, 1902-1917 ...... 22

CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH EMPIRE ‘IS THE GREATEST FORCE IN THE WORLD FOR PEACE:’

VERSAILLES TO GENEVA, 1918-1926 ...... 52

CHAPTER III

‘STILL AN EMPIRE, THOUGH ALSO A COMMONWEALTH:’

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION AND THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER, 1926-1931 ...... 81

CHAPTER IV

PRESERVING ‘THE TIES WHICH BIND:’

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST AN AUSTRALIAN-BORN GOVERNOR-GENERAL, 1930-31 ...... 123

CHAPTER V

‘HEAVEN SAVE US FROM RUSSIA!’

COMBATING LANG, COMMUNISM, AND DISLOYALTY, 1931-1932 ...... 149

CHAPTER VI

FOLLOWING A ‘REASONABLE COURSE’:

THE IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE,

1932-1933 ...... 180

CHAPTER VII

IN THE IMPERIAL INTEREST:

THE AUSTRALIAN EASTERN MISSION, 1934 ...... 220

CONCLUSION AND POSTSCRIPT ...... 263

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 274

Abbreviations

ADB Australian Dictionary of Biography

AEM Australian Eastern Mission

BL Bodleian Library

BED British Empire Delegation

CIB Commonwealth Investigation Branch

CJ Chief Justice

CPA Communist Party of Australia

HOR House of Representatives

IWC Imperial War Cabinet

LON League of Nations

LNU League of Nations Union

NAA National Archives of Australia

NLA National Library of Australia

UMA University of Melbourne Archives

UAP United Australia Party

USL Universal Service League

WAP White Australia Policy

Acknowledgements

Writers of doctorates accrue many debts over the course of their candidature, and I am no exception. My greatest debt is to my supervisors, Prof. Roger Markwick and Dr James

Bennett. Without their continuous support of my PhD study, as well as encouraging my related research and professionalisation activities, this thesis would not have come to fruition.

They righted my direction and provided clarity at many key moments. For their patience, motivation, sage advice, and selflessness in affording me their time, I am immeasurably grateful. Roger, my principal supervisor, is deserving of special thanks. His insights into historical praxis have helped me grow as a scholar.

I am thankful for the insights and support of more colleagues than there is room to include here. Firstly, thank you to the historians in the School of Humanities and Social

Science, University of Newcastle (UON) for their warm encouragement over the years. In particular, Dr Jennifer Debenham and Dr Wendy Michaels have helped me talk through many research and writing problems. I am thankful to Dr James Bennett, Assoc. Prof. Nancy

Cushing, and Assoc. Prof. Lisa Featherstone (UQ) for helping me find my feet early in my doctoral candidature in the form of research assistance and teaching opportunities. I also want to thank the postgraduate community at the Central Coast Campus, and the history postgraduates at the Callaghan Campus, UON. I have been fortunate to share many chats over coffees with people who are also navigating the travails of postgraduate research.

I thank my colleagues in the Centre for Teaching and Learning and at the Central

Coast Campus for their boundless support of my study. Throughout the last three years, they have selflessly lightened my workload so I could finish my study. I am thankful to Dr Emma

Joel, Dr Lil Hayes, and Alison Hillier, who helped proofread the grammar, spelling, and punctuation of this thesis. Fiona Neville and Dr Julie Mundy-Taylor in UON Library assisted

iii

greatly in the compilation of the bibliography. I am indebted to Keith Foggett, Prof. Carol

Miles, and Dr Clare Lloyd for kindly providing vital study leave.

This thesis is the product of substantial institutional and benefactor support. Without

the Australian Government Research Training Program, this project would not have

happened. Moreover, I thank Heather and John Seymour for their generous Seymour

Scholarship in partnership with the National Library of Australia, Canberra, of which I was a fortunate beneficiary in 2015. The six weeks I spent immersed in manuscript collections, especially the voluminous Latham Papers, laid the groundwork for the bulk of this thesis. I will be forever grateful for the Seymours giving me priceless time to research without distraction. Additionally, the special collections staff at the National Library have been

invaluable in guiding me through the nooks and crannies of the vast manuscript holdings

there.

The research base for Chapter VII would not have been nearly as complete without

the assistance of the National Archives of Australia and Australian Historical Association

Postgraduate Scholarship, which I received in 2015. The funding and mentorship offered by

this valuable program allowed me to take great leaps in understanding Latham’s Australian

Eastern Mission. The Australian and New Zealand Law and History Society awarded me a

Kercher Scholarship, giving me the opportunity to present at their 35th annual conference at

Curtin University, Perth. The kind feedback I received on my paper informed Chapter IV.

I will never be able to repay the unwavering support and reassurance my family has shown me during my candidature. My parents, Tom and Leonie, and my sister, Rebecca,

have been a tireless buttress throughout this entire process. Without their emotional and

practical support, from reassuring hugs to cooked dinners, I could not have completed this

PhD while remaining a functional human being in all other walks of life. My second family,

Vince, Maria, and Wendy have likewise been there for me during the numerous working

weekends needed to complete this thesis.

There is not enough room here to sufficiently thank my two examiners, Emeritus

Laureate Professor Stuart Macintyre of the University of Melbourne and Dr Kent Fedorowich

of the University of the West of England. Their comments have improved the readability of

this thesis in several sections and in ways I could not have anticipated. Professor Macintyre

deserves particular recognition. His extensive examiner’s report has not only shaped this final version of the thesis but has also given me the confidence to pursue other avenues of publication. His meticulous and generous review has bolstered my confidence as a scholar and has given me new directions for future research.

Last but far from least, my partner, Bianca, has been a never-ending source of good sense. She has supported me far beyond what could be reasonably expected of any human being. Without her, I would not have retained my sense of purpose, and my journey towards completion would have been much more treacherous and uncertain. Her critical insights during the countless hours I spent discussing Latham have shaped the thesis in indelible ways. As she works towards finishing her own PhD, I hope to be able to repay at least some of the love and support she has shown me.

Introduction

In the brass band of Empire he plays the big drum. Perhaps he considers the Empire as something higher than

an association of philanthropic sovereignties for mutual profit … It is idealised as a beauteous regenerative

alchemy, the exquisite essence of the good in man. Here it is proper to say that John Greig Latham is a very

patriotic citizen. In a sense he is more patriotic than S.M. Bruce … to Latham it [patriotism] is a holy thing to

be worn like a cowl.1

Sir John Greig Latham (1877-1964) was a very important if now seldom remembered figure

in Australian politics between the wars. He was a conservative who was well connected to

some of the most influential local and global power brokers of his time. A holder of a

multitude of federal ministerial offices, his variegated interests and frequent comments on

international affairs from an Australian perspective have obscured his role as an advocate of

the British Empire in the antipodes. In the main, historians have depicted him as a nationalist,

albeit a socially conservative one versed in realpolitik who paid little more than lip service to

London. Yet, his political story exceeds national boundaries. Latham was a deeply

sentimental Anglophile patriot who, in the interwar period, did not dissociate imperial

interests from Australian national interests. At times, his reasons for maintaining, even

strengthening the imperial bonds were practical; at other times, he exhibited an almost quasi-

religious faith in the British Empire and what he believed it represented. Latham’s solutions for reconciling imperial unity with growing national feeling and self-government in the

Dominion of Australia were a mixture of appeals to Australians’ pragmatic self-interest and

1 C.R. Bradish, “J.G. Latham,” Table Talk (Sydney), 2 August 1928, p. 13, clipping in Latham, John (1877- 1964), Australian Dictionary of Biography [hereafter ADB] subject files, Australian National University Archives [hereafter ANU], Canberra.

their emotive transnational connection to ‘the motherland.’2 Yet, Latham’s unflinching

devotion to British imperialism is the most overlooked aspect of his political life.

In the interwar years, the relations between nation states and empires were complex

and often incoherent.3 Latham embraced this ambiguous reality, an embrace which permitted

him to act as a conservative and as a liberal imperialist. Liberal imperial ideas preserved

Dominion sovereignty while providing for mechanisms that enabled Empire-wide

coordinated action and policy.4 As this thesis will demonstrate, Latham occupied traditional

political positions that sheltered the legacy of the British Empire and supported the export of

imperialism in Australia’s region. Simultaneously, he carved a place for Australian liberty

within Britain’s imperium. His version of the Empire was based on volunteered reciprocity

that challenged the traditional metropole-peripheral relationship between London and its

Dominions.

Latham’s imperial patriotism has proven magnetic for this writer. He first came to my

attention while researching my 2010 History Honour’s thesis, which used a trio of

biographical case studies to prise apart the entanglements of Australian conservatism, British

imperialism, and fascist militarism between the world wars.5 Latham’s status as a central, yet

unevenly treated figure in the historiography of interwar Australian foreign policy and

2 The self-governing colonies of the British Empire were assigned Dominion status from 1907 until 1947. Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, and New Zealand were collectively referred to as Dominions for the first time at the 1907 Colonial Conference; they had achieved self-government at various dates before then. South Africa and the Irish Free State followed in 1910 and 1922, respectively. R.A.W. Rhodes, John Wanna, and Patrick Weller, Comparing Westminster (London: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2009), 12-17. 3 Or Rosenboim, The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939- 1950 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), 7. 4 The liberal imperial thought that emanated from European empires during the early-twentieth century was multilayered, encompassing concepts of self-government, paternalism, a teleological view of the past, and scepticism of cultural or ethical differences. Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, “Particular or Universal? Historicizing Liberal Approaches to Empire in Europe,” in Liberal Imperialism in Europe, ed. Matthew P. Fitzpatrick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 3-4; Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism,” The Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 216-18. 5 Michael Kilmister, “Shifting Loyalties: Three Leading Anglo-Australian Conservatives and the Rise of Fascist Militarism, 1931-1941” (honours thesis, University of Newcastle, 2010).

politics made him an ideal candidate for an original study. Convinced that his story needed to

be told in greater depth than it had hitherto been, I originally conceived of my PhD as a

biographical portrait of his life. The timely feedback of supervisors and colleagues on early

proposals made it clear that a single-volume dissertation would likely not do justice to my

subject, whose life encompassed so very much.6 Unlike the scholarly attention that is lavished on prime ministers, Latham is what historian Peter Edwards has called the ‘other participants in policy-making.’7 Latham never secured parliament’s top job, although he

came closer than most. Even in retirement, he was still far from a peripheral public figure. A

biographical study of Latham, then, steps into a gaping historiographical breach largely

ignored by political biographers.

This thesis principally follows Latham’s political training and parliamentary career,

1902-1934. While his years in federal parliament (1922-1934) encompassed a host of

portfolios, debates, and domestic problems, this thesis re-centres the focus on his activities,

outlook, and values as they pertained to, and shaped directly or indirectly, Australia’s inter-

imperial affairs. This emphasis means that certain aspects of his ministerial or extra-

parliamentary career that have interested other scholars to varying degrees receive reduced

attention here. These other aspects include his efforts to federalise industrial relations, 1925-

1929, and his time as Leader of the Opposition, 1929-1931.8 Minimising attention on

6 Two postgraduate theses have been produced on Latham’s periods of Latham’s political and judicial careers: David Potts, “A Study of Three Nationalists in the Bruce-Page Government of 1923-1929: Stanley Melbourne Bruce, John Grieg Latham, and George Arthur Maxwell” (master’s thesis, University of Melbourne, 1972); Kelvin Widdows, “Sir John Latham: Judicial Reasoning in Defence of the Commonwealth” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 2014), 1-94. 7 Peter G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901-1949 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press in associaion with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1983), vii. 8 A comprehensive overview of Latham’s performance as minister in various guises in the Bruce-Page Government can be found in Widdows, “Sir John Latham," 1-94. For his time as attorney-general, see also: Frank Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1983), 243-4; Roger Douglas, “Saving Australia from Sedition: Customs, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Administration of Peacetime Political Censorship,” Federal Law Review 30 (2002): 135-75; Roger Douglas, “Keeping the Revolution at Bay: The Unlawful Associations Provisions of the Commonwealth Crimes Act,”

domestic political issues—except where it illuminates context or reveals tantalising

intersections with imperial policy—permits space for the first book-length examination of

Latham’s imperialist thought. I write this thesis not only to understand who Latham was as a

political being, but also to contribute to the ongoing, contentious study of Australia’s place in

the British Empire.

Throughout his parliamentary career, Latham searched to reconcile British imperial

and Australian national interests. Examination of this search entails a detailed analysis of his

involvement in, and outlook on, key inter-imperial9 moments in the interwar era, including the 1931 Statute of Westminster and the 1934 Australian Eastern Mission to Southeast and

East Asia; the titles of the chapters reflect this focus. Essential to the analysis is the illumination of his social milieu, especially his intellectual and professional networks.

Latham was a political animal from his university days. This thesis therefore details elements of his training in imperial affairs and politics in the decades preceding his entry into federal parliament in 1922. While the period under consideration here ends in 1934, his involvement in politics continued in the years that followed, especially during his time at the High Court of Australia.10 A postscript will provide an outline of his post-parliamentary career.

Adelaide Law Review 22, no. 2 (2001): 259-97; Nick Fischer, “Lacking the Will to Power? Australian Anti- Communists 1917-1935,” Journal of Australian Studies 26, no. 72 (2002): 221-33; Neville Kirk, “’Australians for Australia’: The Right, the Labor Party and Contested Loyalties to Nation and Empire in Australia, 1917 to the Early 1930s,” Labour History, no. 91 (2006): 95-111; Stuart Macintyre, The Reds: The Communist Party of Australia from Origins to Illegality (Sydeny: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 102-03; Graeme T. Powell, “The Role of the Commonwealth Government in Industrial Relations, 1923-1929” (master’s thesis, Australian National University, 1974); Dean Superina, “A Study of J. G. Latham and Conservatism; 1917-1931” (honours thesis, University of Western Sydney, 1996). For Latham’s time on the cross-bench, see: John Robertson, J.H. Scullin: A Political Biography (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 1974), 205-361; John R. Williams, John Latham and the Conservative Recovery from Defeat, 1929–31 (Sydney: Australasian Political Studies Association, 1969). 9 This thesis uses ‘inter-imperial’ to describe relations between the semi-independent states of the British Empire. This was the term Latham and his contemporaries most frequently deployed in their writing and oratory on the subject, although ‘intra-imperial’ is the more accurate word for describing relations within an empire. 10 For scholarship on his engagement with Australian politics beyond 1934, see: Fiona Wheeler, “Sir John Latham's Extra-Judicial Advising,” Melbourne University Law Review 35, no. 2 (2011): 651-76; “The Latham Court: Law, War and Politics,” in The High Court, the Constitution and Australian Politics, ed. Rosalind Dixon and George Williams (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 159-78.

This thesis is supported by a review of the relevant Australian political history and

political biography literature, as well as foreign policy scholarship. Gaps identified in the literature are filled by the analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of a wide range of primary source material obtained from national and university archival institutions in Australia and

Britain. The papers of the Boobooks dining club, held at the University of Melbourne

Archives, constitute a special reserve of primary sources; many of these manuscripts have escaped analysis and comment in the studies of interwar politics in Australia and the wider

British Empire.

Historiographical context

The researcher looking to understand Latham as a political figure must consult a patchwork of secondary sources. In this scholarship, Latham has tended to figure as a bit-player in a larger story. He is one cog in the evolving machinery of Australian diplomacy or is the crutch to Labor politician-cum-conservative Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, or the tireless parliamentary nemesis to communists and unionists. What is lost is a coherent analysis of his contributions to political thought. He was an imperial thinker working on reconciling national and imperial identities and priorities. This has been a fruitful area for Dominion scholarship,11 and historians have discussed Australians who considered this question in the

11 John Eddy and Deryk Schreuder, The Rise of Colonial Nationalism (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988); Deborah Gare, “Britishness in Recent Australian Historiography,” The Historical Journal 43, no. 4 (2000): 1145-55; Daniel Gorman, Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); John Hirst, “Empire, State, Nation,” in Australia’s Empire, ed. Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 141-62. For a discussion of Britishness and Australian nationalism pre-twentieth century, see Luke Trainor’s classic study. Luke Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

interwar era.12 An analysis of Latham’s contributions is not yet counted amongst this

historiography.

Zelman Cowen’s Sir John Latham and Other Papers is the standard source on

Latham’s professional life. Published just a year after Latham’s death, this brief, 60-page book is based on Cowen’s 1965 Macrossan Lectures at the University of Queensland where he presented on Latham’s political and legal careers. Apart from glossing over Latham’s distinguished career in foreign affairs, secondary texts and newspapers informed the bulk of the survey due to the then comparative inaccessibility of Latham’s manuscripts.13 John

Waugh has assessed Cowen’s style of life writing, finding he was a ‘perceptive observer rather than a historical interpreter,’ with his biographies generally anaemic in archival sources.14 The lasting legacy of Cowen’s biography is its rare insight into Latham’s

personality, with whom Cowen made acquaintance in Latham’s final years.15 Cowen’s

familiarity with his subject, however, hampered his objectivity, as he himself

acknowledged.16 His own reservations about his modest study serve to underline the long-

standing need for a substantial archival-based biographical work on Latham. This thesis is a

12 Warwick Anderson, “Liberal Intellectuals as Pacific Supercargo: White Australian Masculinity and Racial Thought on the Boarder-Lands,” Australian Historical Studies 46, no. 3 (2015): 425-39; James Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), especially 21-72, 95-150; Stuart Macintyre, A History for a Nation: Ernest Scott and the Making of Australian History (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994); Neville Meaney, “Frederic Eggleston on International Relations and Australia's Role in the World,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 51, no. 3 (2005): 359-71; Warren Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Fiona Wheeler, “Framing an Australian Constitutional Law: Andrew Inglis Clark and William Harrison Moore,” Australian Journal of Legal History, no. 2 (1997): 237-52. For a good overview of recent historiography on imperial thinkers abroad, see: Daniel Kenneth Wold, “Commonwealth: Imperialism and Internationalism, 1919-1939” (PhD diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2012), 3-22. 13 Latham donated his papers to the National Library of Australia, Canberra [hereafter NLA] in 1963, but they were not sorted and listed until the early 1970s. “Latham Collection” (website), NLA, accessed 4 August, 2018, https://www.nla.gov.au/selected-library-collections/latham-collection. 14 John Waugh, “Cowen as Life-Writer: Sidelights from the Archives,” Melbourne University Law Review 38, no. 3 (2014): 1080-86. 15 Zelman Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1965), 58. 16 Ibid., ix.

major step towards a full-scale biography of a pivotal figure in Australian conservative

politics.

Scholarly views of Latham’s political character vary. David Potts and Kelvin

Widdows strike upon Latham’s nationalist streak, but miss his sentimental Britishness and

the high degree to which his imperial ideology informed his approach to practical topics, like

national security.17 Gregory Pemberton suggests Latham’s Asia-centric foreign relations differentiated him from his imperially minded, non-Labor colleagues.18 As will be seen in

Chapter VII, Latham’s diplomacy with Asian countries was manifestly imperial in its intent and outcomes. Meanwhile, Eric Rolls characterises Latham as a hopeless, dyed-in-the-wool

Anglophile.19 Ruth Megaw agrees, asserting that External Affairs Minister Latham was a

haughty sentimentalist incapable of entertaining the notion that the British imperial order

might be passing.20 William Hudson, who considered Latham a Deakinite nationalist, was

astonished by moments that revealed ‘filial devotion’ to Empire.21 These assessments are

prosaic. Overall, most historians commenting on Latham’s political outlook have restricted

their argument to a point in his parliamentary career. They have not taken a longer view of

his public life or worldview.

Like his domestic political activities, Latham’s contribution to Australian foreign

relations and inter-imperial affairs has in large part faded into the background. No comprehensive study has been made of his contribution to the evolution of relations between

17 Potts, “A Study of Three Nationalists;” Widdows, “Sir John Latham.” Another unpublished thesis hits closer to the mark, finding Latham did not tolerate doctrines oppositional to not just conservatism and capitalism, but also imperialism. Superina, “A Study of J. G. Latham.” 18 Gregory Pemberton, “An Imperial Imagination: Explaining the Post-1945 Foreign Policy of Robert Gordon Menzies,” in Menzies in War and Peace¸ ed. Frank Cain (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), 160. 19 Eric Rolls, Citizens: Continuing the Epic Story of China’s Centuries Old Relationship with Australia … The Sequel to the Sojourners (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1996), 453-54. 20 Ruth Megaw, “The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East in 1934: Its Significance in the Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy,” Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 59, no. 4 (1973): 247-60. 21 William J. Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations (Sydney: Sydney University Press in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1980), 112.

the Dominions in the interwar era. Yet, Latham’s influence in this process is unmistakable.

By the time he took the reins of the External Affairs portfolio in 1932, he was one of

Australia’s most senior politicians active in the international arena. His influence was felt

keenly in Canberra for the External Affairs Department was drastically under-resourced.22

Latham was also one of Australia’s leading interwar internationalists. As detected in a recent

study on the League of Nations Union (LNU) in Australia, Latham used the League of

Nations (LON) to promote progress and consensus following the First World War.23 Hitherto

undetected though was his promotion of internationalist ideas alongside his view that

Australia’s position in the British global order was typified by interdependence. Latham

considered the LON as consistent and compatible with Empire if pro-British imperialists

stewarded it. If London and the Dominions could not mould the League to fit their

prerogatives, then it was a challenge to the very continuance of the British Empire.

As Glenda Sluga argues in a recent ground-breaking study of twentieth century internationalism, international concepts were indissoluble with nationalism in the twentieth century.24 This finding has significance for the study of Latham. As will be seen, the nation and the Empire were mutually reinforcing and interdependent ideas for him. Not only did

Britain’s benevolent imperium give national independence and national rights, it amplified

Dominion voices in the international arena. Furthermore, he imagined that the British Empire was an ideal model for a global community. Nonetheless, a recent biographer of interwar

22 Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (London: Continuum, 2008), 15; William J. Hudson, Australian Diplomacy (Melbourne: Macmillan of Australia, 1970), 24-5. 23 Hilary Summy, “From Hope…To Hope: Story of the Australian League of Nations Union, Featuring the Victorian Branch, 1921-1945” (PhD diss., University of Queensland, 2007), 48-9. 24 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 3. Christopher Waters and Neville Meaney also describe the multifaceted influence of British intellectual and political traditions on nationalist Australia, although they differ on the degree to which an Australian national identity was integrated with an imperial identity. Meaney, “The Problem of Nationalism and Transnationalism in Australian History: A Reply to Marilyn Lake and Christopher Waters,” History Australia, 12, no. 2 (2016): 209-31; Waters, “Nationalism, Britishness and Australian History: The Meaney Thesis Revisited,” History Australia 10, no. 3 (2013): 16.

Prime Minister Joseph Lyons diminishes Latham’s influence and legacy on the global stage

by agreeing with Enid Lyons’ assessment that her husband ‘got on better without him.’25

Despite Stanley Melbourne Bruce and Latham conversing regularly on LON affairs and a

host of international matters in the 1920-1930s,26 David Lee’s biography of the Prime

Minister finds scant cause to mention Latham.27 Overshadowed by the international

reputations of the prime ministers he served under, Latham’s influence has been seriously

underestimated.

A significant aspect of Latham’s political career that entangled him in local and global contexts was his more-than-half-century association with the private ‘Boobooks.’

Founded by Latham and his friends and colleagues at the University of Melbourne in 1902, the Boobooks was a dining club for distinguished professionals. The membership ledger was a roll call for the cream of Victorian society: Herbert Brookes, Richard Casey, Frederic

Eggleston, Robert Menzies, and Edward Shann all counted themselves Boobooks at one time or another. Members, at least outwardly, convened monthly to ‘talk intelligently about interesting things.’28 In its earliest years, literary and philosophical topics carried the most

weight, while light-hearted plays and poems were a meeting staple. Levity, though, was

increasingly replaced by politics as the Boobook fold matured and climbed the nation’s

political and professional ladders. The club’s shifting agenda led a member to remark that

‘we were formed with an object, but memory does not recall what that object was.’29

25 Enid Lyons, Among the Carrion Crows (Adelaide: Rigby, 1977), 70, quoted in David S. Bird, ‘The Tame Tasmanian’—J.A. Lyons and Appeasement and Rearmament in Australia, 1932-1939 (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Press, 2008), 86. 26 Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, 112-16. 27 David Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce: Australian Internationalist (London: Continuum, 2010), 244. 28 “Abstract and Brief Chronicle of the Boobooks,” no author, 16 November 1944, Papers of Sir John Latham, 1856-1964, MS 1009 series 15, item 26 [hereafter given as MS 1009/series number/item number], NLA. 29 Ibid.

Scholars, too, have been as undecided on the significance and status of the Boobooks.

In Race Mathews’ Australia’s First Fabians, the Boobooks are classified as middle-class progressives during its early Federation and Deakinite years. Mathews concludes Latham and his circle of associates ‘probably’ made a final break with any notion of Boobook idealism and social liberal ethos during the Great War.30 Shirking the liberal thesis, Frank Bongiorno positions the Boobooks as a product of Melbourne’s interconnected and self-interested bourgeois ‘intelligentsia.’31 Tod Moore’s recent interpretation positions the club as a network

of liberal imperials concerned with progressing dominion nationalism and racial purity under

the umbrella of Empire.32 Insightful as they are, these studies tend to neglect the Boobooks’

long history focusing instead on its comparatively brief Edwardian incubation. Readers might

assume the Boobooks disappeared on the cusp of the First World War. In fact, Latham was

still a member at the time of his death. The dining club was the epicentre of Latham’s later

associations with elites and their societies: the core group went on to found local chapters of

international organisations, including the Round Table, the Royal Institute of International

Affairs (later known as Chatham House), and the LNU. Influential in advising foreign policy,

these organisations were the listening posts of the British Empire and the prototype forms of

think tanks of their day. Victoria’s native dining Boobook ‘owls’ nurtured Latham’s imperial

ideas. He also doubtlessly influenced them indelibly.

Comprised of establishment figures who did not want for material wealth, the

currency of the Boobooks was ideas, especially about the Commonwealth of Nations and its

future shape and prospects. The problem of how and if empire and local autonomy could be

30 Race Mathews, Australia’s First Fabians: Middle-Class Radicals, Labour Activists and the Early Labour Movement (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 194, 196. 31 Frank Bongiorno, “Bernard O’Dowd’s Socialism,” Labour History, no. 77 (1999): 108. 32 Tod Moore, “Dinner Clubs, Imperial Liberals, and the Edwardian Origins of the Political Think Tank” (presentation, Australian Political Studies Association Conference, Melbourne, Vic., 27-29 September, 2010).

reconciled prompted a steady flow of English publications in the early twentieth century.33

This question had stimulated the imperially minded since Machiavelli.34 To answer it,

justifications for imperialism started to progress in the late nineteenth century from a natural

right of Europeans to notions of trusteeship: British imperialism could create conditions

necessary for settler societies and territories to attain complete self-government.35 During the

early twentieth century, British proponents of ‘Greater Britain,’ such as Richard Jebb, Lionel

Curtis, and Alfred Zimmern, argued imperial unity and liberty were reconcilable.36 Latham

also contributed to this thought, but his contributions are far less known in the

historiography.

Unifying the British Empire in the early twentieth century, an age of rising

nationalism and competing international orders, especially consumed men like Latham. They

were anxious for Britain to defy the cyclical rise and fall of empires, an anxiety heightened

by the collapse of European monarchies precipitated by the First World War.37 In his writing,

Latham explored the question of, in his own words, ‘[w]hat has preserved the British Empire

while other Empires have fallen?’38 Print culture, notably imperial books, was vital for

promoting Empire sentiment in the early twentieth century.39 The books of imperial thinkers

33 Wold, “Commonwealth: Imperialism and Internationalism,” 221-22, 294. Even some British anti-imperialist liberals, notably J.A. Hobson, oscillated between opposing and cautiously supporting a benevolent form of empire. Duncan Bell, “Democracy and Empire: J.A. Hobson, Leonard Hobhouse, and the Crisis of Liberalism,” in British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier, ed. Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 181-205. 34 David Armitage, “Empire and Liberty: A Republican Dilemma,” in Intellectual History, Volume III: Classic Essays by Intellectual Historians (London: Routledge, 2015), 230-48. 35 Camilla Boisen, “The Changing Moral Justification of Empire: From the Right to Colonise to the Obligation to Civilise,” History of European Ideas 39, no. 3 (2013): 351; Dylan Lino, “Albert Venn Dicey and the Constitutional Theory of Empire,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 36, no. 4 (2016): 761-67. 36 Wold, “Commonwealth,” 1-22. 37 Eva Marlene Hausteiner, “Managing the World: Conceptions of Imperial Rule between Republicanism and Technocracy,” History of European Ideas 42, no. 4 (2016): 574-79. 38 John G. Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1929), 3. 39 John Griffiths, “The Branch Life of Empire: Imperial Loyalty Leagues in Antipodean Cities – Comparisons and Contrasts with the British Model,” Britain and the World 7, no. 1 (2014): 63. See also: Antoinette Burton and Isabel Hofmeyr, “Introduction: The Spine of Empire? Books and the Making of an Imperial Commons,” in Ten Books that Shaped the British Empire: Creating an Imperial Commons, ed. Antoinette Burton and Isabel Hofmeyr (London: Duke University Press, 2014), 1-28.

influenced Australian writings on the nature of the Commonwealth, including work by Keith

Hancock.40 This literature also stimulated Latham, who penned tracts for imperialist

audiences overseas. Latham’s writing, though, has not been contextualised or examined in

light of his imperial devotion. This thesis, for the first time, scrutinises his book, Australia

and the British Commonwealth (1929) and locates it within the imperial debates that its

author endeavoured to influence.41

Latham, an imperial ideologue

In the struggle for greater historical breadth and depth, the human face can be lost.42

Biographers have regularly been relegated to the margins of historical practice, and have felt

compelled to defend biography as a legitimate form of historical enquiry.43 For instance,

Stanley Fish has criticised biography for being little more than ‘a collection of random

incidents, and the only truth being told is the truth of contingency, of events succeeding one

another.’44 Such criticism has led David Nasaw to observe that biography ‘remains the

profession’s unloved stepchild, occasionally but grudgingly let in the door, more often shut

outside with the riffraff.’45 Yet, the more hysterical predictions of its demise have been

40 Richard Devetak, “An Australian Outlook on International Affairs? The Evolution of International Relations Theory in Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 55, no. 3 (2009): 343-44. 41 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth. 42 Robert J. Young, “Formation and Foreign Policy: Biography and Ego-Histoire,” French History 24, no. 2 (2010): 145. The innovation of collective biography, which emerged from feminist approaches to research, retains in the historiography some of the exclusivity of biographical writing. The standard methodological text is, Bronwyn Davies and Susanne Gannon, ed., Doing Collective Biography (London: Open University Press, 2006). 43 Others argue that since the late 1980s biography has experienced a slow resurgence, and continues to gain legitimacy as a distinct scholarly methodology. Hans Renders, Binne de Haan, and Jonne Harmsma, “Biography as Critical Method in the Humanities and in Society,” in The Biographical Turn: Lives in History, ed. Hans Renders, Binne de Haan, and Jonne Harmsma (London: Routledge, 2016), 3-4. 44 Stanley Fish, “Just Published: Minutiae without Meaning,” New York Times, 7 September, 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/07/opinion/just-published-minutiae-without-meaning.html. 45 David Nasaw, “Introduction to AHR Roundtable: Historians and Biography,” American Historical Review 114, no. 3 (2009): 573. See also: Daniel R. Meister, “The Biographical Turn and the Case for Historical Biography,” History Compass 16, no. 1 (2017): 1-2.

premature.46 The factual presentation of a life continues to have enduring value to fields of

knowledge. Leaders in the study of biography have suggested the genre, through the

advantage of its singular focus, can relativise, appraise, and correct the broader historical

record.47 This thesis uses biography to reinterpret not only existing understandings about

Latham’s political conduct and worldview, but to also reinterpret findings of significant

events in Australia’s interwar past.

Of all the biographical sub-genres, political biography is oftentimes reserved for

special dressing-down. Writing on Australian biographical practice, Geoffrey Bolton believes

‘political biography is doubly suspect because it carries with it a whiff of the “great man in

history” heresy.’48 However, biography, whether full-length studies or biographical

vignettes, has over the past decade moved towards centre stage in the historiography of

Australia’s British imperial past, especially as a mode of investigating transnational political

practices.49 This shift to centre ground is indicative of the biographical lens’ capacity to

focus on an individual’s community and context.50 As Barbara Caine writes, biography ‘[i]s

seen to offer ways of throwing new light on a range of different historical periods and

46 Charlotte Higgins, “Michael Holroyd Laments the Decline of Biography,” The Guardian (UK edition), 19 August, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/aug/18/michael-holroyd-laments-decline-biography. 47 Hans Renders and Binne de Haan, “Introduction: The Challenges of Biography Studies,” in Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing, ed. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Boston: Brill, 2014), 1-8. 48 Geoffrey Bolton, “The Art of Australian Political Biography,” in Australian Political Lives: Chronicling Political Careers and Administrative Histories, ed. Tracey Arklay, John Nethercote, and John Wanna (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), 1. 49 A selection of recent publications that use political biography to examine early twentieth century inter- imperial affairs from an Australian perspective: Bird, ‘The Tame Tasmanian’; Judith Brett, The Enigmatic Mr Deakin (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2017); Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno, and David Lee, ed., The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010); Carl Bridge, William Hughes: Australia (London: Haus Publishers, 2011); Alan Fewster, Trusty and Well Beloved: A Life of Keith Officer, Australia’s First Diplomat (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2008); Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce; David Lowe, Australia between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010); David Lowe, David Lee, and Carl Bridge, ed., Australia Goes to Washington: 75 Years of Australian Representation in the United States, 1940- 2015 (Canberra: ANU Press, 2016). 50 Nicholas Brown, “Public Lives, Private Lives: The Fundamental Dilemma in Political Biography,” in Australian Political Lives: Chronicling Political Careers and Administrative Histories, ed. Tracey Arklay, John Nethercote, and John Wanna (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), 40.

problems and of bringing individuals and groups who had previously been ignored into the

framework of historical analysis.’51 Through drawing a wide circle around Latham that accounts for his intersecting social and professional lives in local and global contexts, this dissertation explores the representativeness or uniqueness of Latham’s British imperial worldview and vision.

In undertaking a partial biographical study—it is not a traditional cradle-to-the-grave biography—I assert that individuals can shape history, and Latham did. His complex career in inter-imperial politics, and his playing a series of roles rather than following one single, specialised vocation, means his life can be used to reflect on more wide-ranging issues.

‘Political biography,’ writes James Walter, ‘with these general aims of elucidating leadership, philosophy, institutions – has purposes beyond the individual life.’52 By focusing

on a single, very influential individual such as Latham, it is possible to gain insights into the

shared values of Australia’s conservative political class in the interwar years and beyond.

While the many hats Latham wore in his lifetime ensures that he features in a vast array of

Australian political and foreign policy histories, even if fleetingly, a microscope has not been

applied to his imperial and British race patriotism, and the pervasive effect it had on his

politicking. When it comes to studies of Australia’s British connection, Latham is rarely the

focus.53 While other studies of men in Latham’s circle explore this duality of ‘empire and

nation,’54 no existing work has considered this important question in any detail. The absence

of serious study of his imperial ideas means his comments on, and activities within,

international affairs have been decontextualised, and even misunderstood.

51 Barbara Caine, Biography and History (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1. 52 James Walter, “Citizen Biographer,” in Paul Hasluck in Australian History: Civic Personality and Public Life, ed. Tom Stannage, Kay Saunders, and Richard Nile (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1998), 67. 53 A notable exception is David Lee, “States Rights and Australia’s Adoption of the Statute of Westminster, 1931–1942,” History Australia 13, no. 2 (2016): 258-74. 54 Macintyre, A History for a Nation¸82-87; Osmond, Frederic Eggleston, 60-61.

The character of conservative thinking is a source of scholarly contention. While

Latham demonstrated sympathies for liberal thought in his youth, and in his later years did not discard a concern for protecting individual liberty, he nevertheless sought to protect social and monarchical institutions inherited from Britain.55 This thesis posits, with some

caveats, that Latham was socially conservative.56 Historians and political scientists have been divided on the issue of whether conservatism is, in essence, a psychological preference or a codified philosophy.57 Adherents of conservatism do not like to apply the label ‘ideology’ to

their set of beliefs. As Andrew Heywood observes, ‘to describe conservatism as an ideology

is to risk irritating conservatives themselves.’58 Further complicating the issue, as Michael

Freeden discerns, is that it is conservatives themselves who mainly write about

conservatism.59 Instead of ‘ideology,’ conservatives have preferred to brand their ideas as

dispositional or as common sense.60 Latham certainly believed his advocacy for the British

Empire’s deep, ongoing connection to Australia in the interwar period had plain advantages,

namely strategic necessity and economic security. However, his worldview was inherently

ideological. As this thesis will uncover, Latham fundamentally believed that imperial

55 Stuart Macintyre, “Whatever Happened to Deakinite Liberalism?” in Confusion: The Making of the Australian Two-Party System, ed. Paul Strangio and Nick Dyrenfurth (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2009), 230; Mathews, Australia’s First Fabians, 221-22. 56 The terms liberalism and conservatism are generally interchangeable in the Australian political context. Judith Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class: From Alfred Deakin to John Howard (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-2. It is important, though, to differentiate Australian conservatism from British conservatism, which is concerned with the defence of landed privilege (Australian conservatives retained the monarchical trimmings). In the interwar era, a more radical conservatism arose in Britain that opposed the liberalising of the Empire that Latham supported. Bernhard Dietz, “The Neo-Tories and Europe: A Transnational History of British Radical Conservatism in the 1930s,” Journal of Modern European History 15, no. 1 (2015): 85-108. 57 Anthony O’Hear, “Conservatism,” in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), section 1. 58 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 4th ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 68. 59 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 319. 60 Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, “Analytic Conservatism,” British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 4 (2004): 676; Gregory Melleuish, “Understanding Australian Conservatism,” Policy 25, no. 2 (2009): 42.

membership carried responsibilities for Australians beyond the nation.61 His position cannot

be described as strictly rational.

Latham believed Australia had a noble responsibility to compensate the Empire for its

security and British inheritance, but he also believed that the Dominion’s obligations were changeable according to circumstance. He did not discourage or disavow evolution of inter-

imperial relations and Australia’s defence and diplomatic arrangements within them.

Scholars of conservatism have stressed that change is not necessarily heretical to political

conservatives. Adherents of this reading argue that conservatives adopt positions ‘according

to circumstance and the issues that they want to address.’62 Conservatism lends itself readily

to the notion that it is a disposition for it ‘is not a fixed and immutable body of dogmata;

conservatives inherit from [Edmund] Burke a talent for re-expressing their convictions to fit

the time.’63 Latham demonstrated an undeniable talent for shoehorning the Empire into

nearly every international consideration, from the LON to the opening diplomatic relations

with Asian nations. The consistency of his worldview has been lost amidst the twists and

turns of the historiography on the British Empire in Australia. As the eminent historian of

Australian foreign policy, Neville Meaney observes ‘the major issues preoccupying

contemporary historians seem inescapably, even if often unwittingly, to lead back to a study

of Australia’s British past and to a reconsideration of that past in the light of Australia’s

changing circumstances.’64

61 This view of Latham’s is glimpsed in: Nicholas Brown, “Enacting the International: R.G. Watt and the League of Nations Union,” in Transnational Ties: Australian Lives in the World, ed. Desley Deacon, Penny Russell, and Angela Woollacott (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), 76. 62 Melleuish, “Understanding Australian Conservatism,” 42. 63 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot (Washington, DC: Regnery Publications, 1986), 7-8. 64 Neville Meaney, “’In History’s Page’: Identity and Myth,” in Australia’s Empire, ed. Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 386. For more on this theme, see: Stuart Macintyre, “Australia and the Empire”, The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V: Historiography, ed. Robin W. Winks (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 180; Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity:

Since the radical nationalism of the 1970s, the diminishing presence of Britishness in

all facets of Australian life has meant the British race patriotism of Latham and his contemporaries has sat uneasily with historians who have cast the decades between the First

World War and the 1970s as an age of decolonisation. Writing on Canberra’s foreign policy between the wars, the late Eric Andrews argued that the governments Latham was part of were ‘entirely’ devotees of ‘the British attitude to foreign affairs.’65 This interpretation has

been challenged more recently by historians who have detected that Australian conservatives

were usually displeased when London did not consult the Dominions on foreign affairs and

defence matters.66 In place of devotion, Stuart Ward summed-up this idea of a pervasive

‘British connection’ that was adopted rather unthinkingly by Latham and his ilk: ‘The

generation that had grown up in the late Victorian and Edwardian climax of British imperial

fervour were, as W.J. Hudson has suggested, “creatures of their time.”’67 However, this

thesis’ fuller consideration of Latham’s position reveals that Latham determinedly

participated in Empire process and discourse. He was not a passive participant.

‘Rehabilitating’ the legacy of conservative political actors as national rather than

imperial actors is prominent in relatively recent biographies.68 Historians of foreign policy in

particular have challenged the argument that the founders of the conservative political parties

that preceded the Liberal Party were Anglophile reactionaries.69 The emotive ties Australians

The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography,” Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (2001): 89-90. 65 Eric M. Andrews, Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 214-15. 66 See, for example: Carl Bridge, “Appeasement and After: Towards a Re-assessment of the Lyons and Menzies Government's Defence and Foreign Policies, 1931-41,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 3 (2005): 372-79; Kosmas Tsokhas, “Dedominionization: The Anglo-Australian Experience, 1939-1945,” The Historical Journal 37, no. 4 (1994): 861-83; Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1995), ch. 1; Waters, “Nationalism, Britishness and Australian History,” 15. 67 Stuart Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001), 21. 68 Bird, ‘J.A. Lyons—the Tame Tasmanian’, 1; Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 1. 69 A useful summation of this theme can be found in Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, viii-ix.

felt to ‘the home country’ and the compatibility of Australian nationalism and Britishness has

been obscured by the conviction that these politicians were imperialists only when it suited

the national interest. Of course, this trend has not gone unchallenged. Russell McGregor

suggests that ‘Britishness was an ethno-cultural principle to which late-nineteenth and early-

twentieth century Australians were deeply committed, not as an alternative or impediment to

Australian nationalism but as a vital component of that nationalism.’70 This political

biography largely aligns with McGregor’s proposition.

***

As hinted at earlier, a focus on prime ministers that has characterised Australian

historiography has marginalised a pivotal political player such as Sir John Latham. The

neglect Latham has endured has long been lamented, yet little scholarship has rectified this.

Lacunae in the literature, especially on the subject of inter-imperial relations, remain. Having so far eluded his biographer, Latham’s interwar parliamentary career is a rare opportunity to make an original contribution to the wave of scholarship reassessing not only the political outlooks of interwar conservative politicians but also Australia’s British past and identity in the post-imperial age.

This thesis argues that over the course of his political career between the wars,

Latham proved remarkably consistent in articulating imperialism from an Australian point of view. The Crown linked the Empire for Latham, but it was one of many and equally important, interconnected threads in his mind: voluntary association, imperial sentiment, and

70 Russell McGregor, “The Necessity of Britishness: Ethno-Cultural Roots of Australian Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 12, no. 3 (2006): 496-497. See also: Karen Fox and Samuel Furphy, “The Politics of National Recognition: Honouring Australians in a Post-Imperial World,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 63, no. 1 (2017): 93-111; Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 31, no. 2 (2003): 121-35.

economic and defence links. An antipodean imperialist in action and in thought, he

articulated his vision of the British Empire at a moment when British and Dominion

governments differed about its nature. He sought to preserve the British Commonwealth’s

liberal individualism and loose forms of cooperation when some imperial thinkers and

policy-makers were trying to define relations with legal precision.

Latham reasoned that Australian democracy, freedom, and national identity could not exist without imperial loyalty; interdependence meant independence. Dependence would be a burden to Great Britain and a mark against its civilising mission. Yet, he did not want interdependent relations prescribed by law or by force. Imperial federation, a kind of super government, held little appeal. The breaking up of the Empire into sovereign polities that only collaborated out of self-interest was equally abhorrent. He valued close, informal relations between Britain and the Dominions because he possessed the social and cultural capital to participate in this international collaboration at a high level. Latham romanticised the imperial bonds and hoped that when Australians reflected on the British Commonwealth of Nations they too would see it was the basis for world order.

This dissertation examines key moments in the development of Latham’s imperial ideology. Interleaved throughout this analysis are aspects of his personal and social history, as well as information about the local and global contexts in which he operated. The need to explain circumstance and give meaning to Latham’s activities necessitates the inclusion of evidence outside the dates under consideration, 1902-1934. Chapter I, therefore, focuses on

the manifold social and professional connections he established in the wake of Federation. It

shows how he began to think of ways to accommodate Australia’s growing nationalism and

the move towards more autonomous government in the Dominions without sacrificing

imperial unity. The chapter examines how he formed networks to discuss models for

achieving this delicate balance, whether it took the form of a transcontinental federal state or

a looser association of self-governing polities. His networking was advantageous, leading to

profitable professional pursuits and opportunities to offer advice on government policy. As

shown in Chapter II, his concentric circles of conservative elites discussed reforms in global

governance that they projected onto post-First World War peace negotiations and the League of Nations. Along with other liberal imperialists, Latham saw the League as a potentially companion supranational organisation to the Empire, albeit one which required pro-British guidance. Chapter III analyses Latham’s protracted campaign against enshrining inter- imperial relations in constitutional law. As a policy-maker, he influenced domestic debates on codifying the 1926 Balfour Declaration on the equality of status between Britain and the

Dominions. Although dismayed by the 1931 Statute of Westminster, he eventually suggested in Cabinet that it be ratified by an Empire-friendly government so its impact on Australian-

British relations could be minimised.

Chapters IV and V turn inwards to study domestic events in the early-1930s that

Latham feared would have repercussions for imperial cohesion and Australia’s international standing. Accordingly, the appointment of the first Australian-born governor-general in 1931 is the focus of Chapter IV. From the parliamentary cross-bench, Latham waged an ultimately ineffective campaign to retain the Crown’s oversight of the governor-general’s office.

Although unsuccessful, the stock he placed in the Crown adds an extra, constitutional dimension to his brand of imperialism. Chapter V moves onto Latham’s vociferous attacks on New South Wales Premier, Jack Lang. He falsely conflated Langism with communism, implying it was a bridgehead for Russian influence in Australian affairs. He worked to ensure

Lang’s economic plan not to repay the British banks would not throw the nation into disrepute with London’s financiers. As the Great Depression generated turbulent political conditions worldwide, Latham hoped fervent antipodean imperialism might result from a narrow reading of European fascism and its national efficiency ideals.

The last two chapters return to Latham’s engagements on the world stage. Chapter VI

analyses his response to the Imperial Conference of 1932 and the World Economic

Conference of 1933. The chapter shows that Latham maintained faith in the British Empire

as an economic model for the rest of the world and a panacea for the Depression. Once more

a minister in the Australian government, he had the clout to directly influence negotiations

and to shape the subsequent reception of the conference outcome back in Australia. While

imperial solutions to crisis were beacons of international collaboration, the differences and

competing interests inherent in the LON would crush its solutions. His perspective on the

outcome of the 1932 Imperial Conference galvanised his conviction that closer cooperation

within the Empire was possible. Consequently, Chapter VII moves onto his final significant

act as parliamentarian: the Australian Eastern Mission in 1934. His diplomatic tour of Asian

countries and territories, most of them outside the Commonwealth, reflected his desire to

broaden the imperial economy and the Empire’s diplomatic influence. He considered that

Australia had reached a point in its trajectory towards greater autonomy to begin shouldering

the burden for imperial affairs in the Asia-Pacific. He intended to renew the image of the

British lion in Asia and to seek new alliances with allied colonial powers to secure

Australia’s region from Japanese aggression. The British Empire would be the foundation for

reordering Australian engagement with Asia.

Chapter I The Making of a Boobooks’ Man: Latham’s Social and Intellectual Milieu, 1902-1917

Though small, it was a very fine group; the aristocrats of the aviary … besides myself, there was Latham, J.G. I

want just to say a word about him. No decent-minded fellow could possibly object to Latham coming along

now and again…. who knows what effect the things he hears at the Boobooks may have on the destinies of this

glorious heritage of ours.1

Introduction

John Latham’s informal networks in turn of the twentieth century Melbourne contributed to

the formation of his outlook on affairs of the British Empire. Melbourne was Australia’s

temporary federal capital and one of the major centres of the nation’s business, intellectual,

and social realms.2 In the period before the Great War, Latham’s milieu primarily comprised

highly educated, metropolitan elites with transnational ties who valued specific repertoires of

intellectual, diplomatic, and social practice. The centre of his social galaxy, the Boobooks

dining club, emerged at the University of Melbourne one year after Australia’s Federation.

The University of Melbourne was Latham’s alma mater. Like other Australian universities

established in the mid-nineteenth century, Melbourne was modelled on metropolitan tertiary

institutions in the United Kingdom including the University of London.3 An Anglo-Saxon university education consolidated British imperial sentiment for his generation.4

1 Minutes of 262nd Meeting, 21 June 1929, Boobooks Collection, Box 2, Folder 15 [hereafter given as Boobooks/box number/folder number], University of Melbourne Archives [hereafter UMA]. 2 Manning Clark, “Melbourne: An Intellectual Tradition,” Melbourne Historical Journal, no. 2(1962): 17-23; John Docker, Australian Cultural Elites: Intellectual Traditions in Sydney and Melbourne (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1974), ix-xii; Jim Davidson, ed., The Sydney-Melbourne Book (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Brian Head, “Introduction: Intellectuals in Australian Society”, in Intellectual Movements and Australian Society, ed. Brian Head and James Walter (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), 29-30. 3 Stefan Collini, What are Universities for? (London: Penguin, 2012), 24-25; Glyn Davis, The Australian Idea of a University (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2017), ii-iii. 4 Robert Anderson, “Learning: Education, Class and Culture”, in The Victorian World ed. Martin Hewitt (London: Routledge, 2012), 495; Alex May, “Empire loyalists and ‘Commonwealth men’: The Round Table

Latham and the men in his social circle came together out of a realisation that the

reconfiguration of self-governing colonies into a nation-state would have consequences

beyond the local political sphere. Many were young men at the time they formed into clubs,

in contrast to the middle-aged members of similarly-minded associations in Great Britain. As will be seen below, young men like Latham wanted to assist each other to play a leading role in shaping Australia’s imperial future. Likewise, the Boobooks and its offshoots provided fora for the conceptualisation of how the new Dominion of Australia could contribute to, and fit into the imperial whole without quashing its emergent nationalism and self-government.

The formula Latham developed here was liberal imperialism.5 This formula balanced

sentimentalism for and loyalty to the British Empire with support for Dominion autonomy,

thereby positioning Australian sovereignty as a necessary mechanism for evolving British

imperialism. Accordingly, Latham espoused the free association of nation-states based on

common governmental and cultural norms. He projected this idea across national boundaries

through his work as a journalist, and as a founding member of an interrelated organisation

and proto ‘think tank:’ the Round Table.

The Round Table’s operation in Britain and the Dominions might be considered a

kind of ‘unofficial’ Commonwealth of Nations, which mirrored or underpinned the model of

cooperation Commonwealth advocates advanced.6 British imperial thinkers like Richard Jebb and Lionel Curtis broadly planned a model that would see the geographical periphery of the

and the End of Empire,” in British Culture and the End of Empire, ed. Stuart Ward (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 41. 5 Historian Neville Meaney finds Latham a liberal imperialist. Meaney, “‘In History’s Page,’” 380-81. Political scientist Tod Moore supports this finding. Moore, “Liberal Imperialism in Australian Political Thought, 1902- 14,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no. 1 (2015): 58-79; “Saving Private Hegel – Australian Liberalism and the 1914-1918 War,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 61, no. 4 (2015): 501-514. 6 Timothy M. Shaw and Lucian M. Ashworth, “Commonwealth Perspectives on International Relations,” International Affairs 86, no. 5 (2010): 1157-159.

Empire unified by voluntary interdependence and a common imperial culture.7 Latham not

only shared this vision, he also achieved the professional and social standing to transmit and

enhance imperial unity from an Australian perspective. His social interactions, anchored at the University of Melbourne, provide a window into the connected, mobile British world at the turn of the twentieth century.8 Connected so intimately, Latham’s circle defies the

conclusion that Australia’s small and scattered population meant domestic elites were not

closely integrated between the wars.9 Indeed, an analysis of his web of social connections

uncovers complex linkages between Australia’s elected political elite, senior civil servants

and intelligentsia and their counterparts in Britain.10

This chapter provides an analysis of Latham’s early political activities and his

associations that fostered his imperial interests. His pre-diplomatic and parliamentary career

are its focus. Although this chapter focuses on his youth, those aspects of his upbringing

which drew him towards political conservatism are highlighted.11 These aspects, especially

7 Simon J. Potter, “Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart and the Round Table, 1898-1926,” The English Historical Review CXXII, no. 495 (2007): 105-32. Members of the Round Table movement, however, disagreed on the methods for achieving global government. Andrea Bosco, The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the ‘Second’ British Empire (1909-1919) (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 173; Thomas Mohr, “The United Kingdom and Imperial Federation, 1900 to 1939: A Precedent for British Legal Relations with the European Union?” Comparative Legal History 4, no. 2 (2016): 131-61. 8 Tamson Pietsch’s work on transnational academics in the British world is instructive for contextualising the University of Melbourne as a centre of imperial thought. Pietsch, “Wandering Scholars? Academic Mobility and the British World, 1850-1940,” Journal of Historical Geography 36, no. 4 (2010): 377-87. 9 Augustine Meaher IV, The Road to Singapore: The Myth of British Betrayal (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2010), 142-67. For an oppositional view, see: Head, “Introduction: Intellectuals in Australian Society,” 29-30. 10 The standard study of elite integration in Australia is: John Higley, Desley Deacon, and Don Smart, Elites in Australia (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). However, this text does not analyse the period covered in this chapter. 11 Stuart Macintyre’s Australian Dictionary of Biography entry is the most authoritative and widely cited biography: “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964),” ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/latham-sir-john- greig-7104/text12251, published first in hardcopy 1986. For published biographical sketches of Latham’s life, see: Geoffrey Blainey, “Drawing up a Balance Sheet of our History,” Quadrant 37 (1993): 10-11; Zelman Cowen, “Latham, John Grieg,” in The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, ed. Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield, and George Williams (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, reprinted 2003), 419; Sir John Latham, and Other Papers; Warren Perry, “The Late Sir John Latham: An Appreciation,” The Victorian Historical Magazine XXXV, no. 3 (1964): 94-101; Kim Torney, “Latham, John Grieg,” in The Oxford Companion to Australian History, ed. Graeme Davison, John Hirst, and Stuart Macintyre (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 383. Widdows’ PhD thesis interweaves the published accounts with manuscript material at the NLA to compile a recent account of Latham’s early life. Widdows, “Sir John Latham,” 8-43.

his schooling in Melbourne’s elite educational institutions, are important because they

featured in Latham’s later reflections on his youth from the vantage point of high office. He

recognised that his exclusive education elevated him from his family’s relatively modest

station, giving him an entrée into the Melbourne establishment. Latham’s manifold imperial

causes took root in the associations he made at the University of Melbourne: The Boobooks

and aligned interests, writing for a British Empire newspaper, and the Universal Service

League.

Family and early life

John Greig Latham was born in the then new Melbourne suburb of Ascot Vale on 26 August

1877. He was the eldest of five children raised in the modest, disciplined home of native

Victorian Thomas Latham and Scottish-born Janet, née Scott.12 The Lathams were devout

Methodists who instilled diligence, ambition and high moral standards in their five

children.13 ‘In the home,’ Thomas Latham recollected, ‘we did not allow conversation to degenerate into mere small-talk.’14 Described as an austere and pious man,15 Latham senior

was a tinsmith, a leader in the local temperance movement, and the founder of the Victorian

Society for the Protection of Animals; he served as its secretary for over 40 years.16 He

elected to draw an annual income below his abilities yet still donated much of it to

12 John’s siblings were Leslie, b. 1879; Bertrand, b. 1881; Alan, b. 1883; and Elsie, b. 1887. I am thankful to Dorothy Kass for this information. 13 While little is recorded about Janet Latham, who died in 1912, her husband maintained that ‘most of the credit’ for their sons’ success in national and civic life belonged to her. “How I Reared Four Sons -- Mr. T. Latham,” The Herald (Melbourne), 3 July 1935, p. 4. 14 Ibid. 15 “Sir John Latham. The Man Who Stood Aside,” The Herald, 26 July, 1964, p. 4. 16 “Service Before Gain was Mr. Latham’s Philosophy,” The Herald, 16 July, 1938, p. 8.

charities,17 and obituaries celebrated his community-mindedness over personal gain.18 John,

who funded, established, or was involved in manifold non-profit organisations in Victoria

including the Red Cross and Rotary, seems to have modelled himself on his father’s

selflessness and sense of high moral purpose.19

From an early age, John excelled academically and was awarded prestigious

educational opportunities. Beginning his formal instruction at a Victorian state school, he won an academic scholarship to attend one of Melbourne’s most exclusive schools, the

Presbyterian Scotch College.20 The social and professional leverage afforded by this elite education was not lost on him. In 1933, near the peak of his parliamentary career, he told close friends that ‘he ran into far more old Scotch boys in his daily life than he did into boys from the Fitzroy State School which he had once adorned.’21 Indeed, after his retirement

from political office, he credited the disciplined education at Scotch and its ‘school spirit’ for the high standing he had achieved in public life.22 Communities, nations, and empires also

thrived on the prestige and social connections of the ‘old school tie’ as he made explicit at an

Old Geelong Grammarians’ dinner in 1937: ‘Schoolboy loyalty and old schoolboy loyalty

were very real things, and mattered in life … they were the foundation of wider loyalties.’23

Alongside Scotch, the University of Melbourne was another anchor point for

Latham’s identity, networking, and success. Supported by scholarships, he studied Arts at the

17 “Death of Man Who Feared Riches,” The Mail (Adelaide), 16 July 1938, p. 2. 18 C.J. Lowe, “Sir John Latham: An Appreciation,” The Australian Bar Gazette, 1 (1964): 3; “Service Before Gain was Mr. Latham’s Philosophy”, The Herald. 19 “Sir John Latham—A Tribute,” The Australian Law Journal 34 (1964): 188-90. 20 Scotch is responsible for schooling more people who appeared in the biographical reference Who's Who in Australia than any other Australian school. Mark Peel and Janet McCalman, Who Went Where in Who's Who 1988: The Schooling of the Australian Elite (Melbourne: History Department, University of Melbourne, 1992), 24-35. For more on the College, see: James Mitchell, A Deepening Roar: Scotch College, Melbourne, 1851- 2001 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001). 21 Minutes of 298th Meeting, 16 June 1933, Boobooks/3/17, UMA. 22 “Public School Tradition: Its Value in Life,” The Argus (Melbourne), 8 October 1934, p. 8. 23 “Chief Justice speaks up for the School Tie,” The Daily News (Perth), 30 October 1937, p. 2.

Presbyterian residential college of Ormond at the University of Melbourne, graduating in

1897 with high distinctions in logic and philosophy; he later taught those subjects as a

resident tutor there.24 However, his most immediate teaching post after graduation was a

secondary college in the west of Victoria, the Hamilton Academy. Supported by the proceeds

of teaching, he re-entered the University in 1900 to study law.25 He became a regular face at

student events, including at debates against resident socialist sympathisers.26 He graduated in

1902 with the Supreme Court Judges’ Prize. He soon became a pupil at the chambers of

senior barrister, Hayden Starke. C.J. Lowe, a judge of the Victorian Supreme Court, said

Latham ‘was then forging his way to the front rank of Victorian lawyers.’27 He was admitted to the Bar in 1904 and joined Selbourne Chambers in Melbourne, where he quickly gained

‘recognition as a promising young barrister.’28 He specialised in arbitration, commercial, and

taxation law but also took on constitutional briefs; the latter portended his interest in the

Commonwealth Constitution as a politician. At the end of 1921, he was invited to become a

judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria but declined the offer to seek election in federal

politics.29 However, work as a lawyer would later prove necessary for financial reasons. He

purportedly volunteered to leave parliament for the Bar in late-1934 to restore the health of his family finances.30

Latham met his wife, Eleanor Mary Tobin (1878-1964), at the University of

Melbourne. The two affectionately referred to each other in their voluminous letters to one

24 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964).” 25 Graham Fricke, Judges of the High Court (Melbourne: Century Hutchinson Australia, 1986), 134-35. 26 Geoffrey Blainey, A Centenary History of the University of Melbourne (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1957), 97. 27 Lowe, “Sir John Latham,” 4. 28 “The Death of Sir John Latham at 86”, The Sun Herald (Melbourne), 26 July 1964, p. 4; “Sir John Latham,” The Times (London), 27 July 1964, p. 12. 29 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964).” 30 Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers.

another as Ella and Jack.31 She entered the University in 1898 at a time when higher

education was a rare privilege for women, graduating as a Bachelor of Arts in 1902.32 The two became informally engaged in her graduating year but did not marry until 1907. Eleanor hoped to follow in her parents’ footsteps and pursue school teaching, but opportunities were few. Like her husband, she became a force among Melbourne’s elite, becoming a foundation member of the women’s only Lyceum Club (1912) and serving as its president (1925-

1926).33 She was also celebrated for her philanthropy in the field of health and is best known

for instituting post-First World War reforms at the Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne.

Ella’s biographer described her and her husband as sharing a ‘strong supporting relationship’

that nurtured each other’s respective professional pursuits, concluding ‘it is doubtful if either

could have achieved so much’ without their bond.34 Evidence suggests this was the case. For example, John Latham’s letters from Europe 1918-1919 indicate Ella was his confidante, allowing him to share frustrations he might not otherwise have been able to (see Chapter II).

The couple had three children together: Richard (b. 1909), Winifred (Freda) (b. 1912), and

Peter (b. 1924).

Before his marriage, Latham adopted the philosophy of rationalism. According to his diary entries, he had been questioning his Methodist upbringing and spiritual belief since at least 1896.35 According to Ralph Biddington, scholar of rationalist movements in Victoria,

rationalists in Latham’s day saw ‘themselves as having a key role in the free thought

31 See: Latham Papers, MS 1009, Series 10, and Latham Family Papers, MS 6409, NLA. 32 Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this paragraph is taken from the ADB entry. Howard Williams, “Latham, Lady Eleanor Mary (Ella) (1878–1964),” ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/latham-lady-eleanor- mary-ella-10787/text19131, published first in hardcopy 2000. 33 The Lathams also hosted garden and dinner parties at their property, ‘Flete,’ in Malvern. For Melbourne’s elite, these occasions were highlights of the social calendar. Howard Williams, From Charity to Teaching Hospital: Ella Latham’s Presidency 1933-1954. The Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne (Melbourne: Book Generation, 1989), 21-22. 34 Ibid., 11-12. 35 Dorothy Kass, “The Moore Family at Alphington, 1895-1898: A Reflection Through the Diaries of John Latham as a Young Man,” unpublished manuscript (2015), 9.

movement because of their emphasis on reason, and the importance they placed on evidence

rather than conjecture or emotion as the basis for decision-making.’36 This definition fits

Latham’s public persona, which was described by one observer as ‘aloof and austere in manner, impatient of the uninformed, reproving of those who did not treat all issues with stark seriousness;’ in private, he was more companionable.37 In 1906, Latham, then a tutor in

philosophy at Ormond College, gathered together five other young men to form a rationalist

society at the University of Melbourne.38 One year later, he helped to form the Education Act

Defence League to resist the teaching of biblical scripture in Victorian state schools; his friends were wary of the obsessive way he pursued its aims.39 Later, in 1909, he organised

the Victorian Rationalist Association.40 Rationalism eventually lost some of its appeal for

Latham. Upon entering parliament in the 1920s, he recognised that rationalist ideology could

be his Achilles’ heel in the eyes of his conservative electors.41 In politics, he appeared at ease

with the Christian public, addressing church congregations about international affairs.42

The Boobooks and its permutations

While rationalism lost its importance for Latham, another association he founded at the

University of Melbourne retained its value: the Boobooks dining club. Established in 1902, it went on to become, in just a few years, one of the most politically connected meeting places of the political and legal elite in Australia. The Boobooks was formed during the heyday of

36 Ralph Biddington, “Rationalism and its Opposition to a Degree in Divinity at the University of Melbourne, 1905-1910,” History of Education Review 33 (2004): 29. 37 James Killen, “A man’s great gift of refreshment,” The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 9 January 1984, p. 5. For more on Latham’s personality, see: Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964).” 38 Biddington, “Rationalism and its Opposition,” 31. 39 B.A. Levinson to the Boobooks, 12 July 1907, circular letter, Boobooks/1/1, UMA. 40 Biddington, “Rationalism and its Opposition,” 33. 41 Latham to Richard Latham, letters, 16 November 1938, MS 1009/10/2017-19, NLA. 42 For example, see: “The Churches and the League of Nations,” n.d., speech transcript, MS 1009/23/116, NLA.

dining clubs. Victorian and Edwardian England teemed with these exclusive institutions and,

given the high density of metropolitan professionals in the antipodes at that time, replicas of

these clubs thrived in Australia’s capital cities.43 The anchor of the club was a membership

core that has been termed the ‘Latham circle’.44 Apart from its eponymous leader, it included

similarly ambitious, class-conscious, and upwardly mobile persons spread across academia,

the public service, commerce, and of course, politics.45 The circle included Robert Garran,

Harrison Moore, Ernest Scott, and Frederic Eggleston. Despite prestigious membership, the

Boobooks was barely visible; it did not own permanent rooms in the city and it produced no

papers for publication. Unlike some Australian dining clubs at the time, the Boobooks was

not an ‘imperial branch’ of a parent organisation based in London but an Australian

invention.

The Boobooks was likely first convened by intellectual and Victorian non-Labor politician, Frederic Eggleston in 1902—although there is some dispute in the sources as to who was the true ‘father of the club.’46 The name ‘Boobooks’ was settled upon after

extended deliberation at the opening meetings; it was derived from a native species of

common owl, the southern boobook.47 The records of the group’s search ‘for an appropriate

appellation to designate their assemblage’ stressed that their choice signified antipodean

distinctiveness. Members also thought the Boobooks name contained ‘all that is classical,

elegant, intellect-inspiring.’48 Accordingly, the club’s number referred to each other as

‘Boobooks’ collectively and used ‘Boobook’ (shortened to the appellation ‘Bbk.’ in the

43 Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: The Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978), 78. 44 Matthews, Australia’s First Fabians,193-95. 45 For a complete list of Boobooks from foundation to its 60th anniversary dinner in November 1962, see: “List of Boobooks Members,” dated 1962, typescript, Boobooks/4/25, UMA. 46 Minutes of 172nd Meeting, 20 February 1920, Boobooks/2/11, UMA. 47 Minutes of 1st Meeting, 17 November 1902, Boobooks/1/1, UMA. 48 Minutes of 3rd Meeting 16 February 1903, Boobooks/1/1, UMA.

club’s minutes) as a title before each other’s last name.49 While not an English import,

members nonetheless went on to start Australian branches of ‘think tanks’ that originated in

the imperial centre, including the Victorian arms of the Round Table movement and Chatham

House.

Comprised mainly of young, middle-class and urban intellectuals, the Boobooks had strong scholarly ties to the University of Melbourne. The university already had a long

history of association with dining clubs by the time the Boobooks arrived on the scene.

Academic staff at the University of Melbourne mixed with other middle-class male intellectuals, professionals, and politicians at the Melbourne Club and at dining clubs to exert influence on local intellectual life from the close of the nineteenth century to well into the

1920s.50 University House was home to Melbourne’s oldest dining club, the Beefsteak Club.

Newly on the scene, the Boobooks was at pains to draw distinctions between it and

Beefsteak, which was founded in 1866 and was modelled on the London institution of the

same name.51 ‘Anything in the nature of the Beef Steak Club [sic] most inopportune’, jibed the minute taker for the inaugural Boobooks’ meeting, for ‘Beefsteak [was] too dear;’ this was perhaps a reference that the older club was too stuffy for Boobook tastes. In a further show of dissimilarity, those assembled for the first meeting regarded Eggleston’s attempt to formulate rules for the club as practically absurd for such ‘a gathering of Free Souls.’52 This distaste of reflected the liberal imperial disposition Latham would later adopt in his politics.

49 The ornithological theme permeated. Men who held secretarial roles or had seniority received augmented titles such as ‘Archboobook.’ “350th Dinner of the Boobooks held at the Hotel Windsor,” 21 July 1939, order of proceedings, Boobooks/3/18, UMA. 50 Warwick Anderson, The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 104-5. 51 The Beefsteak Club overlapped with English medieval and gothic culture, not the atmosphere the Boobooks wanted to cultivate at the time of Australia’s Federation. Stephanie Trigg, Medievalism and the Gothic in Australian Culture (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishing, 2005), 175. 52 Minutes of 1st Meeting, 17 November 1902, Boobooks/1/1, UMA.

Despite its desire to set itself apart from contemporaneous bodies, Boobooks did not

significantly alter the fundamentals of most Victorian and Edwardian gentleman’s clubs. It

still had in place exclusionary membership practices; meetings followed the usual model of

dinner and drink followed by a paper from a member or invited guest; a chairman

(archboobook) moderated discussions; minutes were taken; a secretariat handled its affairs;

and annual membership fees applied. However, the minutes, particularly in the first years,

were often humorous in tone and the topics of discussion were equally light-hearted at times.

The club’s meeting place in its early years also seemed to be selected by the club to set it apart from its more established contemporaries. The first meeting was held at the ‘quaint’

Mitre Tavern in Bank Place on the night of 17 November 1902. The minute taker claimed the

Mitre was ‘a new-old hostel’ (for Melbourne).53 It can be said that the phrase ‘new-old’ embodied the Boobooks’ advocacy for imperial unity: the ‘new’ Australia would be complemented by closer links to ‘old’ England.

The club opened doors to the stuffiness of the older club by Boobook tastes.

Boobooks occupied the membership ledgers of other exclusive places in Melbourne, including the Melbourne, Savage, and Wallaby clubs (the latter a walking club). Indeed, the overlapping memberships of the Boobooks provide a real sense of how cohesive Australian elites were in the early part of the twentieth century. The club’s exclusiveness was guaranteed by its structured membership protocols. Only members could nominate new blood, and a single dissenting vote in an anonymous ballot would result in rejection of the prospective member.54 It also observed gender-discriminatory membership, barring women from joining the club. Female partners of members were only invited along to the rare

‘ladies’ nights’ or anniversary dinners, where the tone of discussion and subject matter were

53 Ibid. 54 H.W. Allen to Boobooks, circular letter, 10 July 1931, Boobooks/3/16, UMA.

typically less serious than at ordinary gatherings. At one such event, the wives who were

present were described as ‘initiates at the holy mysteries,’ an inference that they were being

made privy to hitherto sacred rituals or rites.55

The rigid protocols that governed the Boobooks suggests that the Boobooks was

amongst the most organised dining clubs of early twentieth century Australia.56 It was a

highly cohesive unit with consistent membership. Most members retained their involvement

with the club until death; it was not until Latham passed away in 1964 that the last living link

to the original cohort disappeared.57 In his case, he never let his membership lapse, even

while Chief Justice of the High Court from 1935 to 1952. Although he resigned from the

Round Table and the Melbourne Rotary Club on the basis that he did not want to jeopardise

the impartiality of the High Court bench, he did not resign from the Boobooks.58 In fact,

Latham confided to fellow Boobook B.A. Levinson that he could ‘see no reason why we

should not go on forever.’59 Melbourne’s dining owls were evidently extremely close to his

heart.

The interconnectedness of Melbourne male elites was based on social uniformity and

educational backgrounds. Social compatibility and mutual outlooks were quintessential to

elite organisations. Knighthoods were unremarkable amongst this cohort. Furthermore,

personal contacts and friendships were nurtured by school and professional ties. The ‘old

boy’ network was alive and well in the dining clubs: 80 per cent of Boobooks were university

educated, with most members connected in some way to the University of Melbourne. In this

55 Minutes of the 100th meeting, n.d., Boobooks/1/6, UMA. 56 James Walter, What Were They Thinking? The Politics of Ideas in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2010), 157. 57 “List of Boobooks Members,” typescript, dated 1962, Boobooks/4/25, UMA. 58 Honorary Secretary of the Melbourne Rotary Club to Latham, letter, 16 October 1935, MS 1009/1/4883, NLA. 59 Latham to Levinson, letter, 26 February 1945, MS 1009/1/5748, NLA.

respect, Boobooks confirms Bourdieu’s contention that private school education binds

together elite social circles more effectively than professional links alone.60 Leonie Foster, in

her study of the Round Table movement in Australia, found that Scotch College was, more

than any other school, responsible for educating Round Table members.61 Apart from

Latham, the Boobooks’ Scotch connection is perhaps best illustrated by Horace William

‘Barney’ Allen. He was the vice-master at Scotch College 1915-1944, and one of the earliest

secretaries and presidents of the Boobooks.62

The Boobooks was well connected in Australia and in London, connections through

which its ideas and influences traversed the British Empire. Furthering the goal of imperial

unity was a key project to which the Boobooks devoted themselves, even as the idea of an

empire governed by a centrally located imperial parliament faded appreciably after the First

World War.63 Participants in the club argued that an evolutionary model of British imperialism was needed. In other words, a free-association of co-operative nation-states brought together by common cultural, racial, and historical bonds and joint security aims. In this respect, Boobooks argued against London dictating imperial policy. The Dominions required consultation and a voice in the making of imperial policy for an imperial unity scheme to be successful; an idea that harkened back to the nineteenth century when the colonial governments made repeated representations to the British government about territorial acquisitions in the South Pacific by foreign powers, notably France and Germany.

Imperial conferences were one mechanism for consultation.64 While it appears that the

60 Pierre Bourdieu, “Systems of Education and Systems of Thought,” in Schooling and Capitalism: A Sociological Reader, ed. Roger Dale, Geoff Esland, and Madeleine MacDonald (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 198. 61 Leonie Foster, High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1986), 42-43. 62 K. C. Wheare, “Allen, Horace William (1875–1949),” ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/allen-horace- william-5594/text8319, published first in hardcopy 1979. 63 Mohr, “The United Kingdom and Imperial Federation, 1900 to 1939,” 146-49. 64 Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 120-56.

Boobooks did not develop a comprehensive solution to the imperial unity question, it

nevertheless went further than might otherwise have been expected from a dinner club—

particularly one comparatively hidden from view. The policies Latham pursued in public life

in relation to Australia and the British Empire reflected its deliberations.

The Boobooks were idealistic about the role they hoped to play in affairs of Australia

and the British Empire more generally. At the inaugural gathering, members defined

themselves as ‘Men of Action’ who grappled with affairs of the nation with ‘religious zeal.’

The minutes-taker recorded a lively proclamation given by lawyer and public servant, Morris

Phillips: ‘SALVATION FOR AUSTRALIA, AS FOR THE WORLD, LIES NOT IN

SPOKEN NOR IN WRITTEN ELOQUENCE. WE MUST BE MADE FIT TO GOVERN.’65

Capitalisation in the minutes suggest the stirring reception Phillips’ words received, or

possibly the enthusiasm with which it was delivered. As the minutes make clear though, the

men in attendance generally concurred with Phillips: ‘most of us … agree that this is the gem

of a rather brilliant conversation.’66 From the first meeting it is apparent most members had

visions for the club that went beyond sociable gatherings. While individually the men who

called themselves, Boobooks were not necessarily major players in national or international

politics (although some, Latham in particular, were to become so), collectively their

contribution assumed larger significance.67

The views expressed in private at dining clubs almost certainly influenced Latham, who could put those ideas into action in the public sphere, especially following the First

World War. Undeniably, elite opinion was focused through the networking opportunities afforded by club dining rooms. ‘The integration of social circle members,’ other scholars

65 Minutes of 1st Meeting, 17 November 1902, Boobooks/1/1, UMA. Emphasis in the original. 66 Ibid. 67 Moore, “Dinner Clubs.”

have argued, ‘can provide the cohesion necessary to the effective transmission of ideas and

influence.’68 The once close connection between the Melbourne and Adelaide Clubs and the

Liberal Party suggests some of the sway elite social circles can hold over politics.69 Senior public servants in the Department of External Affairs were well acquainted with the

Boobooks within the first decade of its inception. In November 1912, Atlee Hunt, then the

Head of External Affairs, approached the Boobooks looking for advice on how his department could best administer the territory of New Guinea.70 The Department’s long-

serving liaison officer in London, Alfred Stirling, was a member from at least 1934.71

The ideology of the Boobooks

It was no coincidence that the Boobooks was formed almost immediately after Australian

Federation in 1901. The Boobooks’ first membership compared their youthfulness

favourably to the nation’s infancy. For them, the fledgling club was an intellectual movement

of its time; they were concerned for ‘our new born nation … its dangers and its hope.’72

Their words encapsulated the metaphor that Australia was a child coming-of-age, widespread at the time of Federation and popularly illustrated in cartoons like The Bulletin’s ‘Little Boy from Manly’, a standard illustration of young Australia. As Richard White aptly observes, the

[‘Little Boy’] ‘was reasonably innocent and very vulnerable to any threats from an evil, outside world.’73 To meet these threats, the Boobooks advanced the view that the new

Commonwealth should turn towards the British Empire. Other organisations also existed for

68 Higley, Deacon, and Smart, Elites in Australia, 45. 69 Iain McMenamin, If Money Talks, What Does It Say? Corruption and Business Financing of Political Parties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 84. 70 Minutes of 110th Meeting, 15 November 1912, Boobooks/1/6, UMA. 71 Minutes of 308th Meeting, 20 July 1934, Boobooks/3/17, UMA. 72 Minutes of 1st Meeting, 17 November 1902, Boobooks/1/1, UMA. 73 Richard White, Inventing Australia: Images and Identity, 1688-1980 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 123.

promoting closer ties between Britain and its self-governing colonies in Australia before the

Boobooks came into being, including the Imperial Federation League (IFL) and the

Australian Natives’ Association (ANA).74 The Boobooks were a uniquely Australian

phenomenon in this respect, with no overseas offshoots.75 However, such was the

entanglement of the Boobooks in the imperial war effort of 1914-1918 they were able to hold

an official dinner at a Fleet Street London hotel in August 1918; only five members were

absent.76

The Boobooks were grappling with Australia’s place in the British Empire. In the

late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the rhetoric of imperialism helped to nurture an

Australian nationalism, sometimes in opposition to the empire, and sometimes as part of it.77

Most Australian statesmen of this period saw themselves equally as Australian and British.

Imperial loyalty and Australian nationalism may appear at first glance incompatible concepts

from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, however at the turn of the twentieth

century the British inheritance was as valuable to independent Australian Britons like Latham

as was their political independence.78 The linkages between nationalism and imperialism, rather than ending with Federation, were arguably intensified after 1901. This intensification

was due to the high value placed on defence and cultural ties to the ‘home country.’ Race and

shared institutions and customs were seen by policy-makers to bind Australia to the self-

governing parts of the British Empire. As Stuart Macintyre observes:

74 Trainor, British Imperialism, 18. 75 For instance, the Australian expatriate community in London at the end of the First World War was clustered around the ANA’s branch in that city. Bruce Scates, Frank Bongiorno, Rebecca Wheatley, and Laura James, “‘Such a Great Space of Water between Us’: Anzac Day in Britain, 1916–39,” Australian Historical Studies 45, no. 2 (2014): 225. 76 Minutes of 1st Overseas Meeting, 2nd August 1918, Boobooks/2/10, UMA. 77 Trainor, British Imperialism, 3. 78 This term, coined by Deakin and made famous by W.K. Hancock, referred to Australians who believed in self-government but still valued the nation’s ties to the British Empire. J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A Biography, Vol. 2 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), 483.

Australian civilisation was the product of a transfer of people, institutions, technology and culture from the metropolitan centre to a new setting; whether the preference was for faithful imitation of the original or improvement upon it, the experiment was judged against received standards.79

This British inheritance acted to heighten anxieties around security and geo-political relations. Australia’s history is marked by this struggle between British linkages and geographic reality.80 Countries to Australia’s immediate north were perceived by many

Australians to be diametrically opposed to ‘White Australia.’ Boobooks, white men themselves, were broadly in support of the White Australia Policy enshrined in the

Immigration Restriction Act 1901.81

For the Boobooks, the increasing sovereignty of Dominions like Australia raised the

dilemma of how to best navigate, mitigate, or accommodate friction between state

nationalism and loyalty to the British Empire.82 They engaged with the published solutions

for developing an organic ‘system of Colonial alliances,’ including Richard Jebb’s concept of

a group of related sovereign states that operated within a free trade arrangement, as set out in

his 1905 Studies in Colonial Nationalism. In this instance, they were far from agreed upon

the solution to supersede the ‘present fabric of Empire,’ which they felt was ‘passing away.’

Some of the dining owls considered that Jebb’s ideas of formal alliances or treaties binding

the British Empire together were ‘loose, ill-considered, and questionable.’83 If Latham did

not agree then, he certainly did later. In 1929, he wrote ‘Imperial Federation, even if it were

79 Macintyre, “Australia and the Empire,” 163. James Belich uses an analogous concept, ‘better Britons,’ to describe this process from the New Zealand perspective. James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 57. 80 The iconic text on this tension is Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History, rev. ed. (Sydney: Macmillan, 2001). 81 Minutes of 56th Meeting, 15 November 1907, Boobooks/1/1; Minutes of 198th Meeting, 18 August 1922, Boobooks/2/11, UMA. 82 Potter, “Richard Jebb,” 106. 83 Minutes of 32nd Meeting, 15 September 1905, Boobooks/1/1, UMA.

desirable, is impracticable.’84 Rather than highly-structured imperial cooperation, the

Boobooks argued emotional, cultural, and racial ties should provide an ongoing basis for

unitary relations within the British Empire; all key elements of liberal imperialism.85 The congruence of thought on imperial federation demonstrated the remarkable influence of the

Boobooks on the development of Latham’s imperial view.

Boobooks also pursued the theories of Lionel Curtis, one of the leading proponents of

British Empire federalism before and after the First World War. A British official with numerous Australian contacts, Curtis knew many Boobook men personally and was familiar with their dining club. Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, who met Curtis through the IFL,

introduced him to the Boobooks during his 1910-1911 tour of the Dominions to establish

branches of the Round Table movement, an organisation that produced regular journals

directed at a readership primarily comprised of informed readers and powerbrokers in foreign

affairs.86 Curtis was looking for young men to form the nucleus of the Melbourne Round

Table group. On Deakin’s recommendation, he turned to the early roster of the Boobooks.

Latham, Herbert Brookes, Frederic Eggleston, Robert Garran, Harrison Moore, Ernest Scott

were amongst those approached by Curtis.87 Their key involvement in the Round Table, a

movement that campaigned for imperial unity and British race consolidation, revealed the

Boobooks dining club’s deep commitment to political activism. An activism that frequently

took imperialist forms.

The emergency of the First World War did not divert the Boobooks from the topic of

imperial unity. One evening in September 1917, the Boobooks discussed Curtis’ then

84 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 15. 85 Moore, “Liberal Imperialism in Australian Political Thought,” 69-70. 86 John Edward Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1975), 95. 87 Foster, High Hopes, 21.

recently published Problem of the Commonwealth.88 Curtis did not have faith in an imperial

parliament elected by citizens residing across the vast Empire, believing the many divergent

views that would result from such a geographically expansive electorate would cause

parliamentary deadlock. He suggested instead a gradual evolution of the consultation process

in imperial foreign affairs overseen by a series of inter-imperial conventions. Curtis was more comfortable with outlining the impediments to imperial union than the solutions needed, reasoning:

the people of the Dominions … can never command or begin to command the ministers in charge of [their foreign affairs] … until they are irrevocably committed to meeting the cost of the policy they adopt.89

It can be inferred from the minutes that most Boobooks present at the talk on Curtis’ ideas

had ‘read the book.’ The audience left the talk with ‘remarkable’ clarity and a succinct

understanding of ‘the question of Imperial Unity.’90 In subsequent years, Latham developed

Curtis’ tenet that the Dominions should shoulder the financial burden of imperial policy in its

various capacities. The clearest enunciation came in June 1923, not long after Latham

became a federal parliamentarian. Speaking to the Lower House, he advised that Australia

should:

recognise our responsibilities, to the conclusion that there must be a co-operation in the determination of policy and a co-operation in the adoption of defensive measures between the various parts of the Empire.91

88 Minutes of 151st Meeting, 21 September 1917, Boobooks/2/10, UMA. 89 Lionel Curtis, The Problem of the Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1917), 228-29. 90 Minutes of 151st Meeting, 21 September 1917, Boobooks/2/10, UMA. 91 Australia, House of Representatives [hereafter HOR], Debates, 19 June 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230619_reps_9_103/.

Projecting imperialist Australia, 1908-1909

Via his dining club links, Latham was offered the opportunity to promote Australia in

England through journalism.92 In January 1908, he agreed to take over the role of Melbourne

representative of the conservative London-based newspaper, The Standard and its sister

edition, the Evening Standard.93 The editor, E.A. Gwynne, intended to ‘bind the Empire together by means of a journal devoted entirely to its interests.’94 He was especially

interested in antipodean opinion because ‘the British public … is amazingly ignorant of things Australian,’ a view that Latham shared.95 He described The Standard as ‘trying to

breach over that awful gulf of ignorance which has done so much in the past to militate

against Australia’s expansion.’96 The previous correspondent and a fellow Boobook, Edward

Shann, offered him the post.97 Latham continued Shann’s contract: £3.15 per weekly column,

with columns to address two or three subjects so the writing could be published over the

course of a week.98 Although disappointment over remuneration played a small role in

Latham’s eventual decision to leave the paper,99 from January 1908 until March 1909 he

wrote long articles on matters of interest to the Empire from an Australian perspective—

92 Latham also took up another journalistic venture at this time, editing and writing for The Trident. It was a monthly magazine published by Melbourne-based publisher of educational and literary tracts, Thomas C. Lothian. Latham, along with B.A. Levinson, Walter Murdoch, and Bernard O’Dowd relaunched the failed modern languages and literature journal as an Australian review in April 1908. This venture, like all of Latham’s intellectual endeavours in the pre-Great War period, was made possible through personal connections. Lothian was well-known to his circle at the University of Melbourne, having published Murdoch and O’Dowd’s poetry in 1907. The magazine failed to make a profit and ceased publication in March 1909. “T.C. Lothian with Mr. H. H. Champion & Others – Agreement,” typescript dated 1908, Latham Papers, MS 1009/16/457; Lothian to Latham, letter, 10 March 1909, MS 1009/16/494, NLA; Cecily Close, “Thomas C. Lothian, Lawson’s Melbourne Publisher,” The Latrobe Journal, no. 70 (2002): 11-12; Matthews, Australia’s First Fabians, 195. 93 The paper had representatives in most major Australian cities. W.A.M. Goode to Latham, letter, 23 January 1908, MS 1009/16/1, NLA. 94 E.A. Gwynne to Herbert E. Easton, letter, 26 June 1908, MS 1009/16/52, NLA. 95 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 28 February 1908, MS 1009/16/3, NLA. 96 Latham to Herbert E. Easton, letter, 26 June 1908, MS 1009/16/52, NLA. 97 Shann was one of Australia’s notable academic economists of the twentieth century. He entered the University of Melbourne’s Queen’s College, a factory for producing notable economists, as an undergraduate Arts student in 1901. Ross Williams, “Queen's College and Australian Economics: 1900-1955,” History of Economics Review, no. 58 (2013): 44-56. 98 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 28 February 1908, MS 1009/16/3, NLA. 99 Latham to Gwynne, letter, 10 March 09, MS 1009/16/123, NLA.

usually on defence, economics, and politics; these were supplemented by Reuter news cables from the capital cities.100 His initial writings, which were described as covering events

‘clearly,’ garnered the approval of Gwynne and The Standard’s readership.101

The first typescript he sent to London, which addressed Australian naval policy, set the theme for his subsequent journalism: Australia’s local interests and circumstances had imperial resonance. Published on 2 March 1908, the article presented thinly veiled inferences that Asian nations posed a threat to Australia’s racial, social, political, and border integrity.

This threat also exposed the Empire’s vulnerable position in the Pacific. He argued that solutions to these regional concerns were only possible through Australian-led interdependent coordination with Britain because ‘[t]he proximity of Australia to Asia creates conditions which [are] unknown to, and possibly unrealisable by, the inhabitants of the United Kingdom.’ He went on to quote at length and add commentary to what he described as ‘an eloquent speech’ of three-time Australian Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin. In

December 1907, Deakin spoke in the Federal Parliament of Australia’s ‘obligation … to protect the territory with which we have been entrusted’, and that as a part of the Empire the nation needed ‘to become a source of strength and not of weakness.’ In his article, Latham added an addendum that ‘“local” defence is … “Imperial.”’102

The article as it appeared in The Standard, however, excluded the final paragraph of the typescript. Here, Latham strengthened his view that Deakin’s scheme for an Australian flotilla—presented to the 1907 Colonial Conference and the Australian parliament later that year103—was complementary to the British Empire:

100 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 15 April 1909, MS 1009/16/125, NLA. 101 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 2 April 1908, MS 1009/16/5, NLA. 102 “Australian Naval Policy,” The Standard, 2 March 1908, p. 9. 103 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 71-72.

the scheme goes far to satisfy Australian national aspirations, and proposes what may be a successful means of reconciling those aspirations with an effective recognition of the value of imperial guidance and the reality of imperial obligation. If it is adopted, the net result will certainly be to strengthen the naval power of the Empire in the Southern Seas.104

Latham was not asserting Australian post-colonial independence but that its national and

British imperial interests were indivisible. There was also a nod to the belief British tutelage

in statehood was a prerequisite for national autonomy, a common idea amongst imperial

adherents in the Edwardian era.105 Moreover, Latham was familiar with naval strategy,

having discussed dreadnoughts and naval defence at some length in the Boobooks dining

club.106 He thought that Australia was not only ideally placed to inform regional imperial

strategy; it also had the responsibility to uphold imperial policy.

Although he was asked to write ‘as Australia itself speaking to the rest of the

Empire,’107 Latham gave little consideration to opinions that were indifferent or unrelated to

British imperialism. He penned critiques of political positions that were antithetical to his

own. He expressed concern about the supposed ‘growing power’ of socialism in Australia,108

and wrote scathingly of the Labor Party’s structure and platform. He declared the party

104 “Australian Naval Policy,” typescript, 21 January 1908, MS 1009/16/139, NLA. 105 See: Boisen, “The Changing Moral Justification of Empire.” 106 Minutes of 75th Meeting, 20 August 1909, Boobooks/ 1/1; Minutes of 113th Meeting, 18 April 1913, Boobooks/1/6, UMA. Deakin presented to the club in person to discuss naval matters. In May 1909, he sat in the audience at a Boobooks’ paper linking education to the construction, maintenance, and manning of dreadnoughts in Australia. He was even invited by the archboobook to give an impromptu speech on the subject. Deakin went on to make ‘a certain number of remarks on the subject’ of ‘school power and sea power,’ which was the proposal that an efficient, educated populace would lead to the development of naval power. Naval development within an imperial framework was high on Deakin’s agenda when he became Prime Minister for the third and final time in November 1909. His turning up in the Boobooks’ midst reflected the lack of a pre-determined plan for an Australian Navy. Nonetheless, he persisted with his goal and Australia’s fledgling navy’s first and only capital ship, the dreadnought HMAS Australia, was commissioned by Deakin’s Fusion government during its short but productive term in office in 1910. James Bennett, “Redeeming the Imagination: A Trans-National History of Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand, 1890-1944” (PhD diss., University of Melbourne, 1997), 24; Minutes of 72nd Meeting, 21 May 1909, Boobooks/1/1, UMA. 107 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 2 April 1908, MS 1009/16/5, NLA. 108 “Growth of Socialism in Australia,” The Standard, 7 April 1908, p. 4.

membership’s hand in the determination of policy had rendered its leaders ‘mere

spokesmen.’109 His articles on corrupt Victorian politician and land speculator Sir Thomas

Bent, and on the Victorian state elections, were rejected by the editor for ‘taking up a strong

party bias in a question of local interest.’110 Despite not representing all shades of opinion,

Latham was invited to write for The Standard’s spin-off weekly supplement, The Standard of

Empire. Commencing publication 22 May 1908, like its parent newspaper it published contributions from the Dominions with the aim of ‘cementing the ties of Empire’ through transnational communication.111

His appointment as the Australian agent for The Standard of Empire made news.

Melbourne’s Argus reported that while the new publication would serve the ‘political

interests … of the empire as a whole,’ Latham’s reportage would transcend politics and

commerce to encompass human-interest stories.112 By broadening the publication’s content,

the editor hoped the project would educate ‘the man ignorant of Australian affairs’ and attract

the public.113 Latham was disinclined to pursue this direction. He wrote to Gwynne on 8 July

1908, ‘I have not hitherto sent much on the “human interest” line – there have been so many

things of genuine imperial interest that I have not felt justified in devoting my space to

comparative trivialities.’114 Understandably, Latham’s time with the supplement was brief.

Feeling unable to do its mission ‘justice’ due to an increase in work at his legal practice, he

resigned as cable agent after only nine weeks.115

109 “Australian Politics: Tactics of the Labour Party,” The Standard, 26 May 1908, p. 8. 110 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 5 February 1909, MS 1009/16/121, NLA. 111 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 2 April 1908, MS 1009/16/5, NLA. 112 “Standard of Empire,” The Argus (Melbourne), 11 May 1908, cutting in MS 1009/16/441, NLA. 113 Gwynne to Latham, 24 April 1908, letter, MS 1009/16/9, NLA. 114 Latham to Gwynne, letter, 8 July 1908, MS 1009/16/75, NLA. 115 Latham to Gwynne, letter, 26 August 1908, MS 100916/97, NLA.

Latham’s foray into international journalism gave him access to Australia’s highest

office. In one of his first acts as correspondent, Latham reached out to Deakin for advice on

journalism.116 Upon later commencing work for the Standard of Empire, he acted as the

paper’s agent to secure subvention fees from Deakin as the cost of sending cables was

prohibitively expensive.117 At one point, Latham was meeting Deakin weekly in connection

with his work for the supplement.118 The Prime Minister, a great supporter of the paper,119

possessed a real interest in publicising the Commonwealth in Britain. To correct perceived

misconceptions about Australia abroad, he wrote anonymously for British newspapers in the

years before the Great War and established a federal publicity office in London in 1906 and a

budget for promoting Australia.120 He also contributed visibly to The Standard. On 8

September 1908, the newspaper published, via Latham’s column, Deakin’s letter of

explanation to the British public about the recent visit of the American ‘Great White Fleet’ to

Australia.121 The Prime Minister stressed that in extending the invitation to the Americans,

Australians had acted ‘as representatives of the Mother-country and her dominions … the

whole people of the Empire.’ The notion that Australians were imperial actors, not national

actors, was agreeable to Latham. He added to a note that criticisms of Deakin’s scheme from

unnamed overseas quarters had aggrieved many imperially loyal Australians.122

116 Latham to Alfred Deakin, letter, 24 January 1908, MS 1009/16/2; Gwynne to Latham, letter, 28 February 1908, MS 1009/16/3, NLA. 117 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 2 April 1908, MS 1009/16/5, NLA. 118 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 19 June 1908, MS 1009/16/48, NLA. 119 Gwynne to Latham, letter, 28 February 1908, MS 1009/16/3, NLA. 120 Simon J. Potter, News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System, 1876-1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 85. For a collection of Deakin’s anonymous articles, see: Alfred Deakin, Federated Australia: Selections from letters to the Morning Post 1900—1910, ed. J. A. La Nauze (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968). 121 For an overview of the United States Navy’s Great White Fleet visit to Australia in 1908, see: James R. Reckner, “’A Sea of Troubles’: The Great White Fleet’s 1908 War plans for Australia and New Zealand,” in Southern Trident, ed. David Stevens and John Reeve (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 174-96. 122 “Australia and the Navy,” The Standard, 8 September 1908, p. 5.

Latham finally resigned from The Standard in March 1909 due to overwork. While he

had some criticisms of misinterpretations and omissions in some of his articles that made it to

print, he had worked with enthusiasm and admitted he had an interest in the paper beyond

‘the pecuniary point of view.’123 Indeed, his ‘genuine interest’ in the papers led him to

overlook the issue of insufficient remuneration. The ‘very real regret’ he felt about leaving

the paper was perhaps assuaged by the parting comments of his editor.124 Gwynne ‘warmly’

appreciated Latham’s work and his ‘keenness about matters imperial and an enthusiasm for

the cause … have always, to my mind, raised [the] work considerably above the level of that

of the ordinary journalist.’ He closed this glowing review by assuring Latham that his efforts

to arouse ‘interest in the Commonwealth among the people of England’ would lead to a

‘strengthening of the Imperial tie which is, I know, the object of your wishes and desires.’125

The Universal Service League

The First World War did not deter Latham’s interests in imperial causes. He joined the home

service in 1915 as a lieutenant and transferred full-time to the Royal Australian Naval

Brigade to head Naval Intelligence in 1917.126 He gained the appointment through a

Boobooks’ connection. Robert Garran, the federal Solicitor-General, personally recommended Latham to lead the investigation staff in Naval Intelligence.127 Military

intelligence and imperial causes went hand-in-hand.128 During this period, and before

Latham went to London and then onto Paris for post-war conferences, he was active in

123 Latham to Gwynne, letter, 26 August 1908, MS 100916/97, NLA. 124 Latham to Gwynne, letter, 10 March 1909, MS 1009/16/123, NLA. 125 Gwynne to Latham, 15 April 1909, letter, MS 1009/16/125, NLA. 126 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964).” 127 Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance, 89. 128 Ibid., 78.

stirring pro-imperial sentiment on the home front. He disseminated this principally through

the Universal Service League (USL), a formidable pro-Empire and pro-conscription

organisation. Latham was one of the founders of the USL in Melbourne, inaugurating it in

September 1915. The USL had branches all over the country.129 The Victorian arm

overlapped with the state’s Round Table grouping and, of course, the Boobooks. Within

months of its inauguration, the Victorian USL alone had 35,000 signatures on its membership

ledger.130 Organisational funds were raised by membership subscription and selling

pamphlets to the public for one penny each.131 Alongside sending their manifesto and

propaganda material to all regional and capital newspapers, the group’s executive arranged

for the printing of posters and the running of promotional slides on cinema screens.132

The USL took its inspiration from a like-minded organisation in Britain that published

a manifesto in The Times, London, in August 1915.133 Shortly after the London manifesto, a

USL branch was established in Sydney. Thomas Bavin, the Sydney organisation’s secretary

and future Premier of New South Wales expressed interest in Latham beginning a branch in

Victoria. The two men were long-time friends as indicated by Bavin’s note that the letter’s

content was ‘private and preliminary only.’ Bavin explained he was

starting an organisation to be called … the Universal Service League. Its object is to induce the Govt. to introduce a measure to compel every citizen, man or woman, to render whatever kind of service, military or otherwise, in or out of Australia, he or she may be considered capable of. The primary object, I suppose will be to obtain a sufficient number of soldiers for service abroad, but we want the law to be wide enough to embrace any kind of service that may be useful to the Empire.134

129 Neville Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 1914-1923 (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 2009), 51- 59. 130 “Conscription,” Argus, 29 April 1916, p. 20. 131 J. Ellis Barker, “America, a Nation in Arms: Why not Australia too?” [pamphlet] (Sydney: Universal Service League, ca. 1915); Universal Service League, “The Case for Universal Service” [pamphlet] (Sydney: Universal Service League, ca. 1915). 132 “Scheme for distribution: Universal Service League Pamphlet,” undated copy of pamphlet, MS 1009/17/32, NLA. 133 Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 49-50. 134 Bavin to Latham, letter, 20 August 1915, MS 1009/17/44-45, NLA.

Within a month of Bavin’s explanatory letter, the USL’s manifesto was published in newspapers in Australia’s capital cities. In the declaration, the group urged an ‘utmost’

national effort in support of the Empire:

Australia has done much. But she has not done enough.... The Mother Country, at enormous cost, has kept open the Seas with her Navy… it cannot be said that we [Australians] have done our share.135

It also declared that voluntary war service could no longer carry the war effort. Instead, the

USL called for conscription to be extended to incorporate the defence of the British Empire for ‘today Australia is being defended in the fields of Flanders and on the hills of Gallipoli. If she is to be saved at all it must be there.’136 Latham and Bavin were searching for more

Australian blood to course through the veins of the British Empire’s war effort, not only on the battle front, but on the home front, too.

If conscription were not introduced, the League predicted dire things would come to pass for Australia and the Empire. The USL published this doomsday rhetoric in pamphlets and flyers. One brochure, ‘A Proposal for National Service,’ published in November 1917 by

Latham and fellow organiser A.T. Strong under the pseudonym ‘An Australian,’ painted dire scenarios should the Allies lose the war. It warned ‘Australia may at once become part of a new, powerful, and unscrupulous German empire.’ In a remarkable demonstration of the idea

that Australian independence and democracy depended on the fate of Britain, the brochure

continued:

In the case of an Allied defeat, even if Australia were not immediately seized by Germany, she would lose her power of self-government, inasmuch as a German victory would mean the disruption of the British Empire. Should this occur, Australia could not possibly stand

135 “Universal Service League. Manifesto,” MS 1009/17/28, NLA. 136 “Universal Service League. Manifesto,” MS 1009/17/28, NLA.

alone; she would inevitably become enslaved by some foreign power.137

The League called for conscription to prosecute not only the war but to win it. It warned

against the so-called ‘Perils of a Drawn War.’138 It demanded Germany be vanquished and

rendered unable to declare war against the ‘British race’ in the future.

Despite the carefully organised efforts of Latham and his collaborators, the Prime

Minister’s Office did not enthusiastically receive the USL. While the group had succeeded in

making conscription a national issue before it was officially on the Australian government’s agenda, it had failed to build enough momentum for parliament to legislate compulsory military service. Labor Prime Minister Andrew Fisher argued that the League’s campaign divided the nation and undermined voluntary recruiting efforts (an Anti-Conscription League, mostly drawn from trade unions, was quickly formed in response to the USL).139 Fisher resigned due to stress and poor health on 26 October 1915. ‘The Little Digger,’ William

Morris ‘Billy’ Hughes, was quickly ushered in as the new prime minister. Unwilling to support conscription publicly at the beginning of his prime ministership for fear of destabilising the Federal Labor Party, he convinced the USL to play-down the conscription issue until Great Britain had taken the lead on the matter. London introduced general conscription in May 1916. This had ramifications for Australia, as the tempo of the conscription debate was again renewed. In line with the League’s thinking, Hughes warned that the British decision to adopt compulsory military service ‘must be felt Commonwealth and through all Empire.’140

137 “A Proposal for National Service,” signed by Latham and A.T. Strong, n.d., MS 1009/17/20A, NLA. 138 Ibid. 139 Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 53-54. 140 W.M. Hughes to G.F. Pearce, 1 May 1916, cable, Pearce Papers, Australian War Memorial 3DRL 2222/2/3, quoted in Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 159.

While Hughes initially agreed to meet Latham and the executive of the Victorian USL

on 11 November 1915,141 he eventually followed Fisher’s lead on the USL, keeping the

organisation at arm’s length. In the press, he downplayed his links to them. The Age,

Melbourne, published a report in November 1915 that quoted him neither condoning nor

condemning the aims of Latham’s organisation, but nonetheless disparaging the USL as

producing ‘propaganda.’142 Following the failure of the first conscription referendum in

October 1916, however, Hughes privately moved to look for other avenues of support for his

cause and to build a closer working relationship with the USL. On 6 January 1917, he wrote

to Latham in a letter marked ‘confidential:’

At the suggestion of many well-wishers of the National cause, and in response to the requests of hundreds of individual correspondents, I have pleasure in inviting you to attend a meeting to be held in the Melbourne Town Hall … to consider steps to be taken to demonstrate Australia’s inflexible resolve to prosecute the War to a successful issue, to preserve and develop National life, and to maintain the solidarity of the Empire.143

The USL and Hughes again narrowly failed to get Australians to vote ‘YES’ for conscription

in December 1917.144 While serving in the Australian delegation to the Imperial War Cabinet

and the Paris Peace Conference over the next two years, Latham remained critical of Hughes’

diplomacy. Prime Minister Hughes, once a Labor stalwart, could not reconcile his politics

with the USL’s mostly conservative leadership even if they each shared strong loyalty to the

British Empire.

141 Hughes to Hon. Secretary, Universal Service League, letter, 10 November 1915, MS 1009/17/70, NLA. 142 “Conscription in Australia,” The Age (Melbourne), 24 November 1915, p. 10. 143 Hughes to Latham, letter, 6 January 1917, MS 1009/1/253, NLA. 144 “Conscription Referendums, 1916 and 1917 – Fact Sheet 161,” the National Archives of Australia, accessed 1 March 2018, http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs161.aspx.

Conclusion

John Latham’s elite integration and upward mobility was fostered by select educational institutions like Scotch College and Ormond College, Melbourne University, and consolidated by a social environment that actively excluded non-male, non-white and non- establishment persons. The most enduring and influential of these institutions throughout

Latham’s life was the Boobooks dining club. The Boobooks wrestled with questions of imperial unity from the moment of their foundation in 1902. Evidence suggests their search for integrating Australia’s newly cemented national feeling and sovereignty within a broader imperial framework made an indelible impression upon Latham, for he returned to these ideas and themes in other forums. He projected an image of imperial unity in Australia through writing for the transnational, pro-British Empire newspaper, The Standard. During the First World War, he used his industrious work ethic and prodigious networks to organise a pro-imperial, pro-conscription movement. The Universal Service League intended to bring together men, women, and children for the service of the British Empire. Towards the war’s end, Latham would travel to Great Britain where he would seize the opportunity to strengthen the Empire in the post-war world order.

Chapter II The British Empire ‘is the greatest force in the world for peace:’1 Versailles to Geneva, 1918-1926

It would be pitiable if our separate membership of the League of Nations were in any way utilized for the

purpose of weakening the bonds which at present make us a united Empire … while I hope that we shall be able

to utilize to the full our opportunities as members of the League, I also trust that nothing will be done in any

way to compromise that principle, which self-interest as well as loyalty commends to us, namely, the

preservation of the unity of the Empire - that is to say, the maintenance of our association with the

Motherland.2

Introduction

In June 1918, John Latham arrived in London as part of the advisory staff attached to the

Australian delegation to the Imperial War Cabinet (IWC) and the Paris Peace Conference. He

did not return to Australian shores until August 1919; most of the intervening period was

spent in Britain and France. Joining him in the British Empire’s capital were long-time

friends and fellow Boobooks dining club members and Round ‘Tablers,’ Frederic Eggleston and Robert Garran, who were also serving in advisory capacities to Australian government ministers abroad. The gathering of Dominion leaders and their staffs in London in 1918 was a watershed moment in imperial policymaking. Dominion representatives and members of the IWC coordinated the human and material resources of the Empire for the benefit of the war effort, erecting the formwork for some enduring cooperative structures and debates in imperial policy.3 The IWC broke with the minimal consultation that marked the earlier years

1 Australia, HOR, Debates, 31 July 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230731_reps_9_104/. 2 Australia, HOR, Debates, 7 March 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230307_reps_9_102/. 3 Douglas E. Delaney and Nikolas Gardner, “Turning Points and Tapestries,” in Turning Point 1917: The British Empire at War, ed. Douglas E. Delaney and Nikolas Gardner (Vancouver: University of British

of the First World War.4 Latham, enthralled by the prospect of a more coherent Empire-

Commonwealth relationship, was in his element.5

Latham was the naval attaché for the Australian delegation to the Peace Conference at

Versailles, although other roles opened up for him. The IWC transmuted into the British

Empire Delegation (BED) at Paris. His work for the BED at Versailles entrenched his

reputation as an expert in international relations in Australia and Great Britain. Latham

during this period is often viewed first and foremost as an Australian nationalist. His role in

drafting the ‘C class mandates’ that gave Australia the right to seize control of the

administration of New Guinea has been interpreted as preserving Australia’s interests above

all else.6 The orthodox emphasis on Nationalist Prime Minister Hughes’ pursuit of national

priorities at Versailles has influenced the interpretation of Latham during this period. Rather,

Latham’s views and activities at Versailles embodied Empire. While his patrician approach to diplomacy is glimpsed through his criticism of Hughes,7 the two men were closer in their

outlook than most historians have recognised. Neither Latham nor Hughes challenged the

fundamental assumption of Australia’s British identity and shared imperial interest after the

conclusion of the First World War.8 As this chapter shows, Latham projected more than

straightforward Australian nationalism at the peace negotiations.

Columbia Press, 2017), 6; Günther Doeker, The Treaty-making Power in the Commonwealth of Australia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 10. 4 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, 3rd ed. (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 115. 5 For a good overview of Latham’s role and activities in London and Paris, see: Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 317–22. 6 Eric M. Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 196-98; Bridge, William Hughes, 79; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 47; William J. Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1978); Tom O’Lincoln, “Making a Mandate: The Formation of Australia's New Guinea Policies 1919-1925,” The Journal of Pacific History 25, no. 1 (1990): 68-84. 7 Hudson, Australia and the League, 19-20; Douglas J. Newton, British Policy and the Weimar Republic, 1918- 1919 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 209, 356-57. 8 For a reappraisal of Hughes’ imperialism, see: James Cotton, “William Morris Hughes, Empire and Nationalism: The Legacy of the First World War,” Australian Historical Studies 46, no. 1 (2015): 100-18.

This chapter will also reassess Latham’s outlook on the League of Nations (LON), the

multilateral peace organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland that emerged from the Paris

Peace Conference in 1919. His view of the League was affected by his perceptions of race,

culture, class, and language in international affairs. He believed the shared lineage of the

Dominions made cohesive action much more likely inside the Empire than outside it. For

imperial thinkers, their ongoing experience of reform within the British Empire informed

their views on global government.9 Latham’s engagement with Richard Jebb’s and Lionel

Curtis’s conceptions of Greater Britain in the Boobooks, in combination with his experience

in the IWC, gave him confidence and experience in supranational institutions. This

understanding of global cooperation led him to see the LON as a British imperial enterprise

of sorts.10 Nonetheless, he portended dire outcomes for the Empire if Geneva was not

translated to fit local, imperial-friendly conditions. Consequently, he transmitted a pro-

British view to Australian citizens through the Victorian arm of the League of Nations Union

(LNU), from which he stepped down as the president in 1926.

The British Empire Delegation and the Versailles Peace Conference

The presence of Dominion representatives at the Paris Peace Conference was the result of

decolonisation processes that had started decades earlier. Since 1887, the periodic colonial

and imperial conferences provided venues for Dominions to advocate the removal of vestiges

of their colonial status.11 Imperial reform was hastened by the war of 1914-18. The external

9 Wold, “Commonwealth: Imperialism and Internationalism,” 44-46. 10 A version of this argument is found in David Lee, “Sir John Latham and the League of Nations,” in League of Nations: Histories, Legacies and Impact (Melbourne: MUP Academic, 2018), 83-99. However, Lee posits Latham was a League ‘idealist,’ and does not detect that he very definitely distanced himself from Geneva and the LNU in the 1930s. 11 Stuart Mole, “’Seminars for statesmen’: The Evolution of the Commonwealth Summit,” The Round Table 93 (2004): 533–46.

threat of Germany had stifled Dominion protests against London’s centralised authority.

Once the threat disappeared following the November 1918 armistice, Dominion governments

were emboldened to demand decentralisation of imperial decision-making on matters that

affected them.12 The Great War and its aftermath effectively ended any Victorian and

Edwardian notion of the Empire as a single-state, instead recasting it ‘as a hierarchical

confederation of current and potential nation-states.’13 This new British Empire—termed the

‘Third British Empire’ by the British public intellectual and historian, Alfred Zimmern in the

1920s14—competed with the LON as an alternative international order and challenged simultaneously the narrowness of the nation-state. Writing a decade on from the peace talks,

Latham said he found Zimmern’s thesis ‘stimulating,’ believing the First World War marked a definite demarcation in the Empire’s history and trajectory.15 The lesson Latham learnt

from the war and the international conference that followed was that the Dominions,

inclusive of Great Britain, should not pursue unilateral action.

One of the significant changes to the imperial structure stimulated by the war was the

Imperial War Cabinet, which was a temporary extension of imperial conferences formed in

order to coordinate the Empire’s military policy. Liberal British Prime Minister David Lloyd

George, who was influenced by imperial federation advocates in the Round Table,

established the IWC in 1917.16 Intended to recognise the Dominions’ wartime sacrifices, it

was a significant step forward from the last Imperial Conference (1911) where the

12 Bosco, The Round Table Movement, 13-14. 13 Mrinalini Sinha, “Whatever Happened to the Third British Empire? Empire, Nation Redux,” in Writing Imperial Histories, ed. Andrew S. Thompson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 171. 14 Alfred Zimmern, The Third British Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1926). This text, like Latham’s 1929 book, is a compilation of revised lectures. 15 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 2-3. 16 Meaney, “‘In History’s Page,’” 61.

Dominions were merely made privy to imperial policy rather than consulted on it.17 At the

series of IWC meetings held 1917-18, the leaders of South Africa and Canada, who were

frustrated by insufficient wartime consultation between London and the Dominion capitals,18

led the charge for Dominions to be recognised as ‘autonomous nations of an Imperial

Commonwealth.’19 Dominion efforts and the sympathies of British leaders resulted in

Resolution IX in 1917. It recommended Dominion autonomy in foreign policy and the

investigation of methods to enhance coordinated action on vital imperial matters following

the war’s conclusion.20 It was not until the 1926 Imperial Conference that Resolution IX was

substantially acted upon.21 Speaking over a decade later, Latham considered the

postponement of the redefinition of inter-imperial relations, as recommended by Resolution

IX, a sound decision.22 However, as will be discussed in Chapter III, Latham eventually

resisted constitutional changes along the lines originally recommended by Resolution IX.

Latham arrived in London for the second series of IWC meetings in mid-1918. The

IWC, renamed the Imperial Cabinet after the armistice, enthused Latham. He concluded the

body reached productive outcomes in usually congenial and collegial atmosphere.23

However, even he detected ‘rather violent’ disagreements between the Commonwealth

nations once attention focused on post-war reparations.24 Originally an executive authority

composed of Dominion prime ministers or their substitutes, the final arrangement did not

17 Keith Jeffrey, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-22 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 9-10; A. J. Stockwell, “The War and the British Empire,” in Britain and the First World War, ed. John Turner (London: Routledge, 1988), 41. 18 Saul Dubow, “The Commonwealth and South Africa: From Smuts to Mandela,” Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History 45, no. 2 (2017): 289-291. 19 K.C. Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 22. 20 Bosco, The Round Table Movement, 16. 21 Stewart, Empire Lost, 4-6. 22 Australia, HOR, Debates, 1 August 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19300801_reps_12_126/. 23 “Inside the Peace Conference,” The Age, 9 September 1919, p. 9. 24 Latham to C.E.W. Bean, letter, 22 November 1935, MS 1009/1/5016, NLA.

quite live up to the word ‘Cabinet.’25 South Africa’s Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, called the body ‘[t]he prime ministers’ conference’; with a hint of criticism, he noted that ‘it is no

Cabinet and takes no executive action, nor is there joint responsibility to any parliament.’26

(The IWC reverted to the title of Imperial Conference in 1921). Latham also levelled

criticism out of frustration that the IWC did not live up to its advisory and consultative remit.

In a November 1918 letter to the British diplomat and politician, Philip Kerr, he expressed

frustration at Lloyd George’s failure to consult the wider Empire on the terms of armistice.27

He hoped Lloyd George’s course was adopted ‘due to care-less-ness,’ but he recognised this

view was rather unlikely. He feared the Empire was being ‘subjected to a strain which may

easily prove to be too great for the system to bear.’ Nonetheless, he felt ‘[t]he consultative

principle embodied in the Imperial War Cabinet’ could be recovered by statesmen adhering

to ‘common loyalty and good faith.’ He spurned legal recourse, in the process foreshadowing

his later argument that sentiment could bind the British Empire (see Chapter III). 28

In 1921, Latham wrote lamentations on his experiences in London and Paris to the

English public servant Clement Jones, who at that stage was writing a history of the British

Empire Delegation. The failure of all members of this imperial body to pursue what Latham

called ‘British interests’ was a particular theme in his communication. He noted here and

elsewhere that the ‘decisions of the B.E.D. were not in themselves results with any character

of finality.’29 As in his letter to Kerr three years earlier, he applauded the essence and

25 John W. Dafoe, “Imperial Cabinet or Imperial Conference?,” Manitoba Free Press (Winnipeg), July 6 1925, reprinted in The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, ed. Robert MacGregor Dawson (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass, 1937, reprinted 2006), 212-14. 26 W.K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel, ed., Selections from the Smuts Papers: Vol. 5, September 1919- November 1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 76. 27 The British PM’s unilateralism generally alarmed the Dominion delegations. Erik Goldstein, “Great Britain: The Home Front,” in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, ed. Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association with the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, 1998), 158. 28 Latham to Philip Kerr, copy of letter, 9 November 1918, MS 1009/19/23-25, NLA. 29 Latham to Clement Jones, letter, 31 January 1921, MS 1009/22/169, NLA.

imprecision of many of the decisions reached in the BED and at the broader Paris Peace

Conference. Ambiguity allowed, in his words, ‘[d]ivergent ideas … to be reconciled.’30

Legal clarity should take a backseat to opaqueness and complexity, which he argued

permitted freer diplomatic negotiation. To Jones, he hinted that the unilateral tendencies of

Australia and the other Dominions had ultimately betrayed the spirit of the BED. Latham

added the caveat that this failure was not malicious but was rather a demonstration of

diplomatic inexperience. ‘[T]he “young democracies” of the Dominions,’ he noted

regretfully, ‘were pushed into the front of Conference at the beginning with a marked

demand for annexation [of former German colonial territories in Africa and the Pacific].’31

Repudiating imperial disunity and national selfishness continued to be a theme in Latham’s

interwar politics and writing.

Despite some setbacks to the IWC model in late-1918, Latham believed that it

functioned better as an elastic body rather than something that should be inscribed in absolute

or constitutional terms. Here, he was informed by his experiences in the Boobooks dining

club and the Round Table. In the latter case, it frequently wrestled with ill-defined schemes for a Britannic alliance, with many of its number resisting heavy-handed approaches to imperial federation.32 As his writing and speaking in the 1920s attested, Latham cherished a

loose model of the British Empire that fostered national feeling and individual liberty in the

Dominions but provided enough mechanisms to ensure that a tight-knit, transcontinental

community remained. This thinking was evident in his account of one of the last Imperial

Cabinet meetings at Versailles before the Peace Treaty was signed in June 1919. He was

30 “Inside the Peace Conference,” The Age, 9 September 1919, p. 9. 31 Latham to Jones, letter, 31 January 1921, MS 1009/22/169, NLA. 32 Kendle, The Round Table, 187-98.

secretary and scribe. He wrote to his wife, describing how the variety of Dominion perspectives added to, rather than subtracted from, the negotiations:

The discussions, as you will readily believe, were of the greatest interest … There has never before been so full a meeting of the Imperial Cabinet and I doubt whether results more critical for the future of the world have ever been reached at any British Cabinet – except possibly in August ‘14.33

Latham also alluded to his belief that the racial homogeneity of the delegations concerned enabled free association to achieve very good things. He ‘felt very proud for our [British] race.’34 His allusion that representatives at the IWC shared the same ‘race’ underscored his belief that Dominions were at once individual nations while also belonging to a supranational structure that bound them in indelible ways.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Latham was embedded in the BED as secretary responsible for the minutes and typing of the decisions.35 He also advised

Australian ministers and sub-committees. While he toiled alongside the Minister for the

Navy, Joseph Cook, as the British Secretary for the commission on Czechoslovakian boundaries, he also worked with greater independence as part of the BED on the South

Pacific Islands mandates—the so-called C class mandates—which helped Australia secure administrative control of New Guinea.36 He had frequent discussions with Prime Minister

Hughes, the natural head of Australia’s delegation. Latham passed briefings onto the PM, although chain of command necessitated that he usually report in the first instance to his direct minister, Cook.37 Cook was a former Prime Minister, but by the time of the conference

33 Latham to Ella Latham, letter, 2 June 1919, MS 1009/21/1450a, NLA. 34 Ibid. 35 “British Empire Delegation,” Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 23 June 1919, p. 5. 36 John G. Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference from an Australian Point of View (Melbourne: Melville & Mullen, 1920), 2-13; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 46-47. 37 Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 319.

appeared out of his depth and uninterested (in Latham’s eyes).38 Historians agree with this

assessment. Peter Edwards notes that even en route to London, Cook was ineffectual in

facilitating contact with Hughes.39 This weighed heavily on Latham’s mind, as Hughes

appeared unable to focus on the task ahead and was only engaging with his memoranda

through Garran. Once in the imperial capital, Latham tried to persuade Cook to insist upon

knowing ‘what Hughes was doing in relation to Australian matters’ and rebuked him: ‘you

ought to confer with him frequently.’40 While the gridlock eventually broke in early

November 1918, Latham remained frustrated with elements of Hughes’ conduct.41

An enduring theme in Latham’s external relations thinking emerged during his time

assisting Hughes: only men ensconced in the world of British gentry could represent

Australian and imperial interests. His opinion that diplomatic spaces were civilised and

private was formed by the extensive time he spent in dining clubs and other meeting places of the elite and reinforced by his experiences in the BED. Consequently, he was critical of the value of open-air diplomacy, which was a feature of the League of Nations and its assemblies (see below).42 Hughes, however, was more at home in the hurly-burly of politics

on the national and world stage than in dinner clubs. The ‘Little Digger’s’ combative style of

negotiation in London and Paris—most memorably represented in New Zealand political

cartoonist David Low’s depictions of the Australian PM’s rambunctious exchanges with

world leaders in this period43—resonates through Australia’s diplomatic history. Yet, the

38 Latham to Ella Latham, letter, 19 May 1918, MS 1009/10/204, NLA. 39 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 43. 40 L. F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, Vol. 2: 1914-1952 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1979), 334. 41 Widdows, “Sir John Latham,” 25. 42 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 15. 43 David Low, The Billy Book: Hughes Abroad (Sydney: N.S.W. Bookstall, 1918), 11.

other members of the Australian delegation, especially Latham and Garran, disagreed with their premier’s approach.44

In private correspondence, Latham was especially critical of Hughes’s brash style of

negotiation.45 In early 1919, he discreetly expressed his frustrations to Ella:

I would work under the P.M. only if duty absolutely required – wh. [which] is not likely. It is most improbable that he would ever ask me. He is an able man—often a good companion—but his methods, almost always, & his objects, very frequently, I regard as most objectionable. In my view they are sometimes distinctly opposed to the interests of Australia.46

These remarks were so sensitive he insisted she not disclose them. However, his letter to his

wife was mild in its views compared to the scathing—if exaggerated—diatribe he later

unleashed to the Boobooks in 1921:

There is no politics … there is just Billy. Billy is not, perhaps, the beau ideal of political virtue … He makes promises that he has no hope or intention of fulfilling, he is an egomaniac, a bully, a rogue and a liar … He is a safe-blower, an incendiary and a horse thief … It is well known … that he forges telegrams, that he steals pennies from blind men, and that he has never been quite right in the head since [his] poor crippled grandfather gave him such a hiding for trying to pinch his crutch.47

Latham was speaking to the Boobooks club to garner support for his forthcoming electoral campaign—which featured the slogan ‘Hughes Must Go!’—for the federal seat of Kooyong

in Melbourne. While the above quote captures the tone of his words more accurately than it

does the content, it nonetheless reflected Latham’s patrician disdain for the PM. In other

ways though, the two men were alike. Latham disagreed with Hughes’ diplomatic style and

44 Peter Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983), 143. 45 Understandably, he felt unable to publicly criticise the Australian PM at the time in the interests of solidarity. Latham to Bean, letter, 22 November 1935, MS 1009/1/5016, NLA. 46 Latham to Ella Latham, letter, 21 February 1919, MS 1009/21/1429, NLA. 47 Minutes of 190th Meeting, 21 October 1921, Boobooks/2/11, UMA.

methods but not always with his aims (although the two men probably would have disagreed

on this point!). One recent reassessment of the Little Digger’s diplomatic legacy has found

that his ‘nationalism and his imperial sentiment were cut from the single cloth.’48 Latham,

too, saw no contradiction between Australian and British Imperial interests.

It was also likely that Latham’s frustration with Hughes was exacerbated by the high

value he placed in ‘informal conversations’ in diplomacy. Though for the first time Australia

was present at a major international conference, this did little to enhance its role or give it

much influence beyond the BED. Since the ‘Big Four’ powers—the UK, France, the United

States, and Italy—took effective control of conference proceedings, the Australian delegation

could only hope to have influence on most issues through the imperial pathways open to it.

During BED meetings and other ‘backroom’ discussions, the Dominions’ representatives

pleaded their case to Lloyd George and British ministers on matters peculiarly related to their

exceptional circumstances, such as the German colonies.49 Negotiations behind closed doors,

however, ran counter to the ostensible ‘spirit of the age.’ Secret diplomacy and alliance-

making were widely considered to be contributing causes to the First World War. Open

diplomacy initiatives by the League of Nations endeavoured to democratise the conduct of

foreign policy. In practice, this spirit was diminished at the Peace Conference50. Even US

President Woodrow Wilson, who enthusiastically promoted the idea of the League, was

prepared to hold informal conferences between the leaders of the great powers in Paris in the

lead up to the Peace Conference.51 The plenary sittings in Paris, at which the Dominions and

48 Cotton, “William Morris Hughes,” 118. 49 Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, 121. 50 ‘The real work,’ writes Margaret MacMillan, was performed ‘by the Four and Japan in informal meetings, and when those… became too cumbersome, by the leaders of the Four.’ Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers: Six Months That Change the World (London: John Murray, 2001), 5. 51 Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 312.

the other small powers were present, were more for show. Latham recognised that this was the likely outcome in his 1920 analysis of the conference. He assessed:

[i]f the Dominions had been put this position [represented themselves] they would not have had access to the documents of the British Delegation, they would not have had the benefit of consultation with British Ministers, and they would not have enjoyed the services of the British Staff. They would have been as separate and distinct as Uruguay or Siam, though they might have been more influential than Uruguay and Siam.’52

While Latham’s reflections on the Paris Peace Conference revealed realpolitik at work, they

also underscore the high value he placed on social and cultural capital in diplomatic circles.

‘[I]n the arena of diplomacy,’ wrote Latham in 1920, ‘the quiet man often wins the greatest

victories, and that only a discreet man can negotiate successfully with those who are equal or

superior to him in power.’53 If Australia was to enhance its global influence, it needed its

diplomats to demonstrate suitable class stature and knowledge of the inner-workings of

British soft power. The ‘hand shake’ diplomacy he described would be a regular feature of his diplomacy as a government minister.

The 1919 Paris Peace Conference asked questions of the precise nature of British-

Dominion relations, particularly whether the Dominions had rights under international law

equivalent to a self-governing state.54 Latham did not think the Dominions were quite ready

to act without guidance from the imperial centre. He had urged caution in the unilateral

pursuit of reparations. He illustrated this point in a letter to Zimmern in 1920. He assessed

Hughes’ post-war outlook on imperial affairs and foreign policy, writing acidly he was ‘a

good specimen of a forceful person who has learnt hardly anything from the debacle of the

52 Latham, Significance of the Peace, 6-7. 53 Latham, Significance of the Peace, 15. 54 Franklin Berman, “Treaty-making Within the British Commonwealth,” Melbourne University Law Review 38, no. 3 (2014): 902-05; Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 221-22.

past six years.’55 He was appalled the Prime Minister had ruptured the BED at Paris by his demands for direct and immediate control of the Pacific islands Australia had seized from

Germany at the outset of the War. Hughes’ demands drew not only protest from Lloyd

George but also Woodrow Wilson.56 More than a decade later, Latham revealed to Charles

Bean that Hughes’ conduct on this issue affronted him. In Latham’s official capacity, he assisted the Prime Minister as best he could but privately he ‘thought that he [Hughes] was making a great mistake.’ Among those mistakes was the strategic misstep of giving Japan licence to make similar demands for islands north of the Equator—Australian concerns about

Japanese aggression were particularly pointed when he was writing to Bean in the 1930s— but Latham also hinted there were ‘other aspects of the matter’ that troubled him.57 These

aspects, revealed in other letters to prominent figures, were imperial in colour.

Post-war imperial defence

One of the key outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference for Australia was securing the

mandate for the former German possession of New Guinea. For Latham, this was a stepping-

stone towards unified imperial defence formulae in the Asia-Pacific. Latham wrote the briefing paper that justified the Australian claim to New Guinea.58 In a 36-page document

dated 19 December 1918, he pursued a number of arguments to make the case for the

Commonwealth gaining the mandate: eliminating the possibility of the islands acting as a

staging post for the invasion of Australia or disruption of its shipping; the native New

Guineans were ‘plainly’ incapable of ‘govern[ing] themselves;’ the country needed

55 Latham to Alfred Zimmern, letter, 10 November 1920, MS 1009/22/146, NLA. 56 For a good summary of Hughes’ clashes with the leaders of the United States and United Kingdom, see: Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 340-46. 57 Latham to Bean, letter, 22 November 1935, MS 1009/1/5016, NLA. 58 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 47.

benevolent investment to recuperate from the alleged economic exploitation and suppression

of the country by Germany; the ‘doomed to fail’ nature of international government by a

supranational organisation; and the opportunity for ‘the Empire to bind itself by treaty.’59 A

couple of strong themes are evident in these arguments for the mandate. Firstly, imperial

interests were at the heart of the Commonwealth’s claim and secondly, the League of Nations

did not have the coordinating capacity to administer the territory through an agency. Overall,

Latham’s briefing report underscored his unwillingness to subordinate Australian and

imperial interests for the sake of collective security in the mould of the LON.

If Australia did not win the mandate and it was returned to Germany or another

potentially hostile power, Latham feared the worst. He wrote that such an outcome would

‘compromise the British position in Papua, the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides …

Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, and New Zealand, as well as in Australia.’60 Indeed, the most sizable portion of Latham’s memorandum addressed defence concerns within an imperial context. In weighing up the former German territories in the Pacific as defensive assets, he stressed that taking possession of New Guinea was not breaking Australia’s reliance on the Royal Navy’s blue water fleet. Rather, Australian mandates in the Pacific would boost the

Commonwealth’s capacity to deploy ‘a smaller [naval] force along sound strategic lines.’61

He went further in reinforcing the imperial brief. A defensive line in the western Pacific inclusive of New Guinea, Tonga, and Singapore was ‘not a matter of merely Australian importance. The welfare of the Commonwealth is, of course, important to the Empire.’

Furthermore,

the establishment of an enemy base upon Australian soil … would be a threat against India and against British power in the Indian Ocean. The

59 “Australia’s Claim to the German Islands,” memorandum signed by Latham, 19 December 1918, MS 1009/21/1342, NLA. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid.

safeguarding, therefore, of the Singapore-Tonga frontier is an Imperial, not merely an Australian necessity.62

Latham called on Britain and New Zealand to help maintain and construct this ‘ring of defence,’ thereby making it a truly imperial undertaking. Concern for the impact German aggression would have on the British Empire had stimulated the formation of the Round

Table years earlier.63 Latham, a Round Tabler, demonstrated that these ideas did not die with

Germany’s defeat on the Western Front in 1918. Through formulating an imperial defence

plan for the Pacific and Oceania premised on the Royal Navy’s anticipated slow response and

limited capability to react to a crisis in Australian waters, he was already ruling out the

likelihood that the League of Nations could disarm the world and effectively mediate

international disputes. This plan would also inexorably involve an expansion of Australia’s

defence capacity. Later, in his first speech to Australia’s federal government Lower House in

June 1923, Latham argued Australians ‘should accept our fair share of the cost of Empire

defence.’64

Australia’s White Australia Policy (WAP) precipitated a dispute at the Paris Peace

Conference between the Commonwealth nations and Japan. The Japanese delegation put

forward a submission for a racial equality clause to be inserted into the Treaty of Versailles

and the League of Nations Covenant that recognised the equality of all coloured peoples in

the member nations of the League.65 For Japanese people, a symbolic expression exemplified

their ‘expectations of the new international order.’66 Hughes, along with Woodrow Wilson,

62 Ibid. 63 Wold, “Commonwealth: Imperialism and Internationalism,” 33. 64 Australia, HOR, Debates, 19 June 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230619_reps_9_103/. 65 See: Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge, 1998, reprinted 2004). 66 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the Question of Racial Equality (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 2008), 285.

was the most outspoken critic of the proposal at the conference.67 The British

Commonwealth representatives overall, owing to their countries’ restrictive immigration

policies, offered resistance to racial equality.68 Latham agreed with the majority

Commonwealth perspective. He declared it was not a trivial issue, but one which threatened

‘the possibility of the continuance of white democracy—indeed, of any democracy, in any

real sense—in this continent [Australia].’ He was protesting the prospect of international law

determining domestic policy in Australia. He declared ‘every self-governing community’ had the right ‘to determine the ingredients of its own population. If that right is surrendered, the essence of self-government disappears.’ Through positioning the WAP as a democratic principle, Latham reasoned it could not ‘just be regarded as offensive by any foreign nation.’69 This de-racialised argument was grounded in Latham’s Britannic outlook on world

affairs. British parliamentary democracy was the wellspring of self-government in the

Commonwealth nations, and individual liberty—even as it pertained to the charged

atmosphere of immigration policy—was a defining feature of imperial membership. To remove liberty would be to destroy the free association of a democratic Commonwealth in

Latham’s eyes.

The League of Nations Union

Latham’s enthusiasm for the League of Nations reached its high-water mark in 1921. That year he and fellow representative to the Paris Peace Conference, Frederic Eggleston, facilitated the establishment of the Victorian branch of the League of Nations Union.70 The

67 Ibid., 290. 68 Glenda Sluga, Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870-1919 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 19. 69 Latham, Significance of the Peace, 8-10. 70 Latham was elected the body’s first president; Eggleston one of its vice presidents. Argus, 13 April 1921.

LNU was intended to inform the Australian people of the objects of the League, which were

mainly to uphold peace and security through the maintenance of international law and fair

relations between nations.71 The Victorian LNU was however, an Anglophile instrument, and

presented this information with a British complexion. It replicated the proven British model,

which was first convened in 1918.72 Latham had been advocating for the establishment of—

in his words—‘a similar organisation in Australia’ since 1920.73 Nonetheless, the LNU’s delayed inauguration in Australia compared with their counterparts in Britain foretold other shortfalls, including failure to achieve the same high degree of public acceptance and support.74 It competed for visibility—even amongst its own leadership—amidst a number of

organisations involved in the pro-British ‘foreign-policy movement’ in Melbourne.75

Particularly notable was the astounding overlap with the memberships of Australian versions

of other British imports interested in international relations, especially the Round Table, an

organisation Latham had also established in his home state.76 Overall, the Australian LNU

experienced uneven recognition from both the public and government despite the patronage

of prominent middle- and upper-class personages and leading intellectuals like Latham.77

71 “Covenant of the League of Nations, Issued by the League of Nations’ Union, Victorian Branch,” leaflet, June 1923, MS 1009/23/1, NLA. 72 While the British LNU was one of many pacifist movements to gain ground during the upsurge of anti-war sentiment after 1918 in Britain, it had its roots in wartime peace and international cooperation organisations. Helen McCarthy, British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c.1918-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 132-54. 73 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 20. 74 The most complete study of the Australian LNU, particularly the Victorian branch is Summy, “From Hope ... to Hope.” See also: Adam Knapp, “Family Matters: Internationalism in Early 20th Century Australia,” Honest History (2 December, 2014), accessed 27 January, 2017, http://honesthistory.net.au/wp/internationalism-in- early-20th-century-australia/. 75 Osmond, Frederic Eggleston, 97. The list of men at the inaugural meeting of the Victorian LNU reads like a ‘Who’s Who’ of Melbourne. Summy, “From Hope ... to Hope,” 48-49. 76 These associations were primarily interested in the changing position of Australia in the British Empire, and the bulk of their publications in the 1920s and 1930s addressed this matter. Foster, High Hopes; Knapp, “Family Matters.” 77 The federal government’s backing of the LNU proved to be inconsistent, especially during the 1930s. Summy, “From Hope ... to Hope,” 62-65.

The LNU in Australia grew from what Sluga has called ‘the momentum of

sociability’ of its senior members.78 Latham was in the engine room of this social momentum

and knew its power. As discussed in Chapter I, his varying networks alongside the LNU were

brought together in the Boobooks dining club. The diners believed the club received

‘reflected glory’ in the recognition and accolades Latham received for his work at the Paris

Peace Conference.79 Unsurprisingly, many Boobooks were also members of the Victorian

Branch of the LNU.80 Despite their patronage, the foundation of the LNU went unremarked

in the Boobooks’ minutes. What the club’s records document, and do not document, about

the LNU reveal that behind closed doors its members, including Latham, were not

enthusiastic about Geneva as international arbiter. Even when the League was new it was

widely derided around the Boobooks’ dinner table. In March 1921, the group collectively

dismissed the international idealism of their only socialist member, the poet Bernard

O’Dowd. He was ridiculed for suggesting ‘[e]very man should be a citizen of the whole

world, and the cry should not be “Australia for the Australians”, but “the whole world for the

whole human race.”’81 O’Dowd’s scheme was labelled ‘unpractical.’82 At their dinner the

following month, held only two days after the Union’s unveiling to Melbourne’s public, the

Boobooks mocked the power of Geneva. The minutes for that dinner’s discussion—focused

on Antarctica—recorded the sardonic comment, ‘with the sanction of the League of Nations

[the South Pole can] change places with the equator.’83 Like Latham, the club took more

seriously the topic of uniting the British Empire.

78 Sluga, Internationalism, 74. 79 Hansen to Latham, letter, 7 January 1920, MS 1009/1/737, NLA. 80 From 1921 to 1934, the men who crossed over the two groups apart from Latham and Eggleston were H. Brookes, K.H. Bailey, D.B. Copland, E.C. Dyason, W.H. Moore, and M.M. Phillips. “League of Nations,” The Argus, 13 April 1921, p. 11; P.D. Phillips, The League in 1933 (Melbourne: Australian League of Nations Union, Victorian Branch, 1933), 4. 81 Minutes of 183rd Meeting, 18 March 1921, Boobooks/2/11, UMA. 82 Ibid. 83 Minutes of the 184th Meeting, 15 April 1921, Boobooks/2/11, UMA.

Thanks to the imperial patriotism of the LNU in Britain, British kinship was

imprinted on the Australian branches’ DNA. Helen McCarthy argues the Union movement

presented Britain’s empire ‘as a model of international community wholly compatible with

the family of nation-states instituted at Geneva.’84 Indeed, the League, which was entangled

in imperial projects, did provide a closer degree of cooperation amongst Dominion

governments.85 Leading speakers for the organisation in Britain, including Latham’s

intellectual ally Lionel Curtis, saw there were privileged positions for Britain and the

Dominions, along with the United States, in the League.86 Latham undoubtedly found the

LNU’s assurances of continuity for the British Empire compatible with his own imperialism

and facilitated the organisation’s replication in Australia on that basis. Expectedly, the vision

of Anglosphere hegemony over internationalism was detectable in the Union’s Victorian

arm.87 Ultimately, Latham viewed the League movement as useful for reconciling post-war

Australian nationhood with the British Empire.

Latham was at least partly motivated to begin the LNU because he thought

‘unofficial’ collaborators were needed to help the League ‘succeed.’88 While he believed

‘men with expert knowledge’ who belonged to groups like the Round Table and the Royal

Institute of International Affairs needed to feed the League with ‘reliable information,’ more organs that were democratic had an obligation to be involved as well.89 Such a view aligned

84 McCarthy, British People and the League of Nations, 247. 85 Tomoko Akami, “Imperial Polities, Intercolonialism, and the Shaping of Global Governing Norms: Public Health Expert Networks in Asia and the League of Nations Health Organization, 1908–37,” Journal of Global History 12, no. 1 (2017): 4-25; Daniel Gorman, “Liberal Internationalism, the League of Nations Union, and the Mandates System,” Canadian Journal of History 40, no. 3 (2005): 451; Anne-Isabelle Richard, “Competition and Complementarity: Civil Society Networks and the Question of Decentralizing the League of Nations,” Journal of Global History 7, no. 2 (2012): 233-56. 86 Kevin Grant, “The British Empire, International Government, and Human Rights,” History Compass 11, no. 8 (2013): 575. 87 To the National Council of Women at Town Hall, Melbourne, the Victorian League of Nations leadership proffered that a ‘safeguard for future peace would be an international language which … should be phonetic English.’ “League of Nations,” The Argus, 29 April 1921, p. 6. 88 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 20. 89 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 20.

with contemporary historian and LNU organiser in New South Wales, Hessel Duncan Hall.90

Predictably, Hall maintained a keen interest in the role played by ‘inter-Imperial voluntary

associations’ in ‘building up a community sentiment in the British Commonwealth.’91

Latham envisaged the organisation as a useful vehicle for steering the public to engage

seriously with matters of foreign policy and imperial affairs.

Latham’s desire to educate the Australian public on international relations predated

the LNU’s establishment in Australia. In his 1920 pamphlet, The Significance of the Peace

Conference from an Australian Point of View, Latham appealed for Australians to show greater interest in external affairs. Australia ‘will need all the ability and wisdom of her people,’ he wrote.92 He argued that Australia’s citizens should regard it as their

‘responsibility and duty … to inform themselves on international affairs as to be able to take

advantage of the opportunity membership of the League affords.’93 In the interest of bringing

the LNU to a wide audience, he introduced it to a gathering of the National Council of

Women at Melbourne’s Town Hall on 21 April 1921. Here, he pronounced that ‘Australians

should enter more actively into the affairs of the League.’94 Indeed, the LNU aimed to

mobilise that support through a variety of activities, including public debates and meetings,

lectures, initiatives and activities for schoolchildren, and lobbying.95

90 Hessel Duncan Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations: A Study of its Past and Future Development (London: Methuen, 1920), 333. Hall was prominent in Australia’s international and imperial affairs networks, leading the Australian delegation to the Institute of Pacific Affairs conference in Honolulu in 1925. B. H. Fletcher, “Hall, Hessel Duncan (1891-1976),” ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hall-hessel-duncan- 10394/text18417, published first in hardcopy 1996. 91 Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, 372, 375. 92 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 4. 93 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 19. 94 “League of Nations. Objects Explained to Women,” The Argus, 29 April 1921, p. 6. See also, “League of Nations. Work in Mandated Territory,” The Argus, 25 June 1925, p. 14. 95 Brown, “Enacting the International,” 83; Phillips, The League in 1933, 4-6; Hilary Summy, “Countering War: The Role of the League of Nations Union,” Social Alternatives 33, no. 4 (2014): 16.

Latham’s involvement in the LNU also revealed a pacifist streak. In the early-1920s,

he cautiously hoped the League of Nations would secure lasting peace. This hope ran

contrary to his activities during the First World War, which were defined by efforts to

intensify Australia’s involvement in the conflict, namely campaigning for the introduction of

wartime conscription.96 Yet, he was determined Australia and the Empire avoid future wars.

He had witnessed Australian and United States’ soldiers breaking the Hindenburg Line at

Bellicourt on 29 September.97 In a May 1919 letter to Boobook and first Chairman of

Ormond College, Barney Allen, Latham—who was ensconced in Peace Conference

commission work—regretted that he could not attend an upcoming dinner of Ormond

graduates in London. He also reflected sorrowfully on the university friends he had lost in the

Great War:

But as we greet each other we would not and could not forget those who cannot be with us – those claimed by Gallipoli, Egypt and France – men like Mathison, Mervyn Higgins and Bruce McLaren, who can stand as types of all that is best in Australia.98

It is clear in his public utterances that personal loss had made its mark. ‘During the war the

people had been led to believe that the object of the war was to end war,’ Latham proclaimed

in his keynote at the launch of the LNU at Melbourne Town Hall on 12 April, 1921.99

Securing a ‘safeguard against a recurrence of the disaster which overwhelmed the world in

96 Summy, “Countering War,” 16. 97 Arthur Conan Doyle, Memories and Adventures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924, reprinted 2012), 384. 98 Latham to H.W. Allen, letter, 27 May 1919, MS 1009/21/1447, NLA. It is difficult to assess the precise impact of the war on Latham’s mentality. The archival record reveals the years 1914-18 were laced with personal loss, notably the death of friends he knew through the Boobooks and the University of Melbourne. “In Memoriam. C.C.M. Mathison. Died from Wounds, May 1915,” typescript, Boobooks/1/9, UMA; “War Memorial Number, Compiled by Graduates and Undergraduates of the University,” The Melbourne University Magazine (Melbourne: Ford & Son for Melbourne University Magazine, July 1920). For an account of Latham’s visit to the battlefront in France in 1918, see: W.S. Robinson, If I Remember Rightly: The Memoirs of W. S. Robinson, 1876-1963, ed. Geoffrey Blainey (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1967), 104. 99 “League of Nations,” The Argus, 13 April 1921, p. 11.

1914’ constituted an immediate post-war priority.100 He also made a similar expression in the company of the Boobooks. Against disparaging remarks from some of the dining club’s cohort, he maintained that Australians needed to invest in the League, even though he thought it an imperfect instrument, in order ‘to make a start with the new and improved’ post-war world.101

Raymond Watt, a significant Australian internationalist and a leading figure in the

LNU movement, summed up the attitudes of Australians like Latham who were toiling on

causes intended to prevent a repeat of the carnage of 1914-1918: ‘to work so that others will

not have died in vain.’102 Unlike Watt, though, Latham was not a true believer in

internationalism. He felt that Geneva’s model of collective security was ‘Utopian.’103 For a

time he preferred the ‘chance of Utopia to the certainty of destruction,’ but he ultimately

considered the League a threat to be cajoled or neutralised by Empire countries.104

Internationalism had its limits. Those limits were the borders of the British Empire.

League of Nations

Latham saw both danger and political utility in the intergovernmental organisation. It had not even convened its first council meeting when he expressed concerns about its role in an address to the Melbourne University Association on 23 October 1919. The substance of his talk was the meaning of the Paris Peace Conference and the establishment of the LON for

Australia, issues he was discussing from the perspective of his advisory role to the Australian delegation to Versailles. He addressed the prospects of the post-war British-Australian

100 Ibid. 101 Minutes of 174th Meeting, 16 April 1920, Boobooks/2/11, UMA. 102 Brown, “Enacting the International,” 77. 103 “League of Nations,” The Argus, 13 April 1921, p. 11. 104 Ibid.

relationship. While he had ‘not attached a great deal of importance … to the separate

representation of the Dominions’ at the Paris Peace Conference, he warned:

when the subject of the League of Nations is considered, it will be seen that a very real separation is established for the future, and that this may bring about most important developments.105

Latham interpreted the LON Covenant as signage pointing to divided imperial policy. Given the inextricable ties between the Dominions and Great Britain, he worried that a complaint affecting Australia might be submitted against Great Britain instead of against Australia. In such an event, ‘interesting questions would arise.’106 While he only inferred that the

Australian-British connection might be tested under these circumstances, he nonetheless

stressed ‘how important it is that we should seek to win the support of Great Britain in

matters of foreign policy in which Australia may be concerned.’107 Australia’s growing

global citizenship and the pressure it placed on the imperial link informed Latham’s

subsequent efforts to shape the League’s narrative and reception in Australia. As James

Cotton observes, ‘Latham was … inclined to see the League in terms of its service for or threat to particular Australian interests.’108 Latham needed to stave off the threat he believed

the League posed to the cohesion of the British Empire.

Latham laboured to frame the League as comparable or aligned to the nation’s

imperial life and interests. He initially saw Australia’s special relationship with Britain as

inseparable from the Commonwealth’s membership to the League. In his 1919 talk to the

Melbourne University Association, he suggested ‘[a] first class man sent to London and

Geneva could do most valuable work for Australia … [he] might act as resident Minister in

105 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 8. 106 Ibid., 14. 107 Ibid., 14. 108 James Cotton, “Realism, Rationalism, Race: On the Early International Relations Discipline in Australia,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2009): 631.

London.’109 Such a ‘man’ would be required to meet regularly with ‘British Ministers.’110

Latham foresaw a great workload for this appointee, arguing the High Commissioner in

London would not be able to attend to League work and his usual business.111 Here, he was

arguing for an expansion of Australia’s diplomatic machinery abroad that was wholly

compatible with existing consultative arrangements with Britain. This consultation needed to

be two-way. In the lead-up to the League’s first assembly, a ‘better system of spreading

information on Dominion affairs to home Members of Parliament [in the United Kingdom]’

was being established with the help of Australian Senator George Pearce and Latham.112

Australian global citizenship needed to be indistinguishable from British imperial citizenship.

Latham distanced himself from the LNU and the LON as the 1920s wore on. He

gradually shifted to the view that imperial instruments should arbitrate international conflict

rather than Canberra and London coordinating with Geneva. His lukewarm expectations of

international regimes did not improve with time.113 By 1925, his correspondence concerning

the LNU had decreased markedly.114 He resigned as president in July 1926 and Selbourne

Chambers in Melbourne’s Chancery Lane—where he maintained his legal practice—ceased

to be the regular venue for branch meetings.115 Australia-wide, the LNU was now flagging,

with membership having peaked in the early-1920s.116 Later, the 1931 Japanese invasion of

Manchuria did irreparable damage to the League’s reputation in Australia.117 While the

Union reportedly had membership surges in the 1930s prompted by sympathy and concern

109 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 15. 110 Ibid, 15. 111 Latham’s scheme eventually took the form of a political liaison officer appointed to London in 1924. This post was held by Richard Casey until 1931. 112 Mills to Latham, letter, 10 October 1919, MS 1009/1/630, NLA. 113 Cotton, “Realism, Rationalism, Race,” 631. 114 See: MS 1009, Series 23, Folder 6, NLA. 115 Summy, “From Hope ... to Hope,” 56. 116 Sluga, Internationalism, 75. 117 Bennett, “Redeeming the Imagination,” 51.

over the international crises, which weakened the mediatory authority of the League of

Nations,118 the outbreak of the Second World War saw membership completely collapse.119

Latham’s declining participation in the LNU coincided with his ascent to the Cabinet

of Stanley Bruce’s Nationalist government, a promotion which followed a rapid political rise

that had started with him being elected as federal member for Kooyong, Victoria in 1922. As

Attorney-General, he represented Australia at the 1926 League Assembly in Geneva.

Although he did not hold the office of minister for external affairs—this was held by the

prime minister of the day until Latham wore the hat in 1932120—Bruce recognised his

expertise in international relations matters and charged him with leading the Australian

delegation. Latham, though, was uninterested in engaging in open negotiation and the spirit

of internationalism, preferring the exclusivity of behind the scenes diplomacy. ‘May I

suggest that often the best work is done with the minimum of sound. Honorable [sic]

members may not hear much of me while I am away,’ Latham told the House of

Representatives in July 1926 before departing for Geneva. In response to a question from the

Leader of the Opposition about Geneva’s policy reach, Latham expressed his liberal ideology

when he said that he would oppose any possibility of the League interfering ‘with questions

which are of a purely domestic character.’121 The following month, while on a ship to

Geneva which stopped over in London, he wrote in a letter to Sir James Barrett ‘that the

Empire is still all important to the peace of the World.’122

118 Jesse Street, A Revised Autobiography, ed. Lenore Coltheart (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2004), 97. 119 Sluga, Internationalism, 75. 120 Patrick Weller, Cabinet Government in Australia, 1901-2006: Practice, Principles, Performance (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007), 30. 121 Australia, HOR, Debates, 30 July 1926, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1926/19260730_reps_10_114/. 122 Latham to Barrett, letter 9 August 1926, CP285/2, Bundle 1/E, National Archives of Australia, Canberra [hereafter NAA].

Although Latham had until now maintained that the League was an accessory to the

British Empire, after he returned from the 1926 Assembly he affirmed his belief that Geneva

had declining relevance in maintaining international stability. Speaking to a crowded Wesley

Church in Melbourne in February 1927 on the topic of his recent overseas tour, he remarked

that the ‘responsibility … rested upon everyone to preserve intact the British Empire as the

greatest force for peace at present existing in the world.’123 Meanwhile, the LNU in Australia

continued its decline. Latham’s contemporaries offer some insight into the movement’s failure in Australia. In 1932, William Harrison Moore observed that Australia maintained a

‘very general public indifference to the League.’124 He cited the fact that the LNU failed to

engage the common citizen, with lectures dealing principally with abstract and general topics

instead of developing solutions to practical issues.125 Lectures were the mainstay of its

activities. Even in its quieter years, the Sydney branch hosted over two hundred.126 Although

Latham was less and less involved after 1925, he too delivered invited speeches at public meetings into at least 1932.127 That year, Latham went to his last meeting at Geneva: the

Disarmament Conference.

By 1932, Latham had taken over the Minister of External Affairs portfolio in the new

Joseph Lyons Government.128 On 7 February 1932, Latham was assigned to head a

disarmament sub-committee in Cabinet.129 The Disarmament Conference, which was an

attempt by LON member states and the US to actualise a system of limiting and reducing

123 “Peace of the World. British Empire’s Responsibilities,” The Argus, 28 February 1927, p. 15. 124 William Harrison Moore, “Public Sentiment towards League of Nations,” undated typescript hosted on Interwar Internationalism: An Archival History, accessed February 5, 2017, http://tretzthurs10.omeka.net/items/show/55. 125 Ibid. 126 Brown, “Enacting the International,” 83. 127 “Drive for Membership,” The Argus, 4 August 1932, p. 7. 128 In at least one instance, the press referred to the newly-formed Cabinet as ‘Lyons-Latham Ministry.’ “Mr. Lyons,” The Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter SMH], 24 December 1931, p. 9. 129 Cabinet Minutes, 7 February 1932, A2694, Vol.1, NAA.

armaments, had already started on 1 February.130 One of Latham’s first acts was to instruct

the High Commissioner in London to maintain full consultation with Britain’s officials.131

Latham subsequently led the Australian delegation for one week in May and a further week

in June 1932; theoretically, he had the opportunity to attend 23 weeks of sessions.132 His limited engagement spoke to the low-order importance of the conference for the Australian

government.133 Latham was accordingly unenthusiastic. He wrote to a well-wisher that he

doubted ‘whether total disarmament will ever be achieved.’134 At the conference sessions he

attended, he was frustrated by the airtime given to ‘experts,’ and remarked it was ‘essential’

for ‘the representatives of the Empire’ to at least ‘endeavour to agree upon a definite

policy.’135 Bill Hudson, in his classic study of Australia and the League, assessed Latham

only offered ‘a nominal performance’ at the conference.136 Latham’s outlook and reportage

on proceedings demonstrated his unshakeable belief that Australia’s security interests were

better served through inter-imperial coordination. In 1935, he cut formal ties with the LNU,

withdrawing from the Victorian Branch’s ‘General Council.’ He did not renew his

membership.137

130 For the history of Australia’s involvement at the Disarmament Conference, see: Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, 95-115. 131 Draft telegram to Ryrie, approved by Cabinet sub-committee (Latham and G.F. Pearce) on 1 February 1932, A981, Item: Disarmament, NAA. 132 Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, 109. 133 The conference experienced lengthy adjournments and was effectively torpedoed by Germany leaving the League and, consequently, the disarmament process in October 1933. However, talks ostensibly ran until 1937. Philip Noel-Baker, The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932-1933 and Why It Failed (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979); Zara S. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 755-99. 134 Latham to Goodman, letter, 7 March 1932, MS 1009/1/2320, NLA. 135 Latham to Lyons, letter, 19 May 1932, A981, Item Disarmament 16, NAA. 136 Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, 109. 137 Phillips, The League in 1933, 4; NLA, “Guide to the Papers of Sir John Latham,” Trove, accessed 12 August, 2018, http://www.nla.gov.au/ms/findaids/1009.html#c0123. While this was not surprising given his declining participation, his exit coincided with his appointment as Chief Justice of the High Court. To avoid the perception that he was compromising the perceived impartiality of the office, he resigned memberships of the Round Table and the Rotary Club at the same as he dissociated from the LNU. Honorary Secretary of the Melbourne Rotary Club to Latham, letter, 16 October 1935, MS 1009/1/4883, NLA.

Conclusion

The end of the First World War challenged political leaders to find ways to prevent war on

such a terrible scale ever occurring again. John Latham, sympathetic to pacifist ideals and

schemes for global government, sought to answer this problem within a British imperial

framework. He promoted international fellowship and peacemaking, which led to the

establishment of the League of Nations, albeit from an entirely Britannic viewpoint. His

understanding was informed not only by his experiences of Commonwealth community and

collegiality in the Imperial War Cabinet in London and the British Empire Delegation at

Versailles, but also his ruminations on imperial reform before the war. He thought these

structures, comprised of Commonwealth political leaders or their representatives, embodied

the Commonwealth spirit of partnership and loyalty when they functioned as intended. He

was appalled that Prime Minister Billy Hughes was amongst those to break this covenant.

Latham’s reaction to working in close proximity to Hughes revealed his distaste for

boisterous, obdurate leadership; he remained wedded to the genteel style of diplomacy

practised behind closed doors. Because of these formative experiences, he did not believe

Geneva could replace London as the epicentre of Australian diplomacy, nor could the League

of Nations usurp the British Empire as the premier model of global governance.

Nevertheless, Latham attempted to use the League of Nations Union in Victoria to encourage Australians to show greater interest in international and imperial affairs. But the

LNU was more often than not presented from an Anglo-Australian, pro-British imperial perspective. Latham was driven less by visions of what Geneva could do for world peace than what it could do for the British Empire (and the security of Australia under that imperial umbrella). His extensive public speaking in the early-1920s focused especially on the enduring cohesiveness of the British Empire and Australia’s need to contribute positively to that cohesion. As the decade progressed and his responsibilities in Australian and imperial

affairs grew, he gradually withdrew his support for the League and became less visible in the

LNU. Latham’s tokenistic engagement with the LON Disarmament Conference in 1932 demonstrated the declining utility of the League for his designs. Indeed, he took into his parliamentary career the lessons he learnt from the negotiations at Versailles and his study of the LON. In doing so, he invested considerable time rallying Australians against bureaucratic and legalistic forms of Commonwealth cooperation. His aim was to bolster the informality of the British Empire and to preserve its shared values.

Chapter III ‘Still an Empire, though also a Commonwealth:’1 The Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster, 1926-1931

Australia [is] in the Empire because she realised it was best for Australia, for the Empire and for the world. It

was the same with other Dominions. The Empire could hold itself together to-day on the basis of good will and

co-operation—not by force.2

Introduction

The late-1920s saw John Latham’s search to reconcile the autonomy of the Dominions with

the unity of the British Empire take on greater urgency. The move towards more enhanced

self-government under the aegis of the 1926 Balfour Report (also known as the Balfour

Declaration), which evolved into the Statute of Westminster in 1931, were the major trigger

points.3 The former was a document, accepted by the British Commonwealth nations at the

1926 Imperial Conference, which recognised the autonomy, equality, and self-government of the settler societies. The latter was a legislative act passed by the Parliament of the United

Kingdom that ratified those principles.4 While statehood nomenclature and the sovereign status of the self-governing former colonies had been evolving since the mid-nineteenth

1 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, vii. 2 “Australia as a Nation,” The Age, 10 March 1927, p. 11. 3 The 1926 report is not to be confused with the 1917 Balfour Declaration that supported the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. On the Balfour Declaration and its impact on Australia’s growing political and diplomatic independence from Britain, see: W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp, Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988), 72-76; George Winterton, “The Acquisition of Independence,” in Reflections on the Australian Constitution, ed. Robert French, Geoffrey Lindell, and Cheryl Saunders (Sydney: Federation Press, 2003), 31-50. 4 For an overview of the Statute of Westminster across the British Empire, see P. Burroughs, “Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, III: The Nineteenth Century, ed. A. Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 170-97. For recent scholarship on the Australian position, see: David Clark, “Cautious Constitutionalism: Commonwealth Legislative Independence and the Statute of Westminster 1931-1942,” Macquarie Law Journal 16 (2016): 41-65; Lee, “States Rights,” 258-74.

century (and had been hastened by the First World War), the residue of Britain’s colonial rule

necessitated these developments.5 The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865—which prevented

colonial governments from passing laws objectionable to imperial laws and also licensed

London to legislate for the whole of its empire—still remained on the law books.6 The

passage of both the Balfour Report and the Statute of Westminster paved the path to

Australia’s independent nationhood. Yet, the legislation received an ambivalent, even hostile,

reception domestically.7 Latham was a key campaigner against the Statute.

Parliamentarians repeatedly rejected the Statute of Westminster in the House of

Representatives in the 1930s; an opposition that reflected their constituents’ view that

Australia was not sovereign nor separate from Britain.8 The Statute represented a shift away from an almost exclusive diplomatic focus on the core of empire (the United Kingdom) to other parts of the periphery, helping to solidify inter-Commonwealth diplomacy.9 While

Latham considered the strengthening of lateral ties between the Empire’s constituent parts

positive, he was troubled by how it came about. He considered the Statute to be inflexibly

constitutionalising imperial relations, the antithesis of British liberal imperial values.

Latham’s vocal opposition, expressed in federal parliament and in a published work, were

defining features of the Australian political landscape and the nation’s response to inter-

5 Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions (London: Macmillan, 1933), ch. 2; Lee, "States rights,” 260. 6 R.G. Menzies, “Attorney-General’s Department. Statute of Westminster,” Cabinet submission, 21 January 1935, A432, 1935/49, NAA. See also: Darwin, The Empire Project, 443. 7 Hudson and Sharp, Australian Independence, ch. 1. 8 McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 1939-1948: The Politics of Preference (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 63. 9 Lorna Lloyd, “’Us and Them:’ The Changing Nature of Commonwealth Diplomacy, 1880- 1973,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 39, no. 3 (2001): 9-30. An example of intra-commonwealth diplomatic relations is found in the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Australia and New Zealand in 1943. P. Orders, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Challenge of the United States, 1939-46: A Study in International History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 91-92.

imperial reform. Seeking an in-depth appreciation of his views helps to clarify why

Australians rejected for well over a decade the next step in achieving total self-government.

Considerable constitutional history literature has been devoted to the significance of

the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster for Australian independence at the

executive, judicial, and legislative levels. However, in most of this scholarship, Latham is lost in the grand sweep of events. This is despite his attempt to write the future of the British

Empire.10 Historian of international affairs, David Lee, has placed him more at the centre of

the narrative.11 Lee, like Peter Oliver before him,12 has astutely detected that fear of imperial

disunity eventually shaped Latham’s decision in late-1933 to advocate behind Cabinet’s

closed doors for the legislation’s ratification.13 While Lee has helped set the historical record

appreciably straighter, he overlooks the fact that Latham initially (and vehemently) opposed

the Statute on liberal grounds. According to Latham, practical and constitutional reasons for

delaying or ignoring completely the 1931 decision were secondary, if still important. Most

important of all was protecting his vision of the Empire: a free and naturally evolving

association of autonomously governed people who cooperated out of shared cultural

ancestry, historical roots, and governmental institutions, and a selfless responsibility to

maintain this imperial inheritance.

10 An exception here is legal academic Peter Oliver, who dedicates some time to considering Latham’s impact on interwar constitutional debates. Peter C. Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2010), 216-18. Some discussion of Latham’s significance can also be found in: Clark, “Cautious Constitutionalism,” 56; Hudson and Sharp, Australian Independence, 118-21. For more general histories of the Statute of Westminster in Australia, see Geoffrey Lindell, “Further Reflections on the Date of the Acquisition of Australia’s Independence,” in Reflections on the Australian Constitution, ed. Robert French, Geoffrey Lindell, and Cheryl Saunders (Sydney: Federation Press, 2003), 52; Winterton, “The Acquisition of Independence,” 31- 50; Raia Prokhovnik, “From Sovereignty in Australia to Australian Sovereignty,” Political Studies 63, no. 2 (2015): 412-30; Anne Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986: Australia’s Statutes of Independence (Sydney: Federation Press, 2010); “Independence Day,” Alternative Law Journal 36, no. 1 (2011): 2-3. 11 Lee, "States Rights,” 258-74. 12 Oliver, The Constitution of Independence, 218. 13 Lee, "States Rights,” 264-65.

Latham expounded his case for the continuance of a liberal form of empire in his

1929 book, Australia and the British Commonwealth.14 It was not a hastily arranged

production. The ideas he accumulated through studying British imperialism in political fora

through the decades are reflected in its pages. This chapter will establish this text as a

framework for analysing Latham’s response to the Statute of Westminster. Building the

discussion around Australia and the British Commonwealth presents an opportunity to re-

centre this text in the historiography of the Australian-British connection. Latham’s book has

been little analysed, nor have scholars included it in the canon of work by imperial thinkers

of the period.15 It was not as voluminous, cited, or famous as other constitutional law books

that addressed the topic of the 1926 Balfour Declaration or the 1931 Statute of

Westminster.16 Not a conventional legal work, Latham’s book is doubly unique in its field

because it was the only one written by a sitting Australian parliamentarian in the interwar era.

To contextualise Latham’s book, his views on inter-imperial developments from the vantage

point of parliament will be assessed, including the Chanak Crisis, Great Britain’s treaty

making in the 1920s, and the Balfour Report.

From diplomat to imperial parliamentarian, 1922-26

Because Latham was influential in the powerful political circles that seriously debated

Australia’s legislative sovereignty, it is necessary to trace his rise through federal

parliamentary ranks in the 1920s, having first been elected to parliament in 1922.

14 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth. 15 Examples and analyses of this canon can be found in: Cotton, “Realism, Rationalism, Race,” 627-47; Oliver, The Constitution of Independence; Wold, “Commonwealth,” 1-22. 16 In Australia, there was Kenneth H. Bailey, The Statute of Westminster (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1935); Herbert V. Evatt, The King and his Dominion Governors: A Study of the Reserve Powers of the Crown in Great Britain and the Dominions (London: Routledge, 2013, first published 1936); W. Anstey Wynes, Legislative and Executive Powers in Australia (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1936).

Just prior to his election, Australian relations with Britain were strained due to

the Chanak Crisis, which was prompted by the rapid advance of Turkish troops on neutral

territory that encompassed Constantinople and defended by Britain and France. Without prior

consultation with the Dominions, Whitehall issued an ultimatum to Turkey that had the

potential to entangle the Commonwealth nations in war. Britain’s unilateralism contravened

Resolution IX and the spirit of the Imperial War Cabinet during the Great War (see Chapter

II). While Canada demurred, Australia and New Zealand stayed the course. However, the

crisis was resolved by armistice before war was declared. The Australian public was divided

on the issue, but Prime Minister Billy Hughes’ loyalty did not waver.17 As he reported to the

House of Representatives on 19 September 1922, he had ‘immediately’ briefed his ministers

and cabled Lloyd George to indicate his government’s support and willingness ‘if

circumstances required, to send a contingent of Australian troops.’18

In his capacity as President of the League of Nations Union, Latham presided over

‘an urgent meeting of the council of the League of Nations Union’ to address ‘questions at

issue in the Near East [Turkey]’ on the same day the PM updated the House on the crisis.

Latham and the delegates resolved to support Hughes.19 At another LNU meeting to discuss

Chanak, held just over a week later at Independent Hall, Melbourne, Latham voiced his

support for Britain intervening in the crisis, a position that implicated Australia.20 While

Latham and Hughes had their differences during the Paris Peace Conference, they saw eye-

to-eye here. Neville Meaney highlights that the Prime Minister persisted ‘in pursuing [the]

mirage of imperial unity, of one imperial defence and foreign policy being fashioned out of

the joint consultations of Britain with the Dominions.’21 While Latham also demanded joint

17 Paul R. Bartrop, Bolt from the Blue: Australia, Britain and the Chanak Crisis (Sydney: Halstead Press, 2002). 18 Australia, HOR, Debates, 19 September 1922, Hughes, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1922/19220919_reps_8_100/. 19 “Australia’s Duty,” The Argus, 20 September 1922, p. 11. 20 “League’s Part in Crisis,” The Argus, 28 September 1922, p. 9. 21 Meaney, Australia and the World Crisis, 511.

consultation, like Hughes he was prepared to put aside his demands in the interest of Empire

cohesion.

Shortly after of the Chanak Crisis, Latham entered politics. Having declined

invitations to enter parliament before, he later maintained his poor perception of Hughes’

government compelled him to seek nomination due to its ‘gross maladministration’ by

Hughes.22 In 1922, he was nominated as a self-described ‘Progressive Liberal Candidate’ for

the federal seat of Kooyong in Victoria.23 He was supported by the short-lived Liberal Union,

which was a coalition of Nationalist Party defectors and people opposed to socialism and

Hughes.24 The party’s manifesto expressed adherence to the ‘clean, traditional, British way

to secure political support is to affirm principles, and stand or fall by them.’25 Further, it

claimed its platform was based on the ‘Maintenance of the unity of the British Empire and

the preservation of White Australia.’ Latham ‘strongly support[ed] the attitude of the Union’

but he opposed or suggested amendments to 7 of the 15 points in their platform. He

challenged their belief that government should not compete with private industry ‘as an

absolute principle.’ In this instance, he was particularly concerned that telecommunications

should still be publicly owned; this was the situation in Great Britain.26 He minimised

Liberal Union branding on election material, although the Empire remained undiminished in

its prominence. The first two of nine principles he put before electors were:

22 Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Essays, 6. See also: “Oral Interview, Sir John Latham,” transcript, 20 August 1956, Papers of B.D. Graham, MS 8471/50, NLA. 23 “Federal Elections. Kooyong. J.G. Latham, K.C. Progressive Liberal Candidate,” election flyer, MS 1009/24/3, NLA. 24 “Liberal Union,” The Argus, 3 November 1922, p. 11. See also: Peter Graham Tiver, “Political Ideas in the Liberal Party” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1973), 40-41. 25 “Liberal Union. Manifesto to Electors,” ca. 1922, MS 1009/24/10, NLA. 26 Latham to E. Glanville Hicks, letter, 4 November 1922, MS 1009/24/39, NLA. On the issue of public versus private ownership of industry, Latham took his cues from Britain. For example, he supported privatisation of the Commonwealth Line of Steamers on the basis the British government did not own the country’s mercantile shipping fleet. In 1928, he appraised Britain’s fleet as ‘the most efficient, successful, and serviceable in the world.’ Australia, HOR, Debates, 9 November 1927, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1927/19271109_reps_10_116/.

1. Loyal co-operation with Great Britain and Other Dominions. 2. Return to the Principles and Methods of Responsible Government.27

These statements broadly represented platforms he would stand on throughout his political

career.

Electoral material and newspapers noted Latham’s record of ‘assisting the Empire’

through his naval intelligence and overseas diplomatic work.28 Indeed, his pre-election

speeches emphasised Australia’s imperial membership from which local electorate issues

were absent. This was evident when he announced his candidacy for the Kooyong electorate

on 17 October 1922. To the ‘well attended meeting’ he argued ‘defence reductions’ could be

achieved ‘after consultation with the Imperial authorities, because Australia could not stand

alone. All defence schemes should be carried out in co-ordination with Britain.’29 He

expanded on this view at Surrey Hills, Melbourne on 12 December. He said that a

‘comprehensive naval policy and the utmost unity’ with the Dominions and Britain ‘were

essential.’30 Unsurprisingly, he received significant campaign support from conservatives:

the monarchist Australian Women’s National League,31 the imperialist Australian Legion, as

well as men from Melbourne’s legal fraternity actively supported him.32 This on-the-ground

assistance, coupled with his domestic and international profile, led The Australasian to

declare the contest for Kooyong as ‘one of the most interesting struggles of the election.’33

27 “Kooyong Electorate, J.G. Latham, K.C., Progressive Liberal Candidate,” election flyer, MS 1009/24/1, NLA. 28 “Get to Know J.G. Latham, Candidate for Kooyong in the Federal Elections,” election flyer, MS 1009/24/2, NLA; “The Election Campaign. Kooyong Contest,” The Age, 11 December 1922, p. 9. 29 “Mr Latham and Kooyong. Address at Brighton,” The Argus, 17 October 1922, p. 19. 30 “Kooyong. Australia’s Development. Mr Latham’s Ideas,” The Argus, 12 December 1922, p. 9. 31 C.E. Bolitho to Latham, letter, 11 October 1922, MS 1009/24/14, NLA. 32 “Kooyong Poll Declared,” (1922, December 26). The Age, 26 December 1922, p. 8. 33 “After-Thoughts,” The Australasian (Melbourne), 30 December 1922, p. 31.

Latham’s allies and reputation gave him the edge in the December 1922 ballot. He

narrowly defeated the Nationalist incumbent Robert Best on preferences.34 Despite his

platform containing the incendiary slogan ‘Hughes Must Go,’ the Prime Minister nonetheless

sent his congratulations.35 ‘Dear J.G.,’ wrote Hughes in rough script, ‘I hope you’ll keep on

hammering in foreign affairs stuff; we’ve a long long [sic] way to go yet.’36 Apart from

acknowledging that Latham’s election had been more concerned with global than local

issues, Hughes was searching for allies as his political position had been eroded by the

election. Labor in the House of Representatives outnumbered the Nationalists, but the

Country Party held the balance of power. Latham now had the opportunity to conclude his

agenda of dismissing Hughes, colluding with the Country Party to withdraw support for the

sitting government.37 With his majority lost, Hughes resigned on 1 February 1923;

Nationalist Stanley Melbourne Bruce succeeded him.

Latham’s maiden speech to the Lower House on 7 March 1923 simultaneously

defended his role in Hughes’ political demise and the centrality of the Empire to Australian

foreign affairs. This juxtaposition arose in response to a withering attack from the Australian

Labor Party (ALP) member for Melbourne, who accused Latham of betraying the confidence

of Labor voters in Kooyong—who had overwhelmingly awarded him their second

preferences—by colluding with the Country Party to install Bruce as PM. Latham defended

himself by referring to his pre-election opposition to both Hughes and the ALP platform; he

was simply keeping this pre-election promise. While before the election he said he was

campaigning ‘to show that there was an alternative to a Nationalist Government without

34 “Federal Elections,” The Mercury (Hobart), 23 December 1922, p. 8. 35 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964).” 36 Hughes to Latham, letter, 4 January 1923, MS 1009/24/273, NLA. 37 Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers, 6. See also histories of the Country Party by Don Aitkin, B.D. Graham, Ulrich Ellis, and Paul Davey.

turning to Labour,’ he quickly fell in with the Bruce Government.38 Latham was an

independent in name only. His publicly stated position was ‘general support of the

Government’ and he attended meetings of both the Country and Nationalist parties.39

Latham’s inaugural speech in March 1923 was principally concerned with Australia’s

imperial relationship. Latham claimed the ‘first point in connexion with the foreign affairs …

is the maintenance of the unity of the Empire; because, with the Empire we stand and with it

we fall.’ Indeed, he questioned whether imperial affairs could be ‘classed as foreign affairs at

all.’ To enable better the government to make decisions in this realm, he recommended the

formation of a bipartisan committee comprised of Lower House and Senate members to

‘consider the questions of foreign affairs which arise from time to time.’40 Latham’s entry

into politics thus marked the continuation of his goal of aligning Australian and British and

Empire interests, one that he had been carrying on since Federation.

On 31 July 1923, during a Lower House debate on imperial and economic

conferences, Latham raised the subject of the Chanak Crisis. By this time, the emergency had

been averted and the Treaty of Lausanne (signed 23 July 1923) had ratified the armistice

between Turkey and Britain, France, and Italy; no other member of parliament raised the

issue during the session. Kooyong’s new representative was still scarred from Chanak and

the prospect of Australia going to war without being consulted. Latham, channelling the

distaste he experienced when Great Britain failed to consult the Dominions on the terms of

the armistice in November 1918, said that ‘consultation between the representatives of the

Dominions and United Kingdom is the only method of endeavouring to arrive at that unity of

foreign policy which alone can lead to satisfactory results.’ He quoted the Canadian Prime

38 “Kooyong. Australia’s Development. Mr Latham’s Ideas,” The Argus, 12 December 1922, p. 10. 39 “Mr. Latham's Position,” The Age, 10 June 1925, p. 11. 40 Australia, HOR, Debates, 7 March 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230307_reps_9_102/.

Minister Mackenzie King’s account of events to the Canadian House of Commons. King

expressed ‘that nothing in the way of an official communication’ was received. Latham then

asked Bruce to say:

definitely and decidedly that this method of conducting foreign affairs is not satisfactory to the Dominions. It does not place a Dominion Prime Minister, a Dominion Ministry or Parliament, or a Dominion people in a fair position. To spring such an appeal without warning upon a Dominion Government is not even to pretend to consult it on foreign affairs. I hope the Prime Minister will take the opportunity to say that, if there are to be such occurrences, a very grave strain will be placed on the bonds of Empire.41

These words expressed his worry the Empire would cease to function as a cohesive unit if

London continued to pursue unilateral actions that bound the Dominions to its consequences.

He did not think Australia should abandon Britain, telling the House ‘I take it as a fact that

when the British Empire is at war we in Australia are at war.’42 His position had not changed

since the League of Nations Union vote on 19 September 1922, when the meeting resolved to

support Hughes’ decision to support Britain militarily. After speaking on Chanak, Latham

returned to the topic of establishing a commission on foreign affairs with the object of

ensuring ‘continuity of information and understanding.’43

While Bruce did not establish an external affairs committee, he still concurred with

Latham’s sentiment. The PM’s efforts to improve Australia’s capacity in this area started in

early 1924. Bruce asked British public servant and Australian expatriate, Allen Leeper, to

undertake an external review of the Australian public service with a view to enhancing

Australia’s capacity to gather and analyse foreign affairs information. Allen’s findings led

Bruce to initiate major reforms in external affairs, including the establishment of a sub-office

41 Australia, HOR, Debates, 31 July 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230731_reps_9_104/. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.

in the Prime Minister’s Department devoted to inter-imperial affairs and engagement with the

League of Nations, the appointment of an Australian liaison officer to the British Cabinet

Secretariat in London, and reforms to make the public service more attractive to high-

achieving university graduates (whom were eventually admitted in the early 1930s).44 These

decisions were entirely consistent with Latham’s own positions.45 He maintained that

external affairs could not be solely the responsibility of the PM.46 Later, in July 1923, he

argued that ‘[i]t would be a good thing’ for Australian information officers to be ‘attached to

the staffs of the British Embassy.’ This course was preferable to appointing a dedicated

minister of parliament to London, which he reasoned was politically unpalatable to local

electors. It was also too expensive given the ultimate outcome of such a position was simply

to widen the information pipeline between Australia and Britain.47 The harmony between

Latham and the PM’s positions drew them together politically and personally.

Contemporaries and public servants, Alfred Stirling and Robert Garran, each observed in

their writings that Latham was Bruce’s ‘right hand man.’48 He eventually joined the

Nationalists and Bruce’s Cabinet as Attorney-General after the 1925 federal election.

Bruce’s external affairs platform emphasised obtaining and processing information

from British sources; a goal that suited Latham’s proclivity to work within and for the

Empire. The PM’s approach was enmeshed in British administrative and governance

44 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 47-48. 45 A decade later, Latham ‘enthusiastically’ supported a bill to recruit Australian university graduates to junior public service roles without examination. In supporting the bill, he remarked ‘some of the best men in the Public Service to-day were graduates of universities.’ Australia, HOR, Debates, 6 December 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19331206_reps_13_143/. The Boobooks dining club observed at this moment that Latham had been fighting ‘for a full thirty years to get intelligence and higher education into the [Public] Service.’ Minutes of 298th Meeting, 16 June 1933, Boobooks/3/17, UMA. 46 Australia, HOR, Debates, 7 March 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230307_reps_9_102/. 47 Australia, HOR, Debates, 31 July 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230731_reps_9_104/. 48 Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers, 7; Robert Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1958), 159; Alfred Stirling, Lord Bruce: The London Years (Melbourne: Hawthorn Press, 1974), 165.

practice. The necessity of information capture and interchange for the efficient organisation

of the British Empire was an idea that had absorbed state administrators since the Victorian

age.49 Imperial connectedness in peacetime, and Dominion responsiveness in crisis,

depended on a steady, reliable stream of information, as indicated by Latham’s writing for

transnational newspaper, The Standard. The fact Latham retained his association with key

government and foreign policy listening posts during his period in office—that is, with

numerous exclusive clubs and bodies—indicate that he understood the centrality of elite

social venues, professional organisations, and other informal information networks to the

formulation of policy.50

Apart from issues of inter-imperial cooperation, Latham’s portfolios in the Bruce

ministry saw him address domestic concerns of his class, including the misappropriation or

inefficient use of tax funds. There were surprising detours, notably his work to ensure the

benefits and liberties of government workers.51 On the domestic policy front though, the key

foci for Latham were legislating against domestic communists and aligned interests, and

reforming industrial arbitration law.52 These themes will be addressed in Chapter V.

Latham, in his parliamentary speeches on imperial issues, not only spoke of the need

to exchange information between Australia and Great Britain, but also people. Geographical

mobility was a priority, and it was a hallmark of his personal and professional circles.

Transnationalism was a defining feature of European elites in this period,53 and in interwar

49 Edward Beasley, Mid-Victorian Imperialists: British Gentlemen and the Empire of the Mind (London: Routledge, 2004), 124-46; Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993), 73-75. 50 Greg Kennedy, “Imperial Networks, Imperial Defence, and Perceptions of American Influence on the British Empire in the Interwar Period: The Case of the 27th Earl of Crawford and Balcarres,” Canadian Journal of History 47, no. 3 (2012): 568-69. 51 Widdows, “Sir John Latham,” 39-40. 52 Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance, 205-08. 53 Dina Gusejnova, European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), xxiii.

Australia, international movement was linked with social status.54 The increased capacities of

steam liners and accessibility of commercial flights meant travel and urbane pursuits were

increasingly valued by the middle-class.55 The clubs and organisations of the elite to which

Latham belonged, particularly those with branches in multiple continents, facilitated

transnational sociability for their membership. This was particularly true of the Round Table

group. It had a membership ‘which came of age during the Great War,’ and which had

offshoots in the Dominions.56 Latham’s extensive archive of letters at the National Library of

Australia reveals that he commanded a sprawling network of important contacts across the

United Kingdom and continental Europe. He therefore agreed that the ‘right to travel’ bound

the British Empire together.57 In his inaugural speech to the Lower House, he argued for

passport reform, including revoking ministerial powers to cancel a passport without reason

and enhancing the accessibility of passport facilities worldwide.58 For him, the mobility of a

British subject was inextricably associated with the foundational motifs of the Empire: liberty

and the spirit of free cooperation.59

54 Eric Richards, “Migrations: The Career of British White Australia,” in Australia’s Empire, ed. Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 171-72. 55 Gordon Pirie, “Incidental tourism: British Imperial Air Travel in the 1930s,” Journal of Tourism History 1, no. 1 (2009): 49-66; V. Kuttainen and S. Liebich, “Worldly Tastes: Mobility and the Geographical Imaginaries of Interwar Australian Magazines,” Transfers 7, no. 1 (2017): 52-69; Angela Woollacott, To Try Her Fortune in London: Australian Women, Colonialism, and Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 198-99. 56 Helen McCarthy, “Service Clubs, Citizenship and Equality: Gender Relations and Middle-Class Associations in Britain between the Wars,” Historical Research 81, no. 213 (2008): 537. 57 A. Lawrence Lowell, “The Imperial Conference,” in The British Commonwealth of Nations, ed. A Lawrence Lowell and H. Duncan Hall (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1927), 584, copy located in Latham Papers, MS 1009/48/1. Latham underlined and made margin notes in this section of the text. 58 Australia, HOR, Debates, 7 March 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230307_reps_9_102/. 59 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 16-17.

The Balfour Declaration, 1926

Latham’s entry into the Bruce Cabinet in 1925 coincided with the reassessment of the

boundaries of the Dominions’ powers in external affairs. Changes to the Colonial Office

exemplified this changing landscape. In June 1925, a separate department and secretarial

position responsible for Britain’s relations with the Dominions was established in London.

The chief architect of this change was the colonial secretary, Leo Amery; he was a leading

British conservative and imperialist devoted to the preservation of the unity of the Empire.60

However, support at the highest levels of the British government for greater inclusion of its

sovereign partners was inconsistent. Despite the Colonial Office’s development, there was

little or no coordination between the Dominion governments and Whitehall on one of the

major multilateral treaties negotiated between the wars, the 1925 Locarno Treaty of Mutual

Guarantee.61 While consultation was limited, so were the obligations imposed on Dominion

governments. Signed in late 1925 by Great Britain and major powers in Northern Europe,

Locarno was a departure not only from Britain’s handling of the Chanak Crisis but also from

the earlier treaties of Lausanne (1923) and the London Reparation Conference (1924), each

of which bound the Dominions based on limited consultative arrangements.62 The rationale

for excluding partner states from Locarno, as expressed in the House of Lords’ debate on the

pact, was that European matters were the sole concern of the British government.63 Locarno

‘marked a still further step in the development of Dominion status’ for it required no more

60 Richard S. Grayson, “Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery and the Chamberlains, 1903–39,” Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History 34, no. 4 (2006): 506. 61 “Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy; October 16, 1925 (The Locarno Pact),” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library (website), accessed 16 July 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/locarno_001.asp. 62 Berman, "Treaty-making,” 908-10. 63 “Locarno,” SMH, 26 November 1925, p. 9.

than passivity from the Dominions. There was no compulsion to intervene in the conflicts of

signatory nations.64

Dominion marginalisation in treaty-making in the mid-1920s irked both loyalist and

nationalist sensitivities and attracted Latham’s attention. In the words of South African

imperialist Jan Smuts, concerned parties were:

afraid the Dominions will keep out of this Pact and will look upon this as a precedent to disinterest themselves in future more and more in the foreign policy of Great Britain. Thus for the Empire too the Pact will become a new departure.65

While Smuts’ view drew sympathetic comment in Britain,66 not all in the broader

Commonwealth shared it, including Latham.67 For South Africans at large, alongside

Canadians and the Southern Irish, the exclusion of their views on the Locarno arrangements

hastened resolve for their constitutional status to be clarified in a legal document.68 Latham

thought this reaction hysterical, however, and professed not to see Locarno as a threat to

imperial solidity. His view was exemplified in a speech on Australia’s international relations

on 9 March 1926. Speaking to the Royal Colonial Institute, Sydney, Latham said there was

not collapse but permanence: ‘under the treaty, the position legally was the same as ever it

was. If the Empire was at war, every part of the Empire was at war.’ His response was

consistent with his comments on the Chanak Crisis and represented an unshakeable

willingness to defend the British Empire and its affiliated causes. He added the caveat that

the degree to which Australia was at war depended on its people and the Parliament of the

64 Dawson, Development of Dominion Status 1900-1936, 102-03. 65 Smuts to A. Chamberlain, letter, 21 October 1925, in Selections from the Smuts Papers: Volume 5, September 1919-November 1934, ed. Jean van der Poel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007/1973), 172-73. 66 “Locarno,” SMH, 26 November 1925, p. 9. 67 “Foreign Affairs,” SMH, 10 March 1926. p. 15. 68 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 226-27.

Commonwealth, a comment that exemplified his liberal imperialism: the Dominions decided the extent of imperial cohesion under no degree of compulsion.69

The policy of Locarno was discussed at a meeting of the Inter-Imperial Relations

Committee, led by Arthur Balfour, at the 1926 Imperial Conference. Latham accompanied

Stanley Melbourne Bruce to the committee’s meetings, which were held over October-

November. The Australian delegation had left Fremantle, Western Australia, bound for

London on 6 September.70 Latham was originally meant to play a secondary role at the

Imperial Conference—his focus was to be the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva—but

Neville Howse, the Minister for Health who was assigned to support Bruce in London, fell seriously ill. Consequently, Latham assisted the PM ‘a great deal’ in the various meetings of the conference committees.71 He remained in London until early January 1927.

Inside the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, the Dominions agreed that Great

Britain was right to sign the Locarno Treaty. They were divided, however, on their obligations. The leaders and representatives of South Africa, Canada, and the Irish Free State confessed Locarno placed them in a politically difficult position, and Great Britain would need to show cause for them to contribute military resources. Although New Zealand’s prime minister was prepared to meet the prospect of additional obligations under the treaty, he worried about the long-term effect such a precedent would have domestically. Only Australia and Newfoundland agreed there should be common action from the Dominions.72 The committee resolved to distance the Dominions further from Locarno, issuing a simple statement congratulating ‘His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain on its share in this

69 “Foreign Affairs,” SMH, 10 March 1926. p. 15. 70 “Foreign Affairs,” SMH, 30 October 1926. p. 17; “Going Abroad,” The Age, 5 August 1926, p. 10. 71 “Mr Bruce’s Return,” The Age, 5 February 1927, p. 17. 72 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 227.

successful contribution towards the promotion of the peace of the world.’73 Dominion

solidarity failed its Locarno test.

The enduring and emphatically supported finding of the committee applied to the

status of Great Britain and the Dominions. The following sentence from the Balfour Report,

originally printed in italics to indicate its importance in the document, declared the

Dominions to be:

autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.74

This was the key statement that paved the way for completely sovereign states within the

Commonwealth, and consequently laid the foundations for the Statute of Westminster.

Overall, the Balfour Declaration was merely symbolic; it gave no practical effect to its words

about Dominion equality.75 Latham was pleased that it was not a binding, legal instrument.

He appreciated the Balfour Declaration’s emphasis on the looseness of the consultative and

collaborative apparatuses of the British Empire. The stuffiness and non-binding nature of

imperial discussions, as well as their privacy, were positive dimensions in his view.76

The extended preamble to the Balfour Declaration demands quoting here, as Latham

echoed many of its sentiments in the book he produced in 1929. The preamble explained that

cooperation within the British Empire had been borne out by historic developments that had

73 “Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference 1926,” A4640/32, NAA. 74 Ibid. 75 Fergal Davis, “Brexit, the Statute of Westminster 1931 and Zombie Parliamentary Sovereignty,” King's Law Journal 27, no. 3 (2016): 347-49. 76 Not all imperial thinkers agreed. Some members of the Australian Round Table, including Frederic Eggleston, found these conventions counterproductive to imperial unity. Foster, High Hopes, 95. Meaney concludes Eggleston did not lose his imperial sensibilities. Meaney, “Frederic Eggleston on International Relations,” 369. A more recent assessment finds Eggleston, after the Second World War, lost confidence in Britain’s foreign policy and the global governance capacities of the Empire. Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations, 62-72.

seen diplomatic and political machinery evolve to meet new conditions. ‘Equality of status,’ the report continued, ‘was both right and inevitable.’ The lifeblood of the Empire was its free institutions. As long as each Dominion ‘was the sole judge of the nature and extent of its cooperation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be … imperilled.’ Beyond principles of equality of status, the Balfour Report decried ‘immutable dogmas’ as a basis for guiding the functioning of the Empire in practice. The committee’s answer was ‘flexible machinery— machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world’ in relation to questions of diplomacy and defence. The report then went on to state that each Dominion government had the right to advise the Crown in all matters pertaining to its own legislation, and that legislation passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom could only apply to a Dominion by way of the Dominion’s consent.77 Behind the scenes,

Latham noted to his dining club confreres that it had only confirmed existing arrangements, having given ‘nothing new except “atmosphere.”’78

Following the conclusion of the 1926 Imperial Conference on 22 November, Latham remained engaged in Commonwealth issues before the Judicial Committee of the Privy

Council. He left Great Britain on 8 January 1927, making land at Fremantle on 9 February, where he spoke about the strengthening of Empire links.79 ‘I consider,’ said Latham, ‘that the report on Imperial relations embodies the most effective and useful work that any Imperial

Conference has yet accomplished.’ Further, he repudiated statements that the Balfour Report had weakened inter-imperial links: ‘[i]n my opinion, it has, in fact, had a quite contrary effect.’80 In his public speaking opportunities that explained the conference’s findings, responsibility was an overarching theme. To a church in Melbourne on 28 February, he said

77 “Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference 1926,” A4640/32, NAA. 78 Minutes of 240th Meeting, 18 February 1927, Boobooks/2/13, UMA. 79 “Mr. Bruce's Return Trip,” The Age, 15 December 1926, p. 11. 80 “Mr. Latham. Reaches Fremantle. Empire Links Strengthened,” SMH, 9 February 1927, p. 16.

the conference had impressed upon him ‘the responsibility which rested upon everyone to preserve intact the British Empire.’81 To the Rotary Club at Anzac House, Melbourne, the following month he elaborated on the methods of keeping the Empire intact:

every Dominion of the Empire was now responsible for its foreign policy. The principle of the unity of the Empire meant that when one part of the Empire was at war the whole of Empire was automatically involved. It was definitely established now that the Empire consisted of several self-governing States quite independent of each other and subordinate to nobody; but all the States were united by common allegiance to the Crown, assisting each other in the cause of the Empire by free co-operation.82

The principle he had espoused on the Chanak Crisis and Locarno—that if Britain was at war,

Australia was also at war—had not altered following the Balfour Declaration. However, some legal matters left outstanding by the 1926 Imperial Conference concerned him. He addressed these issues in his 1929 book on inter-imperial relations.

Australia and the British Commonwealth (1929)

In the 1920s, it was considered unusual for a sitting Australian politician to author a book.83

Books, journals, and newspapers had tremendous power to convey imperial opinion.84

Latham was aware of their influence. Londoners first glimpsed his writing when he supplied a weekly supplement to The Standard. As discussed in Chapter I, he later became a founding and very senior member of the Australian branch of the Round Table; it produced an eponymously titled journal read by imperial thinkers.85 A pamphlet on Australia and the

81 “Peace of the World,” The Argus, 28 February 1927, p. 15. 82 “Australia as a Nation. Address by Mr. Latham,” The Age, 10 March 1927, p. 11. 83 K.H. Bailey, “Australia and the British Commonwealth,” The Australian Quarterly 2, no. 5 (1930): 31. 84 Burton and Hofmeyr, “Introduction: The Spine of Empire?,” 2; Potter, News and the British World, 125-27. 85 Foster, High Hopes, 169-71.

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Paris Peace Conference followed in 1920. His 1929 book also addressed issues that had

lingered since the Peace Conference.

Latham distilled his outlook on imperial bonds and his case for the careful, gradual

evolution of those ties into a small, 149-page book (including an appendix): Australia and

the British Commonwealth, which concisely discussed those emotional, legal, and practical

ties. While the title used post-war nomenclature—the British Commonwealth of Nations or

simply ‘the Commonwealth’—the book is littered with the traditional terminology: ‘British

Empire.’ The terminology implicitly said a lot about Latham’s struggle to bridge the pre-war

British Empire with its post-1919 incarnation. This change concerned him, as highlighted by

a line in the preface: ‘The recent development of the British Empire into the British

Commonwealth of Nations is one of the most striking changes in the modern post-war

world.’ He summed up the challenge posed by this shift in the next sentence, when he wrote

the Empire was ‘still an Empire, though also a Commonwealth.’86 However, it must be

pointed out that it was extremely common for Dominion and British politicians of the

interwar period to pay lip service to the new term Commonwealth, with most opting to revert

to the more customary ‘Empire.’87

Changes in Dominion autonomy, which Canadian legal theorist W.P.M. Kennedy called ‘the tantalizing problem’ of imperial thought of the time, also transfixed other imperial thinkers in Australia. 88 The Australian debate grew more voluminous with the approach and

86 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, vii. 87 James L Sturgis, “What's in a Name? A perspective on the transition of Empire/Commonwealth, 1918-1950,” Round Table 84, no. 334 (1995): 191-207. 88 W. P. M. Kennedy, “The Government of the British Empire by Edward Jenks, and: The Canadian Constitution and External Relations by A. Berriedale Keith, and: The British Empire and a League of Peace Together with an Analysis of Federal Government: Its Function and Its Method by George Burton Adams, and: The Future of Canada: Canadianism or Imperialism by John Boyd (review),” The Canadian Historical Review 1, no. 1 (1920): 108.

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passage of the Statute of Westminster through the UK Parliament.89 Ample room was

provided for such healthy debate because the 1926 Balfour Declaration, particularly the

preamble, was awash with ambiguities.90 More than a decade on from the legislation of the

Statute of Westminster in Great Britain, an Australian-born American historian, Hessel

Duncan Hall, illustrated the enduring opacity of inter-imperial relations: ‘The subtle transformation of an Empire of law and “parchment bonds” into one in which “other forces far more compulsive” (in Winston Churchill’s words) … has been little understood.’91

Latham and his contemporaries embraced this confusion. Nicholas Mansergh perceived an

intellectual elitism at work in this embrace: ‘British constitutional experts … appeared to

consider the infinite complexity of imperial relationships as evidence in themselves of a

superior political wisdom.’92 Latham took abiding satisfaction in the convolution and the

intimate nature of inter-imperial relations. He concluded Australia and the British

Commonwealth by saying ‘[t]he problems of the British Commonwealth of Nations are

essentially complex and there is no simple solution for them.’93 This attitude reflected his

later argument that the Statute of Westminster could not encompass the distinctiveness of the

Empire. According to Latham, political leaders of his ilk needed to oversee imperial developments.

Before analysing in-depth Australia and the British Commonwealth, it is necessary to comment on the scope and structure of the text, which offer insight into Latham’s authorial purpose. The titles of the chapters and their sub-sections reflect most of the headings of

Balfour’s ‘Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 upon Inter-Imperial Relations,’ which

89 Oliver, The Constitution of Independence, 216-30. 90 Alison Pert, “The Development of Australia's International Legal Personality,” Australian Year Book of International Law 34 (2016): 174-75. 91 Hessel Duncan Hall, “Foreign Government and Politics: The Community of the Parliaments of the British Commonwealth,” The American Political Science Review 36, no. 6 (1942): 1129. 92 Nicholas Mansergh, cited in Sturgis, “What's in a Name?,” 191. 93 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 118.

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is handily provided as an appendix to the book. This format reflected Latham’s desire to influence decision-makers across the British Commonwealth. He wanted to speak directly to the Balfour Report. He was acutely aware that the 1926 Imperial Conference would not mark the end of the process of defining the relations between the British Empire’s constitutive parts, and thus desired to ‘bring out into relief the precise points’ of the report ‘to which inquiry should be directed before action can be taken.’94 Imitating the organisation of the

Balfour Report was an implicit act of writing the future of the Empire; Latham was defining

and amending that document according to his own vision. The omission of an index and

bibliography is also suggestive that Latham and the editors did not intend to create a

technical or reference work.95 Rather, Latham had designed a partisan tract that, in his own

words, ‘suggest[s] what action should be taken’ to ‘reconcile autonomy [of the Dominions]

with unity [of the Empire]’ in the aftermath of the 1926 Imperial Conference.96

Eight chapters divide the text, with each containing a sequentially narrowed focus on the components of the imperial relationship. The title of the opening chapter, ‘The Principle of Freedom,’ heralds the book’s overarching, liberal imperialism concern: membership to empire both gave self-government and guaranteed continuance of sovereignty.97 From there, the discussion moves into an analysis of the ‘bonds of the Commonwealth’ in the wake of the

1926 Imperial Conference: the executive, legislative, and judicial ties, alongside the binding authority of the King and the Governor-General. The powers of the Dominions in the fields of foreign, economic, and immigration policy, along with their treaty-making and diplomatic

capacity, are dealt with in the third chapter. The remaining chapters approach the function of

specific Dominion legislation and their flow-on effects for Australian-British relations. In

94 Ibid., viii. 95 The final decision on formatting and indexing were left to the judgement of Lionel Curtis and the publishers. Latham to Macmillan Publishers, letter, 5 June 1929, MS. Curtis 3, Bodleian Library, Oxford [hereafter BL]. 96 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, viii-ix. 97 Ibid., 15.

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these sections, Latham argued for the maintenance of the status quo, unless instigation of

change held clear advantages for the security of the Empire.

Although interested in imperial constitutional development in the wake of the Balfour

Declaration, Latham did not intend his book to be read as a dry legal work. He was

uninterested in exploring ‘the commonplaces of the text-books so as to make the treatment

complete in a technical sense.’98 Latham’s shunning of the traditional style of legal writing is

explained by the nature of his style as a lawyer. Although his judicial abilities were to propel

him to Chief Justice of the High Court—a post that he held for 16-years99—he was

nonetheless criticised by brilliant legal contemporaries, Owen Dixon and Zelman Cowen, on

the grounds of thoroughness.100 Dixon, a Justice of the High Court during Latham’s tenure as

Chief Justice, was concerned by instances where Latham appeared to favour ‘public policy’

and the public interest over sound legal particulars.101 In keeping with these observations,

Australia and the British Commonwealth was premised on making a case for the

‘continuance of the Empire’ in the interests of the nation and world peace, not on

constitutional grounds. For example, the first chapter reminds its readers that ‘[a]lone,

Australia is weak … As a member of the British Commonwealth, Australia is strong.’ The

conclusion, meanwhile, takes this argument a step further: ‘Many of us believe that the future

of Western civilisation is to-day bound up with the destiny of the British Empire.’102

Therefore, Latham intended his book to transcend legalese—the very kind of language he

98 Ibid., viii. 99 However, historians have pointed to rumours in political circles that Latham struck an agreement for the position of Chief Justice in 1931 that saw him step aside from the leadership of the Nationalists in favour of Lyons. See: Manning Clark, A History of Australia. Vol. VI: The Old Dead Tree and the Young Tree Green, 1916-1935 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1962), 453; Fricke, Judges of the High Court, 139. 100 John V. Barry, Review of Australia and the British Commonwealth, by John G. Latham, Melbourne University Law Review 5 (1966): 382-85. 101 Phillip Ayres, “Two Chief Justices: Sir Owen Dixon’s View of Sir John Latham,” National Observer (Autumn, 2004): 61-62. 102 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 15, 118.

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was railing against at that time—to more emotively appeal to readers’ sense of self-

preservation, sentimentalism, and historical consciousness.

In keeping with Latham’s goal of having an impact beyond the legal community,

Australia and the British Commonwealth began its life as a series of public talks. Its

substance was taken from addresses delivered at the University of Queensland, Brisbane in

1928 as part of the then newly established John Murtagh Macrossan Lectureship.103 The

lecture series, intended for the public as well as an academic audience, covered wide-ranging

subject matter not restricted to legal topics.104 Latham, meanwhile, had an established record

of utilising public platforms to promote his imperial cause, as evidenced by his involvement

in the Universal Service League and the League of Nations Union which cultivated patronage

from the community. His selection of a subject for the lectures was, in this sense, a matter of

timing. Academic and fellow Boobook, Kenneth Bailey, suggested that Latham spoke about

Dominion-British relations because the date coincided with the planning for Australia’s

representation to the 1929 meeting of the Dominions Legislation Council, the body charged

with drafting the legislation that was to become the Westminster Act two years later.105

Latham still had this date in mind while he was preparing the manuscript for publication. ‘I

hope that it will be possible to publish the book at an early date,’ he noted to his editors,

as the Committee which is to deal with the legal subjects reserved by the 1926 Conference is to meet in October, and I think the book would be of value to its members and to others who are interested in this subject.106

103 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, vii. 104 University of Queensland, “Senate Rule — Endowed Lectureships,” 23 February 2015, accessed 13 June, 2018, https://scholarships.uq.edu.au/filething/get/14654/EndowedLecturershipsSectionOnly-23-02-15.pdf. 105 Bailey, Review of “Australia and the British Commonwealth,” 31. 106 Latham to Curtis, letter 5 June 1929, MS Curtis 3, BL.

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In all, Latham’s work was not an objective, purely legalistic treatment of the issues. Rather, it

was a persuasive text that positioned him as an expert with practical experience in imperial

matters who was projecting his views across the Empire on behalf of Australians.107

As the book dealt with transnational concerns, it was appropriate that its production

was handled overseas. Although first outlined in Brisbane, and its manuscript finished in

Melbourne, the product was polished, published, and printed in Britain. Lionel Curtis, one of

the leading imperial thinkers of the day, arranged to get it to press in Great Britain. It was no

accident that Australia and the British Commonwealth reflected Curtis’ predilection for

Dominion nationalism within a liberal British Empire.108 According to Latham’s words, the

two men shared ‘friendly personal relations’ and a keen interest in the book’s subject

matter.109 Curtis sought out the proofreading services of Professor J.L. Brierly of All Souls

College, Oxford, who replied ‘he would in any case have to read anything [Latham]

published and it would be no more trouble to do this in proof.’110 MacMillan and Co. in

London, which had a history of publishing works on international law and inter-imperial relations, were the publishers. Richard Clay & Sons in Suffolk had the printing contract.111

Handled completely in England, the publication process not only highlighted the extraordinary interconnectedness of the select group of people thinking and writing about

107 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, ix. 108 Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 109 Latham to Curtis, letter, 5 June 1929, MS Curtis 3, BL. 110 Curtis to Latham, letter, 13 June 1929, MS Curtis 3, BL. Latham’s son, Richard, would later become an All Souls’ fellow who would tread much of the same intellectual ground as his father. He was applauded for his long form essay on the constitutional relations of Australia and Britain, first published in 1937 and reprinted in the 1940s. R.T.E. Latham, “The Law and Commonwealth,” in Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs Volume 1: Problems of Nationality 1918-36, ed. W.K. Hancock (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 510-630. For a celebration of Richard Latham’s work and an assessment of the enduring impact it has, see Peter Oliver, “Law, Politics, the Commonwealth and the Constitution: Remembering R.T.E. Latham, 1909-43,” King’s College Law Journal 11 (2000): 153-89. 111 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, i-ix.

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Commonwealth relations,112 but also confirm that Latham intended his book to attract an

international audience.

Latham attempted to broaden the appeal of the book. His initial choice of title reflected this desire: ‘The British Commonwealth and the Dominions with particular reference to Australia.’ Subsequently, the title would be shortened to ‘The British

Commonwealth and the Dominions.’ His preferred title reflected the fact that the early chapters were general treatments of inter-imperial relations.113 While MacMillan & Co. did

not select his original title, he nonetheless achieved his goal of having the book recognised

internationally. The reviewer for the Canadian journal of Asia-Pacific issues, Pacific Affairs

found the work ‘excellent and lucid.’114 Notably, it impressed its readers in the United

Kingdom. The Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIAA) picked up the Pacific Affairs’ thread when it praised the book for its ‘admirably lucid’ advice.115 Meanwhile, respected

Scottish constitutional lawyer and author of tomes on issues of Dominion constitutions and

sovereignty, Berriedale Keith, considered it a ‘valuable study.’116

The highest praise was awarded at home. Australian lawyer and public servant,

Kenneth Bailey, admired Latham’s perceptive powers and thought the book and the official

report of the 1929 Imperial Conference should be read in conjunction.117 Within a year of its

appearance, Australia and the British Commonwealth achieved positive notice in the Federal

House of Representatives Hansard. It helped convince at least one Labor politician that a

112 Foster, High Hopes, 55-88; Wold, “Commonwealth: Imperialism and Internationalism,” 27-28, 46. 113 Latham to Macmillan Publishers, letter, 5 June 1929, MS. Curtis 3, BL. 114 W.L.H., Review of “Australia and the British Commonwealth,” Pacific Affairs 3, no. 4 (1930): 417. 115 Given Latham and Curtis’ leading involvement in the RIAA, this review is not surprising. W. P. Morrell, Review of “Australia and the British Commonwealth,” Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 9, no. 3 (1930): 405; Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations, 8. 116 Arthur Berriedale Keith, “The Imperial Conference of 1930,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 13, no. 1 (1931): 26. Keith’s monographs included The Dominions as Sovereign States (London: Macmillan, 1938). 117 Kenneth H. Bailey, “Australia and the British Commonwealth,” The Australian Quarterly 2, no. 5 (1930): 31.

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clause should be inserted into the Statute of Westminster stipulating none of its provisions

could apply to Australia until it was passed by federal parliament.118 The leading Australian

industrialist and diplomat, W.S. Robinson, kept a well-read and annotated copy in his private

library.119 The presence of the book in Robinson’s collection reflected a comment Curtis

made to Latham in the course of preparing the book: ‘people who read books on International

Law are as few as they are important.’120 The Australian prime minister at the time of its

writing, Stanley Bruce, gave the highest endorsement. Known to stress frequently the value of the British connection, he wrote in the foreword that the work constituted ‘a valuable contribution towards the solution of questions which are … exercising the minds of all who are interested in the constitutional development of the Empire.’121 The book was also used to

shape a briefing paper for the Lyons Government on the Statute of Westminster.122

Writing the Empire

Latham intended his book to mark out the existing and complex ties that held together the

British imperium and why, in his own words, ‘[r]igid bonds of legal control could not hold

the Empire together.’123 Ratification of the 1926 Balfour Declaration was too prosaic for

Latham’s liberal imperial vision. He quoted Billy Hughes and South African premier Jan

Smuts on this point, who each warned that an imperial constitution drawn up by lawyers

would be a dangerous thing for imperial vitality.124 The trio agreed that formalising the

118 Keith, “The Imperial Conference of 1930,” 27. 119 W.S. Robinson Collection, Item 193, NLA. 120 Curtis to Latham, letter, 13 June 1929, MS Curtis 3, BL. 121 Stanley Bruce, “Foreword,” in Australia and the British Commonwealth, vi. 122 The report found only the revisions to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 contained in the Statute of Westminster were worthwhile adopting. Latham had argued there was ‘no justification for refusing to entrust the Commonwealth with full power over navigation and shipping.’ “Statute of Westminster,” memorandum signed by Keith Officer, dated 2 December 1932, A981, Imp 48, Part 2, NAA. 123 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 19. 124 “From the Gallery,” Examiner (Launceston), 2 August 1930, p. 9.

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imperial bond would limit or stop the Empire’s capacity for evolution. This argument made

sense to imperial thinkers like Latham who had received their training in imperial ideas in the

ad hoc inter-imperial networks of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras.125 Legislation

threatened, in Latham’s eyes at least, to close down this transnational cosmopolitanism.

Latham argued in his text that the appropriately directed temperament of Empire

citizens could balance the imperatives of democratic government in the Dominions with

imperial cohesion. He considered this was possible because each concession to Dominion

autonomy had ‘been associated with an increase of the sense of responsibility, and the evil

consequences which were feared have not come to pass.’126 To support his book’s case, he

quoted an extensive tract of Curtis’ argument that ‘Freedom and the principle of the

commonwealth are correlative ideas:’

society is at its best when able and free to adapt its own structure to conditions as they change, in accordance with its own experience of those conditions. Freedom is the power of society to control circumstance, and that is why freedom and the institution of the commonwealth are linked inseparably, and together constitute the distinctive ideal of Western civilisation.127

Not all societies in the British Empire, Latham contended, could appreciate this link between

sovereignty and unity: ‘Members of the British race’ possessed ‘political minds’ which

guaranteed the colonies’ transformation from mere ‘fields for the … advancement of British

interests’ into self-governing nation-states in their own right.128 According to historians

Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, self-government expressed in this way simultaneously

satisfied masculine determination to self-rule and confirmed the special status of white men

125 John Griffiths, “Were there Municipal Networks in the British World c. 1890-1939?,” Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History 37, no. 4 (2009): 575-597. 126 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 6. 127 Lionel Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature of Citizenship in the British Empire, and into the Mutual Relations of the Several Communities Thereof. Part 1 (London: Macmillan, 1918), 10-11. 128 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 5.

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in an empire that consisted of many races and cultures.129 Latham, through his establishment

connections, was elevated even amongst white men. He saw no reason to change the status

quo.

What did this ‘racialised’ concept of sovereignty mean for the colonies that were not

yet self-governing? There was a spectrum of autonomy within the Empire, with the timetable

for self-rule being different across the Empire and dependent on racial and cultural proximity

to Great Britain.130 Latham hinted at this differentiation when he wrote, ‘[t]he British Empire

is a world empire comprehending nearly all the races of the world illustrating nearly every

stage of human development and civilisation.’131 Dominions were given a voice in the

running of the Empire because they had achieved internal self-government, and thus could

shoulder the burdens of external policy. For racial and socioeconomic reasons, British

political leaders deemed colonies such as India unable to translate British parliamentary

systems without the oversight of colonial officials; they remained subjects of the British

crown.132

Race and the Empire

The issue, as it pertained to India, was discussed among the Boobooks dining club in June

1922. Members, including Latham, agreed that ‘[g]radual development’ of ‘responsible

government’ must be given ‘at once,’ but safeguards should be kept ‘in hand.’133 They were awed by Lionel Curtis’ vision of ‘dyarchy’ for India, which was a gradated form of

129 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, 143. 130 Peter Marshall, “The Balfour Formula and the Evolution of the Commonwealth,” Round Table 90, no. 361 (2001): 545, 547. 131 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 5. 132 Dan Freeman-Maloy, “The International Politics of Settler Self Governance: Reflections on Zionism and ‘Dominion’ Status within the British Empire,” Settler Colonial Studies 8, no. 1 (2018): 85-87. 133 Minutes of 197th Meeting, 30 June 1922, Boobooks/2/11, UMA.

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authoritarianism that would eventually give way to liberal government. Curtis envisioned that

the forced assimilation of English government norms, practices, and languages by the hand

of colonial overseers would lead to a cultural tipping point, whereby the subjected peoples

would be ready to achieve political ascendancy.134 Latham’s friend Frederic Eggleston

revealed the racial element in this type of thinking. In 1923, Eggleston argued that Indians

and Egyptians did not live according to ‘British customs and traditions’ and would follow

their own interests, rather than British imperial interests, if they were given self-government immediately.135

Eggleston’s emphasis on ‘customs and traditions’ makes clear that race had a

different meaning to imperial thinkers in the 1920s than it generally holds today. Briefly

unpacking this difference is important for understanding Latham’s conceptions of how race

impacted on a state’s eligibility for self-government in the British Empire. By the interwar

period, arguments for Commonwealth membership based on racial superiority and biological

determinism were losing traction in British governmental circles. Instead, the rhetoric of

development shifted to emphasising that ‘British race’ status could be achieved through

education.136 Curtis and Zimmern, for instance, each confused the meaning of race as

culture.137 However, it is likely that imperial thinkers’ changing views were determined by

134 Daniel Gorman, Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 64-65; Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, “Political Science and Political Theology: Lionel Curtis, Federalism and India,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 24, no. 2 (1996): 209-10. 135 Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations, 56. For more on Eggleston’s views on race in foreign policy, see: Meaney, “Frederic Eggleston on International Relations,” 366-69; Osmond, Frederic Eggleston, 65-66. 136 Benjamin Zachariah, “British and Indian Ideas of ‘Development’: Decoding Political Conventions in the Late Colonial State,” Itinerario 23, no. 3-4 (1999): 167-68. 137 Daniel, Gorman, “Lionel Curtis, Imperial Citizenship, and the Quest for Unity,” The Historian, no. 1 (2004): 81-82; Jeanne Morefield, Empires without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of Deflection (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 42.

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extrinsic factors such as the American-led revolt against European imperialism that followed the First World War, rather than representing an outright rejection of social Darwinism.138

Regardless of how he reached the conclusions on race that he did, Latham expounded

the view that membership in the British imperium was primarily a matter of political practice

and shared cultural experience. Accordingly, he saw the British imperial project as

intrinsically paternal, the goal being to allow those he saw as ‘backward’ indigenous people

in the colonies to ‘catch-up’ to the standards of Western civilisation.139 His arguments

against dismantling the White Australia Policy (WAP) were likewise premised on ensuring

the non-admission of anti-British, anti-democratic, and communist elements into the country; persons prepared to assume ‘the duties and responsibilities of Australian citizenship’ should be otherwise welcomed.140 In the late-1930s, he demonstrated privately his willingness to

alter the WAP to make accommodations for Japanese people, but only if Tokyo offered

concessions in return. This concession reflected defence concerns rather than a change of

heart on immigration policy broadly.141 The overall evidence suggests Latham was a liberal

imperialist who viewed race in terms of political, administrative, and cultural proficiency,

with the high-watermark here being the so-called British race.

An organic Empire

With culture and politics intertwined with racial terminology within the British Empire, it

was no great leap for Latham to draw on biological metaphors to describe its totality. Latham

138 Morefield, Empires without Imperialism, 10-11. 139 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 10. 140 Australia, HOR, Debates, 1 July 1925, Latham, https://historichansard.net/hofreps/1925/19250701_reps_9_110/#subdebate-42-0-s7; Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, 9-10. 141 Latham to Anne Hooper, letter, 27 May 1938, MS 1009/1/5296, NLA.

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wrote of the British Empire as a global political union in an organic form that responded

naturally to the problems of empire as they arose. South African premier Jan Smuts

agreed.142 In Australia and the British Commonwealth, Latham defined the British Empire in

physiological terms, a body made from autonomous parts.143 In other words, each ‘limb’ or

‘organ’ had its own role and obligation to the rest. This corporeal metaphor served distinct roles. It broadened the definition of the British race beyond biology, gave ‘life and death’ significance to arguments that the Empire was an interdependent supranational body, and incorporated notions of inter-imperial mobility that would have appealed to far-flung

Dominions. Even the antipodes could dramatically affect core imperial functions. Indeed,

historian Duncan Bell suggests ‘the idea of the “biological” growth of the empire’ emerged

in the imperial lexicon as steam-powered transoceanic shipping and the telegram linked the

disparate parts closer together.144

While Latham evidently valued the lanes and lines of imperial communication—he

reasoned that ‘[i]mproved methods of communication by wireless will doubtless make it

possible for consultation [between Dominions] to be more prompt and effective’145—he also

rationalised that the Empire was ‘a unique political organism’ that endured despite its

geographical vastness. The British imperium remained because it reconciled self-government

with responsibility for the whole and unity of action in crises and matters of vital importance,

such as the First World War.146 However, that free cooperation and sense of responsibility

was not a given. He warned that ‘[j]ust as disease may kill a man, so political disease may

142 Dubow, “The Commonwealth and South Africa,” 290. 143 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 3-5, 16. 144 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 86. 145 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 40. 146 Ibid., 3, 6. Imperialists were relieved the war resulted in a unified response from the Commonwealth. Wold, “Commonwealth: Imperialism and Internationalism,” 42.

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kill a political organism.’147 That disease was the abandonment of selfless political leadership

and the privileging of the national and the local over the imperial.

Within Latham’s empire-as-living organism metaphor, the imperial body’s survival

required many individual bodies, especially diplomats and political leaders. This was an early

theme in his political life that continued throughout the interwar period. The value of

leadership was a major refrain of the Boobooks’ discussion from the time of their first

meeting in 1902.148 Later, during the First World War, Eggleston penned Latham his

exasperated thoughts on the administrative abilities of staff in the Australian Imperial Force

Headquarters in Salisbury, reporting glumly that ‘[t]he Australian hardly seems conscious of

his responsibilities.’149 Following the war’s end, the promise of responsible government and

leadership became a plank of Latham’s first federal election platform. He also continued this

train of thought in Australia and the British Commonwealth. He theorised that problems in

the inter-imperial relationship needed to be solved by the ‘practical wisdom’ of political leaders and in the art of ‘practical statesmanship.’150 While not explicitly defined in the

text—it was self-evident to its author—practical leadership was likely the avoidance of

pursuing a political course that placed a Dominion outside of the Empire and, thus, imperilling its sovereignty and security. In Latham’s own words, ‘self-respecting nations … realise that their own individual interests depend upon the preservation of the greater unity.’151 Expressed in this way, national feeling and imperial loyalty were compatible

concepts.

In its entirety, Latham’s 1929 volume cautioned against doctrinaire approaches to

147 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 16. 148 Minutes of 1st Meeting, 17 November 1902, Boobooks/1/1, UMA. 149 Eggleston to Latham, letter, 13 October 1916, MS 1009/1/248d, NLA. 150 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 118. 151 Ibid., 19.

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British imperial problems. His central message was that ‘the principle of the

Commonwealth—freedom realised in self-government’ has ‘preserved the British Empire

while other Empires have fallen.’152 Making the findings of the 1926 Imperial Conference

into law threatened this free and evolving association between equal, white men. He realised

there were manifold circumstantial differences in the Commonwealth nations, signifying that

inter-imperial relations were ‘the result of a balance of many opposing considerations.’ He

warned agitators in the Dominions that the ‘balance cannot be easily upset because so many

interests are concerned in preserving a balance even if the existing position is not satisfactory

to them in particular respects.’153 To retain this balance, experienced sets of political and

diplomatic hands unbound by legalese were required. Moving into the Statute of Westminster

debates 1929-1931, Latham maintained Empire relations were the domain of political

leadership and the diplomatic core, and not lawyers writing parliamentary acts.

The Statute of Westminster

At the time of writing his book, Latham was concerned about the forthcoming Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation, which convened

in London 8 October to 4 December 1929. This conference, which did not have the status of

a full imperial conference, had its origins in the resolutions of the 1926 Balfour Report. The

Inter-Imperial Relations Committee had resolved to leave some outstanding constitutional

issues that related to Dominion legislation, preferring to convene a subconference of experts

later. The terms of reference for the 1929 conference included investigation into the Crown’s

power of assent over Commonwealth legislation, the extent of the Dominions’ powers to

legislate over their external affairs, and whether any provisions and principles related to the

152 Ibid., 3. 153 Ibid., 19, 118.

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Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 should be modified or repealed in light of the Balfour

Declaration.154 As discussed above, Latham hoped in June 1929 that his forthcoming

publication would be of value to those gathering for the conference.

While Latham was ‘greatly interested’ in both the political and legal dimensions of

the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation conference and

had hoped to attend himself as the Australian representative, he felt it was not possible to

leave Australia owing to the parlous political circumstances of the Bruce Government. He

was pleased though that Harrison Moore went in his stead.155 In the words of the Australian

Round Table Group’s biographer, Moore ‘was loath to see the imperial bonds go slack.’156

Not all were as pleased as Latham to see Moore appointed. The radical Labor member for the

federal seat of Corangamite later expressed exasperation that Moore was ‘appointed to

represent Australia at the legal conference which drafted the Statute of Westminster. He has

always been a strong Imperialist, and against Australian national sentiment.’157 Moore’s brief

was complicated. He needed to represent Australia but not provide initiative or contribute

beyond the bare minimum.158 The minutes of the Boobooks dining club described his

delicate task as helping to ‘save the pieces that are left of the Empire, and make them stand

up together.’159 Moore performed as well as Latham could have hoped given he presented in

an advisory capacity, and the fact there was a change in Australia’s government midway

through the proceedings.160 In his parliamentary report and final speech at the conference,

154 Australia, Senate, Debates, 11 July 1930, Senator McLachlan, http://historichansard.net/senate/1930/19300711_senate_12_125/. 155 Latham noted to Lionel Curtis that Australia ‘could not have a better representative for work of this character.’ Latham to Curtis, letter, 5 June 1929, MS Curtis 3, BL. 156 Foster, High Hopes, 97-8. 157 Australia, HOR, Debates, 17 July 1931, Mr Crouch, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310717_reps_12_131/. 158 Hudson and Sharp, Australian Independence, 103ff. 159 Minutes of 271st Meeting, 20 June 1930, Boobooks/2/16, UMA. 160 Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations, 26-27. In the Lower House, Latham later expressed his agreement with much of Moore’s report on the conference. Australia, HOR, Debates, 17 July 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310717_reps_12_131/.

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Moore stressed ‘the advisory and preparatory nature’ of his work.161 The codification of the

Balfour Declaration remained in the offing.

Now Leader of the Opposition following the defeat of the Bruce Government to

James Scullin-led Labor at the 22 October 1929 ballot, Latham began to feel that events were

getting away from him.162 On the floor of the Lower House on 1 August 1930, he presented a

pre-emptive strike against the forthcoming 1930 Imperial Conference in London. He

explained in a lengthy speech—an extension of time was granted—that the legislation was

unneeded ‘because there is no inferiority complex,’ nor suspicion of insufficient

independence, in Australia. Apart from some minor amendments to merchant shipping

legislation and clarification of certain points in the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, he

argued the dictates of inter-imperial relations should be ‘left well alone’ and not expressed in

‘legal phraseology.’ He disputed many of the expert findings of the 1929 subconference,

declaring instead that ‘the statesman is much more important than the lawyer’ in the sphere

of inter-imperial relations. He went on to echo his well-worn position on who should have a

say in inter-imperial relations:

A lawyer likes to make a complete system to tie all things together neatly; to make everything fit. But in statesmanship, as [Francis] Bacon said of divinity, “many things must be left abrupt.” It is impossible to have a smoothly finished off and complete system. I am content with a system that works successfully—a system that does not in practice, whatever it may do in theory, infringe our rights of self-government, but allows us the fullest opportunity for determining our national policy having due regard to our responsibilities. I would rather leave some things unfinished and undetermined than make a completely rigid system of constitutional theory which might break under a strain that would have little or no effect on a more flexible or elastic, though less well defined, constitutional

161 “Report of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation, 1929 together with Report of Sir William Harrison Moore,” A4311, 376/1, NAA. 162 Bruce called a snap election in September 1929 owing to ongoing strikes and unrest in key export industries, as well as his government’s failure to prevent an unwelcome amendment to a key piece of industrial legislation. The Nationalists lost the 12 October ballot, and Bruce famously lost his seat. In November, Latham was elected leader by the Nationalist party room, with only one dissenting vote recorded. Williams, John Latham, 1-3.

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understanding. I prefer fluid conventions, the interpretation and application of which are left to statesmen, to legal formulae to be applied by judges.163

This was a reiteration of the substance of Australia and the British Commonwealth. Latham

continued to refer to his book throughout his speech, and directed members turn to it for

guiding Australia’s response to the legislation of the Balfour Declaration.

Further to the above quote, Latham protested the prospect of equalising the

Dominions’ extra-territorial legislative capacity with Great Britain’s powers in that area and

expressed wariness of the prospect of a ‘tribunal for the settlement of disputes between

different parts of the Empire.’ He preferred the Privy Council to remain the highest court for

inter-Empire disputes of legal character. While he agreed with the subconference’s finding

that Dominion legislatures should possess the authority to amend or repeal British statutes

applicable to the Dominions, he nonetheless reasoned that this ‘understanding should not be

recorded in any statute.’ He suggested the British Empire was a ‘family,’ and legal rules had no place in defining familial relations. He finished his speech by ‘asking the [Scullin Labor]

Government to proceed slowly and cautiously, and not to bind itself beyond what I suggest as the desirable minimum.’ Finally, he reminded the government benches ‘that the interests of

Australia—its self-government and economic welfare—are bound up with the success, prosperity, and continued unity of the British Empire.’164 Latham viewed himself as being

one of the few Australians who recognised the gravity of the Statute of Westminster.

Latham’s passionate defence of the status quo may have impeded proceedings, but it

did not stop the legislation being drafted. The 1930 Imperial Conference was held on 1

163 Australia, HOR, Debates, 1 August 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19300801_reps_12_126/. 164 Australia, HOR, Debates, 1 August 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19300801_reps_12_126/.

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October to 14 November. It was significant for it produced the Statute of Westminster and

laid plans for the Imperial Economic Conference, which took place in 1932 (see Chapter VI).

The Dominions had the opportunity to review and suggest amendments to the proposed

legislation.165 Latham took up this opportunity while still in opposition, seeking to pass

resolutions in the Lower House to amend the Statute. On 17 July 1931, he proposed to add a

clause that read ‘the Parliament of the Commonwealth may, at any time, repeal any provision

of this act which has been adopted by the said Parliament.’166 Fearing the inevitable, he

hoped to be part of a government that one day repealed the legislation.167 Latham got his

wish: the final version of the legislation could be repealed, and contained a clause that

‘[c]ertain sections of Act not to apply to Australia, New Zealand or Newfoundland unless

adopted.’168

As the final negotiations about the wording of the Statute of Westminster Bill were

underway between Canberra and Britain in November 1931, Latham also proposed an

amendment that was successfully carried in the Lower House. The amendment was for

Section 10 (parts i & ii), which stated ‘[c]ertain sections of Act not to apply to Australia,

New Zealand or Newfoundland unless adopted.’169 Latham’s proposal sought to add additional clarification that the Statute of Westminster did not apply to the states of Australia,

and that only the federal government had the capacity to consent and request the Parliament

165 David L. Lewis, “John Latham and the Statute of Westminster,” Electronic Journal of Australian and New Zealand History, conference proceedings issue (1998), http://www.jcu.edu.au/aff/history/conferences/newcastle/lewis.htm. 166 Australia, HOR, Debates, 17 July 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310717_reps_12_131/. 167 “Notes of an address by Mr J.G Latham to Members of the National Union Committee, Monday, September 19/21,” Herbert and Ivy Brookes Papers, MS 1924/19/32, NLA. 168 Statute of Westminster, 1931 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf. 169 Ibid., p. 4.

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of the United Kingdom legislate on its behalf.170 The Under Secretary of State for Dominion

Affairs Malcolm MacDonald found the proposed amendment trifling and needlessly

complicated, and requested more detail from Canberra.171 Latham’s proposal reflected his

dual concerns about Western Australia’s agitation for secession and the presence of Jack

Lang’s ‘radical’ Labor government in New South Wales, both of which Latham feared could upend the Australian-British relationship (see Chapter V).172 The Australian government

persisted with Latham’s amendment, and it was included in the final act.173

Once passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom on 11 December 1931, the

Statute of Westminster effectively established the legislative independence of the Dominions,

thus giving statutory effect to the principles of equality set out in the earlier Balfour

Declaration.174 Prime Minister James Scullin and Labor did not have an opportunity to ratify the Statute in Australia; they lost the 19 December election to the rebranded Nationalists, the

United Australia Party.175 Latham was named Attorney-General (see Chapter VI). On 22

April 1932, he gave a talk on the state of the British Empire, its prospects and its challenges,

to the Royal Empire Society in London. He trumpeted the role he had played in the domestic

debates about the Statute: ‘I was instrumental in the Australian Parliament in introducing an

amendment which makes it optional for Australia to adopt the Statute of Westminster.’ He

was glad that ‘we have not done so,’ and suggested that ‘as long as I am Attorney-General

170 Ibid., s. 9. Latham’s amendment made it clear the specific sections of the act that the Australian government could revoke. Prime Minister’s Department to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, cable, 21 November 1931, A981, Imp 48 Part 2, NAA. 171 Under Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Representative in the Commonwealth of Australia of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, cable, 23 November 1931, A981, Imp 48, Part 2, NAA. 172 For a more detailed discussion about Latham’s position on the constitution and the states, see: See also: Lee, “States Rights.” 173 Keith Officer’s memorandum, 24 November 1931, A981, Imp 48 Part 2, NAA; Statute of Westminster, 1931, s. 10 (ii). 174 Statute of Westminster, 1931. 175 Scullin was also suspicious of codifying inter-imperial relations. Hirst, “Empire, State, Nation,” 159. However, as Leader of the Opposition after 1931, he made enquiries about the status of the Statute of Westminster. “Statute of Westminster,” External Affairs memoranda, 28 April 1932, 22 February 1934, A981, Imp 48 Part 2, NAA.

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with any influence, I do not know that we will.’176 Although it was not ratified by the

Australian parliament until 1942, Latham did make a submission to Cabinet on 2

October1933 that recommended the government adopt the Statute.177

Juxtaposed with his years-long campaign to stop, delay, and eventually amend the

legislation, Latham’s surrender to the Statute of Westminster seems uncharacteristic on the

surface. In his Cabinet submission, he reiterated his total trust in London to continue

abstaining from interference in Dominion affairs unless requested.178 David Lee suggests that

Latham was concerned Australia not passing the statute imperilled imperial unity, as Canada,

South Africa, and the Irish Free State had already done so.179 Latham identified there ‘are

objections to the establishment of a differential legal basis’ amongst the Dominions, but did

not elaborate on this point.180 He did, however, emphasise rather more on the need to pass

the legislation in uncontentious circumstances.181 Latham stressed:

if this Government does not act in adopting the Statute, a future Government might act in such a way as to suggest that the adoption of the Act was a declaration of some form of separation. It would be unfortunate if the Statute were adopted in such circumstances. This could be avoided if the Statute were adopted now, under non- controversial conditions.182

While stage-managing the arrival of the inevitable legislation was an incredibly important

factor in Latham’s Cabinet submission, he had had the opportunity to press this case earlier.

176 John G. Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” United Empire: Journal of the Royal Empire Society (May 1932): 263. 177 “Attorney-General’s Department. Statute of Westminster,” 2 October 1933, Cabinet submission by Latham, A432, 1930/181 Part 2, NAA. 178 “Attorney-General’s Department. Statute of Westminster,” Cabinet submission by Latham, 2 October 1933, A432, 1930/181 Part 2, NAA. 179 Lee, “States Rights,” 265. 180 Ibid. 181 Lee, “States Rights,” 265. 182 “Attorney-General’s Department. Statute of Westminster,” Cabinet submission by Latham, 2 October 1933, A432, 1930/181 Part 2, NAA.

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In fact, he repeatedly denied in 1932 that he would pursue an adoption act.183 Circumstances

in inter-imperial affairs had recently undergone a positive, more cohesive shift. This explains

Latham’s changed position.

The 1932 Imperial Economic Conference brought all the Dominions together with a common goal of solving the Great Depression. The Dominions arrived at a series of trade arrangement agreements that were loose enough to satisfy national feeling whilst not dissolving political union.184 After the conference concluded, Latham was satisfied that the

Empire had a sustainable foundation for cooperation moving forward (see Chapter VI). This

is the best explanatory framework, given that the change in Latham’s position on the Statute

came after the Imperial Economic Conference. There is no robust evidence for a change of

heart. Cabinet resolved to decline Latham’s submission, seeing no practical advantage to

passing the Statute of Westminster.185 Very few paid the matter the serious attention that he

did.186

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that Latham perceived the British Empire as an entity that had

evolved to accommodate emerging national identities in the Dominions while still

safeguarding Britain’s global influence. Although change was permissible within this

structure according to his worldview, codification of inter-imperial relations was not. He

183 External Affairs memorandum, signed by Officer, 28 April 1932, A432, 1930/181 Part 2, NAA; Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 262. 184 Imperial trade preference was embodied in the Ottawa Agreement. Dominions agreed to impose lowered tariffs for Commonwealth trade compared to trade with the rest of the world. The standard study of Ottawa is Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and Empire, 1919-1939 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972; London: Routledge, 2006), 89-120. 185 “Attorney-General’s Department. Statute of Westminster,” 2 October 1933, Cabinet submission by Latham, A432, 1930/181 Part 2, NAA. 186 Lewis, “John Latham and the Statute of Westminster.”

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agreed with the Balfour Report that emerged from the 1926 Imperial Conference because it kept things sufficiently blurry, thereby enabling backroom imperial policy-making by white, male elites to continue unabated. He resisted the prospect of legally formalising the conference’s findings and embarked on a long campaign to impede the process. He produced a small book that fleshed out the liberal imperial ideas he had studied within his coterie of pro-imperialists, and that he had also spoken about ceaselessly as a diplomat and parliamentarian. He reasoned the cohesion of the British Empire had endured its greatest test, the First World War, and passed every test thereafter—the League of Nations, the Chanak

Crisis, the Locarno Treaty—because of loose and evolving inter-imperial machinery.

Australia and the British Commonwealth presented a case for leaving things how they were.

Latham’s defence of Empire was not cold and logical but rooted in sentimentalism.

He went to extraordinary lengths to defend the existing inter-imperial relations system despite the frequent frustrations he encountered, namely the failure of London to consult the

Commonwealth during the Chanak Crisis and the negotiations of the Locarno Treaty. He believed the Empire, which appeared to him like a family, could be maintained by a sense of responsibility, as well as the maintenance of its cultural, historical, and racial ties.

Accordingly, he railed against, and successfully amended, the Statute of Westminster so it did not apply to Australia unless ratified by Canberra. In public, he maintained his contempt for the legislation beyond 1931 but privately suggested in late 1933 it should be ratified while political circumstances were favourable domestically and across the British Empire.

Concurrent with his battle against the Statute of Westminster was his fight against the appointment of an Australian-born governor-general, the focus of the next chapter.

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Chapter IV Preserving ‘the ties which bind:’1 The Campaign Against an Australian-Born Governor-General, 1930-31

I feel that the present [Scullin Labor] Government has weakened every tie that binds us to the Mother Country and that holds the Empire together … I feel that it will be some time before the real significance of the policy of the Government is appreciated by people as a whole. We have been for so many years in such a prosperous state that a great many Australians believe that we can afford to ignore the subject of relations with other parts of the Empire.2

Introduction

In 1930, Sir John Latham scrutinised from the opposition benches Labor Prime Minister

James Scullin’s decision to advise personally King George V to appoint Australian-born lawyer, judge, and politician Sir Isaac Isaacs to the office of Governor-General of the

Commonwealth of Australia. The nomination of an Australian by an Australian PM broke with 30 years of tradition. Beginning with Lord Hopetoun’s tenure as the first Governor-

General of the Commonwealth 1901-03, the sovereign’s representative in the

Commonwealth had been an eminent citizen of the United Kingdom personally selected for the office by the monarch on the recommendation of the British government.3 In other words, the selection of Isaacs was a litmus test for Australian independence and the ‘countervailing cultural and legal force of the imperial connection’ in the interwar era.4 Australians on the non-Labor side of politics—Latham was the most visible Australian opponent of Scullin’s

1 “Political Argument. Mr. Scullin and Mr. Latham,” The West Australian (Perth), 26 April 1930, p. 12. Although a common phrase, Latham used the same phrasing here as used in a resolution passed by a conference of Australian Round Table groups in 1917. Latham represented the Victorian group at the conference. “Australian Round Table Organisation. Minutes of Conference of Groups,” 28 July 1917, MS 1009/19/7, NLA. 2 Latham to Josiah Symon, letter, 16 December 1930, Papers of Sir Josiah Symon, MS 1736/17/30, NLA. 3 Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 246-48. 4 John Waugh, “An Australian in The Palace of the King–Emperor: James Scullin, George V and the Appointment of the first Australian-Born Governor-General,” Federal Law Review 39, no. 2 (2011): 235.

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unilateral recommendation—feared the nomination would have severe repercussions for

Australian-British relations. These feelings were made more pointed by the uncertain

condition of inter-imperial relations. The 1926 Balfour Declaration, which established the

constitutional equality of the Dominions of the British Empire, was still the subject of

deliberation amongst lawyers and statesmen four years later.5 The problem of harmonising

Australia’s growing autonomy with its imperial unity was also a factor that weighed on

London’s financiers, who were losing faith in Australia’s solvency as the Great Depression took root.6

Vexed by concurrent political change and crisis at national and imperial levels,

Latham was incensed by Scullin’s persistence with Isaacs’ nomination in the face of reluctance from Buckingham Palace and a lukewarm response from Whitehall.7 Then Leader

of the Opposition, Latham’s views on the subject were highly visible in the Australian debate

over the nomination. His visibility was not only due to the position he occupied in federal

parliament, but also his high standing in legal and international relations circles. Despite

others amplifying his vocal outcry including the Royal Empire Society, his position is yet to

receive much attention in the historiography on Isaacs’ governor-generalship.8 While Hilary

Rubinstein, Leonie Foster, and James Cotton have revealed how conservative public

intellectuals and notable imperialist volunteer organisations sought to prevent Isaacs being

5 For examples of contemporaneous debates, please see: Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Sovereignty of the British Dominions (London: Macmillan, 1929); Edward Jenks, “The Imperial Conference and the Constitution,’ The Cambridge Law Journal 3, no. 1 (1927): 13-23; Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth. 6 Bernard Attard, “Financial Diplomacy,” in Between Empire and Nation: Australia's External Relations from Federation to the Second World War, ed. Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), 92-109. 7 For Scullin and Isaacs’ account of conversations with King George V and the Colonial Office, see: Leslie F. Crisp, “The Appointment of Sir Isaac Isaacs as Governor-General of Australia, 1930: J. H. Scullin's Account of the Buckingham Palace Interviews,” Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand 11, no. 42 (1964): 253-57. 8 Zelman Cowen, Isaac Isaacs (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1967), 191-207; John Robertson, J. H. Scullin: A Political Biography (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 1974) 238–9, 286–8.

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appointed as the Crown’s representative,9 the blueprint for Latham’s dissent—his book

Australia and the British Commonwealth—has been completely ignored in this scholarship.10

While the historiography suggests that Isaacs’ Australian-Jewish background was a motivation for Latham’s criticism of his appointment,11 close examination of Latham’s

comments reveals this was an insignificant consideration for him. While there were many

imperial bonds, the King had a symbolic position in Latham’s imperial conception because it

was he who was the most visible instrument of Empire unity.

This chapter will locate Latham’s comments within the broader contemporary debate about Isaacs and the governor-generalship. This reveals Latham was exceptional in arguing

so forcefully that Australia’s political, economic, and security interests were best served by

maintaining existing governor-general arrangements. Latham’s outlook on the governor-

general’s office further exposes that he was concerned just as much with the reputation of

Australia in the Empire as he was the Empire in Australia.

The constitutional background to Isaacs’ nomination

It was accepted at Federation that the Crown was ‘indivisible.’ For all the self-governing

Dominions of the British Empire, this meant they were ruled over by one monarch.

Governors-general, appointed personally by the sovereign, performed the Crown’s day-to-

day functions in the realms of the Empire. Following the First World War, some of the

9 Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations, 21-48; Foster, High Hopes, 60; Hilary L. Rubinstein, “’A gross discourtesy to His Majesty’: The Campaign within Australia, 1930-31 Against Sir Isaac Isaacs’ Appointment as Governor-General,” Australian Jewish Historical Society 14, no. 3 (1998): 425-58; “Empire Loyalism in Inter-War Victoria,” Victorian Historical Journal 17, no. 1 (1999): 67–83. 10 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth. 11 Foster, High Hopes, 60, 90; Rubinstein, “’A gross discourtesy to His Majesty,’” 445-47.

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Dominions challenged this indivisibility.12 The events of 1914-18 drained ‘much of the crude self-confidence … out of British imperialism,’13 which gave impetus to Dominion

governments to push for greater freedoms at the Imperial Conferences of 1920s and 1930s.

For instance, in 1919, Billy Hughes alarmed the Colonial Office by proposing that Australia

and other Dominions should be able to submit to the Colonial Office their own nominations

for governor-general, including citizens of the Dominion in question.14 These rumblings led

to the 1926 Balfour Declaration, delivered at that year’s Imperial Conference. It consequently laid the foundation for Dominion governments to have greater say in the selection of the

Crown’s representation. Alongside declaring that the Dominions and Britain were equal in status and were ‘autonomous Communities within the British Empire,’ the conference established:

The Governor-General of a Dominion is the representative of the Crown, holding, in all essential respects, the same position in relation to the administration of public affairs in the Dominions as is held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain, and that he is not the representative or agent of His Majesty’s Government or of any Department of their Government.15

Two new precedents were declared in 1926. First, the governor-general would be expected to

act on the counsel of the relevant Dominion government.16 Second, governors-general were

solely the King’s representatives, not the British government’s as well.17 As far as

Australians were concerned, these outcomes further designated the monarch a symbolic head of state while cementing the governor-general as constitutional head of state, an office

12 Anne Twomey, The Chameleon Crown: The Queen and Her Australian Governors (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006), 263. 13 John Darwin, “Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars,” The Historical Journal 23, no. 3 (1980): 657. 14 Christopher Cunneen, Kings’ Men: Australia’s Governors-General from Hopetoun to Isaacs (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 151. 15 “Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference 1926,” A4640/32, NAA. 16 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, 246-47. 17 Rubinstein, “Empire Loyalism in Inter-War Victoria,” 75.

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increasingly under the purview of the Australian government.18 The imperial apron strings

were loosening.

The 1926 ruling also had major ramifications for the appointment of governors-

general. Dominion prime ministers and their governments could now advise the Crown on

the appointment of governors-general, rather than the King making his decision in

consultation with British ministers. With the sidelining of Westminster in the governor-

general selection process, it was only natural that the post would cease to remain the domain

of distinguished Britons. While the Irish Free State had insisted since 1922 on their

governors-general being Irish, this situation was exceptional until 1930.19 Labor’s James

Scullin tested the 1926 formula soon after Labor’s resounding victory at the 1929 ballot box.

He nominated the Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Isaac Isaacs, to replace Lord

Stonehaven whose term as governor-general was due to expire in October 1930. Isaacs was the Scullin Cabinet’s sole nominee for the position. The discussions between King George V, his advisers and the federal government took place behind the scenes.20 George V protested

because ‘any local man’ could not transcend the political divisions of his own country.21 An

import from the imperial centre, on the other hand, could withstand the pull of domestic party

politics. Scullin withstood the royal dissent. The King grudgingly put aside his personal

concerns on constitutional advice, assenting to install Isaacs in December 1930.22

18 David Smith, “An Australian Head of State: An Historical and Contemporary Perspective,” Papers on Parliament, no. 27 (Canberra: Research Section of the Procedure Office of the Department of the Senate, 1996), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/~/~/link.aspx?_id=D704CA6 CD1B549AF8654FDCFBA383150&_z=z. 19 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, 246. 20 Cowen, Isaac Isaacs, 200-2. 21 Lord Stamfordham to Alexander Hardinge, letter, 20 November 1930, cited in Waugh, “An Australian in The Palace of the King–Emperor,” 248. 22 Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Post- War Change 1939-1952 (London: Routledge, 2013 originally published 1968), 379.

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The nomination of an Australian-born governor-general, and the way it was handled

by the PM, rankled local Empire loyalists. Alongside constitutional arguments, imperial advocates objected on the basis that Scullin acted improperly by giving the monarch only a single candidate;23 that British dignitaries were preferred holders of the governor-general’s

office because they returned to their home countries with Australia’s interests in mind; the

fact that Isaacs had once been a parliamentarian made it unlikely he could rise above party

politics in an office which was supposed not to be mired in such concerns;24 and that the

Commonwealth government lacked the authority to tender advice on constitutional matters

directly to the King.25 Victorian-based pro-Empire bodies were particularly vocal opponents

to changes to governor-general appointments. The Royal Empire Society in Latham’s home state was communicating with the other branches of the organisation and similar bodies in

Australia to coordinate its efforts to combat the Scullin Government.26

Apart from Australian contributions, legal commentators in the UK examined the

constitutional position of governors-general after the 1926 Imperial Conference. The writings

of overseas jurists made an appearance in the Australian literature at the time.27 A basic line of argument in these commentaries is that the Australian position needed to be considered alongside situations in the other Dominions. Arthur Berriedale Keith, Scottish professor of constitutional law, kept a careful eye on developments pertaining to governors-general.

Writing in 1930, Keith disapproved of Australia’s push for the next governor-general to be an

Australian. He felt this was not only unprecedented, it was also an untenable situation beyond

23 The Scullin Cabinet also considered Sir John Monash, but in the end only Isaacs was put forward. Cowen, Isaac Isaacs, 192. 24 Rubinstein, “Empire Loyalism in Inter-War Victoria,” 75. 25 George Winterton, “The Evolution of a Separate Australian Crown,” Monash University Law Review 19, no. 1 (1993): 12. 26 Cowen, Isaac Isaacs, 193; “Governorship of the Dominions. An Australian Innovation,” The Times Weekly Edition (London), 1 May 1930, clipping in MS 1736/17/9; Royal Empire Society to Symon, 7 May 1930, MS 1736/17/4, NLA. 27 See, for instance: Bailey, “Australia and the British Commonwealth,” 34.

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the boundary of the Irish Free State. If Australia got its way, Keith worried there would be

repercussions for other Dominions who preferred British governors-general, notably New

Zealand.28 Keith’s rejection of the contention that a dominion minister could offer advice to

the Crown contrasted with Edward Jenks’ view:

Who then is to advise the King upon the appointment of a Governor- General, say of Canada, Australia or New Zealand? The answer (I may be wrong) seems as a matter of principle to me to be reasonably plain, namely, that just as the King in matters affecting the United Kingdom takes the advice of his Prime Minister in London, so in matters affecting Canada, he will take the advice of his Prime Minister in the Dominion, and in the case of Australia, that of his Prime Minister in the Commonwealth of Australia, and so forth. And I see no difficulty in applying the principle in that way.29

Jenks understood the Dominions better than most English observers. From 1890 to 1892 he

was Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Melbourne. Perhaps because of his

familiarity with Dominion sentiment, Jenks was bemused by suggestions in Great Britain that

the fate of the Empire now rested in the hands of the King’s private secretary. He had faith

that Dominion governments would advise governors-general in a manner that would befit the

unity of the Empire.30 As will be discussed below, Latham’s position was somewhere in-

between the constitutional interpretations of Keith and Jenks. He agreed with Jenks that this

development was a rational evolution of the British imperial system, but he also sided with

Keith in arguing that Australian governments should not dictate on the selection of

governors-general.

28 Arthur Berriedale Keith, “Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 12, no. 1 (1930): 296-97. 29 Edward Jenks, “The Imperial Conference and the Constitution,” The Cambridge Law Journal 3, no. 1 (1927): 21. 30 Ibid., 13-23.

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The indivisibility of the Crown

The governor-general controversy followed on the heels of Latham’s writing and speaking

tours in Australia about constitutional powers and the subject of Australian-British relations.

In these fora, he argued that the development of self-government in the British colonies was

an ‘organic,’ consultative process that responded to circumstance. While he appreciated the

tenor of carefully increasing Australian sovereignty within an imperial framework,31 details

were important.32 Latham argued the governor-general’s office could only undergo minimal

changes, and these alterations needed to be carefully considered in Australia and were not to

endanger the Empire’s welfare. He saw the enduring authority of the Crown as a tenet of

imperial unity, and the attitude of the Dominions vital for maintaining that authority.33

At a Boobooks’ dinner a decade prior to the Isaacs controversy, Latham discussed the

centrality of the sovereign to the British Empire’s cohesion. Boobook William Harrison

Moore addressed the vexed problem of uniting sovereign polities within a monarchic system.

Moore approached the subject through a discussion of the failed personal union between

Sweden and Norway, 1814-1905. The speaker and the audience extracted lessons for the

British imperial cause. ‘As the British Empire is also trying to achieve the impossible,’ recorded the anonymous minute writer wryly, ‘the Scandinavian experiment had more than academic interest for us.’34 Like the Dominions and Great Britain, Moore explained that the

two Scandinavian countries had ‘sought to act together in union, without losing their separate

rights of self-government.’35 Moore’s audience concluded that ‘when the Monarchy was

bundled out of existence as a political power, disunion followed.’36 Latham appeared to take

31 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, especially 1-19. 32 Foster, High Hopes, 98. 33 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 22. 34 Minutes of 185th Meeting, 20 May 1921, Boobooks/2/11, UMA. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

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away that if differences in outlook amidst the countries concerned were left to fester, rather

than reconciled amicably, then the rift in the union would be irreparable. He also insisted that

governments and representatives needed to conduct commonwealth relations in a ‘learned

friendly manner.’37 Scullin’s unilateralism and the controversy it caused in Australia and

Britain contravened the conclusions Latham reached in the Boobooks. If Moore’s talk did not

resonate for Latham in 1930-1931, then those same findings were echoed in his later writings

on the position of the King in the Commonwealth and the Empire.

To grasp why Latham considered the governor-general so central to British

imperialism after 1926, it is necessary to review how he positioned the Crown in Australia

and the British Commonwealth. British kingship appealed to Latham’s conservative inclination to defend historical institutions. He saw in George V a living representative of

British national history.38 Latham drew on the work of nineteenth century British

constitutional theorist Walter Bagehot to paint the Crown as a metaphysical presence across

the Empire, all the while adding flourishes praising the King’s virtue that could be readily found in any romance novel. Yet, the King embodied something more than symbolism. The

Crown was, in Latham’s words, ‘at once a symbol and an effective instrument of unity.’

While the members of the Empire shared other constitutional connections, it was the Crown

that was the most readily identifiable. The Dominions, by their collective loyalty to the

sovereign, shared a relationship that had an ‘international personality’ but was not totally

independent.39 The Crown, through its figurative power, made credible Commonwealth

nations’ claim to inhabit an exclusive space in global politics that at once gave them

autonomy and coherence as a voting bloc. The Crown’s authority was also consistent across

37 Ibid. 38 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 21-22. 39 William Gummow, “The Australian Constitution and the End of Empire - a Century of Legal History,” Law in Context, 33, no. 1 (2015): 79.

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the Dominions. While self-government within an empire necessitated compromise and

change in constitutional relations, respect for the sovereign remained a constant in Latham’s

historical reading.40

Alongside common allegiance to the King, the doctrine of inter se (Latin for among

or between themselves) united Great Britain and the Dominions in Latham’s eyes. Lorna

Lloyd makes clear what inter se meant to sovereign Commonwealth nations: ‘[b]y virtue of their shared loyalty to The King, they [the Dominions] enjoyed a special relationship that was not international and was not governed by international law.’41 The lynchpin role of the

Crown in defining intra-Dominion relations, a point of difference to relations between

foreign states, was central to Latham’s configuration of Commonwealth and Empire. He

realised this arrangement could be disrupted by growing nationalism in the Dominions. Other

imperial policy-makers pondered the precariousness of the Crown as a head of state after

1926. Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leopold Amery, warned that ‘one fatal heresy to

guard against is the idea that there are many different Crowns or that the King is King in

different parts of the Empire in different senses.’42 Following on from Amery, Latham was

concerned about the military implications for the British Empire. He feared that the prospect

of divisibility of the Crown could mean the Dominions would not declare war in unison

against an aggressor.43 Such a failure would not only expose the inherent weakness of

imperial ties after 1926, it would point to the emergence of independent foreign policies

amongst the Dominions.44

40 Ibid., 22-23. 41 Lorna Lloyd, “Loosening the Apron Strings: The Dominions and Britain in The Interwar Years,” Round Table 92, no. 369 (2003): 283. 42 Amery to Low, letter, 29 November 1926, quoted in Robert F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1981), 60. 43 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 16. 44 Lloyd, “Loosening the Apron Strings,” 285.

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With the Dominions rising as distinct bodies politic in the interwar period, the

primacy of the head of state (the governor-general) and his elected representatives was

paramount for Latham. This primacy was explicit in his book. As the Crown could only act

on the advice given by his or her ministries in the United Kingdom and the Dominions (this

was especially so after 1926), Latham warned, ‘[t]he unity of the Crown cannot be

maintained if one Ministry within the Empire gives advice to the King which is really

inconsistent with that given by another Ministry.’45 Echoing earlier discussions at the

Boobooks’ dinner table, Latham saw the future of the British Empire and Australia’s security was bound-up in avoiding such inconsistencies. Effectively, he believed that difficulties could only be circumvented if Buckingham Palace’s appointed representatives in the

Dominions were the ‘right kind of men’ recommended by ministers who shared Latham’s commitment to imperial unity. Scullin’s nomination of Isaacs for this vital office did not meet the fundamental prerequisites laid down in Australia and the British Commonwealth.

Limited reforms to governor-general’s powers

However, as expressed in his book, Latham was not wholly opposed to reforming aspects of the governor-general’s powers with the aim of enhancing local sovereignty. ‘The Dominions are now well equipped with experience in government,’ he wrote.46 In this light, he

supported giving Australia total control of local affairs to boost Australians’ sense of

obligation for the welfare of the British Empire. With respect to the office of the governor-

general, he was seeking to achieve a delicate balance between local sovereignty and imperial

vitality. A case in point was Australia and the British Commonwealth’s handling of the

45 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 27. 46 Ibid., 16.

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Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 and the various navigation acts of the Commonwealth; acts that

constitutionally required the governor-general’s intervention.

Alongside a range of provisions relating to the crewing of and the life aboard trade ships, the Merchant Shipping and Navigation Act 1894 was imperial legislation that permitted registered vessels throughout the Empire ‘the right to use the British flag or assume the British national character.’47 Accordingly, many sections and processes applied wholesale

to ‘His Majesty’s Dominions and to all places where His Majesty has jurisdiction.’48 Writing

in 1932, Berriedale Keith recognised that the Merchant Shipping Act helped lend the

Dominions a British complexion.49 While Latham agreed, he thought Australians—in the interests of supporting imperial vivacity—could exercise sole responsibility for the laws as far as they applied to Australia’s territorial waters. In the course of a long August 1930 parliamentary speech that highlighted the complexity and archaic nature of these laws,

Latham declared ‘that the provisions in that act [Merchant Shipping and Navigation] should be altered.’50 He viewed this legislation as an example where the local law of Dominions, rather than being subordinate to the Crown’s orders via the governor-general, could be greatly expanded to ‘secure healthy activity’ across the Empire.51

Further, Latham believed that under existing arrangements the Commonwealth

commanded strong bargaining positions in situations that demanded the governor-general’s

intervention. Some realities were ignored in forming this position. He challenged the

47 Ibid., 99. 48 The British Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Vic.), s. 91, www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/db_2237/19870112- 2780/pdf/db_2237.pdf. 49 Arthur Berriedale Keith, “Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 14, no. 1 (1932): 102. 50 Australia, HOR, Debates, 1 August 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19300801_reps_12_126/. 51 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 16. See also: Australia, HOR, Debates, 17 July 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310717_reps_12_131/.

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suggestion that governors-general known to British ministers would interfere in

Commonwealth legislation. He claimed that ‘any attempt’ by London to meddle in Australian

affairs without prior consultation with Canberra ‘would be strongly contested by all classes

of opinion.’52 He reached this conclusion despite the outcomes of the 1926 Imperial

Conference not expressly forbidding the King from obtaining advice of his ministers in

Whitehall.53 Rather, Latham suggested ‘great weight would be attributed to the views’ of the

Australian government of the day.54 While this line of argument was not based in constitutional literalism—the UK would not lose its power to legislate for Australian states until the Australia Act was passed in 198655—it did follow the pattern of de facto inter- imperial consultancy that had been established since 1923.56 The great store Latham put in the assurances of British political leaders was in keeping with his general demeanour on these issues: rigid legal structures were not suited to the temperament of the Empire.

Renowned for his statecraft, Latham would also have been aware that Australia’s influence over imperial policy would be lessened if Britain was formally shut out of the Dominions.57

Such an outcome would have endangered his vision of an egalitarian union of British settler

societies.

Alongside stifling any inquiry into the King’s privileged constitutional position, in his

book Latham glossed over the debates and controversies the governor-generalship had

attracted since Federation. ‘In Australia,’ he argued, ‘the position of the Governor-General

had never been doubtful.’ Latham went further, claiming ‘[i]t has never been suggested in

Australia that the Governor-General was the representative or agent of the Government of the

52 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 36-37. 53 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, 247. 54 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 36-37. 55 Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986; “Independence Day,” 2-3. 56 Lloyd, “Loosening the Apron Strings,” 281. 57 Cotton, “Realism, Rationalism, Race,” 631.

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day in Great Britain.’58 This was a selective reading of history. The Bulletin, known for its

nationalist, republican, and working-class views, had been a persistent opponent of the office

since the first governor-general of Australia had been sworn-in in 1901.59 Latham’s blinkered view of the past underpinned his challenge to Scullin’s disruption of governor-general procedures. By ignoring the problems associated with the Crown’s representative, Latham was not only able to later paint Labor’s position and manoeuvrings as radical, he was also in a better position to argue that governors-general were part of the ‘machinery’ that maintained imperial cohesion:

But in order to maintain any form of unity, whether in an Empire or in any other organisation, something more than devotion to a general principle is necessary. There must be some degree of common interest and there must be machinery which provides means for consultation in order to provide opportunities for reconciling differences of opinion.60

To put it another way, the British Empire was an integrated structure that demanded more than sentiment to remain standing. In this model, the governors-general formed an essential

pillar. To compromise that office was to imperil the whole structure.

The ‘right kind’ of Australian for governor-general

Australia and the British Commonwealth was written in a world where the authority of

monarchical European empires had been radically reduced. Latham demanded the findings of

the 1926 Imperial Conference to be enacted slowly and by the hands of a responsible

political party. His concern was amplified by the ousting of his government at the 1929 federal election when Prime Minister Bruce lost his seat in the landslide.61 According to

58 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 36-37 59 Peter Spearritt, Sydney’s Century: A History (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2000), 2. 60 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 20. 61 Bruce had called a snap election over seeking the states surrender their authority in industrial matters. David Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce: Australian Internationalist (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 77-92.

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Latham’s preconceptions, the nomination of an Australian to the office of governor-general was inadvisable, and the PM’s unilateral approach to King George V was particularly insensitive and ill considered. On the floor of the Lower House on 1 August 1930, Latham

argued:

I am content with a system that works successfully - a system that does not in practice, whatever it may do in theory, infringe our rights of self- government, but allows us the fullest opportunity for determining our national policy having due regard to our responsibilities.62

Scullin and his Cabinet’s machinations on the governor-generalship had disregarded those

responsibilities at a tense time in the Australian-British relationship. Latham expressed this

view clearly to the newspaper press in late-April 1930. Putting aside other challenges to the

prime minister’s proposal, he stated that ‘[t]he question is whether it is wise or right to

change, particularly at the present time [author’s emphasis], the relations now existing

between the Empire and the Commonwealth.’63 Such was the seriousness of the matter that if

the Labor federal government continued to insist on its position, he threatened that he would

undo all changes to the governor-general’s office if his party, the Nationals, formed

government at the next election.64 This threat was extraordinary given that, according to

Scullin’s biographer, ‘there was much mutual respect between the two men [Latham and

Scullin], who readily attained that modicum of harmony essential to Parliament’s proper running.’65

The interdependence of nation and empire in Latham’s configuration of imperial relations required a careful balance, and the growing authority of the federal government at

62 Australia, HOR, Debates, 1 August 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19300801_reps_12_126/. 63 “Governor-General. Proposed Appointment of Australian. ‘Unfriendly Gesture.’ Mr. Latham's Warning,” SMH, 25 April 1930, p. 9. 64 Ibid, p. 9. 65 Robertson, J.H. Scullin, 191.

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the expense of the judiciary focused his attention on the precariousness of this balance. In a

high-profile 1920 case, the High Court reached a verdict that reaffirmed the primacy of

parliamentary government. Judicial oversight of the Constitution and Parliament had been

curbed because of the landmark hearing in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide

Steamship Co Ltd, which swept away many of the protections against federal legislative

creep.66 What Engineers meant for the indivisibility of the Crown in Latham’s mind was

‘simply unfathomable.’67 While the governor-general needed to exercise his powers in accordance with the advice of government ministers, Latham emphasised the words

‘according to his discretion’ in the Commonwealth Constitution. The governor-general’s discretion might be required when ‘exceptional cases’ arose, particularly in the matter of a parliament being dissolved.68 What he was hinting at here is that a situation may arise where

a radical, anti-imperialist political party with enhanced legislative capacity might gain

ascendancy and jeopardise Australia’s imperial linkages.

Placed within this imperial frame, the manner of the governor-general’s selection was the main issue for Latham, not the country of their birth. In late-April 1930, the national press broke the story to the public that Sir Isaac Isaacs had been recommended by the

Australian government for governor-general before any official announcement was made.

Both the Scullin Cabinet and the Colonial Office in London refused to clarify these rumours, although official circles in England were said to be ‘perturbed’ by news of these developments.69 Latham responded immediately to the rumoured recommendation. He said

66 Anthony Mason, “High Court of Australia: A Personal Impression of its first 100 years,” Melbourne University Law Review 27, no. 3 (2003): 873–74; Haig Patapan, “The Politics of Interpretation,” Sydney Law Review 22, no. 247 (2000): 253. 67 Keven Booker and Arthur Glass, “The Engineers Case,” in Australian Constitutional Landmarks, ed. H.P. Lee and George Winterton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 53. 68 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 65-66. 69 “Next Governor-General Sir Isaac Isaacs. Rumored Recommendation,” Chronicle (Adelaide), 1 May 1930, p. 54.

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the nomination of Isaacs raised ‘a question of profound importance to the future of the

Commonwealth.’70 In theory, Latham did not oppose the selection of an Australian for the

role,71 and believed a suitably esteemed and politically neutral candidate could be found

locally. He reasoned that a person could harbour both nationalist and imperialist loyalties.

Indeed, he thought the ‘view that one cannot be a loyal Australian without being either anti-

British or at least suspicious of the connection with Great Britain’ was ‘rather childish.’72 His comments, widely reprinted in the major metropolitan newspapers, reveal that he did not share precisely the same concerns as George V about Isaacs’ nomination.73 Rather, an

Australian-born governor-general could transcend local politics. The preservation of the

imperial link was dependent on the governor-general being personally acquainted with, and

supported by, the reigning monarch.

During a debate on the Crown and the Constitution on 5 December 1930, Latham

denied that he or the opposition had suggested ‘an Australian [governor-general] is

considered not good enough for Australia.’ Any other position would have run counter to his

worldview that the Dominions, without heavy-handedness from London, could act with one

voice and with the best interests of the British Empire in mind.74 Generally, other opponents

of Isaacs’ appointment also claimed that their disagreement was not a personal slight against

the man or his country of birth.75 Zelman Cowen observed that Latham ‘did not like Isaacs

personally.’76 Nonetheless, as Chief Justice of the High Court (1935-1952) he paid

70 “Governor-General. Proposed Appointment of Australian. ‘Unfriendly Gesture.’ Mr. Latham's Warning,” SMH, 25 April 1930, p. 9. 71 Rubinstein, “A gross discourtesy to His Majesty,” 441-42. 72 “Governor-Generalship. Reported Recommendation. Mr. Latham Trenchant,” The Argus, 25 April 1930, p. 7. 73 Ibid., p. 7. 74 Australia, HOR, Debates, 5 December 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19301205_reps_12_127/. 75 Cowen, Isaac Isaacs, 191-93. However, Michael Kirby doubts the sincerity of Isaacs’ opponents here. Michael Kirby, “Sir Isaac Isaacs — A Sesquicentenary Reflection,” Melbourne University Law Review 29 (2005): 898. 76 Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers, 19. Latham also lunched with the Governor-General on 5 March 1931. He did not report on the meeting. Latham to B.A. Levinson, letter, 5 March 1931, MS 1009/1/2107, NLA.

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‘appropriate’ tribute to Isaacs at the time of his death in 1948 (although, mention of the

deceased’s time as governor-general was noticeably absent from Latham’s speech).77

Attacking Labor disloyalty

Instead of targeting Isaacs’ character—some critics did point to his Jewish heritage78—

Latham decided on a strategy to criticse the party responsible for his nomination: Scullin and

his ministry. He accused Labor of abject disloyalty. Reports that Labor had essentially

delivered a fait accompli to the King by nominating only Isaacs fitted neatly into the popular

narrative that Labor lacked imperial enthusiasm. The perception that the Labor Party was

placing the interests of Australia above and beyond that of the British Empire was cause for

Latham to unequivocally state his objections. He publicly reproached Labor ministers,

claiming they ‘never possessed any real enthusiasm for the British Empire or for Great

Britain.’ Further, the politicians who sat on the government benches have ‘for many years’

been driven by characteristically ‘strident and narrow Australian jingoism.’79 Latham’s

disaggregation here of the Empire and Britain is telling about his conceptualisation of

Australian nationalism: The Empire was far more than Great Britain; it was all its constituent

parts. Scullin’s ministry was undermining imperial unity.80

On 3 December 1930, the Acting Prime Minister put Isaacs’ appointment as governor- general on record in the House of Representatives. Latham, as Leader of the Opposition, was

77 Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers, 19. 78 Rubinstein, “A gross discourtesy to His Majesty,” 445-46. 79 “Governor-General. Proposed Appointment of Australian. ‘Unfriendly Gesture.’ Mr. Latham's Warning,” SMH, 25 April 1930, p. 9. 80 Generally, Labor and non-Labor politicians were relatively harmonious in their imperial enthusiasm. The most divisive rift was on trade policy, particularly trade preferences to Britain, and the other Dominions and colonies. E.H.H. Green, “The Political Economy of Empire, 1880-1914,” The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 364.

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asked later that day by reporters whether he had anything to say in response. He responded, ‘I

think it is better to make no comment.’81 He did not show restraint for long. Two days later,

he availed himself of the ‘opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the Opposition.’82 He

said the Scullin Government’s fait accompli constituted ‘a distinct and most important

change in procedure.’ Clearly, Labor had misled Australians in to believing George V had

made the appointment based on the prime minister’s recommendation. He argued the King

had been unable to exercise discretion in the appointment. Apart from making a break from

historical precedent, this new development was unsupported by the nation’s constitution.

Latham developed the argument presented in his book further. Inferring that the findings of

the 1926 Imperial Conference needed to be submitted to a referendum or referenda before

they were considered law, he said that the Commonwealth Constitution made ‘no reference to

any advice’ being given to the monarch by the executive of the Commonwealth. Delving

deeper, he pointed specifically to Section 62 of the Constitution and its limiting effect on the

government’s capacity to advise the sovereign.83 The governor-general could be counselled

but not the monarch directly. ‘There is,’ he continued, ‘no warrant in the Constitution for the

practice that has been adopted in this case.’84

According to The Times, the ‘intensification of feeling’ in Australia around the

governor-general problem may have explained Scullin’s decision to release a statement

directly in response to Latham:

What kind of an Australian is Mr Latham when even the rumour that an Australian citizen may be chosen as the King’s representative puts him

81 “Governor-General. Sir Isaac Isaacs. Five Years' Appointment,” The Argus, 4 December 1930, p. 7. 82 Australia, HOR, Debates, 5 December 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19301205_reps_12_127/. 83 Section 62 addresses the executive branch of the federal government, and contains the provisions for the Federal Executive Council to advise the governor-general. Parliament of Australia, “Chapter II: The Executive Government,” 31 May 2013, accessed 21 August 2018, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution/. 84 Ibid.

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into a frenzy? What a weird conception of the Empire Mr. Latham … must have when he suggest [sic] that the appointment of an Australian to this high office would weaken the ties of Empire!85

In reply, the Leader of the Opposition reiterated the argument laid down in Australia and the

British Commonwealth. He said that the Commonwealth Constitution made the governor- general the representative of the King, whereas in this case the appointee was the nominee of

Scullin and not of the sovereign.86 Under these circumstances, the choice of Isaacs as governor-general was illegitimate. Isaacs could not be regarded as the King’s agent and, in turn, the links of Empire would suffer. Incensed, he claimed the appointment was an affront to Australian sentiment, did not confer the least benefit to Australia, and weakened imperial bonds.87 In a nod to his conception that the ‘atmosphere’ of imperial relations was important, he added the appointment of Isaacs was a departure from the consultative, non-binding spirit

of the 1926 Imperial Conference and its findings.88

Who occupied the seat of governor-general and the means of how they got there roused interest in the wealthy and conservative constituency of Latham’s Kooyong electorate, but in most parts of the country there was little interest.89 The organisations of the

social elites in Melbourne took special notice.90 The Round Table worked to scuttle Scullin’s

campaign to have Isaacs installed as governor-general. Harrison Moore who, like Latham,

embodied the cohesion of Australian elites in this period, wrote contemptuously of Isaacs in a

letter to London-based Round Tablers. He reported how Isaacs was referred to as the ‘Jew-G’

(in reference to Isaacs’ Jewish heritage) in some official circles instead of the more usual and

85 “Governorship of the Dominions. An Australian Innovation,” The Times Weekly Edition, 1 May 1930, cutting in MS 1736/17/9, NLA. 86 Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers, 19. 87 Ibid, 19. 88 “Governor-General of Australia. Further Criticisms of Procedure,” The Times, 5 December 1930, p. 13. 89 Foster, High Hopes, 98. 90 Rubinstein, “A gross discourtesy to His Majesty,” 425-58.

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accepted appellation, ‘G-G.’91 Isaacs’ appointment also caused a furore amongst the

members of the Boobooks dining club. They described the Scullin Ministry as ‘the same old

government by the underworld.’92 Members who made their dissent known on constitutional

grounds included Kenneth Bailey and Wilfred Fullagar.93

In 1929, Moore, an esteemed member of the Boobooks, was a member of the small

Australian delegation to that year’s conference on Dominion legislation in London. At the conference, he challenged the Irish Free State and Canadian delegations’ suggestions to leave the position of the Crown in the Dominions up to the Dominion parliaments concerned.

Moore feared this could lead to succession from the British Empire.94 Ultimately, Moore precluded any Australian commitment to the resolutions of the conference, telling the

Australian Press Association that constitutional decisions were for the realm of the Dominion parliaments.95 In Latham and Moore, the Boobooks dining club had two political leaders

working to prevent challenges to the British monarch’s position in Australia.

Coordination with loyal societies

Latham was a notable figure among in the Empire societies in Victoria. The Victorian chapter of the Royal Empire Society claimed 350 members, and ‘proved the most aggressive and

visible’ of the crusading societies.96 In the midst of the governor-general crisis in May 1930,

Latham attended the Royal Empire Society’s Empire Day dinner in Sydney.97 Amongst the

91 Foster, High Hopes, 60, 90. 92 Minutes of 267th Meeting, 15 November 1929, Boobooks/2/15, UMA. 93 Tony Blackshield, “The Isaacs Court,” in The High Court, the Constitution and Australian Politics, ed. Rosalind Dixon and George Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 137. 94 Donal K. Coffey, “‘The Right to Shoot Himself’: Secession in the British Commonwealth of Nations,” The Journal of Legal History 39, no. 2 (2018): 120. 95 “Imperial Conference. Technical Preliminaries,” The Examiner, 7 October 1929, p. 8. 96 Rubinstein, “A Gross discourtesy to His Majesty,” 430. 97 “Personal,” SMH, 24 May 1930, p. 14.

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senior leadership of the Empire societies in Australia, Sir John Symon was a particularly

strong supporter of Latham’s attitude and press statements.98 Symon was a leading voice in

Australia’s British Empire advocacy movement. In 1897 he had presented a ‘long

remembered’ two-hour speech to a crowded Adelaide Town Hall on Queen Victoria’s

diamond jubilee and, from 1917, was vice-president of the Royal Empire Society and of the

Anglo-Saxon Club.99

On 25 April 1930, Symon telegrammed Latham his concern at the Scullin

Government’s ‘humiliating proposals.’100 Symon objected because Isaacs’ nomination ran

counter ‘to the letter and spirit of Constitution’ and lacked ‘courtesy to His Majesty and the

Imperial Government.’ Buoyed by support from a respected ally, Latham telegrammed his

gratitude the following day. He agreed with Symon that further discussions were needed

before a ‘new system’ was in place.101 Later, he thanked Symon for his ‘active public

spirit.’102 On 8 September 1930, Symon wrote to Latham again. He had read in that day’s

newspapers that his recipient was due to be in Adelaide on the 19th of that month, and

enquired whether they could chat about ‘Commonwealth and other affairs’ over a ‘quiet’

lunch.103 Latham was likewise eager to see his compatriot imperial crusader.104 Whether the

two men met in South Australia’s capital is not revealed in the archival record (nor is the

nature of their discussion, if they did meet). No grand scheme appeared to have been hatched

beyond keeping each other abreast of new developments and facilitating the supply of

98 Symon wrote that he ‘strongly’ supported Latham’s utterances on the governor-general controversy. “J.H. Symon to J.G. Latham – Leader of Commonwealth Opposition Melbourne,” typescript, MS 1736/19/3, NLA. 99 Don Wright, “Symon, Sir Josiah Henry (1846-1934),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/symon-sir-josiah-henry-8734, published first in hardcopy 1990. 100 See, for example: “Mr. Latham Combats Proposal,” Chronicle, 1 May 1930, p. 54. 101 Latham to J.H. Symon, telegram, 26 April 1930, MS 1736/17/1, NLA. 102 Latham to Symon, letter, MS 1736/17/59, NLA. 103 Symon to Latham, letter, 8 September 1930, MS 1736/17/18, NLA. 104 Latham to Symon, letter, 13 September 1930, MS 1736/17/19, NLA.

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constitutional arguments against Isaacs’ appointment to other loyalist crusaders in the legal fraternity.105

Once Isaacs was sworn in in late-January 1931, Latham admitted defeat. He

continued to regard Isaacs as an illegitimate governor-general—some of his colleagues

refused the governor-general’s invitations106—but considered there were few options to

challenge the government’s reliance ‘upon the appointment as “un fait accompli.”’ He

confided in Symon:

I do not see how the appointment can be challenged until in the Courts someone disputes the validity of some legislative or administrative act in which the Governor General has taken part.107

Even after the dust over Isaacs’ nomination had settled in 1932, Symon continued to press his

case to Latham, who was by now Attorney-General and Deputy Prime Minister in the United

Australia Party federal government. Latham, then en route to London and Geneva, received

Symon’s letter dated 24 February. The venomous tone of the debates that had raged less than

two years earlier still resonated:

Perhaps … you may have an opportunity which I daresay you will avail yourself of, of ascertaining the view of public men of light and leading in England as to the unholy circumstances and methods of the appointment of our Governor General who should I think be recalled and the old and constitutional order flouted by Scullin and his government restored.108

Latham heeded Symon’s advice. The manner of appointing a governor-general was raised during Latham’s ‘long confidential interview’ with the Secretary of State for Dominion

105 Latham sent on one of Symon’s letters to an important Australian thinker in constitutional matters, Sir Edward Mitchell. He also encouraged Symon to contact Sir James Barrett, who he described as ‘the moving spirit’ of the Empire societies in Australia. Latham to Symon, letter, 16 January 1931, MS 1736/17/93, NLA. 106 Henry Gullett, Minister for Trade and Customs, to Symon, letter, 3 March 1932, MS 1736/17/253. 107 Latham to Symon, letter, 4 February 1931, MS 1736/17/145, NLA. 108 Symon to Latham, letter, 24 February 1932, MS 1009/1/2278, NLA.

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Affairs, James Henry Thomas on 23 May 1932. Latham relayed the discussion to Prime

Minister Lyons:

I discussed the subject of the method of appointment and the qualifications required for the effective performance of the duties of the office. I said that our Government would prefer a return to the former method of appointment, so that the person chosen would be regarded as being, and would really be, the personal representative of His Majesty, The King, it being understood of course that the appointment must be acceptable to the Commonwealth Government. Mr. Thomas said that he was very glad indeed to hear this view and said that he would not dream of doing anything towards appointing a person not acceptable to the Commonwealth Government.109

Latham had simultaneously restored the Crown’s voice in the selection of the governor- general and asserted that Australia must continue to have a say in the appointment. This was the embodiment of two-way, multichannel communication that Latham advanced as a model for inter-imperial relations. Though Latham was not in office at the time, in 1936 the British

Army officer and former Governor of South Australia and New South Wales, Lord Gowrie, was named Isaacs’ successor as Governor-General of Australia. Gowrie served in the role for nearly a decade.

Conclusion

By 1930, Latham grew more and more perturbed by the ways the Australian-British relationship was evolving. While the prospect of change did not shake him, he nonetheless desired that change be managed in consultation with Great Britain and the other Dominions rather than unilaterally. It appeared to imperial thinkers favoured by Latham that the Empire depended on mechanisms and symbols of the Crown’s indivisibility remaining largely intact.

Questions around the Crown’s representative in Australia struck at the very essence of

109 Latham to Lyons, letter, 23 May 1932, MS 1009/52/75, NLA.

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Australia’s imperial identity. In his Australia and the British Commonwealth, Latham laid the

foundations for his arguments to retain existing executive arrangements despite the new

allowances afforded by the 1926 Balfour Declaration. The prestige of the Crown provided

symbolic and instrumental bonds of Empire. While constitutional inscriptions of the King’s

disallowance and reservation powers were effectively rendered dead letters by the withdrawal

of imperial authority in 1926,110 Latham remained insistent on the primacy of the

Commonwealth Constitution. And while he opposed Canberra’s bid to assert greater

determination in the selection of the Crown’s representative in Australia, he supported in

principle limited changes to the governor-general’s authority over certain domestic

legislation. He wagered that enhanced Australian responsibility for domestic policy that had

imperial significance would enhance Australians' sense of responsibility for the whole

Empire. British imperialism could not continue to exist unless its ideals and institutions were

honoured at home in the Dominions.

When James Scullin and the Labor Party challenged the Crown’s indivisibility by

nominating the Australian-born Isaac Isaacs for governor-general, Latham protested on the

ground that King George V’s authority was being curtailed. Although he believed elite male

Australians of appropriate (imperial) education had a lot to offer to the office, he was

affronted by the way Scullin had gone about the nomination. Latham subsequently rushed to

the front of the imperialist vanguard in Australia in 1930-1931. He expressed his opposition

in the House of Representatives and in interviews for newspapers, and consorted with

friendly organisations, notably the Royal Empire Society. While his efforts were in vain, his

propositions were nonetheless congruent with his schema for a form of ‘organic’ British

Empire in the post-First World War, post-Balfour Declaration world. That is, the self- governing Dominions and the United Kingdom could use the mechanisms of shared

110 Gummow, “The Australian Constitution and the End of Empire,” 80.

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institutions (particularly the Crown), imperial conferences, and a common sense of

responsibility to unify the British Empire in the face of rising nationalisms and declining self-

assuredness amongst the European imperial powers. This framework was supported and

nurtured by organisations of the establishment in Melbourne that were interconnected with

the Latham circle. His words and actions proved that Australia’s conservative powerbrokers were not prepared to surrender the ‘ties which bind Australia to the Empire’ without a fight.111 A more serious fight soon emerged for them, made more severe by the worsening

Great Depression: the spectre of John Thomas Lang and the Labor Party in New South

Wales.

111 “Political Argument. Mr. Scullin and Mr. Latham,” The West Australian (Perth), 26 April 1930, p. 12.

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Chapter V ‘Heaven save us from Russia!’ Combating Lang, communism, and disloyalty, 1931-1932

However many rounds the contest lasted the Federal Government would fight to the end against Langism,

which was nothing short of Sovietization.’1

Introduction

Like most conservatives, Sir John Latham was alarmed by communist, socialist and anti-

British politics in early-1930s’ Australia—movements invigorated by the Great Depression.

His alarm was compounded by events in 1931 that loosened the British apron strings locally,

namely the ascension of the first Australian-born governor-general, and the reorganisation and reclassification of inter-imperial ties embodied in the Statute of Westminster, which passed the United Kingdom parliament. While the public barely considered these twin developments, in Latham’s mind they were pregnant with significance. His campaigns to arouse interest in imperial topics in Australia up until now represented his conviction that the

Empire could only survive if it was bound by sentiment in the Dominions. Political

ideologies like socialism threatened imperial loyalty. Hence his anxiety about Lang Labor in

New South Wales. He suspected the socialist-inspired policies of ‘Jack’ Lang’s state Labor

government imperilled the Australian-British relationship. The Labor Premier was a

harbinger of an impending collapse of imperial fervour and cooperation with London. These

suspicions led to his brief dalliance with the New Guard and the Old Guard, the most

prominent conservative paramilitary organisations in interwar NSW. Both organisations

shared Latham’s interest in signs of perfidy amongst local Labor politicians, labour

1 Latham quoted in Argus, 11 April 1932, p. 7, cited in Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers, 24.

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movements, radicals, and the Russian community. In some ways, the Old and New Guards

drew his sympathies because they were loyal to British imperialism.2

Latham sought to adapt only select elements of fascism that he felt were useful for

British imperialism. This chapter challenges the conclusion that Latham was a fellow traveller of fascism and Japanese militarism.3 His limited brand of enthusiasm for fascist thought was a reaction to the rise of anti-democratic political ideologies in Europe and the threat subsequently posed to the hegemony of democratic world powers; it was not born out of ideological conviction for fascism or its offshoots. His unwavering conviction in

Westminster and British institutions meant he never contemplated an authoritarian dictatorship for Australia. However, he extolled certain fascist virtues to bolster the nation and the Empire against ‘Langism’ and communism, in the process overlooking the violent and unethical excesses of European fascism in all its guises. He maintained that fascism’s sole utility was to be found in the ideology’s capacity to inspire British race patriotism and selflessness amongst the general populace that, in turn, would boost the security and stability of Australia and the British Empire.

This chapter traces the development of Latham’s opposition to domestic and international communism and socialism. Latham’s anti-communism played a decisive role in

2 Australia’s conservative and reactionary paramilitary organisations of the early-1930s are conventionally painted as fascist, proto-fascist, or fascist in inspiration. Yet, the movements’ imperial patriotism meant they failed to embrace the revolutionary intent of fascism. In short, a ‘fascist turn’ eluded these right-wing movements at their height in all but the ideology’s militaristic paraphernalia. Loyalty to the British monarchy was an unshakeable theme. For revisionist analysis, see: Baron Alder, “The ideology of the New Guard Movement,” Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 82, no. 2 (1996): 192; Mathew Cunningham, “Australian Fascism? A Revisionist Analysis of the Ideology of the New Guard,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 13, no. 3 (2012): 375-93; James Saleam, “The Other Radicalism: An Inquiry into Contemporary Australian Extreme Right Ideology, Politics and Organization 1975–1995” (PhD diss., University of Sydney, 1999), 30– 32. 3 Andrews, Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia, 215; Shane Cahill, “This Fascist Mob,” Overland, no. 189 (2007): 56-61.Drew Cottle, The Brisbane Line: A Reappraisal (Leicestershire: Upfront Publishing, 2002); Rupert Lockwood, War on the Waterfront: Menzies, Japan and the Pig-Iron Dispute (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1987); Andrew Moore, The Right Road: A History of Right-wing Politics in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press Australia, 1995).

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Australia’s national and international affairs, matured on a home front gripped by conviction

that dissent and suspected sabotage warranted a state of national emergency, and later

heightened during the economic panic of the early-1930s. According to his worldview, international communism and the local variety intertwined at both an ideological and practical level through Moscow’s Third International. Opposition to Bolshevism and keeping relations with Soviet Russia ‘at a distance’ were consistent themes of his outlook on world affairs, as they were for ‘[a]ll of Australia’s conservative and liberal politicians.’4 Latham’s fears about Moscow and communism reinforced his views about Australia’s place within the

British Empire and decisively justified his intervention in interwar NSW politics in the

interests of Australia’s imperial links.

Langism looms large

In 1931, Latham as Federal Leader of the Opposition reacted to what he perceived were

Premier Lang’s attempts to incite left-wing revolution. Lang Labor’s contemplation of the socialisation of industry at the behest of Socialisation Units embedded in the NSW Labor

Party,5 and the Premier’s defiance of Acts by the Commonwealth that demanded the recovery of its debts,6 constituted sedition in the minds of Lang’s conservative critics.7

Although Latham and Lang had their seats in different states and operated at separate levels of politics, an intense rivalry developed between the two men. To a packed hall at

Paddington in March 1931, Lang rejoiced in pointing out inconsistencies between Latham’s

4 Christopher Waters, Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the Origins of World War II (London: I.B. Taurus, 2012), 164. 5 Michael Hogan, Labor Pains. Early Conference and Executive Reports of the Labor Party of NSW. Volume 5 (1926-39) (Sydney: Department of Government and International Relations, 2011), 4-5. 6 John Manning Ward, “The Dismissal,” in Jack Lang, ed. Heather Radi and Peter Spearritt (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1977), 165-67. 7 Alder, “The Ideology of the New Guard Movement,” 192.

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publicly-stated position on repaying ‘every penny on her [Australia’s] interest upon the due

date’ with the Nationalist position of funding ‘only a certain portion of our [Australia]

interest payments.’8

Latham had cause to attack the Premier on interest rates. In late March, Lang

telegrammed the Prime Minister to advise the High Commissioner in London ‘that New

South Wales does not intend to meet the interest payable to the Westminster Bank on April

1.’ Latham was aghast. He saw it as national and international crisis, declaring it ‘a black day

for Australia’ that ‘involves the whole of Australia in discredit and disgrace.’9 Latham’s long

association with ideas and movements that positioned the welfare of the state, both imperial

and national, above the individual also weighed on his perception that the Premier and his

followers brought out ‘cupidity’ in Australia.10

Later, Lang’s decision to release the confidential names of holders of NSW inscribed

stock at the 1931 Premiers’ Conference further rankled Latham, who viewed it as an

unjustifiable attack on the patrician class that could be the harbinger of ‘some sinister

design’ from federal Labor.11 Lang Labor appeared to portend grave things far beyond the

borders of NSW. As will be seen in Chapter VI, Australia’s financial standing in London

constituted one of Latham’s special concerns in this period.12

8 “Mr. Lang's Speech,” SMH, 4 March 1931, p. 14. 9 “Mr Scullin’s Speech,” SMH, 27 May 1931, p. 11. 10 “Mr. Latham's View,” SMH, 27 October 1930, p. 10. 11 Australia, HOR, Debates, 15 July 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310715_reps_12_131/. With its scant majority in the Lower House, the Scullin Government relied on the support of a number of MPs in its own ranks ideologically and factionally aligned with Lang. Bede Nairn, The ‘Big Fella:’ Jack Lang and the Australian Labor Party, 1891-1949 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995), 236-53. 12 Alongside targeting Lang in NSW, Latham also pursued the personal finances of the Federal Treasurer, Edward Theodore. Latham’s line of attack concerned Theodore’s alleged financial impropriety as Queensland Premier. Latham’s dogged pursuit of the issue contributed to Joseph Lyons’ decision to quit the Labor Party in 1931. Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, 1929-1949 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1963), 6.

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The eponymous financial plan Lang adopted from early-1931 especially constituted a

national and international issue for Latham. The state government’s resistance to the

spending cuts required by the Bank of England’s visiting representative Sir Otto Niemeyer in

1930, and the subsequent defaulting on the interest repayments on British loans,13 were

considered onerous for foreign, particularly British, investment.14 The Premier’s attack on

Niemeyer’s recommendations were formalised in the three-prong Lang Plan, which was unveiled in February 1931:

That the Governments of Australia decide to pay no further interest to British bondholders until Britain has dealt with the Australian overseas debts in the same manner as she settled her own foreign debt with America.

That in Australia all interest on all Government borrowings be reduced to 3 per cent. That immediate steps be taken by the Commonwealth Government to abandon the gold standard of currency, and set up in its place a currency based upon the wealth of Australia, to be termed the goods standard.15

As Lang’s biographer explained, ‘[t]he first head of the Plan was immediately labelled

repudiation of solemn contracts with the Mother Country.’16 Latham thought the Plan

tantamount to treason. Leader of the Opposition at the time of Niemeyer’s tour, he was

personally acquainted with the British banker,17 defending him against criticism in the House

of Representatives:

Is there any rule of Parliament which prevents an honorable member from using his position in this House to attack the guests of the Commonwealth and private persons, or is it merely a matter of taste?18

13 Kirk, “’Australians for Australia,’” 94; Kosmas Tsokhas, “Sir Otto Niemeyer, the Bankrupt State and the Federal System,” Australian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1 (1995): 18-38. 14 Geoffrey Robinson, “The All For Australia League in New South Wales,” Australian Historical Studies 39, no. 1 (2008): 43. 15 "Mr. Lang's Plan," SMH, 10 February 1931, p. 9. 16 Nairn, The ‘Big Fella,’ 224. 17 “Sir Otto Niemeyer. Lunch at Parliament House,” SMH, 2 August 1930, p. 14. 18 Australia, HOR, Debates, 14 November 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19301114_reps_12_127/.

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With regard to the Lang Plan, Latham warned on 25 February 1931 ‘[i]f they [NSW]

dishonoured their promises to the British investors, could they expect Great Britain to buy

from them? Could they expect preferences to be maintained?’ In this same speech to Sydney-

siders at King’s Hall, and in language reminiscent of his fight against Scullin installing an

Australian-born governor-general, he charged the Premier’s ‘scheme would mean the

smashing of all values in the community.’19

In opposition to the radical Lang Plan, Latham and his allies designed the Premiers’

Plan presented at the Premiers’ Conference of May-June 1931.20 A subcommittee of the

Loan Council, which had been busy signing off emergency loans to prevent NSW defaulting,

helped to devise it. Apart from permanent heads of the Commonwealth Treasury and the

State Treasuries (NSW excepted), the subcommittee enlisted the University of Melbourne

economists and Boobooks’ members, Professors L.C. Giblin, D.B. Copland, as well as

economic consultant to the Bank of New South Wales, E.O.G Shann.21 The Commonwealth

Treasurer, Edward Theodore, and Scullin extended the hand of bipartisanship to Latham and the Country Party’s Sir George Pearce. Scullin asked his political opponents to join a special

session at the conference. Lang initially, and with reservations, signed the plan agreed to at

the conference, but soon reneged.

Although the economic implications of NSW’s recalcitrance worried Latham, he was

more concerned by the Premier’s political ideology. In the House of Representatives on 27

19 “Federal Economies,” SMH, 26 February 1931, 10. 20 For an outline of the Premiers’ Plan, please see: Nairn, The ‘Big Fella,’ 242. 21 Allan G. B. Fisher, “Crisis and Readjustment in Australia,” Journal of Political Economy 42, no. 6 (1934): 769. Giblin, Copland and another Boobook member and stockbroker, E.C. Dyason had earlier, in August 1930, submitted a document to the then acting Commonwealth Treasurer Joseph Lyons titled ‘A Plan for Economic Readjustment.’ In short, the trio’s proposal involved the distribution of ‘loss "fairly" among all classes “according to their capacity to bear the burden.”’ The plan attracted criticism from conservative quarters and largely faded from view. Fisher, “Crisis and Readjustment in Australia,” 763-65; Alex Millmow, The Power of Economic Ideas: The Origins of Keynesian Macroeconomic Management in Interwar Australia 1929-39 (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), 98-100.

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October 1930, Latham accused Lang of using ‘violent language’ to depict Great Britain, the

United States and the Westminster tradition as ‘sinister powers.’22 Language and sentiment were essential to imperial unity in Latham’s view, so supposedly ‘violent’ speech directed at

Britain and its progeny could not go unchallenged. Some months later, the Sydney Morning

Herald reported his comments that Lang’s re-election—he won the 25 October 1930 ballot— was foreboding for Australian democracy:

We are faced with the example of Italy, Greece. Spain, Russia, and other countries where democratic government has been adjudged a failure by the people because the politicians sought popular applause, and were not prepared to do, or recommend the doing of unpleasant or unpopular things. Where that happens, democratic Institutions cannot maintain themselves.23

Stories of failed nation-states were a common element in Latham’s writing and speeches on

the British Empire and featured in the opening chapter of Australia and the British

Commonwealth.24 He was keen to apply the lessons he took from the post-Great War experience in Europe to the danger he observed in NSW, which appeared to be assuming a

Bolshevist inflection in his eyes.

Communism and Langism

In Latham’s flights of fancy, the Lang Cabinet morphed into an Australian politburo.25 The

Premier was accused of being a leading ally of communists. Even though Lang struck

alliances with militant and left-wing unions including the Trade Hall Reds to gain control of

the NSW Labor Party, Lang was not a communist.26 Nevertheless, in Latham’s mind the

22 “Mr. Latham's View,” SMH, 27 October 1930, p. 10. 23 “Federal Economies,” SMH, 26 February 1931, p. 10. 24 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 1-19. 25 “Mr. Latham Confident of Outcome,” SMH, 14 May 1932, p. 14. 26 Frank Farrell, “Dealing with the Communists, 1923-36,” in Jack Lang, ed. Heather Radi and Peter Spearritt (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1977), 49-68.

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tense political situation in Sydney merged with the perceived ‘threat’ of Sovietisation and

international communism. Riddled with fear of dissent, foreignness, labour politics, and

leftist radicalism, non-Labor governments at the state and federal level enacted draconian

legislation designed to suppress domestic communism during and after the First World War.

The international dimension of communism—that is, links between Moscow and the radical

organisations residing domestically, whether real, exaggerated, or imagined—disturbed

Latham and other imperially minded Australians. For Latham, however, the threat was real.

Communists and Russians were the natural enemy to Anglophile imperialism. He perceived

local communists as looking to Moscow because ‘Russia is in favour with trouble makers

and is more particularly an enemy of Great Britain and the Empire.’27 Consequently,

conservatives often reacted to political and economic developments in the Soviet Union with

the sternness and rectitude of a nation at war. The Anglophile Latham felt he was engaged in

a years-long struggle against the most resourceful, hidden, and cunning enemy of Australia and the British Empire.

Latham reflected on the supposed perils of communism and Russia in the Boobooks dining club, even before the events of the October Revolution. The scribe at the club’s 127th

meeting held in 1910, where Boobooks disparaged the Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky,

recorded:

Boobook Latham was insistent in asking whether Russians were people such as Dostoyevsky portrays, and their conditions of life such as he describes. If so, “Heaven save us from Russia!” was his characteristically devout exclamation. He felt that Russians, if they are as Dostoyevsky indicates, can have no appreciation of western [sic] life, which of course is essentially rational.28

27 MS 1009, 27/5/169, NLA, cited in, Nick Fischer, “An Inspiration Misunderstood: Australian Anti- Communists and the Lure of the U.S., 1917 – 1935,” Eras, no. 5 (2003): http://arts.monash.edu.au/publications/eras/edition-5/fischerarticle.php#a15. 28 Minutes of 127th Meeting, n.d., Boobooks/2/10, UMA.

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Latham possessed little understanding ‘of the psychological and sociological roots of

revolution,’ and Russia generally.29 Regardless of the accuracy of the picture Latham

painted, he acted on his perceptions. While Latham’s opposition to Russia formed in the

meeting places of the establishment, his anti-communist streak strengthened during his time

in naval intelligence during the First World War.30 Stuart Macintyre argues that Latham’s

spell in this office moulded the ‘habits of mind’ that endured throughout his long public

career: ‘an apprehension of the grave menace of Bolshevism and a conviction that sedition

should be prosecuted with the full weight of the law.’31 Latham’s participation in the Paris

Peace Conference of 1919 cemented his conviction that ‘the rule of law in national and

international affairs’ was imperilled by radicalism in the labour movement; particularly when

that radicalism adopted the political consciousness of Bolshevism.32

Russia and the international dimension of communism continued to unsettle

conservatives in the interwar decades. On 6 October 1925, the Age newspaper referred to

incumbent Prime Minister Bruce’s re-election campaign as a struggle ‘with a hydra-headed

Communism.’33 If communism was considered a hydra-headed monster, then the monster’s

lair was imagined to be Moscow. Latham was keen to highlight the otherness of communism

to Australian-British life and the danger it posed. On 28 January 1926, introducing his

Crimes Bill to the Lower House that targeted socialists, communists, trade unionists, and

other radical anti-British elements, Latham denounced a ‘small but growing body of men in

Australia, who, inspired by foreign ideals, deliberately seek the destruction of Australian

democracy.’ He made it clear that this coming storm had origins external to the

29 Fischer, “An Inspiration Misunderstood.” 30 Andrew Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier: Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in New South Wales 1930-32 (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1989), 109-10. 31 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964).” 32 Macintyre, The Reds, 102. 33 “Mr. Bruce’s appeal,” SMH, 6 October 1925, p. 8.

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Commonwealth and the whole British Empire: ‘the headquarters of communism, and of most

forms of violence directed against governments, is in Russia.’34

Legislating against communism

Latham’s appointment as Attorney-General in the Bruce Government coincided with the communist-linked 1925 seamen’s strike, which was a transnational strike in Britain and some of the Dominions.35 The Commonwealth government attributed the strike to the ulterior motives of the union's revolutionary leaders.36 During the legal proceedings to deport the

president of the Seamen’s Union, Tom Walsh, Latham recognised that the charges against

the union leader were beyond the legislative reach of the Commonwealth.37 Latham put the

lessons learned from the seamen’s strike into practice after less than three months as

Attorney-General. In February 1926, he introduced legislation to give the Commonwealth

unprecedented power to take decisive action against Bolshevism, and threats to law and order

in general. The Commonwealth Crimes Act 1900 was amended to incorporate portions of the

Unlawful Associations Act 1916 and expanded the definition of an ‘unlawful association.’

The reforms made it an offence for persons to hold office, membership, financial interests, or

sympathy with an unlawful organisation. In practice, however, the provisions of the

legislation remained unenforced by the Bruce-Page Government during its term in office.

The Scullin Labor Government also took no steps to enforce it in the period 1929-1931.38

34Australia, HOR, Debates, 28 January 1926, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1926/19260128_reps_10_112/. 35 Baruch Hirson and Lorraine Vivian, Strike Across the Empire: The Seamen’s Strike in 1925; in Britain, South Africa and Australasia (London: Clio, 1992). 36 Macintyre, The Reds, 102. 37 “Seamen's Strike. Case of T. Walsh. Appeal Against Conviction,” SMH, 13 May 1925, p. 15. 38 Douglas, “Keeping the Revolution at Bay,” 270.

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At the December 1931 federal election, the Lyons and Latham-led United Australia

Party (UAP) won a landslide victory over the incumbent Labor Party. Latham occupied manifold offices in the new government, including Attorney-General.39 In this familiar role,

he resolved to further strengthen and enforce the Crimes Act 1926. Latham’s election

platform had contained a promise to ‘wipe them [communists] off the ground altogether.’40

Subsequently, the Commonwealth prohibited the transmission and registration of

publications printed by unlawful associations. Under these auspices, communist-controlled

newspapers were deregistered. In all, six domestic publications, including the Workers’

Weekly—the official organ of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA)—lost their status as

registered newspapers.41 The legislation also permitted the confiscation and destruction of

published communist literature, although there were no provisions for fining or gaoling

publishers, importers, and people in possession of prohibited reading material. To this end,

Latham’s Attorney-General’s Department maintained a list of banned newspapers.

Publications were included on this list if they carried seditious statements, republished

communist or revolutionary ideology, or propagandised the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR). For instance, the journal of the Australian section of the Friends of the

Soviet Union, The Soviets To-day, was banned for popularising ‘Soviet thought’ and praising

‘Soviet efforts.’42

39 Latham ‘exercised great influence’ over Lyons and policy development, even purportedly writing some of the Prime Minister’s speeches. Williams, John Latham, 25. See also: Bird, J.A. Lyons—the ‘Tame Tasmanian,’ 22- 23. 40 This threat was in response to Scullin’s intention to not drive communists ‘underground.’ “Mr. Latham would Deport Communists,” SMH, 12 December 1931, p. 13. 41 Veteran Defence Minister George Pearce had brought Latham’s attention to the Workers’ Weekly as early as 1928, declaring that it is ‘shocking’ the broadsheet could circulate. Pearce to Latham, letter, 19 May 1928, MS 1009/27/166, NLA. 42 “Communist Party of Australia: Communist Publications,” typescript, A467, SF10/15, NAA; Douglas, “Keeping the Revolution at Bay,” 271.

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Attorney-General Latham was perturbed by links between the Communist

International, or ‘Comintern’ as it was more commonly known, and the CPA.43 To this end,

in 1932 Latham expanded the Commonwealth’s power to deport non-native Australians

legally if they had an association with an unlawful group. Clearly concerned by the prospect

of the immigrant community spreading foreign ideologies in Australia, the Lyons

Government deported 401 ‘undesirables’ in its first 30 months of government.44 Extra

scrutiny was paid to Russian migrants by the forerunner to ASIO, the Commonwealth

Investigative Branch (CIB), who were not only charged with responsibility for building the

evidence to take deportation cases to court, but also reviewing the applications of migrants

for entry into Australia.45 Latham and Lyons’ legislation had a precedent. Russian-born

political leaders accused of having a leading role in the Red Flag Riots of 1919 had been

deported under Commonwealth government directive.46

Prohibiting Russian imports

A constant stream of intelligence from Britain flowed to Latham about Soviet and communist

activities in that country. Richard Casey, Australian liaison officer attached to Sir Maurice

Hankey in Whitehall, regularly sent British intelligence back to Latham during the mid-to-

43 Derestriction of the CPA’s archives decades later has possibly vindicated Latham’s claim that Comintern ‘hand’ was at work in Australia. The CPA were arguably ‘unswervingly loyal’ to the Communist International and the Soviet Union from the late-1920s to 1940. David W. Lovell, “The CPA and the Comintern: From Loyalty to Subservience,” in Our Unswerving Loyalty: A Documentary Survey of Relations between the Communist Party of Australia and Moscow, 1920-1940, ed. David W. Lovell and Kevin Windle (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), 25; Stuart Macintyre, “Miles, John Bramwell (Jack) (1888-1969),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/miles-john-bramwell-jack-11120. 44 David Dutton, “The Commonwealth Investigation Branch and the Political Construction of the Australian Citizenry, 1920-40,” Labour History, no. 75 (1998): 164-66. 45 Antonia J. M. Brok, “The Commonwealth Investigation Branch in Western Australia, 1919-1939,” Early Days 12, no. 6 (2006): 677. 46 Raymond Evans, The Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1988), 164-82.

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late 1920s.47 This source led Latham to conclude, in the wake of a British raid on a Soviet-

backed trading company in England, that Russia is in favour of ‘trouble makers’ and is an

‘enemy’ of the Empire.48 Russia’s 1927 refusal to attend the International Disarmament

Conference in Switzerland only compounded his assessment.49

Against this backdrop, Latham played a leading role in a series of trade disputes

between Australia and Russia. In 1931-1933, Latham suspected an ominous Bolshevik plot in

relation to Russian agricultural and oil exports to Australia.50 The parlous state of Australia’s

economy in the depths of the Depression had heightened sensitivities to fluctuations in world

markets. Making nerves even more jittery were rumours that Soviet grain yielded from the

USSR’s economic ‘Five-Year Plan’ was flooding onto the world market, producing a slump

in grain prices. Falling commodity prices were dreaded for the impact it would have on the

working class, particularly regarding unemployment; the growing masses of unemployed

might provide fertile ground for the spread of communism.

Concerned by rumours of a Soviet trade conspiracy, Frank ‘Keith’ Officer, a staffer

with the Department of External Affairs, made inquiries into the matter in October 1930

through Casey in London. Specifically, Officer wondered whether ‘a subversive Soviet

organisation’ was working globally to cause political instability by means of dumping

Russian grain in England.51 Six months later, a confidential British Foreign Office memo titled ‘Soviet dumping of grain’ landed on Officer’s desk. He annotated the report before duly circulating it to Cabinet. The following line drew Officer’s attention: ‘The rest of the

47 Macintyre, The Reds, 103. 48 “Communism,” undated transcript, MS 1009/2/169, NLA. 49 Australia, HOR, Debates, 15 March 1927, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1927/19270315_reps_10_115/. 50 Latham took special interest in Soviet Union oil exports to Australia. Frank Cain, The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History (Melbourne: Spectrum Publications, 1994), 8. 51 Officer to Casey, letter, 15 October 1930, Papers of Sir Keith Officer, MS 2629/1/230, NLA.

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world is naturally apprehensive lest a hostile Government, with unexampled resources at its

disposal, should adopt dumping as an instrument of national policy, or of revolutionary

policy.’52 The report concluded that there was no genuine evidence of economic sabotage.

Rather, Russia had re-entered the world market as a small-scale seller, but its presence was

nonetheless a ‘tragedy’ for an industry already straining under slumping grain prices and

global oversupply. Indeed, the Soviet ‘flooding’ of the international grain market proved to

be little more than a chimera. Insufficient grain harvests led to the Soviet Union suffering

severe famines in 1932 and 1933, and crops yielded poorly for most of the 1930s.53 The

Foreign Office report called for calm, but those calls went unheeded by Latham and his circle. 54

Only two weeks after Officer had passed on London’s report, Latham raised in

parliament the prospect of Russia ‘dumping’ grain onto the world market. On 18 March

1931, the House of Representatives met to discuss a Labor-sponsored bill to subsidise wheat farmers. Latham opposed the bill because he felt international markets were uncontrollable.

Instead, he pressed for the review of the costs of production and labour. He also raised the

Russian spectre, declaring it a significant and uncertain factor in the market. Latham’s speech here came on the back of a ban on the importation of Russian petrol into Australia.55 With

respect to the ‘Russian five-years [sic] scheme,’ Latham remarked that he was filled ‘with the

gravest apprehension.’ Although he doubted the ambitious goals of the scheme could be met

within the proposed timeframe, he considered Moscow’s subordination of ‘everything’ in

52 Ibid. 53 Walter Scott Dunn, The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), 16. 54 “Russia. Confidential. Mr Strang to Mr A. Henderson – (Received 20 October) (No. 614),” memorandum bearing Keith Officer’s signature and markings, A981, SOV 35 PART 1, NAA. 55 Frank Cain, “Governments and Defectors: Responses to the Defection of Gouzenko in Canada and Petrov in Australia,” in Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century, ed. Margaret Macmillan and Francine McKenzie (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 185.

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order to advance ‘productive efficiency’ could have a ‘very serious’ effect on the world’s

grain markets.56 The Wheat Bill was eventually defeated in the Senate in August, but

Latham’s apprehension lingered. In a last-minute appeal to Victorian electorates, published

in the Argus on the eve of the 1931 election, Latham implored voters to consider his party’s

strong stance ‘against the dumping of foreign goods.’57

While fear of a Russian grain glut receded after 1931, Canada succeeded in keeping

Canberra on ‘Red alert.’ The decision by the Canadian government to prohibit the import of

timber from Russia, on the grounds forced labour was being utilised for its production,

resonated with Australian conservatives. The question of the Commonwealth’s stance on

imported Russian lumber was put before the PM in the Lower House on 26 June 1931.

Scullin deferred the question to a joint review conducted by the Departments of External

Affairs and Trades and Customs.58 Relying on information flowing from Whitehall, Keith

Officer conducted a full investigation into the matter. His subsequent advice to the

Commonwealth government was that the existing evidence on the use of coerced labour in

the Soviet lumber industry was not completely reliable and, until a full investigation could be

conducted ‘on the ground’ in the USSR, no action on deliveries of Russian timber should be

taken.59 The matter was left in abeyance for more than a year.

Latham was Minister for External Affairs when the matter was revived in 1933.

Bruce, who was by now Australia’s High Commissioner in London, cabled PM Lyons on 12

January to pass on unofficial Canadian concerns that Russians were ‘dumping’ timber in

56 Australia, HOR, Debates, 18 March 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310318_reps_12_128/. 57 “Principles and Patriotism: Mr Latham’s Appeal,” Argus, 18 December 1931, p. 7. 58 Untitled document, dated 30 June 1931, signed by Officer and newspaper cutting, “Russian Timber; No Clear Evidence of Forced Labour. Ministry’s Inquiries,” Argus, 24 June 1931, A981, Sov 42, Part 3, NAA. 59 See: A981, Sov 42 Part 3, NAA.

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Australia; Latham was made aware of the confidential cablegram the next day.60 Little

progress was made in the matter until the following month when Latham, as Acting Prime

Minister, made inquiries to Bruce about the standing and reliability of the Sydney-based

‘Russoexport Agency,’ the Soviet-backed business buying and selling the Russian timber.61

The affair came to a head when the Tariff Board moved to disallow Russoexport from selling

Russian timber onto the Australian market. The firm closed its doors shortly thereafter.62

G.K. Radygin, the head representative of the company widely depicted in the

Australian press as a ‘Soviet agent,’ resented the popular image of Russian trade in Australia

as a ‘bogey.’63 While Radygin did not possess official credentials—although Lyons was

advised that he was an ‘employee’ of Moscow, and the Russoexport Agency was importing

goods ‘for and on behalf’ of the USSR64—he was the closest Australia had to a Soviet consular official or representative in the 1930s. Speaking to the Sydney Wool Commission on 1 September 1932, Radygin had passionately stated that ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’ had been ‘systematically carried out in Australia … on the floor of Parliament, and in every place wherever this or that political problem was touched upon.’65 When Radygin spoke of the

‘floor of Parliament,’ it is probable that he was referring to Latham and his efforts to provoke

visions of a Russian ‘bogey’ at work across the Commonwealth and the Empire.66

60 Bruce to Lyons, cable, 12 January 1933, bearing Latham’s and Officer’s signatures with dates, A981, Sov 42, Part 3, NAA. 61 Latham to Bruce, 17 February 1933, cable, A981, Sov 42, Part 3, NAA. 62 Lyons to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, letter, 16 March 1936, A981, Sov 42, Part 3, NAA. 63 “Russian Timber: Reply to Soviet Agent,” SMH, 19 September 1931, p. 14. 64 “Russo Export Agency,” Investigation Branch memorandum, 10 March 1936, A981, Sob 42, Part 3, NAA. 65 Radygin to Lyons, letter, 23 September 1932, A981, Sov 42, Part 3, NAA. 66 While Latham was not mentioned specifically by name, the Bruce-Page Government—in which Latham was a key Minister—came in for special mention in Radygin’s speech. Radygin to Lyons, letter, 23 September 1932, A981, Sov 42 Part 3, NAA.

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Old and New Guards

Domestic communism and Lang were met with organised, and even violent, resistance. In

NSW, the Old Guard and New Guard paramilitary bodies rallied in the belief that Lang

Labor represented communist interlopers in Australia, the abandonment of British tradition,

property confiscation, and the destruction of the social fabric they held dear.67 Latham was

not a stranger to extra-parliamentary means of combating social and political disorder. In

1923, he served as legal advisor for John Monash’s Special Constabulary Force. The

‘specials,’ as they were known, were a volunteer force of mainly returned service members

who quelled vandalism and looting in Melbourne during the police officers' strike in

October-November 1923.68 It is unlikely that a mutual interest in riot breaking brought the

former general and Latham together. The professional and personal relationship between the

two men developed before the police strike, when Monash was appointed vice-chancellor of

the University of Melbourne in 1923. He had been invited to talk at the Boobooks dining

club in June of that year.69

Apart from Monash, Latham’s social and professional networks tied him to the

establishment’s paramilitary indulgences. Latham had peripheral connections with the New

and Old Guards, especially the latter, which of the two organisations was the most

establishment in its disposition. He did not hold membership in either organisation or attend

their meetings, but he was aware of some of their activities via the reports sent to his

67 The existence of the Old Guard as a cohesive organisation, as opposed to a series of loosely connected paramilitaries and secretive political sects situated in country NSW, is debated. For a summary of this debate, see: Richard Evans, “'A menace to this realm’: The New Guard and the New South Wales Police, 1931-32,” History Australia 5, no. 3 (2008): 76.1-76.20. 68 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, 110-11. 69 Minutes of 206th Meeting, 15 June 1923, Boobooks/2/12, UMA.

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Attorney-General’s Department.70 Latham’s genteel modus operandi meant that he was less

inclined to entertain the more ostentatious New Guard leadership led by Eric Campbell. In

October 1931, as a seaman’s strike gripped Sydney ports, Latham spurned the New Guard’s

offer to protect strike breakers.71 The strike ended shortly after. His dismissal of assistance

reflected his firm faith in established governmental institutions and processes, which the New

Guard often blatantly disregarded.

Evidence suggests one of the Old Guard’s organisers was Charles Abbott, a senior

politician in the Bruce and Lyons Governments in which Latham served as a senior Cabinet

minister across multiple portfolios.72 George Macarthur Onslow, another Old Guard

organiser, was a member of the mysterious Waterfall Farm Fly-Fishing Club (see below).73

The Macarthur Onslows were a prominent family who had long promoted imperial

patriotism, including helping to organise the Women’s Loyal Service Bureau, which operated

from August to October 1917 in Sydney.74 The fact that Latham’s links to Old Guardsmen

Abbott and Macarthur Onslow predated the paramilitary organisation’s formation meant his

connections were circumstantial rather than direct. It is also unlikely that he turned to the

group directly for intelligence on domestic communists. His position as Attorney-General in

the Bruce-Page and Lyons governments meant he was supplied, on request, with regular

copies of material on communist and paramilitary movements, courtesy of Australian and

British military intelligence agencies.75 This kind of intelligence material was denied to the

70 “Summary No. 5. Information on Various Secret and Other Organizations,” confidential report by Defence Department forwarded to Attorney-General’s Department and containing Latham’s initials, 9 November 1932, A467, SF42/2, NAA. 71 Australia, HOR, Debates, 22 October 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19311022_reps_12_132/. 72 Cain, Origins of Political Surveillance, 221. 73 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, 3; Amicus, “Thomas Rainsford Bavin.” 74 Wendy Michaels, “Conflict on the Australian Home Front: The Women’s Peace Army and Women’s Loyal Service Bureau” (presentation, Women’s History Network Annual Conference, University of Worchester, UK, 5 September, 2014). 75 “Summary No. 5. Information on Various Secret and Other Organizations,” 9 November 1932, A467, SF42/2, NAA.

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previous Labor Attorney-General, Francis Brennan. The Defence Department, which was

responsible for producing these reports, perhaps thought the material would particularly

appeal to Latham, given his experiences as head of civilian naval intelligence during the First

World War.76

Latham had contacts at the highest levels of conservative politics and the business

community in NSW who could furnish him with political intelligence in the state. One of

Latham’s closest friends and regular correspondents was Thomas Bavin, who was Nationalist

NSW State Premier, 1927-1930.77 Like Latham, Bavin was a member of the Round Table.

Along with other establishment figures, the duo made the annual pilgrimage to Khancoban,

on the Snowy River, NSW, for trout fishing holidays with the secretive, unassumingly-

named, Waterfall Farm Fly-Fishing Club. Latham was a keen sportsman in his youth,78 but it

was more than just the sport of fishing that drew these men together.79 Lang, who defeated

Bavin in the 1930 state election, denounced the fly-fishing club as a ‘conservative cabal.’80

Latham did his best to stay up to date on NSW state politics through his professional

channels. Charles Marr and Archdale Parkhill, Cabinet members in the Lyons Government whose seats were in Sydney, wrote to Latham in alarming terms on the allegedly parlous condition of politics in Australia’s most populous state in March 1932.81 Latham may have

76 Michael Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop: Australia's Secret Army Intrigue of 1931 (Melbourne: Penguin, 1988), 71. 77 A good account of their friendship is found in Amicus, “Thomas Rainsford Bavin,” undated manuscript, Papers of Sir Thomas Bavin, MS 560/5/23, NLA. 78 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Grieg (1877-1964).” 79 Primary source material on the club is patchy. A membership list, dated 1964, lists then current and deceased members. Of the 50 men listed, 9 had knighthoods, and one was a Peer of the realm. “Waterfall Farm Fly- Fishers Club. Nominal Roll of Members Season 1964/1965,” Latham Family Papers, MS 6409, NLA. A 1940 letter addressed to the club from Sir Richard Casey sought their views on correspondence he received in relation to his post as Minister to the United States. Casey’s letter is suggestive of the kinds of conversations that flowed freely while the men fished. Casey to Latham, letter, 8 January 1940, MS 1009/1/5390, NLA. 80 John Carmody, “Dew, Sir Harold Robert (1891-1962),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/dew-sir-harold-robert-9961/text17649, published first in hardcopy 1993. 81 Charles Marr to Latham, letter, 24 March 1932, MS 1009/1/2334; Archdale Parkhill to Latham, letter, 29 March 1932, MS 1009/1/2340; Marr to Latham, letter, 30 March 1932, MS 1009/1/2346, NLA.

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also enlisted the help of the legal fraternity to frustrate Lang’s ambitions. A minute taker for

the Boobooks’ October 1932 meeting cryptically recorded that Latham had assisted High

Court justice Owen Dixon with curbing Lang’s power.82 The Boobooks’ minutes were

supported by the fact that Dixon was sympathetic with Latham’s agenda, seeing Lang’s

Government ‘dangerous and thoroughly corrupt.’83 Lang’s bills to dismantle the NSW

Legislative Council were challenged, and ultimately defeated, at the High Court (Dixon was

sitting on the bench) in 1931.84 As Attorney-General, he appealed to the Privy Council against Lang’s bid to abolish the Legislative Council in May 1932. Before arriving in

London for that case and other duties, he wrote to Lyons in March 1932:

The feeling against Lang is intense. From a political point of view I am sure that it will be a good thing for me to appear against him before the Privy Council.85

Lang failed in his appeal to the Privy Council to have the High Court ruling overturned.

Reconnoitring the New Guard

On one occasion, Latham intersected with the less patrician New Guard to obtain intelligence

on communism and its sympathisers in NSW. In late January 1932, the journalist Frederick

Cutlack advised Eric Campbell that Latham, who had only just resumed in the office of

Attorney-General, wanted to arrange a discreet discussion.86 The fact Latham reached out to

the New Guard at this precise moment, despite his distaste for brutishness, speaks to the

82 This cryptic remark was probably in reference to Lang’s legislative campaign to abolish the NSW upper house, the Legislative Council, which Latham opposed. Minutes of 293rd Meeting, 21 October 1932, Boobooks/3/17, UMA. 83 Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (Melbourne: Miegunyah Press, 2003), 60, 182-83. 84 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Trethowan’s Case,” in State Constitutional Landmarks, ed. George Winterton (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006), 98-106. 85 Latham to Lyons, letter, 25 March 1932, MS 1009/52/60, NLA. 86 Campbell to Latham, 28 January 1932, A367, C94121, NAA.

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palpable worry Lang’s Premiership instilled. Cutlack, an ardent anti-communist, moved in

Latham’s circle: he served in the prime ministerial office of Bruce, accompanied Latham to

the 1932 Imperial Conference, and worked as a media officer on Latham’s tour of Asia in

mid-1934.87 Campbell duly wrote to Latham on 28 January 1932, who likewise thought that discretion should be the utmost priority in arranging the meeting. Regularly attracting the attention of the press, Campbell thought it would be ‘less embarrassing for you [Latham] at this stage if I were not to see you personally.’ ‘In order to proceed along the lines indicated by Mr. Cutlack,’ continued Campbell, ‘I am asking Captain F. De Groot (late 15th Hussars) to

call and see you.’ Campbell was of course referring to Francis De Groot, the Irish-Australian who infamously cut the ceremonial ribbon at the opening of the Sydney Harbour Bridge on

19 March 1932. Campbell advised Latham that he had ‘implicit faith in Captain De Groot,’ and that he had confidence in his personal envoy’s capacity to discuss ‘any matters of a confidential nature’ that may be raised in the course of the discussion.88 The emphasis

Campbell placed on De Groot’s military rank was an appeal ‘from one military man to

another.’ Latham served at home during the Great War and also held membership to

Australia’s Naval and Military clubs.89 De Groot, however, was an antique and furniture dealer with a brutish public persona, and not the kind of establishment or intellectual figure to which Latham was accustomed.

The privacy surrounding the proposed meeting was indicative of Latham’s hesitancy

to meet with a petit bourgeois paramilitary group. The New Guard’s leadership was understandably eager to hasten proceedings. In this vein, L.W. Sutherland, the New Guard’s secretary, wrote to Henry Gullett. In the letter, typed the same day as Campbell’s dispatch to

87 Nairn, The ‘Big Fella,’ 177; A.J. Sweeting, “Cutlack, Frederic Morley (1886–1967),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/cutlack-frederic-morley-5859, published first in hardcopy 1981. 88 Campbell to Latham, letter, 28 January 1932, A367, C94121, NAA. 89 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Grieg (1877-1964).”

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Latham, Sutherland wrote to the newly installed Minister for Customs enquiring about the

meeting.90 The coordinated timing of the two letters suggests the planned meeting was a high

priority for the New Guard. The fact that Sutherland requested Gullett to intervene personally

to facilitate the tête-à-tête, rather than leaving the Attorney-General to make suitable

arrangements, gives the impression New Guard leadership was concerned the meeting would

not eventuate. Their organisational efforts were ultimately successful, and the meeting went

ahead in early 1932.

Buoyed by having an audience with one of the most senior politicians in the country,

De Groot gave an account of the meeting at a gathering of New Guardsmen. This public

airing ignored Cutlack’s attempt to keep the meeting secret. De Groot reported the most

pressing purpose of the meeting stemmed from the New Guard’s concerns about the lack of

security of the arms store at Liverpool Army Camp in Western Sydney, which was situated

close to ‘hostile men’ encamped at nearby makeshift campgrounds for unemployed persons.

He reassured Latham that the New Guard was willing to assist the Lyons Government in

intelligence gathering on communists and in the provision of workers in the event of

emergency. On this point, it is worth reiterating that Latham had declined a New Guard offer

to provide volunteers and security for ships during a seaman’s strike. It is unlikely his

position changed during this discussion with De Groot.91 ‘I declined to give Capt [sic] De

Groot any understanding or make any agreement,’ Latham told H.E. Jones, director of the

CIB. Latham also suggested that De Groot had ‘made statements’ which Latham promptly

forwarded to the Investigation Branch ‘for inquiry.’ It is unclear whether this refers to

communists or the New Guard itself.92 In 1932, the CIB was monitoring paramilitary

90 L.W. Sutherland to Latham, 28 January 1932, A367, C94121, NAA. 91 The meeting was the high watermark for the New Guard’s contact with the Commonwealth government. Moore, Francis De Groot, 85. 92 Campbell to Latham, letter, 28 January 1932, A367, C94121, NAA.

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organisations including Eric Campbell’s organisation.93 Latham had no more meetings with

the New Guard, instead utilising Commonwealth legislation to undermine Lang.

Unimpressed by De Groot, Latham again revealed his preference for the elite, Anglophile

imperialist milieu.

Latham’s refusal to endorse publicly the New Guard was despite the organisation’s

admiration for the Australian-British relationship. To a packed Sydney hall on the night of 18

September 1931, the group’s leader, Eric Campbell, outlined its half-dozen core principles.

He affirmed his organisation primarily stood for ‘[u]nswerving loyalty to the Throne’ and

were ‘[a]ll for the British Empire.’94 Although Anglophile elites naturally applauded the loyalty of the New Guard, like Latham they were reticent to embrace the organisation. Both

Governor Game and his private secretary considered the New Guard ‘a right-minded but

highly explosive body.’95 Lyons felt the same. In the Lower House on 15 March 1932, he

urged the New Guard and like-minded organisations go about removing Langism ‘in a legal

and constitutional way.’96 Lyons and Latham broadly sympathised with the New Guard’s

anti-communism and British loyalism, but refused to align themselves with Campbell’s

flashes of militaristic and corporative rhetoric and the casual thuggish behaviour engaged in

by some of the group’s personnel.97

93 “Summary No. 5. Information on Various Secret and Other Organizations,” 9 November 1932, A467, SF42/2, NAA. 94 “Inquiries Relative to the New Guard Movement and its Objects. Commissioners Minute of 18 September, 1931”, copy of report, A432, 1931/1871, NAA. 95 Bethia Foott, Dismissal of a Premier: The Philip Game Papers (Sydney: Morgan, 1968), 129-30. 96 Australia, HOR, Debates, 15 March 1932, Lyons, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1932/19320315_reps_13_133/. 97 The bashing of trade union leader and Lang ally ‘Jock’ Garden in May 1932 is the most notorious example of violence perpetrated by the New Guard. Andrew Moore, Francis De Groot: Irish Fascist, Australian Legend (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2005), 117. Latham did not comment on the bashing, but he thought little of Garden, commenting he was ‘Red … or that he is at least fairly pink.’ Australia, HOR, Debates, 7 June 1928, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1928/19280607_reps_10_119/.

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Bringing an end to Lang

By mid-1932, the threat ‘Langism’ posed to the status quo had effectively passed, defeated

by legal and political institutions. The dismissal of the Premier by NSW Governor Game on

constitutional grounds on 12 May 1932 reassured conservatives. For example, the Australian

Round Table supported dismissal and had made their advocacy known.98 Lang’s eviction

from office evidently delighted Latham, who took to the press the following day. He was

projecting his own feelings about Lang’s government when he remarked that the Governor

had given New South Welshmen the opportunity to pass ‘judgment upon Mr. Lang’s

extraordinary legislation and administration, to which they have been subjected for the past

18 months.’99 He went on to describe the Lang Government as oligarchic, tyrannical, autocratic, and unconstitutional. His comments also reflected his belief that Lang Labor had international consequences. The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Latham immediately informed the Dominions Secretary, James Henry Thomas, of Game’s decision. Thomas gave

a politically correct response in the interests of maintaining Britain’s neutrality in the

Dominions’ local politics:100 ‘Very interesting, but I have no comment to make.’101

Lang was convinced that various conservative forces had converged against him.102

He was right, of course. The Bruce and Lyons Governments, in which Latham was Attorney-

General, were openly hostile towards Lang Labor.103 Latham assisted PM Lyons in the

development of the Financial Agreements Enforcement Act 1932, which permitted the

98 “Australia,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 87 (1932): 631- 33. 99 “Mr. Latham Confident of Outcome,” SMH, 14 May 1932, p. 14. 100 Ward, “The Dismissal,” 172-73. 101 “Mr. Latham Confident of Outcome,” SMH, 14 May 1932, p. 14. 102 Lang to a meeting at Auburn Town Hall, 26 May 1932: ‘Arranged against us were the whole of the newspapers of Australia; all the other governments of Australia; corrupt Courts …prepared at all times to twist the law and give it an interpretation to the benefit of the financial institutions and the detriment of the people.’ “Highlights of the Speech. Everyone Corrupt!,” The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 27 May 1932, p. 1. 103 Nairn, ‘The Big Fella,’ 253.

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Commonwealth to direct state revenues and public monies held by banks towards the

repayment of debt.104 Lang’s defiance of the bill—he withdrew money held in banks on

behalf of the state and ordered officials to obfuscate the state’s treasury records—were

significant factors in his dismissal.105

With Labor confined to the opposition benches in Canberra and Macquarie Street,

fears that government could act as a conduit for working class insurrection were allayed. The

Old Guard disbanded almost immediately while the gradually marginalised New Guard limped on for a few more years at the behest of its increasingly delusional leader.106

Latham’s tenuous association with domestic paramilitary organisations ends here. While he

later refused to be associated with anti-Nazi protests held over April-May 1933, and organised by the Lord Mayor of Sydney, he stated this was in the interest of keeping trade and diplomatic dialogue with Germany open.107 As has been discussed, Latham evidently did

not extend this same respect to ties with Russia. As will also be shown, he had sympathies for the capacity of fascism to marshal the working class for the ostensible benefit of the national interest. In Australian conservative politics, Latham was not alone in this view.

Addressing the Millions Club in Sydney on 20 January 1932, Lyons hinted at the

Commonwealth’s struggle with Lang and the Great Depression when he said that the task of the Australian nation and its people was to increase efficiency: ‘The battle for national solvency is being fought and won, and we must now win the battle for national efficiency.’108

104 Gabrielle Appleby, “The Gavan Duffy Court,” in The High Court, the Constitution and Australian Politics, ed. Rosalind Dixon and George Williams (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 148. 105 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 99. 106 David S. Bird, Nazi Dreamtime: Australian Enthusiasts for Hitler's Germany (London: Anthem Press, 2012), 10. 107 Latham to Sydney Lord Mayor on behalf of Lyons, letter, 20 April 1933; Latham to D. Watkins, letter, 5 May 1933, A981, Ger 22 Part 2, NAA. 108 “Task of Nation and People,” Examiner, 20 January 1932, p. 7.

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Imperialism and national efficiency

Latham was better informed of the situation ‘on the ground’ in fascist countries than most

Australians. For example, his contacts in the Boobooks dining club kept him abreast of fascist politics, including the violence and brutality in Mussolini’s regime. Boobook members regarded their engagement with international affairs as an intellectual obligation, taking it upon themselves to keep each other fully informed with regular reports on international events. One such report was delivered by educationalist L.S. Wrigley to a ‘big meeting’ of the Boobooks on 20 February 1923. Wrigley, who had stayed in the Italian capital in the aftermath of Mussolini’s October 1922 March on Rome, concluded on his travels that ‘the methods of Mussolini are forceful and effective;’ the dictator had ‘cleaned up

Italy.’109 Three years later, on 26 April 1926, Boobooks received another lecture on Rome, this time given by Ernest Scott. While the professor lamented not hearing Mussolini speak, he took the opportunity to view the frescos in the Vatican City’s Sala Regia (which was closed to the public). He, like Wrigley before him, took time to talk of Fascismo in some detail with the Boobooks. He described Italian fascism as ‘militant and triumphant,’ with

Italians ‘expressing unbounded confidence in the Duce [Mussolini].’ He further tacitly approved Mussolini’s use of political violence—one of the things about the New Guard that later made Latham cautious—to achieve national rejuvenation. According to the note taker at the meeting, the group tried to ruminate on fascism after Scott’s paper. Only Frederic

Eggleston dissented from the group’s prevailing view that ‘Mussolini… had saved Italy from civil war.’110 For the most part, the Boobooks chose to overlook the misgivings expressed for fascist methods, choosing instead to look favourably on the ostensible outcomes. The positions Latham took on Fascist Italy in following years indicates that even if he was not

109 Minutes of 221st Meeting, 20 February 1923, Boobooks/2/12, UMA. 110 Minutes of 232nd Meeting, 16 April 1926, Boobooks/2/14, UMA.

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fully informed of the views of his fellow Boobooks (it is difficult to know whether he was

present at these meetings, but minutes were reproduced and made available to members), he

carefully circumnavigated issues around violence perpetrated by Mussolini’s regime.

For an Anglophile conservative like Latham, political stability was paramount. A

dictatorship, though, held no appeal. The British Empire, Latham speculated, had survived

because it had not subjected individuals to the law of an autocrat or dictator.111 Moreover, the

advantageous elements Latham discerned in fascism were considered useful for retaining

Australia’s parliamentary democracy and the status quo. This thinking took its root in his

notion that the British Empire was a living, breathing organism that functioned best when all

its composite ‘parts’ (the Dominions) were running at peak efficiency.112 Struck by this idea

of empire as living organism, Latham subscribed to the belief that Australians had to work

with collective discipline to keep it alive. One of the reasons the Empire had survived while

others had fallen, Latham argued, was because its far-flung commonwealth of self-governing states had laboured judiciously to keep it functioning effectively.113

As the rolling international crises of the 1930s made Britain’s military position appear

more and more precarious, Latham demanded Australia increase its so-called ‘national efficiency’ to meet international challenges. An abstract and loosely defined concept, national efficiency was an effort to reduce waste in all areas of society and the economy, to advocate modernisation and progress within a patriotic and pre-existing mould, and to marginalise sentimental humanitarianism. In interwar Australia, the relationship between individuals, families, communities, and the nation was also increasingly a matter of state

111 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 2-3. 112 Ibid., 16. 113 Ibid., 1-19.

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concern.114 More broadly, much of the popular and elite support for the national efficiency

movement in the British world grew out of an Edwardian era concern for Britain’s military

position in relation to Germany.115 Latham had first marshalled the idea of national

efficiency through the Victorian arm of the Universal Service League, a vocal pro-

conscription and pro-British Empire organisation that operated on the home front 1915-1917.

Almost two decades on from the First World War, Latham revived the rhetoric of

national efficiency and reinvigorated it by referring to the fascist dictatorships’ supposedly

successful efforts in mobilising their communities for the good of the state. While Latham’s

renewed efforts to promote the ideals of national efficiency did not take on the high degree of

organisation and vigorous campaigning that had typified the Universal Service League, he

nonetheless went to some lengths to speak publicly of his aims. In a speech given to the

South Australian Law Society in November 1935, he offered an insight into his perception of

how national efficiency operated in Mussolini’s Italy: ‘The law of Italy… was directed

toward the organisation of the people as a whole rather than to the protection of the rights of

individuals as such.’116 His endorsement of Italian fascism also had its limits. Latham was

keen to highlight that Mussolini’s government worryingly ‘challenged the principles upon

which democracy was based.’117 Latham’s cautious dealings with the New Guard in 1932 indicate that he required national efficiency initiatives to be permissible by Australian and imperial law. As his participation in the League of Nations Union also showed, he preferred imperial organisation at the community level to occur through education, the leadership of responsible political leaders, and the activities of citizens’ movements.

114 Alexander Cameron-Smith, “Raphael Cilento's Empire: Diet, Health and Government between Australia and the Colonial Pacific,” Journal of Australian Studies 38, no. 1 (2014): 103-18. 115 Warwick Funnell and Michele Chwastiak, Accounting at War: The Politics of Military Finance (London: Routledge, 2015), 54-55; Geoffrey Russell Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 3-5. 116 “Voice of the Law,” The Age, 31 October 1935, p. 12. 117 Ibid.

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Speaking later to the Commonwealth Club in Sydney on 2 October 1936, Latham

visited the subject of marshalling Australians through harnessing national sentiment. Here, in

a probable reference to the threat posed by Russia, the fascist dictatorships in Europe and

militarist Japan, he pleaded for Australians to adopt a more patriotic spirit because ‘Australia

may need it.’ Australians, he continued, had developed a character all their own. While he

reasoned that Australian citizens would never become intensely nationalist in the same way,

as other countries had done, he nevertheless added:

that I should like to see Australians with more of the earnestness of the Japanese, with more of the devotion to Australia which… the German has for Germany, and the Italian for Italy. I would wish to see something more of that spirit here; a keen Australian patriotism, shown not merely in words, but in deeds.118

He did not elaborate on what ‘deeds’ he expected Australians to accomplish with their

patriotic energy. It should be noted that his definition of Australian was the same as Alfred

Deakin’s almost two decades earlier, ‘independent Australian Britons.’ Speaking over a year later at the Old Geelong Grammarians annual dinner, Latham elaborated further on his contention that national spirit and efficiency was in dire need. He was speaking of

‘schoolboy ties’ and school loyalties, which ‘the world might well heed in these troubled times.’ During the talk, he surmised that the ‘growth and development of loyalties towards national ideals’ seen in some countries were closely ‘associated with ... a high degree of efficiency.’ He concluded his speech with the warning that ‘it would be folly to ignore’ the trends that were occurring internationally.119

118 “Keen Patriotism,” The Age, 2 October 1936, p. 8. 119 “Chief Justice Speaks Up for the School Tie,” The Daily News, 30 October 1937, p. 2.

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Conclusion

Latham approached the domestic issue of Jack Lang and his Labor offshoot as though they

were icebergs; he predicted that international forces and worrying political trends lay beneath

the surface. As Leader of the Opposition in 1929-1931 and later Attorney-General and

Minister for External Affairs from 1932, he fought Lang’s ascendancy in the state of New

South Wales. This task was made more urgent by the high value he placed on the

interconnectedness between inter-imperial relations and domestic politics. Although the

accuracy of his claims against the NSW Premier were disputable, he nonetheless considered

Lang Labor’s platform a lightning rod for communism, socialism, anti-imperial sentiment,

and other enemies of the British Empire. Decades of anti-communist and anti-Russia ideas

had shaped his outlook. Beginning from his time as a naval intelligence officer in the First

World War, he was active in efforts to curb domestic working-class radicalism and communism. Fears that the international elements of communism would undermine the security and preponderance of the British Empire led him to counter alleged ‘Sovietisation’ and Russian-led economic warfare in Australia. In these endeavours, he was brutally efficient and highly successful.

His definite anti-communist streak and his professional and social links to like- minded men placed him on the periphery of local conservative paramilitary forces across

1930-1932. The ideological composition of the Old Guard and New Guard aligned more closely with conservatism and British imperialism than it did with fascism. Indeed, it was more than the guardsmen’s intense anti-communism that fired Latham’s imagination, as well as their ideological ties to British traditions and, in the case of the Old Guard, their belonging to the patrician class. The trappings of fascism, particularly its street violence that was

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entertained by Australian paramilitary organisations in the early 1930s, were unappealing.

Where fascist doctrine did intersect with his worldview was in the strengthening of the

nation’s commitment and material contribution to Britain’s Empire. In a series of speeches,

Latham expressed his desire to see aspects of fascism—ultra-nationalism in an Anglophile sense, and a spirit of selfless national service—replicated in the antipodes. He hoped these qualities might serve to preserve Australia and the Empire through strengthening economic and defence vitality and national-imperial feeling, rather than subverting historic systems and

institutions, which he deeply admired. With non-Labor governments restored to Canberra

and Macquarie Street by mid-1932, Latham turned his attention to reviving the economic

fortunes of the British Empire through imperial trade preference.

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Chapter VI Following a ‘reasonable course’:1 The Imperial Economic Conference and the World Economic Conference, 1932-1933

The great majority of Australians believe that the Empire’s interest and sentiment march together. That is the view we are putting forward at Ottawa.2

Introduction

The restoration of imperial-friendly government in Canberra, heralded by the election of

John Latham and Joseph Lyons’ United Australia Party in December 1931, renewed hope for greater unity in the British Empire in Australia and Britain. The UAP’s landslide electoral victory represented for Latham a ‘mandate’ to stop the perceived erosion of the Australian-

British connection that he argued had happened under Labor’s watch, personified in Isaac

Isaacs’ appointment as governor-general. Latham was rewarded with a plethora of Cabinet positions for surrendering the leadership of the non-Labor party to Lyons: Deputy Prime

Minister, Minister for External Affairs, Minister for Industry, and Attorney-General.3 Lyons leaned on Latham’s political expertise and exceptional administration. Effectively, Latham was a ‘co-leader’ and the government was referred to as the ‘Lyons-Latham Government’ in at least one notable British circle.4 The conservatives’ electoral triumph in Canberra could not have come at a better time for London. British political leaders and financiers were anxious to establish an imperial trading and currency bloc to lift Great Britain and the

Dominions out of the Great Depression.

1 “Attack on U.A.P.,” The Canberra Times, 27 September 1933, p. 1. 2 “His Right,” The Sun (Sydney), 11 April 1932, p. 6. 3 For detail on Latham handing Lyons the leadership of the UAP, see: Bird, J.A. Lyons—the ‘Tame Tasmanian,’ 20-22; Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers, 16-20. 4 Phillip R. Hart, “J.A. Lyons: A Political Biography” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1967), 196- 97; Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 273.

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As discussed in the chapter last, Latham saw the economic catastrophe as a veritable hornet's nest, tied up with Langism in New South Wales and communism. He was convinced that the Depression could only be meaningfully lifted for Australia (and the world) by the coordinated efforts of Great Britain and the Dominions though a series of conferences and meetings. This chapter analyses Latham’s approach to the 1932 Imperial Economic

Conference held in Ottawa, Canada, and the 1933 World Economic Conference in London.

For the former, he anchored his hopes on a cooperative British Empire, while he offered resistance to the latter. In preparation, he took inter-imperial issues to the Lower House in

Canberra, presented speeches to Empire unity groups, and gave several interviews to domestic and London newspapers. Through these engagements, he sought to build the cachet of the Empire and the case for Australia to be a more responsible imperial citizen. He argued that this responsibility entailed maintenance of the country’s sovereign debt, which was held mainly by British bondholders. He argued that the restoration of Australia’s credit rating would offer relief for unemployment and Australian trade. To enact more efficiently the

Commonwealth’s deflationary economic policy, Latham intervened in discussions in London concerning the conversion of sovereign loans to lower rates of interest. Ultimately, he believed that if Australia gave greater preference to Commonwealth markets and efficiently marketed itself as a defender of the British imperial faith, then negotiations amongst statespersons would be eased. It was from these deliberations that solutions to the Depression would emerge.

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Sterling bloc

The foundations of Latham’s response to the Great Depression are outlined in Australia and

the British Commonwealth. In this treatise, he wrote the Empire required the Dominions to

demonstrate unwaveringly wise ‘temperament’ and ‘responsible government.’5 The principle

that respectability was an essential precondition for the Empire’s survival underwrote his

approach to economic questions across 1932-1933. Here, respectability was tied to

creditworthiness. Operating on this basis, and an inherent scepticism of labour politics, he

blamed the Scullin Government for ‘the dismal failure to uphold the financial honour and

credit of the country.’6 Successfully protesting Labor’s proposal for the Premier’s Plan to compel bondholders to lower the interest they received on their bonds, he argued instead that impassioned appeals to bondholders were vastly preferable for ‘security of contract’ and governments’ credit rating.7 To restore Australia’s monetary integrity, which he reasoned

would return investor confidence in the nation’s solvency and its commercial industries, he

vowed on the eve of the December 1931 federal election to implement the UAP’s

deflationary economic policies.8 The planks in this platform were the Premiers’ Plan,

‘balancing the budget,’ and boosting business confidence. Latham’s party emerged

triumphant. In a March 1932 letter to an admirer in New York, Latham expressed that the

UAP victory at the ballot box was ‘a definite mandate in favour of political sanity and honest

dealing.’9 If the UAP agenda were successfully implemented, and the maintenance of

5 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 16-17. 6 “Mr. Latham. Labour Dissension. Need for Economic Security,” SMH, 17 December 1931, p. 10. 7 Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 June 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310619_reps_12_130/; Peter Cook, “Labor and the Premiers' Plan,” Labour History, no. 17 (1969): 99. 8 The UAP’s financial manifesto was inherited from Latham. Alex Millmow, The Power of Economic Ideas, 118-19. 9 Latham to J.M. Stead, letter, 1 March 1932, MS 1009/1/2165, NLA.

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sovereign debt continued unabated, the nation would be upholding its obligations and

contributing to the economic strength of the British Empire according to Latham’s vision.

That relief was to arrive in the form of a stronger sterling currency bloc. Latham

applauded Britain for abandoning the gold standard and devaluing its currency in September

1931. He immediately realised London’s move in the short-term would appreciate the

Australian pound against British sterling, returning better prices for exporters. In the longer-

term, he correctly predicted the Australian currency would be pegged to sterling.10 Before the

year was out, Australia, along with New Zealand, South Africa, and India, anchored their

currencies to Britain to establish the sterling area.11 The move suited Latham’s worldview in

many ways. Aside from presenting a challenge to internationalism—it effectively conferred

monetary autarky on Britain and much of the Anglosphere12—currency blocs privileged pre-

existing trade partners and made it more likely that expansion into new markets would be

homogenous across member states.13 Australian capitalists and politicians would also take a

real interest in maintaining the international value of sterling. For this reason, ‘gentlemanly

capitalists’ in Britain grasped the advantages of imperial tariff preferences and the sterling

area for the financial and service interests of the imperial metropolis.14 The Ottawa

Agreement served London by elevating the capacity of the Dominions and the colonies to

pay interest on loans.15 The city also intended to grow the value and international standing of sterling beyond the Dominions and the colonies, a move which required the currency bloc to

10 “Gold Standard. Act Amended,” The Argus, 23 September 1931, p. 8. 11 John Singleton and Paul L. Robertson, Economic Relations between Britain and Australia from 1945-1970 (London: Palgrave, 2002), 7. 12 Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 128. 13 Joanne Gowa and Raymond Hicks, “Politics, Institutions, and Trade: Lessons of the Interwar Era,” International Organization 67, no. 3 (2013): 443. 14 Gentlemanly capitalism is a theory that holds business interests in London drove the expansion of the British Empire through structural power and relational processes. P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2016); Susan Strange, States and Markets 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 1994), 23-42. 15 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 501-26.

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be ‘open and responsive to the external world.’16 In the Australian camp, Stanley Bruce,

submerged as he was in the world of British financiers and treasury figures in the early-1930s

as Resident Minister in London, realised that the imperial economic area needed to expand

into foreign markets to remain viable.17 Latham, who wanted London to remain the primary

source of Australia’s finance, reached the same conclusion as Bruce: Australia needed to

adopt a course that would bolster sterling. As early as July 1932, he was remarking with

interest on ‘overseas competition to obtain British markets.’18 While his sentiment would

remain in favour of developing Australia’s traditional markets, he showed increasing concern

for opening Empire markets to the wider world.

British imperial finance and trade

For Latham, trade with Britain was an inviolable contract. When he famously wrote ‘[a]lone

Australia is weak … As a member of the British Commonwealth, Australia is strong,’ he did so with every facet of Australia’s ‘contribution to the welfare of the world’ in mind, trade included.19 In his speech to London’s Royal Empire Society luncheon in the weeks preceding

the Ottawa Conference, Latham elaborated at length, in sentimental and practical terms, the

important place imperial trade held in the antipodes:

our sentiment and our interest go together; we have a very real feeling of loyalty and affection for Great Britain as the Mother Country. We consider that during our life as a nation we have been protected by the strength and the shield of the British Navy, but we also know that we live upon exports very largely, and that our best market is in Great Britain, and it is only by being able to sell there that we are able to live. Our sentiments and interests march together, and we recognize the essential value of the British market to Australia.20

16 Shigeru Akita and Naoto Kagotani, “The International Order of Asia in the 1930s,” in Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History, ed. Shigeru Akita (London: Palgrave, 2002): 148-49. 17 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 95. 18 “Mr. Latham. Impressions Abroad. Confidence in Australia,” SMH, 20 July 1932, p. 11. 19 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 15-16. 20 Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 264.

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He was not only presenting this view for the benefit of reassuring Britons, but also repeating

it to officials in the Australian states. To the Agent General for Western Australia, Hal

Colebatch, Latham wrote a hopeful letter on the topic of Australian-British connection in

early-1933: ‘I sincerely hope that you will be able to assist general Australian interests in

Great Britain from which the interests of Western Australia cannot, in my view, be

divorced.’21 Aside from the tone of the letter reflecting the pressing issue of trade, Latham

was then attempting to diffuse the forthcoming Western Australia’s secession vote, which he

warned would dissociate the state from the British Empire.22 The tariff bill resulting from the

Ottawa Conference was then being worked through Parliament and the World Economic

Conference in London was only months away.

Latham’s support for deflationary measures and ongoing dependency on British

financial machinery and capital seemed unbreakable. Australia’s leading economists, who

were all known to Latham, fortified his position. While they generally supported the Lyons

Government’s implementation of the Premiers’ Plan and fiscal conservatism,23 most prominent economists, including Boobooks’ Douglas Copland and Edward Shann, slowly drifted towards Keynesianism and built cases for stronger national reform over the course of the 1930s.24 Despite sharing the same social circles in Melbourne as economists who

espoused fiscal change, Latham was largely allergic to economic revisionism unless it was an

imperial measure, and had little time for Keynes’ thesis of stimulating the economy through

21 Latham to H.F. Colebatch, letter, 3 February 1933, MS 1009/1/3300, NLA. 22 “Warning to W.A. on Secession Vote. Mr Latham Explains Futility,” The Advertiser (Adelaide), 2 March 1933, p. 8, clipping in MS 1736/16/115. See also: Lee, “States Rights,” 258-74. 23 C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression: A Study of Economic Development and Policy in the 1920s and 1930s (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1988, first published 1977), 225. 24 Millmow, The Power of Economic Ideas, 117-44; Sean Turnell, “Monetary Reformers Abroad: Australian Economists at the Ottawa and World Economic Conferences,” History of Economics Review, no. 29 (1999): 81- 96.

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public investment. Latham considered Keynes’ work to ‘only’ state ‘the problem without

making the slightest suggestion for solving it.’25

Latham wanted Australia to be tied as closely to the sterling bloc as politically justifiable. Otherwise, he feared simultaneous deterioration of the nation’s economic conditions and the fabric that tied the Dominions together. ‘They [Dominions] know the traditions and the history,’ Latham maintained, ‘which both explain and support democracy

in a British community.’26 He also warned the League of Nations that ‘[i]t would be a grave

mistake … either to identify itself with any particular school of economic theory’ or to take

‘a course of action’ equivalent to identification with a particular economic theory antithetical

to the Empire.27 Presumably, this advice applied to the Dominions. Placed in such a frame,

fiscal reform, especially without guidance and consultation from London, was heterodox. In

1930, he portrayed Labor’s proposal for a fully-fledged reserve bank—at this time, the

Commonwealth Bank Act 1924 only conferred extremely limited powers to the central

bank28— as an ‘irresistible’ temptation to print ‘paper money’ and a departure from the

‘canons of sound finance.’29 He also opposed Labor’s proposal to expand government control

over, and the powers of, the Central Bank and, later, resisted the proposal of a Royal

Commission into banking.30 Central banks, he argued, manifested a ‘great development of

monetary problems’ that would act as brakes on transnational agreements.31 Reforms that

privileged national priorities over imperial ones, like centralised banking, were a hindrance in

25 A.C. Davidson (Bank of New South Wales) to Latham, letter, 23 December 1931, MS 1009/52/7; Latham to Davidson, copy of letter, 30 December 1931, MS 1009/52/8, NLA. 26 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 16. 27 Ibid., 45. 28 Turnell, “Monetary Reformers Abroad,” 83. 29 “Central Bank. Mr. Latham’s Attack,” The Argus, 4 June 1930, p. 8. 30 Lyons eventually assented to a Royal Commission into banks once Latham had left parliament. Warwick Eather and Drew Cottle, “’Keep Government Out of Business’: Bank Nationalisation, Financial Reform and the Private Trading Banks in the 1930s,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 59, no. 2 (2013): 161-77; Peter Groenewegen and Bruce McFarlane, A History of Australian Economic Thought (London: Routledge, 1990), 128-29. 31 “Gold Standard. Act Amended,” The Argus, 23 September 1931, p. 8.

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Latham’s economic designs. He envisaged that the best path for necessary reform was via

multilateral and bilateral schemes.

Welcoming the Ottawa Conference

Latham did not attend the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa, held between 21 July

and 20 August 1932, but he was an enthusiastic promoter of the conference aims. It was

attended by delegations from Great Britain and the Dominions and sought to establish a zone

of preferential trade agreements and lowered tariffs known as ‘imperial preference.’ In the lead up to the conference, Latham, then Leader of the Opposition, was in favour of lowering tariffs for the benefit of inter-imperial trade.32 His enthusiasm for the Imperial Economic

Conference was in keeping with the preferences given to the United Kingdom’s imports to

Australia, preferences which were enshrined in legislation in 1907 under the watch of the

Colonial Office’s dependable ally, Alfred Deakin.33 Britain, enchanted by free trade until the

interwar decades, was slow to award similar privileges to the Dominions. Trade preferences

with the Dominions only became politically tenable as the nation grew increasingly reliant on

trade with the countries in its empire. Following the First World War, the United States

replaced England as the world’s foremost exporter and source of finance. Consequently, by

the late-1920s political and business support for laissez-faire trading conditions declined while higher tariffs gained in popularity.34 However, a proposed economic conference to

32 Australia, HOR, Debates, 9 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330309_reps_13_138/. 33 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c.1850–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 128. The similarities between the Ottawa Conference and Deakin’s legislative efforts were also detected by Bruce. “National Broadcasting Company, New York, August 31, 1932: Text of Address by The Right Hon. S.M. Bruce”, typescript, AA1970/559, 4, NAA. 34 Tim Rooth, “Retreating from Globalisation: The British Empire/Commonwealth Experience between the Wars” (unpublished paper, University of Portsmouth, July 2010), accessed 20 January, 2017, http://history.uwo.ca/Conferences/trade-and-conflict/files/rooth.pdf.

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discuss trade preferences and tariffs in August 1931 did not go ahead, possibly based on

unbridgeable differences between some of the Dominions and London.35 James Scullin, who

had ordered the design and implementation of a carefully prepared and supposedly political

neutral ‘scientific tariff’ in 1929 that raised the bar on some British goods,36 was seen as an

opponent to an Empire-wide tariff agenda.37 As Prime Minister, Scullin gave prima facie support to discussing trade treaties at the Imperial Economic Conference but, as federal

Leader of the Opposition after 1931, he criticised the eventual agreement arrived at Ottawa on the basis that it deprived Australians of the opportunity for self-determination in trade policy.38

Britons were enthused by the prospect of Latham and his non-Labor government

overseeing closer inter-imperial economic ties. In November 1931, Copland told Latham that

a conservative victory would rally investor confidence overseas.39 Soon after the federal election’s outcome was known in late December, Australian observers hoped the election of a conservative government would boost chances of a multilateral agreement being reached at

Ottawa in 1932.40 The Times, London, also expressed confidence that the incoming UAP

government could facilitate an agreeable outcome.41 The newspaper wrote that Latham was

amongst Australia’s class of political leaders (incoming Prime Minister Joseph Lyons and the

Country Party leader, Earl Page, were also mentioned in the same sentence) who ‘are known

35 David S. Jacks, “Defying Gravity: The 1932 Imperial Economic Conference and the Reorientation of Canadian Trade” (working paper, London School of Economics and Political Science, January 2011), accessed 29 December, 2016, http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/seminars/EH590Workshop/papers/jacks.pdf. 36 Ann Capling and Brian Galligan, Beyond the Protective State (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 98-99; William Coleman, Selwyn Cornish, and Alf Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon: The Trials and Triumphs of the Economist in Australian Public Life (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), 48. 37 See Scullin’s statements in the press, including: “Mr Scullin. Eager to Face Tasks,” The Argus, 10 January 1931, p. 19; “London Opinion,” The Age, 27 November 1931, p. 8. 38 “Mr. Lyons In Sydney. Defends Ottawa Agreement,” SMH, 18 October 1932, p. 9. 39 Millmow, The Power of Economic Ideas, 125-26. 40 “Big Jobs Ahead. Work for New Regime,” The Sun, 20 December 1931, p. 9. 41 As reported in: “Britain’s Lead,” SMH, 27 November 1931, p. 10.

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to be animated by the same spirit’ of Australian patriotism entangled with imperial fervour.42

Similar eulogies continued for some weeks in the imperial capital. London’s Evening

Standard published a special illustrated supplement on Australia Day 1932, which included

an article by Australian soldier and federal parliamentarian, Sir Granville Ryrie, advocating

preferential trade within the Empire, and an editorial detailing the rejuvenation of Australian

credit following the conservatives’ electoral success.43 This rebound in investor confidence

overseas could only have buttressed Latham’s conviction that a macroeconomic policy

focused on increasing Australia’s credit access in its traditional markets was the sanest path.

Latham argued London and Canberra had ‘jointly’ neglected their economic

responsibilities to one another.44 Many of his public pronouncements on inter-imperial economic relations in the lead-up to the Ottawa Conference echoed this theme: Australia had a responsibility to both Britain and the Empire. This was the tone of the oration he delivered at the Melbourne Town Hall on the evening of Australia Day, 1932. The occasion was the

Australian Natives’ Association annual ‘smoke social,’ which he was attending in Lyons’ stead. Along with the Governor-General, Sir Isaac Isaacs, Latham was an honoured guest speaker. Following a rapturous recital of ‘patriotic Australian songs’—including the National

Anthem and God Bless Australia—and a ‘warm-hearted’ reception to the ‘toast of the King,’

Isaacs talked of the ‘historic’ Imperial Economic Conference. He dressed the British Empire in the anthropomorphised language to which Latham was accustomed, calling the forthcoming meeting a ‘grand family council of the Empire.’ He hoped the agreements reached in the Canadian capital would ‘strengthen the Empire,’ a hope also reflected in

Latham’s words later that evening. The theme of his oration was national ‘privileges and responsibilities.’ Latham argued that the first opportunity Australia had in meeting its

42 Ibid. 43 As reported in: “London Commemoration,” The Age, 27 January 1932, p. 8. 44 “Ottawa,” SMH, 25 April 1932, p. 5.

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external responsibilities, under its new federal government, was the Ottawa Conference.

Extended applause followed. He ended his speech with the reminder that Australia should not

disappoint the British Government’s faith that an agreement could not only be reached at

Ottawa, but that ‘more and better markets … could … be found within the boundaries of our

own Empire.’45

Latham and his government hoped that rejuvenated imperial markets could lift

Australia’s Depression-affected unemployment figures, thereby propping up the existing

social system against political agitation. To acclaim at the Millions Club in Sydney on 19

January 1932, Latham and Lyons spoke together of the capacity for ‘assured markets within

the Empire’ to boost employment in Australia’s primary industries.46 The former believed

the Ottawa meeting ‘would have the greatest significance for Australia,’ particularly for the

‘internal problem of unemployment.’47 Increasing jobs through demand for Australian

exports within the sterling bloc was really the only employment measure Latham supported:

he had committed to reducing government expenditure through the deflationary Premiers’

Plan and he opposed using cheap loans to relieve unemployment.48 At any length, he agreed

with Frederic Eggleston’s sceptical and timely portrayal of socialist experiments in state

politics in State Socialism in Victoria.49 As Attorney-General, and gripped by fear the

communist ‘parasite’ would take root in an impoverished underclass, Latham was

particularly wary of the political discontent fuelled by widespread joblessness.50 Trade deals

45 “Australia’s Destiny. Speeches at A.N.A. Social,” The Age, 27 January 1932, p. 7. 46 “Appeal for Efficiency,” SMH, 20 January 1932, p. 10. 47 “Australia’s Destiny. Speeches at A.N.A. Social,” The Age, 27 January 1932, p. 7. 48 “Central Bank. Mr. Latham’s Attack,” The Argus, 4 June 1930, p. 8. 49 Frederic W. Eggleston, State Socialism in Victoria (London: P.S. King, 1932); Latham to Levinson, letter, 10 March 1933, MS 1009/1/3252, NLA. 50 “Menace of Communism,” 8 May 1933, Examiner, p. 6

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arranged at Ottawa were the democratic panacea to the ‘servility’ of the communist

anathema.51

Latham was not alone in viewing the Ottawa Conference as allied in the struggle

against international Communism. The conference hosts, alarmed by the prospect of growing

Soviet competition with key Canadian exports including timber and wheat, hoped Anglo-

Soviet trade could be curtailed.52 On 11 April 1932, the Sydney Morning Herald ran an

interview Latham gave shortly after arriving in London, in which he discussed both the

‘Sovietisation’ supposedly represented by Lang’s premiership in NSW and the approaching

Ottawa Conference.53 In Britain’s Observer, Latham again raised the spectre of Russia and

Langism, claiming that communism posed the gravest danger to the Empire.54 Latham was

emphatic that Ottawa would reassure the world of the primacy of democratic government in

the Anglosphere.

Inter-imperial economic reciprocity

Global politics was rarely far from Latham’s mind, linking together imperial interests with

the fate of the world. He considered the British Empire the ideal model for a supranational

organisation. Stanley Bruce thought the same, writing that if the Ottawa Conference was not

successful, there would be ‘disastrous results to the British Empire and probably to the whole

world.’55 In the aftermath of Ottawa, Latham kept a keen eye on international reactions.56

While the meeting certainly had interested observers outside the British Empire—Canada’s

51 “Preparations. Preference Extensions,” 11 April 1932, The Age, p. 9. 52 Ian M. Drummond, “Empire Trade and Russian Trade: Economic Diplomacy in the Nineteen-Thirties,” Canadian Journal of Economics 5, no. 1 (1972): 35-47. 53 “Mr. Latham. Arrival in London. Fight Against Langism,” 11 April 1932, SMH, p. 9. 54 “Preparations. Preference Extensions,” 11 April 1932, The Age, p. 9. 55 Bruce to Lyons, letter, 23 August 1932, AA1970/559, NAA. 56 Latham to J.D. Millen, letter, 6 March 1933, MS 1009/1/3312, NLA.

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involvement in imperial preferences greatly alarmed the United States57—sterling remained a competitor amongst a sea of currency blocs in the 1930s.58 Like Bruce, Latham believed the

British Empire could lead the world in confronting the financial crises of the Depression

era.59 He said exactly this in his 9 April 1932 interview in The Times. In congratulating

Britain for balancing its budget, he boasted the imperial centre had ‘retaken the leadership’ in

world affairs.60 The British government had reduced expenditure and had gained greater flexibility in its fiscal policy through suspending the gold standard (albeit as a result of

exhausting its reserves).61 Latham was taking Australia down a similar path.

The Attorney-General also considered the Ottawa Conference an opportunity for the

nation to define its external relations more closely within imperial, rather than global,

limits.62 Latham presented the case that the Commonwealth could not secure comparable

trade agreements in any other international forum, and other efforts at developing a

multilateral response to the Depression had ‘failed.’63 Other international bodies and efforts

were ‘slow’ and ‘gigantic,’ their ‘machinery … lying haphazard and the engineers have not

agreed regarding the plan of assembly.’64 Disunity on economic questions was unavoidable

in the international sphere owing to the ‘different degrees of development’ and ambitions

present in ‘every community.’65 The Dominions, sharing comparative blood and history,

57 Roy McLaren, Commissioners High: Canada in London, 1870-1971 (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 302. 58 Steiner, The Lights that Failed, 695. 59 ‘At Ottawa there would be an opportunity of showing that self-governing peoples have the capacity for formulating a large-scale economic policy.’ “Preparations. Preference Extensions,” 11 April, 1932, The Age, p. 9. 60 “Mr. Latham in London,” The Argus, 11 April 1932, p. 7. 61 Jeremy Wormell, The Management of the National Debt of the United Kingdom 1900-1932, e-book edition (London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004), 589-627. 62 See, for example: “Australia’s Destiny. Speeches at A.N.A. Social,” The Age, 27 January 1932, p. 7. 63 “Preparations. Preference Extensions,” 11 April, 1932, The Age, p. 9. 64 “His Right,” The Sun, 11 April 1932, p. 6. 65 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 44-45.

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represented a community that could overcome differences of opinion on tariff policy. Despite

these ostensible advantages, Latham demanded strenuous preparations on Australia’s part.

Preparing for Ottawa

In the course of an interview in London, published by The Age 11 April 1932, Latham

boasted that Australia was taking the Imperial Economic Conference extremely seriously,

‘carefully preparing’ for its commencement.66 One of Lyons and Latham’s immediate post- election priorities, in conjunction with confirming the makeup of the cabinet, was appointing a minister to lead the Australian delegation to Ottawa.67 Another aspect of the preparations involved the commissioning of a Commonwealth sub-committee that consulted with economists and manufacturing and primary industry peak bodies.68 He later surmised that the

steps taken meant the Commonwealth was prepared for Ottawa ‘in a more thorough way than

for any previous Conference.’69

While Latham thought Australian preparations were of a high calibre, these preparations did not include wide consultation with people outside government.

Businesspeople, for instance, were not consulted. This was due to practical and ideological grounds. At the conference proper, there was limited space for persons outside ministry and the public service in the Australian delegation.70 On 19 February 1932, UAP member for

Wentworth, E.J. Harrison, submitted a question to the prime minister on ‘whether the

66 “Preparations. Preference Extensions,” 11 April, 1932, The Age, p. 9. 67 These discussions, which took place in Latham’s Malvern home shortly after the election, were widely reported in the press. “Ministry. Likely Members,” SMH, 26 December 1931, p. 9. 68 The resulting Wallace Bruce Report was considered politically useful in parts, but Lyons and Bruce distanced themselves from its findings. Millmow, The Power of Economic Ideas, 127-32; Australia, HOR, Debates, 4 March 1932, Lyons, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1932/19320304_reps_13_133/. 69 Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 263. 70 The list of delegates can be found in: “Imperial Economic Conference, Ottawa, 1932. Report of the Conference, Together with Appendices and Annexes,” 2 December 1932, A1667, 430/B/18, NAA.

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Government intends to encourage a delegation of business men to accompany the political

delegation to the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa?’ In response, Lyons said this

proposal had not been considered and would not be entertained.71 ‘[O]fficial consulting

status’ was, however, conferred upon five trade representatives from primary industries, but

these appointments were only made on the understanding that ‘no expense will be incurred

on their behalf by either the Commonwealth or the Canadian Governments.’72 Despite

industry representatives covering completely their costs, most of their requests to accompany the Commonwealth’s delegation were refused by the government.73 This restriction on business involvement in Australia’s negotiations reflected that political considerations were paramount. Similarly, Latham’s reluctance to agree to a Labor request to commission an inquiry by the High Commissioner in London on the ramifications of Ottawa for Australian industry demonstrated a macro view of the Ottawa Agreement.74 Any disadvantages for

domestic businesses in the short-term would eventually be alleviated by the long-term security of prescribed trade preferences backed by strong imperial currency.

Latham asserted that Britain needed to be the recipient of a fair deal at the Ottawa

Conference. He was concerned by the impact decisions made at Ottawa would have on the

United Kingdom and how they could potentially harm imperial unity. In a speech to

Parliament on 28 April 1931, that was described by the leader of the Country Party as

71 Australia, HOR, Debates, 19 February 1932, Lyons, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1932/19320219_reps_13_133/. 72 Lyons to Secretary of the Associated Woollen & Worsted Textile Manufacturers of Australia, letter, 27 June 1932, A786, O40/2, NAA. 73 Lyons to Secretary of Federal Council of Flour Millowners of Australia, letter, 27 June 1932, A786, O40/2, NAA. 74 Latham did, however, assent to finding out general information on this issue. Australia, HOR, Debates, 6 April 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330406_reps_13_138/.

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‘forceful,’ Latham suggested high import duties currently rendered it ‘impossible’ for many

British goods to arrive in the country.75 On this theme, he declared:

it is important for us to remember that we must do everything we can to retain the good-will of Great Britain, which we have enjoyed for so many years. Some items in the tariff imperatively demand reconsideration from that angle.76

When questioned by the Country Party’s leader on this statement two years later, Latham

responded that he ‘believed in what I then said, and I believe in it now.’ Latham was not

approaching the conference with Australian interests solely in mind.77

Publicising Ottawa

Amidst calls for Australia House in London to spearhead an advertising campaign promoting

Australian primary and manufactured goods,78 in April 1932 Latham embarked on a

publicity drive of his own in London. He advertised the advantages of the Ottawa Conference for imperial cohesion. Latham was ostensibly in London to represent the Commonwealth in the New South Wales Government’s appeal to the Privy Council to abolish the state parliament’s upper house, while en route to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Ottawa was in the safe hands of Bruce.79 Despite his more pressing responsibilities, imperial

conference matters took up his time. He had a meeting with the Lord President of the Privy

Council, Stanley Baldwin, in mid-April to discuss the tricky topic of meat tariffs at Ottawa.80

75 Australia, HOR, Debates, 9 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330309_reps_13_138/. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 “Australia. Sound Publicity. Sorely Needed in London,” SMH, 12 February 1932, p. 11. 79 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 100-101. 80 Latham’s 1932 Diary, MS 1009/2/18, NLA; “Must Not Expect Too Much,” The Sun, 24 April 1932, p. 3.

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He also reportedly spruiked the Commonwealth’s deflationary and ‘respectable’ economic methods, pointing out to Britons that £500 million worth of Australian debt held by British bondholders was an asset for England.81 Astute observers noted Latham’s support of

Australia’s Ottawa crusade. Chief Commonwealth entomologist Robert Tillyard, writing to

Latham to congratulate him on his appointment as a Privy Councillor in the New Year, thought the position was a reward for ‘fine work … done for Australia and the Empire at

Ottawa.’82

Latham’s words in mid-1932, given in interviews and speeches, were intended for audiences in Great Britain and in all of the Dominions, not just Australia. His statement to

The Times, which dwelt on the importance of the Ottawa Conference, was widely reprinted in the major metropolitan broadsheets in Australia. The conservative Argus in Latham’s home state printed copy under the sub-heading ‘Holding the Empire Together.’83 In its editorial,

Sydney’s Sun made much of Latham’s pleas for the Dominions to be generous at Ottawa, describing him as a ‘citizen of the Empire’ and possessing ‘disinterested patriotism.’84 His prerogative was endorsing the economic mechanics and supposed political security of the

Empire with the end goal of asking conference delegates to negotiate with the health of the

Empire firmly in their minds. ‘[I]n the Empire we have a political and economic organisation full of vitality and capable of almost infinite adjustment to the varying conditions,’ Latham fawningly claimed.85 The preparations of Australia in the lead-up to Ottawa would be for nought if the Dominion delegations were unwilling to, in Latham’s parlance, ‘give and take.’86 Apart from expressing the usual hope that the conference would lift inter-empire

81 “Australia's Export Quality,” The Age, 3 August 1932, p. 13. 82 R.J. Tillyard to Latham, letter, 4 January 1933, MS 1009/1/3199. 83 “Mr. Latham In London. Fight Against Mr. Lang,” The Argus, 11 April 1932, p. 7. 84 “His Right,” The Sun, 11 April 1932, p. 6. 85 Ibid. 86 “Preparations. Preference Extensions,” 11 April 1932, The Age, p. 9.

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trade and provide the basis for mutual schemes for marketing of Dominion and British goods,

he gave weight to the need for ‘genuine reciprocity.’87 His warning from Australia and the

British Commonwealth that ‘autonomy within the Empire involved responsibility as well as

privilege’ resounded here.88 Drawing upon the apocalyptic imagery that he was fond of

deploying should the Dominions dare act selfishly,89 Latham said if the conference failed

then ‘the Empire might fall apart into separate, and possibly insignificant, fragments.’90 His

views were met with wide approval in London.91

A high-point of Latham’s publicity tour was an address to the Royal Empire Society on 22 April 1932. With offices in every Dominion, the Society was one of the many

‘physical manifestations’ of the Empire across London that acted not only as places of imperial networking but which also helped to promote imperial unity.92 Latham was a

renowned figure in its halls: a member of the Victorian branch, he had secured the

organisation’s services during the governor-general crisis of 1930-31. The occasion of his speech was a ‘Special City Luncheon’ held in his honour at the Cannon Street Hotel.93

The intent of Latham’s speech was threefold. Firstly, to reassure audiences at home

that Australian interests would be secured in the long-run. Secondly, to guarantee to British listeners that his nation’s allegiance to the Empire was as strong as before the Great

Depression as it was during its ravaging of the world’s economies. Thirdly, to argue for an outcome that was mutually beneficial to the Dominions and to the Empire. In an effort to reassure some nervous stakeholders in the eventual outcome of the Ottawa Conference, he

87 Ibid. 88 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 18. 89 Ibid., 16-19. 90 “Preparations. Preference Extensions,” 11 April 1932, The Age, p. 9. 91 “Ottawa Conference. Mr. Latham’s Views,” The Argus, 12 April 1932, p. 7. 92 Woollacott, To Try Her Fortune in London, 74. 93 Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 262.

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said that ‘[i]t will be relatively easy to make adjustments’ to certain terms of agreements,

particularly in regard to fruit and dairy produce.94 He also made it clear to his addressees that

the object of the Ottawa conference from Canberra’s point of view was not just securing

Australian interest but also imperial interests. ‘Unless we combine on an economic front,’ he

said, ‘the results will be disastrous to the entire Empire and for this reason Australia is

sparing no effort.95

Latham was careful to highlight that the imperial credentials of his government did

not mean Australia would accept sacrifices for Empire unity without benefits in return.

Presenting dry economic figures from Australia’s trade across 1928-30—mostly years of

conservative government in Canberra—Latham argued that trade preference for Britain ‘has

been a real and substantial one, and has not been a pretended and illusive thing.’96 In

positioning Australia as a loyal trading partner, he expected Australians would fairly profit

from proceedings at Ottawa, arguing the trading relationship could not be ‘one-way.’97 He

evidently hoped the meeting would put imperial relations on a reciprocal footing akin to the

symbiotic relationship he had written about in his 1929 book.98 He had pushed pro-British interests in his speeches at home, and presented a more forceful Australian front abroad, albeit definitely within an imperial framework. If the Empire failed to embrace mutually beneficial and selfless trade arrangements, he thought international organisations were unlikely to respond with the agility demanded by the Depression. Despite being only weeks away from attending the international Disarmament Conference in Geneva—one of the interwar period’s historic examples of global goodwill and cooperation—he claimed the

Empire ‘cannot wait for international action’ and must solve its problems ‘without delay.’99

94 Ibid., 264-65. 95 “Ottawa,” SMH, 25 April 1932, p. 5. (1932, April 25). 96 Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 264. 97 Ibid., 265. 98 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 16. 99 “Ottawa,” SMH, 25 April 1932, p. 5.

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Along with casting a pall over Australia’s contribution to the looming Disarmament

Conference and the League of Nations generally, his speech emphasised that he placed

greatest weight on external relations filtered through the sieve of British imperialism.

Defending the inter-imperial economy after Ottawa

Despite the public relations efforts of Latham and other imperial unity advocates,100 the

Ottawa Conference was not as cordial as hoped. Purportedly, the atmosphere at the meeting

‘was charged with suspicion and less than friendly’.101 It had been reduced to the ‘bargaining ground’ Bruce had earlier thought unimaginable.102 While trade connections amongst Great

Britain, the Dominions, and the colonies registered a slight uptick, no substantial scope was

awarded for the investment in projects to develop the Empire.103 A uniform arrangement

went begging as the British delegation was forced to negotiate separate trade agreements

with individual Dominion delegations, which proved largely unwilling to surrender their national agendas.104 The series of bilateral agreements concluded in August 1932 were the

outcome of delegates to Ottawa acting ‘as representatives for their national industrial or

agricultural interests, not as imperial politicians planning a glorious common future.’105

Britain’s preparedness to disadvantage their local industries for the advantage of London’s

100 British conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin and Colonial and Dominions Secretary, Leo Amery were particularly prominent in the pro-imperial campaign, as was the enthusiastic Canadian Prime Minister, R.B. Bennett. Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience: Volume Two: From British to Multiracial Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1982), 39-40. 101 Richard Perren, Taste, Trade and Technology: The Development of the International Meat Industry Since 1840 (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 136. Bruce’s private comments reinforce the perception that the Ottawa Conference was laden with animosity. Bruce to Pearce, letter, 14 September 1932, AA1970/559, 4, NAA. 102 Bruce, “Notes for Speech – Commercial Travellers’ Club,” dated 1932, AA1970/559, 4, NAA. 103 Cameron Muir, The Broken Promise of Agricultural Progress: An Environmental History (London: Routledge, 2014), 124. 104 Canada would not have signed an agreement at Ottawa if Britain had not relinquished its Anglo-Soviet trade deal. Drummond, “Empire Trade and Russian Trade,” 47. 105 Robert J.A. Skidelsky, “Retreat from Leadership: The Evolution of British Economic Foreign Policy, 1870- 1939,” in Balance of Power or Hegemon: The Interwar Monetary System, ed. Benjamin M. Rowland (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 180.

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financial services ensured an agreement was nevertheless concluded.106 Even though the

leader of Australia’s delegation demonstrated readiness ‘to temper Australian demands in the

broader imperial interest,’ Bruce nonetheless demanded concessions from British delegates

on foreign meat imports to Britain.107 Bruce’s actions, however, matched the ‘give and take’

paradigm Latham expected of the conference. As discussed below, Latham expressed some

dissatisfaction with the overall results of Ottawa for imperial solidarity, although he

remained hopeful it could form the groundwork for further efforts to draw together the

British Empire.

While Bruce busied himself abroad spruiking the benefits of the Ottawa Conference

for the British Empire,108 Latham did the same in Canberra. He was Acting Prime Minister

and Acting Leader of the House of Representatives—alongside his permanent roles of

Minister for External Affairs, Minister for Industry, and Attorney-General—during the

domestic political tussles over the Ottawa Agreement. These commitments located him as the

Lower House’s most visible and vocal defender of the federal government’s commitment to

the program established at Ottawa. During the parliament’s debates on the agreement, he

reiterated many of the themes included in his earlier speeches in London: Australia was not

an isolated nation; it could not selfishly prioritise its terms of trade above the interests of

others; and the nation needed to buy and sell commodities. Latham asserted that self-

government did not mean self-sufficiency in all things, arguing

Australia needs her markets overseas. It is important to us that we shall develop and cultivate real and friendly relations with nations that afford markets for our producers of many commodities.’109

106 Akita and Kagotani, “The International Order of Asia in the 1930s,” 149; Spencer Mawby, The Transformation and Decline of the British Empire: Decolonisation After the First World War (London: Palgrave, 2015), 122. 107 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 101. 108 “National Broadcasting Company, New York, August 31, 1932: Text of Address by The Right Hon. S.M. Bruce”, typescript, AA1970/559, 4, NAA. 109 Australia, HOR, Debates, 23 May 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330523_reps_13_139/.

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He used the outcome of the Imperial Economic Conference to underline the imperial network

that was to support Australia’s economic projection:

The Ottawa agreement is the first step towards maintaining and extending the most important of all these markets for the Australian producers. We want to proceed further along the same line in the interests of our own people, and we should take every opportunity to establish friendly relations with other peoples.110

Here, too, the seeds of Latham’s Australian Eastern Mission are visible (see next chapter).

Speaking to the Constitutional Association in Melbourne on 4 April 1933, Latham reiterated

his parliamentary pronouncements. Australia could not hope to be ‘self-contained’ and

pursue a ‘one-way trade’ policy that prioritised exports over imports. Warning that self-

sufficiency in goods was ‘impossible,’ he maintained that Australia could only achieve economic efficiency within the British Empire and the Ottawa trade pact. In fact, to abandon the 1932 agreement as early as 1933 would lead to ‘ruin and disaster, and practically the abolition of our [Australia’s] standard of living.’ The UAP, he said, ‘did not pretend to be a

free-trade party.’111 Latham’s disavowal of free trade, even within the British Empire, as

impractical was reported in the House of Lords.112

By siding with the Ottawa Agreement, Latham believed he was pursuing a middle

path in trade policy that looked beyond the confines of local politics and conditions. In his

view, his government’s pursuit of inter-imperial trade satisfied supporters of free trade and

those in the protectionist camp. This ‘middle way’ represented ‘fair mindedness and honest

efforts of the Government to carry out a policy which is in the general interests of the

110 Ibid. 111 “Tariff Policy. Mr. Latham’s Defence,” The Age, 4 April 1933, p. 9. 112 United Kingdom, House of Lords, Debates, 21 May 1930, Earl Beauchamp, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1930/may/21/unemployment-and-fiscal-policy.

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community’—Latham referred to the British Empire as a ‘community of nations’113—in the

face of intense scrutiny from hard-liners on each side of the tariff debate.114 He felt enfiladed

on two sides in the readings of the tariff bills that emerged from Ottawa, and from Labor on one side and the Country Party on the other. Scullin referred to this situation as a ‘triangular contest.’115 Undoubtedly feeling frustrated by this ‘contest,’ Latham characterised opposition

to inter-imperial trade preferences as betraying deeper anti-Empire and anti-British

sentiment.

The Country Party’s opposition to the government’s tariff policies particularly

incensed Latham. In a fiery letter to the Prime Minister on 10 March 1934, he accused the

UAP’s usual allies of engaging in ‘political propaganda.’116 The protectionist-minded

Country Party, alive to the concerns of primary producers that the Ottawa Agreement disadvantaged them, argued the Commonwealth’s approach was pro-British at the expense of national industries.117 To the contrary, Latham was disappointed to learn that the outcome of

Ottawa disadvantaged the manufacturers of Britain to the advantage of Australia and the

Dominions. In a 1932 speech challenging the Imperial Economic Conference accord, British

Liberal leader, Sir Herbert Samuel, who resigned from the United Kingdom’s National

Government over tariff disagreements, quoted Latham’s words as they were reported in The

Times: ‘the Agreements offered very fair advantages to Australia, while for Great Britain

they involved the imposition of taxes on food and restrictive arrangements which would

increase food prices.’118 Latham had accurately detected the UK would absorb an increase in

113 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 9. 114 Australia, HOR, Debates, 6 April 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330406_reps_13_138/. 115 Ibid. 116 Latham to Lyons, letter, 10 March 1932, CP30/3, 53, NAA. 117 Australia, HOR, Debates, 9 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330309_reps_13_138/. 118 “Leader’s Speech, 1932. Herbert Samuel (Liberal),” British Political Speech, accessed 30 December, 2016, http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=30.

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Australian exports because of the settlements reached at Ottawa in 1932.119 Many Britons

ultimately resented the terms and burdens of the Ottawa Agreement.120

Given his high visibility in the Commonwealth parliament and his imperial mindset,

Latham was a target in Labor’s criticism of the Ottawa Agreement and the Lyons

Government’s record on employment and tariffs. Only days before Christmas 1932, Scullin

delivered an indictment of the federal government on a Melbourne radio station, 3AK. The

Ottawa Agreement was singled out by the Leader of the Opposition for striking blows at

Australian industries and ‘seriously affecting employment.’121 He went on to accuse Latham

of misleading parliament on the nature of the imports arriving in the country in the months

following the conclusion of the agreement.122 Latham responded promptly. The same day the

report on Scullin’s radio speech was printed in The Age,123 Latham telegrammed Lyons’

secretary at 7 pm. He urged the Prime Minister’s Department to ‘get something out [to the

press] on’ the slight uptick in the unemployment figures for the December quarter.124 (The

positive change in unemployment Latham eagerly wanted publicised flagged the beginning

of a trend that would see national unemployment fall from a high of 19¾ per cent in mid-

1932 to 9 per cent by 1937).125 Even though the employment figures would not be finalised

by the Commonwealth statistician until after Christmas,126 the Lyons Ministry’s response to

Scullin went to press two days later.127 No doubt thankful that his government had not been

119 Tim Rooth, “Ottawa and After,” in Between Empire and Nation: Australia's External Relations from Federation to the Second World War, ed. Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), 110. 120 John B. O’Brien, “F.L. McDougall and the Origins of the FAO,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 46, no. 2 (2000): 166. 121 “Imports and Unemployment,” The Age, 19 December 1932, p. 7. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Latham to Threlfall, letter 19 December 1932, CP30/3, 53, NAA. 125 David Gruen and Colin Clark, “What Have We Learnt? The Great Depression in Australia from the Perspective of Today,” (19th Annual Colin Clark Memorial Lecture, Brisbane, 11 November 2009), http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1689/PDF/03_Colin_Clark_speech.pdf. 126 Threlfall to Latham, letter, 20 December 1932, NAA: CP30/3, 53, NAA. 127 “Signs of Recovery,” The Argus, 21 December 1932, p. 7.

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silent about criticism of its unemployment record—particularly in view of Latham’s prior

hopes for Ottawa to deliver blows against joblessness and communism—he swiftly

congratulated Lyons’ secretary for his efforts in getting the statement to the media.128

Honouring Ottawa

As the Ottawa Agreement reduced tariffs and restrictions on many imports from the

Dominions and dependencies of the British Empire, there were clashes with domestic

industry. Australia’s banana industry was amongst those troubled industries. 40,000 centals

(a cental is 100 pounds in weight) of bananas were arriving from Fiji when the issue was

debated in the House on 22 March 1933. The Labor Party claimed the reduced import duties

on Fijian bananas hit ‘a blow at a great Australian primary industry in which thousands of

returned soldiers are engaged.’ In response, Latham invoked the interests of the Empire. In

an energetic defence of the banana tariff, he said that the duty on bananas originating from

Fiji was the same as duties applied to goods imported from Britain. The extension of

concessions was now simply applied across the entire Empire rather than favouring the

traditional imperial centre. The enhanced inclusivity in accordance with the Ottawa

Agreement meant Australia would also benefit from concessions and special terms with all

British colonies. Latham argued that imperial guarantees of this kind meant Australian trade

interests ‘with the Crown colonies’ would be considerably extended, ‘particularly those to

the north of Australia, on the continent of Asia, as well as those in the Pacific.’129 Within this

statement lies another kernel for Latham’s Australian Eastern Mission the following year:

128 Latham to Threlfall, letter, 22 December 1932, CP30/3, 53, NAA. 129 Australia, HOR, Debates, 22 March 1933, Frank Forde, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330322_reps_13_138/.

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under the terms of the Ottawa Agreement, Australia had greater trade connections with the

Asia-Pacific region.

Over the course of Lower House debates on Ottawa, Latham returned to his earlier

defences of reciprocity within the Empire. He claimed ‘[i]t is quite hopeless for Australia to

expect always to sell and never to buy.’130 ‘It is quite right for Americans “to buy

American,”’ he wrote to Senator John Millen, ‘but of course quite wrong for those belonging

to the British Empire to buy British.’131 Latham drew on this theme in other tariff debates.

On 9 March 1933, he said that ‘[e]very agreement must allow for a certain amount of give

and take, and that is the case with … Ottawa.’132 Indeed, the admission of Fijian bananas had

‘important bearing on the Ottawa agreement - because if this duty disappears the Ottawa agreement goes.’133 Assistant Minister Harry Lawson summed up the position in Canberra

when he told the Senate on 5 July 1934 that the government ‘adhered to the policy of

promoting trade within the Empire’ and a belief ‘in trade reciprocity and trade preference.’134

However, Latham made some concessions. Later, on 30 November 1933, the Labor

Party submitted a question on whether the Commonwealth’s duty profits yielded from banana importation would be used as relief funds for banana growers on the east coast of

Australia. ‘A large portion of it [duties collected on imported bananas] is expended to benefit the Australian industry generally by way of scientific investigation and research,’ Latham claimed.135 Overall, he agreed with his opponents that flexible tariff arrangements under the

130 Ibid. 131 Latham to J.D. Millen, letter, 6 March 1933, MS 1009/1/3312, NLA. 132 Australia, HOR, Debates, 9 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330309_reps_13_138/. 133 Australia, HOR, Debates, 22 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330322_reps_13_138/. 134 Australia, Senate, Debates, 5 July 1934, Harry Lawson, http://historichansard.net/senate/1934/19340705_senate_13_144/. 135 Australia, HOR, Debates, 6 April 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330406_reps_13_138/.

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Ottawa Agreement umbrella were preferable. In relation to trade barriers, he said ‘it is

impossible to lay down universal and absolutely mathematical and dogmatic rules in these

matters.’136 This was reminiscent of his arguments against the Statute of Westminster, and a

refutation of Scullin’s allegedly objective ‘scientific tariff.’137 The idea tariffs could be

apolitical levers on the economy, popular with some moderate protectionists in late-1920s

Australia, was evidently not favoured by Latham.138

The determination of the Lyons Government to enact the Ottawa Agreement was

reinforced under Latham’s direction on 6 April 1933. During the second reading on a bill on

tariff rates, Latham asserted ‘[t]he Ottawa agreement is being performed beyond question by

this Government.’139 The agreement also, predictably, meshed nicely with a policy agenda

that the UAP had taken to the 1931 federal election: to reduce duties on imported goods.

Later, in July 1933, Latham reiterated that the outcome of the 1932 Imperial Economic

Conference aligned with a key pillar the UAP had taken to the 1931 federal election. In the same breath, he referred to critics of Australia in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons who had suggested the Commonwealth was not acting in the spirit of the Ottawa Agreement.

Latham, in turn, reminded his British counterparts that ‘everything Australia had agreed to under the Ottawa pact had been carried out … to the letter.’140 He was especially unwilling to

accept criticism of the Ottawa Agreement from international quarters. In specific reference to

an article in the American journal The Saturday Evening Post, he thought that Americans

were being ‘impertinent’ for their attacks on the British Empire awarding ‘first preference to

136 Australia, HOR, Debates, 9 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330309_reps_13_138/. 137 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 19. 138 Coleman et al., Giblin’s Platoon, 65-68. 139 Australia, HOR, Debates, 6 April 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330406_reps_13_138/. 140 “The Ottawa Agreement,” The Age, 22 July 1933, p. 13.

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Empire goods.’141 Later in 1933, Latham was to be vitriolic in his assessment of the global

equivalent of the Ottawa Conference: the World Economic Conference.

Converting sovereign loans respectably

Alongside shepherding the customs and tariff adjustments through Parliament over the

course of late-1932 to the end of 1933,142 Latham (and the Australian Commonwealth and

state governments) was concerned by external debt.143 In 1931, the Scullin Government had

legislated to coerce domestic holders of government debt to substantially lower interest rates

on existing balances;144 the Lyons Government hoped to use diplomacy to reach a similar

outcome with British bondholders.145 Following Ottawa, one of Bruce’s responsibilities as

Resident Minister in London was pursuing the conversion of £84 million in matured loans

held by British bondholders.146 Latham lamented that he would not be in London but

expressed gratitude for having Bruce ‘watch things.’147 London and Canberra fundamentally

disagreed on the portion of that amount that could be converted to a lower interest rate. The

Australian government’s broker, Lord Glendyne of Nivisons, as well as the Chancellor of the

Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, and the Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu

Norman, wanted an incremental conversion over two years. Lyons, however, wanted the full

debt converted as quickly as possible.148 Throughout the negotiations, Latham coveted a

141 Latham to J.D. Millen, letter, 6 March 1933, MS 1009/1/3312, NLA. 142 Customs Tariff (Exchange Adjustment) Act, 1933 (Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1933A00029/Download. This act reflected the changes requested by the Ottawa Conference, and was assented to on 4 December 1933. 143 Although neglected in the historiography, Latham features frequently and prominently in the cables and conversations between Canberra and London. See: Series M110, 1 and M110, 2, NAA. 144 Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, 263-64. 145 An accessible overview of these negotiations is found in Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 102-05. 146 Lyons makes it clear that debt conversion was just one of the tasks assigned to Bruce. He was certainly there to meet British officials in advance of the World Economic Conference. Attard, “Financial Diplomacy,” 92-109. 147 Latham to Lord Macmillan, letter, 28 February 1933, MS 1009/1/3261, NLA. 148 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 103.

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cautious approach that was more in-line with the British position than Lyons’.149 While

Bruce warned his British counterparts that the interval scheme was politically unpopular in

Australia, he understood that he could not imperil imperial economic relations nor the

reputation of Australian stocks. 150 The situation called for delicacy. Despite Latham not

holding the treasury or trade portfolios, he had argued for reducing the interest paid on

sovereign debt since his time as Opposition Leader.151 His trusted diplomacy, honed in

British circles, was called on to help guide negotiations in London.152

While scholars have suggested that the Australian governments maintained their loan

repayments in the self-seeking and narrow hope of favourable treatment from London

financiers,153 an analysis of Latham’s treatment of a memorandum dated 8 February 1933,

destined to land on Bruce’s desk for circulation to British officials, reveals that he did not

strictly follow this line of thinking. The confidential document emerged out of a private

meeting of the Loan Council, which was comprised of the relevant Commonwealth ministers

and state premiers or their delegates. The memo stated that the ‘increasingly impatient’

public compelled the case for immediate assistance from the British government.154

Extensively detailed were the sacrifices, including the slashing of spending on social

services,155 which Australia had already made to meet its considerable debt repayment

149 See, for example: Latham to Bruce, letter, 16 February 1933, M110, 2, NAA. 150 Notes by Bruce of interview with Lord Glendyne, typescript, 28 October 1932; Notes by Bruce of interview with Governor of the Bank of England, typescript, 2 November 1932, M110, 1, NAA. 151 Australia, HOR, Debates, 19 June 1931, Latham,http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310619_reps_12_130/. 152 Notes by Bruce of conversation with Latham by telephone, typescript, 18 February 1933, M110/1, 2, NAA. 153 Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, “The Anatomy of Financial Crises,” in Threats to International Financial Stability, ed. Richard Portes and Alexander K. Swoboda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 20; J.J. Pincus, “Australian Budgetary Policies in the 1930s,” in Recovery from Depression: Australia and the World Economy in the 1930s, ed. R.G. Gregory and N.G. Butlin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 177. 154 Greene to Sheehan, letter, 8 February 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. 155 John Murphy, A Decent Provision: Australian Welfare Policy, 1870 to 1949 (London: Ashgate, 2011), 157- 82.

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obligations.156 Latham removed the line ‘[a]ll these things [cutting expenditure] have been

done to maintain the incomes of her oversea [sic] creditors.’ In the place of this statement,

Latham inserted a line that better reflected his perception of Australia’s role in the Empire:

Only the overseas creditor has not been reduced and there is a strongly growing feeling which therefore regards these severe local reductions as having been made merely to maintain his position.157

This revision changed the meaning of a line that the Loans Council had agreed upon. Rather

than implying bitterness or that Australian governments desired their ‘backs scratched’ in

return, now the line implied Australia’s privations were for other purposes. While perhaps

hinting at Australia’s commitment to firming the value of sterling, Latham was probably

embedding a reference to his oft-stated belief that the Dominions had a responsibility to be

respectable and responsible citizens of the Empire.158 He was also sensitive to how the

Australian-British connection was portrayed. He crossed out the word ‘foreign’ and replaced it with ‘overseas’ in reference to British bondholders.159 Something so seemingly minor

reflected his shared conviction with Bruce that ‘strained’ relations between Australia and

Britain over loan conversion would detrimentally affect the Empire and affect the uptake of

future government bonds.160 Later, he disagreed with Lyons and the New Zealand

government’s suggestion that the two Dominions should pressure London with a united front

on debt conversion.161 As discussed below, Latham would do everything he could to impress

on the financial hierarchy in Great Britain that the longer negotiations dragged on the more

damage the Empire would suffer.

156 Greene to Sheehan, letter, 8 February 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. 157 Ibid. 158 See, for example: “World Affairs. Greater Interest by Australia,” The Canberra Times, 6 October 1932, p. 2. 159 Greene to Sheehan, letter, 8 February 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. 160 Notes by Bruce of his Interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, typescript, 10 November 1932, M110, 1, NAA. 161 Latham to Greene, letter, 22 March 1933, A11874, 4; Latham to Bruce, cable, 24 March 1933, M110, 2, NAA.

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Following British advice

In April 1933, he decisively intervened at a critical juncture in discussions over loan

conversion. Negotiations had effectively stalled. Lyons was increasingly anxious about the

political situation at home,162 and British investors had recently shown little interest in

acquiring almost £5 million of NSW government debt.163 Despite these disconcerting conditions, Latham was composed in his ‘long’ telephone conversation with Bruce on 5 April

1933.164 Two days earlier, Bruce had telegrammed advice that Chamberlain and Norman

guaranteed to use their ‘influence to ensure subscription of loan or provision of short term

finance to cover any deficiency’ on a conversion of £26 million. Bruce wanted almost twice

that amount converted: £43 million.165 Latham had two objectives to achieve from his phone

call. The first, to impress on Bruce that inter-imperial relations should not be endangered, as the domestic situation was not presently critical.166 The second, to follow British advice as

was feasible.

Under these conditions, he advised Bruce to take up the case for the conversion of

£43 million of sovereign debt at four per cent. He insisted that ‘everything possible’ should

be done ‘to obtain the indirect and generous assistance’ of Chamberlain and Norman. He

agreed with Chamberlain that so-called ‘direct assistance’—which would have involved the

British government underwriting the debt by an act of the UK Parliament—was unthinkable

as it might set a precedent for Britain compulsorily underwriting Dominion sovereign debt;

162 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 103. 163 Bruce to Lyons, cable, 7 March 1933, M110/1, 2, NAA. 164 Notes by Bruce of conversation with Latham by telephone, typescript, 5 April 1933, M110/1, 2, NAA. 165 Bruce to Lyons, cable, 3 April 1933, M110, 2, NAA. 166 He thought Australia was not at risk of immediate default and deemed the political situation ‘quiet’ overall. Notes of telephone conversation between Latham and Bruce, transcript, 5 April 1933, A11874, 4, NAA.

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an outcome that would strain the Empire immeasurably.167 Diplomacy behind closed doors

suited Latham better. He suggested that Bruce, in the course of discussions with officials,

reveal that British advice:

has been very carefully considered, and the importance of their views recognised, and we are anxious to be guided by them, as far as possible, and in deference to their views.168

Bruce was satisfied with this advice and asked Latham to transcribe it in a cable to be sent

immediately on the prime minister’s behalf.169

Latham’s cable was subsequently submitted in negotiations with the Chancellor of the

Exchequer and the Bank of England, but the Australian position was repeatedly rebuffed.170

These interviews impressed on Bruce that he should soften his negotiating posture. He

subsequently advised Lyons to agree to a series of smaller conversions.171 He telephoned

Latham and Lyons on 13 May 1933 to discuss this proposal. Bruce was looking for advice on

whether a figure less than £43 million would be politically acceptable in Australia. He

received no definitive response from Lyons in the course of the conversation. Latham,

however, was receptive to revising Canberra’s position to be more in-line with London’s. He

talked ‘a few minutes’ without the PM present and in ‘rather clearer’ terms, implying that

167 Notes of telephone conversation between Latham and Bruce, transcript, 5 April 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. Having said this, Latham favoured the British government giving compensation to trustees of Australian loans who opted to roll-over to the lower interest rate rather than elect to take cash. Secretary to the Treasurer to Bruce, letter, 10 February 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. 168 Notes of telephone conversation between Latham and Bruce, transcript, 5 April 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. 169 Latham to Bruce and Bruce to Latham, cables, 6 April 1933, M110, 2; Latham to Bruce, cable, 7 April 1933, M110, 2, NAA. 170 Notes by Bruce on his interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, typescript, 10 April 1933, M110, 1; Notes by Bruce on his interview with the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, typescript, 10 April 1933, M110, 1; Notes by Bruce on his interview with the Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, typescript, 12 April 1933, M110, 1, NAA. 171 Bruce to Lyons, cable, 13 May 1933, M110, 2, NAA.

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‘something less than 43 million would do,’ although Bruce said the conversation did not reach ‘anything really definite.’172 The need for something definite was mounting, however.

A few days later, federal Labor were making forceful inquiries into the

Commonwealth’s failure to secure a reduction in the interest Australia paid on its British loans, a development that concerned Lyons.173 On 17 May 1933, Scullin successfully

delayed the adjournment of the House of Representatives to discuss ‘plainly’ Australia’s

failure to receive hitherto ‘more sympathetic consideration … from the British Treasury, and

the banks and other financial groups in Great Britain.’ Lang Labor supporter Jack Beasley

reinforced Scullin’s cynicism, bluntly stating that ‘the time for plain speaking arrived over

two years ago.’ Beasley called Bruce’s mission a failure and pressed for his ‘recall’ from

London, a demand Latham found ‘personally offensive.’ In a sign that he hoped this parliamentary debate would reach Great Britain and ‘serve a useful purpose,’ Latham

actually welcomed Scullin introducing the subject to the Lower House, saying he did so ‘in a

manner and tone worthy of its importance and significance.’174

Throughout the heated 17 May debate on overseas loans, Latham returned to the

theme of responsible government and its responsibility to Empire. ‘What has been done in

Australia in order to preserve the reputation, honour and prestige of our people,’ he said, ‘has

not, I think, been sufficiently recognized [sic] in all quarters overseas.’175 If Great Britain

understood the efforts Australia had made to balance the budget it would act in greater haste

to ease the country’s interest repayment burden, was a theme detectable in the Loans Council

172 Notes by Bruce on telephone conversation with Lyons and Latham, typescript, 13 May 1933, M110, 2, NAA. 173 Lyons to Bruce, cable, 18 May 1933, M110, 2, NAA. 174 Australia, HOR, Debates, 17 May 1933, Scullin, Jack Beasley, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330517_reps_13_139/. 175 Ibid.

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memo of 8 February that Latham co-authored.176 While defending the secrecy and length of

negotiations thus far, he nonetheless warned financiers and treasury officials in London that

‘[p]atience cannot last for ever.’ ‘Unless some action which is fair in the circumstances is

taken,’ he implied the ideas expressed by Labor would spread and threaten Australian

perceptions of the British connection.177

Some relief for Australia and the integrity of its imperial connection soon came. At

the end of May, Bruce arranged with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Bank of

England for £11.4 million worth of Australian debt to be converted at 3.5 per cent interest.178

This conversion was the first in a series of smaller operations that would see the whole £84

million converted to favourable interest rates between 4 and 3.5 per cent by February

1934.179 These final arrangements, and the Commonwealth’s management of budgetary and

trade affairs since 1932, were warmly received in the British press.180 Latham also

demonstrated his pleasure at the conversion results, even if they fell short of his initial hope

for fewer conversion operations. He felt his adherence to deflationary economic policy had

been thoroughly vindicated. ‘The Commonwealth,’ said Latham in a broadcast speech from

Perth on 20 July 1932,

stands very high to-day in public esteem in Great Britain, where people are beginning to realise the vital difference between dominions of the British Empire which pay all their debts and the many countries which have defaulted.181

176 Greene to Sheehan, letter, 8 February 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. 177 Australia, HOR, Debates, 17 May 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330517_reps_13_139/. 178 Bruce to Lyons, cable, 26 May 1933, M110, 2, NAA. 179 Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 109-10. 180 Bruce to Lyons, cable 14 July 1933, M110, 2, NAA. 181 “Mr. Latham. Impressions Abroad. Confidence in Australia,” SMH, 20 July 1932, p. 11.

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At the Australian Women’s National League annual conference at Melbourne’s Independent

Hall on 26 September 1933, Latham applauded Bruce’s negotiating skills and claimed the

conversions had saved the Commonwealth £1.5 million annually.182 In Latham’s eyes and

those of other government ministers, imperial networks had again triumphed where

‘international action’ had failed.183

Obstructing internationalism

The 1933 World Economic Conference was an example of abortive international cooperation

during Latham’s final parliamentary term. From 12 June to 27 July that year, representatives

from 64 countries gathered in London intent on harmonising tariffs and monetary systems

and boosting faltering international trade. The prospects of the meeting were dimmed by the

failure of Britain and France’s earlier negotiations in Washington with the newly elected

Roosevelt administration.184 Bruce, now the High Commissioner in London, led Australia’s

delegation to the conference, which was much smaller in number than the delegation to

Ottawa one year earlier.185 Back in Australia, Latham was Acting Prime Minister for some of

the conference’s duration. Out of concern for the Commonwealth’s commitment to the

sterling bloc, Bruce was pleased to obtain guarantees from British delegates that sterling

would not be pegged to gold currencies and that future decisions on monetary policy would

proceed on an imperial unity basis.186 Australia’s hard-line stance on this Dominion unity

182 “Women in Politics,” The Age, 26 September 1933, p. 10. 183 “The Next Step. Action by British Empire,” The Age, 25 July 1933, p. 9. 184 Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin, and Gianni Toniolo, “International Economic Organization: Banking, Finance, and Trade in Europe between the Wars,” in Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe Between the Wars, ed. Charles H. Feinstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 52-53; Patricia P. Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 105-11. 185 Sean Turnell, “F. L. McDougall: Eminence Grise of Australian Economic Diplomacy,” Australian Economic History Review 40, no. 1, (2000): 57. 186 Bruce to Lyons, cable, 1 July 1933, A981, ECO21, NAA.

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heralded the conference’s inconclusive results, with delegations failing to reach overall

international agreement.187 This result, according to economic historians Barry Eichengreen

and Marc Uzan, discouraged further ‘collaboration in the diplomatic sphere.’188 Latham had

also reached this conclusion.

Already convinced that internationalism could not relieve the Depression for

Australia and the world, Latham insisted that the variety of economic policy and theory

around the world made ‘difficult, if not impossible, to secure international agreement on the

administration of finance, currency, and credit. I can see no real prospect of it.’189 Latham’s unrelenting pessimism coloured his approach to the conference. Telephone transcripts of conversations between him and Bruce in early April 1933 reveal minimal time was allocated for discussing the meeting compared to Australian-British matters.190 When the London

conference was still in its opening sessions, Latham advised Bruce on 16 June to obstruct a

proposal for compulsory restriction of wheat production.191 This advice was based on

Latham’s assessment that disappointing trade volumes were underlined by ‘problems of

distribution’ rather than quantity of production.192 That evening, he attended the monthly

Boobooks dinner held in Melbourne. Events in the imperial metropolis drew no comment

from the dining club, typically gripped by topical international events. This is especially

surprising in this case, since the speaker was economist, Edward Shann, who made an off-

hand remark on the difficulty of taking conferences ‘seriously’ anymore.193 While Latham

187 Sean Turnell, “Monetary Reformers, Amateur Idealists and Keynesian Crusaders: Australian Economists’ International Advocacy, 1925-1950” (PhD. Diss., Macquarie University, 1999), 63-64. 188 Barry Eichengreen and Marc Uzan, “The 1933 World Economic Conference as an Instance of Failed International Cooperation,” in Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 171. 189 “Mr. Latham. Agreement Unlikely,” SMH, 9 August 1932, p. 8. 190 Notes of telephone conversation between Latham and Bruce, transcript, 5 April 1933, A11874, 4, NAA. 191 Latham to Bruce, letter, 16 June 1933, A981, Conference 117/Part 2, NAA. 192 Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 263. 193 Douglas Copland would later deliver a report on the World Economic Conference to the club, but the minutes disingenuously equated the conference as a meeting of religious leaders from competing

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was still one of the Boobooks men to take conferences seriously, these needed to be inter-

imperial in character.

In an anti-Keynesian move, Latham later ordered the delegation not to cooperate on a

scheme for international finance of public works.194 Towards the conference close, Bruce had

precipitated a furore by denouncing the delegates’ general support for hastening worldwide

price increases through mandated restrictions on the production of primary resources.195 It is

possible that Bruce’s challenge was inspired by Latham’s earlier advice to rule Australia out

of compulsory restriction talks on the basis that it was simply unworkable.196 In the aftermath

of the London conference, Latham thought the High Commissioner was possibly ‘the only

statesman’ who had enhanced his reputation over the course of its deliberations.197 Keen to

emphasise that only solutions formulated within the network of the British Empire could

answer economic conundrums, Latham was quick to draw attention to the World Economic

Conference’s failure in the press.

Privy to the Australian delegation’s insider view of proceedings, Latham publicly

forewarned of the conference’s failure. More than a week out from the conference’s official

conclusion, he dismissed the conference as failure at the annual smoke night of the Returned

Soldiers’ League, held on 19 July at Anzac House, Melbourne. Divergent interests of the

participating countries had contributed to insurmountable ‘inherent difficulties’;198 an

denominations. In effect, the Boobooks mocked the London conference as an event organised and conducted under fictional assumptions rather than reality. Minutes of 298th Meeting, 16 June 1933, Boobooks/3/17; Minutes of 304th Meeting, 16 March 1933, Boobooks/3/17, UMA. 194 Latham to Bruce, cable, 28 July 1933, A981, Conference 117/Part 4, NAA. 195 Australia Delegation to the Monetary and Economic Conference, 1933, London, “Monetary and Economic Conference, London, 1933. Report covering the period 12th June-26th July, 1933,” Parliamentary Paper No. 186 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1933), 32; Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 105. 196 Bruce’s key adviser at the World Economic Conference, Frank McDougall, was also an influence on Bruce’s expansionary thinking. Latham to Bruce, cable, 16 June 1933, A981, Conference 117/Part 2, NAA; Turnell, “F. L. McDougall,” 56. 197 “Recovery. Rewards for Sacrifice,” SMH, 26 September 1933, p. 10. 198 “Empire Conference,” The Canberra Time, 21 July 1933, p. 1.

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evaluation essentially lifted from Australia and the British Commonwealth.199 The Age

reported his declaration that further ‘efforts would be made to put the affairs of the Empire

on a co-ordinated and co-operative basis’.200 Those efforts were to take the form of another

Empire economic conference.201 A gathering of the Commonwealth countries would reduce

difficulties ‘ten thousand fold.’202 This was the position in London, too, as Bruce and British

leaders at the World Economic Conference supported a series of ongoing committees or

conferences on primary products amongst the Empire.203 A smaller, more intimate

conference also appealed. In 1932, Latham had told the Royal Empire Society in London that

‘many problems … cannot be satisfactorily settled unless it is possible to get into real touch

with the individuals directly and intimately concerned.’204

Conclusion

As the Ottawa Conference neared its denouement, Latham pondered aloud on the future of

British imperialism to the conservative National Club in Sydney on 9 August 1932. He

reflected on the success of Empire-wide collaboration and the opportunities afforded by the

imperial tariff and currency bloc. To cheers and applause, he confidently proclaimed that

‘this century will transcend the marvellous and remarkable achievements of the British

Empire in the last century.’205 Captured in this statement was his belief that he had done his utmost since returning to government to secure imperial union. In achieving this aim, he felt

199 Latham, Australia and the British Commonwealth, 44-45. 200 “World Conference Failure,” The Age, 20 July 1933, p. 9. 201 “Empire Conference,” The Canberra Time, 21 July 1933, p. 1. 202 Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 262; “World Conference Failure,” The Age, 20 July 1933, p. 9. 203 Ian M. Drummond, The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area, 1931-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 159-60. 204 Latham, “Australia and Ottawa,” 265. 205 “Mr. Latham. Agreement Unlikely,” SMH, 9 August 1932, p. 8.

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confident that he had set Australia on a course to meet the global challenges the Great

Depression had wrought on the global economy.

Steadfastly committed to utilising the monetary authorities of England and the trade connections of the British Empire as an anchor-point to pull Australia from the economic

quagmire, Latham strove to attain the perceived benefits of imperial membership for the

nation. To do this, he trumpeted the respectability and imperial credentials of his

government’s economic management. In doing so, he utilised to great effect the organs of the

press and his networks at both home and abroad. His pursuit of policies designed to maintain

repayments to bondholders reflected his strident belief that Australia’s reputation as a reliable

debtor would provide the necessary business and investor confidence to reverse the decline in

employment. As the exchange of trade and credit tumbled globally, he galvanised his

conviction the Dominions had economic responsibilities to Britain and the British imperial

family of nations. These views, that Britain and Empire were both the salvation and duty of

Australia, were put forward with greater vehemence as the Ottawa Conference loomed.

The opposition of economic experts could not dissuade Latham from his insistence on

pursuing deflationary and pro-Empire economic policies. He resisted subscription to the

expansionary fiscal options advanced by Keynes and the Labor Party. In the main, he was

sceptical of any proposal that was not subject to courteous diplomacy behind closed doors.

The eventual restoration of British confidence in Australian government bonds, represented

by the conversion of sovereign debt in London to lower interest rates, and the boost in

employment statistics over the course of 1932-1933, entrenched Latham’s conviction in the

legitimacy of his ‘reasonable course.’ Although those successes were mild and uneven, the

1933 World Economic Conference ultimately failed to offer an alternative to Latham’s

vision.

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Elastic and comparative tariffs, rather than protectionist and prohibitive ones, secured at the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference gave Latham cause to grow the sterling currency bloc beyond imperial borders. Australia, a responsible member of the British Empire in his definition and under his tutelage, needed to contribute to bolstering the imperial currency.

The logical outcome of Ottawa, as interpreted in Latham’s vision, was economic diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region in mid-1934. As we shall see, Latham would progress imperial unity under the banner of his so-called ‘goodwill mission’ to Asia.

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Chapter VII In the Imperial Interest: The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934

Some say that the Pacific is to be the cockpit of the future. I see no reason why that should be so.1

The Australian Eastern Mission (AEM; commonly referred to as the Mission) was

Australia’s first diplomatic mission to countries outside the United Kingdom and the

Dominions. While missions to Asia by private individuals had already taken place, the 1934

mission was the first led by an Australian government minister. Its navigator and captain, Sir

John Latham, mapped and helmed the enterprise. Following three months of coordinated

planning with British diplomatic personnel in Southeast and East Asia, Latham and his staff embarked from Sydney by ship in late-March 1934. The route encompassed the Netherlands

East Indies (12 days), British Malaya (four days), French Indochina (three days), Hong Kong

(three days), China (15 days), Japan (13 days), and the Philippines (three days).2 This chapter

presents a new analysis of the Mission through a lens tightly focused on Latham’s words and

activities. An examination of his role in the planning, operation, and completion of the AEM

shines light anew on its purpose, conduct, and outcome. It had been gestating in Latham’s

mind for some years, but it was not until the Ottawa Agreement secured Australia’s traditional markets that he embarked upon it. Brisbane’s Courier-Mail published that the

Mission was part of ‘[t]he process of Imperial evolution.’3 The newspaper was correct.

1 Sir John Latham, quoted in Sun, 19 March 1934, cutting in A981, Far 5, Part 15, NAA. 2 The complete list of cities and regions visited is found in: Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934. Report of the Right Honourable J.G. Latham, Leader of the Mission” (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1934), located in A12007, 4B, NAA. 3 Courier-Mail, 15 March 1934, cutting in A981, Far 5, Part 15, NAA.

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Latham was involved in all aspects of the AEM. He occupied several key government

offices in 1934: Deputy Prime Minister, Attorney-General, Minister for External Affairs and

Minister for Industry.4 However, the Mission was his parliamentary swansong before

retirement in September 1934 (he did not contest that year’s federal election).5 The AEM

was ‘Latham’s Mission.’ After its completion, he authored reports including a general

document submitted to federal parliament, and secret documents given to the Cabinet and

relevant ministries. Both the public and private accounts revealed not only an indebtedness to

the British diplomatic machinery that made the endeavour possible, but also the belief that

Britain and Australia’s imperial interests had been furthered by the enterprise.

The biggest gap in the historiography of the AEM is Latham’s influence.6 As the chef

de mission, he cannot be divorced from its history, yet he tends to be depicted merely as a

cog in the Australian government’s pivot towards Asia. Scholarly analyses of the Mission are

lacking (the first and only discrete assessment was published in 1973).7 In the main, scholars

have analysed certain features of Latham’s mission to fit studies of Australia’s relationship

with Asian nations, typically China and Japan.8 The AEM has also been trumpeted in nation-

building narratives.9 These histories feed into a broader, troubling triumphalist story of

4 Latham was the first non-prime minister to hold the office of External Affairs since the First World War. 5 Latham continued influencing politics after 1934. See: Wheeler, “Sir John Latham's Extra-Judicial Advising,” 651-676; “The Latham Court: Law, War and Politics,” 159-178. 6 Note: the AEM is referred to in many ways in the literature, including the ‘goodwill mission to the East’ and ‘Australian goodwill mission.’ See, for example: Megaw, “The Australian Goodwill Mission,” 247-260. 7 Ibid. 8 Timothy Kendall, “Within China's Orbit? China Through the Eyes of the Australian Parliament” (Canberra: Australian Parliamentary Library, 2007), 37-45, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/APF/mono graphs/Within_Chinas_Orbit; Sophie Loy-Wilson, Australians in Shanghai: Race, Rights and Nation in Treaty Port China (London: Routledge, 2017), 68-69; Jacqui Murray, Watching the Sun Rise: Australian Reporting on Japan 1931 to the Fall of Singapore (New York: Lexington Books, 2004); Jaroslav Valkoun, “Great Britain, the Dominions and Their Position on Japan in the 1920s and Early 1930s,” Prague Papers on History of International Relations, no. 2 (2017): 41-46. 9 Carl Bridge, “In the National Interest: Liberal Foreign Relations from Deakin to Howard,” in Liberalism and the Australian Federation, ed. J.R. Nethercote (Sydney: Federation Press, 2001), 304; David Walker, “Naming and Locating Asia: Australian Dilemmas in its Regional Identity,” in Alterities in Asia: Reflections on Identity and Regionalism, ed. Leong Yew (London: Routledge, 2011), 70-71.

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Australian foreign policy in transition that misinterprets the British-Australian connection in the interwar era as overwhelmingly utilitarian. Lyons’ later appeasement initiative, the

Pacific Pact, also casts a long shadow.10 The Mission is depicted as the Pacific Pacts’

precursor.11 While many people in the 1930s perceived the AEM as evidence of an

independent Australian approach to Asia,12 this was not at all Latham’s intention. Overall,

the historiography overlooks Latham’s British imperial agenda for AEM and the subsequent

impact that worldview had on its operation.

Any survey of the AEM must consider not only Latham’s imperial zeal but also the

economic crisis of the early-1930s and the British Empire’s response to it. Scholars have noted that the Great Depression enhanced Dominion self-interest and the pursuit of freer trade but lingering colonial economic, defence and diplomatic structures still led to expanded cooperation at the imperial level.13 The Eastern Mission fitted this paradigm: a Dominion-led exercise, planned carefully between London and Canberra, and enabled by the diplomatic apparatuses of the British Empire. While others have excluded the possibility that it was motivated by disillusionment with Great Britain,14 this chapter takes this view further: the

AEM under Latham’s direction was intended to provide mutual benefit to Australia and the

Empire, particularly economically and in public relations in Southeast and East Asia.

Latham ceaselessly appraised the Empire’s ‘health’ and global position. He chose to

embark on his Mission to Southeast and East Asian countries at the time of the 1932 Ottawa

10 The Pacific Pact was an unsuccessful Australian proposal for a regional non-aggression agreement in 1937. Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia 1933-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 200-201. 11 Eric M. Andrews, Australia and China: The Ambiguous Relationship (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1985), 66-68; Bird, J.A. Lyons – the ‘Tame Tasmanian’, 60-92; Honae H. Cuffe, “The ‘Near North’: Issues of Empire, Emerging Independence and Regionalism in Australian Foreign and Defence Policy, 1921- 1937,” Flinders Journal of History & Politics 31 (2005): 49-75. 12 Walker, “Naming and Locating Asia,” 71. 13 John Gallagher, “The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire,” in The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other Essays, by John Gallagher, ed. Anil Seal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 85, 114, 127; J.D.B. Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), 22-24. 14 Megaw, “The Australian Goodwill Mission,” 255.

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Agreement for imperial trade reform, which had secured Australia’s preferential trade within

the Empire. This was a significant moment in the Empire’s development. To ground this

case, this chapter will examine aspects of inter-imperial relations that made the AEM

permissible from the perspective of Latham. The entanglement of imperial mechanisms at

work was evident in its planning, execution, and reception.

Imperial beginnings

Latham perceived Australia as a vital element of the British Empire, and Australians as

imperial actors on the global stage. As such, he was concerned by how other nations saw

Australia as there were ramifications for the Empire at large. His concern was piqued by

three events domestically: growing industrial unrest linked to wage arbitration (which his

former political party, the Nationalists, under Stanley Bruce attempted to twice reform in the

late-1920s);15 the disastrous impact of the Depression on employment and commodities

markets; and the election of the ‘socialist’ Lang Government in New South Wales in 1930.

He was horrified when an Australian traveller who had spent extensive time in the United

States and Europe wrote to him to complain that the opinions of ‘well know [sic] people’ on

Australia ‘were anything but flattering.’16 He promised that the ‘new Government … will be able to improve Australia’s position in the eyes of the world.’17 While he was intent on husbanding Australian resources to this end, he also intended the Empire to contribute to the cause. In May 1933, Latham criticised those who ‘resent any action taken by, or on behalf of,

Australia, outside the limits of our Commonwealth.’18 His intimation that Britain should

15 A well-known example of Australia’s industrial disputes of the Depression was the Rothbury Riot, December 1929, in the New South Wales’ Hunter Valley. David Baker, “The Rothbury Riot, 1929,” in Radical Newcastle, ed. James Bennett, Nancy Cushing, and Erik Eklund (Sydney: NewSouth, 2015), 115-23. 16 J.M. Stead to Latham, letter, 28 January 1932, NLA: MS 1009/1/2162. 17 Latham to Stead, letter, 1 March 1932, NLA: MS 1009/1/2165. 18 Author’s emphasis. Australia, HOR, Debates, 23 May 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330523_reps_13_139/.

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continue to act on Australia’s behalf if required, despite the passage of the Statute of

Westminster in the UK, reflected his belief that Australian problems were imperial problems

and vice versa.

As noted in Chapter VI, the AEM followed on the heels of imperial trade preference schemes. The contraction of international trade and the rise of protectionist economic policies—represented by the tariff walls erected by Washington, most notably the

introduction of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930—compelled Canberra to set about

expanding Australia’s roster of trading partners.19 Policy-makers first looked inwards at the

British Empire. Australians were historically disposed towards a degree of market protection and scepticism of free trade;20 a sentiment that Latham certainly shared.21 Both the Bruce-

Page and the Scullin governments sent trade commissioners to Canada, in 1929 and 1930

respectively, while Newfoundland followed later.22 Initially, Latham’s platform for lifting

trade exchange reinforced Australia’s traditional markets: Britain, other Dominions and

colonial dependencies. The 1931 negotiations with Lyons and his backers over the formation

of the United Australia Party demonstrated that ‘Empire-first’ trade policy was essential to

Latham. Newspapers reported that the basis of his resignation as Opposition Leader, in favour of Lyons, was his successor’s ‘seven point’ plan for economic recovery,23 which

19 Forrest Capie, “Disintegration of the International Economy between the Wars,” in The Great Depression of the 1930s: Lessons for Today, eds. Nicholas Crafts and Peter Fearon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145; Susan B. Carter and Richard Sutch, “Why the Settlers Soared: The Dynamics of Immigration and Economic Growth in the ‘Golden Age’ for Settler Societies,” in Settler Economies in World History, ed. Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzer, and Richard Sutch (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2013), 58. 20 Joanne Pemberton, “The Middle Way: The Discourse of Planning in Britain, Australia and at the League in the Interwar Years,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 52, no. 1 (2006): 55-6. 21 He supported the Bruce-Page Government’s policy of ‘men, money and markets,’ which advocated closely integrating Australia into an imperial economic system that depended on Britain. “United Empire,” SMH, 7 February 1930, p. 11. For discussion of this policy, see: Bernard Attard, “The High Commissioners, Empire Development and Economic Diplomacy between the Wars,” in The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives to the United Kingdom, 1910-2010, ed. Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno, and David Lee (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010), 69-81. 22 C.B. Schedvin, Emissaries of Trade: A History of the Australian Trade Commissioner Service (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008), 40-44. 23 “Federal Affairs,” The Age, 18 April 1931, p. 12.

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favoured lower tariff rates for the United Kingdom and encouraged ‘inter-Dominion

reciprocity.’24 The AEM did not disrupt these arrangements. As Melbourne’s Argus reported,

‘[t]he mission is a matter not only of Australian interest but Empire and world interest

also.’25

Watching Japan and China

Imperial preference was instinctual for Latham and many other Australian politicians, but it

did not explain the almost absolute exclusion of Australia’s geographically closest trading

area from strategic economic planning in the early 1930s. Asia was an alien landscape to

white Australians. According to historian Nicholas Brown, ‘[a] colonial rather than a

metropolitan construction this image [of Asia] drew on … fears of contamination and

invasion.’26 British firms, outraged at fierce Japanese economic competition,27 affected

Australian national discourse in the early-1930s even as the nation commanded a highly

favourable trade surplus with Japan.28 One Australian newspaper reported modest growth in

Japanese imports into Australia and other parts of the British Empire as an ‘economic

24 Anne Henderson, Joseph Lyons: The People’s Prime Minister (Sydney: NewSouth, 2011), 262. 25 Argus, 16 March 1934, cutting in A981, Far 5, Part 15, NAA. 26 Nicholas Brown, “Australian Intellectuals and the Image of Asia: 1920-1960,” Australian Cultural History, no. 9 (1990): 80. 27 Antony Best, “Economic Appeasement or Economic Nationalism? A Political Perspective on the British Empire, Japan, and the Rise of Intra‐Asian Trade, 1933–37,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 30, no. 2 (2002): 80-81. 28 Murray, Watching the Sun Rise, 164. Japan’s insatiable desire for raw materials in the 1930s, when it embarked on an armament building program unsupported by sensible economic policy, benefitted raw material exporting nations like Australia. Saburo Okita, “Japan’s High Dependence on Imports of Raw Materials,” in Raw Materials and Pacific Economic Integration, ed. John Crawford, and Saburo Okita (Canberra: ANU Press, 1978), 218-28.

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invasion.’29 As Neville Meaney points out, Australians had a tendency to ‘treat her [Japan]

every move with suspicion.’30

Like most Australians, Latham had a long history of wariness of East Asia’s military

and economic capacity. Japan’s victories in the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars, in 1894-1895 and 1904-1905 respectively, breathed renewed life into 19th century notions

that populous East Asian nations coveted Australia’s vast open spaces and resources.31

Policy-makers’ initial response was to isolate the continent from the region through the

White Australia Policy (WAP) in 1901.32 The treaty pact agreed between Britain and Japan

in 1902 did not soothe concerns, with plans for a Royal Australian Navy laid down at the

1909 Imperial Conference.33 Australia then defended the WAP at Versailles in 1919 to the frustration of Japan.34 Latham supported the WAP on the basis that it preserved the nation’s

Britishness, but also later feared its harm to Australian-Japanese relations.35 Into the interwar

period, Australians continued to perceive a rapidly shrinking and worrisome Asia-Pacific

29 “Australia and Japan. A Diplomatic Mission,” The Age, 13 December 1933, p. 11. 30 Neville Meaney, Fears & Phobias: E.L. Piesse and the Problem of Japan, 1909-39 (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1996), 35. 31 This prompted defence and immigration policy responses by the Australian government. Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 15–50; Russell McGregor, “A Dog in the Manger: White Australia and its Vast Empty Spaces,” Australian Historical Studies 43, no. 2 (2012): 157-73. For cultural responses, see: Catriona Ross, “Paranoid Projections: Australian Novels of Asian Invasion,” Antipodes 23, no. 1 (2009): 11-16; David Walker, “National Narratives: Australia in Asia,” Media History 8, no. 1 (2002): 63-66. Even Japanese naval aid to the Australian Navy during the First World War stoked Australia’s fears, although Japanese occupation of German possessions in the Pacific was the main cause of tension. Yoichi Hirama, “Japanese Naval Assistance and its Effect on Australian-Japanese Relations,” in The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, ed. Phillips Payson O’Brien (London: Routledge- Curzon, 2004), 144-51. 32 David C. Atkinson, “The White Australia Policy, the British Empire and the World,” Britain and the World 8, no. 2 (2015): 204-24; Sean Brawley, The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America 1919-78 (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1995), 11-29; Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, 147–50. 33 Jesse Tumblin, “’Grey Dawn’ in the British Pacific: Race, Security and Colonial Sovereignty on the Eve of World War I,” Britain and The World 9, no. 1 (2016): 45-50. For a good survey of the RAN’s initiation, see: Nicholas Lambert, “Sir John Fisher, the Fleet Unit Concept, and the Creation of the Royal Australian Navy,” in Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rise of Australian Naval Power, ed. David Stevens and John Reeve (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 214-24. 34 Brawley, The White Peril, 14-29; David Dutton, “A British Outpost in the Pacific,” in Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia. Volume 1, 1901 to the 1970s, ed. David Goldsworthy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2001), 51-60; Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality. 35 Brawley, The White Peril, 65.

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from which Britain might not be able to keep Australia aloof.36 Evidence to the contrary did

not influence Latham’s perspective. In 1923, he admonished a fellow member of parliament

who credited Tokyo with pacifist intentions.37

Latham’s immediate circle was also highly critical of Japan. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, his beloved Boobooks dining club hosted speeches critical of China and Japan by authoritative figures, including Frederic Eggleston, Herbert Gepp, and E.L. Piesse.38 In 1925,

Piesse offered a derisive assessment of Japanese people: ‘Actively conscious of her own race

superiority, Japan did not like the white race.’ Although he found significant cultural, racial,

and attitudinal incompatibility between the Anglosphere and Japan, he thought diplomatic

relations could be preserved by Australia if the federal government did not object to Tokyo’s

belligerent policy on China.39 Members found Piesse’s talk ‘illuminating.’40

Immersed as he was in colonial constructions of Japan that perceived menace in the

Far East, Latham could scarcely lose his scepticism of Tokyo’s strategic military aims, but he

later foresaw the public relations damage of anti-Japanese sentiment and Sinophobia. In

March 1933, he warned the Lower House:

The people of this country would hardly be able to exist to-day if it were not for the purchase of Australian wool, wheat, flour, and minerals in the East by Chinese and Japanese. Apart altogether from the question of what we can afford, it ill becomes us to speak in derogatory terms of people who are now important and, indeed, vital buyers of our goods.41

36 Meaney, Fears & Phobias, 3-20; Hilary Summy, “From Missionary to Ministerial Adviser: Constance Duncan and Australia-Japan Relations 1922-1947,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 54, no. 1 (2008): 30-34; Tumblin, “’Grey Dawn,’” 32-54. 37 Australia, HOR, Debates, 31 July 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230731_reps_9_104/. 38 Meeting Minutes of the Boobooks, nos. 224, 267, 268, 285, 287, and 302, over the period 1925-1934, Boobooks Collection, UMA. 39 For more on Piesse’s strategic assessment of Japan, see: Meaney, Fears & Phobias. 40 Minutes of 224th Meeting, 15 May 1925, Boobooks/2/12, UMA. 41 Australia, HOR, Debates, 22 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330322_reps_13_138/.

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The evidence demonstrates Latham’s shift in perception regarding China and Japan derived

from his desire to defend the economic interests of Australia and the Empire. Noticeably, his

1933 speech did not indicate a change in his attitudes towards the Japanese people, only a

shift in what they could contribute to the Australian economy during the Depression. The

intrinsic value of nation states and their citizens was determined not by their cultural, moral,

or personal significance. Instead, value was determined in relative terms: relative to

Australia, and the needs and interests of the Empire.

Latham observed other Dominions’ embrace of Asia, aware that Australia was being

left behind. The Australian government had first sent federal trade commissioners to

Shanghai and Singapore in 1921 and 1922, respectively, but this initiative was short-lived.

PM Billy Hughes’ removal from office in 1923 severely eroded support for the trade

commissioner program in Asia, and the Bruce Government elected not to renew the

commissioners’ contracts.42 Meanwhile, Canada and New Zealand used their treaty-making power, gained by the Dominions at the Imperial Conferences of 1923 and 1926,43 to establish

firm trade ties with Japan. Wellington signed its first non-Commonwealth trade treaty with

Japan in 1928. That same year, Ottawa cemented its already strong trading partnership with

Tokyo through the establishment of a diplomatic legation in the city.44 The Pacific Affairs

journal reported that the ‘commercial understanding between Japan and New Zealand … is a

development … [which] marks a definite forward step in relations between the British

Dominions in the Pacific and the leading Asiatic power.’45 Although those same Dominions

later responded to the deterioration of international trade conditions in the Depression by also

42 Dutton, “A British Outpost in the Pacific,” 50. 43 Berman, “Treaty-making within the British Commonwealth,” 902-07. 44 Carin Lee Holroyd, Government, International Trade and Laissez-Faire Capitalism (London: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2002), 44, 51. 45 Guy H. Scholefield, “Japan and New Zealand: An Interesting Trade Agreement,” Pacific Affairs 2, no. 3 (1929): 123.

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turning inwards to the imperial family,46 the paths the AEM trod were not novel in an

imperial context.

Watching these changes from Australian shores, Latham expressed anxiety in 1930

that the nation’s exports were being outpaced by other Dominions.47 Eighteen months later,

he remarked to the Lower House that ‘[i]t has been suggested from time to time that an effort

should be made in the interests of Australian trade ... between Australia and the Eastern

countries.’ He continued with a gently worded request for the treasurer to ‘perhaps, consult

with the Commonwealth Bank authorities to see whether it is possible to initiate negotiations

with the object of arranging direct exchange between Australia and the Eastern ports.’ At this

moment, his main concern lay with reviewing ‘Australian duties’ on ships from the East and

hastening their processing in port.48 He was not yet suggesting a government-led mission to the Far East. It took the Ottawa Agreement to develop that vision.

Latham did not ignore the minor but growing chorus of Australian citizens demanding concerted economic engagement with countries in the Asia-Pacific. Since the

1910s, China watchers in Australia had been advocating trade that was more voluminous,

closer commercial relations, and thoughtful marketing.49 In the interwar period,

agriculturalists and raw material exporters wanted to profit from East Asia’s rapid

46 Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand pursued conventional trading partners in the early-1930s. Robert Holland, “Imperial Collaboration and Great Depression: Britain, Canada and the World Wheat Crisis, 1929– 35,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 16, no. 3 (1988): 124. 47 Australia, HOR, Debates, 3 April 1930, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1930/19300403_reps_12_123/. 48 Australia, HOR, Debates, 20 October 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19311020_reps_12_132/. His first instinct was to reduce the cost and regulation for Far East trade. See also: Australia, HOR, Debates, 23 September 1931, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1931/19310923_reps_12_132/. 49 Loy-Wilson, Australians in Shanghai, 67-68; David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1999), 68.

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industrialisation.50 Wool producers were especially keen to exploit the commercial

opportunities afforded by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931.51 Latham

evidently had little compunction about profiting from war in this case. Echoing Piesse’s

advice on Japan and China years earlier, Latham remarked that his government ‘has not

considered it useful to make any separate representations’ to the League of Nations to protest

Japan’s annexation of Manchuria from China.52 However, he did not agree with the

Chambers of Commerce and Manufactures’ suggestion that commercial figures should serve

as trade envoys. Civil servants could more reliably balance imperial and Australian

interests.53 Tokyo’s finance policy was also favourable to the Dominions at this time. The

Japanese government had reacted to the Depression and falling exports to the United States

by leaving the gold standard, which effectively made it a member of the ‘sterling area.’54

Ottawa Agreement and trade with Asia

The 1932 Ottawa Agreement provided Canberra with greater scope to probe foreign trade

opportunities without putting their imperial markets at risk (see Chapter VI). The agreement

left scope for concession of duties on foreign goods. Not believing the agreement restricted

Australian trade to imperial trading partners, Latham remarked in March 1933 that as a result

he had ‘seen the representatives of five or six countries which are seeking special trade

50 Kevin Burley, British Shipping and Australia 1920-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 135-36; Ian W. McLean, Why Australia Prospered: The Shifting Sources of Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 172. 51 Murray, Watching the Sun Rise, 164. 52 Australia, HOR, Debates, 9 November 1932, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1932/19321109_reps_13_136/ 53 Latham to Lyons, letter, 27 July 1933, MS 1009/54/25-26, NLA. 54 Kaoru Sugihara, “Japanese Imperialism in Global Resource History” (presentation, Global Economic History Network conference, Irvine, CA, 15-17 January, 2004), pp. 15-16, http://www.lse.ac.uk/Economic- History/Assets/Documents/Research/GEHN/GEHNWP07KS.pdf. See also: Mariko Hatase, “Devaluation and Exports in Interwar Japan: The Effects of Sharp Depreciation of the Yen in the Early 1930s,” Monetary and Economic Studies 20 (2002): 144-46.

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agreements with Australia.’55 He wanted to engage other nations as soon as a tariff schedule

for foreign goods was agreed upon by the Department of Trade and Customs and Department

of Commerce.56 Negotiations over new tariff rates were, however, a prolonged process.57 In

answer to a question from the Leader of the Opposition during an April 1933 debate on

tariffs, Latham stressed that ‘the agreement does not prevent Parliament differentiating in its

tariff between foreign countries.’58 When he was again challenged about his enthusiasm for

developing foreign trade within the bounds of Ottawa, he responded emphatically: ‘The

Ottawa agreement is the first step towards maintaining and extending the most important of

all these [overseas] markets for the Australian producer.’ He went on to say that his

government was desirous to ‘proceed further along the same line [Ottawa] in the interests of

our own people, and we should take every opportunity to establish friendly relations with

other peoples.’59 For Latham, Ottawa was a necessary stepping-stone for Australian diplomatic and trade engagement outside the Empire.

As far as imperial dictum allowed, Latham was emboldened to argue for Australia to command a greater global presence. At a Constitutional Association luncheon in Sydney in

April 1933, he rejected the idea of ‘a self-contained Australia as impossible.’60 The following

month, in a response to a parliamentary report on the Thirteenth Assembly of the LON,

Latham laid the groundwork for emboldened Australian engagement with countries outside

55 Australia, HOR, Debates, 22 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330322_reps_13_138/. 56 Australia, HOR, Debates, 26 May 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330526_reps_13_139/. 57 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia No. 43 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1957), 328-30, accessed 17 January, 2018, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/allprimarymainfeatures/9D8F7D90264A2A15CA2573AE000460 12?opendocument. 58 Australia, HOR, Debates, 26 April 1933, Latham, Scullin, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330426_reps_13_138/. 59 Australia, HOR, Debates, 23 May 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330523_reps_13_139/. 60 “Tariff Policy. Mr. Latham’s Defence,” Age, 4 April 1933, p. 9.

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the Empire. He exclaimed that he loathed the notion that Australia was ‘developed in

isolation, thousands of miles from the rest of the world, and developed … from the main

centres of civilization.’ He continued:

I regard Australia not as an island in the southern seas, but as a continent of the world with an already complex and entirely developed civilization. Australia is a self-governing nation. We say that from time to time; but if we accept the rights of self-governing nations, we must also recognize our responsibilities. The interests of Australia to- day are, perhaps, more intricate and more complicated with those of the other parts of the world than at any other time in our history.61

Here, Latham concluded that White Australia was a successful experiment in Britain’s colonising project. It possessed the capacity, and the responsibility as a Dominion, to play a more active role in world affairs as circumstance demanded. He also emphasised the prominent position trade relations would have in this engagement:

Our people are beginning to learn, as a whole, that our interests depend in a large measure upon what in the past has been referred to in terms of apparent derogation as foreign trade. … Australia needs her markets overseas.62

Trade and diplomacy could provide answers not only to the Depression, but also to the kinds

of international problems that concerned Australia and Empire. Again, conditions had

obliged Australians to act. Favourable trade balances with East Asia made imperial trade

preference no less appealing in Latham’s eyes.

61 Australia, HOR, Debates, 23 May 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330523_reps_13_139/. 62 Ibid.

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Momentum builds

The Lyons Government though, like Australian governments before it, was hesitant to pursue a trade agreement with Tokyo.63 A 1932 report on Asian trade submitted by government

consultant Herbert Gepp generated little discussion in parliament.64 Gepp, carrying a letter of

introduction from Labor Prime Minister James Scullin, had spent five months in China, Hong

Kong, and Japan. He advised Canberra to prioritise trade with the region through missions

that were more exploratory and the appointment of trade commissioners and correspondents

in major Chinese and Japanese cities.65 Latham took little notice of Gepp’s report. His only

reference to it was a comment that such missions by private individuals were valuable for the

promotion of Australian and Empire goods in the Pacific basin.66 Even so, the report further

pressured government to act. A federal committee to coordinate Australia-Asia trade was

subsequently set up in 1933.67 The Trade Commissioner Act 1933, which permitted the

federal government to appoint public servants as overseas trade delegates, was also passed by

parliament.68 With its passage, Latham notified the British Foreign Office of Canberra’s

intention to appoint trade commissioners after the AEM was completed.69

Latham took great interest in a letter written by a friend of Gepp, the retired Royal

Australian Navy (RAN) Captain, H.J. Feakes. Lyons forwarded the letter to him with a

63 Brawley, The White Peril, 146. 64 “Trade with the East. Report by Mr. H.W. Gepp,” A461, C323/1/5, NAA. Gepp’s report was tabled in parliament. Australia, HOR, Debates, 8 September 1932, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1932/19320908_reps_13_135/. 65 Shannon L. Smith, “Towards Diplomatic Representation,” in Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia. Volume 1, 1901 to the 1970s, ed. David Goldsworthy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2001), 70. 66 Australia, HOR, Debates, 30 March 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330330_reps_13_138/. 67 The most important body was the Federal Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade. James Cotton, “A.C.V. Melbourne in Australian International Thought: Nationalism and Appeasement Between the World Wars,” in Australia and the World: A Festschrift for Neville Meaney, ed. Joan Beaumont and Matthew Jordan (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013), 147. 68 Trade Commissioners Act, 1933 (Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004C07632. 69 Latham to Bruce, cable, 30 January 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA.

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request for comment.70 Feakes had recently toured China and Japan with a letter of

introduction from Gepp. He was entertained by Canadian and British legations and could

arrange ‘many opportunities of meeting prominent Japanese statesmen, and international

representatives.’ Feakes was impressed by the ‘permanent character and commodious’

Canadian legation premises in Tokyo. He was surprised ‘that Canadian trading interests with

Japan amount to about half those enjoyed by Australia.’ While he reassured Lyons that, apart from wool, demand for Australia’s primary exports would not drop ‘for many years,’ he was left with the impression that ‘Austral-Japanese relations was not so satisfactory’ and that ‘a condition approaching irritation is … apparent.’ He continued:

In the Economic and Commercial spheres the Japanese view is that the industry of their people, and the excellence of their trade organisation entitles their entry into the trade markets of the World on an equality with all other nations.

Suggestions of exclusion or restriction in what the Japanese regard as their national right is productive of considerable resentment – a disturbing condition in this period of military activity and dominance.71

Latham was troubled by Feakes’ comments. He replied to the Prime Minister:

Other countries take pains to assist and make opportunities for their traders. We do almost nothing in this direction. I consider that we should begin with New Zealand and the Dutch East Indies then extend to the East. Possibly an offer of the Commerce Department attached to the British Trade Commission in Tokio [sic] would be useful as a beginning. In Java an officer working for a time with the British Chamber of Commerce there might be tried as an experiment.72

70 Lyons to Latham, letter, 17 July 1933, MS 1009/54/20, NLA. 71 Feakes to Lyons, letter, 6 July 1933, Latham Papers, NLA: 1009/54/21-23. 72 Latham to Lyons, letter, 27 July 1933, Latham Papers, NLA: 1009/54/25-26. It is worth noting that Latham’s letter predated Lyons’ late-1933 hint that his government intended to send a goodwill mission to Australia’s neighbours. Smith, “Towards Diplomatic Representation,” 72.

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He did not suggest that Australia should establish an independent legation in Asia. Rather, it

might attach civil servants to existing British offices. Latham was repeating words he had

spoken 10 years earlier in parliament: ‘It would be a good thing if Australians could be

attached to the staffs of the British Embassy in some of the more important centres of the

world.’73 Gathering information for use by Australia and correcting misinformation was his

express purpose rather than direct representation to foreign political leaders. Latham was

proving remarkably consistent in his view that Australia’s foreign policy posture should

remain aligned with the Empire.

Imperial planning

Latham began frenzied preparation for the AEM in December 1933 and continued right up until the Mission’s departure from Brisbane on 21 March 1934. He performed the bulk of the work while juggling his involvement in the 1934 Premiers Conference. His name featured in early press speculation, with variations of ‘Mr. Latham’s Mission’ headlining newspaper articles.74 On 2 December 1933, the Sydney Morning Herald published rumours:

discussed in Federal circles that a special mission should be sent from Australia to the East for the purpose of cementing goodwill between Australia and Government and commercial authorities in … Eastern countries with which Australia has business relations. … It is thought that the Attorney-General (Mr Latham) … may be asked to undertake the leadership.75

Latham was horrified by publicity about the mission before he had consulted with the

Foreign Office. He wrote an explanatory note to London that blamed one newspaper for

73 His 1923 proposal foreshadowed what became the Australian liaison officer in London, a role created only one year later. Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, 31 July 1923, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1923/19230731_reps_9_104/. 74 See, for example: “Mr Latham’s Mission,” Queensland Times (Ipswich), 22 March 1934, p. 6; “Mr. Latham’s Errand,” Argus, 16 March 1934, p. 6. 75 “Trade with the East,” SMH, 15 December 1933, p. 15.

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being in ‘breach of definite undertaking.’ He apologised ‘because we [the Commonwealth

government] recognise that the first step was to consult the Foreign Office. … We greatly

regret this and any embarrassment caused.’ He also confirmed that his plan had trade objectives but rejected outright that it was a ‘preliminary step to appointment of Australian diplomatic representatives in Japan.’ Those press reports had ‘no foundation’ and he was considering ‘no such idea.’ He also reassured British authorities that an eventual trade representative would be a ‘good type.’ That is, a white man with imperial leanings.76 Aside

from concern that such newspaper reports frayed Australia-British relations and humiliated the Empire abroad, Latham’s comments reflected his Boobooks’ fondness for political discussions that took place behind the scenes and amongst men of ‘good type.’

The press announcement forced Canberra to announce prematurely its intentions. On

4 December, Lyons admitted that members of his government were giving serious thought to a mission to Southeast and East Asia.77 The matter was soon put before the government’s

front bench. On 12 December, the Cabinet met in Melbourne to consider ‘proposals for a

Mission of Good Will from the Commonwealth to the Far East.’ While the Sydney Morning

Herald had earlier reported that ministers were enthusiastic,78 the minutes also reveal

ministers supported the scheme only in principle and wanted to liaise with the British Foreign

Office before any commitment was made.79 The next day, Lyons cabled Stanley Bruce, the

High Commissioner in London.80 Amongst the Dominion high commissions, Bruce had

76 Latham to Bruce, cable, 30 January 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 77 “Federal Minister. May Visit the East,” SMH, 4 December 1933, p. 9. 78 “Mission to East,” SMH, 7 December 1934, p. 10. 79 “Agenda no. 945, Minutes of meeting of the Cabinet, Melbourne,” 12 December 1933, A2694, 169, NAA. 80 Following on from Lyons’ initial cable, Bruce acted as a conduit between Latham—with whom he communicated directly on AEM matters—and the Foreign Office.

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unparalleled access to the foreign policy-making apparatuses in the British government.81

The PM explained to Bruce the scheme in broad-brush strokes:

It is proposed that Latham, Deputy Prime Minister, Attorney-General, Minister for External Affairs and for Industry, should visit Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and possibly China, on a mission of goodwill and friendship and not in search of trade.82

As evidenced in Lyons’ cable, commercial considerations were not far from Lyons’ mind:

‘trade relations are becoming more and more difficult and … it is important to do something

to offset the idea that friendship depends upon equivalence of volumes of trade.’83 Latham’s

earlier demand for ‘real and friendly relations with nations that afford markets for our

producers’ reverberated here.84 A copy of the secret communiqué was also sent to the

Australian Minister for Commerce.85 Latham’s 1934 enterprise must be seen in the context of

Australia’s trade worries.

The Australian government sought Whitehall’s support. Latham had suggested to

Lyons in July 1933 that the British Consul-General in Tokyo should be consulted before

proceeding with a trade delegation lest Australian actions ‘be construed as hostile.’86 Lyons

used his subsequent cable to impress upon Bruce the need for imperial cooperation, writing

‘[p]lease consult with Foreign Office on the whole matter and advise us.’87 The High

Commissioner acted quickly. On the 15th, he cabled Lyons that John Simon, British Secretary

of State for Foreign Affairs, saw ‘no objection to the plan in general’ and ‘is looking into

81 Kent Fedorowich, “When is a Diplomat not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner,” in The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives to the United Kingdom, 1910-2010, ed. Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno, and David Lee (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010), 16. 82 Lyons to Bruce, cable, 13 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 83 Ibid. 84 Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, 23 May 1933, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19330523_reps_13_139/. 85 Lyons to Bruce, cable, 13 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 86 Latham to Lyons, letter, 27 July 1933, Latham Papers, NLA: 1009/54/25-26. 87 Lyons to Bruce, cable, 13 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA.

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various points of detail on which his advice has been sought.’88 In stamping its approval,

Whitehall had brushed aside the concerns of British industrialists.89 It had also dismissed the commercial anxieties of business owners during the shift to sterling currency.90 The

Australian government’s decision to first approach London not only reflected a long

established pattern in Australian foreign affairs, but also set the tone for consultative arrangements on the Mission.

The Foreign Office’s interest in the Eastern Mission was publicised alongside reports that the Japanese government welcomed it. Tokyo was ‘making inquiries’ of its own as it had

not yet ‘received any official advice.’91 This lack of communication with foreign governments worried Latham. In his next cable to Australia House, sent on 28 December

1933, he expressed nervousness that delays at Britain’s end were damaging the Empire in the eyes of international observers. He also recommitted to coordinating the Mission with British officials. He cabled:

Recognize that Ministers very busy but we are very embarrassed owing to ignorance whether visit would be acceptable to countries concerned and whether the Foreign office would assist through British Ambassadors, Consuls and interpreters. We considered appropriate channel of inquiry was through Foreign Office to Ambassadors.92

Latham was frustrated with the inaction of Whitehall. This cable highlighted that he and the

Australian government were unwilling to act unilaterally, even as he added that ‘[c]onsuls

here are embarrassed through hearing nothing either from us or from own countries. Press

88 Bruce to Lyons, telegram, 15 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 89 Bird, J.A. Lyons—the ‘Tame Tasmanian,’ 65. 90 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 26. 91 “Mission to Japan,” The Argus, 16 December 1933, p. 23. 92 Latham to Bruce, cable, 28 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA.

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full of embarrassing speculation.’93 National humiliation was preferable to independent policy that might harm inter-imperial relations or the Empire’s external affairs.

Latham’s terse cable was not representative of the cordial disposition British officialdom had for the Mission and the active interest they took. Bruce responded immediately to Latham with reassurance that the Foreign Office staff respected the ‘urgency’ but they nonetheless needed more time to ‘advise fully.’94 A detailed reply was conveyed on

2 January 1934. Bruce explained that ‘His Majesty’s Representatives at Tokio [sic] and

Peking instructed to inform the Governments to which accredited of proposed visit and to

enquire whether acceptable.’95 Lyons and Cabinet had earlier suggested this approach, which

saw Britain contacting foreign governments on Australia’s behalf.96 However, contrary to

Latham’s initial presumption,97 he was instructed that ‘subsequent arrangements could be

made direct’ through ‘communication with His Majesty’s diplomatic and consular officers in

the territories concerned.’98 Sir John Simon later advised his staff in relevant places that

every logistical support should be made available to Latham and his staff.99 Ultimately, the

Foreign Office considered the visit ‘semi-official,’ conducted by ‘one of H.M. Ministers of

State in the Commonwealth of Australia.’100 Australia’s leading civil servant in London,

Keith Officer, relayed to Latham that in the House of Commons, the Lord Privy Seal

Anthony Eden said ‘His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom felt confidence your tour will serve a valuable purpose in promoting closer relations with the countries to be visited.’101

93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Bruce to Latham, cable, 2 January 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 96 Lyons to Bruce, cable, 13 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 97 Latham to Bruce, cable, 28 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 98 Bruce to Latham, cable, 2 January 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 99 Latham to His Britannic Majesty’s Consul-General, Manila, letter, 19 March 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 100 Undated memorandum, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 101 Bruce to Latham, copy of cable, 16 February 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA.

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Coordination with Foreign Office

While Lyons and Latham had set out a list of countries they wished to visit in initial

correspondence with London, the ports where the Mission eventually disembarked were

selected through lengthy consultation with the Foreign Office. Simon advised that a visit to

China was ‘very desirable if Japan is visited.’102 Latham was receptive to this

recommendation, but he did not want his tour of China to disrupt his itinerary in Japan where

he hoped to spend at least a fortnight.103 Latham was especially interested in Japan because

its imports exceeded its exports.104 Based on a compromise, the Mission eventually spent

almost roughly equal time in China and Japan.

London also did not want Latham to appear to favour certain allies: if the Netherlands

East Indies was visited then it was considered appropriate for visits to ‘other foreign colonies

and possessions in the Far East, namely French Indo-China, Philippines.’105 Latham was open to adding more colonial ports to his itinerary but was concerned that boat connections might not be possible within the limited period available.106 If there were any tensions

between the Foreign Office and Latham it was over the inclusion of the Philippines and

French Indo-China in the itinerary. London did not want to make official contact with Paris

and Washington due to the shortness of the AEM’s stay in Saigon and Manila, while Latham

wanted the Mission to be assigned higher priority with those foreign governments.107 The

Foreign Office resolved ‘to mention visits informally.’108

102 Bruce to Lyons, telegram, 15 December 1933, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 103 Latham to Bruce, cable, 9 February 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 104 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 19. 105 Bruce to Latham, cable, 2 January 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 106 Latham to Bruce, cable, 18 January 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 107 Officer to Latham, cable, 28 February 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1; Officer to Latham, letter, 20 March 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 7, NAA. 108 Officer to Latham, telegram, 5 March 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA.

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Even though Whitehall was careful and offered advice based on standard practice,

King George V was more open-minded about the Australian initiative. To Latham’s question

regarding the presentation of gifts to the Emperor of Japan and the President of China, Keith

Officer reported ‘the King was most anxious that nothing that might help the mission should

be omitted merely because there was no precedent for it.’ However, as Britain was unwilling

to offer a gift to the Chinese president, the idea was scrapped.109 Overall, the 36 cablegrams

transmitted between Canberra and London from December 1933 to March 1934 demonstrate

that Latham strove to accommodate British advice on the Mission itinerary, even if this

meant major inconvenience or the subordination of Australian wishes.

In Australia, Latham was criticised for not considering the effect his endeavour would

have on Geneva. In January 1934, feminist and pacifist Jessie Street, who was greatly

involved with the League of Nations in Australia and in Geneva, wrote a letter to the League

of Nations Union (LNU) NSW president that was critical of the AEM. Street thought

Latham’s visit would legitimise Japan’s recent aggressions against China and its flouting of

decisions of the League. It was wiser to ‘show our loyalty to the League,’ she advised, by not

paying ‘the compliment of honouring her [Japan] with an official visit.’ She pressured the

LNU to make representations to the Commonwealth Government to reconsider the

Mission.110 Latham only gave Street’s three-page letter ‘a perusal.’ His reply was rather curt, suggesting he was incensed that a prominent member of an organisation in which he had played a leading role was questioning his wisdom. He reiterated the official line that the

Mission afforded opportunities for developing Australia’s friendship with nations to its north.

Moreover, he could ‘see no justification for associating the Mission in any respect with the

109 Officer to Latham, letter, 20 March 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 7, NAA. 110 Jessie Street to Francis Anderson, letter, 9 January 1934, A981, Far 2, NAA. Another leading LNU figure, Raymond Watt, also shared Street’s concerns about Latham visiting Japan. Watt to Sir Littleton Groom, letter, 1 February 1934, Sir Littleton Groom Papers, MS 236/2/6133, NLA.

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attitude of Japan towards the League of Nations,’ or that it diminished Canberra’s support of

Geneva in any way.111 If Street and the LNU NSW branch suspected that Latham did not

bother to consult Geneva then they would have been right. Only London’s assent mattered to

the AEM’s captain.

Loyal personnel

Latham handpicked the AEM’s personnel and reassured London of their suitability.112

Representatives of the business community were excluded despite their considerable

interest.113 Latham feared that they would lack the respectability and knowledge that he

demanded of trade officials.114 The final group consisted of eight members (including its

chief) and two accompanying news reporters. His wife, Ella Latham, and adult daughter,

Freda, were there in social and cultural exchange capacities; ceremonial visits were

specifically planned with their attendance in mind.115 At one cultural dinner, on board the

ship Kitano Maru, Ella and Freda entered into a ‘kimona [sic] parade’; Freda won a ‘first

prize’ of a Japanese vase.116 Beyond the cultural facets of the mission, wives travelling with

their husbands overseas was part of the social mores of the time and an important aspect of

diplomatic conduct. As the Australian Women’s Weekly reported in February 1934:

Mrs J.G. Latham’s tact and charm will contribute much to the success of the Australian goodwill mission to the East, on which she will accompany her Attorney-General husband. She has gone with him on several missions to Europe, and will be a great help to him.117

111 Latham to Raymond G. Watt, letter, 12 March 1934, A981, Far 2, NAA. 112 Latham to British Charge D’Affairs, Tokyo, cable, 8 May 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 113 Latham to Secretary of the W.A. Chamber of Manufactures Inc., letter, 22 January 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 7, NAA. 114 “Australian Eastern Mission Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners,” pp. 5-6, A981, Far 5, Part 16, NAA. 115 SMH, 6 April 1934, cutting in A981, Far 5, Part 14, NAA. Freda, who developed diabetes in childhood and was frequently unwell, was also highly reliant on Ella and John for her health and social wellbeing. Freda’s dependency on her parents may therefore explain her presence on the Mission. Williams, From Charity to Teaching Hospital, 23-24. 116 Australian Women’s Weekly, 30 June 1934, p. 2. 117 Australian Women’s Weekly, 17 February 1934, p. 3.

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At one of the most important official functions in Tokyo, Japan’s Minister for Foreign

Affairs especially welcomed Mr and Mrs Latham and their daughter at a dinner held at his

official residence.118 This suggests the presence of mother and daughter was intended to

‘soften’ the Mission’s official image by helping to create a familial portrait of Latham.

Congenial optics obscured the trade and political matters that lay outside the well-publicised

remit of the tour.

Two high-ranking public service personnel were the chief advisers to Latham: an

information officer from the Department of Trade and Customs, Arthur Moore, and a

member of the Attorney General’s Department, Major Longfield Lloyd. Moore went to the

Ottawa Conference with the Australian delegation and since his return had been working on

bilateral trade relations in the trade treaty-making section of the Customs Department.119 His

inclusion further points to the importance of trade.120 Melbourne’s Herald reported that he

‘had extensive experience in the East.’121 More importantly for Latham, he possessed

exceptional deportment and grooming which were essential qualities as the group worked

extremely closely with British embassy staff and interacted widely with statesmen. Lloyd

was also an Anglophile. He ‘had never been outspoken about the need for an independently

Australian approach to relations with Japan.’122 The following year, with Latham’s support,

he was appointed Australia’s first trade commissioner to Japan. Lloyd made a good

impression on British diplomats during the AEM. On his first arrival as trade commissioner,

he was invited by a staffer at the British Embassy in Tokyo to stay in the building. The

118 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 25. 119 Herald (Melbourne), 17 March 1934, cutting in, A981, Far 5 Part 14, NAA. 120 Ian Nish, “Relations with Japan,” Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War, ed. Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), 132. 121 Herald, 17 March 1934, cutting in, A981, Far 5 Part 14, NAA. 122 Walker, Anxious Nation, 207.

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invitation was generous: ‘[w]e have plenty of room, and should be delighted to see you.’123

Accord with British diplomacy in the Far East was evidently reflected even in the staff

Latham selected for the Mission.

Rounding out the Mission were three supporting staff in secretarial roles: Latham’s

long-time personal secretary, Henry Standish; a private assistant secretary, John Ferguson,

and the stenographer, Marjorie Grosvenor.124 Standish, who had a background in journalism

in Queensland, was a trusted confidant. He had continuously acted as Latham’s private

secretary since he was Leader of the Opposition in 1930.125 Grosvenor was the PM’s

confidential typist and had been made a Member of the British Empire (MBE) only in

January 1934. In his report on the Mission, Latham commended his staff. He said ‘[t]he

conditions under which they had to work were very exacting,’ with the heaviest burden being processing the ‘great volume’ of correspondence and interviews.126 Extensively publicising

Latham’s words and activities constituted a significant aspect of the tour.

Escorting the formal party were two Australian journalists, Francis Murray of the Sun

Herald Cable Service and Frederic Cutlack of the Australian Press Association. In a cable to the British Charge D’Affaires in Tokyo, Latham stated the two men were ‘not official members of mission but specially selected with my approval to accompany.’127 The English-

born Cutlack had a long association with Australian-British affairs and orbited Latham’s

social galaxy. He served Charles Bean, later famed historian of ANZAC, as an official war

correspondent. Enlisted as press secretary for the Australian High Commission in London,

123 Letter to Lloyd [sender’s name unreadable], 5 June 1935, Longfield Lloyd Papers, MS 2887, folder 3. 124 Kendall, Within China's Orbit?, 38-39. 125 “Personal,” Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton), 15 January 1930, p. 14. 126 Latham, The Australian Eastern Mission 1934, p. 23. 127 Latham to British Consul-General, Batavia, cable, 15 March 1934, NAA, Canberra: A981, Far 5 Part 1; Latham to British Charge D’Affaires Tokyo, telegram with handwritten date added later, 8 May 1935, NAA, Canberra: A981, Far 5 Part 1.

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for the Australian Imperial Force he subsequently wrote the Australian Flying Corps official

war history, and worked with Stanley Bruce at the 1923 Imperial Conference.128 Latham

insisted the journalists lodge in a location proximal to the main party’s quarters.129

Predictably, the journalists were uncritical of the Mission.130 Shortly upon his return to

Sydney, Cutlack wrote a small book on the topic of Japan and Australia. Therein, he

reinforced Latham’s approach towards Japan, and judged the 1934 initiative as having

‘cover[ed] every possible investigation’ in the region.131 The personnel selected by the

Mission’s leader ensured it spoke with one voice.

An imperial mission

Before departing Australian shores, Latham undertook a short but demanding publicity tour

where he spoke to exclusive audiences in Sydney and Brisbane. He emphasised the imperial

dimensions of his endeavour. The Mission had a ‘quiet send-off’ from Melbourne on 17

March 1934.132 On the 19th, the party reached Sydney. Latham spoke to a combined luncheon

hosted by the Institute of International Affairs and the LNU, both organisations he helped to

bring about in Australia. The Mission, he said, ‘is being made with the entire approval of the

Foreign Office in Great Britain and with assurance of the warmest welcome in countries that

I will have the privilege of visiting.’133 On the 20th, he dined with the Consul-General for

China, W.P. Chen. Latham departed Sydney for Brisbane on the 21st. Their vessel, the Dutch

mail ship K.M.P Nieuw Zeeland, postponed sailing so he could address a large meeting of the

128 Sweeting, “Cutlack, Frederic Morley (1886–1967).” 129 Latham to British Embassy, Tokyo, telegram, 20 March 1934, NAA, Canberra: A981, Far 5 Part 1. 130 Murray, Watching the Sun Rise, 107. 131 F.M. Cutlack, The Manchurian Arena: An Australian View of the Far Eastern Conflict (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1934), 76. 132 “Mission to East Mr. Latham’s Suite Departs,” Shepparton Advertiser (Victoria), 19 March 1934, p. 2. 133 “Not a Trade Mission. Delegation to the East,” Argus, 20 March 1934, p. 7.

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Institute of International Affairs.134 He reported ‘the objects of the Mission were

enthusiastically approved by those present.’135 Advertising the Mission’s aims and

Australia’s friendly intent was a major concern for Latham.

Over the course of his pre-departure schedule in March 1934, Latham spoke of the

Ottawa Agreement as a pillar of Australian foreign and trade policy and touched on trade

with Asia, but not always truthfully. He reminded his audiences that his intention was to

cultivate friendship with Asian nations, and trade agreements and other tangible matters were

to be delayed until after the AEM had completed its journey.136 In a famous quote, he likened

his endeavour to ‘a courtesy and complimentary visit – not at their business offices, but in

their homes.’137 Behind the scenes he was laying the groundwork for useful trade discussions

abroad. On the evening of the 19th, he was received by the Japan-Australia Society and had dinner with the Consul-General for Japan, M.K. Murai. Latham later announced in Japan that

Murai was in discussions with the Minister for Trade regarding a trade agreement.138 Indeed,

diplomacy and trade were inextricably connected for Latham, but he was loath to admit

publicly his trade agenda for Asia.

The Nieuw Zeeland reached the first stop, the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), on

1 April. There, Latham and his party stayed until the 11th,, and reached many other stops

before returning to Indonesia on 2 June. The first of these was British Malaya (Singapore and

Malaysia), on the day of departure from Indonesia (11 April), followed by French Indo-

134 Latham to Lyons, report, 22 April 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 7, NAA. 135 Ibid. 136 Sun, 19 March 1934, cutting in, A981, Far 5, Part 14, NAA. 137 “Mission to East Asia,” SMH, 19 March 1934, p. 8. This message was reinforced in an interview with the English language Shanghai Times while abroad. ‘The object behind this mission is not trade. I am coming here not with the idea of trying to sell or buy anything,’ explained Latham, ‘but to make a gesture of friendship, and to further the cultural and human relations between Australia and the East.’ The Shanghai Times, 26 April 1934, cutting in, MS 2887, folder 3, NAA. 138 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 26.

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China (Vietnam) on the 16th, Hong Kong on the 22nd, and China on the 25th. The group

remained in China until 7 May, thereafter crossing the Sea of Japan. From 9 to 21 May, they

stayed in the major centres and ports of Japan’s largest and most populous island, Honshū

(particularly the capital, Tokyo). Next, the group returned to Hong Kong and spent 25-27

May there. Nearby Canton (now Guangzhou), which was held by anti-communist Chinese

nationalists, also received a brief stopover. The last ports were in United States-occupied

Philippines: Manila on 29 and Davao on the 31 May. From there, the group turned for

Indonesia and then home, reaching Brisbane on 12 June.139 The returned party were feted

with celebratory engagements in capital cities on the Australian east coast.140 Including travel

between destinations, the length of the tour was 83 days.

The officially designated title of the ‘Australian Eastern Mission’ was not incidental.

Latham consistently used the term and drew attention to it to dispel misapprehensions of

critics that the Mission was focused on Japan.141 It was also printed on the official

stationery.142 Notably, it reflected imperial terminology rather than strictly antipodean

classifications. ‘Eastern’ in reference to Asia was a familiar term to Australians, but Robert

Menzies’ famous declaration in 1939 that the region was Australia’s ‘near north’ was a more

accurate reflection of geographic reality in the southern hemisphere.143 Given that

geographical space is reconceptualised through historical institutions, political practice, and

behaviour,144 the use of Eastern in the endorsed appellation exemplified the colonial concepts

139 Latham to British Ambassador, Tokyo, cable, 19 March 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 1, NAA. 140 “Mrs Ella Latham, Mr Moore and Miss Winifred Latham being served at a lunch for John Latham at Hotel Australia, Sydney, 14 June 1934,” Fairfax Archive of Glass Plate Negatives, NLA, http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj- 162085832. 141 Latham to Watt, letter, 12 March 1934, A981, Far 2, NAA. 142 MS 6409, Box 6, Folder 52, NLA. 143 Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 24-25. 144 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005); Laura Sjoberg, “Scaling IR Theory: Geography’s Contribution to Where IR Takes Place,” International Studies Review 10, no. 3 (2008): 472-500.

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Latham drew on to guide Australian discourse on Asia and foreign policy. In saying this, he appreciated the European geographical lexicon needed to be adapted to an Australian context. ‘It is the Far East to Europe, to the old centres of civilization, but we must realize that it is the “Near East” to Australia,’ he said in July 1934.145 He was not the first to utter the

‘Near East’ in this context (he is commonly misattributed as its originator),146 but in the case

of the AEM, the juxtaposition of Australian and European terminology flagged regional

imperatives within a discernable imperial framework.

Latham worked closely with British authorities on the ground in Asia. When he

reached a destination, he was advised the ‘best course is to see immediately on arrival British

representative and be guided by him as to entertainment etiquette calls.’147 This was

especially so for Japan, where the Foreign Office thought it ‘most advantageous if an officer

from Embassy at Tokyo were to be attached for duty to the mission whilst in Japan.’148

Latham was ‘glad’ if an officer could be assigned.149 In arranging accommodation, meetings

with foreign officials, social engagements, and transport, he liaised with British embassies,

governors and consuls.150 He also reached out for guidance and permission. From the British

Governor of Hong Kong, he asked whether he should accept a luncheon or dinner invitation

145 Australia, HOR, Debates, 6 July 1934, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1934/19340706_reps_13_144/. 146 For a recent example of this misattribution, see Tony Abbott, “Speech to the Asia Society, Canberra,” 24 March 2014, http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-23365. The origins of the term in Australian international relations discourse are murky. Australia’s adherence to European terminology for demarcating the globe meant the Near East was commonly used in the post-WWI years to describe Turkey and the area of the eastern Mediterranean. To account for this, in Historic Hansard and Trove I used proximity search to set a maximum distance between keywords: ‘“Near East Japan China”~20.’ Based on this search, Anglican Archbishop Frederick Head first deployed the term about the threat Japan posed Australia in January 1933. Later that same year, the terminology was first spoken in parliament in specific reference to China and Japan by UAP politician, Fred Stacey. Each of these utterances, even if they were not the first, still predate Latham’s. “China and Japan. Address by Archbishop Head,” The Age, 11 January 1933, p. 8; Australia, HOR, Debates, 8 November 1933, Fred Stacey, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1933/19331108_reps_13_142/. 147 Undated memorandum, A981, Far 5, Part 1, NAA. 148 Bruce to Lyons, cable, 12 January 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 1, NAA. 149 Latham to Bruce, cable, 17 January 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 1, NAA. 150 Latham to the British Embassy, Tokyo, telegram, 20 March 1934; Latham to British Consul-General, Saigon, cable, 15 March 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 1, NAA.

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from the Australian Association of Hong Kong and South China: ‘Prepared [to] accept

invitation … subject your advice and approval.’151 The symbiosis of the AEM and Britain’s

diplomatic machinery at a day-to-day level reinforced the imperial dimensions of Latham’s

endeavour.

British friendliness

Throughout the AEM, Latham received significant support from British diplomatic staff.

While he reported ‘[t]hroughout Java we were the guests of the Netherlands East Indies

Government,’ when his tour of the East Indies ‘proper opened’ on 4 April, the British

Acting-Consul was the first to meet the party on-board the Nieuw Zeeland. The Dutch were traditional allies and responded enthusiastically to the Mission. Transport and accommodation at government residences was provided free of charge, processions saluted the party at their destinations, even a chairman of Royal Dutch Airways flew from the

Netherlands to meet Latham personally and discuss air communications, however the British

Consul-General escorted them for most of the Indonesian tour.152 In Japan, British assistance

was more marked. Upon Latham’s party disembarking at Kobe on 9 May, the commercial

secretary of the British Embassy in Japan greeted them.153 Diplomat Charles Dodd

accompanied Latham to all functions and meetings in the Japanese capital including the

Australian minister’s important interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota.154

The Australian delegation frequently dined with British officials and patrons, including a

151 Latham to Governor, Hong Kong, cable, 16 March 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. Latham eventually accepted the invitation on the governor’s advice. Governor to Latham, cable, 19 March 1934, A981, Far 5 Part 1, NAA. 152 Latham to Lyons, report, 22 April 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 7, NAA. 153 “Australian Eastern Mission, Japan – General Itinerary,” 3 May 1934, MS 2887, NLA. 154 Ian Nish, Collected Writings of Ian Nish: Part 2 (Tokyo: Japan Library and Edition Synapse, 2001), 343.

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luncheon with the British Society in Tokyo on 12 May.155 In addition, British embassies

provided accommodation, while the British fleet of ambassadorial cars convoyed the

delegation to their many appointments.156 The generous logistical and diplomatic support

during the Japanese tour, compared to the East Indies visit, might be explained by the greater

capacity of the British consular service there.157 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office, which was

acutely aware of the antagonisms in Anglo-Japanese relations in the 1930s including

economic flashpoints such as the cotton trade,158 possibly desired to assist Latham during

delicate discussions.

There is no evidence that the Mission’s leader resented British help. Once back on

Australian soil, he wrote to Lyons ‘to make a proper acknowledgment of the great courtesy

shown to the Australian Eastern Mission and the valuable assistance given … by members of

His Majesty’s Diplomatic and Consular Services.’ While all assessments of British consuls

were glowing here, he was particularly complimentary of Charles Dodd in Tokyo:

Mr. Dodd met me on my arrival and was my host throughout my stay in Tokyo. He was present at all the functions and interviews I attended and accompanied me to the audience with the Emperor and the Empress. He gave an official reception for me and was exceedingly helpful to me. I value all he did very much indeed.159

Inter-imperial friendliness in this moment was more evident than in the British approach to

the establishment of Canada’s trailblazing embassy in Tokyo in 1929. London debated

155 “Australian Eastern Mission. Japan – General Itinerary,” 3 May 1934, MS 2887, NLA. 156 See, for example: “Australian Eastern Mission – Program – Tokyo – Monday 14th May 1934,” MS 2887, NLA. 157 Latham’s despatches mention the names of 12 British consuls and commercial agents in Japan but only five in Netherlands East Indies. Latham to Lyons, letter, 25 June 1934, A981, Far 2, NAA. 158 Antony Best, “The Road to Anglo-Japanese Confrontation, 1931-41,” in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000. Volume II: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931-2000, ed. Ian Nish, and Yoichi Kibata (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 26-50; John Sharkey, “Economic Diplomacy in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1931-41,” in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000. Volume II: The Political- Diplomatic Dimension, 1931-2000, ed. Ian Nish, and Yoichi Kibata (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 78- 111. 159 Latham to Lyons, letter, 25 June 1934, A981, Far 2, NAA.

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whether diplomatic unity was threatened by Dominions representing themselves on the

global stage.160 Although Latham’s designs were less radical than the Canadians, he

nevertheless got the impression from British personnel that he was helping imperial

cohesion. He wrote:

I appreciated the cordiality and very real helpfulness … I was delighted to confirm by personal experience the belief which I have always held that the British Empire is well served by its representatives in these far away places of the world. I was most interested to have an opportunity of meeting so many of them, of benefiting by their experienced advice, and of discussing with them matters affecting the Commonwealth of Australia and the policy of His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth.161

Latham had British trust. By maintaining his reticence on Japan’s aggressions against China,

he had demonstrated knowledge in the British custom of muzzling criticism of Japanese

foreign policy to maintain amiable diplomatic intercourse.162 Moreover, he had done his

homework. Six weeks prior to his departure, he asked the Foreign Office ‘for advice and any

warnings or admonitions to which I will give careful attention.’163 He was careful to present a united imperial front on precarious matters. Once back in Australia, he even desired for his confidential reports on the Mission, written for prime minister and Cabinet, to go to

Whitehall.164

160 Lorna Lloyd, “’(O)n the side of justice and peace’: Canada on the League of Nations Council 1927-1930,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 24, no. 2 (2013): 173; John D. Meehan, The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-41 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 14. 161 Latham to Lyons, letter, 25 June 1934, A981, Far 2, NAA. 162 Meehan, The Dominion and the Rising Sun, 36. 163 Latham to Bruce, cable, 2 February 1934, A981, Far 2, NAA. 164 “Report upon the international position in the Far East,” 3 July 1934, CP290/1, 10, NAA.

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British and Australian goodwill

To the Japanese people, Latham was keen to project Australia as a sovereign nation in the

southern hemisphere and, equally, a loyal member of the British Empire. He explored this

theme in a radio speech broadcast in Japan on 15 May titled ‘All Japan.’ He appealed to

Japan’s sense of imperial and racial identity:

Australia is a Dominion of the British Empire; [sic] our loyalty and our affection are given to the people of our own race and I am sure that the people of Japan, loyal as they are to their own country, will understand that Australia owes her first duty to her own people, and after that to the great British Empire of which she forms a part.165

The words ‘Australia owes her first duty to her own people’ should not be interpreted as being incompatible with imperial ideas. Continuing his speech, he informed his Japanese audience while:

Australia is … proud to be a part of the British Empire, we realize that we are a nation in the Eastern hemisphere … The people of Australia regard themselves as representatives of Western civilization in the East.’166

On ‘many occasions,’ Latham found himself needing to explain to Japanese audiences that

‘the interests of Australia were closely bound up with those of the British Empire.’167 The

content of his speeches in Japan reveals him positioning Australia as the natural agent of the

Empire in the Asia-Pacific with an British-aligned foreign policy.

In his report to the Australian parliament presented in July 1934, Latham suggested

that the Mission served Australian and imperial interests alike. He claimed that in all his

deliberations he ‘frankly put the Australian point of view’ first, but this inevitably meant the

165 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 26. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid., 22.

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concerns of all British people.168 The opening paragraph emphasised Australia was permitted

within the framework of the British Empire to despatch a diplomatic mission to foreign

countries. He added his Mission had maintained, even strengthened, imperial-dominion diplomatic hegemony in the Far East:

On many occasions I found it desirable to draw particular attention to the position of Australia as a self-governing member of the British Empire. I am glad to have justification for my belief that the work of the Mission was of value not only to Australia, but also to the British Empire as a whole.169

He did not, however, draw attention to benefits conferred, present or future. Rather, he preferred to cloak such analysis in the claim that ‘it required some effort of the imagination to understand that the psychological effect of such a mission might be very real and valuable.’170 He concluded that the significant contribution he made to the affairs of the

Empire was an atmosphere that might ‘greatly assist in the solution of present and future

problems.’171 With its somewhat nebulous outcomes, Latham’s endeavour did not lock

Canberra or London to a policy course. His speeches and reports on his diplomatic activities

indicated he was content to underscore for Eastern countries that Australia was a part of the

British imperial equation in the region.

Latham’s experiences in China and Japan did not appreciably shift his largely

deprecatory view of them. He offered a scathing assessment of the two nations in his secret report to Lyons. ‘Both China and Japan,’ he wrote, ‘want trade and other concessions from

Australia. After experience of both countries I suggest that nothing should be given to either

of them without an equivalent.’ This stern recommendation applied to the White Australia

168 Australia, HOR, Debates, 6 July 1934, Latham, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1934/19340706_reps_13_144/. 169 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 23. 170 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 3. 171 Ibid., 23.

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Policy. He did not think the Commonwealth should ‘give anything on immigration unless e.g. we get something on trade.’ Commercial concessions might be conferred on the British through ‘declining to consider requests independent of the treatment of British interests.’172

This admission highlights not just the imperial dimension of the AEM, but also its alignment

with the goals of the Ottawa Agreement: building British Empire trade.

Chinese attitude towards Britain troubled Latham. ‘The individuals in power in China

to-day are attacking British interests at every point,’ he reported to Lyons. He continued:

One of the main planks in their platform is hostility to the foreigner … any abandonment of or failure to protect British interests in China … may gravely prejudice the future of British interests in the whole of the East.’173

In no uncertain language, his advice to the Prime Minister was to support Britain to the hilt in

the pursuit of its policy in the Near East. His observations, too, confirmed that Australia

needed to be wedded with Britain on major security and trade questions in Asia.

Appointing imperial trade commissioners

Latham found himself explaining his government’s trade policy ‘everywhere’ throughout his

journey. That policy, in his words, was ‘the protection of Australian industries, to assist

British industries and then to consider the interests of foreign countries which traded largely

with us.’174 While he ‘made no arrangements and gave no undertakings with respect to trade

matters,’175 he gave various assurances to Chinese and Japanese audiences that the

Commonwealth was considering the appointment of trade commissioners.176 Substantial fact-

172 “Report upon the international position in the Far East,” 3 July 1934, CP290/1, 10, NAA. 173 Ibid. 174 Sun Pictorial (Melbourne), 19 June 1934, cutting in, A981, Far 5, Part 14, NAA. 175 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 4. 176 Ibid., 27.

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finding on trade also took place. This is spelt out in his official reports, which paid

considerable interest to commercial concerns. ‘Commercial officers of Governments and

commercial men’ approached Latham and Moore. The content of many of those discussions

was laid out in the reports. Latham ‘hoped that this information will be of value to the

producing, manufacturing and commercial interests of Australia.’177 The British Consul-

General in Jakarta, Henry Fitzmaurice, considered these informal trade discussions

advantageous. He cabled John Simon on 12 April that ‘the discussions which took place …

cannot but facilitate greatly the conduct of any specific negotiations which follow.’178

Despite Latham’s continual attempts to manage the Mission’s brand as simply a goodwill

tour, his priorities and the activities of his staff reveal that this was a highly selective reading.

He plainly hoped improved trade exchange for Australia and Empire would result from his

exertions.

Latham considered the appointment of trade commissioners to the Netherlands East

Indies, China, and Japan.179 This trio was given equal weighting in Latham’s parliamentary

and secret reports and were toured longer than other countries in the Mission’s schedule. His

tour of the East Indies is the most overlooked by historians, despite Latham’s significant

interest in trade and defence ties there. While he considered that the British diplomatic staff

had ‘done most valuable work in helping Australian interests,’ he felt they lacked ‘the

detailed knowledge … to correct misstatements and remove misapprehensions.’ Based on

this assessment, he observed that British consular and trade representatives ‘were evidently

glad to see us.’ Latham fully intended Australia to maintain the ‘very cordial’ feeling with

177 Ibid. 178 Fitzmaurice to Simon, letter, 12 April 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 7, NAA. 179 Herald, 17 March 1934, cutting in A981, Far 5 Part 14, NAA.

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the East Indies in political, defence, and trade matters.180 Consequently, Canberra appointed

Australia’s first trade commissioner to Jakarta, Charles Critchley, in 1935.

Latham held great sway over the selection of trade commissioners following the

completion of the AEM.181 As evidenced by a letter to independent politician Sir Littleton

Groom in January 1934, Latham was thinking about suitable trade commissioners when he

was selecting his staff for the tour.182 He maintained strict requirements for the candidates,

the most important of which was their ‘standing.’ For the positions in Jakarta, Shanghai and

Tokyo, he demanded each commissioner ‘be a gentleman with good education,’ be willing to learn the local language, and possess a suitable presence to hold memberships to the clubs of politicians and businesspersons where important commercial negotiations and networking took place. One of his picks, Longfield Lloyd, was highly regarded in British diplomatic circles. Latham did not agree with Canadian advice that Lloyd’s position should carry diplomatic rank. The British thought such a distinction unnecessary, and Latham agreed.

Latham concurred with Britain’s counsellors and staff on matters that directly affected

Australia’s future trade commissioners.183

Latham felt confident that British diplomats and commissioners could aptly represent

Australia when necessary. In Japan, a market with good prospects for rapid growth of

Australian exports often in competition with the UK, he was pleased that British counsel staff

there ‘would be only too willing to lend every assistance’ to an Australian commissioner.

Moreover, he hoped that the British Trade Commissioners stationed at Singapore and Hong

Kong ‘could be appointed to act on behalf of Australia; the Commonwealth on its part to be

180 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 5-9. 181 Schedvin, Emissaries of Trade, 51-53. 182 Latham to Groom, letter, 25 January 1934, MS 236/1/3200, NLA. 183 Latham, “Australian Eastern Mission. Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners,” 30 July 1934, CP290/1, 10, NAA.

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prepared to pay certain sum towards … expenses.’184 No Australian trade commissioners

were appointed to those British colonies until after 1945.

Security coordination with Britain and its allies

While the appointment of emissaries of trade waited until Latham completed his journey,

matters of security were more pressing. His history of pursuing an anti-communist agenda drew the attention of communist circles in the Far East. The NSW Commissioner of Police alerted the state Premier to the following information, which had been supplied from an unnamed informant:

It is general talk in the C.P. [Communist Party] Headquarters that Mr Latham is to be dealt with during his visit to the East because he refused passports to four delegates to the Pan Pacific Conference in China in 1924. This may be hot air or it may not and such things are easier in the East than in Sydney. They have at least handed on his name to their confreres in China and Japan.185

Although the report was not substantiated ‘in any way,’ a copy was brought to Latham’s attention as an ‘urgent matter’ so he could take advisable safeguards.186 Soldiers and police

guarded the Mission in China and Japan, but no untoward incident took place.187 While

Latham found the presence of an armed escort merely ‘interesting,’ the police commissioner’s advice must have been in the back of his mind when, in April, he met a paranoid wealthy Chinese man whose experience of being kidnapped led him to ‘always’ drive in a ‘bullet-proof car.’188 Latham also took interest in reports from the Dutch navy that

184 Latham, “Australian Eastern Mission. Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners,” 30 July 1934, CP290/1, 10, NAA. 185 NSW Premier to Lyons, letter, 6 March 1934, NAA: A981, Far 2. 186 Ibid. 187 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 11. 188 Age, 30 April 1934, cutting in, A981, Far 5, Part 14, NAA.

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communist activity in the service had been severely reduced following the crushing of the

mutiny aboard the HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën by Dutch aerial bombardment in February

1933.189 It is evident that he regarded communists, along with the Japanese (discussed

below), as a threat to stability in the Pacific.

Imperial security in the region was a priority for Latham on the Mission, although a

confidential one, particularly in relation to Japan. This was highlighted by two instances: his

discussion with defence personnel in the Netherlands East Indies and his survey of the British

base at Singapore, both of which took place in April 1934. Latham was impressed that the

Dutch East Indies shared ‘so many interests which are largely identical in character with

those of Australia.’190 Apart from a real interest in expanding trade between the two

countries, these interests extended to defence and fear of Japanese invasion.191 Throughout

his visit in the Indonesian islands, he spoke informally with the Dutch admiralty and the

military commander-in-chief about ‘some closer liaison between the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Dutch Navy.’192 Afterwards he described these talks as ‘valuable.’193 They

indicate that Latham was willing to coordinate Australia’s military with European powers in

Southeast and East Asia, but not with the sovereign powers in the region, Japan and China.

Indeed, he found ‘there was a very real apprehension of a Japanese attack’ almost

everywhere he went. His coordination with the Dutch fitted into a British imperial context.

He worried ‘that an attack by Japan upon the Dutch East Indies would raise important

questions for the British Empire’ and other powers in the Pacific including the US.194

189 Latham, secret ‘report upon the international position in the Far East,’ CP290/1, 10, NAA. 190 Latham to Lyons, report, 22 April 1934, p. 9, A981, Far 5, Part 7, NAA. 191 Latham to C.A.S. Hawker, letter, 18 May 1932, MS 1009/57/17a, NLA. 192 “Report upon the international position in the Far East,” CP290/1, 10, NAA. 193 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 5-9. 194 “Report upon the international position in the Far East,” CP290/1, 10, NAA.

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With high-level security discussions with key Dutch military figures still fresh in his

mind, Latham arrived in Singapore. There, he toured the British naval and air bases—still in

construction—and called upon the commanding officer.195 During his observations of the

Singapore defences, he was concerned that works appeared to lack focus and were

consequently proceeding slowly. He qualified this criticism with the admission that he was

‘an external and not specially qualified observer’ and ‘that this aspect of the matter is well

before the minds of the British authorities.’ His slight unease with defence preparations at

Singapore perhaps influenced his frank warning to Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota on 12

May. Towards the end of the tense meeting, he warned his Japanese counterpart that ‘it

would obviously be unwise for Japan to engage in any war with the British Empire’ and that

‘to attempt to land an army in Australia’ would be to find ‘in her [Japan’s] hands a very

lively nest of hornets.’196 This extraordinarily undiplomatic language—on a purported

mission of goodwill—demonstrated that Latham did not intend to appease Tokyo, at least in

relation to Britain and Australia. His inherent suspicion of Japan had not lessened.

Imperial unity in the Asia-Pacific

When in Kobe on 10 May, Latham suggested the AEM ‘might be regarded … as a message

from Britain, to which nation Australians were glad and proud to owe allegiance.’197 He was referring to the approval the Foreign Office had given his Mission. Regardless, London saw his endeavour in an extremely positive light in terms of what it did for the Empire. The

British Consul-General Henry Fitzmaurice, in his report to the Foreign Office, said:

195 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 9. 196 “Report upon the international position in the Far East,” CP290/1, 10, NAA. 197 Age, 11 May 1934, cutting in, A981, Far 5, Part 14.

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Mr. Latham emphasised very happily Australia’s pride in her membership of the British Empire – a particularly useful point at the present moment when signs are not entirely lacking of a tendency on the part of foreign countries to try and play one part of the empire off against another in trade matters.198

Other messages of high praise were forthcoming from British government quarters. Keith

Officer, who was assisting the British Empire delegation at the Disarmament Conference on

31 May 1934, took the time to write to Longfield Lloyd on the splendid way the AEM had

been received in Britain:

Your trip appears to have been a tremendous success. … the Embassy at Tokyo, who were apparently delighted not only with the way the Japanese received you, but with the way you worked in with them and emphasised British Commonwealth solidarity. I was over here at the time and [Anthony] Eden showed them to me himself and went out of his way to express his gratification at the way the whole thing had been conducted.199

Meanwhile, John Simon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reported in the House of

Commons on 14 June 1934:

the British Government had been kept fully informed of the progress of Mr. Latham’s Mission. I feel sure that the House will join me in congratulating Mr. Latham on the success of his journey, which has been of the greatest value to Australia and the British Commonwealth of Nations in promoting good relations with the countries of the Far East.200

Latham, pleased by the reception of his tour in British circles, said that Simon’s comments

constituted ‘very real testimony to the value of the work of the Mission.’201 He must have

been happy that the AEM would have a legacy steeped in pro-British imperialism.

198 Fitzmaurice to Simon, copy of cable, 12 April 1934, A981, Far 5, Part 7, NAA. 199 Officer to Lloyd, letter, 31 May 1934, MS 2887, NLA. 200 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Debates, 14 June 1934, John Simon, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1934/jun/14/far-east-ministers-visit. 201 Latham, “The Australian Eastern Mission 1934,” 23.

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Conclusion

An examination of the 1934 Australian Eastern Mission through the eyes of its leader and

architect, John Latham, offers new understandings of the Mission and the place it has in the

development of Australian foreign policy. His enterprise was a response to recent

developments in imperial affairs, namely the Ottawa Agreement and the treaty-making powers accorded to the Dominions in the 1920s. Conducted within this imperial framework, he sought and obtained the support of London and British Embassy officials in Southeast and

East Asia for the AEM. He took every opportunity to stress the imperial context of the

Mission in public and worked behind the scenes to ensure British officials understood his intent was pro-British imperial, not Australian nationalist. His belief that self-government entailed a responsible and interdependent foreign policy rather than a selfish one, ‘combined with a common allegiance in a Commonwealth which is part of an Empire,’202 was manifest

in his direction over the AEM. Given this, his pursuit of friendlier relations with Asian nations complemented his view of Australia’s place in the Empire.

Within the guidelines Latham set, which privileged the British Empire and Australia’s

obligations to it, the AEM had limited manoeuvrability unless negotiated with the imperial

centre. If British civil servants and politicians expressed any concerns about the Mission,

Latham eventually silenced them. The things he said while overseas proved completely

agreeable to the people in control of Britain’s Far East policy. Indeed, the leader of the AEM

considered carefully the conservation of British imports to Australia and the Empire’s

markets in Asia. To help achieve this, he extinguished expectations of binding trade talks by

depicting his tour as simply a mission of goodwill. He adopted this public relations strategy

202 Latham, “Australia and the British Commonwealth,” 17.

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despite being fully aware of growing Australian demand for trade with Asia. Indeed, the

Mission’s trade agenda was presented differently in public and in private. Latham, though,

did not depict the Australian-British relationship contrarily in any forum. He was remarkably

consistent in presenting the argument to foreign audiences that Australia and the British

Empire’s interests had an unshakeable unity.

Though Latham declared to his Chinese and Japanese audiences that he placed

Australian interests first, and the British Empire’s second, in practice he did nothing to

indicate that he was prepared to develop an external relations or trade policy in the Far East

that was not entirely enmeshed with Britain. Rather, he came away from his tours of China

and Japan with the distinct impression that Australian-British coordination in international affairs needed to be preserved above Australia’s economic interests. Moreover, his strong warnings to Japan’s foreign minister that a military excursion southward was inadvisable did not endear Australia to the East Asian power, in effect making Canberra more reliant on its traditional allies for defence planning. The inescapable conclusion is that Latham’s AEM

initiative must be viewed as an exercise that not only brought Australia and Britain closer

together but also furthered their shared imperial interest.

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Conclusion and Postscript

Mr. Latham’s impending retirement from politics is a blow but having seen at close hand how strained he is –

and the trip did not ease him at all, quite the reverse – I think he is wise to get out before he damages his health

beyond repair. He is a great man and he has helped Australia wonderfully – and as we are all assured – the

Empire itself in the East.1

This thesis is a study of a powerful if largely forgotten early-20th century Australian

statesperson: Sir John Latham. This is not a complete life study, but an examination of

Latham in a crucial period both for him and Australian nationhood, 1919-1934. This

dissertation differs from previous analyses by carefully considering the nature of Latham’s

outlook, and by locating his decisions in the context of themes and debates in interwar inter-

imperial relations. Many scholars have regarded him as a nationalist who planted the germ of

a distinctly Australian regional and international engagement. This thesis, however, argues

that a liberal imperial ideology guided Latham’s political decision-making in the 1920s and

1930s. In many ways, Latham embodied a Deakinite ‘liberal imperialism,’ albeit much more

conservative in inflection. However, he toiled to improve the entire Empire, not just

Australia’s place in it.

Latham’s worldview accommodated both Australian sovereignty in domestic and

international affairs and loyalty to the British Empire. He saw no contradiction in this

platform. Australian autonomy in external affairs was a natural outcome of British tutelage

and was coupled inextricably with the Empire’s strength. Accordingly, Australia’s growing

influence in imperial and international affairs required the nation to shoulder greater

1 Officer to Lloyd, letter, 31 May 1934, MS 2887, NLA.

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responsibility in the British Empire’s areas of concern and spheres of influence, including the

realms of defence, inter-imperial trade, and Dominion relations. The relationship between

Australia and the Empire and its constituent parts needed to be interdependent, not

independent nor dependent. Consequently, his positions on issues of imperial or international

character were in complete harmony with the British Empire. He framed Australian national

interests as imperial interests and vice versa. Latham thus projected onto the world stage an

image of Australia that was unswervingly loyal to Empire.

The consistent outlook that guided Latham in his engagement with inter-imperial problems during his years in parliament was informed by the professional and social circles in which he moved. Elite white, male, imperial thinkers surrounded him throughout his career in politics. These men transmitted ideas about the Empire’s unification in writing and in person, nationally and transnationally. The global connections of his Anglophile associates were analogous to the British Commonwealth; informal and self-selected groupings whose transfer of information and personages bridged continents out of common concern for

Britain’s imperium. Furthermore, informal assemblies outside government such as the

Boobooks dining club and the Round Table were ‘proving grounds’ for Latham’s defence, foreign policy, and political thinking. They afforded safe, uncritical spaces to test his ideas and prepare initiatives before exposure to broader audiences. His social galaxy, which valued upper-class behaviour and knowledge, was also an incubator for political and diplomatic behaviour that was practised across the upper-echelons of the broader Commonwealth. This acculturation and initiation into exclusivity secured Latham’s place in the imperial decision- making apparatus. Throughout his political career, he continued to support behind the scenes diplomacy that marked inter-imperial politics on the basis that he and his confreres could navigate these arrangements. He opposed designs that constitutionalised and demystified inter-imperial processes, most notably the 1931 Statute of Westminster.

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From the vantage point of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Latham understood that the First World War galvanised national feeling in the Dominions. Latham deftly sought to retain the primacy of the British Empire in the global order while preserving Australia’s and the other Dominions’ enhanced voice in inter-imperial affairs and international relations. A secretary to the Australian delegation at Versailles, he was impressed by the backroom negotiations of Commonwealth political leaders but felt unilateral decision-making by

London in meetings with world powers, and diplomatic inexperience on the Dominions’ part, derailed proceedings to the detriment of imperial unity. In response, he believed Australia would need to lead by example on imperial unification rather than continue down the path of independent nationhood. Within the limited scope of his secretarial and advisory role, he submitted advice to the British Empire Delegation and Australian Prime Minister William

Hughes that prioritised the overall strategic position and racial homogeny of the Empire. In this regard, he envisaged Australia’s mandate over New Guinea as an occasion to extend not only Britain’s civilising mission, but to demonstrate also that Australia could be the backbone of Empire defence in the Pacific. He advocated a ring of defensive islands to

Australia’s north that was to be staffed by coordinated imperial defence forces. Australia would not dominate but contribute to, and facilitate, the Empire’s security in the region.

After the Versailles Treaty was signed in June 1919, Latham endeavoured to influence

Australian opinion on the League of Nations, an organisation that he saw as potentially detrimental to British imperial interests. With the help of his concentric social circles, he formed the Victorian League of Nations Union in 1921, a body that put forward British

Empire-friendly positions. The aftermath of the First World War thus reinforced Latham’s conviction that imperialism was mutually compatible with internationalism, and that the

British Empire was the best model for global government.

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A major plank in Latham’s parliamentary platform was ensuring Australian laws

remained compliant with his liberal vision of imperial unity. Latham’s political machinations

on the 1926 Imperial Conference and the 1931 Statute of Westminster exemplified his

imperial outlook. In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, he strove to steer Australia from

constitutionalising post-First World War inter-Commonwealth relations. Although he bore witness to flaws in the existing systems for cooperation, he did not propose radical changes or formal structures to regulate relations between the governments of the Dominions and

London. He agreed with the sentiment of the 1926 Balfour Report, namely that the

Dominions and Great Britain were equal in status and that the Parliament of the United

Kingdom could not legislate for any Dominion without the assent of the relevant Dominion parliament. He opposed the legislation of this understanding on several bases. First, it restricted or closed the ‘organic’ evolution of inter-imperial relations. Second, it violated the notion that the Dominions were freely associated with Great Britain. And third, it sidelined the backroom deals of political leaders and self-styled imperial crusaders. In 1929, he wrote a book that detailed his multifaceted case against the process that led to the Statute of

Westminster, thereby engaging with the informed reading public. Australia and the British

Commonwealth contributed to imperial thought. Latham wanted to shape the Empire and influence decision-makers from a distance. Overall, his opposition to the Statute was ideological and sentimental. He demonstrated wilful ignorance of the disadvantages of the status quo for Australia and the rest of the Dominions.

While the loosely defined and voluntary association of the Dominions was the basis for the British Empire in Latham’s mind, he nonetheless believed that a hierarchy of decision-making needed to be preserved. He thought the ultimate authority to resolve disputes and solve deadlocks or crises should remain with London and the Crown. He reasoned that the Crown’s prestige was a procedural and emblematic tie to Empire. Latham

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campaigned to retain the privileged position of the British monarch in Australian politics. As

Leader of the Opposition from 1929 to 1931, Latham was the most visible domestic

opponent of the appointment of Sir Isaac Isaacs as Governor-General of Australia. He opposed Isaacs’ selection because, in his determination, the Australian government did not sufficiently consult King George V and British ministers. While he argued for limited reforms to the governor-general’s powers, these proposals were premised on enhancing

Australia’s responsibility for managing the affairs of the Empire in Asia and the Pacific. The context of events heightened Latham’s feeling: the impending Statute of Westminster and the fact that a Labor government was in office in Canberra. Latham’s criticism of the Labor

Party, rather than questioning the suitability of Isaacs as a candidate, revealed his deep social conservatism. Latham actively drew on the support of Royal Empire Societies around

Australia, who were similarly dismayed by the violation of traditional procedure by a Labor federal government. Latham’s connections to loyalty organisations during this episode demonstrated the enduring importance of extra-parliamentary groups and elites to his political conduct.

The election of John Thomas Lang as New South Wales Premier in October 1930 alarmed Latham, who mistakenly considered him and his faction of the Labor Party as the beachhead of communism in Australia. Latham had a long-history of opposing communist ideologies and radical unionism before entering parliament, which he considered threats to the British-friendly status quo in Australia. Moreover, Lang’s criticism of the British-backed

Premiers’ Plan was an affront. Latham was dismayed at New South Wales’ refusal to meet its obligations to London’s financial institutions. Latham used his authority as a federal minister to undermine Lang and kept British ministers and interested persons abreast of political developments unfolding in New South Wales. His establishment outlook and adherence to

British-inherited democratic institutions meant he was unenthused by the plebeian New

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Guard’s anti-Lang, anti-communist paramilitary. Nonetheless, he sympathised with the New

Guard’s anti-communism. In his youth he nurtured a distinct distrust of communism and

ideologies that he feared threatened individual liberty; a distrust he carried with him into the

political arena. In the early 1930s, Latham suspected Russia of using economic manipulation

to destabilise the economies of the Dominions during the Great Depression and used his

remit as Attorney-General to limit Russia-linked interests and activities in Australia. To counter the appeal of communism during the economic crisis, he called for Australians to be inspired by the efficiency of the nations ruled by fascist and militaristic governments. This efficiency, though, was to be directed to sustaining nation and uniting empire. Latham’s response to the Lang Government in NSW underscored his conviction that Australia needed to rally under the Union Jack to defy international socialism and communism and their domestic permutations. Considering this, Latham’s anti-communist rhetoric and policies were conservative imperial in character.

The Great Depression brought together the Dominions in search of an inter-imperial solution to flagging economic conditions. The commencement of the sterling bloc and the

Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa enthused Latham. His visit to London in early

1932 was a public relations exercise, his intent being to promote the value of the conference and the imperial devotion of Australia. Concerned that Labor governments in Canberra and

Sydney had harmed Australia’s standing in the financial circles of London, Latham collaborated with Prime Minister Stanley Bruce to negotiate terms for repaying national debt.

In this role, he proved willing to defer to British advice and imperial interests. He criticised the London Economic Conference, a meeting of 66 nations to decide on measures to fight the

Great Depression held in June-July 1933, on the basis that too many competing interests and cross-cultural clashes would make agreement impossible. Imperial conferences, on the other hand, worked because of the participants’ common histories and interests. He argued that

269

anchoring the Dominions to the British hegemon could stabilise economic conditions in the

Dominions and revive international trade.

Latham reasoned that Australia had a responsibility under the 1932 Ottawa

Agreement to bolster imperial trade and grow the sterling bloc. Using Ottawa as a platform,

Latham planned and led the Australian Eastern Mission (AEM). The AEM was carried out in

the imperial interest. Latham’s 1934 endeavour was entirely supported by the apparatuses of

the British diplomatic services throughout Southeast and East Asia. He ensured that it was

coordinated with the British Foreign Office through Australia House in London. When

speaking to foreign audiences, Latham emphasised Australia’s historical and enduring

connections to Great Britain and its Empire. During the Mission, he did nothing that inhibited

imperial links or that might imperil Britain’s interest in the countries he visited. Although

concerned by the state of the defences at Singapore and the threat Japan’s military and naval

capacity posed to stability in the region, he did not recommend Australia establish its own

legations or independent machinery to verify the diplomatic information Britain was

supplying Canberra. Latham recommending Longfield Lloyd, a noted imperialist with

establishment credentials, to be trade commissioner to Japan underwrote the imperial

economic intent of the Mission. How Latham carried out the diplomatic, defence, and

economic aspects of the AEM fulfilled his earlier recommendations that Australia should

carry more of the burden for British Empire responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region.

Concluding comments

Without context, events can be skewed to support nation-centred ideas, erecting epistemic borders that divorce a nation from the international environment in which it exists. Through the eyes of one central Australian political figure, this dissertation has illustrated that the

270

relationship between Australia and Britain during the interwar decades was characterised by

interdependence. Sir John Latham pursued imperial goals in the local and global spheres. He

consistently privileged the interests of the British Empire whether he was in Melbourne,

Canberra, or London. His pro-Empire predilection is easily overlooked if Latham’s political

trajectory is viewed as a series of isolated decisions, or if his comments on events are

disaggregated from his liberal imperial and conservative worldview. A more searching

history must account, as this thesis has done, for the imperial spirit that Latham lived and

breathed. By exposing Latham’s innate, energetic imperialism, a lacuna in Australia’s

political historiography has been filled.

Sir John Latham’s imperial outlook reinforced a restricted cultural and political

pluralism that extended equality and egalitarian status only to select peoples and nations

within the British Empire: principally the white Dominions. This same imperial worldview

supported his decidedly non-humanitarian international politics. He participated in British

imperial institutions of hegemonic control to advance Australia’s interests. He did not want

London to dictate to Australia, but instead to consult and collaborate. Latham’s ideological

bearing guaranteed that domestic political issues were refracted through an imperial

kaleidoscope. His platform encompassed concern for both the Empire’s welfare and the

image of Australia in the eyes of Great Britain and the Dominions. His global outlook also

demanded local action. He spent considerable energy buttressing Australians’ imperial

zealotry and attacking groups that supported ideologies antithetical to the Empire. Likewise,

jingoism and acting in the narrow interest of the nation were thoroughly distasteful to his

sensitivities. He marvelled instead at the complexity and secrecy of the inner-workings of inter-imperial relations and took up professional positions that entrenched him in this sphere.

He negotiated the complications and affordances of being an antipodean imperialist through discursive productions, movements, and configurations of professional and personal linkages.

271

Overall, Latham viewed Australian and British imperial interests as entangled, harmonious,

and inseparable.

Postscript

Sir John Latham announced he would not recontest the 15 September 1934 election just

before parliament was dissolved. His final parliamentary act was handing down his

Australian Eastern Mission report. One member of the House of Representatives was

concerned there would be no opportunity to discuss Latham’s findings in parliament.2 Robert

Menzies won the seat of Kooyong and assumed Latham’s old portfolio of Attorney-General.

Latham was appointed Chief Justice of the High Court in October 1935 following the retirement of Sir Frank Gavan Duffy from the position. Latham continued to exercise political influence from the bench on imperial and conservative causes.3 He was also unable

to leave aside his political allegiance in his court judgments, which caused tension with other

judges, especially Sir Owen Dixon.4 The most notorious instance of disagreement between

Latham and his court was the Communist Party Case of 1951. The High Court’s brief was to rule on the constitutional validity of Prime Minister Menzies’ Communist Party Dissolution

Act, which gave the federal government authority to dissolve the Communist Party of

Australia. Six of the judges declared the legislation invalid; Latham was the sole dissenting

vote.5 He maintained his distrust of communism beyond politics.

2 “The Hansard Proof, House of Reps, Friday, 6 July 1934,” A981, Far 5, Part 16, NAA. 3 Wheeler, “Sir John Latham's Extra-Judicial Advising,” 651-76; “The Latham Court: Law, War and Politics,” 159-78. 4 Ayres, “Two Chief Justices,” 60-64. On Latham’s subjectivity on the bench, see also: Russell Smyth, “Explaining Voting Patterns on the Latham High Court 1935-50,” Melbourne University Law Review 26, no. 1 (2002): 88-109. 5 Widdows, “Sir John Latham,” 204-07.

272

On the High Court bench Latham sustained an abiding interest in international affairs.

In 1935, he wrote a widely cited article that was highly critical of the League of Nations’ sanctioning Italy during the Abyssinian Crisis.6 In 1940, Menzies appointed him Australia’s

first Minister to Japan. He reached Tokyo late that year and led a small staff that included

Australia’s former diplomatic liaison in London, Keith Officer. Latham spoke frankly to

Menzies about the low likelihood of averting war with Japan.7 One academic and Australian expert on Japan, however, worried that Latham would effectively ‘rubber stamp’ British policy on Japan.8 Further study of Latham’s tenure in Tokyo across 1940-41 is needed, especially research that considers continuity with the 1934 Australian Eastern Mission.

Illness forced Latham’s return to Melbourne in late-1941 and before the Pacific War began. Once he had recuperated in April 1942, he called a special meeting of the Boobooks in his house in the exclusive suburb of Toorak. In a long talk and discussion, he told the

Boobooks about his experiences as Minister to Japan. He relayed that the Japanese officials were less friendly than in 1934. Japanese diplomatic hostility towards Britain also curbed his

desire to express honestly his pro-British position.9 Latham remained involved in the dining

club until his death. Whilst outside the scope of this thesis, a history of the Boobooks,

including the mapping of their connections to other like-minded organisations and thinkers, would flesh out the account of Latham’s networks provided here. This may contribute to the field of inquiry that emphasises imperial networks and the links between and among colonies.10 A collective biography of the Boobooks might also highlight the complexities and

6 John G. Latham, Some Recent International Problems (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford University Press, 1935). 7 See, for example: Latham to R.G. Menzies, letter, 20 June 1940, MS 1009/1/5468, NLA. 8 Prue Torney-Parlicki, “Selling Goodwill: Peter Russo and the Promotion of Australia-Japan Relations, 1935- 1941,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 47, no. 3 (2001): 361. 9 Minutes of 374th Meeting, 17 April 1942, Boobooks/3/19, UMA. 10 Alan Lester, “Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire,” History Compass 4, no. 1 (2006): 124-41.

273

opportunities entailed in the quest to conceptualise nation and empire as mutually

compatible.

Latham continued to collect offices after his parliamentary retirement. Among the

most prestigious was chancellor of his alma mater, the University of Melbourne (1939-1941).

He was also president of the anti-communist organisation, the Australian Congress for

Cultural Freedom (1954-1961). His wife, Lady Ella Latham, kept up her work in women’s

and children’s health, and was president of Melbourne’s Royal Children's Hospital (1933-

1954). Latham retired from the High Court in 1952, spending most of his retirement with

Ella in Melbourne.11 The couple lost two of their three children: their eldest son, Richard, in

1943 and their daughter, Freda, in 1953. Ella’s biographer reports the couple were also

estranged from their youngest son, Peter.12 Ella predeceased her husband by four months,

passing on 26 March 1964. Sir John Latham died in a private hospital in Melbourne on 25

July 1964. He was 86. Like his wife, he was cremated; he refused a state funeral.13 He kept

up regular correspondence ‘with people in various parts of the world on a wide variety of

subjects’ until the end of his days.14

11 Macintyre, “Latham, Sir John Greig (1877–1964).” 12 Williams, “Latham, Lady Eleanor Mary (Ella) (1878–1964).” 13 “Sir John Latham Dies, 86,” The Australian, 27 July 1964, p. 4, paper cutting in, “Select Bibliography on Sir John Latham”, dated January 1975, NLA. 14 Perry, “The Late Sir John Latham,” 100-01.

274

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