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Constitutional Law Mnemonics

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Constitutional Law Mnemonics CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MNEMONICS 1) PEG a violation of the Establishment Clause: P – The state statute or activity must have a primarily secular PURPOSE as opposed to the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion E – The law’s primary or inevitable EFFECT must neither disapprove of nor endorse religion AND G – The law or conduct can’t foster excessive GOVERNMENTAL religious entanglement 2) A content-neutral regulation must be a reasonable SON of the First Amendment: S – The restriction must be justified by a SIGNIFICANT governmental interest O – The regulation must leave OPEN ample alternative channels of communication AND N – The regulation must be NARROWLY tailored to further the government’s goal, but doesn’t have to be least restrictive means of doing so 3) All commercial speech restrictions with STAN are valid: S – Government must have a SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST to restrict the speech T – Advertisements must be TRUTHFUL and concern lawful products and services A – Governmental restrictions must directly and materially ADVANCE the government’s “substantial interest” in enacting the law (and there must be “reasonable fit” between the state’s goal and means used to achieve that goal) N – The regulation must be NARROWLY-DRAWN and must not be more extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s substantial interest 4) The statute’s primary purpose must be a secular (non-religious) purpose, as opposed to a DOE purpose of Disapproving Or Endorsing religion 5) SLAP POP’S PAW is simply obscene, and is not constitutionally protected: SLAP – Lacks SCIENTIFIC, LITERARY, ARTISTIC, or POLITICAL value (determined by a national standard, not local) POP’S – PATENTLY OFFENSIVE PORTRAYAL of SEX PAW – PRURIENT interest appeal, in which the material tends to excite lewd, lascivious, and lustful thoughts in a person of AVERAGE sensitivity; here, the WHOLE material must be weighed by the court 6) A suspect class RIO for equal protection: R – RACE I – IMMIGRANT O – National ORIGIN © 2016 Pieper Bar Review 1 7) Fundamental rights drink from the Equal Protection VAT: V – VOTING rights A – ACCESS to courts T – The right to TRAVEL throughout the U.S. 8) Privileges and Immunities claims cannot be asserted by RAG CAP: R – A RESIDENT of the state who’s law is being challenged (i.e., the P here must be a non-resident or a newly arrived resident) A – ALIENS G – The U.S. GOVENMENT C – CORPORATIONS A – ASSOCIATIONS (partnerships, LLCs, etc.) P – PARTNERSHIPS 9) For an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, use “IS” four times… IS – INTERMEDIATE level of judicial SCRUTINY IS – There must be an IMPORTANT governmental interest, and the method chosen must SUBSTANTIALLY relate to achieving that interest IS – ILLEGITIMACY and SEXES (genders) IS – ILLEGAL SCHOOL-AGE children 10(a) Intermediate scrutiny arises whenever you drink GIN: G – GENDER I – ILLEGAL school age IMMIGRANTS N – NONMARITAL children 10(b) Note that “IS” does NOT apply to a MAP person: M – MENTALLY disabled A – AGE discrimination victim P – POVERTY-STRICKEN person 11) The President always wears his VETS’ CAPS: V – VETO power over Congressional acts E – EXECUTIVE power to “take care” that laws of the U.S. are faithfully executed T – TREATY Power S – STATE of the Union recommendation to Congress for proposed legislation C – COMMANDER in Chief of the armed forces A – APPOINTMENT power over ambassadors, judges of the Supreme Court, and other “superior officers” of the U.S. P – PARDON power over federal crimes S – Power to call a SPECIAL Session of Congress 12) Congress requires a 2/3 vote only when drinking a TEA I.V.: T – For the Senate to ratify a TREATY E – To EXPEL a member from either House of Congress A – To propose an AMENDMENT to the Constitution (2/3 vote in each House) I – For the Senate to convict an IMPEACHED official (2/3 of those present) V – For both Houses to override a Presidential VETO © 2016 Pieper Bar Review 2 13) PIEPER FIT WABCD in Congress (express powers of Congress, enumerated in Article I of the U.S. Constitution): P – POST office I – INVESTIGATORY power to find facts in order to pass legislation E – ENFORCEMENT of federal civil rights under the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments P – PROPERTY power E – Federal ELECTIONS R – RAISING revenues by taxing F – FISCAL power I – The power to regulate INFERIOR federal courts and their procedures T – TREATY power W – The power to declare WAR A – Power over ALIENS and their naturalization to become citizens B – BANKRUPTCY C – International and interstate COMMERCE D – DISTRICT of Columbia police power 14) The 13th Amendment confronts the VIBS of slavery: V – VESTIGES I – INCIDENTS and BS – BADGES of the SLAVERY system 15) MAD2 COPS protect fundamental privacy interests: M – Right of heterosexual couples to MARRY A – Right to an ABORTION (“undue burden” standard) D – Spouse’s right to DISSOLVE a marriage D – Right of a terminally ill person to DIE C – Right to buy, sell, or use CONTRACEPTIVES O – Right to privately possess OBSCENE material (but not if it depicts minors) P – PARENTING rights (right to control the upbringing and education of child) S – Right to private, consensual SEXUAL activity 16) A parent has 3-C fundamental rights to raise children: C – CUSTODY C – CARE C – CONTROL © 2016 Pieper Bar Review 3 In-Class Multistate Questions: Constitutional Law Breakdown of Constitutional Law on the MBE 50% 50 % Individual Rights Judicial Review, Separation of Powers, and The Federal System Individual Rights (50%) What Concepts Do They Expect You to Know? Individual Rights Privileges and immunities clauses, the contracts clause, unconstitutional A. State action conditions, bills of attainder, and ex post B. Due process facto laws 1. Substantive due process F. First Amendment freedoms a. Fundamental rights 1. Freedom of religion and separation b. Other rights and interests of church and state 2. Procedural due process, including a. Free exercise personal jurisdiction b. Establishment C. Equal protection 2. Freedom of expression 1. Fundamental rights a. Content-based regulation of 2. Classifications subject to heightened protected expression scrutiny b. Content-neutral regulation of 3. Rational basis review protected expression D. Takings c. Regulation of unprotected E. Other protections, including the expression © 2016 Pieper Bar Review 4 d. Regulation of commercial speech f. Regulation of expressive conduct e. Regulation of, or impositions g. Prior restraint, vagueness, and upon, public school students, overbreadth public employment, licenses, or 3. Freedom of the press benefit based upon exercise of 4. Freedom of association expressive or associational rights 15th Amendments Judicial Review, 4. Other powers Separation of Powers, B. The powers of the president 1. As chief executive, including the “take and the Federal care” clause 2. As commander in chief System (50%) 3. Treaty and foreign affairs powers What Concepts Do They Expect You 4. Appointment and removal of officials to Know? C. Federal interbranch relationships 1. Congressional limits on the executive 2. The presentment requirement and the I. Judicial Review president’s power to veto or to withhold action A. Organization and relationship of state and 3. Non-delegation doctrine federal courts in a federal system 4. Executive, legislative, and judicial B. Jurisdiction immunities 1. Constitutional basis 2. Congressional power to define and limit II. The Federal System 3. The Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity A. Intergovernmental immunities C. Judicial review in operation 1. Federal immunity from state law 1. The “case or controversy” requirement, 2. State immunity from federal law, including the prohibition on advisory including the 10th Amendment opinions, standing, ripeness, and B. Federalism-based limits on state authority mootness 1. Negative implications of the commerce 2. The “adequate and independent state clause ground” 2. Supremacy clause and preemption 3. Political questions and justiciability 3. Full faith and credit 4. Authorization of otherwise invalid state II. Separation of Powers action C. Federalism-based limits on state authority A. The powers of Congress 1. Negative implications of the commerce 1. Commerce, taxing, and spending clause powers 2. Supremacy clause and preemption 2. War, defense, and foreign affairs 3. Full faith and credit powers 4. Authorization of otherwise invalid state 3. Power to enforce the 13th, 14th, and Action © 2016 Pieper Bar Review 5 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PIEPER BAR REVIEW 1. Congress passed a new federal excise tax on 1. (C) is correct because a challenge to the taxing cigarettes and mandated that the funds and spending power is only possible where collected be spent on advertising the dangers of there is a positive limitation on those powers in smoking. A major U.S. tobacco company the Constitution, a condition not present here. brought suit in federal district court to block implementation of the new tax. (A) is incorrect because there is no applicable limitation on the taxing and spending power of On the issue of standing, how is the court likely Congress. Therefore, there is no taxpayer to hold? standing. (A) The tobacco company has taxpayer (B) is incorrect because the harm to the standing because the tax is solely on cigarette company’s sales is clear before the cigarettes and thus the tax affects it statute is actually implemented. Therefore, the uniquely. cigarette company need not wait until actual harm occurs before it sues. (B) The tobacco company does not have standing until it has experienced actual (D) is incorrect; Congress can use the taxing harm. and spending power to achieve goals which it cannot achieve by regulation. (C) The tobacco company does not have standing to object to an exercise of Congress’s spending power unless it alleges a positive constitutional limitation on that power. (D) The tobacco company has standing because Congress cannot use the taxing or spending power to achieve goals it could not achieve directly.
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