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1610390415-Text02 Layout 1 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT INDEX Abacus –, , Adverse market conditions, liquidity failure, – Abacus –, –, – liquidity puts, ABS East conference, Affordable housing, –, Merrill Lynch’s CDO ABX index, –, , , –, – tranches, , , , African Americans: jobless rate, over-the-counter ACA Capital, , derivatives, xxvi Accountability Agosta, Jeff, payment to AIG increasing sloppiness in Aguero, Jeremy, counterparties, (fig.) mortgage paperwork, AIG Financial Products, – risk management, xix mortgage lending fraud, systemic risk after Bear systemic breakdown in, xxii Alex Brown & Sons, Stearns collapse, – Accountant firms, Alix, Michael, , , Accounting practices Allianz, TARP, AIG valuation, – Ally Financial, Ameriquest, , –, , , AIG-Goldman dispute over Alt-A securitization, –, CDO, – –, , , , Andrukonis, David, – collapse of subprime Antoncic, Madelyn, – lenders, Alvarez, Scott, , , , , Appraisals, inflated, – GSEs’ capital shortfall, Arbitrage, – Lehman Brothers, – Alwaleed bin Talal, Archstone Smith trust, – mark-to-market rules, , Ambac, Arizona: mortgage delinquency, –, , , , American Bankers Association, , , , , Arthur Andersen, Adams, Stella, American Home Mortgage, Ashcraft, Adam, Adelson, Mark, American International Group Ashley, Stephen, Adjustable-rate mortgages (AIG) Asset-backed commercial paper (ARMs), , , , bailout, –, – (ABCP) programs delinquency, CDO structuring, , BNP Paribas SA loss, hybrids, – –, – – increasing popularity of, – credit default swaps, Countrywide, – , failure triggering crisis, xvi expanding use of, – mechanism of, financial crisis and bailout, IKB as casualty, – mortgage-securities – latent subprime exposure, entanglement, Goldman dispute over option ARMs, – subprime losses, – money market funds, savings and loan crisis, government rescue, – Wachovia’s liquidity lack of concern over SIVs, – concerns, subprime-mortgage Asset-backed securities, (fig.) See also Option ARM loans failure, – Associates First, I NDEX Athan, Tom, , – mortgage-backed securities synthetic CDOs, Auction rate securities (ARS), market losses, See also Investment banks – nontraditional loans, Bear Stearns Asset Australia See also Investment banks Management (BSAM), house price appreciation, Bank runs, , –, –, –, , –, (fig.) Bankers Trust, , – housing bubble, – Banking “Bear Stearns Light” liquidity Automobile manufacturers, bank failure affecting scenario, Automotive Industry Financing commercial real estate “Bear Stearns” liquidity Program, market, scenario, big bank bets and bank Beneficial Mortgage, Bacon, Kenneth, failures, – Bensinger, Steven, , dismantling Glass-Steagall, Bailey, Kevin, Bernanke, Ben – Bailouts acknowledging housing failure numbers, AIG, –, market drop, financial fallout from controversy over Lehman Bear Stearns’ collapse, – recession, – Brothers collapse, savings and loan crisis, – Bear Stearns’ toxic hedge – Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, funds, See also Commercial banks; – BofA-Merrill Lynch merger, Investment banks savings and loan crisis, Barber, Mark, – – concerns over Lehman’s Barclays, ”too big to fail” principle, liquidity, Barker, Randolph, , – consumer advocates’ Barnes, Murray, – concerns about mortgage Bair, Sheila C., , , , , Basel International Capital lending, , – Accords, , , – credit rating agencies’ role in Baker, Dean, – CDO structuring, Bakersfield, California, , Basis Yield Alpha Fund, delinking Fed interest rate Balloon mortgages, Bass, J. Kyle, –, , hikes and real estate Bank of America Baxter, Tom, , –, , bubble, acquisition of Countrywide, BBB-rated securities, –, Fed-Lite, agencies’ peer group study , Fed’s failure of housing of mortgage practices, Beal, Vicki, regulation, Bear Stearns financial crisis of , Bear Stearns toxic hedge BSAM role in CDO global capital flows, funds, business, – housing bubble, consolidation and growth of commercial real estate, housing prices leading to banks, CSE oversight, nontraditional lending Countrywide’s ABCP loss, fall of, – products, financial sector growth, lack of concern over CRA-qualifying portfolio, government response to housing bubble, xxi collapse of, xxi Lehman collapse, –, credit default swaps, , hedge fund creation, – financial crisis, – JP Morgan purchase of, , measuring investment bank financial sector growth, liquidity risk, GSE delinquent loans, mortgage-backed securities monetary policy Lehman Brothers collapse, market losses, contributing to credit , regulators’ concerns over bubble, litigation over failure of, – mortgage fraud, – delinquencies, risk concentration, predatory lending practices, money market funds, risk exposure of hedge mortgage fraud, funds, – recession of , I NDEX refusal to believe in housing government response to Chau, Wing, , –, , market crash spillover, economic shortfalls, mortgage delinquency, Checks and balances, run on Goldman Sachs, SIV losses, Cheyne Capital Management, small businesses’ losses underwater mortgages, – during recession, (fig.) Chicago Board of Trade, TARP, – California Reinvestment Chicago CRA Coalition, underestimating magnitude Coalition (CRC), , Children, housing foreclosures of systemic risk, , Callahan, Jim, , and, underestimating the Callan, Erin, China housing bust, Canada: housing bubble, credit bubble, See also Federal Reserve CanagaRetna, Sujit, – global capital flows, Bies, Susan, –, – Canavan, Sheila, – Bisenius, Donald, Capital flows GSE securities, Black, Dennis J., – insufficient capital leading Christie, Chris, Black, William K., , –, to bank failure, Cioffi, Ralph, –, –, mortgage-backed securities – Blankfein, Lloyd, , , –, losses, Cisneros, Henry, , Capital Markets Approval CIT Group Inc., Blinder, Alan, Committee (Citigroup), Citibank Blow up risk, Fannie Mae involvement in BNP Paribas SA, , – Capital Purchase Program, housing bubble, BNY Mellon, –, , Cardwell, J. Thomas, – Maiden Lane payments, , – Carter, Carolyn, – Bookstaber, Richard, Case, Karl, Citicorp: deregulation of bank Born, Brooksley, – Case-Shiller Index, consolidation, Bowen, Richard, , , Cash management accounts, CitiFinancial, , , – Cash reserves, , , Citigroup Braunstein, Sandra, , Cassano, Joseph, –, – agencies’ peer group study of mortgage practices, Breaking the buck, , Cattani, Arnold, , Breeden, Richard, , Causes of the crisis, xv Ameriquest acquisition, Brendsel, Leland, big bank bets and bank Bear Stearns’ toxic hedge Broderick, Craig, , , failure, – funds, – – credit bubble, – CDO losses, , – Brown, Lloyd, differing theories of, – CDO structuring, – Brown, Richard, commercial banks’ Bruce, Kenneth, housing bubble, – downturn, – Bubbles. See Credit bubble; mortgage securitization, consolidation and growth of Housing bubble; – banks, Mortgage bubble systemic failure through credit default swaps, Buffett, Warren, , , –, common shock, – deregulating bank systemic failure through consolidation, Burks, Gail, , contagion, – due diligence and Burry, Michael, ten essential causes, – disclosure, – Bush, George W., , – expansion of, – Bushnell, David, , Cayne, Jimmy, –, failure to control excesses, Bynum, Gregory, Cecala, Guy, xviii Center for Responsible failure to heed warning Calhoun, Michael, Lending, signs, California Century Financial, financial crisis, – delinquency, , Chanos, Jim, financial sector growth, fallout from the crisis, Charles Schwab, lending violations, foreclosures, Chase Home Financial, liquidity puts, –, I NDEX Citigroup (continued) Bear Stearns toxic hedge See also Citigroup; mortgage securitization, , funds, – Wachovia; Washington Citigroup liquidity puts, Mutual mortgage-backed securities – Commercial Paper Funding market losses, Citigroup’s synthetic CDOs, Facility, raising capital after Bear – Commercial paper market, Stearns collapse, Consolidated Supervised –, –, – reducing subprime exposure Entity program, – AIG liquidity failure, – through CDS, creating demand for lower- , subprime exposure rated tranches, – Citigroup involvement, level, – creation and expansion of, – Wachovia acquisition, – Lehman decline, – downgrading, – money market funds, warehouse lending, – due diligence and post-recession financing, Civil rights, disclosure, Clark, Timothy, , end of the boom, stopping mortgage lender Clarke, Vaughn, Goldman Sachs, , funding, Clarkson, Brian, , –, – Commercial real estate, housing boom repackaging, –, – Clawback provisions, Commodification of the Clayton Holdings, – housing entanglement in housing industry, – Clearing banks, – securities market, – Commodities, Cleveland Ohio: predatory leverage, Commodity Exchange Act lending practices, – managers’ response to the (), “Climbing the Wall of madness, – Commodity Futures Subprime Worry” report, mechanism of, (fig.) Modernization Act – Merrill Lynch, – (CFMA; ), Clinton, Bill, Moody’s downgrade, Commodity Futures Trading affordable housing, – – Commission (CFTC), Commodity Futures Moody’s role in, –, – Modernization Act, – Common shock, , – CRA lending, mortgage-backed securities Community Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, market losses, fallout from the crisis, reducing subprime exposure housing industry links to, HOEPA, through CDS, – Cloutier, C.R., regulators’ missed mortgage fraud, – CMLTI -NC, , , opportunity, – Community Reinvestment Act (fig.), , (fig.), self-fueling machine, (CRA), xxvii, –, , –, , – –, –, Coffey, Kevin, See also Credit default swaps Community-lending pledges, Cohen,
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