Notices Openssl/Open SSL Project
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Effective Cryptography What’S Wrong with All These Crypto Apis?
Effective Cryptography What’s Wrong With All These Crypto APIs? Thorsten Groetker, CTO Utimaco, Inc. Utimaco IS Business Unit· Aachen, Germany · ©2015 Page 1 Outline § What I mean by Effective Cryptography § Crypto APIs § Security § Ease of Use § Runtime Performance § Predictions § CryptoScript in a Nutshell § Outlook Utimaco IS Business Unit· Aachen, Germany · ©2015 Page 2 Effective Cryptography Definition in a Nutshell Cryptography is effective if it is Li lingues es membres del sam familie. Lor separat existentie es 1. Secure unJCE/JCA myth. Por scientie, musica , sport etc, litot li sam vocabular. Li lingues differe solmen in li grammaticaOpenSSL, li pronunciation e li pluEVP commun vocabules. Omnicos directe al desirabilite de un nov lingua franca: On refusa continuar payar custosi traductores. At solmen va esser necessi 2. Efficient far uniform grammaticaPKCS#11, pronunciation e plu sommun paroles. Ma quande lingues coalesce, li grammatica del resultant lingue es plu CAPIsimplic e regulari quam ti del coalescent lingues. Li nov lingua CNG a. Time to Result franca va esser plu simplic e regulari quam li existent Bouncy linguesCastle. I b. Performance What’s wrong with all these crypto APIs? (Focused on Hardware Security Modules) Utimaco IS Business Unit· Aachen, Germany · ©2015 Page 3 Problem #1: Security PKCS#11 § Numerous key extraction attacks known § Jolyon Clulow “On the Security of PKCS#11” § Tookan project (e.g., “Attacking and Fixing PKCS#11 Security Tokens”) § CVE entries (not necessarily sporting “PKCS#11” in the text) -
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations Chad Brubaker ∗ y Suman Janay Baishakhi Rayz Sarfraz Khurshidy Vitaly Shmatikovy ∗Google yThe University of Texas at Austin zUniversity of California, Davis Abstract—Modern network security rests on the Secure Sock- many open-source implementations of SSL/TLS are available ets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. for developers who need to incorporate SSL/TLS into their Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded software: OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, CyaSSL, PolarSSL, Ma- devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection trixSSL, cryptlib, and several others. Several Web browsers against network attacks. This protection critically depends on include their own, proprietary implementations. whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. In this paper, we focus on server authentication, which We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for is the only protection against man-in-the-middle and other large-scale testing of certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS server impersonation attacks, and thus essential for HTTPS implementations. Our first ingredient is “frankencerts,” synthetic and virtually any other application of SSL/TLS. Server authen- certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real cer- tication in SSL/TLS depends entirely on a single step in the tificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions handshake protocol. As part of its “Server Hello” message, and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if the server presents an X.509 certificate with its public key. -
Libressl Presentatie2
Birth of LibreSSL and its current status Frank Timmers Consutant, Snow B.V. Background What is LibreSSL • A fork of OpenSSL 1.0.1g • Being worked on extensively by a number of OpenBSD developers What is OpenSSL • OpenSSL is an open source SSL/TLS crypto library • Currently the de facto standard for many servers and clients • Used for securing http, smtp, imap and many others Alternatives • Netscape Security Services (NSS) • BoringSSL • GnuTLS What is Heartbleed • Heartbleed was a bug leaking of private data (keys) from both client and server • At this moment known as “the worst bug ever” • Heartbeat code for DTLS over UDP • So why was this also included in the TCP code? • Not the reason to create a fork Why did this happen • Nobody looked • Or at least didn’t admit they looked Why did nobody look • The code is horrible • Those who did look, quickly looked away and hoped upstream could deal with it Why was the code so horrible • Buggy re-implementations of standard libc functions like random() and malloc() • Forces all platforms to use these buggy implementations • Nested #ifdef, #ifndefs (up to 17 layers deep) through out the code • Written in “OpenSSL C”, basically their own dialect • Everything on by default Why was it so horrible? crypto_malloc • Never frees memory (Tools like Valgrind, Coverity can’t spot bugs) • Used LIFO recycling (Use after free?) • Included debug malloc by default, logging private data • Included the ability to replace malloc/free at runtime #ifdef trees • #ifdef, #elif, #else trees up to 17 layers deep • Throughout the complete source • Some of which could never be reached • Hard to see what is or not compiled in 1. -
Hannes Tschofenig
Securing IoT applications with Mbed TLS Hannes Tschofenig Part#2: Public Key-based authentication March 2018 © 2018 Arm Limited Munich Agenda • For Part #2 of the webinar we are moving from Pre-Shared Secrets (PSKs) to certificated-based authentication. • TLS-PSK ciphersuites have • great performance, • low overhead, • small code size. • Drawback is the shared key concept. • Public key cryptography was invented to deal with this drawback (but itself has drawbacks). 2 © 2018 Arm Limited Public Key Infrastructure and certificate configuration © 2018 Arm Limited Public Key Infrastructure Various PKI deployments in existence Structure of our PKI The client has to store: self-signed • Client certificate plus corresponding private key. CA cert • CA certificate, which serves as the trust anchor. The server has to store: Signed by CA Signed by CA • Server certificate plus corresponding private key. Client cert Server cert (Some information for authenticating the client) 4 © 2018 Arm Limited Generating certificates (using OpenSSL tools) • When generating certificates you will be prompted to enter info. You are about to be asked to enter information that will be • The CA cert will end up in the trust incorporated into your certificate request. What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished anchor store of the client. Name or a DN. There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank For some fields there will be a default value, • The Common Name used in the server If you enter '.', the field will be left blank. ----- cert needs to be resolvable via DNS Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:. -