Kosovo's Alternatives Towards Nato Membership

POLICY PAPER BY KCSS 05/2015

Kosovar Center for Security Studies

Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership

May , 2015

Kosovar Center for Security Studies

Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership

May , 2015 Publisher: Kosovar Center for Security Studies

Author: Plator Avdiu

Internal review: Florian Qehaja Mentor Vrajolli

Peer review: Shpend Kursani

Proofreading: Jacob Phillipps

May , 2015

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher.

This project was supported through Think Tank Fund – Open Society Foundations grant. The views expressed in this study are those of the Kosovar Center for Security Studies and do not necessarily represent those of the Think Tank Fund – Open Society Foundations. TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ��6 TABLE OF FIGURES ��7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ��8 INTRODUCTION �� 11 METHODOLOGY �� 12 SECTION 1 – NATO’s role in Kosovo’s post-war period (1999 to 2008) �� 13 SECTION 2 – Kosovo-NATO relations (2008-2015) �� 16 2.1. Four Non-Recognizing Countries ��16 2.2. Current status of relations between Kosovo and NATO ��18 2.3. Kosovo Armed Forces vis-à-vis NATO ��23 2.4. Kosovo’s public perception on NATO integration and comparison with regional countries �� 25 SECTION 3 – Policy options on the prospect of Kosovo-NATO relations �� 28 3.1. First scenario: From Kosovo-NATO dialogue to full membership ��28 3.2. Second scenario: Bilateral cooperation with NATO countries ��32 RECOMMENDATIONS �� 34 LIST OF ANNEXES �� 37 BIBLIOGRAPHY �� 39 INTERVIEWS �� 44 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC Adriatic Charter BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina COMKFOR Commander KFOR DNSP Department for NATO and Security Policy EU European Union FOC Full Operational Capability FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan K-Albanians Kosovo Albanians K-Serbs Kosovo Serbs KAF Kosovo Armed Forces KCSS Kosovar Center for Security Studies KFOR Kosovo Force KP Kosovo Police KPC Kosovo Protection Corps KSB Kosovo Security Barometer KSC Kosovo Security Council KSF Kosovo Security Force MAP Membership Action Plan MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MKSF Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force MoD Ministry of Defence NAC North Atlantic Council NAT NATO Advisory Team NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO PA NATO Parliamentary Assembly NLAT NATO Liaison and Advisory Team NLOK NATO Liaison Office in Kosovo NRCs Non-Recognizing Countries NSRK NATO Special Representative in Kosovo NWG NATO Working Group OPMK Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PfP Partnership for Peace RACVIAC Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SSSR Strategic Security Sector Review UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR 1244 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 U.S. United States TABLE OF FIGURES

Figures

Figure 1: Public perception in Kosovo towards NATO membership ��25 Figure 2: Public perception in Kosovo compared to Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina towards NATO membership ��26 Figure 3: First scenario - From Kosovo-NATO dialogue to full membership ��31 Figure 4: Second scenario - Bilateral cooperation with NATO countries ��33

Tables

Table 1: Kosovo’s institutional framework vis-à-vis NATO integration ��37 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS 8 CHALLENGES: THE CONTEXT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • • • • • • • Kosovo hasnotestablishedany officialbilateral relations with NATO, ittheonly making in the cooperationing the rightto participate mechanisms and various NATO’s programmes. W not recognize Kosovo. This was becausefour NATO membercountries –Greece, andSpain–did Slovakia Romania, stance towards Kosovo andcontinued to operate inaccordance 1244. withtheResolution relation between Kosovo andNATO. After theindependence, NATO adopted astatus neutral Kosovo’s Declaration on17February any ofIndependence 2008didnotbring alteration in over someifitsresponsibilities to theKosovo institutions. troop inKosovo from 50,000in1999to lessthan5,000soldiersin2015andgradually handed in Kosovo. As aresult oftheimproved situation inKosovo, security NATO gradually reduced its ended in1999.Since then,KFORwas given anddefence theleadingrole inthefieldofsecurity the deployment ofNATO-led peacekeeping missioninKosovo thewar (KFOR)after military tion inKosovo againstSerbia. airstrikes andits78-day developedThe relationswith further The relations between Kosovo andNATO NATO’s during firststarted - interven humanitarian Kosovo shouldmove forward withitsPartnership for Peace andNATO membership. spite ofthesechallenges,In Kosovo’s NATO friendly membercountries have insisted that presented for suchan endeavour. the two thirds would oftheminorities have to agree onthis. There hasnotbeenany timeline the approval by ofmemberstheAssembly thedoubletwo thirds –whichmeans majority would transform Force theKosovo Security into theKosovo Forces. Armed This dependson The Kosovo Assembly hasnotyet adopted theconstitutional andlegislative which package NATO inpursuingthelatter to establishofficial relations withKosovo. were only. limited efforts to declaratory Never was there any official request directed towards in Kosovo made Theby policymakers in strengthening efforts the relationship with NATO Peace. might yet beanotherimpediment for Kosovo ofthePartnership tofor even become part eration inEurope first. Given that Kosovo ofthisorganization, this isnotamember country programme could depend on its membership into the Organization and Co-op for Security Based onsomeNATO’s officialdocuments, Kosovo’s membership into for Partnership Peace forReasons this are analysed more indepththroughout thepaper. not to have country any Balkan ern form of cooperation with NATO’s Atlantic Council. North hen itcomes to cooperation withNATO, Kosovo withoutenjoy isblockedat allaspects W est - - - First scenario: SCENARIOS Second scenario:Second • • • • • • • • Representative inKosovo; theestablishment oftheNATO the establishment oftheNATO inKosovo; LiaisonOffice theappointment ofthe NATO Special to takeplace between Kosovo undereitherEuropean andSerbia UnionorNATO mediation; The dialogueshouldcontain thefollowing issues:aprocess ofborder demarcation isrequired ment inthecountry. lead to the assumption of responsibilities from KFOR to guarantee a safe and secure environ - ber countries. Consequently, the Kosovo Forces’ Armed would increase importance andmay maketheroleindirectly ofKFOR’s infront missioninKosovo oftheNATO unnecessary mem- ately theKosovo after Forces Armed develop itshumanandoperational capabilities, itwould rived by 1244whichisnotyet theResolution abrogated by theUnited Nations, thenimmedi- KFOR’s mainresponsibility to theKosovo Forces. Armed that Knowing KFOR’s mandate de An eventual dialogue between Kosovo andNATO should foresee the gradual transfer of ofKosovo.throughout thewholeterritory fullresponsibilityly consolidatedfrom KFORfor andcapableoftaking providing security Kosovo, theKosovo Police inparticular andtheKosovo Forces Armed would beadequate toprior itsgradual withdrawal ofitstroops. shouldprovide institutionsin It that thesecurity ment ofKFOR’s contribution inKosovo andto review alltheremaining dutiesofthemission An eventual dialoguebetween Kosovo andNATO shouldfocus onacomprehensive assess- membership inPartnership for Peace andconsequently NATO itself. of notmore thantwo years, withthemaintaskto prepare Kosovo andgain to participate andformalstructural dialoguewithKosovo. linkedto As atimeframe such,ithasto bestrictly The Kosovo institutionsshouldaskexplicitly for NATO’s Atlantic Council North to launcha from for theircasesaslessons learned joiningPartnership for Peace andNATO. Kosovo shouldsign bilateral agreements withAlbania andCroatia so asto benefit directly member countries that have recognized Kosovo. grammes andjoint exercises oftheKosovo Forces Armed forces withthearmed oftheNATO The existing andtheupcoming bilateral agreements shouldbefocused onthetraining pro with NATO membercountries that have recognized Kosovo. countries. Kosovo hasto findotheralternatives to approach NATO through close cooperation scenario focuses more on deepening bilateral cooperation with the individual NATO member The Kosovo institutionsshouldbeprepared for thesecond scenario ifthefirstfails. Hence, this in NATO operations. tual dialoguewithNATO oftheKosovo and itwould Forces Armed enabletheparticipation that would eventuallyment between thetwo parties leadto Kosovo entering into acontrac The oftheKosovo-NATO finalobjective dialogueshouldbethesigning ofabilateral agree Government. W orking orking Team withintheKosovo - - - - -

Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 9 10 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS Other recommendationsOther are provided intherelevant ofthereport. section RECOMMENDATIONS: • • • • • • • for participation ininternationalfor peacekeeping operations. participation trained professionally basedontheNATO standards inorder ofinter-operability to beready the latter will not stay in Kosovo inevitably. Furthermore, the Kosovo ForcesArmed should be and territory, theKosovo Forces Armed shouldbeready to assumetasksfrom KFORgiven reachingIn its capabilities to be responsible for of the Kosovo the safety and security citizens pave theway for Kosovo towards NATO integration. tribute inthe inthelong-term peace andstability Kosovo straight away. a decisionto recognize taking By Kosovo, thosecountries would con- Four NATO member countries – Greece, and Spain – should recognize Slovakia Romania, nent Representation at NATO Headquarters. withinthePartnership for PeaceHeadquarters Programme aswell asto establishitsPerma - in Brusselsuntil Kosovo right officially getsthe tosenditspermanentliaisonofficer toNATO The Kosovo ofKosovo institutionsshouldseekto openaLiaisonOffice in NATO Headquarters should consider launchingtheKosovo-NATO formal dialogue andstructural programme required andfor steps further onNATO’s membership. Ontheotherhand, NATO limited induration and to some extentwould prepare Kosovo for thePartnership for Peace The anofficialdialoguewith Kosovo institutionsshouldseekto start NATObe which would NATO. integration for documents andpreparing inproducingmembershipinto thecountry policy contractual relations. outtheirdutiesconcerningThe NATO Kosovo institutionsshouldcarry tutional framework soasto putinto ofdeveloping theobjective practice theKosovo-NATO isanimmediate reforms ofKosovo needforIt to intheinsti- thepolicymakers undertake vo. lomatic staff initsdiplomatic missionsin NATO member countries that have recognized Koso The Kosovo Government should increase the number of Kosovo’s Defence Attaches and dip for membershipinthePartnership for Peace programme andNATO itself. doing so, Kosovo, to someextent, willbeprepared whenitcomes to aneventual application institutions may unilaterally fulfil conditions and standards required for NATO membership.In Once Kosovo hasreached bilateral agreements withindividualcountries inNATO, theKosovo W estern Balkans aswell asitwouldestern Balkans finally - - of fostering theascension dialoguewithinbothparties. paper alsolistsspecific recommendations for theKosovo institutionsandNATO withthepurpose by optionsfor providing two scenarios regarding policy theprogression of Kosovo into NATO. The provide alternative solutions inovercoming theexisting impasse. As aresult, thispaperconcludes ofthepaperisnotonlyto identify theexisting problemsThe andgaps, aimofthispart butalsoto the lackofcommitment oftheKosovo institutionsto dealwiththeNATO membershipprocess. impediments that Kosovo isfacingwithregards to establishingadialoguewithNATO aswell as sinceperiod theKosovo aimsto analyse Declaration in2008untilthe ofIndependence 2015.It a comprehensive approach inanalysing thecomplex relations between Kosovo andNATO for the institutionsaswell asthedownsizingsecurity ofKFORtroops. ofthepapertakes The second part ofthepaper alsolooks at the gradual handoverfirst part of competencies from KFOR to theKosovo ofKosovo by part KFORtroops including theevents followedthe northern by the2004riots. The across Kosovo following Kosovo’s post-war in period, andthechallengesofmaintaining security aiming to establishasafe environment thewar. after inthecountry covers It the role ofKFOR NATO, from 1999,whentheNATO-led peacekeeping mission(KFOR)was deployed inKosovo paper examines the context ofthe ofthispolicy relations betweenThe Kosovo firstsection and would intheKosovo-NATO aturning-point mark relationship. to takeboldsteps instimulating fullcooperation NATO withitsfriendly membercountries, which this paperisto have by ontheKosovo encouraging animpact institutionsandpolicymakers them cooperation andcoordination ofallinstitutionsinvolved intheprocess. addition,thefocus In of with NATO reforms integration, the necessary related as well to as undertake establishing better relations withNATO. First ofall, Kosovo shouldreconsider itsinstitutionalframework that deals Kosovo institutions in order to proceed with the membership process and establish contractual membership inNATO. alsoprovides It two concrete scenarios that shouldbepursuedby the policy paper aims to addressThis policy the main challenges faced by Kosovo with regards to its NATO membershipprogression andtheoverall relations withNATO. asachallengefor Kosovo’s served Council 1244has further the United Resolution Nations Security ofKosovo’simpediments ontheobjection statehood by four NATO membercountries aswell as with noprogress madeinestablishingrelations between Kosovo andNATO. Ontheotherhand, havepolicymakers shown onlydeclarative commitments withregard to Euro-Atlantic integration, official cooperationfrom operational and ashift towards political relations with NATO. Kosovo Kosovo has not demonstrated political will that a firm demands the commencement of two standpoints. clearthat Ontheonehanditisfairly over theyears following itsindependence, thelackofofficialNevertheless, cooperation between Kosovo and NATO shouldbeviewed from in themargins ofrhetoric. This paperanalyses thecomplex relations between Kosovo andNATO. structures, includingNATO; however, until recently commitments thepractical have remained only was launched. The politicaldiscourse hasrepeatedly referred to membershipinEuro-Atlantic for ofKosovo Kosovar Review a priority institutionsin2014whentheStrategic Sector Security ofKosovoMembership withintheEuro-Atlantic withNATO, structures, inparticular onlybecame INTRODUCTION 11 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 12 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS countries that aspire to joinNATO. to Kosovo’s path towards NATO as well as the comparative with other perspective respondents inalltheregions ofKosovo. thisway, In we have inrelation tested thepublicsupport Barometer included a question on citizen perceptions towards NATO membership with 1001 Studies Barometer underitsKosovo programme. Security editionoftheKosovoThe fourth Security The research alsorelied by onthepublicopinionpollsconducted theKosovar Center for Security Kosovo’s daily “Koha Ditore” basedinBrussels. Embassy ofCroatia inPrishtina. Finally was withacorrespondent alsoconducted aninterview of with foreignconducted missions in Kosovo, Embassy in Prishtina which include: the British and the of the Prime of Kosovo, Minister of the and the Office President of Kosovo. wereInterviews also Force,Security for Force, theKosovo Security ofForeign theMinistry theMinistry Affairs,Office the withtherepresentativesface interviews ofrelevant Kosovo institutions, whichinclude:theKosovo other sources of public institutions. Additional data was gathered by eight face-to- conducting of legalandpoliticaldocuments, of national and international official organizations, reports and and quantitative methodsof research. The qualitative analysis data usedincludesawide-ranging outthisresearch, order hasusedbothqualitative In to successfully theauthorofreport carry METHODOLOGY W estern Balkan estern Balkan Kosovo outside zone the whereasKosovo included the distance the air security of 25 km border this agreement theground safety zoneperimeter outsideoftheborders includeda5-kilometre of safety zone where theFRY forces uniformed security were notallowed to operate. According to Liberation Army. Furthermore, theagreement addressed theissuesregarding theground andair the agreement alsomadeareference to demilitarizationanddemobilization oftheKosovo Kosovo by 20June1999inaccordance with theKumanovo Agreement (NATO, addition, 2014a).In forcesand Serbian from Kosovo. The Yugoslav/Serbian forces andmilitary withdrew security from all thecitizens ofKosovo. The Kumanovo Agreement alsoforesaw thewithdrawal ofall Yugoslav ofKosovo,entire territory withtheaimofestablishingandmaintaining asecure environment for The Kumanovo Agreement foresaw thedeployment ofKFORwithnoobstaclethroughout the the legalbase. Council (UNSCR) 1244, in which the KFOR presence Resolution Nations Security in Kosovo finds June 1999. The Kumanovo Agreement asoneofthelegalfoundations served for theUnited signed between NATO andrepresentatives offormer Federal of Republic Yugoslavia on9 (FRY) and derived from theMilitary Technical Agreement alsoastheKumanovo (known Agreement) given inKosovo, theleadingrole inthefieldofsecurity andinthedefence ofKosovo. Its mission (KFOR) undertheinternational administration oftheUnited Nations (UN).Since then,KFORwas thewar inKosovoafter withthedeployment ofNATO-led peacekeeping missioninKosovo military day campaign air strike against Serbia. The relations between Kosovo and NATO developed further Organization (NATO) ofNATO intervention thehumanitarian during started inKosovo andits78- Relations interms ofjoint responsibilities Atlantic andgoalsbetween Kosovo andtheNorth Treaty 1 organizations, cooperation andtheKosovo tools usingcivil-military andstructures authorities KFOR’s tasks occurred incoordination withotherinternational organizations, non-governmental ofthepolitical, economicand otheraspects andsociallife ofKosovo (NATO, 2014a). of The majority the provision forjudicial andpenalsystem. process ofsecurity theelectoral KFORalsoundertook for the establishment of civilian institutions, and support weapons law destruction, and order, the implementation ofaKosovo-wide weapons, ammunitionandexplosives programme, amnesty protection ofpatrimonialsites, border security, interdiction ofcross-border weapons smuggling, for destroyed infrastructure, medicalassistance, aswell andpublicorder, asde-mining, security intheimmediate ofwar,operations aftermath necessary whichincluded:reconstruction efforts (UNSCR 1244,1999,pp. 2-8).Furthermore, intheinitialperiod, KFORwas involved inspecific also facilitated theprocess ofthesafe return to theirhomesfor alldisplaced personsandrefugees the Commander ofJoint Force Command (NATO, inNaples, Italy 2014d). The peacekeeping mission command, that oftheCommander is, ofKFOR(COMKFOR) undertheauthority to whoreported At theoutset, KFORconsisted ofmore than50,000troops whichoperated underasinglechainof (NATO, 1999,pp. 1-2). SECTION SECTION 1 – 2001) However, wideground since 2001KFORabolished its5-kilometre safety zone between Kosovo (NATO, andSerbia NATO’ period s role (1999 to (1999 in K 2008) osovo ’ s post-war

13 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 14 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS Programme, 2006, p. 2006, the first handover 13). In of responsibilities to the Kosovo architectureand propose thenewsecurity withinKosovo (United Nations Development (ISSR)–aprocess Review whichaimed to Sector evaluate Security institutionaldesignInternal international administration to theKosovo institutions. This year thelaunchof marked The year thebeginning 2005marked ofamore steady transfer ofresponsibilities from theUN (Telegrafi, Monastery bishopsoftheDecani 2012). Orthodox not enjoy thetrustofSerb fulfilled inorder for to besecuredresponsibility by the KP. The latter, ontheotherhand, does responsibility to theKP(Peci, 2010).Another cause is that someconditions stillneedto be fixed KFORoperation (NATO, 2014a)asNATO hasnot yet decided to transfer Headquarters over to theKosovo Police stillremains undera (KP).Nonetheless, Monastery theDecani situation improved over time, KFORgradually transferred responsibility to secure suchsights Kosovo, churches mainlythoseoftheOrthodox inKosovo (Isufi,2010).Given that thesecurity KFOR assumedtheresponsibility to protect andsecure religious andcultural sites heritage in occurred andeven lesssoasto how theyspread throughout Kosovo. Following the2004 riots, However, even theMarchthere 2004riots adecade after isnoclear account asto how they The violence uncovered that KFORdidnothave to astructure dealwithsuchmassive riots. caught unprepared to respond effectively Rightsto theviolence (Human to anabsence to oftimelyintervention halttheviolence, withtroops to appearing have been down the role (BBC, 2014). Nevertheless, of KFOR in managing was such riots criticized due mainly owned by K-Serbs, to bedemolishedaswell asseveral churches Orthodox burned (11 K-Albanians and8K-Serbs). Demonstrations expanded into riots, whichledto houses, day violentnext demonstrations erupted allover Kosovo whichresulted in19beingkilled that theywere attacked by Kosovo (K-Serbs) (Qehaja Serbs & Vrajolli, 2011,p. 14).Onthe Mitrovica hadbeendrowned River,children intheIbar innorthern claiming withasurvivor oneoftheKosovo beganafter Indeed, theseriots mediaannounced that three K-Albanian tensions over timeandeventually culminated intheeruptionofviolent inMarch riots 2004. about Kosovo’sSuch divisionsandlackofclarity finalstatus amongstthe Albanians increased ofKosovo. part could notaccess thenorthern Group, 2005,p. from 3).Hence, theinternational administration, apart theKosovo institutions ofKosovo (InternationalCrisis part movement andnorthern ofpeoplebetween thesouthern Mitrovica, immediately put a cordonthe River restricting Northern on the Ibar on the bridge issues. andsocio-economic other socio-political The French KFORtroops, that were located in (K-Serb) inMitrovica community setupparallel insecurity, structures education, health,and Government, oftheSerbian theKosovo ofMitrovica Serb andwiththesupport in thecity ofKosovo. forcespart security Serb expelled Kosovo Albanians (K-Albanians) from theirhomes The greatest the initial stages of KFOR’s challenge during deployment was in the northern (Etchemendy, 2010,p. 6). 2 such as the Liaison and Monitoring such astheLiaisonandMonitoring Teams (Mårtensson, 2013, pp.(Mårtensson, 14-15). oftheLiaisonandMonitoring information andreports Teams are utilized by theCOMKFOR for operational decisions meetings with key leadersandcitizens of Kosovo, across patrols and presence inthe communities. The gathered LiaisonandMonitoring Teams operate withinKFOR. The tasksofthemconsist ingathering openinformation through 2 inorder to produce tangible results inthefield W atch, 2004,p. 28). in 2003(NATO, 2014a). its presence. KFORreduced thepresence ofitstroops from 39,000 troops in2002to 17,500 theyears,Over andasaresult oftheimproved environment security inKosovo, NATO decreased Forceof theKosovo Security (KSF). the KPC (NATO, 2014a), which officially dissolved in 2009 and paved the way for the creation the KPC.As of2008,KFORwas provided withthetaskofassistingindecommissioning of peacekeeping mission inKosovo was involved of supervision inthetraining andday-to-day andKosovo(KPC) Police addition to this, In andwithregard Service. to theKPC,NATO andits was positive, theKosovo role asKFORplayed Protection insupporting animportant Corps to operateability throughout Kosovo. Overall, itscooperation withtheKosovo institutions largely unchanged, withsome improvements madeintheeffectiveness ofthe forces andtheir ofJustice hadbeenintroduced. thisperiod, theKFORmissionremained During the Ministry Internal tookauthorities place of Affairs and inthefieldofsecurity,Ministry by whichtimethe 2008 and2015. examines relationssection of the Kosovo institutions with KFOR, respectively, NATO between challenges,and external have context inKosovo. changedthepoliticalandsecurity The next byIndependence theAssembly ofKosovo inFebruary 2008;andpost-independence internal failure of the Kosovo-Serbia Vienna status negotiations (2005-2007); the Declaration of New circumstances were stimulated by theevents whichoccurred inKosovo in2008. The Kosovo institutionsto address theirgrievances (Telegrafi, 2014). area ledto whichhasoften protests for amongstthelocalpopulation KFORandthe asking 2014). This violation continues and to theanxiety reflect fear among theinhabitants ofthat violating theKumanovo Agreement ofKosovo andillegallyentering into (Sadiku, theterritory hasprovoked Gendarmerie 2014, theSerbian thelocalpopulation ondifferent occasions by which falls under the control of KFOR. According to concerns of the people,Karaceva during particular, asignificant problem appeared to betheeastern green border crossingSerbia with andthecontinuedand Serbia tense relationship between theK-Serbs andK-Albanians. In under thesoleresponsibility ofKFORtroops becauseofsensitive relations between Kosovo in2008.However,Independence theborderline between Kosovo stillremains andSerbia (Albania, Macedonia andMontenegro) were transferred to theDeclaration theKPafter of of theborder-line between Kosovo andthree ofthefour countries neighbouring ofKosovo and safeguarding oftheKosovo borders from KFORto theKP. The control andsupervision themeantime,In oneofthemajorsteps takenwas thetransfer ofresponsibilities for the control Atlanticapproval Council ofNATO. oftheNorth (NAC) remain (NATO, condition-based andnotcalendar-driven 2014b). Suchadecisionrequires the of KFOR’s troop presence willbe measured andindicators, against clear benchmarks andwill NATO member countries (NATO, 2015b). of anyThe possibility future decision on a reduction in Kosovo inthemission,includingNATO from 31ofthosecountries participating andnon- (NATO,reserves 2010).According to the2015estimations, KFORhaslessthan5,000soldiers deploy forces andeffectively whenever quickly andwherever necessary, including robust to aroundin thecountry 5,000troops intotal. At thesametime, KFORremained ready to Alliance settled on adjusting its presence in Kosovo, respectively, KFOR reduced its presence W hile an important decisionwas takenby NATOhile animportant in2010whenthe 15 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 16 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS path inNATO. neutral stance towards Kosovo’s independence presented achallengefor Kosovo’s membership its memberstates recognized Kosovo itsindependence declaring inFebruary after 2008.NATO’s and responsibilities unchangedinaccordance that notallof withtheUNSCR1244,dueto thefact its presence in Kosovo in accordance to UNSCR 1244. NATO continued to operate with its status anyof 2008didnotbring alteration inrelations between Kosovo and NATO. The latter haskept in Kosovo remains unchanged(NATO, 2008). The changeofthepoliticallandscapeinKosovo as and that NATO’sotherwise, to ensure responsibility and capability a safe and secure environment 1244, asagreed by Foreign Council decides inDecember 2007,unlesstheUNSecurity Ministers pointed out that NATO2008. It reaffirms that KFOR shall remain inKosovo on thebasisof UNSCR shaped theneutral positionandapproach ofNATO to inrespect Kosovo’s independent status since day independence after was declared; theNAC of NATO issued a statement which has thoroughly Comprehensive Proposal for theKosovo Status Settlement, alsoreferred to astheAhtisaari Plan. A proclaimed theDeclaration on17 February ofIndependence 2008infull accordance with the thefailure after ofnegotiationsSoon between Kosovo theKosovo andSerbia, Assembly demonstrations were registered (Qehaja & Vrajolli, 2011,p. 21). threatssecurity that would come through unforeseen onlya conflict, inter-ethnic few smallscale were present at thetime, andwithnonewcaveats (NATO, 2014c).Despite thefear ofpotential commitment to maintain KFOR’s national force contributions, includingreserves, at levels that and, renewed as a result,of UNSCR 1244, unless their the UNSC decided otherwise they further ofNATOMinisters membercountries agreed that KFORwould remain inKosovo onthebasis as to thepotential situation inKosovo. escalation ofthesecurity theendof2007Foreign By inKosovomaintain safety andstability allowing thenegotiations to proceed withoutany worry presence inKosovomilitary following 2006b, thestatus settlement (UNOSEK, p. 2).KFORhelped 2006a,p.(UNOSEK, 2). They alsowelcomed NATO’s planfor thecontinuation oftheinternational ministers recall NATO’s commitment to maintain asafe andsecure environment through KFOR negotiations onthefuture status ofKosovo. thecourse ofthesemeetingstheContact Group In of NATO the at andsupported themeetingsofContact Group participated whichobserved as well for asinproviding thesenegotiations. politicalsupport For General instance, theSecretary and peacekeeping duties inKosovo in fulfilling itssecurity this processduring has been important negotiations between Kosovo proved andSerbia to beunsuccessful. However, therole ofNATO to findasolutionInternational efforts tothestatus ofKosovo through theUN-mediated Vienna at theMKSF andNATO LiaisonandAdvisory Team (NLAT) at theKSF. Suchcooperation, however, has ForceKosovo Security (MKSF)inwhichNATO contributed through the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) forunder theframework the provided ofUNSCR 1244,withtheexception to the Ministry ofsupport neutral stance towards Kosovo’s newstatus. From NATO’s perspective, cooperation out was carried since Kosovo operated inaccordance to itsnewstatus andConstitution, whileNATO maintained its The relations andcommunication between Kosovo andNATO continued, however, withambiguity, 2.1. SECTION SECTION 2 – K Four Non-Recognizing Countries osovo-NATO relations (2008-2015) 3 Kosovo. with theirrespective troops intheKFORpeacekeeping missionindifferent regions of Despite thenon-recognition ofindependence, theNATO’s have NRCs contributed significantly relations between thetwo parties. facilitated politicaldialoguebetween the Kosovo ofnormalizing anditspurpose andSerbia, Despite theiroppositionto recognize Kosovo, theEuropean Union(EU)- support theseNRCs independence. Therefore, asanexample to befollowed itcannotserve by othercountries. case ofKosovo issuigeneris, different anddissimilarfrom other regions wishing to declare cultural Kosovo’srelations which firmly rejects with Serbia, independence.In spite of this, the W the fact that the mission of Spanish troopsthe fact had been completed, stating that “it is time to Government officials, thewithdrawal of600Spanishsoldiers from Kosovo wasjustified by decidedtoSlovakia withdraw according theirtroops fact, in2009and2010.In to theSpanish the years. Greece’s positiononKosovo, compared to theotherNATO’s NRCs, hasbeenmore optimisticover freedoms (Armakolas andtheprotection ofminorities 2012, p. &Karabairis, addition, 112).In peace for andprosperity allthepeoplesofregion, for withrespect humanrights, fundamental Kosovo needsto beresolved andconsensus by through buildinganenvironment diplomacy of to secede from (Marinas, 2008). Romania is highlighted by thefear that livingintheprovince theethnicHungarians of Transylvania may try 2008).Romania’s (Hurn, away ofHungary andbecoming part oppositiononthestatus ofKosovo breaking politiciansstated inSlovakia Slovakian that there minority oftheHungarian isarisk maintain their reasoning for the non-recognition of Kosovo. Following Kosovo’s independence, with Kosovo by theirdecisionto recognize ofKosovo. thepassports however, Officially theyalso step towards apositive andimportant the otherthree undertook NRCs settingupgoodrelations which may challengesregarding causeserious Kosovo’s ambitionto achieve NATO membership, 2012, p. 13). and Cataloniawill of the people of the Basque Country to declare independence from Spain (Fanés, Kosovo, withthedomesticproblems butitislinkeddirectly thatface Spanishauthorities withthe instance, theSpanishpositiononindependence ofKosovo isnotrelated to developments in There are otherjustifications, however, onwhy theNATO’s donot NRCs recognize Kosovo. For move towards Kosovo’s recognition ofJustice, (InternationalCourt 2010,p. 53). did notviolate general international law andtheUNSCR1244,NATO’s didnotmakeany NRCs ofJustice whichconcluded that2010 oftheInternationalCourt thedeclaration ofindependence violation ofinternational law andUNSCR1244.However, Opinionof22July despite theAdvisory The refuse NRCs to recognize Kosovo onthegrounds that Kosovo’s independence was declared in continue to theindependence Kosovo’s reject whichishindering membershipprocess into NATO. andSpainareSlovakia thefour Non-Recognizing Countries outofNATO’s (NRCs) 28membersthat that notallNATOfact memberstates have recognized Kosovo’s independence. Greece, Romania, not resulted intheintroduction ofany contractual relations between Kosovo andNATO dueto the hat mustalsobenoted isthat have someoftheseNRCs strong traditional, religious and decision andstated that Kosovo hasaclearEuro-Atlantic (AAB, perspective 2015). Kosovo’s 2015 shedeclared independence that inthefuture. at the righttime, January Greece In willtaketheright does notrecognize Kosovo, however, at thesame Greece timedoesnotexclude onthe recognition thepossibility of of The headoftheLiaisonOffice Greece in Prishtina, Konstantina Athanassiadousaidthat even though her country W 3 hile Greece continue andRomania to keeptheirtroops inKosovo, Spainand W hile Spain,inparticular, maintains arobust discourse againstKosovo’s statehood W hile theofficialpositionof of Greece isthat thestatus 17 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 18 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS non-recognition. to approach thesecountries andcooperate with theminrelated fieldsdespite oftheissue Kosovo institutionshave prepared neitheraplan,strategy, norat leastadocument onhow NATO’s programmes asitwillbeshown Nevertheless, the later andpartnerships. inthisreport, withinNATO parties asblocking they canserve to any by Kosovo potential participation in Kosovo andtheirhesitation to establish any withtheKosovo contact show authorities that hinders any official cooperation between KosovoNRCs. andthe NATO’sNRCs position towards 4 any official, bilateral, or contractual relations with NATO, anditistheonly outoftheNATOKosovo left istheonlycountry enlargement process. Kosovo hasnotestablished all Kosovo’s countries neighbouring have thePartnership for Peace (PfP)programmes withNATO, Despite NATO’s involvement direct inKosovo for closeto 15 yearsthat andirrespective ofthefact 2.2. has, at some progress least, marked intheEUmembershipprocess. with that ofpotential EUmembership. Compared to itsmembershipaspiration into NATO, Kosovo aspiration oftheKosovo institutionsitisusefulto compare Kosovo’s potential NATO membership neutral stance to Kosovo. As longastheEuro-Atlantic integration isconsistently mentioned asan the cooperation mechanisms and various programmes of NATO organization as a result of NATO’s cooperation with NATO, Kosovo without enjoyingin is blocked at tothe right all aspects participate that does not have any form of cooperation with the NAC of NATO. Furthermore, when it comes to institutions. this, theydidnotmeet, at leastofficially, from thesideofKosovoany oftheir counterparts 2014) visited Kosovo, KFORandtheirnation troops basedinKosovo. inparticular from Apart ofDefenceSpanish Minister (March 2009) andthePrime (November ofRomania Minister officials ofthese(SeptemberSenior countriesincluding the Minister 2010), of Slovakia Prime 2012,p. &Kallaba, 11). Kosovo (Vrajolli of bothcountries, which influenced them to withdraw troops from the NATO mission in 2009).Another(Burnett, reasonrestrictions includesalsothefinancialburdens andbudgetary mission inAfghanistan, whiletheSpanishGovernment was underpressure to dothesame reasons. withdrew Slovakia military troops becauseitwanted to redeploy themintheNATO reason onwhy thesetwo countries withdrew theirtroops from Kosovo, besidestheirown Slovak Spectator,commitments inKosovo (The 2010a). There isnoindication asto any other Slovak authorities contract was“the valid until theautumnof2010” metits andthat Slovakia grounds that itaccomplished themissioninKosovo. According to theseniorofficialsof return home” (BBC,2009).Similarly, withdrew Slovakia itscontingent troops from KFORonthe plan to meetalsorepresentatives ofthe Kosovo institutions. political dialoguebetween Kosovo (NATO, andSerbia 2014e),butas the previous delegations ofNRCs, theydidnot with COMKFOR at theKFORHeadquarters. They KFORmissionand confirmed thatRomania will continue to support of Romania, Victor Ponta National ofRomanian Defence, andtheMinister Mircea hadameetinginPrishtina Dusa from theKosovoher counterpart Government 2009).Furthermore, (Burnett, inNovember 2014thePrime Minister of Defense, Carme Chacón visited thetroops ofSpaininKFORMarch 2009,butthere isnorecord that shemet of Kosovo orother representatives Slovak Spectator, oftheKosovo institutions(The 2010b). The SpanishMinister the Slovak contingent inKFORandCOMKFOR aswell, butshedid nothave ameetingwiththen thePrime Minister For instance, thePrimeIveta Radičová ofSlovakia, had avisitto Minister Kosovo inSeptember2010where she met Current status ofrelations between Kosovo andNATO 4 This shows that theissueofnon-recognition ofindependence by thesecountries W ith respect to its prospective toith respect itsprospective W estern Balkan country country estern Balkan have demonstrated that they lagbehindinrelation to thecountry’s membership inNATO. They with theNATO membershipprocess isnotyet complete andeven theexistent institutions so theywere largely newindealing withtheissue. Kosovo’s institutionalframework dealing work onthecountry’s NATO membershipemerged in2008,immediately theindependence, after relations withNATO inthePfPprogramme. andto institutions committed participate fact, to In integration rather thanNATO membership, demonstrating nopolitical willto enter into official isobvious that between 2012untilIt 2014,theKosovo institutionshave placed more stress on EU Kosovo’s aspiration to joinNATO. respectively to influence theotherNATO’s their attitudes to soften towards inparticular NRCs in NATO, which,onthe other hand, makesitmore difficult for NATO itself toSerbia, condition 2007). Consequently, at leastofficially, Serbia, doesnot have theaimofachievingmembership resolution which has declared Serbia’s towards neutrality status NATO of military membership (B92, with regard to NATO membership, withthe Nationalsince Assembly 2007adoptinga ofSerbia Kosovo to theirstance soften onKosovo’s aspiration to theEUmembership. The opposite isgiven Thus theEUmay as influenceSerbia well asthefive Member States EU that donot recognize relationsnormalizing withKosovo ofregional underthe principle cooperation (Maksimovic, 2014). StatesBut theEUandsomeofitsMember have conditioned Serbia’s EUmembershipthrough 2014 theEUformally launchedaccession (European negotiations withSerbia Commission, 2014). does notrecognize Kosovo’s independence, hasexpressed theambitionto jointheEUandsince The path of Kosovo towards membership in the EU and NATO which Serbia, differ in anotheraspect. no specific commitment andtangible results regarding Kosovo’s potential membershipinto NATO. mostly declarative. The Euro-Atlantic integration was withinthemargins ofpoliticaldiscourse with September 2012,theKosovo policymakers’ discourse regarding membershipinto NATO hasbeen as theKosovo institutionshadsomelimitations withregards to defence policies. Lastly, since Thus, no progress this period during towards had been marked official cooperation with NATO, was stillconsolidating betweenitsstatehood 2008and2012thecountry process. supervision membership than with Kosovar relations with the EU. Thirdly, Kosovo was under international structure, have theNRCs beenmuchmore Kosovo effective inblocking movements towards NATO the ambition of Kosovo to initiate official relations with NATO, and due to NATO’s organizational (Palokaj, 2014).Secondly, thepositionofNATO’s onthestatus NRCs ofKosovo hasimpeded the newcircumstances ontheground aswell asthenewpoliticalreality inKosovo since 2008 abrogated. otherwords, In NATO continues to narrowly interpret regardless theUNResolution of the EU. Firstly, NATO’s mission in Kosovo is determined by the UNSCR 1244 which has not been membership process andaspirations towards NATO compared made totowards itsefforts There are a number of other reasons as to why Kosovo is not on the same footing with its it comes to themembershipprocess. comparison to NATO’s involvement, whichmore thannothasremained often inthemargins when much more inKosovo’s active in politicalprocesses aspects andintheshapingofitssocio-political which unlikewithNATO, allows for Kosovo to makesomeprogress. this, Besides theEUhasbeen Kosovo’s progress towards EUmembership;however, organisation itisthestructural oftheEU, in theEUprogrammes dedicated for the involved dialoguewith the EUonruleof inofficialstructured law, regularly as wellasparticipating membership into theEU, Kosovo initialledtheStabilisation andAssociation Agreement; itis W estern Balkans. estern Balkans. There are that alsoEUNRCs are hindering 19 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 20 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS Kosovo’s membershipinthePfP. addressed a letter to the U.S. of State, Secretary John Kerry, regarding the involvement of of the U.S. (United States) Congress, including Michael Turner and Eliot L. Engel, signed and should move forward withitsNATO membership. On5February 2014agroup ofmembers there were anumberofNATO membercountries that have required andinsisted that Kosovo Despite Kosovo’s to into independently inability pushfor official relations entry with NATO, into 2015. due to apoliticalimpasseinKosovo inthesecond to halfof2014whichisexpected proceed arethe KAF yet to beadopted by theKosovo Assembly. Kosovo was unable to adoptthem 2014, pp. 20-31).However, andrecommendations theobjectives to ofthe SSSRwithrespect operations and otherinternational mission of NATO (Government of Kosovo, oftheRepublic preparation ofcapabilitiesrelevant institutionsto contribute to peace andhumanitarian of exercising civiliananddemocratic control oftheKAF. integrity, ofDefence (MoD) withtheobjective whiletheMKSFwillberenamed astheMinistry the Kosovo Forces Armed withamissionto protect Kosovo’s (KAF) sovereignty andterritorial and contributor.beneficiary The SSSR referred to the gradual transformation oftheKSF to of theSSSRisKosovo’s integration andmembershipinto Euro-Atlantic asbotha structures (SSSR)(Government Review Sector ofKosovo, oftheRepublic 2014,f. 7).Oneoftheobjectives aim to joinNATO ofthe institutionsmentioned intheStrategic asavisionandpriority Security its NATO mentioning that membership. itwas onlyin2014that isworth Kosovo its It putforth time failingto even NATO asktheirfriendly membercountries to pushaheadtheagendaon has mademuchmoreto move efforts withtheEUmembershipagenda,while at thesame Balkan countries, includingKosovo,Balkan have Euro-Atlantic prospects. senior representatives ofNATO anditsmemberstates have constantly declared that Kosovo shouldhave aclearpath towards integration withtheAlliance (Engel, 2014).Also, that ithasapathway for eventual membershipinto NATO. addition,theyhave In stated that member countries to ensure that Kosovo joins its neighbours as amember of the PfP, and 7 6 5 process into NATO as an impediment in this regard. that has served Kosovo institutions, andMFA inparticular, to takemore steps serious towards themembership addition to challengesposedby theUNSCR1244andNATO’s NRCs, itisalsothefailure ofrelevant the NATO for membershipprocess theKosovo hasnotbeenapriority institutions. Therefore, in should thenfollow concerning thePfPprogramme andNATO integration. This demonstrates that membership process. Suchastrategy isneededinorder to shapepoliciesthat various institutions any document, oranational strategy withregards that could to encourage actions theNATO NATO ofForeign Policy (DNSP)withintheMinistry Affairs andSecurity (MFA) hasnotproduced are faced withthelackofinternal capacitiesandlackofhumanresources. for The Department response, andcooperation onscience andenvironmental issues (NATO, 2014g). cooperation and exercises,education and training, planningand disaster civil emergency military-to-military NATO activity, including defence-related defence work, reform, relations, defence and planning, civil-military policy countries countries between relevantandNATO. partner fieldof every underthePfPtouch Activities uponvirtually 1994 NATO BrusselsSummitwiththeaimto enhance cooperation inCentral andstability andEastern European an individualrelationship withNATO, for choosingtheirown priorities cooperation. The PfPwas launchedinthe cooperation countries between the individualEuro-Atlantic andNATO, partner to buildup which allows partners The PfPisthefirst, andafundamental, step for aprospective country’s way to joiningNATO. bilateral It isapractical For more detailsontheKAF, 2.3. seethesub-section For more detailsasto Kosovos institutionalframework vis-à-vis NATO integration, see Table 1at theListofAnnexes. 7 to work NATO with friendly They Kerry have askedSecretary 6 Another of theSSSRis objective 5 In addition to this, In Kosovo W estern membership into the PfPcould firstlydependonitsmembership into theOrganization for Study onEnlargement andstatements ofseniorofficialswithinKosovo institutions, Kosovo’s of Kosovo, 2015, p. 3)..Also, based onsomeofficial NATO documents, including the1995 reference to aspiring joinNATO ifacountry shouldbe amemberstate oftheUN(Assembly stated Demolli 2015, Minister that officialdocuments of NATO donot contain any explicit in fronthearing ofthe Committee on Foreign Affairs ofthe Kosovo Assembly, on 9 February namely Russia and China, who strongly Kosovo’s reject independent status. However, at his given that there isastrong oppositionfrom thetwo permanentmembersoftheUNSC, membership inNATO might initiallydependonitsmembershipinto theUN. This isproblematic in itsrelations withNATO. According to seniorofficialsoftheKosovo institutions, Kosovo’s These are nottheonlyimpediments andissuesthat have brought Kosovo to lagbehind beyond thisKosovo hasnever madeanofficial request tothe NATO authorities. have madedemandsonlydeclaratively meetingswiththeNATO during seniorrepresentatives; membership (Assembly ofKosovo, 2015,p. 3). The problem isthat theKosovo policymakers approves anIPAP, then itwillpave theway for theKSF, KAF, ortheforthcoming to attain PfP oftheadvancement capacitiesoftheKSF. ofinter-operability the importance caseNATO In Partnership Plan Action (IPAP). According theIPAP to Demolli, Minister shouldhighlight precisely theMFA, onbehalfofKosovo, shouldprepare andsubmitto NATO theIndividual representatives of the MKSF have appealed that the relevant Kosovo institutions, more tothe dialogue (MKSF, conduct order 2015). In to progress towards reaching the PfP, senior he proposed thebestway would befor NATO to appoint aSpecialRepresentative inorder General to establishapoliticaldialoguebetween Kosovo andNATO, andinorder to doso, press release issuedby theMKSF, requested Demolli from Haki theNATO Minister Secretary NATO, itspath andaspiration isultimately to become afullmemberofNATO. According to a W the President ofKosovo, 2015). needs to betransformed into acontractual relationship between Kosovo and NATO (Office of developing Kosovo’s forces incompliance withNATO standards, andthat suchapartnership Jahjaga highlighted that theKosovo institutionsandNATO in mustwork infullpartnership between Kosovothis visit, theKosovo andNATO. leadersdemandedapartnership President forand Serbia abetter future for bothcountries (NATO, 2015c).Ontheother hand, during Stoltenberg alsoprovided NATO’s ontheEU-facilitated dialoguebetween Kosovo support take thefullresponsibility from KFORonlywhenNATO considers withdrawing from Kosovo. on conditional, rather thanonacalendarbasis, whichimpliesthat theKosovo institutionswill integration. The chiefofNATO, ontheotherhand, declared that KFORisgoingto stay inKosovo However, hedidnotmakeany reference to withrespect Kosovo’s aspirations towards NATO welcomed intheEuro-Atlantic to participate cooperation mechanisms(NATO, 2015a). inorderprosperity to gainitsfuture withintheEuro-Atlantic andis, community therefore, positive messagefrom Brusselswhere hestated that Kosovo shouldmove towards peace and Stoltenbergof Secretary (Office ofthe President ofKosovo, 2015). Stoltenberg brought a KSF Commander. additionto this, In President Atifete Jahjagaheldastate reception inhonour institutions, includingKosovo’s President, Prime Minister, oftheKSFandformer Minister from ameetingat KFORHQwithCOMKFOR, healsometwiththeleadersofKosovo The NATO General, JensStoltenberg Secretary 2015.Apart visited Prishtina inJanuary hile senior officials at the MKSF stressed that Kosovo with wants to establish a partnership 21 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 22 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS regarding the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 10 9 8 Parliamentary Assembly, 2014b, p. 4). the NATO PA butcannotbeentitled to andmay vote speak, ormove amendments (NATO approval oftheAssembly. inmeetingsoftheCommittees addition,itmay participate In of of theStanding Committee, body, whichistheleadingdecision-making to the andsubject may attend sessionsoftheNATO PA withaninvitation by itsPresident andwiththeconsent process. According to the NATO PA’s Rules of Procedure, observer Kosovo as a parliamentary Assembly, 2013)anditisnotlinkedwiththelatter interms oftheEuro-Atlantic integration separate from theNATO structure, itworks independently from NATO (NATO Parliamentary anymarked progress towards its membership prospective in NATO. NATO PA is institutionally insessionsoftheNATO ofobservers capacity PA. This, however, doesnotmeanthat Kosovo has Parliamentary Assembly, 2014a). Two membersoftheKosovo inthe Assembly may takepart inthe observer officially become aparliamentary NATO Assembly Parliamentary (PA) (NATO inone NATO participation partial related body. As ofMay 2014,theKosovo Assembly has Kosovo’sBesides inrelation to blocking NATO integration, Kosovo didmanageto have a countries andtwo non-NATO membercountries). memorandums ofcooperation countries, theMKSFhasreached anumber ofbilateral agreements, respectively including cooperation mechanism. Ontheotherhand, to withrespect cooperation withNATO member as agoodsignal towards for thenecessity Kosovo to involved bedirectly inNATO’s wider should beinitiated withNATO Minister’s aswell.theLatvian fact, In statement shouldbeseen dialoguewiththeEUasagoodexample,structural andhasproposed that suchadialogue and formal dialoguecanbedeveloped” (KohaNet, 2014a).Furthermore, hehastakenKosovo’s added that in case Kosovo and the NATO member countries are ready to cooperate, “a structural haspointed Edgars Rinkēvičs outthatLatvia, “a dialoguewithNATO structured ispossible” and official cooperation with NATO. Forinstance, in Minister of August2014,the Foreign Affairsof spite ofthesechallenges,In for there Kosovo are stillsomeopportunities to establishsome the OSCE, thismay poseanotherimpediment for Kosovo ofthePfP. to become part in Europe and Co-operation (OSCE). GivenSecurity that Kosovo of is not a member country KSF intheterritories ofthe respective states (MKSF, 2013, p. 3). SOFA. adjusts entry, stationing andstatus It exit, ofthemembersAlbanian Forces Armed temporary andthe Explosive Ordnance Disposal (MFA, of Albania July 2013 the signedMKSF and MoD a memorandum 2012). In of the its fourin order coreto perform missions of Fire-fighting,Search Rescue, and Hazardous Material Disposal, and Based on Kosovo’s MFA, the U.S. develop its capacity with members of the KSF to personnel further will be working U.S. ofDefence ofNATO civilianpersonnelwhoare Department notpart missionwilloperate inKosovo’s territory. agreement between Kosovo andtheU.S. that provides andthe the legalframework military withinwhichAmerican February 2012seniorrepresentatives In oftheKosovo Government andtheU.S. Government signed SOFA’s advise for theKSF. exchanged experiences withIowa National Guard, whilemembersofthe latter ontheotherhandhave provided this programme over theyears, infield exercises theKSFmembersononehandhasparticipated inIowa andhave 2011the MKSFreached In theState Partnership withtheU.S. National Guard ofIowa. implementation During of financialaidas wellasfinancialassistance. health,military training andcooperation inthefieldofmilitary training, between bothministries, unification training ofeducationand security andmilitary theKSFmembers, Macedonia, Slovenia, Turkey, Sweden andtheU.S. Those memorandums affectdifferent fields, including: defence From 2012until 2015theMKSFsigned ofCooperation Memorandums withAlbania, Croatia, Germany, Latvia, 8 , annualbilateral plans, state partnership 10 with eleven countries (nine NATO member 9 andmemorandums the 11 a safe andsecure environment for allKosovo citizens.civil defence hasto consolidate It further decides to withdraw willbeincharge troops ofguaranteeing andthustheKAF from thecountry from inplace. otherduties, willsupersedetheroleKAF Apart theKAF ofKFORinKosovo once NATO a sovereign state, andjudgingenvironment, by itssecurity Kosovo may holdtherightto have the Above all, having forces armed modern defence isacrucialpillarofthecontemporary sector, andas onKAF’spackage establishment. also agree onsuchatransition. The Kosovo Assembly, however, hasnotyet adopted thelegislation communitiestwo thirds inKosovo, oftheminority heldby theK-Serb majority community, should change, andtherefore intheKosovo adoubletwo thirds majority Assembly. This meansthat the to implement thetransition oftheKSFto theKAF, butsuchanendeavour requires aconstitutional according Nevertheless, pending elections. to him,itisupto Kosovo to decidewhetheritwants an embassyinKosovo pointed outthat itwas somewhatthat unexpected itcameaheadofthe received by by someofKosovo’s surprise NATO friendly membercountries. Aforeign diplomat of announcement, whichwas madeafew of2014,was months elections before theparliamentary Kosovo Prime Minister, Hashim Thaçi, (OPMK, announced theestablishment 2014). oftheKAF This Following ofKosovo’s anniversary thesixth independence, on17February 2014,theformer 2.3. (BiH) (KohaNet, 2014b). The AC isaninitiative oftheU.S. however,observer; membershipinthisinitiative isfirmly contested Bosnia &Herzegovinaby possible. Kosovo hasattended conferences, andevents activities oftheAC ofan inthecapacity After becoming amemberofRACVIAC, theKosovo to jointheAC expect authorities assoon Kosovo hasappliedfor membershipin2012,withoutyet succeeding inbecoming amember. (Emini, 2014,p. regional initiative 17).Another important (AC) istheAdriatic to which Charter forcriteria NATO membership andwillcontribute to theenhancement ofregional stability (RACVIAC, 2014a).As Kosovo isnow amemberofthisorganization, itwillbeableto fulfilthe reform andinternational andregional cooperation withafocus onEuro-Atlantic integration sector issues, includingsecurity includes awiderange ofpolitico-military scope of activities inthemeetingsofRACVIAC duetoparticipate Serbia’s opposition(RACVIAC, 2014b). Its ofRACVIAC,terms inallactivities theKSFanditsrepresentatives donothave therightto into from RACVIAC. onthepoliticallevel onequal through Apart permanentparticipation Centre –Centre (RACVIAC) Cooperation. for Security However, Kosovo isnotfullyrecognized been amemberoftheRegional Control Arms VerificationImplementation and Assistance Croatia theirpath during towards joining NATO 2014, Kosovo in2009. Since October has 2014). easier (Kraja, This isbelieved becauseasimilarstrategy was adopted by Albania and believing that membershipinsuchinitiatives would makeitspath to PfPandNATO much Kosovo hasputitsmembershipto regional initiatives security at thetop oftheagenda, W compatible (U.S. ofState, militaries Department 2011). membership inorder to strengthen democratic institutions, civilsociety, ruleoflaw, economies, market and NATO- of theU.S. isto continue reforms assistingthesecountries inimplementing necessary ontheirpath to NATO’s defence, andbetween themandtheirneighbours. andeconomic cooperation amongthepartners The intention The AC promotes andEuro-Atlantic thestability integration ofallthe estern Balkan countries to joinNATOestern Balkan (Çeku, 2014). Kosovo Armed Forces vis-à-visNATO 11 W in order to assist, support andprepare inorder to assist, support estern Balkan countries by bolstering political, estern Balkan 23 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 24 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS the K-Serb community, (OPMK, 2015). onestablishingtheKAF promised IsaMustafa Minister that Kosovo willgetthefullconsent including ofallpoliticalsubjects, added that itdependsupontheKosovo institutionsto decideontheKAF, whereas Kosovo’s Prime all thedifferent ethnic groups inorder to foster more reconciliation inKosovo’s society. Hefurther thedialoguebetween tensions; andwithouthindering doesnotcontribute to more instability; Kosovo institutionsdecideontheKAF, itshouldbecompleted inaway that doesnotcreate new buildingoftheKSFwithinitsmandate.capacity According Stoltenberg, to Secretary whatever the in Kosovo inaccordance Kosovo withtheUNmandate from onthe 1999anditissupporting decide” onthecreation (NATO, oftheKAF 2015a).Headded that NATO isjustfulfillingitsmission Stoltenberg stated that keymessageis that NATO“the isnotgoingto dictate, NATO isnotgoingto Kosovo institutions. 2015,the NATO hisvisitto Kosovo During inJanuary General, Jens Secretary senior officials have expressed theviewthat the KAFisancreation ofthe “internal affair”the of Government have said that NATO 2014). On the other hand, (Kastrati, NATO’s the KAF supports neither formally contested even norsupported, thoughtheseniorrepresentatives ofthe Kosovo Establishment oftheKAF, however, hasnotbeendiscussedinsideNATO anditis structures be voted ontherelevant (Assembly legislation andconstitutional ofKosovo, packages 2015,p. 3). the viewthat the Kosovo institutions do not have a timeline aswhen such changesare to expected creation is depended upon the political developments, of the KAF has expressed Demolli Minister communitiestwo thirds intheAssembly. oftheminority Ontheotherhand, astheprocess ofthe be approved by ofmemberstheAssembly, thedoubletwo thirds majority includingvotes of the law, declared Demolli that Minister there are constitutional amendments sixteen pendingto requiresas the establishment of the KAF an amendment to the Constitution of Kosovo. from Apart Transformation oftheKSFto theKAF; however, thelatter isnotadopted yet by theKosovo Assembly and two NATO teams inKosovo, namely NAT andNLAT. Also, theMKSFhasdraftedLaw on namely theDefence Reform Initiative, Institution Iowa National Guard, U.S. EmbassyinPrishtina officials oftheMKSF, isgetting accomplished infull cooperation withthe U.S. Government, Transformation oftheMKSFtoandthat oftheKSFto theMoD theKAF, according to thesenior and develop defence policiesofKosovo. providing civilianoversight andguidance to theKAF. Furthermore, itshouldformulate, implement, 2014, pp. isforeseen 29-30).It that theMKSFwillberenamed ofKosovo theMoD of withthepurpose with NATO andultimately leadingto NATO membership(Government ofKosovo, oftheRepublic ininternational ofanational strategy operations,participation to aspart buildacloserrelationship will bebuiltbased on theNATO standards of inter-operability. willhave It a clear goalof eventual the sovereignty andterritorialintegrity ofKosovo. According to theKosovo Government, theKAF 2014)anditwillberesponsible personnel(Kastrati, forand amaximumof3,000reserve protecting operations. is deemed to be comprised of personnel a peacemaximum of 5,000 active It support defence andbedeployed missions,perform withincountry abroad authorized to to serve support the peopleofKosovo, recruited from amongthecitizens ofKosovo, oftheRepublic equippedto According force, willbeanational to military theSSSR,KAF theethnicdiversity of reflecting resulting from terrorist attacks. to aswell civilauthorities ascombating disasters support providing services, military emergency components, preparedness, management, includingcrisis emergency planning, contingency and in providing for security allcitizens. to joinNATOvision ofthecountry aswell asthework ofitsinternational presence inKosovo (KFOR) W relations withKosovo, itenjoys ahighlevel oftrustandcredibility amongthecitizens ofKosovo. Even thoughNATO doesnotrecognize andassuchitdoesnothave thecountry any official 2.4. 12 Kosovo shouldbecome aNATO hence mostofthemhave member; responded negatively when On theotherhand, theK-Serbs have athoroughly different opiniononthequestionofwhether of themdidnotknow, regarding orhadnoopiniononthesubject Kosovo’s membership into NATO. the KSBresults, 8.7percent ofrespondents were opposedto NATO membershipwhile2.6percent respondents (88.7percent) shouldbecome aNATO thinkthat the country member. According to Studies (KCSS),for Security whichtook 2014shows place inOctober of that alarge majority The Barometer opinionpolloftheKosovo by (KSB)conducted Security theKosovar Center membership inPfPandNATO. that willmakesure thesteps ofestablishingtheKAF that ittranslates into Kosovo’s path towards oftheU.S. (MFA,enjoy thesupport inthefieldofsecurity In addition to this, 2015). it was noted meeting inPentagon withtheKosovo Government’s representatives, stressed that Kosovo will the U.S. ofDefence Assistant for Secretary Deputy Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia,Evelyn N.Farkas, at a on completion oftransformation oftheKSFto theKAF. Apress release ofKosovo’s MFA saidthat officialsoftheSenior U.S. Government have fortheKosovo expressed theirsupport institutions stronglyThe by formation Kosovo’s issupported of the KAF NATO friendly membercountries. hen itcomes to theEuro-Atlantic integration ofKosovo, citizens ofKosovo the strongly support (Kosovar Center Studies, for 2014). Security 0,0% 10,0% 20,0% 30,0% 40,0% 50,0% 60,0% 70,0% 80,0% 90,0% 100,0% regional countries Kosovo’s publicperception onNATO integration andcomparison with 0,0% 20,0% 40,0% 60,0% 80,0% 100,0% 120,0% 88,7% Kosovo 8,7% All respondents 88,7% Figure 1:Public perception inKosovo towards NATO membership 2,6%

8,7% Yes Yes 2,6%

35% Montenegro No 45% No K-Albanians andother 96,8% 20% No opinion/I donot know

No opinion/Idonotknow 1,9% 77% 1,3% Macedonia 15%

7% 8% Bosnia &Herzegovina

K-Serbs 76% 65,1% 12

16% 26.6%

8,3%

25 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 26 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS 13 Montenegro joinedthePfPprogramme in2006and2009NATO granted to Montenegro the are undecided ordonothave an opinionconcerning theEuro-Atlantic integration. However, of Montenegro inNATO onlyby 35 percent issupported of citizens and 20percent ofcitizens Rights, 45percent oftherespondents would vote against membershipinNATO. Membership integration isrelatively low. According to the2014pollofCentre andHuman for Democracy countries ofthe Kosovo citizens’ views on NATO membership are quite different compared to other aspiring considered as one of the main medium to long term goals (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012,p. & Kallaba, considered 12). asoneofthemainmediumto longterm goals(Vrajolli EU integration. As such,andaccording to politicaldiscourse inKosovo, Euro-Atlantic integration is in joiningNATO, state whichisexplicitly officialdocument mentioned alongside inalmostevery of trustbetween communities inthecountry. The second reason refers to theaspirations ofKosovo situation inKosovo’ssecurity ofKosovo, territory, part except aswell asthebuilding inthenorthern the international presence of NATO has contributed significantly towards the improvement of the NATO whichhasbeenshown consistently by theKosovo citizens ismadeupoftwo reasons. First, entering the Euro-Atlantic integration process. However, towards itcanbeargued that thesupport institutional leaders, theaforementioned politicalchallengesare largely holdingKosovo backfrom demonstratedDespite thehighlevel by Kosovo ofsupport citizens (except K-Serbs) and in order to halttheethniccleansinginKosovo in1999. into NATO canbeexplained by NATO’s anditsair-strike intervention againstSerbia humanitarian an opinionifKosovo shouldjoinNATO. oftheK-Serb Refusal onKosovo’s community integration of themare infavour ofit, whereas 16percent amongK-Serb respondents that theydonothave percent ofK-Serb respondents opposetheintegration firmly ofKosovo into NATO; only8percent asked onthismatter. Compared oftheK-Albanian to themajority population andothers, 76 Figure 2:Public perception inKosovo compared to Montenegro, andBosniaHerzegovina Macedonia towards NATO Republican Institute,Republican 2014,p. 13);(Foreign Policy Initiative BH,2012, p. 58). (Kosovar Center Studies, for 2014);(Centre Security and HumanRights, for 2014,p. Democracy 9);(International 0,0% 10,0% 20,0% 30,0% 40,0% 50,0% 60,0% 70,0% 80,0% 90,0% 100,0% 0,0% 20,0% 40,0% 60,0% 80,0% 100,0% 120,0% 88,7% W estern Balkans. In Montenegro, In estern Balkans. for example, thepublicperception towards NATO Kosovo 8,7% All respondents 88,7% 2,6%

8,7% Yes Yes 2,6%

35% Montenegro No 45% No K-Albanians andother 96,8% membership 20% No opinion/Idonotknow

No opinion/Idonotknow 1,9% 13 77% 1,3% Macedonia 15%

7% 8% Bosnia &Herzegovina

K-Serbs 76% 65,1%

16% 26.6%

8,3%

move forward towards establishingcontractual relations with theKosovo institutions. the long term. Considering this, NATO should reconsider its current relations with Kosovo and guaranteed to becontinually demonstrated withKosovo outsideof theenlargement process in The continued by Kosovo highdegree ofsupport citizens towards NATO integration cannotbe NATO integration could Kosovo’s change, withlesscitizens supporting membershipinto NATO. is extensively prolonged, there that isarisk theperceptions oftheKosovo citizens towards to aspiring conditions joinNATO. by acountry However, ifKosovo’s integration process inNATO integration into NATO isarather politicalprocess whichisfollowed by thefulfilment of certain of citizens for the process.the publicsupport To the contrary, itproves that thelongprocess of Therefore, it can be concluded that NATO integration with or indirectly is not linked directly the condition onregistration ofimmovable hasbeenmet(NATO, defence property 2014i). involved inanIntensifiedDialoguewithNATO, andin2010,NATO invited BiH to jointhe MAP once of their path to NATO integration. The latter two years joined the PfP in2006, and after it hasbeen of thecountries ofthe undecided (Foreign Policy Initiative BH,2012).Similarto Kosovo’s comparison withtheothercases them have answered that BiHshouldbecome amemberofNATO, and10percent ofthemwere Accordingly, BiH’s 52percent ofthemdonotsupport membershipinto NATO, while37percent of to theNATO inBiHobject Republic) (Serb Srpska livinginRepublika Serbs integration ofthecountry. against, and8percent were undecided. However, just likethecasewithK-Serbs inKosovo, the 66 percent the membership of BiHinto NATO, of them, supported while 26 percent of them were out in 2012 byopinion poll carried the Foreign Policy of the respondents, Initiative BH, the majority ofBiH’sSimilar to Macedonia, themajority NATO citizens support integration. According to an problemthe mostserious Institute, (InternationalRepublican 2014,p. 4). problemserious isthecountry’s name, whereas only3percent responded that NATO integration is membership into NATO. from other issues, Apart 6 percent of respondents answered that the most mentioning than that for ismore thecitizens important ofMacedonia, thenameofcountry has beenreached withGreece, Macedoniawillbeinvited to joinNATO (NATO, isworth 2014j).It official name (Lungescu, 2008). However, NATO’s stance isthat once amutually acceptable solution NATO in the 2009 Bucharest Summit, as there is a dispute between both countries over Macedonia’s Macedonia inNATO remains pendingsince Greece hadblockedaninvitation for Macedoniato join Macedonia joined the PfP programme and in 1999 it was granted the MAP, but the membership of regards to the progress that both countries towards are making membership into NATO. 1995, In have there anopinion.Nevertheless, isahugedifference between KosovoMacedonia and in NATO, 15percent expressedconcerning NATO an objection integration, while7percent didnot comparison with Kosovo. Accordingly, 77 percent of them favoured Macedonia’s membership in opinion withtheKosovo citizens, thoughthere are someslight differences inpercentages in Institute’sRepublican opinionpollof2014hasindicated that citizens ofMacedoniashare asimilar Public membershipinto opinioninMacedoniapredominantly NATO. supports The International will assesswhetherto invite to jointheorganization thecountry (NATO, 2014f). has establishedofficial cooperation and Montenegro relations with and bytheendof2015 NATO NATO by theMontenegrin citizens, that compared theKosovo to citizens thesupport have, NATO of possiblefuture membership(NATO, for 2014h).Regardless membershipinto ofthelow support potential membershipandto demonstrate to meettheobligations itsability andcommitments Plan Action (MAP).Membership Theto prepare MAP isthefinalstageofanaspiring country for W estern Balkans, Kosovoestern Balkans, andBiHdiffer quite alotfrom eachother in terms 27 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 28 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS membership procedures for thePfPandNATO. NATO relations, through shapingnewpolicieswiththe Kosovo institutionsto officiallystart The following alternatives optionsoffer onhow policy to move aheadwithimproving Kosovo- from initiating contractual relations withNATO. process ofmeetingtheseconditions, despite thepoliticalimpediments Kosovo that are blocking relations (NATO, andinstitutionalstructures democratic civil-military 2014h).Kosovo isinthe contribution to NATOand willingness to makeamilitary operations; and(v)commitment to populations; (iii)commitmentof minority to thepeaceful resolution ofconflicts’; (iv)theability democratic politicalsystem (ii)fairtreatment include: (i)functioning economy; based onamarket it willhave to beinvolved inthefulfilment ofNATO membership conditions. These conditions addition,once KosovoIn achieves contractual relations withNATO andappliesfor itsmembership, member countries, represent two keychallengesthat Kosovo mustapproach withmore urgency. in NATO, andthepoliticaldisadvantages created by theissueofnon-recognition by four NATO process andfullmembership. ofKosovo’sThe inability institutionsto dealwithKosovo’s integration introduce contractual relations withNATO itspath that towards would serve theintegration as recommendations for theKosovo institutionsto begin official cooperation with NATO and regard to theways inwhichKosovo canmove forward. Policy options are to expected serve into NATO. Therefore, theKCSS aimsto provide options, suggestions, andalternatives in This research hasfound that there are impediments internal onKosovo’s andexternal membership comprise ofa request to decrease thenumberofKFORtroops, slowly resulting inthehandingover and NATO ontherole ofKFOR inKosovo andanassessment ofthismissionontheground. should It withanagreementThe onmutuallyacceptable dialogueshouldstart solutionsbetween Kosovo a document to theNATO to formally by authorities initiate asking theKosovo-NATO dialogue. theKosovo2014). Afterwards Government, more precisely Kosovo’s MFA, willhave to submitsuch of Kosovo (OPMK) shallberesponsible to prepare aplancalledPresentation Document(Çeku, according to Çeku, then the NATO NATO. isestablished, isadopted Once by theKAF andalegislation theKosovo package Assembly, dialogue that would leadto theestablishment offormal andofficial relations between Kosovo and oftheKSF, Minister Acting Agim Çeku, hasrevealed detailsonwhat thisdialoguemay looklike;a andgainmembershipinPfPconsequently NATOparticipate itself. 2014,thethen October In limited ontime,to bestrictly not more thantwo years, withthemaintaskto prepare Kosovo to They shouldaskexplicitly for NATO’s NAC to launchaformal dialoguewithKosovo. As such,ithas the Kosovodeveloped between bothparties, onand institutionsshouldbothreflect consider it. andformalthat thestructural dialoguebetween Kosovo andNATO ispossibleandcanbefurther Pursuant ofForeign to Minister theideasofLatvian Affairs’, who for thefirsttimementioned 3.1. SECTION SECTION 3 – First scenario: From Kosovo-NATO to dialogue fullmembership Policy K osovo-NATO relations W options G) within the Office of the Prime Minister Group of the Minister (NWG) within the Office Prime orking on

the prospect of block theprogress madeinthedialogue, andthat NATO would commit to Kosovo’s membership. used inEU-facilitated dialoguebetween Kosovo meaningthat NATO’s andSerbia, would NRCs not into a contractual dialogue with NATO. The agreement should be based on the similar modality bilateral whichwould agreement eventually between thetwo parties; leadto Kosovo entering The ofthe finalobjective dialoguebetween Kosovoformal andNATOa shouldbethesigning of launching ofaKosovo-NATO formal dialogue. Document to the NAC and to all NATO member countries, which should eventually lead to the decision. They shouldestablishtheNWGassoonpossible, prepare and submitthePresentation this doesnotmeanthat shouldcontinue the Kosovo theform to ofNATO expect policymakers and the appointment of the NSRK by NATO in Kosovo are likely to occur 2015; however, during relations. According to theKosovo Government’s ofthe re-establishment seniorofficials, theNLOK the sametime, itwould assumethetaskto coordinate onallmatters inregards to Kosovo-NATO would cooperate withtheNLOK inorder to helpKosovo onits way to NATO membershipand, at on issuesregarding theformal dialoguebetween Kosovo andstructural andNATO. Also, theNSRK NATO SpecialRepresentative shouldwork inKosovoclosely, withKosovo’s (NSRK) inparticular MFA Representative whowillhave apoliticalmandate to represent NATO inKosovo (Çeku, 2014). The dialogue withNATO isestablished, theKosovo that NATO institutionsexpect appoints aSpecial until thelatter becomes afullNATO member. Ontheotherhand, theformal after andstructural towards NATO membershipand, compared to KFOR’s mandate, theNLOK would stay inKosovo Kosovo’s membershipinto NATO. Also, itshouldadviseandassisttheKosovo institutionsinitspath andprepare politicaldimensioninorder missionshouldhave tothis. assist, support, Its afurther theKSF,supporting KAF, ortheforthcoming but, at thesametimeitshouldnotbelimited to (NLOK). The NLOK shall be independent from KFOR, and its key responsibility should focus on be transformed into a single mission, possibly in the form of a NATO in Kosovo Liaison Office addition,itisrequiredIn that NATO merge itscontribution ofNAT andNLAT whichshould Atlantic integration processes for bothKosovo andSerbia. inthe stability agreement, whichtheKCSS considers to be possible, would leadtowards the long-term peace and is required to takeplace between Kosovo undereitherEUorNATO andSerbia mediation. Suchan NATO membershipprocess. However, to prior KFOR’s withdrawal, aprocess ofborder demarcation country. Additionally, itwould opentheway for the Kosovo anditsinstitutionsto officiallystart the assumptionofresponsibilities from KFORto guarantee asafe andsecure environment inthe NATO membercountries. Consequently, theKAF’s would increase importance andmay leadto wouldwhich indirectly maketherole ofKFOR’s infront missioninKosovo ofthe unnecessary the KAF’s establishment theformer shoulddevelop itshumanandoperational capabilities KFOR’s mandate derived by 1244oftheUNwhichisnotyet theResolution abrogated, following havethe KAF to work closelywithKFORto gradually takeresponsibilities from that KFOR.Knowing in compliance with the progress Kosovo inthe NATO willmark integration process. Furthermore, to ensure asafe andsecure environment inKosovo shouldbehandedover gradually to theKAF mission inKosovo by NATO incooperation withtheKosovo institutions. KFOR’s mainresponsibility Kosovo-NATOand structural acomprehensive dialogueshouldconduct assessment oftheKFOR ofKosovo. andeastern part andKosovo bordersinthenorthern Monastery withSerbia The formal of itsresponsibilities andKP, to theKAF includingresponsibilities regarding inparticular theDecani W estern Balkans regionestern whichisakeystep Balkans towards relations normalizing andEuro- 29 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 30 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS membership inNATO. the doorfor Kosovo to beinvited intheMAP to asthefinalstep participate to meetobligations for formal dialogueaswell andstructural asKosovo’s fullmembershipinPfPthat willitultimately open given that any decisiononthismatter istakenwithconsensus. Nonetheless, itisthesuccess ofthe any to theconsent decisiononthePfPmembershipwillbesubject ofallNATO membercountries for joiningtheseprogrammes whichwould theresponsibility oftheKosovo institutions. However, and theEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council isopened, withthefulfilment ofthe required conditions agreement between Kosovo andNATO shouldassure that themembershipprocess towards PfP wishing to joinNATO are invited andimplement relevant to reforms. undertake Afterwards, the NATO’s IPAP, includingtheintegral element oftheIntensifiedDialogueandinwhich countries international peacekeeping mission. The agreement shouldalsoguarantee that Kosovo willreceive Furthermore, in NATO of the KAF it should enable the participation operations, as well as in the NATO Figure 3:First scenario-From Kosovo-NATO dialogueto fullmembership From Kosovo-NATO dialogue to full membership NATO formal dialogue Launching ofKosovo- shall clearly provide:shall clearly responsibilities from KFOR Presentation Documentto NATO Serbia underEUorNATOSerbia to guarantee asafe and operational capabilities operational capabilities secure environment in 3. Border demarcation between Kosovo and between Kosovo and the KAF’s humanand MFA shouldsubmitKosovo’s that may lead to the that may leadto the assessment of KFOR assessment ofKFOR assumption of main assumption ofmain 2. Development of 2. Development of 1. Comprehensive mediation. mission. Kosovo. STAGE 1: NATO shalldecideto: to represent NATO inKosovo KAF andprepareKAF Kosovo on Representative inKosovo in Kosovo to support the the in Kosovo to support into NATO LiaisonOffice and coordinate Kosovo- Appoint NATO Special Merge NAT andNLAT NATO membership. NATO dialogue. Bilateral Agreement between between Agreement Bilateral of dialogue, theagree Kosovo andNATO After the completion After thecompletion ment shallprovide: STAGE 2: 5. KAF’s in participation international missions; towards PfPandNATO will notblockKosovo’s membership inNATO; membership process; NATO operations and between Kosovo and between Kosovo and contractual relations contractual relations 4. The NATO’s NRCs the way for Kosovo 1. Establishment of 1. Establishment of 2. Starting ofNATO2. Starting 3. NATO shallpave membership; NATO; - 31 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 32 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS with NATO.with getsthegreenexhaust allpossibilitiesunlessthe country light to enter into contractual relations integration, however, institutionsinKosovo responsible for dealingwithNATO integration should inmindthat thisscenario islessfavourableBearing thanthe firstonewith to NATOrespect NATO’s to theirstance NRCs soften onKosovo’s independence. close cooperation withKosovo’s NATO friendly member countries shouldaimto influence the Germany,Kingdom, Turkey andothercountries. The overseas embassiesofKosovo in working number of diplomatic staff in theNATO member countries, specificallyin the U.S., theUnited these countries. Furthermore, theMFA shouldbearinmindtheideato expand andincrease the NATO security, membercountries. would deepenfurther defence It anddiplomatic relations with increase thenumberof Kosovo’s Defence Attaches to thediplomatic missionsofKosovo’s friendly The Kosovo Government, specificallytheMKSF,MoD, orthe forthcoming andtheMFA, should cooperation NATO withfriendly membercountries. the Government, MFA andMKSF, MoD, ortheforthcoming at allstages, resulting instronger of NATO to consider, isalsoimportant through cooperation between Kosovo institutionsincluding fulfilment of NATO standards by the Kosovo institutions. An alternative scenario to membership that Kosovo’s NATO friendly theunilateral implementation membercountries and willsupport in thePfPprogramme andNATO itself. At thesametime, bilateral cooperation shouldensure doing so, Kosovo, to someextent, willbeprepared whenitcomes to anapplication for membership this case the KAF, may unilaterally fulfil conditions and standards required for NATO membership.In political impediments ofNATO integration are exceeded. Additionally, theKosovo institutions, in far easierfor theKosovo institutions to adoptandfulfilNATO’s membership conditions until the Once Kosovo hasreached bilateral agreements withindividualcountries inNATO, itshouldbe institutions shouldbetaskedto viewandstudytheMAP ofMontenegro andMacedonia. Croatia soasto from benefitdirectly theircasesofjoiningPfPandNATO. from this, theKosovo Apart MoD,or theforthcoming shouldsign bilateral agreements ofAlbania and withthelineministries successful stories of countries that have previously joined NATO. Kosovo’s MFA as well as the MKSF, for this regard,In the Kosovo important institutions to it is very follow the best examples and the development according ofthecapabilitiesKAF to theNATO standards ofinteroperability. international peacekeeping operations. Kosovo’s NATO friendly member countries can help with respective NATO countries. Also, shouldbeprepared theKAF withregards in to participation be focused on training programmes and joint exercises forces with the armed of the KAF of these Turkey andotherNATO membercountries. The existing andupcoming bilateral agreements should with otherNATO France, membersincludingtheUnited Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, done withsomeNATO members, jointly withtheMFA, shouldinsistonreaching bilateral agreements The Kosovo institutions, more precisely theMKSF, MoD, ortheforthcoming justlikeithasalready with NATO countries. with NATO, Kosovo hasto findotheralternatives to approach NATO through close cooperation Kosovo isblockedby theNATO’s andprevents NRCs theformer inestablishingcontractual relations more ondeepeningbilateral cooperation withtheindividualNATO membercountries. As longas thefirstscenario fails,If theKosovo institutionsshouldbeprepared for anotherwhich focuses 3.2. Second scenario: Bilateral cooperation withNATO countries Figure scenario-Bilateral 4:Second cooperation withNATO countries Bilateral cooperation with NATO countries bilateral agreements with Albania andCroatia soas tasked to view and study tasked to viewandstudy Government should sign Government shouldsign Plan ofMontenegro and their cases of joining PfP their casesofjoiningPfP the Membership Action Action the Membership KAF with the armed forces withthearmed KAF Government should be Government shouldbe to benefit directly from to from benefitdirectly agreements withother Strengthening ofcooperation with NATO membercountries and joint exercises ofthe on training programmes Government should Government should reach more bilateral Bilateral agreements of respective NATO NATO countries. should be focused should befocused 1. The Kosovo Kosovo 1. The 2. The Kosovo Kosovo 2. The 3. The Kosovo Kosovo 3. The Macedonia. and NATO. countries. of the capabilities of the of thecapabilities with the development with thedevelopment KAF according KAF to the prepared whenitcomes NATO standards of countries can help countries canhelp 2. Bilateral cooperation membership in the PfP membership inthePfP for NATO membership. programme andNATO support the unilateral theunilateral support standards by Kosovo. interoperability. implementation and implementation and Thus, Kosovo willbe to anapplication for conditions required NATO countries will friendly NATOfriendly should ensure that should ensure that fulfilment ofNATO Kosovo’s friendly institutions may institutions may unilaterally fulfil unilaterally fulfil Kosovo’s 1. The Kosovo Kosovo 1. The itself. Diplomatic efforts 2. It should be increased shouldbeincreased 2. It the numberofKosovo’s 3. Embassies of Kosovo 3.EmbassiesofKosovo cooperation withNATO to influence theNATO’s friendly NATOfriendly member countries should aim countries shouldaim increase the number increase thenumber Attaches to Kosovo’s Government should Government should of Kosovo’s Defence NRCs to soften their to their NRCs soften the NATO member stance onKosovo’s diplomatic staff in diplomatic staffin working in close inclose working independence. independence. 1. The Kosovo Kosovo 1. The countries. countries. countries. 33 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 34 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS To theKosovo institutions: RECOMMENDATIONS ------• • • • in theUnited States, Germany, theUnited Kingdom, Turkey and othercountries. of Kosovo’s diplomatic staffin theNATO member countries, specificallyinKosovo’s embassies ofForeignThe Ministry Affairs shouldtakeinto account to increase thepossibility thenumber Defence Attaches to thediplomatic missions ofKosovo’s NATO friendly membercountries. of Foreign of Defence, andMinistry Ministry Affairs shouldincrease thenumber ofKosovo’s on Kosovo’s NATO for integration, Force, the Kosovo Security the Ministry or the forthcoming orderIn to strengthen relations withNATO countries interms ofsecurity, defence andsupport Peace andNATO integration. and implementing unilaterally theconditions andstandards required for Partnership for Through bilateral cooperation withthosecountries, applying, Kosovo fulfilling shouldstart ments. usefulandKosovoThey canbevery canbenefitonitspath to joinNATO. Belgium, andothers. Additionally, thefocus shouldbeonimplementing theexisting agree where there isnosuchagreement, France, includingtheUnited Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, reach bilateral agreements with individualNATO membercountries, especiallywiththose for Force, theKosovo ofDefence,The Security Ministry should Ministry ortheforthcoming countries through thefollowing actions: Kosovo shoulddeepenandstrengthen bilateral cooperation withindividualNATO member tries. ings inNATO Generalaswell aswithrepresentatives withitsSecretary ofNATO membercoun- representativesSenior oftheKosovo institutionsshouldhave more frequent visitsandmeet Representation at NATO Headquarters. withinthePartnership for PeaceHeadquarters Programme andto establishitsPermanent in Brusselsuntil Kosovo right officially getsthe liaisonofficer tosenditspermanent toNATO The Kosovo ofKosovo institutionsshouldseekto openaLiaisonOffice in NATO Headquarters programme required andfor steps further onNATO’s membership(seethefirstscenario). limited induration and to some extentwould prepare Kosovo for thePartnership for Peace The anofficialdialoguewith Kosovo institutionsshouldseekto start NATObe which would to changetheirstance onKosovo’s status. Turkey, France andothercountries to influence the four non-recognizing countries ofNATO NATOits friendly membercountries, includingtheUnited States, Germany, United Kingdom, Kosovo’s shouldbebrought andbemore into with diplomacy proactive action inworking details, see Table 1). al relations aswell asobligations andsteps neededto follow for NATO membership(for more framework soasto putinto ofdeveloping theobjective practice theKosovo-NATO contractu - immediate reforms ofKosovo needfor to thepolicymakers intheinstitutional undertake A NATO W orking Group shouldbeestablishedby thePrimeorking of Kosovo. Minister There isan - - To NATO andKosovo’s friendlyNATO countries: member To theforthcomingKosovo Armed Forces: - - - - • • • • • NATO integration. inthe stability decision to recognize Kosovo, thosecountries would contribute in the long-term peace and not beaprecedent for othercountries to declare independence. Furthermore, a by taking Kosovo asthecaseofKosovo’s independence isunique, andconsequently sui generis can- Kosovo straight away. They donothave adequate reasons intheirstandto notrecognize Four NATO member countries – Greece, and Spain – should recognize Slovakia Romania, NATO for oftheKosovo theinter-operability Forces. Armed conditions inorder forces. to armed setupmodern doingsothey should work closelywith In Kosovo Forces Armed defence basedontheNATO thenecessary policy shouldundertake ipation ininternational peacekeeping operations. The relevant institutionsinvolved inthe The Kosovo Forces Armed shouldbetrained professionally inorder to beready for partic latter willnotstay inKosovo inevitably. and territory, theKosovo Forces Armed shouldbeready to assumetasksfrom KFORgiven the reachingIn its capabilities to be responsible for of the Kosovo the safety and security citizens totasks withtherespect protect theterritorialintegrity andsovereignty ofKosovo. As thefuture army ofKosovo, theKosovo Forces Armed shouldbeableto assumesecurity sus withinNATO andamongitsmembercountries. depend onlyfrom theKosovo to institutions, decisionsmadeby butitisalsosubject consen- not give promises can joinNATO. empty asto whenthecountry NATO integration doesnot ofKosovoMembership inNATO isnotamatter oftimeframes. The Kosovo politiciansshould countries to notblockKosovo’s fullmembershipinandrecognition by theAdriatic Charter. The Ministry of ForeignThe Ministry Affairs should pursue the United States and other initial phaseofcooperation between Kosovo andthesecountries. through intensified dialogueinmultilateral meetings at regional level that the would mark Kosovo anditsinstitutionsshouldbegin cooperation withNATO’s non-recognizing countries when itcomes to theofficialapplication on NATO membership. Plan Action ofMontenegrostudy theMembership andMacedoniainorder to beprepared NATO ofForeign Policy withintheMinistry Affairs andSecurity shouldbetasked to viewand of Defence as well NATO as the forthcoming ing Ministry ofForeign for theKosovoThe Ministry Security Ministry Affairs andthe Force,- orthe forthcom NATO membershipattainment ofthesecountries. for Peace andNATO integration. Kosovo shouldfollow lessonsfrom andlearn thesuccessful bania andCroatia withtheviewto benefitfrom their examples with regards to Partnership ofDefence, shouldsigncoming bilateral Ministry agreements ofAl- withthelineministries ofForeign for theKosovoThe Ministry Security Ministry Affairs andthe Force,- orthe forth W estern Balkans aswell asitwouldestern Balkans finallypave the way for Kosovo towards W orking Group and Department for for Group and Department orking W estern Balkan estern Balkan - 35 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 36 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS - - - - - • • the Kosovo Forces. Armed many, France, Italy, Turkey andothersshouldhelpwiththedevelopment ofthecapabilities Kosovo’s NATO friendly membercountries, includingtheUnited States, Ger United Kingdom, ofDefence onexercisingistry civiliananddemocratic control over theKosovo Forces. Armed sist intheprofessional development oftheKosovo Forces Armed - aswell asassistingtheMin Forces according to the NATO programme ofinter-operability. Furthermore, NATO shouldas- NATO shoulddevelop, trainofdefence andassistthecapacity-building oftheKosovo Armed KFOR to guarantee asafe andsecure environment inthecountry. Forces’ would increase importance and may leadto theassumptionofresponsibilities from beforeKosovo unnecessary theNATO membercountries. Consequently, theKosovo Armed human andoperational would capabilitieswhichindirectly maketherole ofKFOR’s missionin abrogated, following the Kosovo Forces’ Armed establishment the former shoulddevelop its that KFOR’s mandate derived by 1244oftheUnited theResolution Nations whichisnotyet Forces have to work closelywithKFORto gradually takeresponsibilities from KFOR.Knowing progress Kosovo intheNATO willmark integration process. Furthermore, theKosovo Armed Kosovo shouldbehandedover gradually to theKosovo Forces Armed incompliance withthe the Kosovo institutions. KFOR’s mainresponsibility to ensure asafe andsecure environment in anassessment oftheKFORmissioninKosovo shouldconduct byIt NATO incooperation with formal dialoguewiththeKosovo andstructural institutions. point theNATO SpecialRepresentative inKosovo whowillbeincharge the ofconducting To merge thetwo NATO teams inKosovo into theNATO inKosovo LiaisonOffice and toap towards thePartnership for Peace andNATO membership. To launchthedialoguebetween Kosovo andNATO that would leadto paving Kosovo’s path first scenario). NATO’s shouldtake anofficialdecision: structures decision-making NATO shouldconsider launchingtheKosovo-NATO formal dialogue(seethe andstructural non-recognizing countries ofNATO to changetheirstance ontheindependence ofKosovo. Kosovo’s NATO friendly Kosovo oninfluencingthe membercountries shouldsupport four - - LIST OF ANNEXES (DNSP) Policy Security for NATO and Department ofForeignMinistry Affairs (MFA) Prime Minister Advisor ofthe Security National Group (NWG) NATO Working Council (KSC) Kosovo Security Office ofthe Minister of Prime Kosovo (OPMK) for membership into NATO. NATO integration andinproducing documents andpreparing thecountry inparticular have specifictasksandtheir outduties concerning role needs to bespecified forcarrying confusion between theDNSPandNWGshouldbeavoided. ofthemshould Both membership process into NATO, especially whentheNWGisestablished. Any possible carefulThe incoordinating DNSPshouldbevery step withtheNWGregarding every issues affecting cooperation and relations ofKosovo withNATO. to itiscritical mention thatof fact, theMFA doesnothave aplanonhow to proceed with producing related documents concerning NATO integration (Ahmeti, 2014).As amatter asabodywithintheMFA,Nevertheless, theDNSPhasnotachieved in itsobjective countries for Kosovo’s path toward integration inEuro-Atlantic (MFA, structures 2014). foreign policy, withregards from to increasing member consensus andsupport relations withNATOsupervising memberstates aswell ascoordinating and overseeing documents towards NATO integration. The DNSPisresponsible for coordinating and The DNSPhas beenestablishedin2013withtheaimto prepare policy thenecessary Kosovo-NATO cooperation. be strengthened more recommendations inproviding thepolicy ofaneventual aswell asfor otherinstitutionsingeneral,in particular therole oftheAdvisor should relations withNATO have for theKosovo notbeenofanutmostpriority Government related issues. oninternal andexternal that to Knowing until security 2014the Advisor isresponsible National Security to advisethePrime onthepolicies Minister organizational ofNWG,asaresult. structure an operational role intherelations withNATO. The Kosovo Government shouldreview has aleadingrole ofDefence intherelated (MoD) hasmainly matter whiletheMinistry international organization, namely inNATO, isaresponsibility oftheMFA. The latter leads it, whileontheotherhandKosovo’s representation andmembershipto the NWGshouldberevised since currently itisforeseen ofDefence that theMinister have group asaworking withintheKSC.Furthermore, to function asto wholeads ofthis, Instead under theOPMK. SSSRshouldbereviewed andtherefore NWGwill However, itisinsubstantial for theNWGto beestablished asaninstitutionalbody the ultimate goal for NATO membership(Kosovo Government, 2014,p. 57). NATO, aswell asto putKosovo onthepath towards inPfPprogram participation with that theKosovoactions Government caninitiate to improve itsrelationship with (Çeku, mainfocus willbeondeveloping 2014).Its recommendations, ideas, and NWG willhave to beestablishedimmediately theestablishment oftheKAF after its role shouldbe reconsidered by theKosovo Government. process towards NATO. SSSRhasnotforeseen any for duty theKSCinthisregard, but However, ontheoccasion KSCshouldbeengageddirectly ofKosovo’s membership foreign agenciesororganizations counterpart (Kosovo Government, 2014,p. 23). relevant to security, andestablishesrelations agenciesand between national security ofKosovo,the foreign policy security alltreaties drafts andinternational agreements ithave reviews any specific Itsresponsibilities inthisfield. roleismainlyadvisory: KSC isnotinvolved whenitcomes directly to Kosovo-NATO relations anddoesnot Table 1:Kosovo’s institutionalframework vis-à-visNATO integration 37 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 38 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS KSF control over the democratic Civilian and for theKosovoMinistry Force Security (MKSF) (KSF) ForceSecurity Kosovo member countries. member countries. should increase thenumberofDefence Attachés to otherKosovo’s NATO friendly them, except Sweden, are NATO member countries. However, the Kosovo Government ofthesixcountries22). Out where theDefence Attachés have beenappointed, five of (Germany), (Turkey), Ankara Tirana (Albania) (Sweden) andStockholm (MKSF, 2014, p. the following embassiesofKosovo: 2013and2014theMKSFKosovo’sIn MFA appointed sixDefence Attachés in and othercountries (MKSF, 2014,pp. 22-23). bilateral trainings includingtheU.S., Germany, Sweden, theUnited Kingdom, Albania countries, anumberoftheKSFmembershave beensent abroad for education and agreements ofsomeNATO between theMKSFandMoD andnon-NATO member programme oftheresource management andplanning. As aresult ofthebilateral at NATO’s schoolsinGermany andPoland focus oneducation withaparticular For training thefirsttime, in2014,someoftheKSFofficers amilitary conducted training (NATO, 2013b). at level brigade and above, emphasisonstaffcapacity-building withaparticular to helpthe professional development oftheKSF. NLAT theKAF isdeemedto support from KFOR’s is madeupofapproximately andcivilianpersonnel mission.It 30military in thedevelopment oftheKSF by establishingtheNLAT inPrishtina whichisdistinct Following theFOCby theKSF, NATO hascontinued to provide advice andsupport 2013b). of hazardous assistance materials, andotherhumanitarian tasks(NATO, fire-fighting search andrescue operations, explosive ordinance disposal, control andclearance that are functions notapplicablefor security thepolice aswell asitdealswith military disasters and otheremergencies. Furthermore, theKSFisinvolved non- inconducting civil protection operations inresponding andassistingthecivilauthorities to natural the FOCwas reached, theKSFrole hasremained thesame, mainlyinconducting conditions setby NATO inorder to reach 2014).However, theFOC(Kastrati, even after (NATO, 2013a).According to theseniorofficialsofKSF,132 the latter hasfulfilled Full whichwas declared Operational by (FOC), Capability NATO’s NAC on9July2013 as well asinenrolling allethnic communities intheKSF. 2013,theKSFhasreached In NATO’sdirect inallareas includingrecruitment, assistance andsupervision training, The KSFhasmadesubstantial progress isbuiltwith since itsestablishment in2009.It (NATO, 2014a). The latter islocated at theMKSFoffices. andcontrolorganization aiming to theKSF. supervise NAT KFORistaskedto support NATO hascontinuously assisted inestablishingNAT’s team whichisacivilian-led W personnelandisaccountable to theKosovoand military Assembly (MKSF, 2014b). management ofcivilian addition,itiscomprised andadministration. ofamixture In The MKSFisaccountable for exercising civiliancontrol over theKSF, inboth ith the aim to fulfil its mission, the MKSF is supported by NATO.ith theaimto fulfilitsmission,theMKSFissupported More precisely, W ashington (U.S.), Brussels(Belgium), Berlin Foreign Policy Initiative BH.(2012).BiHPublic ontheEUIntegration Opinion Processes 2009-2012.Foreign Fanés, J. V. (2012).Spain’s Position onKosovo. Kosovo In Calling (pp. 9-30).Kosovo Foundation for Open status.Retrieved 13,2015,at: April -Membership http:// European 21).Serbia Commission. (2014,January Etchemendy, J. D. 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43 Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership 44 POLICY PAPER BY KCSS Ministry ofForeignMinistry Affairs ofKosovo. Xhafer Ahmeti. for (2014, November NATO 14). Director of Department Policy at the and Security Force (November 2011–March 2015). 24). Former (2014,October Kastrati. Lieutenant Commander General Kadri of the Kosovo Security Colonel Matešić. Ivica (2014,November 10).Defence Attaché at theEmbassyofCroatia inPrishtina. Kosovo. 22).AdvisorGarentina (2014,October onForeign Kraja. ofthePresident Policy andSecurity of Kosovo. Dhurata Hoxha. 22). Former (2014,October Advisor ofthePrime National of Security Minister Augustin Palokaj. 24).Correspondent (2014,October ofdailynewspaper “KOHA Ditore” inBrussels. December 2014). Agim Çeku. 24).Former (2014,October for Minister Force theKosovo Security (February 2011– INTERVIEWS Katalogimi në botim – (CIP) Biblioteka Kombëtare e Kosovës “Pjetër Bogdani”

061.1(4/9:496.51):355 327(496.51:4/9)

Avdiu, Plator Destination NATO : Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership / Plator Avdiu. – Prishtinë : Qendra Kosovare për Studime të Sigurisë. – 46 f. ; 21 cm.

Bibliography : f. 39-44.

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