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Eugene Kogan Eugene Kogan Ukraine’s Post-Election Defence and Security Agenda Key Points o There is no doubt that with election of influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy President Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine’s and does not see in this interference some- defence and security agenda has undergone thing unusual. And “Who dares Wins” considerable changes. However, the process of (author’s italics). changes has not yet been completed. o Major Yury Luzhkov repeated and consistent o The decision of not joining North Atlantic statements about Sevastopol and the Crimean Treaty Organisation in the foreseeable future, Peninsula, namely that they are an integral part does not mean no further naval and military of the Russian Federation needs to be exercises with NATO and/or NATO Partner- countered by a clear, coherent and consistent ship for Peace member states in Ukraine. As statements from Ukraine. Luzhkov and his long as the expenses are covered by the political supporters are not going to change external parties, whether it is the United States their minds and, as a result, continue to pursue and Canada or the European NATO member the same explicit virulent anti-Ukraine policy. states, the current government would not As long as the President and the Government object and would do its utmost to rein in the of Ukraine say nothing, Luzhkov and his Communist Party in Crimea. We can call it political backers feel encouraged to encroach Ukraine’s pragmatic approach since the MoD on Ukraine’s sovereignty. The author’s budget is so meagre that there are not enough statement would be dismissed out of hand by funds for national military exercises. However, the Russian officials. the government has also kept up its right to change its mind and to cancel naval and o The issue of neutrality status for Ukraine has military exercises at any time it finds suitable. to be assessed within the framework of Thus, an element of unpredictability needs to economic, financial and military consequences be remembered. for the country and not via the internal bickering alone. In addition, political decision o The decision to extend the lease of Sevastopol per se rubber-stamped by the Verkhovna Rada to the Black Sea Fleet hangs over Ukraine as (or Parliament) and enshrined in the country’s Damocles Sword. As long as the vaguely constitution does not solve the problem, but defined terms of stationing foreign troops on rather swept it under the carpet. A potential the territory of Ukraine have not been membership of Ukraine in the Collective properly addressed and anchored in the Security Treaty Organisation should not be country’s constitution, Russia’s fleet would dismissed out of hand. Russia, as presented in remain in Sevastopol, Crimea. That also means the report, is bidding for the right time to that Ukraine cannot become member of bring Ukraine on its own terms into NATO for the foreseeable future. We also organisation. President Dmitry Medvedev need to remember the strong objection of stated clearly that ‘If in the future you would Russia regarding Ukraine’s interest joining consider it proper to join the CSTO, we would NATO. Russia dares (author’s italics) to be happy to invite you and accept you’. Introduction Pre-Election Assessment and Post-Election Reality In February 2010 issue of the Institute for Security any way.5 It should be clearly emphasised that the Studies (ISS) Analysis Sabine Fischer noted that deepening of Ukraine-NATO co-operation has the Viktor Yanukovych administration will make nothing to do with year-to-year co-operation and concessions to Russia mostly in the security the year-to-year co-operation is not a substitute realm. It will not add North Atlantic Treaty for the deepening of co-operation. These two Organisation (NATO) membership to its agenda issues are not interconnected, although Ukrainian but will continue its co-operation with NATO. It officials are likely to disagree with the author. In has already indicated its openness to renegotiate addition, as it clearly stated in note 5, year-to-year the lease of Sevastopol for the Black Sea Fleet co-operation with NATO can be cancelled at any (BSF).1 Fischer has not elaborated further on the time suitable to the government of Ukraine. issue of Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO, since it was not yet clear at the time of her writing Nonetheless, Fischer was correct in her assess- what exactly this co-operation would entail. ment that membership or rather Membership However, Valeriy Chaly, deputy director-general Action Plan (MAP) was discarded from Ukraine’s of the Razumkov Centre, noted that a new law agenda. In addition, openness to renegotiate the on the ‘Fundamentals of Domestic and Foreign BSF’s lease of Sevastopol, which would be Policy’ presented to the Verkhovna Rada (i.e. discussed further below, was on the top of the Parliament) represents a change to the national agenda of Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and security strategy, military doctrine, and an Viktor Yanukovych. As for Fischer’s other abolition of state programmes. Considering the assertions that Ukraine will not become more fact that the issue of NATO membership was no deeply involved in the military integration project longer high on the agenda, but rather the deepening such as the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty (author’s italics) of Ukraine-NATO co-operation Organisation (CSTO) or that President to prepare the country for an eventual membership Yanukovych will keep arguing in favour of (author’s italics), documents on co-operation with neutrality6 the first assertion proved to be in- NATO might be negatively affected now.’2 Chaly correct and the second accurate. The issues of did not elaborate further his statement, but we neutrality and the CSTO are addressed further can deduce from his statement that the deepening below. As for Fischer’s last note – where (author’s italics) of Ukraine-NATO co-operation Ukrainian concessions to Moscow have the to prepare...for an eventual membership (author’s potential to perpetuate existing problems and italics) was dropped from the agenda. We also tensions, as is the case with the presence of the need to remember that back in December 2008 BSF in Sevastopol, the European Union (EU) NATO invited Ukraine to a new format of should be an attentive observer and offer support relations as part of the so-called Annual National where necessary7, the author considers the EU Programme (ANP) on preparations for joining the attentive position being not just marginal, but also alliance (author’s italics). Since then, Ukraine, completely ignored by Moscow. In a manner of along with NATO experts, has drawn up and speaking, Moscow counts on a feeble reaction implemented such a document for a second from Brussels and, as a result, perceives Ukraine consecutive year.3 Altogether, it means that its own zone of interests. It can also be foreseen whether it called deepening of or preparations for that the EU would be very reluctant to flex its joining the alliance it has come to a dead end with military muscle versus Russia regarding Ukraine’s President Yanukovych’s decision to cancel current and future development. But even Ukraine’s goal of seeking NATO membership.4 political rhetoric coming from Brussels is no longer taken seriously by Moscow. European It should be noted, however, that thus far year-to- officials would, however, disagree with the author. year co-operation with NATO was not affected in The BSF Landmark Deal and Its Repercussions for NATO Membership An analysis written by Dmitry Gorenburg proved Ukraine. In addition, government of Ukraine to be off the mark, namely that the BSF’s lease of insists that modernisation of the BSF should be Sevastopol would not be extended.8 On the coordinated with Kyiv.16 Furthermore, it became contrary, on 21 April 2010, Presidents Medvedev known that during Anatoly Serdyukov, Russia’s and Yanukovych reached a sensational agreement Minister of Defence, visit to Crimea on 24 June on the BSF extension of the lease for another 2010, Mikhail Ezhel, Ukraine’s Minister of twenty-five years with a clause allowing for an Defence, said that ‘We need to sit down and additional five years extension. In return, Russia negotiate the issue of re-armament of the fleet.’ said it would cut the price of natural gas delivery Ezhel has also emphasised that issues related to by 30 per cent9 for the next ten years. The strengthening of the BSF would be coordinated decision by President Yanukovych represents a with Ukraine.17 In a sense Ezhel reiterated official sharp reversal in policy of his predecessor position of the Ukrainian government. Whether President Viktor Yushchenko, who opposed to Russia would agree to find common solution for extend the lease and a victory for Russia, which the passage of Russian naval vessels and had feared that it might face a challenge to its coordinate with Ukraine the rearmament of the military readiness if the base were to be closed.10 BSF remains to be seen. It appears that Ukraine’s Chaly noted that although ‘The decision on the government is not linking these two issues and, as extension of the BSF’s lease, while not posing the a result, Moscow is ignoring the issue of passage immediate threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, of its naval vessels. According to Nezavisimiya substantially reduces our country’s independent Gazeta, the Ukrainian military sources clarified decision-making process’ (emphasis added).11 The that Kyiv’s cautious response on rearmament of independent decision-making process is pre- the BSF was linked to Russia’s plan to rearm the requisite of each and every country’s sovereignty fleet and merge shipbuilding enterprises of the and substantial reduction in it is a sign that two countries.
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