An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia
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Relief and Rehabilitation Network Network Paper 3 An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia Mark Duffield March 1994 Please send comments on this paper to: Relief and Rehabilitation Network Overseas Development Institute Regent's College Inner Circle Regent's Park London NW1 4NS United Kingdom A copy will be sent to the author. Comments received may be used in future Newsletters. ISSN: 1353-8691 © Overseas Development Institute, London, 1994. Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged. Requests for commercial reproduction of Network material should be directed to ODI as copyright holders. The Network Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of any use of this material in training, research or programme design, implementation or evaluation. An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia Mark Duffield(1) Contents Page 1. Introduction 1 2. The Conflict and its Effects 1 3. UNPROFOR 8 4. Organisation of the Relief Operations 11 5. The Role of NGOs 14 6. Donor Operational Programmes 17 7. Issues in the Operation of the Humanitarian Aid Programme 18 References 24 Acronyms 26 Maps: Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina Frontlines 1. Mark Duffield is Senior Lecturer at the School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom. An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia 1. Introduction Members of the RRN will be familiar with the terrible drama being played out in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the extensive international media coverage. Though such coverage often focuses upon the progress of relief efforts in relation to particular communities, it is difficult for those not directly involved in the relief operations to understand how they are organised and how such arrangements differ from the type of operation that most RRN members are familiar with. Drawing on material from a recent study(1) (Duffield, 1994), this paper describes the effects of the conflict, and the organisation of military protection for humanitarian assistance, the organisation of the relief programme focusing upon the role of UN agencies, NGOs and donor organisations. 2. The Conflict and its Effects Open conflict began in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 as a conflict between Serbs and a Croat/Muslim alliance. During the course of 1993, the confrontation became three-sided as previous compacts broke down(2). It is estimated that between the start of the conflict and June 1993 140,000 people had been killed and a similar number injured. 1. Material for this study was gathered during a study commissioned by UNICEF. The view expressed here are the authors own and may not reflect those of UNICEF. The visit to Bosnia was prior to the February 1994 cease fire around Sarajevo which has subsequently been extended to other areas. 2. The factors contributing to the break-up of the Former Yugoslavia are deliberately not discussed here because of their complexity and the focus of this paper upon the relief operations. Those wishing to learn more about this process are referred to Magas, 1993; Schierup, 1993 and Zizmond, 1992. Though the ethnic complexity of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a significant factor, these sources reveal the importance of the economic fragmentation in the process leading to the conflict. 1 RRN Network Paper 3 From a humanitarian perspective the principal characteristics of the conflict have been the displacement of upto half the pre-war population of 4.36 million through forced migration and `ethnic cleansing', and the blockade and terrorisation of civilian populations generally. While access can be negotiated this has become increasingly difficult as the war has spread across central Bosnia. The politics of blockade and terrorisation currently take two main geographical forms: i) the isolation of contiguous urban/rural areas to produce ethnic enclaves. For example, the Croat pocket between Vitez and Kiseljak or the Muslim enclaves around Srebrenica and Gorazd (see Map); ii) the forcible containment, blockade and terrorisation of trapped urban populations. For example, the predominantly Bosnian Muslim ghettos of Sarajevo and Mostar East (see Box 1). 2 RRN Network Paper 3 3 RRN Network Paper 3 Box 1 Mostar East Since Croat versus Muslim fighting began in Mostar in May 1993, about 58,000 Muslims have been concentrated and forcibly contained in the thin strip of territory which represents Mostar East. More than half of this total have been displaced from other areas. The urban part of Mostar East is an area about 2 kilometres long by one kilometre wide. It is separated from the larger West and Croat part of the town by a river. More than 20,000 people live in desperate conditions in the urban part of Mostar East. Every building has been damaged by frequent shelling, some parts are totally devastated. There is no electricity or piped water and UNHCR convoys protected by Spanish troops maintain a fragile lifeline. Even on a `quiet' day the civilian population is terrorised by sniper fire. Like Sarajevo, Mostar East has evolved a ghetto structure. Within half a mile of enforced deprivation, the restaurants and shops in Mostar West function as normal. The Croatian Government recently released around 2,000 Muslim prisoners and forced them into Mostar East. Within the ghetto, a Bosnian War Presidency functions and has assumed responsibility for defence and the provision of basic needs. All housing has been commandeered and a space survey undertaken. Where room exists, it has been allocated to the large displaced and refugee population. Productive assets which have no immediate use have been put into store. All food and relief supplies are centrally controlled. The population is fed from communal kitchens. More than 38,000 were supported in this manner during December 1993. Water is drawn direct from the river and supplied to the town by a patched and bullet-riddled tanker. No money circulates and the small additional in-kind payments that are made to those within the civil administration helps sustain a barter economy. Unlike Sarajevo, Mostar East has not produced a siege currency. It is a duty centred system linked to the provision of security and basic necessities. Since late 1993, teachers have been attempting to restart and maintain schooling under the most appalling conditions. 4 RRN Network Paper 3 According to the most recent UNHCR estimate (UNHCR, 1994), there are currently 2.74 million beneficiaries of the relief operations within Bosnia (un-disaggregated internally displaced, vulnerable groups and refugees). It is estimated that up to 90% of the displaced and refugee population has been housed in private residences (DHA, 1993). This has been the result of direct action by civil authorities or informal kinship networks. The remaining displaced are in collective centres, usually commandeered buildings of varying quality. With the exception of the relatively small Bosnian Croat area, Bosnia-Herzegovina is subject to blockade. Thus, virtually all of the population is directly or indirectly affected by the war. Figure 1: From UNHCR, January 1994. Refugees and Displaced in Former Yugoslavia Total 3.8 Million Croatia UNPAs Serbia Bosnia & H Montenegro Bosnia Slovenia and FYR Macedonia Herzegovina 2.7 Million As a result of the dependence of the majority of the population on regular paid employment and regional or national food, energy and water supplies, the degree of dislocation or collapse of the social and economic structure caused by the war has been extreme. Bosnia has been split into three separate economic and political 5 RRN Network Paper 3 entities. Herzegovina is under Bosnian Croat domination and has been integrated into the Croat economy. It is outside of the blockade and is in a better condition than the rest. 6 RRN Network Paper 3 Central Bosnia which is largely under the control of the Bosnian Presidency has suffered serious and widespread destruction of buildings and facilities. Up to April 1993, the Bosnian government has estimated the financial cost of this as between US$150-180 billion. Due to the blockade of all but relief items, the industrial and commercial economy within the region has totally collapsed. The drop in GNP must approach 100%. The overwhelming majority of the population is effectively unemployed. According to area, around 10-30% have continued to report to what is, essentially, an unpaid job. It maintains social contact and is better than doing nothing. As few as 3-4% could be said to be gainfully employed. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the main employers in Bosnia are the aid agencies. UN agencies and NGOs in Bosnia probably have the best qualified drivers in the world and can boast engineers, doctors and architects among their personnel. Hyper-inflation has rendered the Bosnian Dinar worthless. For the few in employment outside of the hard currency paying aid programme, mainly those in the essential public services, monthly salaries are the equivalent of little more than a couple of Deutch Marks (US$1). In Sarajevo, the civil authority has issued what amounts to its own siege currency: a voucher that can be exchanged for basic items in the government controlled distribution centres. Here, and more widely, hyper- inflation has prompted the emergence of a barter economy. According to region, values are reckoned in differing weights of essential relief items, flour, sugar, etc (Alikadic, 1994). It is also a situation which has forced the growth of the black market. It is a market which, of necessity, has close links with the combatants. In places like Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla, for those who have got what it takes, a limited supply of goods and services can be obtained. The electricity, gas and water infrastructure within central Bosnia has suffered extensive damage. In many places, however, patched systems are capable of limited output. In industrialised conditions not only is food a weapon of war, but essential utilities are also subject to withdrawal and political manipulation.