An Fmri Study on Sunk Cost Effect
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brain research 1519 (2013) 63–70 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com www.elsevier.com/locate/brainres Research Report An fMRI study on sunk cost effect n Jianmin Zenga,b, Qinglin Zhanga, , Changming Chena, Rongjun Yuc, n Qiyong Gongd, aFaculty of Psychology, Southwest University, Chongqing, No.1 Tiansheng Road, Beibei District, Chongqing City 400715, China bKey Laboratory of Cognition and Personality, Ministry of Education, China cSchool of Psychology and Center for Studies of Psychological Application, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China dHuaxi MR Research Center, Department of Radiology, West China Hospital, Sichuan University, No.37 Guoxue Alley, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province 610041, China article info abstract Article history: Sunk cost effect (also called escalation of commitment, etc) is a pervasive, interesting Accepted 1 May 2013 and famous decision bias, which has been intensively discussed in psychology, Available online 9 May 2013 economics, management, political science, zoology, etc. To date, little has been known Keywords: about the neural basis of this phenomenon. We investigated it by using functional Sunk cost effect magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to monitor healthy subjects' brain activities when Escalation of commitment they made decisions in a task wherein sunk cost and incremental cost were system- Decision making atically manipulated. Higher sunk cost only increased activity of some brain areas Prospect theory (mainly lateral frontal and parietal cortices, which are involved in risk-taking), whereas Neuroeconomics lower incremental cost mainly increased activity of some brain areas (including striatum FMRI and medial prefrontal cortex, which are sensitive to rewards). No overlapping brain areas were found to respond to both sunk cost and incremental cost. These results favor certainty effect over self-justification or diminishing sensitivity as account of sunk cost effect. & 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction invested and is irrevocable no matter which option one chooses, a traditionally rational decision maker should Sunk cost effect (also called sunk cost fallacy/bias/error/ neglect sunk cost (Thaler, 1980). However, individual, com- paradox, escalation of commitment, escalating commitment, pany and even parliament decision makers are actually throwing good money after bad, knee-deep in big muddy, susceptible to sunk costs. For example, one is more likely to concorde effect/fallacy, etc) is a pervasive, interesting and wear a piece of ugly clothing if it has cost him more money; fi famous decision bias. It refers to the following phenomenon: one is more likely to nish watching a boring movie if the if one has invested more money, time, effort etc (sunk cost) ticket cost money than was free; a corporation is more likely on something, then he is more likely to make further invest- to continue a hopeless project if more money has been ment (incremental cost) on it. Since sunk cost has been invested in that project; a congress person may advocate to n Corresponding authors. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (Q. Zhang), [email protected] (Q. Gong). 0006-8993/$ - see front matter & 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2013.05.001 64 brain research 1519 (2013) 63–70 continue a hopeless war because many soldiers have sacrificed focuses rather than explored neural basis of sunk cost effect. in it (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Sleesman et al., 2012; Staw, 1976; Some previous studies examined the neural basis of delay or Strough et al., 2008). These examples illustrate that people are effort costs (Croxson et al., 2009; Day et al., 2010; Gan et al., more inclined to continue an action when sunk cost is higher. 2010; Hillman and Bilkey, 2010; Rudebeck et al., 2006). How- Conversely, some research has reported opposite effect (less ever, these studies never divided cost into sunk cost and when higher) (Heath, 1995). Both cases can be called sunk cost incremental cost; the subjects were usually non-human ani- effect since the traditionally rational theory assumes people mals and so the methods were usually lesion or other should neglect sunk cost. This phenomenon exists in not only methods appropriate for non-human subjects. Remarkably, humans but also non-human animals such as pigeons and Croxson et al. (2009) used functional magnetic resonance rats (Curio, 1987; Macaskill and Hackenberg, 2012; Magalhaes imaging (fMRI) with human participants to study neural basis et al., 2012; Navarro and Fantino, 2005; Pattison et al., 2012). of effort cost and revealed the following brain areas Given the phenomenon of sunk cost effect is pervasive in real decreased activation with higher effort cost: bilateral puta- life and interesting in several disciplines, to study its neural men, bilateral supplementary motor area (SMA), left primary substrate is quite meaningful. motor cortex, left midbrain. In a word, previous research has Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)wasusedto investigated the neural basis of investment and costs. explain sunk cost effect in the following way (Thaler, 1980): However, little research has been devoted to understand- individuals have diminishing sensitivity to losses; the more they ing the neural basis of sunk cost effect and testing its have invested (sunk cost), the less painful they fell for additional alternative explanations in the viewpoint of neuroscience. loss (incremental cost), and the more likely they continue the Therefore, we investigated it by applying fMRI to healthy course. It is important to note that this explanation treats both subjects. We manipulated magnitude of sunk cost and incre- sunk cost and incremental cost as one thing (loss). If the human mental cost systematically and independently in order to brain really treats them in the same way, then the neural identify the neural correlates of each and test the alternative correlates of sunk cost and incremental cost should be similar. explanations of sunk cost effect. Another account of sunk cost effect was self-justification (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976): if one abandons continuing the investment, then it seems that he admits the previous 2. Results investment in his responsibility is wrong; to avoid this bad appearance, he has to continue the investment. In addition, 2.1. Behavioral results cognitive dissonance was thought to be the psychological root of self-justification (Bazerman et al., 1984). If this account If each participant was a rational decision maker, then, when is the case, then the higher the sunk cost is, the more the incremental cost became larger, given the total gain was fixed, responsibility and cognitive dissonance is and the more the he should be less inclined to continue to invest (negative effect), self-justification is needed. Consequently, when sunk cost is and so the number of participants with negative effect should be higher, brain areas involved in self-referential processing 25 and that of all the other should be 0. If each participant was a (such as cortical midline structures) (Northoff et al., 2006), rational decision maker, then he should neglect sunk cost, that cognitive dissonance (such as anterior cingulate cortex and is, his decisions should not affected by sunk cost at all (no effect), anterior insula) (van Veen et al., 2009), or responsibility (such and so the number of participants with no effect should be 25 as striatum) (Camille et al., 2010) should be more active. and that of all the other should be 0. The third account (Arkes and Blumer, 1985)ofsunkcost To determine whether this is the case, a logistic regression effect is based on another mechanism in prospect theory was applied to each participant's data, with his/her behavioral (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), named certainty effect. Cer- responses (choices) as the dependent variable and sunk cost and tainty effect refers that certain gains (losses) are more attrac- incremental cost as the independent variables. Figs. 2 and 3 tive (disgusting) to people than possible gains (losses), even if show the numbers of participants with special effects predicted their expected values are equal, given the probabilities are not and observed. All except one participants' choices were nega- too small. In the case of sunk cost effect, if the subject chooses tively affected by incremental cost significantly (po.00001 for not to continue the investment, then he faces a certain loss; if each of the 24 participants; p¼.16 for the one participant), almost he chooses to continue the investment, then he possibly same as predicted by the rational model. However, although the recovers the loss though he also possibly loses more. There- rational model predicted no participant should be affected by fore, certainty effect drives him to continue the investment. If sunk cost, 19 out of 25 were actually affected significantly (po.01 this is the case, then, the more the sunk cost is, the stronger for each of the 19 participants; the number of participants whose the certainty effect is (i.e., the stronger the tendency of po.001,.0001 or.00001 was 14, 13 or 11). Taken together, for each avoiding the certain loss and choosing the risky option is), of most participants, both incremental cost and sunk cost had and the more risk taking the subject is. Therefore, we can significant effects on his choice. The former is traditionally expect, activity of brain areas involved in risk taking (such as rational while the latter is not. lateral frontal and parietal cortices) (Fecteau et al., 2007a, 2007b; Gianotti et al., 2009; Huettel et al., 2006; Knoch et al., 2006; Rao 2.2. Neural results et al., 2008) should correlate with the magnitude of sunk cost. Some previous studies attended to the neural basis of As in most of fMRI studies, we made two levels of analyses: economic investment (Chiu et al., 2008; Lohrenz et al., 2007; firstly individual level and then group level. In the individual- Mohr et al., 2010; Shiv et al., 2005).