© 2014 Michele Rotunda ALL RIGHTS RESERVED “DRUNKENNESS IS NO EXCUSE FOR CRIME” – ALCOHOL, MURDER, AND MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH- CENTURY AMERICA by MICHELE ROTUNDA A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School – New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in History Written under the direction of Susan R. Schrepfer And approved by ___________________________________________ ___________________________________________ ___________________________________________ ___________________________________________ New Brunswick, New Jersey May 2014 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION “DRUNKENNESS IS NO EXCUSE FOR CRIME” – ALCOHOL, MURDER, AND MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA BY MICHELE ROTUNDA Dissertation Director: Susan R. Schrepfer Using a variety of court cases as evidence, this study focuses on several competing, and often unresolved, models of responsibility for crimes related to intoxication that emerged in nineteenth century America. Drunkenness truly was “no excuse” for crime in the early years of the nineteenth century; however, changes in the fields of medicine, the law, and society created the circumstances under which such a defense became more viable, and certainly more prevalent, if only intermittently successful, by mid-century. American courts began, in the 1820s, to accord an expanded exculpatory value to intoxication due to several factors: 1. The medicalization of alcohol use from delirium tremens to dipsomania to inebriety created categories of mental illness from which to argue for limited or even absent responsibility under the law. 2. American law, beginning in 1794, allowed for a greater recognition of the issue of intent in crimes, in particular, creating statutory degrees of violent crimes that were dependent on establishing appropriate mens rea. Evidence of intoxication could be used to disprove intent and thus lower the charge to second degree. 3. The cautionary tale of a good man ruined by the effects of alcohol was an important tool used by the early temperance movement as it sought to curb the pernicious effects of drinking in a nation rife with ii alcohol. In much of the temperance literature, “demon rum” and the “rum-seller” often joined the drunkard as accomplices in crime. Somewhat ironically, the demonization of alcohol and those who sold it allowed for a narrative that mitigated the actions of the drunkard himself. By the post-bellum period, a backlash, led by medical professionals and buttressed by an influential temperance movement, materialized, but the groundwork had been laid for considering what today is more likely to be called a defense of “diminished capacity.” iii Acknowledgements This project took a little longer than the traditional dissertation to complete, but I can’t imagine my life if I had done it any other way. I have had the opportunity to work with and to receive advice and support from so many brilliant scholars over the years, and for that, I am enormously grateful to the History Department at Rutgers, in both New Brunswick and Newark. I am indebted to my students at Rutgers-Newark and, more recently, Union County College, who provide me with deeper purpose and remind me every day why history is the most interesting subject in the world – even if they don’t always agree. I am grateful that my children, Scott and Kate, pulled me away from my research and provided me with perspective – even if they added years onto my work. I would also like to thank my husband, Keith Delaney, who made up for the challenges of dealing with his unpredictable law enforcement schedule, by reading through various drafts of the paper and acting as my unofficial legal consultant. When I read the transcript of the James Graves trial that mentioned a diary used as evidence, my fellow historians assured me that the “source” must still exist. My husband looked at me as though I were insane, but he still called someone in the homicide division in Newark to see if there was any chance they held onto evidence from the 1880s. I think they’re still laughing. My deep and abiding appreciation to my committee members Gerald Grob, Ann Fabian and Sarah Tracy for their guidance and encouragement. iv My greatest debt is to my advisor and friend, Susan Schrepfer whose advice always managed to be both brilliant and kind, and whose promise to remain my friend even if I never finished my dissertation inspired me more than anything else. v Table of Contents Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………ii Acknowledgements ...…………………………………………………………………..iv Introduction ...…………………………………………………………………………...1 Chapter 1: “Not the intended result of drink” – Delirium Tremens as a Defense ..……………………………………………………………………….13 Chapter 2: “Not capable of entertaining this specific intent” – Intoxication as Mitigation …..…………………………………………………...49 Chapter 3: “A victim of intemperance” – The Drunkard’s Story .…………………….75 Chapter 4: “The broad resemblance between insanity and drunkenness” – Moral Insanity .…………….…………………………………..111 Chapter 5: “They are simply drunk” – Backlash against Dipsomania ……………….152 Chapter 6: “Represented as framing an apology for sin and for crime” – The Problem of Establishing a Disease Concept of Inebriety .......……..……....184 Epilogue …..…………………………………………………….…………………....211 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………….217 vi 1 Introduction On September 29, 1790, a Proclamation signed by Massachusetts Governor John Hancock offered a reward of one hundred dollars for the apprehension of Samuel Hadlock. The escaped prisoner had been convicted “of the horrid crime of Murdering Eliah Littlefield Gott,” reportedly beating him to death when he was “too much inflamed with strong drink.” Hadlock was captured a short time afterwards, and a date was set to carry out the sentence of execution. On the scaffold, the condemned man insisted “that he never had any malice afore-thought, or premeditated determination to kill any one,” but as the newspaper had assured its readers, “the law considers intoxication as an aggravation, rather than an excuse for murder.” Hadlock was executed on October 28.1 Had he committed his crime several decades later, Hadlock’s insistence that he had no intent to murder might have formed his defense rather than his last words. Whatever opinions they may have held on this particular case, American citizens in the early republic knew that drunkenness provided no excuse for crime. As early as 1551, in the case of Reniger v. Forgossa, English common law proclaimed, “if a person that is drunk kill another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it…” The intoxicated state of the individual at the time of the crime was irrelevant inasmuch as it “was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby.” In other words, when the act of drinking is undertaken voluntarily, the resulting state of intoxication is predictable, thus the offender bears full responsibility 1 “Trial for Murder,” The Massachusetts Magazine 2 (July 1790); 446; “Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” Hampshire Chronicle (September 29, 1790); “Domestick Affairs,” Hampshire Chronicle, October 13, 1790; “Hadlock, the Inhuman Murderer Executed,” Hampshire Gazette, November 24, 1790. 2 for his actions.2 Writing on medical jurisprudence almost 300 years later, physician Theodric Romeyn Beck validated this rule of law stating, “It is a well known and salutary maxim in our laws, that crimes committed under the influence of intoxication, do not excuse the perpetrator from punishment.” Yet he also noted that medical wisdom of the time accepted habitual drunkenness as a cause of insanity. A staunch proponent of the value of medical expertise in legal matters, Beck recognized the complexity of the issue as he predicted that “The partition line between intoxication and insanity may hence sometimes become a subject of discussion.”3 Here Beck is quite prescient if ultimately understated. Repeatedly from the pages of my research, figures from the past adamantly declared that, “Drunkenness is no excuse for crime.” The seeming forthrightness of the statement belies the reality of nineteenth century courtroom scenes in which heavy drinking was often pled as a defense to a variety of heinous crimes, including murder. Even as prosecuting attorneys attempted to convince juries that drunkenness was no excuse according to the law, physicians and defense attorneys often relied on the very same declaration with an important “but” that negated its relevance in the case of their client. Arguments pointing out the lack of intent in an intoxicated defendant’s actions were often supported by medical testimony for judges and juries to consider. The defendant also may have attempted to shift some of the blame by proclaiming, “the 2 Case of Reniger v. Forgossa cited in Mitchell Keiter, “Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 87 (1997): 484. Note that the law did make a distinction between voluntary drunkenness and involuntary drunkenness – even as the former condition was considered to be a rare event. For more on the early history of the insanity defense, see Daniel N. Robinson, Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: The Insanity Defense from Antiquity to Present (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996). 3 Theodric Romeyn Beck, M.D., Elements of Medical Jurisprudence Vol. I, (Albany: Websters and Skinners, 1823),