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NOTES to PREFACE I 'A Problem for Utilitarianism,' Analysis 28 (1968 NOTES NOTES TO PREFACE I 'A Problem for Utilitarianism,' Analysis 28 (1968), 141-142. 2 Three especially impressive items are: Lennart Aqvist, 'Improved Formulations of Act Utilitarianism,' Noas 3 (1969), 299-323; Lars Bergstrom, The Alternatives and Consequences of Actions (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966); Howard Sobel, 'Values, Alternatives, and Utilitarianism,' Noas 4 (1971), 373-384. Further relevant items are cited in Chapter I, note 3. 3 'Ought, Value, and Utilitarianism,' The American Philosophical Quarterly VI (1969), 257-275. 4 Analysis and Metaphysics, ed. by Keith Lehrer (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), pp. 255-271. 5 Analysis 24 (1963),33-36. 6 'The Ethics of Requirement,' The American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964), 150. NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 I The classic statements of utilitarinaism may be found in Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) and Mill's Utilitarianism (1865). Moore's utilitarianism is developed in Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903) and Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1912). J. J. C. Smart's An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1961) contains a clear exposition and defense. 2 I first encountered this puzzle in Harold Zellner's paper, 'The Inconsistency of Utilitarianism,' presented at the 69th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Boston, December 27-29, 1972. An Abstract of the paper appears in The Journal of Philosophy LXIX, 19 (October 26, 1972),676. 3 Hector-Neri Castaneda, 'A Problem for Utilitarianism,' Analysis 28 (1968), 141- 142. Castaneda's paper provoked several replies, including: Harold Zellner, 'Utilitarianism and Derived Obligation,' Analysis 32 (1972), 124-125; Fred Westphal, 'Utilitarianism and Conjunctive Acts: A Reply to Professor Castaneda,' Analysis 32 (1972),82-85; R. E. Bales, 'Utilitarianism, Overall Obligatoriness and Deontic Logic,' Analysis 32 (1972), 203-205; Lars Bergstrom, 'Utilitarianism and Deontic Logic,' Analysis 29 (1968), 43-44. Castaneda responded to Westphal and Bergstrom in his 'On the Problem of Formulating a Coherent Act-Utilitarianism,' Analysis 32 (1972), 118-124. 4 The concept of the "devilish machine" is derived from Lennart Aqvist, 'Improved Formulations of Act Utilitarianism,' Noas 3 (1969),299-323. 227 228 NOTES 5 For a detailed account of this approach, see Lars Bergstrom, The Alternatives and Consequences of Action (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966). Bergstrom has discussed this approach in several papers, including: 'Alternatives and Utilitarianism,' Theoria 34 (1968), 163-170; 'Utilitarianism and Alternative Actions,' Nous 5 (1971), 237-252; and 'On the Formulation and Application of Utilitarianism,' Nous 10 (1976),121-144. Bergstrom's approach is discussed at length in a critical review by R. E. Bales, in Theoria 40 (1974),35-57. 6 Mainly because it is so simple, I have used Robert Stalnaker's account of subjunctive conditionals. See his 'A Theory of Conditionals,' in Studies in Logical Theory ed. by Nicholas Rescher, American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series: Number 2 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), pp. 98-112. Where it really matters, I guess I prefer David Lewis' view. See his CounterJactuals, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). 7 A case relevantly similar to this one, but more amusing than it, is discussed by Aqvist in 'Improved Formulations of Act Utilitarianism: Nous 3 (1969), 318-321. 8 See, for example, G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp. 77-81. Several useful papers on this topic are mentioned by Dan Brock in 'Recent Work in Utilitarianism: American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), 242-243. Some attacks on qualitative hedonism are evaluated in Norman O. Dahl, 'Is Mill's Hedonism Inconsistent?,' in Studies in Ethics, ed. by Nicholas Rescher, American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series: Number 7 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), pp.37-54. 9 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 117, 21ff. See also Moore's Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), pp. 24-25 and his Philosphical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), pp. 253-275. NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 I See my 'World Utilitarianism,' in Analysis and Metaphysics, ed. by Keith Lehrer (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), pp. 255-271. See especially the discussion of "life history worlds" on p. 265. 2 This issue is discussed in David Lewis, 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,' Nous XIII (1979), 455-476. Lewis there cites four philosophers who apparently have endorsed something like the "past-wise indiscernibility thesis". Lewis rejects it. See also Terence Horgan, '''Could'', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsi­ bility,' The Southern Journal of Philosophy XVII (1979), 345-358; and 'Counter­ factuals and Newcomb's Problem,' The Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII (1981), 331-356. 3 Moore defends this view in Principia Ethica and in Ethics. See esp. Ethics, pp. 42-49. More recently, a version of it has been defended by Roderick Chisholm in 'Intrinsic Value,' in Values and Morals, ed. by A. Goldman and J. Kim (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 121-130. Chisholm's proposal is criticized in E. Bodanszky and E. Conee, 'Isolating Intrinsic Value,' Analysis 41 (1981), 51-53; and defended in Chisholm's 'Defining Intrinsic Value,' Analysis 41 (1981), 99-100. 4 Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Objectives and Intrinsic Value,' in Jenseits von Sein und NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 229 Nichtsein, ed. by Rudolf Haller (Graz: Akademi· ...:hes Druck; und Verlagsanstalt, 1972), p.262. 5 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association XLII (1968- 1969), p. 34. Moore seems to have held a similar view. See his 'The Conception of In­ trinsic Value,' Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), pp. 260-261. 6 For an interesting proposal concerning this further problem, see Warren Quinn, 'Theories of Intrinsic Value,' American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974), 123-132; and Edward Oldfield, 'An Approach to a Theory of Intrinsic Value,' Philosophical Studies 3 (1977), 233-249. Quinn's proposal is criticized in Peter Markie, 'Quinn, the Logic ofIntrinsic Value, and Defeat,' International Logic Review 19-20 (1979). 7 This concept of obligation is a time- and agent-relativized version of concept developed by David Lewis. See his Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). I am deeply indebted to Lewis here and elsewhere in this book. I am confident that he would not endorse the modifications I have made to his views. 8 Perhaps I should also mention that I reject the assumption that for each possible act, there always is exactly one possible world that would exist, if that act were performed. 9 See below, Chapter 9, Section 1. 10 "It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the commands of the categorical command of morality; ..." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans!. by Lewis White Beck (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1956), p. 38. NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 I This topic is discussed in Dan Brock's 'Recent Work in Utilitarianism,' American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), 250-251. He there cites several relevant papers. In my view, one of the most interesting discussions can be found in R. E. Bales, 'Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Proce­ dure?,' American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), 257-265. See also J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961). 2 Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, abridged edition (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 109. 3 For an example of this sort of position, see Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Tht; Clarendon Press, 1982). 4 An excellent, though somewhat dated, bibliography of this topic can be found in Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966),pp.137-139. 5 The article appeared in The Philosophical Review 85 (1976),449-487. 6 In 'Utilitarianism and Pa~t and Future Mistakes,' Nous 10 (1976), 195-219. 7 The objection made by Goldman and Sobel provoked several comments, and eventually led to at least one reconsideration. Among these are: Lars Bergstrom, 'Utilitarianism and Future Mistakes,' Theoria 43 (1977), 84-102; Michael McKinsey, 'Levels of Obligation,' Philosophical Studies 35 (1979), 385-395; Holly Smith Goldman, 'Doing the Best One Can,' Values and Morals, ed. by A. I. Goldman and 230 NOTES J. Kim (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 185-214; P. S. Greenspan, 'Oughts and Determinism: A Response to Goldman; The Philosophical Review 87 (1978), 77-83. g The official account of conditional obligation is presented and explained in Chapter 4, Section 5. 9 I am grateful to Ed Gettier for explaining the plausibility of this line of argument. 10 Edited by Bernard Williams and J. J. C. Smart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150. In subsequent notes, I refer to this work as 'Williams'. II Useful discussion of Williams' essay can be found in: Nancy Davis, 'Utilitarianism and Responsibility; Ratio 22 (1980), 15-35; John Harris, 'Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,' Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974), 265-273; Harry Silverstein, 'Utilitarianism and Group Coordination,' Noils XIII, 3, (September, 1979). 335-360. Williams extended the discussion in 'Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indul­ gence,' Modern British Philosophy 4th Series, ed. by H. D. Lewis (London: Allen and
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