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TITLE: THE OF MALEBRANCHE PLACE: [HOUSTON, TEX.] DATE: 1921 * Master Negative #

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194LI29 i DS Swabey, William Curtis t 1894- The philosophy of Malebranche, by V/illiam Curti 8 Swabey ... ^Houston, Tex,, Gulfport printing co. 1921. 94 24 cm. I p.

Thesis (Ph.D), Cornell, 1921.

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MfiNUFfiCTURED TO fillM STfiNDfiRDS BY fiPPLIED IMfiGE. INC. "5" ' THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE

BY

WILLIAM CURTIS SWABEY, A. M.

K A THESIS Presented to the Faculty op the Graduate School t* OP Cornell University for the Degree op Doctor op Philosophy 'J

1921 m^

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LIBRARY THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE

:

BY

WILLIAM CURTIS SWABEY, A. M.

A THESIS Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School OF Cornell University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

1921 t

PREFACE.

In the following pages, I have attempted merely to give an accurate historical account of the main philosophical opinions of Father Malebranche; the perhaps more important task of making a critical ap- praisal of the of these opinions has been largely

left to some future date. It is, at any rate, clear that PRESS OP OULFPORT PRINTINO CO. the system of Malebranche, as a chapter in the history K HOUSTON. TEXAS of the Platonic tradition, deserves more consideration

than it has hitherto received. I must take this occa- sion to express my gratitude to my teachers at Cornell University, and especially to Professor J. E. Creigh- ton, without whose kindly encouragement this disser- tation would never have been completed.

The Author. 3S TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAOB Chapter I. Introduction 5

Chapter II. Malebranche *s Psychology 12 The Faculties of the 13 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE. The 16 The Imagination 19 Chapter I : Introduction. Our Lack of an of the 25 Bouillier, in his splendid Histoire de la philosophie cartesi- enne, declares that Malebranche Chapter III. Malebranche 's Psychology (Cont.) 29 is the greatest metaphysician of after Descartes.^ Few would contest The Natural Inclinations 29 this statement.* Now Malebranche was a member of the Congregation of the The Passions 30 ^ . This latter may be described as an associa- tion of priests, Chapter IV. Malebranche 's Theory op 34 devoted to prayer, study and teaching.^ Its mem- bers were not monks, and it had neither The Argument for Vision in 34 secret constitution nor \/ solemn vows, other than those of the priesthood itself.^ They Malebranche and St. Augustine 43 were simply priests united by a common love of piety and sci- Malebranche and Locke 43 ence, living in common according to the ideals of the primitive Malebranche and Berkeley 45 church. Upon entering the Oratory, a priest did not renounce Malebranche and Arnauld 46 his , but was always as free to leave as he had been to enter; and each of the members preserved a certain independ- I' Chapter V. Malebranche 's Methodology 49 ence, permitted to devote himself to the study for which Aids to 49 he felt most inclination.* The Oratory was distinguished by a Rules of Method 51 happy combination of philosophy, science, scholarship and the- ology.* Its liberal is seen in the rule which dispensed a 1/ Chapter VI. Malebranche 's IMetaphysics and . .57 member who showed some special aptitude for study from all Mind and Body 57 other duties.* Intelligible Extension and the of God 59 The famous ecclesiastic, Bossuet, declared, in his Oraison 64 Funehre du P. Boiirgoing, speaking of Cardinal de BeruUe, that his * ' great love for the Church inspired him to form Image and Cleaning 66 a company to which he desired to give no other spirit than that of the Existence of Bodies 67 Church, nor other rules than the canons, nor other superiors than Chapter VII. IVIalebranche 's and Theology the bishops, nor other bonds than charity, nor other solemn oaths than those of baptism and priesthood, a company where (Continued) 7] a holy liberty creates a holy obligation, where there is obedience The Divine Omnipotence 71 without dependence and without command, where The Attributes of God 73 all authority is in gentleness and where respect is not aided by The Theory of Providence 76 fear; a company in which a charity that banishes fear works a The Explanation of Evil 77 great and in which with no yoke charity is able, not only

to captivate, but also to annihilate ; Divine and Divine Reason 78 self-will a company in which to form true priests they are lead to the source of truth, where Chapter VIII. Malebranche 's System op 81 » Bouillier. op. cit., Ed. Love of the Eternal Order of 1854, Vol. II, p. 32. Henceforth referred to as BouU- 81 lier simply. Unless otherwise stated, the references are all to Vol. II. Force of Mind 87 J. Simon, in his able Introduction to his edition to the Oeuvres de Malebranche (XLIII), says: "Ce fou de MtUebranehe eat une de nos grandet gloires Liberty of Mind nationaies ; 999 89 visions mHaphysiques sont une icole de 9age99e et de profonde philo9ophie, et plai99 i Dieu pour I'honneur de la Obedience to Order philosophie et le progris de I' esprit humain, qu'U notts 91 puisse naitre den rHeurs comme lui!"

Bouillier, p. 4.

* Bouillier, p. 5. ;

INTBODUCTION 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBBANCHE

tiana, published under the name of Ambrosius Victor, he de- they have always at hand the holy books to seek in them without velops his views at length, claiming the authority of Augustine rest the letter by the mind, the spirit by prayer, depth by re- this work is the most noteworthy predecessor of the Recherche treat, etc/'* de la verite.^^ In this Philosophia Christiana, Andre Martin ex- As Bouillier remarks, Bossuet's praise marks the difference pounds the doctrine of St. Augustine concerning God, man, ani- between the Jesuits and the Oratory.'' And just as these two mals, and concerning many other topics, but it is not difficult were opposed in spirit, so they were opposed in philoso- to see that it is always Descartes who is speaking through Augus- phy. Cardinal de Berulle gave the Oratory its initial tendency.^ tine.^° Thus in his Sanctus Augustinus de anima hestiarum he His admiration was, in the first place, for y St. Augustine, a fact claims to find many arguments in Augustine that support the which made the Oratory always open to suspicion of .® Cartesian theory of animal automatism. ^° But Andre Martin is And, through St. Augustine, the Oratory came to esteem above all the precursor of ^lalebranche in the way in which he V more than even before the of Descartes.** Thus emphasizes Augustine's version of in regard to the certain of the early Fathers of the Congregation sought to in- eternal and the divine . ^° He held that there were, troduce the Platonic doctrine. Father Fournenc was the author in the divine mind, ideas of all creatures, just as in the mind of of a complete course of philosophy which appeared in 1665 in an artist there is an idea of his work; and that God does not which he declared his of uniting the spirit of Plato draw his knowledge of his creatures from his creatures them- with the true philosophy of Aristotle.® But when the Cartesian selves but from his own ideas of them." We say that we behold philosophy came into vogue the original y Platonic tendency of creatures, but in truth we behold their ideas in God, although the Oratory was at first forgotten.^ their ideas have neither extension nor figure." And, lastly, However much influence de Berulle may have exerted to the among the Oratorians before the time of Malebranche who were advantage of Plato, his friendship and admiration for Descartes followers of Descartes, we have the learned Father Poisson, who were even more influential in determining the philosophical ten. was a commentator on the Discourse on Method and the dency of the Oratory. As Baillet tells us in his Vie de Descartes of Descartes.^* Thus the Oratory was always characterized by the discourse of Descartes on a certain occasion so impressed the an idealistic tendency and preferred Plato to Aristotle, St. Au- NX Cardinal that the latter sought private conference with him, and gustine to St. Thomas.*^ Descartes was only received by the Ora- gave him great encouragement in his project of philosophical tory with an intermixture of elements borrowed from Plato and reform.^ However, it was not de Berulle who actually intro- Augustine, for, even before Malebranche, the Oratory inclined duced the study of Descartes into the Oratory so as w^ much Fa- to the doctrine of a divine reason enlightening men, i. e., to the y thers Gibieuf and La Barde, who were zealous partisans of Des- of vision in God, and to the tendency to justify by cartes.^ And the friendship of the Oratory was undoubtedly reason." one of the causes of the success of Descartes' philosophy. The contrast between the Oratory and the of Jesus Now Malebranche was not without predecessors in the Ora- is very striking, and may be compared to the medieval conflict tory in uniting the / spirit of Descartes with that of Augustine between Franciscans and Dominicans.^^ The Oratory represents and Plato nevertheless >/ ; his philosophy was the most brilliant and the spirit of or ; the Jesuits that of empiri- successful performance of this feat. Father Andre Martin, who cism. The first society favored Plato and Descartes ; the second, is known under the pseudonym of Ambrosius Victor, seems to Aristotle and Gassendi." Indeed, as Bouillier says, the historic have been his immediate precursor and master.® Andre Martin mission of the Congregation of the Oratory seems to have been was a professor of philosophy at the college d'Angers and was to have defended throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- one of the first to introduce the doctrine of Descartes into - turies the of ." sophical teaching.® This latter proceeding aroused the authori- Now, Nicolas Malebranche was born in in 1638, of a ties of the college to the extent that / he was ordered to confine Nicolas Malebranche, a secretary to the king, and of Catherine his teaching to the doctrine of Aristotle.® Later in his life he de Lauzon, whose brother was vice-regent of Canada.^* He was was suspected of Jansenism and for that )>n' reason suspended from the last of ten children, according to Adry, and of thirteen, ac- the chair of philosophy at Saumur.^® In his Philosophia Chris- " Bouillier, p. 11. • Bouillier, p. «. " Bouillier. p. 12. • Bouillier, p. 7. " Bouillier, p. 13. • Bouillier, p. 8. " Bouillier, p. 14. • Bouillier, p. 10. ^* In regard to Malebranche' s life. I am following the later account given in Joly, • Bouillier, p. 10. Malebranche , Paris, 1001, henceforth referred to as Joly. See Joly. p. 1. *• Bouillier, p. 11. ;

8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE INTRODUCTION

cording to Andre. His constitution and physical frame were yy very defective; he suffered from curvature of the spine and a his Meditations metaphysiques et chretiennes, which, although relatively very narrow chest.^^ From an early age, according to Andre, important, is yet not of any crucial significance. In 1688, we have the \/ he felt a desire to withdraw from the world.*' At sixteen years Entretiens mr la metaphysique et sur la re- he followed the course of the college de la Marche}^ There he ligion.^^ This work, which we take as the basis of our account \y^ of Malebranche's y Studied under a certain M. Rouillard, a peripatetic, who, how- metaphysics, as Bouillier says, ''contient toute la doctrine ever, succeeded only in disgusting him with the scholastic sys- de Malebranche dans son plus haute et son dernier tem.*® He hoped for more satisfaction in the theology of the deyeloppement/'^^ In 1697, we have the Traite de Vamour de Dieu, in v^ Sorbonne, which he studied for three years. But he found this 1708, the Entretiens d'un philosophe chinois sur Vexist- ence et la study equally unsatisfactory.*^ Feeling a profound need of re- de Dieu, and in 1715, the very year of his tirement, and having lost his mother and his father, the one death, we have Reflexions sur la premotion physique,^'' took, in steps to enter the Con- These s/ shortly after the other, he 1660, various writings brought him in the course of his life Oratory.*^ At first he applied himself to works into many controversies, gregation of the all of which were distasteful to him, \y of erudition and historical criticism, but without success.*® Up for his genius was more dogmatic and constructive than polemi- vivid interest in St. cal in , to the age of twenty-six, in spite of a rather character.28 His love of repose was his dominant passion, his philosoph- but he y/ Augustine,"^ he could not be said to have found was forced to spend the greater part of his life in contro- ical vocation." One day he happened upon Descartes' post- versies of various sorts. Of these struggles, the longest and in which Descartes en- keenest humous and incomplete Treatise on Man was with the great Jansenist and Port Royal leader, deavors to give a mechanistic account of the human constitution .^^ In this controversy, as Victor Cousin point- % connection of ideas ed out, he was so fascinated with the clarity and Malebranche has the timidity and obstinacy of the re- that, as he said, he was frequently obliged to interrupt his cluse.^^ He repeats his arguments without variation rather than reading by reason of the violent palpitations of his heart." analyzes the of his ^^ y opponent. His greatness lay in Malebranche thus became a and a Cartesian at constructive thinking rather than in dialectic. V v/ the same time; he now abandoned Greek, Hebrew, and history, Malebranche 's literary style was one great cause of his suc- and for ten years buried himself in the philosophy of Descartes, cess, Fontenelle, Bayle, Andre, Daguesseau, Arnauld, Bossuet, Diderot which he was interested in reconciling with that of Augustine.^* and are mentioned by Bouillier as having spe- v/ cifically He then produced the first volume of his Recherche de la verite praised the style of Malebranche. ^^ The same author remarks y (1675), covering , Imagination, and Understanding." In that Malebranche joins to the ''perfume of spiritual- the course of the next year (1676), he published the second vol- ity," or ''mystical grace," the vivid and sharp style of Pascal and ume, covering the Natural Inclinations, the Passions, and INIeth- La Bruyere.^^ In fact, the beauty of his style does consist his od." The Recherche de la verite was highly successful and the m way of combining the abstract and the concrete, in his y happy faculty Oratory voted its author thanks and congratulations.^* of giving a kind of substantial existence to the ^ In 1677 he published his Conversationes mftaphysiques et objects of the most abstruse . ^ chretiennes.^^ In 1680 appeared his Traite de la nature et de Malebranche was, like Descartes, at the same time, meta- physician, la grace, which is his most important work from a specifically mathematician and physicist.^^ jj^ throughout, like I Plato ^ theological standpoint.^** This work was the occasion of his great himself, rests his thought upon mathematical examples.

He was a friend of the I\Iarquise 1 , quarrel with Arnauld.^' In 1684, he published his Traite de de 'Hopital, the famous math- ematician, ^ morale, which we shall review in this study. In 1684, we have and explained the latter 's analysis of the infinitely small to the young Mairan, who later carried on with him a very " Cf. Andre, La tne de Malebranche avec I'kistoire de set ouvragea, Bibliotheque important philosophical correspondence. ^^ jjg j^^^ Oratorienne, 1886. Joly, p. 2. ^ controver- sy with Leibniz " Joly. p. 2. on the laws of and with very honorable " \y Cf. Andre, op. cit., p. 6. good faith modified his views in the last edition of the Recherche " Joly, p. 4. " Bouillier. p. 15. • Bouillier, p. 17. Joly, p. 37f. » Joly, p. 14. Bouillier, p. 17. It is greatly to be desired that the proposal, which » Bouillier, 15. ^ D. Roustan p. 80 ably defends {Pour une Edition de Malebranche, Revue de metaphyexqite et de mo- " Bouillier, p. 15, and Joly, p. 14. rale. Vol. XXIII, p. 163) be realised! «» Bouillier, p. 16. A liatin translation of the Sixth Book of the Recherche WM • Bouillier, p. 17. along with certain other of Malebranche's works ; see Joly, p. 40. put on the Index » Joly, p. 77f. »• Bouillier, p. 16, and Joly, p. 23f. ** Bouillier, p. 18. * Joly, p. 27f. It wa« condemned at Rome in 1690; Bouillier, p. 17. " Bouillier, p. 19. " Bouillier, p. 21. . 1T

I

INTRODUCTION 11 PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 10 THE of the world, he soon became famous through his writings, not V modified Descartes the- only in France, but in foreign countries de la veriU.^^ In the field of he as well.*^ Fontanelle y was made an honorary mem- tells us that very few foreign savants came to Paris ory of the vortices." In 1699, he without vis- Academy had a long iting him.*2 Lord Quadrington, ber of the Academy of Science, and in the who died vice-regent of Jamaica, Descartes will re- spent two or three controversy with Regis, whom the student of hours every morning with Malebranche for moon on the two years studying his v/ member, on the of the apparent size of the philosophy.*^ The Prince of Conde was statement signed an enthusiastic admirer.*^ horizon, which terminated to his advantage in a Although of frail constitution, a Academy." But severe manner of living by the 'most prominent mathematicians of the gave him fairly good health throughout

such as chem- his life ; he was seventy-seven he did not esteem as highly the empirical sciences, years old, when in 1715, after an and mathematical illness of four months, he was istry or astronomy, as he did overtaken by death.** V Recherche de la ver- physics.^^ As he says in the Preface to the Let us now turn to his doctrine. chemists, and He- "Men are not born to become astronomers or or a furnace and then to pass their lives attached to a telescope observations. draw useless conclusions from their laborious historical science, for erudition, He had still less admiration for the other hand, v/ for the study and criticism of language." On he had a very vivid interest in insects." time of Des- For Malebranche, all philosophy before the Malebranche had only cartes was barbarism, while for Descartes Ke- s/ profound admiration and veneration." He says in the feel * * works of this learned man cherche""' : Those who read the in a country fortu- a secret joy in being born in a century and past centuries, nate enough to spare us the trouble of seeking m among barbarians \ among pagans, at the extremities of the earth, ' in the truth. But, as and foreigners, a teacher to instruct us ' of Plato, says, Malebranche makes only slight mention Bouillier * the ' prince v while he often cites Aristotle, whom he regarded as opinion of the great of false .''" He had no higher Augustine, philosophers of the School, with the exception of V scholastic." who, indeed, is hardly to be considered a Malebranche passed the greater part of his life in Pans in absorbed in meditation, as a cell of the Saint-Honore Oratory, refers to him- we may say, upon divine things." He pleasantly as a meditatif, as a self in the Entretiens s\ir la metaphysique from the life taciturne meditatif.*'' In spite of his withdrawal

" Boaillier, p. 22.

Malebranche't scientific work, consult fur- » BouUlier. p. 23. Cf. Joly. 46f. On

inidU» la biblioth^que nationale. ^^^''C. Henry, Malebranche d'aprfi, rfen manuscrits of Vol. H- 1\^"^ Revue PhUogophique , p. 410 . _ PhQonophiquei>fc.i«.««i„-/,.i* 1884.irra p.n 293.293 Lechelas, L'oeuvre seientifique de Malebranche, Revue mitaphymque et de morale. Vol. P. Duhem, L'Optique de Malebranche, Revue de

de Malebranche, Revue de mitaphy- "But cf M Blondel. L'Antxcart^»ianisme very skillful comparison of D«»cartes and Mique et de morale. Vol. XXIII. p. 1. A essential difference^ between t^e «5»«°;»;<^ Malebranche is made in this article. The of Malebranche is brought out. the differ- spirit of Descartes and the religious spirit part, mithode OMcetxque et tpec ence between "mithode Bcxentifique et rationale dune vlaHve d'autre part." Cf. 18fl. Bouillier, p. 25. II, 478. *» " Op. cit., Ed. of . Vol. P- BoniUier, p. 27. " 25, Bouillier, p. *• BouiUier, p. 28. » Bouillier. p. 26. «> Entretiena, Ed. of Jules Simon, p. 95. '

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 12 MALEBRANCHE 'S PSYCHOLOGY 13

The Faculties of the Mind.

Let us consider, first of all, Book I, Des sens. Malebranche begins with a general Malebranche's Psychoixwy. characterization of understanding and Chapter II: will. The human spint is a simple and unextended being and IS in no way composed of parts. Nevertheless it is customary to Cassirer has called attention to the psychological aspect of distinguish two faculties, understanding and will * But story," says this these Malebranche 's teaching. ''The well known ideas are very abstract and do not fall under the imagination • the theory of knowledge, ''which tells us It IS, therefore, learned historian of better to express them by a comparison with of Descartes' TraiU de Vhomme that , although, to be sure, that it was the reading this comparison with matter is not is very signifi- entierement juste."' aroused Malebranche to his philosophical calling Matter possesses two faculties or prop- from the erties; the first is that of receiving cant in this respect. It is in fact from physiology, and different figures; the second with the IS that of being moved. In the same physiological psychology which is necessarily connected way the human spirit has two faculties Understanding, problem that he : which is the capacity of y former, that he takes his start. It is with this receiv- ing ideas the second, ; which is the will, is the historical originality. ... The analysis capacity of re- achieves his peculiar ceiving different inclinations or of willing different ' results which precede and things Now of the problem of led to matter can receive two sorts of figures. One sort are entirely doctrine of Berkeley. Not the Englishmen, make possible the exterior, like the roundness of a bit of wax ; the other sort in the history of are but Malebranche, is the first true psychologist interior, like the figures of the minute parts of which the wax is composed. ."* The first are figures in the strict sense ; the second can understand the may be called configurations.^ Now there It is from this point of view that we are two sorts of per- ceptions of the is an elab- soul which correspond to these structure of the Recherche de la veriU} This work two sorts of modi- hcations of bodies on the mind is liable. ; one hand we have pure orate exposure of the errors to which the human which may be considered as superficial the imagination. Book III, to the soul, on the other Book I discusses the senses, Book II, hand we have the more sensible perceptions, of IV, the inclinations, Book V, the which pleasure v/l the pure understanding. Book and , and problem , taste and odor are examples. Now passions, while, finally, Book VI deals with the general says Malebranche, we shall see that these sensible philosophical method. All of these topics are perceptions of scientific and are nothing but modifications of the psychological expla- soul ; thus as long as we do discussed with regard to the problem of the not transcend sensible perceptions, we do not transcend INIalobranche thus combines the metaphysical the nation of error. states of our own consciousness.® and cor- theory of mind—the problem of the relation of mental The faculty of receiving ideas with the empirically psychological considera- and modifications, like the poreal substances— capacity of doctrine, that we matter of receiving both figures and tion of mind. We shall later see how his great configurations IS entirely passive. In both cases neces.sary deduction from this dualistic we deal with a wholly receptive see all things in God, is a faculty. our This theory of the essential passivity of metaphysics. But for the present let us be content to trace understanding plays an important role in Malebranche the Recherche de la verite. We shall find that it 's . As way through Kouilher has remarked, point Malebranche 's very use of possesses a peculiarly rich content from the psychological a phvsical analogy m his explanation "What a knowledge of the hu- of the nature of mind shows a \end- of view. As Bouillier exclaims: ^ncy por- to deny the mind all activity and causal heart, what profound and delicate observation, what efficacy.^ It would man however, be well striking truth, not to push this criticism too far. traits and characters of admirable ftvesse and The same analogy piquant strokes in this description of all our mental ills!"* between the faculties of the mind and what the shall first examine it. properties of matter holds in the It is in this psychological regard that we case of will that holds in the epistemo- the case of understanding.^ Later on we shall give more especial attention to Just as God is the cause of all the cannot re- movements of bodies so he is logical and metaphysical issues which Malebranche the cause of all the natural in- frain from discussing even in the Recherche. Recherche, I, p. 2. Recherche, I, p. 3. 1 Erkenntnigproblem, Ed. 2, Vol. I, p. 554. Recherche, I, p. 4. edition. » For the Recherche de la viriU I am using the Julea Simon Recherche. I, p. 5. Bouillier. p. 36. » Bouillier, p. 89. Recherche. I, p. 7. MALEBEANCHE MALEBRANCHE S PSYCHOLOGY •4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF 15

place in a anything, but apprehend the ideas that all movements take of things as to which I can clinations. In the same way causes which form a judgment. But no error is properly are no foreign and special speaking found in stSht 1 ne if there curves by their opposi- it, provided the word error is taken in its proper signification. determ ne them and change them into we have from ... I likewise cannot complain that God has given way, all the inclinations that me a free Sn Tthe same or would have no other end a will which is suflScient, ample, and perfect, since God'are ''straight" (droites) and they as were there not a matter of fact, I am conscious of a will so extended possesion of the good and of the truth as to be than the subject to no limitations. the impression of nature towards . . . From all this I recognize that a foreign cause that determines o" iberty the power of will which I have received from » special foreign factor is our freedom God is not of itself bad ends This the source of "Hence by this word my errors—for it is very ample and very perfect MalebSlche defines his terms as follows : movement of its kind—any more than is the power of designate the impression'" or natural understanding, for Wai I here since I indeterminate and Qeneralgood; understand nothing but by the power which God has whi^h carries us toward the else than the given me for understanding, there is no doubt that word Liberty I understand nothing all I under- and by the stand, I ^mpress^on toward^ understand as I ought, and it is not possible power which the mind has of turning this that I err about that our not- in this. Whence then come my errors? They come please us, and thus bringing it from the objects which sole fact that since some particular , while the will is much wider in its range and com- ural inclinations are directed upon good in pass than the understanding, I were previously directed toward the do not restrain it within the these inclinations same bounds, but say, toward God, who is extend it also to things which I do not under- general or the good, that is to includes within stand, and as the will is of itself indifferent good, since it is he alone who to these it easily the sole general falls into is the power error and sin and chooses the evil for the hiLelf aU goods '•" Later he tells us that liberty good or the as they are false for the true."" This element of goods and to love them m proportion which thus to compare occurs m the heart of Descartes' all-inclusive good, God.' Thus rationalistic philosophy is also lovable and to relate them to the abso- found m Malebranche. "The system which inclines toward an extreme understanding merely perceives in the midst of a and it of God, we tmd is will alone that judges and reasons, in voluntarily or over-emphasis of the omnipotence rest- lutism ing m that which the ' is yet in understanding presents to it. '" Maleb^anche maintaining that the individual It is by may say painstaking critical analysis that any proposition " to the active side of mind, then, we comes to be free In regard evident to which have us. When we have made it evident regards it as a play of inclinations to ourselves, we that Malebranche torget the effort or final cause-in term of volitional activity that was necessary divine being as both efficient and to the make it evident. But when there metaphysics-and yet as affording room for a certain is something obscure in the Aristotle's material under consideration, or when on the part of the mind itself. we have not made the spontaneity or liberty principles involved clear and logically transparent to that Descartes regarded judgment as ourselves It will be remembered then we are free to withhold Judgment is our assent. It is this freedom to will rather than of understanding. a function of doubt all that does not fully satisfy the responsibility for the intellect, all that is expression of free choice, otherwise not logically an manifest, that is the basis of the possibility back upon the divine creator Where- of true human error would fall Knowledge. It is because we can doubt more closely and con- of that which is obscure says Descartes, "regarding myself and ambiguous upon," that we can elevate ourselves into the (for they alone testify to there be- realm of sidering what are my errors pure deductive truth. on a Thus this voluntaristic theory of judg- in me) I answer that they depend ment ing any imperfection means for both Descartes and Malebranche, on the faculty of knowledge in the firet combination of two causes, to-wit, place, the ability that the mind or of - possesses of obtaining absolute in me, and on the power of choice logically that rests coercive, truth. It is the opposite of any understanding and at the same time on the voluntaristic that is to say, on the theory of judgment that would reduce neither assert nor deny all truth to the arbitrary For by the understanding alone I choice of the will. individual. We may note that Spinoza, with haps per- impttu, rather than «n«.(ion. greater clarity of vision, » M»lebranche u.e. this word a. denies Descartes' notion that 77. 78. judgment is an act of will, n Recherche. I, p. »t. C(. Bouillier. pp. 7«, and declares in the Ethics that "there " I. 10. "'""1'*'° •'' affirmation Recherche, p. . "•" and negation save that always endearors to maintain the wVi'^i, It "^-A 1' pointed out, Malebranche Which the idea, in so As Bouillier has >» far as it is an idea, involves."" the TraUi de la nature et de la <"«« •»« That is, freedom of the indiTidual especially in Arnauld, the J.n.en»t ^Morale. B.iiUier. p. 79. Indeed, '""r^ "'^^ ''"'""'•"""^ ^ZiU '^' ^ork. of Dccarte.. Trans, by Haldane and Eo«. , Bouillier, p. 79 Vol. I, p'^i't"!"" branche of Nt'"^'-."-,"^'o» Cf BouiUior.Bouilltor 8080. that Malebranche admits freedom. Of. ^p^ •• Recherche. mean, of a gra.e contradiction I, p. 12, Of. BoaiUier, p. 88f. Vol, I. Mil. p»

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 16 MALEBRANCHE 'S PSYCHOLOGY 17

itself arbitrary the truth affirms in the mind without any act of we are able to distinguish the soul from the body by positive will. The note to this Proposition is a thorough criticism of the attributes and by the properties that belong to these two sub- Cartesian and Malebranchian view. This liberty of the mind, stances. Body is only extension in length, breadth, and depth i. e., this ability to doubt all that is not logically coercive, is and all its properties are exhausted in rest and motion, and in renders potent the of central sig- what two maxims which are an infinity of different figures; for it is clear (1) that the idea nificance in 's system: should never Malebranche (1) One give of extension represents a substance, since one can think of ex- assent to propositions so complete save which appear evidently tension without thinking of anything else; and (2) that this idea true that cannot one deny them without feeling an inner pain can only represent of distance, either successive or per- secret of and the reproaches reason;^® and (2) One should never manent, that is, either or figures. The soul, on the con- absolutely love a good if one can refrain from loving it without trary, is the " I that thinks, " that feels, that wills ; it is the sub- remorse.** It is on these rigorous maxims that Malebranche 's stance in which are found all the modifications of which I have system is founded. sought a system of truth He which would an inner feeling {sentiment interieur) and which can only exist stand upon unyielding logical ground, and an object for his in the soul that feels them.^^ Having laid down this fundamen- that itself all love would maintain against foreign attractions. tal metaphysical distinction, Malebranche proceeds as follows: How closely he was here allying himself with Descartes is evi- The sense-organs are composed of minute fibers which originate these dent when we compare maxims with those of Descartes' in the brain, and extend hence into all our members and finally In the methodology. Discourse on Method Descartes lays down end in the exterior parts of the body. If these nerve fibers are four rules of method of which the first is : accept nothing "To externally stimulated, we have normal perception; if they are

I not clearly ; is as true which do recognize to be so that to say, internally stimulated, from the brain itself, we have the phe- carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments nomena of dreams." The final paragraph of this crucial chap- accept in nothing and to them more than what was presented ter clarifies the whole doctrine by distinguishing four phases in clearly I to my mind so and distinctly that could have no occa- the process of perception. In the first place, we have the action to it.''** In this principle basic sion doubt we have the idea of the object, in the case of heat, for example, the movement of from which all exact science springs, the criterion of logical co- the small particles of wood against the hand. Secondly, we erciveness. We shall see how Malebranche 's maxims unfold have the passion, or being acted upon of the organ of sense, for themselves in his philosophy as a whole. example, the agitation of the fibers of the hand, which agitation is communicated to the brain. Thirdly, we have the passion, or sensation, of the soul The Senses. : and, lastly, the judgment of the soul, by which we place the sensation in its objective context.^* But let us continue our account of Malebranche 's psychol- ogy as expounded in the Recherche. After the general and pre- This last phase of the process is precisely where the illusion of sense liminary discussions which we have just reviewed, he enters up- arises. For this judgment is merely a jugement naturel, a on a more detailed consideration of the errors which spring from sensation composee.^^ In other words, it is a natural that holds the senses; here his psychology comes clearly to light. In the that sensible qualities belong to external objects. Nev- ertheless, this first place, we may note that Malebranche holds throughout to natural or instinctive belief is not theoretically the theory that none of the sensible qualities are properties of trustworthy. The senses and our natural belief in the inde- pendent external things themselves, but that they are all modifications of their content are helpful from the standpoint of the welfare of the mind itself.^® The Tenth Chapter of the Recherche^ Book of our bodies. They are pragmatically valuable. The explanation I, establishes this point. It is true, he says, that the judgments of our habit of projecting our sensations into an external that we make concerning extension, figure, and movement of world can ultimately only be on teleological grounds. This explanation bodies, involve some truth, but the same is not true in regard to is given in Chapter XX, Book I, of the Re- cherche, in light, color, tastCj and all other sensible qualities; for here the but more detail in the Entretiens sur la metaphy- sique. Thus, explains truth is never met with.^* Theodore, in the latter, it is evident that God, desiring This theory Malebranche supports by reference to the meta- to unite and bodies, had to establish as an occasional physical difference between mind and matter. He supposes that cause of the confused knowledge we have of the pres-

" Recherche, I, " p. 84. Recherche, I, p. 17. • Reeherehe 1, p. 85. . »» Philosophical Works. Trans, of Haldane and Roes. Vol. I, p. 92. •* *• On this point ef. Bouillier, pp. 36-37, 88f. Recherche, I, p. 90.

" Reeherehe, I, p. 83. * Recherche, I. p. 90. 18 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE MALEBRANCHE'S PSYCHOLOGY 19

ence of objects and of their properties in relation to us, not our thing that we see in nature and that only exist in the imagina- attention, which merits clear and distinct knowledge, but vari- tion of the philosopher.^*^ Thus arises the whole medieval world ous disturbances of these same bodies. He had to give us dis- of substances, , and substantial forms. It rests upon the tinct witnesses, not of the nature and properties of the bodies illusion of the objective and independent existence of sensible that surround us, but of the relation which they bear to our own qualities. In this Malebranche has laid his finger upon the rad- body, that we can work with success for the conservation of life, ical difference between the medieval system of the universe and without being incessantly attentive to our needs. He had to that explained in modern science. On the one hand reliance is give us short proofs of that which has reference to the body, to placed on the immediate appearance of things to the senses; on convince us promptly with vivid proofs that would effectively the other, upon pure mathematics together with critically ana- determine us, with sure proofs that no one woujd think of con- lyzed experienced^ tradicting, in order the more surely to preserve us. But these The senses are the source, not only of theoretical illusions, proofs are essentially confused in character and are certain not but of moral illusions as well. The excessive attention that the with regard to the relations between objects, in which consists mass of mankind give to sensuous good comes from the same truth, but with regard to our bodies in their actual disposition. ^^ source. We believe that ''all those agreeable tastes which de- It is the divine foresight that explains the persistent and uni- light us at feasts, those sounds which flatter the ear, and those versal illusion in which the mass of mankind grope, for it is by other pleasures that we feel are, undoubtedly, contained in the '^* means of this illusion that we find our way through the world sensible objects, or at least these objects cause us to feel them. * of bodies. The truth is, in terms of Malebranche 's system, that sensuous But let us return to our study of the psychology of the Re- objects neither contain the pleasures nor produce them; they cherche. It is this objectification of sensible qualities that is the are contained in the soul as its modifications and are produced greatest error arising from sense." But Malebranche does not by the one truly efficient cause in the universe, the divine will.^^ rest here. Our sense of sight perpetually deceives us as to the The error of the Epicureans consists in just this : That they re- size of objects, and is blind to everything smaller than a certain gard sensible things as the causes of our pleasures and as there- size. It is essentially inexact.^® It is from the senses that there fore worthy of love.^* The error of Stoicism rests on the same arises the false philosophy of .^® assumption. They place pleasures and in the outer ob- Let us assume that sensible qualities exist in bodies them- jects and insist that the soul should seek its own good. They selves. Then it is indubitable that what I sense in honey differs thus reach the false conclusion that pain is not an evil, nor pleas- essentially from what I sense in salt. The whiteness of salt dif- ure a good. The true ethical point of view comes to light only fers beyond doubt more than merely in degree from the color of when we regard pleasures and pains as states of the soul itself, honey, and the sweetness of honey differs in the same way from and as flowing from the one supreme good, the divine being. th piquant taste of salt. Consequently, according to this argu- These remarks may suffice to give us a notion of Male- ment, it is necessary that there be an essential difference be- branche 's psychology of the senses and of his theory of the illu- sion-generating character of the same.^^ Like Plato tween honey and salt ; since everything that I sense in the one he believed that the first does not differ merely as a matter of more or less from what I requisite for profound philosophical and scientific sense in the other, but differs in . Since then honey and views was distrust of the senses and of all the information they salt and other natural bodies differ essentially from each other, offer, and confidence in the ability of pure thought to master the it follows that they deceive themselves who try to make us be- world. lieve that the whole difference that is found between bodies con- The Imagination. sists in differences of configuration of the small bodies that com- Let us now examine his critique of imagination. pose them. It is necessary then that some other substance be This fills the second book of the Recherche.^^ Malebranche found that, being joined to the primary matter which is common begins by distinguishing the faculties of imagination and sense to all bodies, bring it about that they differ essentially from from the point of view of physiological psychology. The agita- each other. This will be the second step and the discovery of tion of the minute fibers of the nerves cannot pass to the brain substantial forms, those fecund substances which produce every- " Recherche, I, p. 127. " Cf. Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem, I, p. 20dff. and many other places. "• Entretieng, p. 85. Jules Simon edition. Recherche, I, p. 130. " Cf. Joly, p. 215ir. Recherche, I, p. 132. •* Recherche, I, p. 183. * Recherche, I, pp. 42-69. » BouUlier. pp. 36-37. • Recherche, I, pp. 125-134. *> On Malebranche's doctrine of imagination cf. Bonillier, p. 90. 20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE MALEBRANCHE 'ft PSYCHOLOGY 21

with a ''trace without the soul perceiving something; if the agitation com- du cerveau,'^ with a cerebral trace, and memory mences by an impression that an object makes on the exterior is to be explained by the mutual connection between these cere- traces. surface of our nerve fibei*s, the soul feels and judges that what bral To understand memory, according to Malebranche, it is sufficient to understand this she feels is outside, that is, that she perceives an object as truth: *'That all our differ- present. But if only the inner fibers are agitated by the move- ent perceptions are attached to changes that take place in the ments of the animal spirits, or in some other manner, the soul principal part of the brain in which the soul more especially

resides. . . . For, in imagines, and judges that what she imagines is not without but the same way that the branches of a tree, which have within the brain, that is, she perceives an object as absent.^^ remained bent in a certain fashion for some time, retain some facility for Imagination is akin to sense-perception. The difference is a dif- being bent again in the same manner, so the fibers of ference in vivacity." Two phases of imagination may be dis- the brain, having once i*eceived impressions from the movements of the tinguished, the active and the passive. The first is under con- animal spirits and the action of objects, retain for a long time a facility for receiving these trol of the will ; the second is more under control of the animal same dispo- sitions. consists spirits and the fibers of the brain.^* ** Imagination, then," says Now memory only in this facility, since one Malebranche, "consists solely in the power that the soul pos- only thinks of the same things when the brain receives the same sesses of forming images of objects, by imprinting them in the impressions.** In very similar terms, Malebranche explains habit." brain ; the stronger and more distinct the vestiges of the animal spirits are the more distinctly and strongly will the soul imag- It does not fall within the purpose of this study to follow '^^ ine its objects. ' It is the difference in the force of the animal Malebranche *s psychology of imagination into its details. We spirits and the definiteness of their imprint on the brain that may note, however, discussions of the ** communication between explains the observable difference in the imaginations of differ- the brain of a mother and that of her (unborn) child, "*^ of

ent men.^® * * Malebranche proceeds to point out the various fac- changes that take place in the imagination of a child in issuing tors that can influence the imagination. is first Wine one of the from the womb of his mother, by conversation with its nurse, its agencies mentioned. Malebranche quotes Horace: mother, and other persons.*'**

Quid non ehrietas designat? operta recludit: Several chapters are devoted to the various types of imag- Spes jiihet esse ratas: in praelia trudit inermem: ination. These chapters reveal the keen analyst of human na- ture. * * Of women he says : It is for them to decide as to the Sollicitis animis onus eximit: addocet artis. fashions, to judge as to language, to discern the correct air and Fecundi calices quern non fee ere disertunif fine manners. They have more knowledge, skill, and finesse Contracta quern non in paupertate solutum?*^ than men concerning such things. Whatever depends on taste is in their field, but ordinarily The air that one breathes has an influence on the imagina- they are incapable of penetrating to truths a little difficult of discovery. Whatever is tion. This is manifest in the different mental characteristics of abstract is incomprehensible to them. cannot avail persons of different countries. The Gascons, for example, have They themselves of their imagination to develop complicated a much more vivid imagination than the Normans. People of and embarrassed ques- tions. ... In short, the manner and not the reality is Rouen and of Dieppe and the Picardians all differ from each enough to exhaust the capacity of their minds, because the least other, and still more from the Low^ Normans, although they are objects produce great movements in the delicate fibers of their brains, sufficiently close to each other. But if we consider men who and consequently necessarily excite in their feelings suffi- live in more widely separated countries, we meet still greater ciently vivacious and great enough to differences, such as those between an Italian, a Fleming a occupy them complete- and »»45 ly Q£ course, Malebranche is obliged to admit that there Dutchman. And lastly there are places renowned in all may be exceptions to this generalization. There are for the w^isdom of their inhabitants, like Therma and Athens: femmes sa- vantes^ courageous women, women capable of everything, and other places are renowned for stupidity, like Thebes and and there can be found, on the other hand, men who are soft and Abdera.*^ The imagination is affected by the nerves that go effeminate, incapable of understanding anything and incapable to the heart and lungs, viscera, etc. Each image is correlated

>" *2 Recherche. I, Rerherrke, I, p. 151. Cf. Bouillier, p. 40f. p. 182flF. Cf. Joly. p. 225ff. * Rerherrhe. I, p. 152. " Recherche, I, p. 189. * Recherche. I. p. 153. ** Recherche, I, p. 212. *« Recherche, I, p. 158. *^ *i Recherche,!, p. 222. Recherche,!, V. 162. Pi

22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE MALEBRANCHE 'S PHYCHOLOGY 23 of dging anything.*® A man's mind is at its prime between the Fifthly, our stupid vanity which makes us desite to ages of thirty and fifty. Then his cerebral fibers are of the right ibilities. for they are called learned consistency; sufficiently firm to assure self-mastery, appear learned, who have read the Sixthly, we imagine, without reason, that the ancients and not so firm as to prevent all new forms of cerebral modifi- most. enlightened than we can be, and that where they cation.*^ But men are not only confirmed in their views when were more they have reached the age of forty or fifty years. They are have failed no one can succeed. Seventhly, because of a false with a stupid curiosity as to distant things, old subject to new errors; they believe themselves capable of judg- reverence mixed that from afar or from countries, ing of everything, as indeed they ought to be. They decide with things, things come unknown presumption and consult only their prejudices, for men do not or from obscure books. Eighthly, because when we admire a are afraid that their reason of things save by relation to the ideas that are the most new opinion and a new author we fame outshine our own, while one has nothing to fear when one familiar to them. A peripatetic thinks first of the four elements will the ancients. In the ninth place, it is falsely and the four qualities, while a philosopher of another school re- pays homage to that because it is wrong to innovations in reli- lates everything to other principles.*® As is explained at length*' believed make it is to changes in science. tenth the animal spirits ordinarily flow in the traces of the most fa- gious faith, wrong make A cause of undue in science and philosophy is the miliar ideas, which brings it about that we do not judge sanely live in time in which the knowledge of ancient of things. fact that we a opinions is in vogue and few can rise above what is customary. Studious persons are especially subject to error. ''^ They are And lastly, because men act only according to their interests, lovers of authority. It is difficult to understand, says Male- and even those who perceive the error and vanity of their ways branche, how it happens that people who have minds prefer to do not cease to apply themselves to these same studies because use the minds of others in the search for truth rather than the of the honors and dignities that are attached to them. This mind that God gave them. There is beyond doubt infinitely more ** terrific" attack on the spirit of scholasticism and of erudition pleasure and honor in guiding oneself by one's own eyes than was characteristic of Malebranche. He loved the pure truths by those of others; and a man who has good eyes would never of reason, the eternal ideas in the mind of God, so well that he think of closing them or of tearing them out in the hope of hav- had little use for the truths of history and scholarship. He de- ing a guide. Sapientis oculiy in capite ejus, stultus in tenebris velops the same theme in chapters on "Two bad effects of read- amhulat. Why does the fool walk in darkness? It is because ing. "^^ **That people ordinarily grow stubborn, concerning he only sees by the eyes of others and to see only in this manner whom their aim is to know what he said without caring as to is properly speaking not to see at all. The use of the mind is what they should believe."'*^ Another chapter is **0n the pre- to the use of the eyes what the mind is to the eyes ; as the mind occupation of commentators.'"^* It is refreshing to a historical is infinitely higher than the eyes, so the use of the mind is ac- student to find at last an equally penetrating paragraph on * * The companied by much more solid satisfactions and by a very dif- invention on new systems," in which it comes to light that nov- ferent contentment than light and afford sight. Men, elty is not always preferable.** however, always avail themselves of their eyes to guide them- 's analysis of the psychology of imagination is selves, and very rarely avail themselves of their minds to dis- Malebranche so penetrating it is difficult to it cover truth.*^ that not examine more com- Malebranche suggests a number of causes of this natural pletely than considerations of time and space permit us in the present study.*® special division of the of the Recherche weakness of the mind. In the first place we have man's nat- A book on is of ural laziness. Secondly, the inability of men in meditation Imagination devoted to the contagious communication strong influ- owing to lack of practice in youth, when the cerebral fibers are imaginations. Strong imaginations are extremely ential imaginations. those have plastic. Thirdly, man's lack of love for abstract truth, which and dominate weaker Thus who strong and vigorous imaginations are very frequently the cause is the foundation of all that we can know ici-has. Fourthly, of our love of pleasant and sensible probabilities, mere casual plaus- the general errors that are spread among mankind.*^ God has united the human race by certain natural bonds, which con- *• Recherche, I, p. 223. *• Recherche, I, p. 241. « Recherche, I, p. 225. •• Recherche, I, p. 245 *• Recherche. I, p. 226. •* Recherche, I, p. 252. *• Recherche, I, p. 230-234. " Recherche, I, p. 262. " Recherche, I. p. 235. •• Cf. Bouillier, p. 94. " Recherche, I, p. 237. •» Recherche, I, p. 278. MALEBRANCHE 'S PSYCHOLOGY 25 24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANOHE

ants and masters, pupils and teachers, courtiers and kings. 66 certain disposition of men to imitate those with whom sist in a But it comes clearly to light in the influence of great authors. converse, to make the same judgments and enter into the they And here Malebranche displays again keen and vivid insight. with them.^^ This disposition to imitate has it- same passions His characterizations of the relatively small number of authors self causes. The first is the desire for a high place in the two with whom he was familiar are admirable. , he says, second cause of the disposition to imi- opinions of others; the was in truth a man of profound erudition, but he had more exerted by stronger imaginations over tate is this influence memory than judgment, more penetration and extent of imag- imaginations.'^® weaker ination than penetration and extent of intellect.®^ The imagina- to a weak Malebranche distinguishes a strong as opposed tion of Seneca was no better ordered than that of Tertullian to strong imagination in terms of cerebral structure. He has a carry him into a country that is unknown to him, where never- has a constitution which and vigorous imagination whose brain theless he moves with the same assurance that he would have if renders it capable of extremely deep vestiges and traces.®^ An he knew where he was and where he was going. Provided he imagination of this sort is capable of so completely occupying makes great strides, and strides in regular cadence, he imagines it think of nothing save the images presented that he is the soul that can greatly advancing ; but he is like those who, in danc- with strong imagina- by this imagination.®^ People endowed ing, always finish where they began.®® Montaigne is not to be tions in this sense are not capable of judging sanely of compli- regarded as a man who reasons but as a man who amuses him- ideas cated things. The capacity of their minds is exhausted by self, as a man who tries to please rather than to instruct. If which are connected with deep cerebral traces, and they are those who read him could merely amuse themselves with him, think of many things at the same time.®^ These he would not not at liberty to be injurious ; but the mind cannot draw pleasure in excess they people are always visionaries. They are always ; from the reading of an author without imitating his feelings. distant elevate unworthy things, magnify small things, make It is not only dangerous to read Montaigne because of the pleas- things seem near.*^ Nothing appears to them as it is. They are ure one is insensibly led to take in his sentiments ; but because always vehement in their passions, obstinate in their opinions, this pleasure is criminal, for it is born of concupiscence and does satisfied with themselves.®^ They have great facility in talking nothing but fortify the passions.®^ The easy skepticism of Mon- in a manner that is strong and vivid although not natural. Their taigne, with its worldly point of view, was thus deeply repug- thoughts, being connected with deep cerebral traces, are accom- nant to the Oratorian. the panied by vivid emotion.®* The look of their countenances, This remarkable portrayal of the secret workings of the their tone of their voices, and the turn of their words animate imagination terminates in the injunction to seek to deliver our- expressions and cause those who hear them to be attentive and selves from the illusions of sense and imagination, and from the is penetrated to receive mechanically their ideas. When a man illusions generated by the imaginations of other men in our impas- with what he has to say, he penetrates others, and an minds. Let us reject with care all the confused ideas that we sioned man always moves those who hear him. Persons of this have by reason of our dependence on our bodies and only admit that sort of imagination ordinarily speak only of easy subjects the clear and evident ideas that the spirit receives from the great are within the reach of every one ; they only treat of and union that it necessarily has with the Word (Logos), or eternal way, without ven- difficult matters in a vague and commonplace wisdom and truth.^® Malebranche 's psychological insight has themselves to turing to enter into detail and without attaching that clarity and profundity that are the natural right of the of reason principles. Such people are ordinarily the enemies meditative man, who lives, perhaps, more or less as a recluse, and of good sense by reason of the pettiness of their minds and and yet perceives in his own self the universal motives of hu- of the visions to which they are subject.®*^ man life." The influence of imagination over imagination is seen in Our Lack of an Idea of the Soul, the case of children and parents, daughters and mothers, serv- 11 The Third Book of the Recherche is on the ** Understanding " Recherche, I, p. 279. or Pure Spirit.'' The major part of this discussion we shall » Recherche, I, p. 280.

** Recherche, I, p. 281. •• Recherche, I, p. 289. •* Recherche, •1 Recherche, I, p. 281. I, p. 301. * Recherche, I, p. 304. • Recherche, I. p. 283. •• Recherche, I, p. 3 19. •» Recherche, I, p. 285. *• Recherche, p. 388. •* Recherche, I, p. 286. ^ Of. Jolp. p. 222.

• Recherche, I, p. 288. ;

I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 26 MALEBRANCHE 'S PSYCHOLOGY 27 consider later under the head of Theory of Knowledge. There do not possess the **idea'* of the soul.^* to under- We We do not behold is but one point that here deserves attention. And the soul in God.^* We only know the soul by conscience, by sen- stand this point we must turn again to Descartes. In the doc- timent interieur, that is, by inner .^* For that reason trine of the cogito ergo sum the consciousness of thought of its Our the knowledge we have of it is imperfect. Had we never felt own activity is made the starting-point of philosophy. Phil- pain, heat, light, etc., we should not know that our soul was clearest idea is an idea of our self. In the PHnciples of capable of these feelings. Were it true, on the contrary, that osophy, for example, Descartes explains *'How we may know ' ' ' we beheld in God the idea of our soul, we should be able to de- * * says, in order to our mind better than our body. ' But, ' he ' duce from it all the properties of which it is capable, just as we understand how the knowledge which we possess of our mmd can deduce from the idea of extension all the modifications it is only precedes that which we have our body but is also more not of assuming.^* the nat- capable If we knew nothing of matter save some evident, it must be observed that it is very manifest by properties twenty or thirty figures we should know practically nothing; ural light which is in our souls, that no qualities or we may say that we are capable of knowing the nature of mat- pertain to nothing; and that where some are perceived there ter because we can evolve an infinity of mathematical forms out must necessarily be some thing or substance on which they de- of the idea of extension. But we have no deductive knowledge pend. And the same light shows us that we know a thing or of the possible modifications of the soul. Nevertheless, adds substance so much the better the more properties we observe Malebranche, our sentiment interieur demonstrates qualities in our the Immor- in it. And we certainly observe many more tality, Spirituality and Liberty of the soul.^* mind than in any other thing, inasmuch as there is nothing This same point is made in the Entretiens. Theodore urges that excites us to knowledge of whatever kind which does not that some truth must be contained in our mental states as men- even more certainly compel us to a consciousness of our thought. there is an earth tal states. **For it is a truth that I now have much joy in lis- I To take an example, if I persuaded myself that f a yet tening to you. It is true that the pleasure that I feel at present ' i because I touch or see it, by that very same fact and by exists is greater than that which I felt in our preceding conversations. stronger reason, I should be persuaded that my thought even though I know, then, the difference between these two pleasures. And I because it may be that I think I touch the earth is not possible do not know it otherwise than by the feeling (sentiment) that I there is possibly no earth existing at all, but it judges thus, have of it, by the modalities with which my soul is affected; that I who form this judgment and my mind which "^* is modalities, then, which are not so dark that they do not should be non-existent; and so in other cases. The soul teach me a constant truth.'* Ariste replies: **You should say, Theo- thus its own clearest object. dore, that you feel this difference in your modalities and in your Malebranche holds that although we have a superior Now pleasures. But do not say, if you please, that you know it. God of the existence of the soul as compared to our consciousness knows it and does not feel it. But as for you, you feel it with- of the existence of matter, we have on the other consciousness out knowing it. If you had a clear idea of your soul, if you saw superior consciousness of the essence of matter as com- hand a the archetype of it, then you would know that which you now of the essence of the soul. We are pared to our consciousness only feel."^® And Ariste goes on to point out the unmeasurable is but we are that the soul is than that the body ; more certain character of mental facts, urging that if we were really to know to what the body is than as to what the soul is. more certain as them it would be necessary to know them mathematically. Malebranche does not believe, as he tells us, that after having that the •• given the matter serious thought it is possible to doubt Recherche, I, p. 413. in the same way that "^ essence of the mind consists in thought, Recherche, I, p. 415. Cf. BouxUier, p. Sit. Bouillier holds that Malebranche that according and the essence of matter consists in extension ; and Gassendi agree on the obscurity of our knowledge of the soul, but that they reach wills and this identical result to different modifications of thought the mind now by different methods. Gassendi was over-occupied with the sensi- now imagines, or assumes other particular forms, in the same ble, Malebranche with the divine, Bouillier, idem. As Bouillier points out, Male- extension, matter branche thought that Qod did not permit us to behold the idea of the soul lest we be way as, according to different modifications of other of an infinity •o occupied with its beauty that we forget everything else. (Meditation, X.) Boul- is now water, now wood, now fire or has some knowing lier, p. 58. Victor Delbos has made an interesting comparison of Malebranche and of possible particular forms." Thus we are capable of Maine de Biran. "On concoit," says Delbos, "que »ur cette affirmation du caratere is thought, but only in a general way. that the essence of mind irriductible et tingulier de la donnie de congcience, tout en I'estimant incomplete, Mairie de Biran ait pu gympathiser avee Malebranche." See Revue de m^taphysiqu4 " Phaonopkical Work», Haldane and Ross, Vol. I. p. 223. et du morale. Vol. XXIII, MaUhranche et Maine de Biran, p. 157. " Recherche, I. p. 341. '• EfUretiens, p. 113. .

OF MALEBRANCHE MALEBRANCHE'S PSYCHOLOGY 28 THE PHILOSOPHY 29

been We may note that this doctrine of Malebranehe 's has compared with the theory of Hume that we have no logical basis Doxsee" compares for belief in a permanent self. Dr. C. W. the soul in God Malebranche's position that **we do not see Chapter III: Malebranche's Psychology taking place (Continued). and that **we only know of our soul what we feel ' ' * most inti- ' when I enter within us, to Hume 's statement that The Natural particular per- Inclinations. mately into myself I always stumble upon some shade, love or hatred, ception or other, of heat or cold, of light or our account of Malebranche's Ti, ^^* "it «°V°"/ psychology. Dr. Doxsee declares: *'Now this argument The Fourth Book of pain or pleasure.'^ the Recherche de la verite concerns the "In- is common to both Hume and Malebranche clinations or Natural from introspection Passions of the Mind."' Just as God gave both. They are at one m motion is really fundamentally one in to matter, so he gave inclinations ^ and to minds. But it is an * inner sense' is totally unable to reveal the incontestable truth recognizing that that God has no end for his actions but him- abiding spiritual substance behind the phe- self. He must have existence of a simple himself as his principal end, for he would ''^ to be denied that this consciousness. ' It is hardly err were he to put his end nomena of in everything that did not, like him- standards of know- self, somewhat misleading. For the contain a 1 good.' comparison is Nevertheless, he can have, as a sub- by Malebranche and Hume respectively differ ordinate end, the conservation ability employed of created , for these too Malebranche says that we have no knowledge of the to a certain extent, can completely. participate in his goodness. Now the cannot give a mathematical or deductive expli- natural inclinations of soul because we created minds are certainly continual cannot deduce its modifications impressions cation of the idea, because we of the will of their ' creator and conserver It is rejects the idea of the self be- necessary that it ; Hume, on the contrary, they can have from no other principal end than his find no impression from which it could be derived. glory, nor secondary end cause he can than their own conservation and the in their results, but a radical difference in conservation of There is a similarity others, but always with regard to him Male- who gave of reaching those results. Furthermore, them being.- There is, their methods strictly speaking, in God only one love never have admitted that ' * inner sense is totally which is love of himself, branche would and as God can love nothing save by the existence of a simple abiding spiritual sub- that love, since God can unable to reveal love nothing save by relation to him- very sentence quoted by Doxsee from Male- seit thus God has given stance.''^® The us only one love, which is the love soul by of proves the contrary: ** We only know of our good in general Love of the branche good in general is the principle of all feel taking place within us." our special loves.- This love is what we our will, which is simply the continual impression exerted by God on all finite creatures to- wards the all-inclusive good." Not only does our will for good in general come from God our inclinations for particular goods, which are common in all men, such our ^ inclination for the perpetuation of our own being and of those with whom we are united by nature, are sim- ply efleets of the divine will as exerted upon us.« This inclina- tion for the good in general is the cause of the inquietude of our will, for striving for a universal good necessarily gives the soul a continual agitation. Whatever the mind regards as a particu- lar good IS finite, and the finite can only attract the will for a time; It cannot permanently hold it.' The will is always rest- less; It IS forced to seek what it cannot find; hence, it loves what

**" ""' '"'''"' " 0"*I'«I'""'«- I" philo.ophie de 2»M. Malebranche. Vol. I, p. * Recherche, II, p. I ' Recherche, II, p. 3. * Recherche, II, p. 4. * Cf, Olle-Laprune, " PkUoaophical Review. Vol. XXV. p. 704. La philunojihic ,le Malebranche, Vol I n.- 308« • Recherche, 11, p. 5. - ^ Doxsee, idem. ' Recherche, II, p. 8 '^ Doxsee, idt-nt. -if..]

MALEBRANCHE MALEBRANCHE 'S PSYCHOLOGY 30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF 31

is like the infinite.® Not relate especially to it, and which are is great or extraordinary, whatever caused, maintained and familiar things, the fortified by some movement of having found its good among common and the (animal) spirits."^* And restlessness of the will further on in the same treatise he mind seeks it in the unknown. Now this explains that *'they (the pas- related to Malebranche 's sions) are principally caused by the is a great cause of illusion, and is thus (animal) spirits which are exposure of the contained in the cavities of central purpose in writing the Recherche, the the brain, in as much as they take con- their course towards the psychological causes of error. The will is generally more nerves which serve to enlarge or con- The essential rest- tract the orifices of the heart, or to cerned with our happiness than with truth.« drive in various ways to it the to any one blood which is in other parts, lessness of the will prevents sufficient application or, in whatever other fashion it morality are so may be, to carry on the subject.® This explains why the principles of same passion, we may from this clearly had to be made understand why I have placed in little understood,^ and why the truths of my definition of them above, discovered that they are caused evident to the senses through revelation rather than by some particular movement of the animai spirits."" In laying stress by reason.^° upon a physical factor as the dif- ferentia With unwearied thoroughness, Malebranche points out the of passion Malebranche is thus carrying on the thought the secret of Descartes. relation between our inclinations and our errors. All The most machinations of self-love and vanity are laid bare. The sections, complete analysis of passion occurs in Book V, '' * * of false Chapter III, of the * * On the desire to appear wise, On the conversations Recherche, IMalebranche holds that in each leads passion, with the savants/' "How our inclination for dignities and wealth exception of admiration, seven phases can be of their sub- distinguished. First to error,'' are complete and adequate discussions (1) we have an intellectual judgment or to follow this either clear or confused view jects. But there is no need for us in this study of the relation the object bears to appreciate its us.^« Then we have analysis into its details. It is enough for us to (2) the movement of the will towards the object previously to the general character." ; just-mentioned judgment the will was directed merely towards the good in general. But when the mmd perceives this relation The Passions. of the object to it, a movement of the will occurs.^* (3) Then we have in each of the passions a the Recherche is on the Passions. It The Fifth Book of sentiment" or feeling, such as has two love, aversion, desire, joy, sad- opens with a masterly definition. The human mind ness. These feelings are different in each of the different pas- the body, the other to God. As pure essential relations, one to sions. (4) This is followed by a new eternal determination of the course is essentially united with the Word of God, of spirit, man the animal spirits and of the blood towards the human spirit, exterior parts wisdom and truth, sovereign reason." But as of the body. The animal spirits are forced into the muscles of the body. In sense or imagination the mind man is united to the arms, of the face, and of all the in outer parts of the body to body as the occasional cause of its modifications, and put has the them in a condition appropriate to the dominating ^1 it is the passion. is directly united with God. Now understanding it If the forces of the individual are not sufficient essentially to fulfill his need the human will. As pure will it depends his same with animal spirits are mechanically distributed in will it is such a way as on the love that God bears to himself. But as human to cause him to utter certain words and cries and to assume is the proper term ^ body. ** Natural inclinations'' related to the certain posture of countenance and body of a nature have in common with to attract for all the movements of the soul which we the attention of others who may be able to help him. In this way ** passions" is to be applied to all the emo- pure ; the human species is bound together." extraordinary movements (5) We then have a tions the soul feels on the occasion of sensible emotion of the soul. This is the necessary psychic ac- blood. It is thus the addition of a of animal spirits and the companiment of the disturbance of the animal the inclina- spirits." (6) We bodily element that distinguishes the passions from now have the feelings of love, of aversion, of joy, of desire or the Soul'^ defines the pas- of tions. Descartes, in his Passions of sadness. This is distinct from the purely intellectual feeling de- ' of the soul which as ' the perceptions, feelings or emotions scribed sions m (3), for it includes the expression of the disturbances of the animal spirits.^« (7) Lastly, • Recherche, II, p. 9. we have a certain feeling of

• Recherche, II, p. 10. " Philosophical Works, Ross and Haldane. Vol. I, p. 344. " Recherche, II, p. 18. « Op. eU., Vd. I. p. 348. " Bouillier, p. 97ff, and Joly. p. 109ff. But cf. " Recherche, II, p. 147. M Recherche, II, p. 129. " Recherche, II, p. 150. Theoriet of Emotion, Philorophical R« M Cf. D. Irons, Descartet and Modem " Recherche, II, p. 161. view. Vol. IV. p. 291. MALEBRANCHE 'S PSYCHOLOGY 33 32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE

aversion,"" ''That the passions all justify themselves, "^s and joy, of douceur inUrieury which stops the soul in its passion and That those passions which have evil as an object are it should be in the most witnesses to it that the soul is now in the state dangerous and the most unjust, and that those which are ac- in regard to the object it is considering. This douceur interieur companied with least knowledge are the most vivid passions, those which spring from and sensi- accompanies generally all the ' '26 ble. Space is lacking here for any fair treatment of the con- the sight of evil as well as those which come from the sight of tent of these chapters it ; may be said, however, in a general way, good.^® This douceur is what renders all our passions agreeable that they merely carry through the general principles that must be conquered by the dou- we have to us, and it is this douceur already made clear." ceur of reason and faith, if we are to be freed from slavery to passions directed toward sensible goods/^ This analysis of pas- sion, which one can only characterize as masterly, is further elaborated in the same chapter. The limits of the present study alone prevent presentation of this elaboration. Chapters IV and V do not require analysis here. Their titles, ''That the pleasures and movements of the passions in- volve us in error in regard to the good, and that they must be perpetually resisted,'' and "That the perfection of the mind consists in its union with God by knowledge of the truth and its imperfection comes love of virtue ; and, on the contrary, that from its dependence on the body by reason of the disorders of ' veri- sense and passion, ' indicate, as a perusal of their contents fies, that they fall rather in the realm of ethics than in that of psychology. But in the remaining chapters we find much valu- able material. The most general error of sense is that we project our sensations into the outer world and regard them as inde- that pendently existing properties of objects ; the general error comes from the passions is of the same sort.*^ We attribute to the objects that cause them all the disturbances of our hearts, our good will, our gentleness, our malice, our anger and all the other qualities of our minds. When we love some person we tend to believe that this person loves us, and we can scarcely conceive that he should have the design of destroying us, or of opposing himself to our desires. But if hatred succeeds love,

we cannot believe that this person wishes us well ; we are always on our guard and defiant, although the person in question may not be even thinking of us or is thinking only of rendering us ** some service.2° Our passions not only disguise their principal Recherche, II, p. 225f. * Recherche, objects, but all things that are related to them. They not only II, p. 240f, * Recherche, II. p. 250f. render amiable all the qualities of our friends, but even the " Cf. Bouillier. p. lOOf, and Joly, greater part of the qualities of the friends of our friends.^^ p. 230f. Most modern psychologists, I pre- sume, would agree with the general judgment on Malebranche by Van Bidma. "Male- Malebranche discusses branche montre done une grand With this as a point of departure, independence d'esprit lor&que la religion n'est pas en *«The good uses one can jeu. II pouvait utiliser avec fruit ses belles qualit^s ** Admiration and its bad effects,"" de psychologue ; il aime h analyser la vie de I'esprit, les perceptions, make of admiration and of the other passions,"*^ *'Love and les Amotions, les inclinations, k rechercher les conse- quences de I'imagination ou des passions, on connait sa finesse de 'moraliste.' Mais d'abord la psychologie n'a jamais pour lui » Recherche, II, p. 134. m qu'un moyen, elle se subordonne h la logique et k la morale. Et surtout il avait » Recherche, II, p. 185. une connaisance trop precise de la nature de Dieu, de ses perfections, de ses volont^s. » Recherche, II, p. 187. Une m^taphysique aussi audaci- euse et aussi sftre d'elle-m§me est bien dangereuse *• Recherche, II, p. 191£. pour un savant." Revue de Mita- physique et du Morale, Vol. XXIII. p. 127f. " Recherche, U. p. 215f The citation is from p. 146. 1

PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 34 THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 35

possible that in the case of beings higher than man, such as the angels, direct perception of spirit by spirit is possible without the intermediation of ideas ; thus ideas are only absolutely neces- Kno\vi.edge. sary in the Chapter IV: Malebranche^s Theory op case of the perception of matter.* Nevertheless, for us men, since we only know each other's minds through speech and gesture, the intermediation We now take up Malebranche 's most famous doctrine : That of idea is necessary in the per- ception of y/ we see all things in God. For in this proposition is summed up all external objects, whether material or spiritual.^ his specific contribution to the Theory of Knowledge. We take We know through ideas : but what is the origin and nature II of III of the Recherche, of ideas? as our primary authority Part Book According to Malebranche, there are five possibili- where necessary ties. correcting and supplementing this authority His method of argumentation is to exclude four of these sources. hypotheses with material drawn from other and leave the fifth standing. And the fifth theory is that we see all things in God. Let us follow the argument The Argument for Vision in God. through. The first hypothesis^ is that material objects cast Every one will agree, says Malebranche, that we do not per- off species that resemble them. This ancient Democritean of us themselves. We see the sun, the doctrine Male- ceive objects outside by branche attributes to the peripatetics. In detail it is that these stars and an infinity of outer objects. But it is not probable! sensible objects, being thrown off by the object, are rendered that the soul leaves the body and goes, so to speak, marching ' intelligible by the ' ' active intellect, ' and are then perceived through the skies to contemplate objects seen there. The soul by the "passive intellect." The foundation of this whole does not see them in themselves; the immediate object of our system is the notion that sensible objects cast off species that for example, is not the sun, but resemble mind when it beholds the sun, them. There are many reasons why this is an absurd hypoth- something that is intimately united with the mind, and may be esis. The first is the impenetrability of bodies. If the sun. idea, Malebranche understands, objects like called the idea of By the sun and stars and all nearer bodies cast off species, these in the first place, the immediate object of the mind.^ When the species would have to be of the same nature as the bodies them- mind perceives something, or that it perceives something, selves they would ; have to be gross and material. They would it is absolutely necessary that there actually be an idea whether have to interpenetrate; but this is impossible.^ The whole or not there exists any object of this idea.^ of space would be full of species; they would rub against Men naturally believe that corporeal things are more real each other and break, and thus fail to render things is objects visible. Since than ideas; they think that the existence of corporeal from a single point we can see a great number of objects, the assured in spite of the fact that it often happens that our ideas species of a great many objects would necessarily concentrate have nothing external to correspond to them; and it is certain themselves to a point, which is impossible since matter is im- that external things do not resemble ideas.^ Men regard the penetrable.^ it is Again certain that the nearer an object is, the idea as nothing, just as if ideas did not have a great many prop- larger it appears. Now there is no reason why the species should erties, as if the idea of a square and of any given number were shrink.® And it is still more be true difficult to explain on this theory not essentially different, a thing which could not possibly what "^ happens to the species when one regards the object through if ideas were " nothings. if then ideas are 'Ures-rcelle/' let a magnifying glass.® And so on. us inquire into their nature. M The second hypothesis to fall before Malebranche 's All the things perceived by the soul are of two kinds : either dialec- tic is the theory that the soul they are within the soul or they are without.^ Those that are has the power to produce its own ideas.^° Some maintain that our souls within the soul are its own modifications, and may be expressed have the power to pro- duce the ideas of the things by pensee, maniere de penser, modification de Vdme.^ Under this of which they wish to think, and that they are excited head we may consider the sensations, imaginations, intellections, to produce them by the impressions that objects make on our bodies, conceptions, passions and natural inclinations.^ The soul has although these impressions are not no need of ideas to perceive these things in the way it does per- • Recherche, I, p. 876. It is • Recherche 1, p. 875. ceive them ; but it needs ideas to perceive external things.^ • Recherche, I, p. 878f.

* Recherche, I, p. 373. • Recherche, I, p. 397. Recherche, I, p. 874. • Recherche, I, p, 879. » Recherche, I, p. 875. • Recherche, I, p. 880. PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 36 THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 37 them.| They supposed to be images of the objects that caused ideas of seuse and imagination are only distinct is in the image of by reason of that it is in this respect that man made their conformity claim with the ideas of pure reason " just as God created all God, and participates in his power ; that "^^^ "''^ ^''^ ™'"<^ produces its own as he can annihilate them and create .u Tu*^ u u**"** ideas hold things from nothing and that the mind ha« the power to and destroy ideas of create with wisdom and order other things anew, thus man can create and yet without knowledge of what it is doing, a thing that pleases.^^ But this participation in the is whatever things he clearly inconceivable." It ordinarily is true that, ordinarily when men power of God that men boast of possessing, as it is 1^ '?^^' *^* "*^*^ •=°"»^= ^^^""^^ it is falsely something of independence in it, but it is a false TaaZ'I con- explained, has cluded that the desire is the cause of of men makes the idea. As well argue and chimerical independence that the vanity that because the sun and Mars are connected at the ^° that ideas are real beings and nativity of them imagine. No one can deny a child who IS destined to have some extraordinary thing of representing very different things. It is happen, that they are capable that the sun and Mars are the cause different of the extraordinary event " impossible to doubt that they are spiritual and very The desire IS of course only the occasional cause In fact, the intelligible of the manifes- from the bodies that they represent." tation of the Idea." The theory then that the mind creates perfect than the material world, as we shall see in or world is more produces its own ideas is to be rejected. say that men have the power of form- what follows. When we The third hypothesis to be submitted to pleases them to form them, we run the risk of sup- criticism by Male- ing ideas as it branche IS that noble we see objects by means of ideas that men have the power of creating beings more created with posing us. But let us consider the has created." Even if one vast number of objects of which and more perfect than the world God we can have the ideas. The number of geometrical grant the human spirit power to create and destroy figures is infinite were to and If we take any particular avail itself of this power. For geometrical figure, such as the ideas of things, it could never ellipse, we find that there is an infinite he may be in his art, cannot number of species of it » just as a painter, however skillful In the same way, we can conceive of the animal he has never seen, in the same way a man height of a triangle in- represent an creasing to infinity, and in this way an infinite form the idea of an object if he does not know it before- number of tri- cannot angles being produced or the possession : we can conceive of the side if he does not already possess the idea, and which hand, triangle But if he has the -^^^ increasing to infinity, and in of the idea does not depend on his choice.'- '^Z^IZL % this way another infinite number of triangles new idea.'- being produced. This idea, it is useless to create a general idea that the mind has of this infinite opponents object that the mind has number of tri- It is in vain that our angles of diflPerent species proves produce, but that that, even if we cannot con- certain general ideas which it does not itself ceive each particular triangle of the infinity of triangles ideas. For just as a painter cannot it is it produces its particular because of the limitations of cannot our minds rather than because of paint a particular man he has never seen, so the mind of being in to itself a horse if it only possesses ideas consideration represent of the properties of all the true that when we con- difl'erent species of tri- general and animal in general.'^ It is angles even if he were to continue this study forever, intellection we can further imagine it. he would ceive a square by pure ideas, are not the "?*'*;?'*' .°7 but his mind would uselessly although this cannot be explained here—we tTrritifif But ^^^ ''^"' ''•^^ ^f ™°^ ^" things ' ideas would of the image.'^ Malebranche is referring nevernZlf ; -l cause of the existence fail it even were it to thus imag- devote centuries to the considera- of occasional causes. Now when we do tion of a to his theory single figure. There is an infinite it, the first number of ideas in square on the basis of a previous intellection of fact, there ine a are as many infinite numbers of of the second.' We ideas as there are idea serves as a rule for the production different figures and : since there is an and sense-perceptions are more dis- infinite number of dif- must not believe that images terent figures the mind must have contrary, the in order to know nothing but than the ideas of pure understanding; on the tigures, tinct an infinity of infinite number of ideas " Now is it Leibniz clearly perceived probable that God should have 1" Recherche, hv.3S2. It is interesting to note that created so many expense of the creature. ' There « good things with the ?>» dangers of this magnification of God at the human mind For God had the Malebranche. at his disposal a '' the Reverend Father reason he says in one place, "also for refuting much simpler means, as we shall see purely passive I tl^.nk I have d^mon shortly. especially when he maintains that the soul is especially the soul." PhUosophxcal WorkM. Even were the mind a magazine strated that every substance is active, and of all the ideas that are Duncan's Translation, p. 234. " Recherche, I, p. 387. " Btehercht, I. p. 383. ** Recherche. I, p. 388. " Recherche, I. p. 38.'). " Recherche, I, p. 390. " Recherche. I, p. 3.''6 " Rerherrhe. T. p 391. OF MALEBRANCHE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 38 THE PHILOSOPHY 39

explain how the soul should °''*^"' ^^^^^"•'^ '^»'- necessary, it would be impossible to '' '^', the essence of tfafn^"th ngs. Thet£Thuman spir.t for example, she can know all choose some of them to present to itself, how, things, finite and infinite but it does not contain them very instant that within itself ; it about that she perceived at the for the soirk could bring can not only behold one size, figure, dis- thing and then another thing she opened her eyes in the midst of a landscape, success"^^" ly, but It can actually perceive the movement V^ She could not even in this way perceive infinite even if it cannot fullv F tance and "•" the sun is present to the eyes " '•'"°^'« ''''' °*>* beingTnfinl a single object, like the sun, when ca3fof "^'T^- nir that she should justly ""^'^^ modifications, it is of the body; for it is not conceivable . ^K t^ u u'^TJ."^ impossible that ''''"'' which one is necessary to imag- ' "* ^'"'"^ ^y considering its ow^ divine from among all her ideas, L«i " per definite size. Further- or 'see the sun, and to see it of such a ine We now come to the or immediate object of our fifth and last hypothesis: more it is evident that the idea That we think of immense spaces, of a circle in general '"• " "*^ ^y '^'^ theory that Malebranche minds when we waswl'1best knownll^^ in^l^- nature, for created his own age. of an 'indeterminate being, is not of created place let us keep in mind that God reality can be neither infinite nor general.^^ ooi* ^A *^%'''?f has in him- Malebranche "^ °?^ he has created.^* The fourth hypothesis, which is attributed by f^iJ K K ^f Thus he beholds all <'»°«'

M Recherche, I, p. 400. ^"'** « Recherche,!, p. 401. *°^ ^^' '»^« °f the Father and the bonSon williSi be re-established.""f Iv F^!^^'' » Recherche. I, p. 401. n Recherche, ^02. 1,V- . . . ^^'"•^ '*^<^ , Malebranchew i v,o«^>.o'-• °"« *" Relieve that minds facetious over this point of nereeTvf!,'/lT' *'"t 'Tv.'""' - » I. .J.- T r. doq Locke waxes perceive all things by the intimate presence of him who compre- " Recherche, I, p. 403. •* Recherche, I, p. 404. sues, the several part. """"' of «H sorts and , /j present need of." Exam- " Recherche, I, p. 406. to her lump of butter, ,»" '^ *' «"» llckV. PkUo-opk- 'f /f^"o/ Senng'•'^V^Mn^ITniu inxngw in ^^ • inoKon of P Uatebranchel Otnnwn Recherche, I, p. 407. The quotation » from p. 425. Bohn Library. Vol. II. P. 413. tTwork,. " Recherche, I, p. 408. .

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 43 in God." We only know is the in- the soul by consciencp simplicity of his being." God anH if ;. f hends all things in the this reason that our knowledge the material world s is imperfect""^ place of spirits, just as God the K we beh d L' SSwe worl?the Idea that corresponds to power, spirits receive all their our soul we shoi^H w ^ b^ies From his the properties the Dlace of of which it is capable, all their ideas and it is fi as' ^e^k^' they find ; ^^^^^^ modffications in his wisdom, movements. ^« moved in all their lawful -P^^^^ ^y eontemplationli tt by his love hat they are ^S'^^'j^S^rZ:^^ xn xpso emm vnnmus, mo- est ah unoquoque nostrum, Nonlonge The fourth kind of knowledge Malebranche calls knowled.,. by conjecture. This is the completed in the four-fold knowledge that we have of Malebranche's epistemology is of other men and the tuk Book III, of pure intelligences. which we find in the Recherche, We have no dS division of knowledge knowledge of them either in themselves or by the'r Ideas and as Part II, Chapter VII. them- -t Possible^that we knowledge is knowledge of things by Zlo7c^'r^:T'4:T -.'V- Sow'them The first kind of conjecture" that that we • the souls of other in this way. It is God alone are.« of«f f^ men selves. God alone is known the same species with our that which is own. What we feel we sun^o^ immediate vision, m which that they feel, behofd by a direct and and even where these feelings ° No finite be- are not related spirit by its own substance. the body, we are to toown illumines the sure that we are not deceived without restriction, univer- because we see il represent the infinite, being God certain ideas and immutable Si^n conceive that laws according to whirh " it is not difficu t to are ' Twe ^f bring On the other hand certain, God acts on all spirits." by the infinite being that in^ toite bf ngs can be represented We thus know God eludes them in its "substance tres-efficace." Malebranche and veiy imperfect manner" St. Augustine. by «" although, to be sure, in a through ideas that is, second kind of knowledge is The origin of the doctrine of The Vision in God is undoubtediv from the things known themselv^. to be found through something different in the writings of St. Augustine. any sort of knowledge From thrSnt in the world of which we have Bathing proper- know bodies and their is important. k effer mind or matter." We St. Augustine, says Malebranche, God and by means of their speaks in a only Through ideas. It is in thousand places in his works of the ties have of them intimate union of (Sd and reason the knowledge that we man, and of this deas and for this union as the life, light, and felicity to inform us of of the soul" of extension is enough Malebranche is is ve^y perfect ; the idea astonished that Christian cannot^ desire to philosophers should be extension can have, and we content to regard the Lu the Sropert es soul as merely the form of the fruitful than that of ex- body and have an idea more distinct and more ^"'^ the '^ ^""^""^ P"'"^''' °'°'*« luminous, stronger with souls; and here we come upon InH-^f K f *'""k il not the same *'*''^'" of the soul ^° '^' ^^'^d' '^' ^^^^^ of the knowledge. We do not behold the idea ^,?1 2tWh K f'°*;k third kind of '^ ^^^ measure of the corruption, weakness andTa blindnessZ-a ofathe soul." As St. Augustine says, "Eternal wisdom is the principle of all creatures capable of intelligence the «<«'"°* «' ''"' ' and that Leibniz virtually accept, 7 «, far this wisdom, which remains " ef but .1.0 of el^nc", always the same, never ceases' "that in God is the source «'t "."'y »' "''^""' Leibniz, TO.Tim is l^oauseb«« the under to speak to Its .s re. m the p<,» We. « creatures in the secret a, they are real, of that which depths of their minds that eternal ""'"•• they of God is the region of may turn towards their standing "'"''Jf „ the p

" Recherche, I, p. 412. PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 44 THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE ^ Ch. 50.)** This ac perfecta non possit. De Genesi ad litteram. the whole mighty doctrine of Augustine is indeed the basis of and can alone system of Malebranche. God is our only master manifestation of his sub- instruct us, and this he does by the ''Insinuavit nobis (Christus) ani- stance. As Augustine says: eyes, he has theXTf ^^ ^''^ ^'^ *<> ^is non illumi- thHuTin Pn^n'^'ri hiimanum et mentem rationalem non vegetart, to him but the ^^ exhibited mam ; sun becauseTt cannot' '('^'"'^.^f nariy non heatificari nisi ipsa suhstantia Dei.''*^ cannot see. How '" ^'^ '°^' '^^ then does he know that T"^ teachers are, as Augustine again says, only monitors. he never **'^'"* '^ * «'^° '^hieh Human sawt And sincrr-n^^ ,, .1 They do not speak with They are neither masters nor teachers. pendious ways what .>*' *^"'^ ^^ ^^^ •»««* ^m- w^- need S fh own authority but are only representatives of eternal that we 2""^ ^^''''^^ ""^k^ ^ «un their migT'see itS S in hi l*"** all our light our own but we draw when ™ ^^ P'«»«^d to exhibit it, dom.*« We are not this Sht as well L 1 ""il."" te ipsum esse lucam.*^ Non a me miht Locke *''^."* ""^^^ all."- from God : Noli putare does S sem to hL? T^ ™" «* non participas nisi in TE}"" '"^^^^^^^ ^^at his own theory lumen existens, sed lumen knowledge,&^^^""^"could beoe develonlnaeveloped of •4. • ^ m the same Hir^Pfinr. << t It IS God alone,' says our author," ''^P' and Locke, wS Locke °"'wV. Malebranche ligten our ' *^° "*" «"- mind by his substanoA ' wi^ t , -^ ^"^ ^^^t the comments stance of God is and f*^. ^^^" stih- At this point we may note certain criticisms and Jw stance, I '*"' *«^- first an inter- shall know wl *^ upon the doctrine of Malebranche. In the place, It lo'sh'alUhTnWrl I confess myself ^'"'' ""^ '*' ''"^ at present commentary on the philosophy of Malebranche, or, more in the hLI i * .u esting words ^'^"^ ''Examination of of Xlce andt'5. : ^^ ^'^^ particularly, on his epistemology, is Locke's • f^ used, help 7^^' «>-e here in God.'''"^ Tt is, me one jot out ""0° I P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things of it t ^^^/''f must *'''*'^' h«^ever, it for which Locke be said that Locke"s J; .f *,? ^^f of course, written from the general standpoint hah those *'*°"^''* ^^""^ »PPo«ed to Malebranche as ''acute and in- of Malebranche that hl.^ ^ is so well known. He refers to ''''^°'" ^'^ ^^^''^d a judi- understanding of him.- superficial genious," and as having a ''great many very fine thoughts, Malebranche s cious reasonings, and uncommon reflections."" the Vision in God is at proof by elimination of the theory of Malebranche and Berkeley. weakness "loses all its force as soon as we consider the fault; it Berkeley's reaction our capacities, and have to Malebranche sets ih^ Aiff of our minds and the narrowness of their systems *"® difference of things in a clear lio^ht i^ Vu c. , but humility enough to allow that there may be many ^" *''^Second between Hylas and Phi"onous f is not bound The JL which we cannot fully comprehend, and that God the "^''''' philosopher considers doctrine of Vision in /nT of operation to the scrutiny of in all he does to subject his ways Hylas "'•" -° theory, nothing but what we asks.%le'^;rg'Be''r£i:^rSf.^.i^ thoughts, and confine himself to do it Do you not i our looks very like a notion P„tiT„- 'r^''^™' think most significant point, however, is must comprehend."'"'' The of Seeing III '"'"^"^ "'°*^^^"«' philosophy leads TUnTX^t^'^r^^^^^Z that Locke clearly perceives that Malebranche 's continues Locke, to . "He further says," "that had we a magazine of all ideas that are necessary for not seeing things, they would be of no use, since the mind could sun. What know which to choose, and set before itself to see the cTm *• Recherche, I. p. ix. ^:iX:^f~r^^^^-^"^" Philonous says ^ of reference to Augustine. In. Joan. "Ha hn.i^o lu Malebranche « Recherche, I. p. xi. Malebranche gives the '- " 'deal, which I Tr. 23. di"cL?mdisclaim. ItTtlTl^'"'''"i"*'«^'-««t eXeiv XVII, must be owned that I «» Malebranche here refers us to Augustine, De Mavvitro, entirely agree with i\ •* S Op. *» Malebranche's reference is. In Paal, XVII. eU., p. 426. Cf. Saint Auffwtine, J. Martin, " Op. «> The reference is Dr Verbis Domini. Ser. 8. cit., p. 444. teachings of St. Augustine. Cf^»J»o Paris 1907, for « verv scholnrh account of the De»caHea, Marguerite Witmer Kehr, The Doctrine of the Setf in St. Aupustine and in 587. de Malebranche, "' Malebranche. cf. OIle-Laprune. Philosophical Review, XXV, p. Vol. H p 33f La phUosopht 413. " Philonovhical Workit, Bohn Library, Vol. II, p. " W-orAr*. Ed. Eraser, Vol. I. p. 305. M Op. cit., p. 414. " Op. cit., p. 306. » Idem. * Idem. ,

MALEBRANCHE THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEORY OF 46 KNOWLEDGE we^.^live and move and saith•*v. ^TVi«f >nin GodOod we the Holy Scnpture J^a ^^^^^ ^^^ see ^^^^^ tZuS^^7a^^^;^ ^°- *^^ -*-- being. But that w^ J« in VcnrouS\h" have our ^^^.^ ^ake here .r^'*""^.' ^^'^ tar »«iro the will which it *<=* through above set forth 1 am are exprSes tZ^I f t manner the tmngs perceive bent on ^°'- '*''* theologian is evident that overturning wis brief my meaning-it ^ SebrancLw f he therefore centerfd !" "^"'"y **«*«"' and ideas, and that '^^ »'i«%«*°,^„7L'^°^%y his attaet nnf T xny own r^^ by mer^^^^^^^^perceived. point, that thesejdeas orjh the doctrine of deal '*« P'^°*^ it is less plain ^^ TaWn^ t.V'T^ Nor exist inaep passages ''^'^^''^ the.r archetypes in Malebranche "P"'' either themselves or ^ ^^^ 's writing wV,tt T""^ press spirit °°* "*"'" *» «^- of the kttlr'f;J v.- ^u branche's ideas as /rm,epml,l/f/!;"^^ ^' ''^""^^^ ^ale- entities '"ePJ'esentative beings, uU,a«ected wHh distinct from thP aT? ](' ^VO^Z^^'^L^ '^^^^^ ^ it knows, ^''"^ ^'^ on the on^hand an/f^"^* I'y t'^' ^W^h Tl ''^^^"^ conc^^^^^^^^ other. He '^*>^°' o° the wtLeVhilonous -^^^^^ thuL accuses MaS/T ^'i' S^raJ. tionism. '"^P'-^^^'^tative percep- every His ^ posTtioi S th,f •. • 1 v^hich affects me manner of these, '»«'«^«'«^firardthe variety, ™' think of, and *."/' "* '^' ^"'^l *« perceive. And, from ?o^C oHects extl«. f' f / *°^^,^„ful and good is ^°** them to be no need for the -^ *•»** *»»«'« include the Author of ---^PJ/ things inreVmedfation nf i.*""^'' I , ,^ its object. ^''''" "*" '"''^ ^"'^ comprehension. MarK it wen That which™Sts7« "„'^'^ beyond intelligible Sub- existing '" "^'."''' o6i.chV«;/i^ the S nd tS t '''^^^^' "« possesses of ''^"'' *•"« ««"' having objecL present to .>T"'f- its very essence and nS no explanat on 'if :r'^ '''"'•'i*"*^^ to be used it ," *^^ *^™ '« possibility of being «'««"y^ must be either ity, i. e., the excep- preJnTtself or"^ h ; ^.eu'.known • ''^ represented some image, • by of reality is-wrthc^^^^^^^ as when we .spp th;ll ' latter the standard ^^.^^^^ ^^ ^^^ reducea i ^v not hold of ^^^ things do possibility of ^""^ inteUecturviln ^ il! ""'r""'- tions-the ^^^^ ^"'^ *''" ^'^^'^ ""^i^'^ is is simply a fiction * '^'^ "^ "ideas"

ii^ reality. Malebranche and Arnauld. in an entirely^dtSnrsre^krherrr ^^ represent ^^ tl^'V'*^'^^^ pictures their oriffina]<5 nr* fV.of i vie ; points 01 , epistemology, from frtain . images of ^''^' ''' ^ j^ ^he- our tho"K 'for with rTgtd t^o^J""? th'e criticism Tj^i^^Z-^'-iSr i/ Z^^^^^^^^^ writings inTurl^rnit philosophy " Repre- t ^uXno^^ S^^- ^^^^ caiieucaled'nCtmporaryi i- "^.risuggest 'Swhat is score by is so peSS attacked on that to^"mTnf:„rtLlh\""^ iiii up its S^f^ht^* ^^'•'•i'V''^ niakes'^^r'^' to represent the peculiar nature thut „ i ^ -^ . holeveru do not seem Z passages, ' for anything r**V; ""SIhese paXs . lar in all simi- Arnauld. ^ ^ ^^^^1 pass- that L rotmi'nS and thouth/V*.'" true spirit «« his deeper what has confused tWs "' ^ ^^^^ '''^'''^'^' ^-/«£^f,p,t S^ b^!es to us, whole mattr nf w ! ages he speaks of not by desired to explain, "'' '' **"** *"^^ ^^ objects in God, by coZarisrs S.n f '<^f.«^. XsreprJent the ^" ^^'^^ corporeal meaning significance We manner in whir>h nW„f things, ^T^^^^^Vy eVprTrng t^^^^^ real ''^'"''''''^ b^ onr of a though there can ideas, Til not^as we know the original t no tn.^' r^fb?c^'thrugh^dS mind'-3 On thTb^s Tf «"^ o^idSrof *^'^t^"'!. "f^ completely denies the *^ ^*"^' Arnauld •• Op. eit., p. 807. exist^n^P «f ties. WA this » Op. eit., p. 808. lee M. deJit! h^bSresti^t^ A,«*nH'« criticism of Malebranche. t^haT/rer^L^t

182-l»*. Ariatotelian Society, 1916-17, pp. ; ; '

PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBBANCHE METHODOLOGY 48 THE 49

system. As a matter of fact, very foundations of Malebrauche's arguments were really beside the pomt. it is easy to see that his contemplate things were For the divine ideas through which we They were not copies of essentially representative entities. Chapter not V: Malebranche 's Methodology. things. We owe to Arnauld s things, but representatives of part of Male- a very clear re-statement on the attack, however, We are now in a position to examine reflection, 'he says in his Malebranche 's contri- of his position. "A serious bution to branche methodology.' The Sixth Book of the difference which is to be found between Recherche is a tet reply "upon the complete exposition of the knowing by idea, or rather rationalistic ideal of scientific and v/ knowing bV feeling (sentiment) and philosophical numbers and method. We shall see here how true Malebranche knowing and feeling, between knowtng between spirit of Descartes, and especially geometrical figures and their rela- to the Descartes their properties, extension, otZ^fh^the KegulaeI ad dtrecttonem ingenii, as Cassirer ' pain, heat, color, and even the inner points out tions, and feeling pleasure, First of ail, we may note that gives reason enough, it Malebranche divides his discus- perceptions which we have of objects, sion into two parts : the first treats of accustomed to metaphysical spec- means for rendering the V/ seems to me, for those who are mind attentive ; the second, of the rules to be followed in the ulation to conclude: search for truth.' to have "^ns pain, for example it is not necessary I That to feel Aids to Attention. the modality of the soul is suffi- a representative idea, and that is modality or modifica- Understanding has the exclusive it is certain that pain a function of cient ; because perceiving- there is no difference, as far as soul understanding is concerned, be- tion of the tween simple perceptions, judgments and reasonings.* geometrical figures and re- Judg- II That to know numbers and ments and reasonings, however, are can have per- much more complex than an idea, in order that the soul simple perceptions lations' one needs because they not only represent several the soul has perception of things ception of them; for without idea, to the mmd, but also relations between arcle can- several things.* Simole itself, and the idea of a perceptions nothing distinguished from only present things to the mind ; judgments present be a modaliiy of the soul relations between things, and not reasonings relations between re- ations. object, the sun, a tree, Nevertheless simple perception, judgment III That in order to see a sensible and reason- for ing are only three levels of are needed, the modality of coior complexity in the same process.* And a house', etc., two things since of the soul, and a judgment and reasoning are only complex M. Arnauld agrees that color is a modification perceptions (as far as understanding is extension, concerned) error is • idea, namely the idea of inconceivable for pure f,.»"t;"f'^^'^^^^J^"; we cannot conceive sensation of light, attached to a how a pure perception should be in sion; for when one has a lively error rendered One can see that 2 times 2 equals 4 circle in a certain intelligible space and that 2 times 2 is not 5 distant intelligible for there really sun, not as it is but as one is a relation of equality between 2 sensible by certain colors, one sees the times 2 and 4 necessary to feel that which *™"' and thus {sic). Here, Sir, is all that is 2 5; the perception sees it of^f *^r?l"-'''"ttruth IS n^ ?lfT^^ to see all 1,he objects of intelligible." But no one will ever see passes in the soul, to learn sciences, and that 2 times 2 is 5. ^rror then consists This pas.sage shows that Malebranche re- solely in a precipitous consent of the this visible world."" will as its mean- which permits itself to be dazzled as the essence of the sensible thmg, by some false gleam, and garded the idea in the place of not exist, not as a copy or preserving its liberty as much as ing or nature, without which it could possible rests re- negligently in the appearance reasons Arnauld 's attack can be of truth." picture of it. For these ^e/t^n ^ifica- We must seek means then that will largely irrelevant, although it had « Jf prevent our perceptions garded as from being confused and terminology with which Malebranche imperfect. And as there is nothing ffon in the looseness of that renders perceptions more clear and himself.'" distinct than attention expressed we must attempt to discover methods of becoming more atten-

""P"'"""- ot M,lebr.nche'8 methodology, noTsro,Nov«o*'Di,"UK Ph\totoph\epia!!.''.f«i'°V°''v™f"'dea cf. flicolavt Malebranche, p. 7f. • Erkenntnitprobtem, I, p. 668. Recherche, II, p. 261. • Recherche, II, PhUo.ophU d, UaUbranch.. p. 262. « interesting di»cus»i.n in 0116L.prun., La oHh. • Recherche, II, p. 283. Yd II, p. 7«. MALEBRANCHE METHODOLOGY 50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF 51

dent as geometricians imagine." tive than we are. In this way we must **conserver Vevidence'* Arithmetic, with its basic idea of equality, is a more enlightening in our reasonings, and see in a single view a necessary connec- science." And algebra is still more important than arithmetic; tion between the parts of the longest deductions.* Now the it divides the power of the mind still less, and abbreviates mind naturally applies itself not to abstract ideas but to sensi- ideas in the simplest and easiest manner that can be conceived.^^ ble things.® Hence all who would seriously devote themselves ^^at can only be done m arithmetic m a great deal of time, can to the pursuit of truth ought to avoid all strong sensations, such be done in a moment m algebra.^2 Tj^^g^ ^^^ sciences are as loud noises, too bright light, pleasure and pain. They ought the foundations of all the rest and give us the true means for to guard ceaselessly the purity of their imaginations lest there mastering all the exact sci- ences; one cannot utilize to a greater be traced in their brains too deep vestiges which would contin- advantage the capacity of the mind than in arithmetic and ually disturb and dissipate the mind.** They ouglit to prevent algebra. of the passions. Although the pure ideas of every movement The Rules of Method. truth are always present to us, we cannot contemplate them when The preceding methodological discussion the mind is occupied with these disturbing modifications.* may be regarded as concerned, in general, with means Nevertheless there is a positive side to passion and sense. of availing oneself of the power of attention, of concentrating There are useful passions which give us the force and courage and focusing the mind In the Second Part of the Sixth Book, the pain that is involved in attention.^ Good pas- De la Methode, of the Re- to overcome cherche, Malebranche discusses certain rules sions are the desire to discover the truth, to acquire sufficient that are to be fol- lowed in the pursuit of truth. The principle light to conduct oneself, to render oneself useful to one's neigh- of all the rules is that m order to discover the truth without bor. Bad passions are desire to acquire a reputation, to estab- fear of deception it 18 always necessary "conserver I'evidence lish oneself, to rise above one's equal and other still more law- dans ses raisonne- ""' reasonings must always less passions.^ The passion for glory can be related to a good "^ir ' ,3 L'?' be clear and com- pelling. This may be compared with it is permitted to some persons and on certain occa- the first of Descartes' end, and four rules of method, which is stated in the sions to avail themselves of this passion to render themselves Discourse on Method as follows To accept : nothing as true more attentive.^ But it is indeed necessary to take care in mak- which I did not clearly recognize to be so."'« From this we ing use of this passion, which is liable to lead us insensibly into may derive a rule in regard to the subject matter of our studies: we bad studies which have more glitter than utility or truth.® should reason only con- cerning things of which we can Malebranche was deeply convinced of the philosophical have clear ideas.'^ As Descartes says in his Regulae : "Only those objects of mathematical studies. He regards geometry as a species of should engage our at- tention to the sure and indubitable universal science which opens the mind, renders it attentive, and knowledge of which our men- tal powers seem to be adequate."" Hence gives it skill in controlling the imagination. One can compare we should always commence with the easiest and simplest things this conviction with that of Plato, who, in the Republic, says: and remain with teem a long time before geometry aims is knowledge of undertaking the investigation ''That the knowledge at which more of the complex and difficult." As Descartes not of aught perishing and transient. . . . says: "We ought the eternal, and to give the whole of our attention to the Geometry will draw the soul towards truth and create the spirit most insignificant and s. «°d remain of philosophy and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed ^ a long time in the con- tZnU?^^templation of"^f^^"'^them **f '* until we are accustomed to behold to fall down. ' the truth clearly and distinctly. '" In Book VI, Chapter V, of the Recherche^ Malebranche pur- *"' governing the 1* with respect to arithmetic and algebra. Of ™'^ procedure of our thought, sues the same theme d^sAi.r'^l as met from rules governing the choice of all the sciences, says Malebranche, arithmetic and geometry are the subject-matter, ** Malebranche proposes the following: the principal ones that teach us to think with skill and light First, we must conceive veiy clearly the question which and admirable management of the mind."'° Ordinarily geom- we are attempting to answer ihis rule corresponds to Descartes' etry does not perfect the intellect so much as the imagination Rule XIII, which runs': evi- " and the truths discovered by this science are not always as Reeherehe, II, p. 302(1. " Herherrhr, II, p. 306. " • Recherche, II, p. 266. Rrcherehe, II, p. 308. " PhUotopkifol Work; Tr. » Recherche, II. p. 267. RoM and H.ldane. Vol. I p 92 " Recherche. II, p. 308. • Recherche, II, p. 26«. '• Op. eit., Vol. I, p. 3, Rulo II. • Jowett's Translation: Book VII. " Recherche, II, p. 308. " Op. cit.. " Recherche, II, p. 302. Vol. I, p. 28, Rate IX. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE METHODOLOGY 52 53

*'Once a 'question' is perfectly understood, we must free it of would cause. In the sixth place, we should compare all our state it in its sim- every conception superfluous to its meaning, ^"^ ^^' ^^ combination, '^u' says Malebranche, terms, and, having recourse to an enumeration, split it up eitherSp'rTalternately?i one with another, plest or by a single glance of the which analysis cannot go in mmd, or by a into the various sections beyond movement of the imagination accompanied '^^ by a * glance of the intellect or by minuteness. the calculation of the pen joined with attention of mind and As a second rule, IMalebranche has: We must discover by imagination.- And in correspond ence with this we have Descartes' an effort of mind one or more intermediate ideas which can Rule IX, "If, after we have recognized intuitively a number of serve as a common nature in the discovery of relations.^^* To simple truths, we wish to draw any inference from * * science to be them, it is useful to this may be compared Descartes ' : If we wish our run them over in a continuous and uninterrupted complete, those matters which promote the end we have in view act of thought, to reflect upon which ''''' ^''''*^''' must one and all be scrutinized by a movement of thought ^ZJ^tTT.i. ^^^ *^ ^^^P t^^^ther distinctly interrupted; they must also be in- ''' propositions as far as is possible is continuous and nowhere F f^ at the same H^time. For this is a way of making eluded in an enumeration which is both adequate and method- our knowledge much more certain and of greatly increasing ical."" Thirdly, says Malebranche, we must eliminate from the power of the mind." > the subject under investigation all things that are not neces- ^^^'""'^ contenting ourselves ..IPAr^^f"''''! f^v!^ with some truth we seek. This may gleam of probability and repeat sary for the discovery of the particular the comparisons so often that just corre- be compared with the rule from Descartes we have r^^^t)elieving without feeling the secret reproaches In the fourth place, says Z\TTof the Master, Eternal Reason.- lated with Malebranche 's first rule. The necessary rules are not Malebranche, we must divide the subject of meditation into other all, one after another in their natural They are natural and can parts, and consider them be made so familiar that it the simplest, that is, with those that in- '^^"^ order, beginning with '^ '^^^ ^"^^ «^ '^' '^^ that one s the more complex ulin'. thr'^s^I' volve fewest relations, and never passing to "^ governing the attention the ^C. 1^7 ^r '""P^^^' of the simpler, and rendered r^inHmind without dividing it.- save when we have clearly grasped But in order to understand the compare Descartes' Rule V: mportance of these rules it is them familiar.22 ^j^h this we may necessary to see the errors into ** which philosophers Method consists entirely in the order and disposition of the fall who do not apply them vision must be directed if we The philosophers of the objects toward which our mental School do not follow the first niost and shall comply with it exactly if elementary rule of exact would find out any truth. We thought which is to reason only I propositions step by step to concerning that of which we reduce involved and obscure we have clear ideas, and to com then starting with the intuitive ap- those that are simpler and \^ ^*,/' ^^^^^ ^"^ ^^^^"^^ t^ ^hat is complex.- simple attempt to Aristotle,SLi who well merits prehension of all those that are absolutely the title of the prince of these osophers phil- of all others by precisely similar steps." m Malebranche 's opinion, ascend to the knowledge almost always reasons a"- In the fifth place, says Malebranche, we should abbreviate our ^^ }^^^ ^^<^^ived by sense and TJ^^y A '^^^f on certain other imagination, or write them vague and indeterminate ideas ideas and then arrange them in our which represent nothing in par- not occupy too much of the down on paper, so that they may ^^.'^tle's physics is the worst^exam^ple to this we may compare Descartes' otmJ" 't TT. capacity of the mind.^* Now '^ '' \" ^^ '^' ^^^^^^ t^^t the sensible matters which do not re- oLmtr.AV^'qualities of thin^ ^Tbelong Rule XVI, ''When we come across to the things themselves rather than even though they are to our minds.- If one ciuire our present attention, it is better, asks for example those who have passed them by highly abbre- their entire lives in the necessary to our conclusion, to represent reading of the ancient philosophers and rather than by complete figures. This guards physicians (mcdeans) as to viated symbols, whether water is humid, fire drv on the one hand, and, on wme hot the blood of against error due to defective memory, fishes cold, or as to whether plants and thought which an effort animals have souls, they the other, prevents that distraction of will reply at once without consulting to keep those matters in mind while attending to other instances » Op. cit.. p. 66. •• Recherche, II. p. 310. » Op. cit., Vol. I. p. 49. '0^')'''''" ^^ '^/ '"''''''^' ^' Descartes and Malebranche » Recherche, II, 309. •Jon "more 'tneraflinrs''';? v- ^ 011^-Laprune. La philosophic de p. 79ff. Malebranche, Vol. I, « Op. cit., Vol. I. p. 19. Rule VII. * Recherche, II, p. 311. » Recherche, II. p. 309. * Recherche, II, p. 312. » cit., 14. *> Op. p. Recher(he,II, p. 313. a* Recherche, II, p. 309. " Recherche, II, p. 314. 54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE METHODOLOGY 55 anything but their sense and their memory of what they have tion, we can hardly avoid adoring what we love read. They do not see that these terms are all equivocal, and and fear.'« Thus the admission of subordinate powers into nature is the they find it strange that one should care to define them. They basis of pagan . But the development of this grow impatient if one tries to make them see that they are going theme, which leads into Malebranche 's whole scheme of occasional too fast and that their senses are misleading them.^^ If we re- causes, may well be postponed to a later chapter. member that the greater part of the questions of philosoph^rgf The rule that we should begin with and physicians include such equivocal terms as we have just the simple and advance to the complex was completely disregarded mentioned, we cannot avoid believing that there is nothing solid by the scholastics. This rule is contrary to the natural inclination of men, who nat- in all of their big books.'^^ Descartes proceeded in another way; f urally despise the simple because it appears he knew how to distinguish things from each other and he did too easy." The mind has a natural striving for the not answer questions with ideas drawn from sense-impression. infinite and love of what is obscure and mysterious." The reason is, not that the If people would take the trouble to read him, they would find mind really loves shadows, but that it hopes to find in the that he explains in a clear and evident manner the chief effects shadows the good that it desires, and which it knows cannot be of nature solely from the ideas of extension, figure, and move- attained in broad daylight in this world." Vanity also leads ment.^^ minds to plunge into the great and extraordinary. '« Experience Besides ideas draw^n from sense-perception, the philosophers teaches that exact knowledge of ordinary things gives no reputation of the School use general logical terms by means of which they in the world, and determines those who are more can explain anything without having any special knkowledge sensitive to vanity than to truth to search blindly for a specious knowledge of all that is of it.^^ Such terms are genuSy species, act, power, nature, form, grandiose, rare and obscure.'^ Many reject the faculty, , cause in itself, and cause hy accident, etc.^^ The philosophy of Descartes for the amusing reason that partisans of Aristotle do not understand that these words sig- its principles are too sim- ple and easy.'8 There are no obscure and nify nothing and that one is no wiser after one knows that/ fire mysterious terms' in his philosophy ; women and people who know neither dissolves metals because it has the faculty of dissolving, and that Greek nor Latin can understand it, therefore it is thought a man does not digest because he has a weak stomach or because worthless. It is imagined that principles so simple and clear his faculte cancoctrice does not perform its functions well.^^ cannot explain na- ture and that it is better to use incomprehensible Senna purges because of its purgative quality, bread nourishes principles of explanation.'® because of its nutritive quality; these propositions are not er- The Fourth III Chapter of the Sixth Book, roneous, but they have no significance. They do not involve us Part II, of the Re- cherche elucidates this point at length, but along in error, but they are entirely useless in the pursuit of truth. lines with which we are now familiar. It also develops The most dangerous fallacy in the philosophy of the an- in some detail Descartes' vortex theory of the universe. Time prevents cients, which arose because the ancients did not follow the max- any consideration of this latter development. The Fifth Chapter is ims of the method of clear ideas, was the notion that there are an intensive critique of the peripatetic system and in certain subordinate powers in nature. If we consider attentively particular of Aristo- tle *s De * Coelo. The Sixth Chapter, ' the idea of cause or power of action we see that this idea con- General Advice Necessary to Conduct One's Investigation of Truth," etc., tains something divine in it.'* The idea of a sovereign power is adds little or nothing to what has already been said. the idea of a sovereign divinity, and the idea of a subordinate The Seventh Chapter, **0n the Use of the First Rule as Regards Particular power is the idea of an inferior divinity.'* We therefore admit Ques- tions/' and the Eighth Chapter, ''Application of the that there is something divine in the bodies that surround us if Rules to Particular Questions," while valuable we admit that there are forms, faculties, virtues, or real beings and suggestive in them- selves, call for no particular comment or any other beings capable of producing effects by the force of here. The same is true of the Ninth Chapter, which deals with the cause their own nature.'^ We necessarily tend to adopt the feelings of hardness, that is, of the union of the parts of bodies with each of the pagans if we respect their philosophy.''* It is hard to other, from the standpoint of method. persuade oneself that one should neither love nor fear real pow- Malebranche's philosophical ideal act upon us ;'^ and love and fear being genuine adora- now stands before us. ers that In spirit it is identical with the spirit of exact science, which has » always Recherche, II, p. 317. found its philosophical foundation in rationalistic phil- »> Recherche, II, p. 318. " Recherche, II, p. 324. »* Recherche, II, p. 322. " Recherche, II, p. 336. » Recherche, II, p. 323. " Recherche, II, p. 337. METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 57 PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 56 THE

is deep enough to be both osophy, or rather in philosophy that says: 'In general, as rationalistic and empiristic. As Novaro not combat sense and ex- has been said, he (Malebranehe) does and that Chapter VI: Malebranche's Metaphysics and perience as such, but rather unscientific Theology. natural science upon empty scholastic philosophy which bases conceptions that same Schopenhauer, in the Preface to the World as Will and Idea, particular facts of sense and arbitrary DMogues, Malebranehe remarks of his own system: '*A single thought, however philosophy which Galileo fought in his com- experience to mere prehensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect opposes reason or science, that is, scientific unity. If first stage it admits of being broken up into knowledge and regards this latter the parts to facilitate its com- empirical ^ munication the center and measure of all the connection of these parts must yet be organic, of knowledge in which man is between their subjective and i, e., it must be a connection in which every part supports the things, and draws no distinction whole just as much as it is supported by it, a connection in objective aspects.^® which there is no first and last, in which the whole thought gains distinctness through every part, and even the smallest part can- not be completely understood unless the whole has already been grasped. A book, however, must always have a first and last line, in and this respect will always remain very unlike an or- ganism, however like one its content may be ; thus form and mat- ter aj-e here in contradiction. '^ ' The same is true, of course, of any philosophical system and is particularly true of so closely integrated a system as that of ^Malebranehe. It has frequently been necessary in our expositions of the Psychology, Epistemol- ogy and Methodology of Malebranehe to assume conceptions which cannot be understood save in the light of his metaphysical doctrine. It is now to this central doctrine that we turn our attention. Here our guide is the Entretiens sur la metaphysique et la religion, which, as Joly says, is 'Toeuvre ou il faut chercher le fruit le plus suhstantiel de sa pleine maturite."^ Here Male- branehe 's system is expounded in systematic and complete form, and the center of gravity is no longer, as in the Recherche, in H psychology and theory of knowledge, but is rather in metaphy- sics and theology. Mind and Body.

The Premier Entretien establishes the distinction between ^ mind and body. Indeed, as Kuno Fischer says: *'The funda- mental speculative question, which dominates the doctrine of our philosopher (Malebranehe), lies in the application of dualistic principles to the possibility of our knowledge of things: How can the essence of bodies become known to the mind, if there is between mind and body no natural community but on the con- trary a complete opposition ?* '« The discussion opens with the proposition that the Nothing has no properties.* From this Malebranehe advances to the Car-

* World o* Wm and Idea, Trans. Haldane and Kemp. Vol. I, p. viii. ' Jobf, p. 55. « Genchirhte der neuern Philosophie, Vol, II, Ed. 5, p. 54. * Entretienn, p. 5. Cf. Novaro, op. cit., p. 26. BouilUer. I03f. » Philosophie d€S N. Malebranehe, p. 18. Of. ;

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE METAPHYSICS 58 AND THEOLOGY 59

think, hence I am. But what am I \/tesian cogito, ergo sum. I this distinction Malebranche can conclude an infinity of truths I think? Am I body, spirit, mant I who think, at the time that it is the foundation of the principal dogmas of philosophy.^^ I only know that nothing of that ; In the first place, I know Here then we have the Cartesian distinction between exten- something which thinks. But can a body sion and thought upheld when I think I am in its integrity, and made the basis of y in length, breadth far-reaching think? Can something which is extended a metaphysical construction. But before we can Beyond a doubt, no; for all understand this metaphysical and depth, reason, desire, or feel? construction, we must understand d'etre) of such an extended the third substance in which the two finite substances the ways of existing (manieres are K/' distance and it is evident grounded, that is, God. thing consist solely of relations of ; not perceptions, reasonings, pleasures, that these relations are Intelligible Extension and the . this not, in a word, thoughts. Hence 1 desires, or feelings, It is in the Deuxieme Entretien that the existence of God is that thinks is not a body." proved. The foundation of geometrical knowledge is intelligi- pure thought as Descartes has The essence of mind then is ble extension, and infinite intelligible extension eternally is not a modifi- ' that thought as pure thought is said And it is clear cation of the finite mind.'^ It is immutable, eternal, and neces- extension. But perhaps matter is distinct from matter as pure sary." Whatever is immutable, eternal, be- and necessary, and extension. Perhaps my body is something something besides above all infinite is not created, but belongs to the creator." it is finger that feels the extension, for it seems that my Hence there is sides a God and a reason ; a God in whom is found the heart that desires, my brain that reasons. pain of a wound, my archetype of the created world, and in whom is also found the that my body is nothing but pure ex- Prove to me, says Ariste, reason which enlightens me by purely intelligible ideas." For thinks, wills, and will admit that my mind, which tension and I I am sure that all men are united to the same reason that I am, nor corporeal.' Do you not under- reasons, is neither material since I am certain that they see or can see to form what I see when I that it suffices to have extension stand, replies Theodore, enter into myself, and there discover the truths, or necessary and everything else of which j a brain, a heart, arms, and hands relations, that the intelligible substance conceived of universal reason in- composed.' Whatever is can either be your body is cludes.^* Nevertheless, although it is in God that we behold in- alone.' Now whatever can be con- alone or cannot be conceived telligible extension, we only see the archetype of the material anything else, that is, can alone and without thought of world and of infinity ceived an of possible other worlds ; we do not be- everything else, is a as existing independently of be conceived hold the divine essence in itself, but only in so far as it is repre- which cannot be conceived alone or with- substance.' And that sentative of material creatures.^* We can infer with certainty is a mod- anything else is a maniere d etre, that out thinking of from infinite intelligible extension that God is, for nothing finite Roundness, for example, cannot be an ification of substance.' can contain an infinite reality." But you do not see what God always refers us to something independent existence by itself; it is, for God has no inat limits in his perfections, and what you be- possesses roundness as an attribute, which is round, or hold when you think of immense spaces is deprived of an infin- t. e., extendea is not roundness, is matter, which is round, but ity of perfections. Thus the divine essence, in itself, escapes us. substance and in no sense substance.'" Hence extension is a Infinite intelligible extension, then, is only the archetype manner of being.'/ Modifications of merely a modification or of an For relations infinity of possible worlds like our own." When we think consist merely in relations of distance." extension of that extension we only behold the divine essence in so far as compared, measured, and exactly determined of distance can be it is representative impossible to measure in of bodies." But when we think of being, the principles of geometry, and it is by and not of such and such beings, when we think of the infinite feelings. Hence my soul is not this manner our perceptions or and not of such and such an infinite, it is certain that we do not substance, and has no resemblance to ; is a thinking material it From behold so vast a reality in the modifications of our own minds." substance of which my body is composed. the extended For if the modifications of our own minds do not have enough

» Entretifn», p. 5. *• Entretiens, p. 8. On the distinction between mind and body, cf. Novaro, p. 33f. • Cf. Bouillier. p. 35. " Entretiens, p. 26. Cf. 0116-Laprune, La phQosophie de Malebranche, Vol. I, ' Cf. Joly, p. ll«ff. p. 143f. ** • Entretiens, p. 6. Entretiens, p. 28. Cf. Kuno Fischer, Qesehxchte der neuern Philosophie, Ed. 5. 54. neuern PhUosorhie. Vol. II. Ed. 5. p. Vol. II. p. 73. • Cf. Kuno Fischer. Gesekiehts der " Entretiens, p. 28. Cf. Novaro, Die PhUosophie des N. Malebranche, p. 31. » Bouillier, p. 34. Cf. For Noraro. Malebranche's proof of the existence of God means Das Sein wird gedacht " Entretien*, p. 7. —dtu Sein ist.

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OF MALEBRANCHE METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 60 THE PHILOSOPHY 61

extension, how There is a possibility, however, reality in them to represent infinite intelligible that we ourselves have cre- all ways?** Thus ated this idea of being in can they represent that which is infinite in general or of the infinite. Perhaps the the indeterminate being, only mmd constructs general ideas only God, only the infinite, only from several particular ideas infinite, can contain the infinitely infinite When we have seen several trees, the infinitely infinite an apple tree, a pear tree, and think of being.^« Being, reality, a plum tree, reality which we think when we we construct a general idea of ''tree/' so far After we perfection, is not the divine substance in have seen several indeterminate beings, we construct an idea of being be a contradiction in gen- as representative of a creature.^^ It would eral. Thus this idea of being in general may be only a engender a being in general or being infi- confused were God to make or assemblage of particular ideas.- If himself our ideas were infinite, they all ways that would not be identical with God could nite in not be of our own creation, but perhaps participate in the divine they are finite, the do not although It the Son and IS through them that we ^3 circle perceive the infinite The completely receive it.^^ Again the idea of a answer being; they to this is that our ideas are finite so far as intelli- if by ideas you under- general is not the intelligible extension in stand the in perceptions or modifications of our minds ^^ representative of such and such a circle." But if gible extension is you understand by the idea of the In the infinite that which is the im- of a circle in general covers infinite circles." mediate The idea object of the mind when you contemplate restriction, of infinity, is not the infinite same way the idea of being without assuredly that is infinite.^^ The impression that the infinite creatures, but the idea that represents the divinity." the idea of makes on the mmd is finite.^^ Nevertheless, created and possi- although the mind Being includes all things, but all things both is always more touched, more penetrated, more modified cannot exhaust its vast extent." by a ble, with all their multiplicity, finite Idea than by the idea of the infinite, there is more reality is." God, then, is : He that in the Idea of the infinite than in that of the finite.^^ We imag- infinite, is not visible by an idea that rep- But God, or the ine that we have drawn our general arche- ideas from an assemblage him." The infinite is its own idea." It has no of particular resents ideas. We think of a circle of one " made, and only creatures, only foot diameter type It can be known, but not then of one of a two foot ' diameter, then ' are visible by the one of three, of four such and such beings, which are ' makable, ' and finally we do not determine the diameter at circle, a house; a sun, all and think ideas that represent them." We can see a of a circle in general. Now this circle in general cannot be a when such an object does not exist, for every finite object confused even assemblage of the particular circles of includes the intelligible ideas which we have can be seen in the infinite, which thought for it represents ; an infinite number itself nothing of circles and we But the infinite can only be seen by ; only can of all things. have thought of a finite number of exists.^^ We circles.^* The fact represent it.^^ If we think of God, he is that finite can we find the secret of forming the idea being without contem- of circle in general can contemplate the essence of a finite by seeing five or six circles. This is true in one sense is true of God. We can and false its existence ; but the opposite m another. plating It is false that there is enough existence, for he is reality in the ideas behold his essence without admitting his ot hve or six not circles to form the idea of circle in Thus the proposition, There is a general. But himself his own archetype.^^ It IS true m this sense, that, after existence having recognized that the in itself the clearest of propositions affirming size of God, is circles does not change their properties, we am.^"^ have perhaps is as certain as / think, therefore I ceased considering and them in order and begun to La phUosophie de Malebranehe, Vol. I. consider them in !• Entretiem. p. 28. Cf. 0116-Laprune, genera and as of indeterminate (luantity.-^* We could not form p. 232ff. general 29. ideas if we did not find " Entretienft, p. 28 and p. in the idea of the infinite suffi- i« On this point rf. Bouillier. p. 107. cient reality to give generality to our ideas.^* You can » EntretietM, p. 29. only ihmk of an indeterminate diameter » Entretiens, p. 30. because you see the infinite reaction of the modernw«^or« « It \h interesting to observe the m extension, EntretienM p. 30. that is that you can augment or Aristotle, to Malebranches doctrine. Oar^ diminish a diam- scholastics, as eve'r the faithful disciples of eter to infinity.- follows: "The fundamental Without the idea of the infinite, dinal Mercier. for example, writes as ^»^fj^ you could for instance, (a) were^^f the«'/J"knowledge think only of clearly belied by many psychological facts: such and such a particular is and proper circle but never of a from Him it would be a positive we hare of God immediately derived circle m general." No finite are all either negative or analogical, and determinate idea can knowledge, whereas our present ideas of Him represent as we have seen, upon the senses anything of the infinite All our intellectual cognition is dependent, and indeterminate, but (b) immedi- the mind, with- supersensible and absolute for its direct and vet if our intellect has what is The theory stands al«. how has such a dependence any explanation! • 'ate object, en- Mntreticng, p. 33. that may be deduced from it. For. if we condemned by some of the consequences ** should necessarily be in V<^^^^ EntreticfUf, p. 34. joyed an intuition of the Divine Essence (a) we happiness; (b) there wou d be no error possible ** Entrf'tirnft, of our highest good and complete p. 35. doubts about his existence and attributes. " about God. and (c) there would be no EntretienM, p. 36 liondon. 1916. Vol. I. Manual of Modern Scholastic Philoaophy. .

METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 63 62 THE contingent in character. Like all created beings, it is a ideas the idea of a generality product out reflection, joins to its finite of the free act of God. As Joly remarks,^* this apercw—that is, infinite." finds in the . • that it , the distinction between intelligible and material assemblage of particular ideas can extension—does Thus a mere confused sufficiently distinguish Malebranche from mix twenty colors together Spinoza. On the one never possess true generality. If we hand, the transcendent color God, on the other, the immanent God. color in general, but some particular we do not obtain The discussion between de Mairan and IMalebranche in general we fail in the develops mix feelings to obtain a feeling interesting If we many and instructive points. Unfortunately the lim- " Every modification of the mind is, as the modihca- same way its of the present study prevent the exposition here. itself a particular thing, and is unable tion of a particular being, It is interesting because to compare this demonstration of the ex- generality." We must not suppose that to possess true istence of God with the arguments of Descartes. ideas that they are more Descartes uses modifications are more sensible than three arguments. The first is from the idea of God to the cause like that of people who say that there real." Such a judgment is of the idea of God which can only cubic foot of be God himself. "There is in a cubic foot of lead than in a is more matter no doubt,'' he says, ''that those (ideas) which more reality than the represent to me " This is to give the prick of a pin air substances are something more and contain so to speak more being itself." In this way Male- whole universe and the infinite objective reality within ideas to them (that is to say, by representatiop the empiricist, who would reduce our branche answers participate in a higher degree of being or perfection) defends his idea of God. than those mere heaps of sensations, and thus that simply represent modes and accidents ; and Malebranche explains how the that idea again In the Troisetne Entretien by which I understand a substance the supreme God, eternal, infinite, immuta- as universal reason includes in its divine Word ble, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things possible thin^.» All in- which are ideas of all created and outside primordial of himself, has certainly more objective reality in sovereign reason and discover in it itself telligences are united to this than those ideas by which that in- finite substances are represented. wills.'" Thus, we cannot doubt ideas according as God Now it is evident by the natural light is con^ that there must at least is the archetype of bodies, telligible extension, which be as much reality in the minds and efficient and total cause as in its ef- universal reason which enlightens all tained in the fect."" Therefore there must be a God Thus there is a pro- since otherwise we with whom it is consubstantial.- should even him have no idea of him. The second argument is "la lumiere de nos idees and les essentially found difference between a restatement of the first. difference What, less than God, can be the cause propres modifications."'" It is this tenebres de ses of the existence of me who contain in myself argument for the existence of the idea of God V^ is the basis of the ontological The third that argument, which Descartes says has the appearance of expounded by Malebranche." • being God as ^ i ^ a sophism," is the in between intelligible and material ex- its purest It is the distinction form. ''But when I think Malebranche from that of it with more attention, I clearly that distinguishes the system of see that tension existence can no more be separated from the essence of comes out in the very interesting correspond- of Spinoza. This God than can its having three angles Mairan, a well-instnicted equal to two right angles ence between Malebranche and de be separated from Spinoza Ue the essence of a rectilinear triangle, or the student of both Malebranche and and skillful idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley, turns to Malebranche for aid and so there is Mairan, as Kuno Fischer says,'» not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, of Spinozistic . Male- a in withstanding the attraction being supremely perfect) system of to whom existence is lacking, (that is of a fundamental error in the branche had spoken to say, to whom a certain perfection this error is? Male- is lacking) than to con- not make it clear just what Spinoza; will he ceive of a mountain which has no valley. "^» has not adequately distinguished branche replies that Spinoza It is, in of course, only with this third argument that Male- real extension, between the world between intelligible and branche 's of argument is to be compared. We immediately behold world. The world of eternal ideas is, God and the created the essence and existence of or real space- the divine being and discern that ; created extension course, necessary in character they are inseparable. not necessary but Spinoza's arguments are virtually the Spinoza called an attribute of God-is same. what The Ethics^^ defines God as "a being absolutely infinite—

>• Entretiens, p. 37. "* Joly, "' Entretie'M, p. 38. p. 81. » Meditations. PhUosophical » Entretiens, p. 39. Works, Trans. Roks and Haldane, p. 162 74. Meditations, » On this whole matter cf. Bouillier, p. Op. cU., pp. 167-171 » 42-43. " Op. cte., p. 118. Entretiens, p. • 60f. Op. cit., p. 181. » Cf. Joly, p. 55f and p. . Frapmentn de phao>'oph\e eartisxenne. • Chief Works » Cf. Victor Cousin, of Benedict de Spinoza, trans, by R. H. M. Elwes, Vol. II. Vol. II, 86. » Gettchiehte de neuern rhilottorhie. p. < ^

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 64 METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 65 which that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of "*° you ask me the cause of the pain that each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality. Proposition we feel when we are pricked, I should be wrong in answering at once XI establishes the conclusion that ''God, or substance, consist- that it is one of the laws of the author of nature of which each expresses eternal and that being pricked is fol- ing of infinite attributes, lowed by pain. I should first tell you that the fibers infinite essentiality, necessarily exists," because, as Proposition of our flesh cannot be separated without ' of substance. disturbing our nerves which VII states, ' Existence belongs to the nature reach to the brain, and without disturbing the brain Many a proposition of the Ethics might have been written itself. But if you wish to know whence it comes about that when by Malebranche. Consider, for example, the following, Proposi- a certain part of my bram is disturbed in this way, I feel the tion XIII: "Substance, absolutely infinite, is indivisible/* pain of being pricked, we can assign no further natural or Proposition XV: ''Whatever is, is in God, and without God particular cause but must refer to the author of nature.** or be conceived." Proposition XVII: "God We clearly see that nothing can be there can be no necessary connection between the acts solely by the laws of his owti nature and is not disturbed disturbances of the brain and the feelings of the any one." Proposition XX: "The existence of God and soul; therefore, we must by have recourse to a power which is not contained in his essence are one and the same." Proposition XXIV: "The these two beings.*» There is no metamorphosis of physical essence of things produced by God does not involve existence. event into phy- sical event. The disturbance ' only of the of the brain cannot change : ' God is the efficient cause not itself Proposition XXV into a mental state.*« When we press the corner of existence of things but of their essence." Proposition XXX: the eye you see light this is because ; he who alone can act "Intellect in function finite or in function infinite, must com- upon minds has established certain laws according of God and the modifications of God and to which body and soul re- prehend the attributes ciprocally correspond to each other.*« You see else." Proposition XXXI: "The intellect in function, a light where nothing there is no luminous body because luminous bodies finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, should be' re- act in a sim- whether liar way on the nervous system and the brain, and ferred to passive nature and not to active nature." These God acts ac- cording to constant laws.*^ God performs propositions show how the two systems tend to coincide, al- no , says Malebranche in this between a transcendent and an connection.*^ His conduct alwavs bears the though the radical difference character of his attributes: it remains forever never to be lost sight of.** the same, unless immanent God is m some circumstances, his immutability is a lesser consideration as compared with some Occasionalism.*^ other of his perfections.*^ God does not stand les hras croisrs:'' everything that happens Entretien Malebranche discusses the na- in the world In the Quatrieme is an expression of his aetivity.*^ There is no necessary connec- ture of sense, the wisdom of the laws of the union of the soul and the body, and the fact that this union was changed into of the OCCMwnahKm If I consider myself In speaking acting. I • dependence by the sin of the first man.*^ become conscious of two things first that my act is real. and. secondly, that until it i.s over to what we have not already and done with it is thorou^hlv nature of sense he adds nothing dependent upon me." "If we study the thin^^s of nature we see a m rvluVvarTetf point is brought out in our review of the Recherche. The chief "°^ '""^^^°"- Ttiier ^l: r"'''/"l'^" •" ^«^ -»^^* >« «" this profuse variety qualities.** But in the next division """' "'," ""* '"'"^^* '^'''''' Such richness would be pur^ the subjectivity of sensible ^sitssposeless andTa meaninglessV"'' prodigality." Op. rit.. Vol. I. 540. the very important doctrine of p. Furthermore ''oc- of the dialogue he expounds '"""'"•" ''''- "'^^^^^ ^ZtTe;:m'7r540K" ^^- ^ •^^«'^-'" ^^^- ^^O) and ; occasionalism as an explanation of the relation between mind ^""•.^^^''w. P- 78. Thus Leibniz's famous figure of the clock-maker, and body. When we investigate the reason of certain effects, ohli..*^ who was •*?•'' "^ ""'' ^'^^''^ *^ ^^^^ '""'^ accu^M'''H r*^^""' ^""^''^^ together, is a veryT eifect to cause we come in the end to a general occasionalism. This conception and ascend from accordilt''"'^''"" ?' of God's action taking place ""»^«''^"' ^^<'r^^^< and not according one clearly sees has no relation to to particular decrees, is one of Male- cause, or to a cause which bran.t"'' '"»^«^t""t theological positions. The diflFerence between then, in place of constructing Ltnw l^T Liebniz's pre- the effect that it produces, and Malebranche's occasionalism is very nearly b^th t\nn^ »!rr'' r."^ one of names, for If bo^l, thinkers believed in an immutable God, chimeras, we must have recourse to the author of nature. who foresees everything, and rules every- unchanging will. We are sorry KoiJ-T^'Sl'^^ ^J""" to note that Mr. Russell, in his scholarly Philosophy of Leibniz, * accepts Leibniz's misinterpretation of « Part I, Def. 6. Malebranche . r^. Phil-m , 1^^ advantage which he (Leibniz) had over « There thus seems to be some exasperation in Hegel's statement that "D%t wh.VH k"^'*^ occasionalism, and of '"*•* ^***^ ^^^ "^*^^^*y den»elben Inhalt ahdrr SpinozUmus, aher in an "" "*^^ ^^ «>' «^«ry substance he was able to osophie deg Malebranche hat gam preserveZrolt Tthe u harmony of all the series, without Form." Geachichte der PhUosophie, Werke, 1844, XV, p. 369. On the perpetual intervention of God. derer, theolofjigher already secured Fischer. OesehichU der neu- ?® .7** in Spinoza, but not in occasionalism such as that the relation between Malebranche and Spinora. ef. Kuno «? w , I*° ./P-, ^^^'^- ^^^^''^ «^ Malebranche Vol. II, Ed. 5, p. 80f. iS'*°» ^"^ "*<*'"S would have con- em Philnsophie, vincedvL^J Mr. Russell of the contrary. op. eU., 43. *2 the whole matter of occasionalism rf. Novaro, p. *' On Entretiens, p. 79. a Entretieng, p. 69. *• Entretienti, p. 80. rit., 54. « Enfretienit. p. 76 77. Cf. Kuno Fischer. Op. p. *• Entretiens, p. 80. OF MALEBRANCHE 66 THE PHILOSOPHY METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 67 tion between the two substances of which we are composed.** sensible objects there is always a clear idea and a confused to mind or from feel- There is no relation of from body ing the idea represents ; their essence, the feeling informs certain disturbances us of mind to body.^*' (iod ceaselessly wills that their existence. «« The first gives us their nature, properties, and it is and of the brain be always joined with certain thoughts, relation among themselves ; the second the relation they bear to this constant and efficacious will of the creator that produces the the convenience and conservation of life.*« But as a whole this union of the two substances.''** dialogue adds very little to what we have learned from the Why did (iod will to join mind and body? The answer is, Recherche, apparently, that God wished to give us as he gave to his Son, a The Existence of Bodies. victim which we could offer to him.''** He wished to make us The Sixieme Entretien, on the contrary, on proofs merit, by sacrifice and self-annihilation, the possession of eternal of the existence of bodies drawn from revelation, on the two goods.^** For this reason we have our bodies. That our bodily sorts of revelation, and upon natural revelation as an occasion of error life might be conserved and at the same time our souls directed ' is relatively important.*^^ as far as possible upon eternal goods, God has established as an There are sciences of two sorts : One sort considers occasional cause of the confused knowledge we have of the pres- the re- lations of ideas the other, ; the relations of things ence of objects, and of their properties in relation to us, not the by means of their ideas.«« The first sort are evident in every activity of attention, but diverse disturbances in our brains.^* way ; the sec- ond are only evident on the supposition that He has given us distinct witnesses, not of the nature and prop- things resemble the ideas we have of them and according ^8 us, but of their relation to our to which we reason erties of the bodies that surround These latter sciences are very useful but they involve own bodies, to the end that we be able to work with success for great ob- scurity, for they presuppose facts concerning of our lives without being incessantly attentive which it is impos- the conservation sible to know the exact truth. But if we can find to our needs.^^ We are, however, subordinated to our bodies to some means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our reason of the original sin.''-* That a suppositions, we can the extent that we are by avoid error and at the same time discover truths which prick warn me is just and conformable to order, but that it more closely concern us.«« Thus the best use that we can should trouble me, make me unhappy, disturb my ideas and make of our mmds IS to discover what things are related is disorder, and is to us, what things prevent me from thinking of true goods, a can make us happy and perfect.*^ Thus it wisdom and goodness of the creator.^-^ The seems that the best unworthy of the use we can make of our minds is to attempt to understand explanation is that the human spirit has lost before God its dig- the truths which we believe wrath.** by faith.*« We believe these great nity and excellence ; we are sinners worthy of the divine truths, but that does not dispense those who can from filling their mmds with them Image and Meaning. and convincing themselves of them in all possible ways.«« For faith The Cinquieme Entretien discusses the use of the senses in is given us to regulate all the move- ments of our minds as well as between clear ideas and confused feel- those of our hearts.*^ It is given science, the distinction us to lead us to the understanding of those ing, and the fact that the idea illumines the mind, while it is very truths it teaches.®** by feeling {sentiment) that the intelligible idea becomes sensi- A man must be a good philosopher to will not be necessary to dwell very long on this dia- enter into the truths bie.^^ It of faith, and the stronger one is in the logue since the main ideas have already been brought out in our truths of religion the stronger one is in content ourselves with noting an metaphysics.®^ Good philosophers can not earlier discussion. We may ^^ Entretiens, p. 120. relation between image and admirably clear statement of the " Entretiens, p. 122. " meaning, to use the langimge of modern psycholog>^ It is not Entretiens, p. 123. *> Entretiens, 124. reason joined to sense, that enlightens us and discloses p. sense, but « Entretiens, 125. p. Cf. Bouillier. p. 139, and E. Boutroux, L'inteUeetualisme de the truth to us.^'*' It is the clear idea of extension and not black Malebranche, Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, Vol. XXIII, pp. 27-36. In this last paper It 18 shown that Malebranche, and white which are only feelings, only confused modalities of although an intellectualist, was obliged to extend his mtellectuahsm beyond the limits of mathematical truth and make it include sense, that gives mathematical truth.-'** In our perception of reli- *'^!!\*!;r ."'*"* *'^***- Thus Boutroux says: "Etant donn6e I'impossibilit^ de reduire a intelligible 1 mathematique une partie considerable des choses «> 81. que nous tenons pour EntretienH, p. des reaht^s. telles que I'existence du monde materiel et les v^rites " EntrHieTM, 84. morales et reli- p. gieuses deux partis sont possible : ou tenter de demontrer que ces Elements refracts ires ^ EntTitifTUt, p. 88. ne poBsedent aucune r^alit^ effective, et ne sont que des fantomes de notre imagina- ^ EntretienH, p. 87. tion; ou se demander si I'intelligence math6matique est bien toute I'intelligence si ** Entretiens, p. 88. I intelligence ne comporterait pas des modes de penser et de comprendre, analogues, * Entretiens, p. 96. mais sup^rieurs a la demonstration mathematique. De cette alternative, Malebranche »• Entretiens. p. 100. adopte le second terme" (p. 85). PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 68 THE METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 69 have opinions opposed to those of true Christians.®'* For wheth- rather this notion seems to exclude such a will.«« speaks to philosophers Onlv revels er Jesus Christ, the Word, eternal reason, tion can assure us that God did indeed wiU to create bodlS" souls, or whether he instructs Christians by There in their most secret are two sor s of revelation, natural him- and supernaturaP^ the visible authority of the Church, he cannot contradict The former take place according to certain general laws ways, but it always says the whL self."^ Truth speaks in various are known to us and the latter ; either according to philosophy to religion, unless certain un same thing.*=* We must not oppose known general laws, or by particular which does not volitions superadded to indeed it is the false philosophy of the pagans, the general laws.®^ Now both revelations are in invincible evidence which com- theSves a^ bear the stamp of truth, that thentic.®^ But natural revelation is now an occasion of error to submit.'^'* pels all attentive minds not because m itself it is false but because in the first place we there are three sorts of beings of which we can have do not make the proper use of Now it, and secondly because original God, or the infinitely perfect being; minds, that sin has corrupted our natures.®^ knowledge: The general rules of the union and bodies, of know by our inner feeling of our own souls ; mind and body are very we only wisely established.®^ Whence then the existence of which we are assured of by a revelation.*^ For comes It that we are now plunged in an infinity of errors/ It bodies.®* h is only by revelation that we know of the existence of because our minds are obscured, it because our union with uni- himself who produces in our souls all the different feel- versal reason is greatly It is God enfeebled by the dependence upon our which they are affected on the occasion of changes in ings by ''^ ''"' ^' P^^^'^ ^«" A« ^«d follows and accordance with the general laws goveniing the S?ought tof"" follow7ii exactly'r our bodies in the laws he has established concerning union of body and soul.®* These laws are nothing but the con- the union of the two natures of which we are composed, and al and efficacious decrees of the creator.®* Thus it is God we have lost the power that stant our rebellious animal spirits make himself who reveals to us what takes place outside of us.®* But m the bram, we mistake phantoms for realities.®^ But the cause perhaps there are no external bodies? Is the revelation that of our error IS not precisely the falsity of the natural revela- existence certain? It is certain that we tion, but rather the God gives us of their impudence and temerity of our judgments- bodies which do not exist, as for example when we m a word, the disorder see certain into which sin has thrown us- Never- sleep or fever disturbs our brains.®^ If God in consequence of theless there is no good reason for doubting the existence of Kis general laws sometimes gives us deceptive perceptions, could bodies in general.®« We see that the errors into which we fall Thus it seems that we should concerning bodies he not always give them to us? are merely because the irregularity conduct of our our judgment on the existence of bodies.®^ cannot influnce the ®« suspend uniformity of divine action There- of It is true that no exact demonstration of the existence ""^"^/^ ^^ mistaken concerning the IZ^ o i'^'^'^u existence of given.®*^ On the contrary it is possible to give an ^""^y^ "^^ ""^^^ ^^^ bodies can be Zt ? ^ ^^^^* concerning the exist- is impossible.®* ence of bodieskT m general. exact demonstration that such a demonstratioti For the different feelings we have infinitely perfect being includes no neces- consecutive, so chained For the notion of an riJf'^.u^^ •? together and so well or- sary relation to any creature.®® God is fully self-sufficient.®® ^PP^^"^ '^^'^^^^^ ^^^* ^od would have tuA } } . to have divinity, whence willed to deceive us Matter is not a necessary emanation from the were nothing of all that we see real ^® follows that no demonstration of the existence of matter is ^* '^ ^'""^^ ^"^ irresistible it no« .i i^ l^^* demonstration which divine res- cannot be resisted bodies is arbitrary ; this ; for whether possible.®® The existence of or not there are bodies, it is cer- the punishment of the tain that we see them and olution is not like the decrees involving that it is God alone who gives us these works. These latter de- perceptions.- God, then, wicked and the compensation of good presents to my mind tllese appear ances others like them are necessarily included of men, these books, these crees of God and many preachers ; I read in the New is the inviolable I estament of the miracles in the divine reason, that substantial law which of the Man-God, of his resurrection perfect being and gen- of his ascension to heaven, rule of all the decrees of the infinitely of the preaching of the apostles, of bodies is not nec- Its tortunate success erally of all intelligences.®® The will to create and of the establishment of the Church - infinitely perfect; 1 compare all these essarily included in the notion of a being appearances with my ideas of God, of beauty the of religion, of the sanctity of morality, relation of faith and res- and of the neces- «* Entretiens, p 125. On Malebranche's theory of the sity of a cult and at length I de Malebranche, Vol. I. p. lOOfT. Of. also Joly, ; am led to believe all son, see OU^-Laprune , La phUosophie that faith p. 149ff " Entretiens, p. 131. " Entretiens, p. 126. •• Entretiens, p. 133. •* Entretiens, p. 127. * Entretiens, « Entretiens, p. 128. p. 134. '" "• Entretiens, p. 129. Entrctitns, p. 135 OF MALEBRANCHE METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 70 THE PHILOSOPHY 71

proof of teaches.''^ I believe it without having a demonstrative than infidelity.^'* Men it, for nothing seems more unreasonable need an authority to teach them truths necessary to lead them end.'^ Now faith teaches that God created the heavens to their Cu.u>TEB is a di- VII: Malebranche's and the earth, and teaches me that the Holy Scripture Metaphysics and and positively that there vine book. This book tells me directly Theoixksy (Continued). "ap- are thousands and thousands of creatures." Hence my ' change into ** realities. '" Thus Malebranche re- pearances^' The Divine Omnipotence. before subjective idealism in the name of Christian faith." tires The Septieme Entretien is on the inefficacy of natural causes or the powerlessness of creatures, and on the proposition that »t IS only to God that we are directly and immediately united. As we have already seen neither mind nor matter can affect the other.'' Neither can body act on body.' It is contra- dictory to suppose that such action is possible. A body cannot move Itself.* This is evident from the pure essence of matter, intelligible extension." Now a body must be either in rest or motion, and it is self-contradictory for a body to be in neither rest nor motion.

The same will that created bodies always subsists, and should this w-.ll cease to exist, bodies would necessarily cease to exist.' It IS, then, this same will that puts bodies in rest or motion for It gives them existence, and, as existing, they must be in either rest or motion.' Hence it is self-contradictory that God should make a body and not give it either rest or motion.' It is sup- posed that when the moment of creation is past, God no longer gives bodies their rest or motion ; but the moment of creation never passes.' Should God cease to will that there be a world the world would be annihilated, for the world depends on the will of the creator.' The conservation of creatures is only their continued creation.' When a human architect dies, the house he has built may remain, but we depend essentially upon the creator. Since bodies depend essentially upon the creator they only exist as sustained by his continual influence, and thus what- ever takes place in the world is only an expression of divine activity.' The greatest, most fertile and most necessary of prin- ciples IS that God does not communicate his power to creatures and only unites them with each other by making their modali- ties occasional causes of effects he himself produces' One moving ball does not move another upon collision ; for one body can only communicate its motion to another body by communi-

"^ «"*-^*''-'' Entretieru, p. 136. i "' »" ««•. V.'. I. P. 321ff. p'-liVf.- problem cf. the ex- ^^. " «•/. 126ff. For a special study of the On this matter Joly, * Entretien*, L'^volution de l'ideali»m0 p. 149. istence of an outer world in Malebranche's system cf. Pillon, * Entretien*, p. 150f. phUoMophique No. 4, p. 108. dithuiti^me siicle, Malebranche et ses critiques, Annie , au ' Entretien*, p. 151. he is interested in showing Pillon is himself a subjective idealist {Cf., p. 206) and * Entretien*. p. 152. Cf. Bouillier, doctrine to his own position. Since our aim is merely p. 116f. the relation of Malebranche's ' Entretien*, account of PiUon s p. 153. in its original form, we have not given any to present the doctrine " Entretien*, our knowledge of what p. 155. Cf. Kuno Fischer, op. cU p 56 paper, which, valuable as it is in itself, adds very little to » Entretien*. p. 158. Malebranche himself thought. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 72 73

moving force of a moving body and Malebranche make eating its moving force ; but the ^a very similar analysis of causation. -» to the body but is the will of the There is a good deal of truth is not a quality that belongs in this position, but yet as Dr sustains it in existence in different Doxsee himself says, -Although creator which successively Malebranche remarkably an^ ticipates the position that was later to be developed by Hume ^ only to God, and depend directly the hnal place of causation Thus creatures are united in his system is by no means what have nothing that comes from the analysis just outlined would and essentially upon him." We seem to indicate. All the causal imaginary Nature of the philoso- efficacy that he denies to finite our own nature, or from the creatures he attributed to God '''^ from God." God himself is pres- The difference between Malebranche phers, but everything comes and Hume remains as rad- as simple spectator, but as the ical as the difference between ent in the midst of us, not a a rationalist and empiricist must the bond of our friendship, and the always be. For Malebranche, principle of our society, we must remember, has no occa- commerce." sion to deny causality in principle, soul of our . . as Hume u ivr i was forced to: on observe that Hume s rejection of Male- the contrary, his philosophy It is interesting to merely focuses causality in a su- of his dictum that all knowl- preme cause without branche's theory is a consequence questioning the validity of the example, edge comes from impressions. In the Treatise, for say, is entirely says: ** Matter, they (the Cartesians) Hume The Attributes of God. it may produce unactive, and depriv'd of any power, by which these effects are The Huiiieme Entretien, on or continue or communicate motion. But since God and his attributes, devel- produces them ops the same theme. By Divinity our senses, and since the power that we understand the infinite evident to being Deity, or that without restriction, the ^^ must be placed somewhere, it must lie in the infinitely perfect being We excellency and per- know that he exists by the thought divine being, who contains in his nature all of him.^^ God is independ- well ent, hence he is is certainly very curious, and immutable.- He cannot be affected fection . . . This opinion by outer superfluous to examine ^^^''^^' ; 'twill appear ^^ ^^«t ^^^^ds worth our attention but cTiT't. ^''^/...'^''''u'^^^^ change him- present purpose in i^ absolutely place if we reflect a moment on our p'^^^"^^^ ?"^ free, he does not change it in this hin^elf.-htClf^ it as a principle, that God forms his eternal decrees taking notice of it. We have established according to his eternll precedent wisdom, which IS the inviolable ideas are derived from impressions, or some rule of his actions, and although as all the idea of power and effects of these decrees are infinite perceptions, 'tis impossible we can have any and they produce thou- this sands and thousands of unless some instances can be produced, wherein changes in the universe, they are them- efficacy selves as these instances can unchanging.- But how can God power is perceived to exert itself. Now, be both free and im- proceeding upon mutable? The answer is that in never be discovered in body, the Cartesians, God there is no succession of recourse to a supreme thoughts and volitions. By an eternal their principle of innate ideas, have had and immutable act he only active being m knows and wills all that he knows and spirit or deity, whom they consider as the wills. He wills with per- tect liberty cause of every alteration in and entire indifference to create the the universe, and as the immediate world : but his be decrees assumed, they cannot the principle of innate ideas being allowed to be changed.- They are not abso- matter. But hitely serve us in necessary but necessary ^^ follows that the supposition of a deity can by the force of the supposition false, it Certain of of agency, which we search his decrees only hold for a limited no stead, in accounting for that idea time ; these are those concerning miracles. objects which are presented to our senses, When that time arrives, he does for in vain in all the change not own minds. For, his mind, for these special decrees or which we are internally conscious of in our have been included m that etenial act impression, the idea of a deity of will which is related to all if every idea be derived from an the times he includes in his eternity.^o if impression either of proceeds from the same origin ; and no tis equally God, then, is all-powerful, eternal, sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy, necessary and immense He IS immense because the the same course ot divine substance is • discover in such a principle ; everywhere in impossible to the the supreme universe and beyond it." God's reasoning should determine them to exclude it from work is contained in him; Malebranche but he is not contained in his work." being ' *" This passage sets the relation of Hume to It is because he is not Dr. Doxsee" that Hume ** in a clear light. It is maintained by Doxsee, op. eit., p. 692. *• Op. cit., p. 699. " Entretiens, p. 174. *» Entretiena, p. 159. " Entretiens, p. 175. " Entretiens, p. 164. " Entretiens, p. 176, ^ Entretiens, Tp. 165. ** Grow. 1886. p. 454. Entretiens. " Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. Ed. Green and p. 177, " Entretiens, M PhUosophieal Review, Vol. XXV. pp. 692-701. p. 179, METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 75 PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE ^4 THE an unworthy idea of the divinity. They regard God as the Were he corporeal he could cre- 1 ^hui ViP is everywnere^evervwhere.^^ ator of the universe and as that he is nothing more ; we cannot avoid corporeal ^^ substance does com- plaining of the idea they form of the infinite being. Men hu- manize all things, strip and the infinitely perfect being of all his essential attributes.'*^-* if we consult the idea of an infinitely perfect being, we see that omniscience is involved in it.^" God knows in himself aU that He knows.^^ He is not only wise but is wisdom itself, not only enlightenment but the light that enlightens.^^ It is by this wisdom that one of us sees what another sees. 1 see that two plus two are four, and 1 am certain that God sees this and that all minds either actually do or are able to see this.^^^ There is, however, this great difference between finite minds and the mind of God God is wise ; by His own wisdom, and we are wise by union with His wisdom.^^ The question may be asked wheth- er, when God sees that two plus two is four, and at the same time two persons behold the same truth, may there not be, not one truth which all three minds behold, but three similar truths? On the contrary, there are three similar perceptions of one and .utel.n.. of '»'' the same truth. gibk ««m.io.. is only the And we know that the perceptions are similar, ;».^,'"i"^„;,„,p, because we know that one and the same truth is perceived.^^ Thus is God not only the eliheieut cause of our knowledge, but mor. olsar than n.trii.. taton the otter hand nothing is also the formal cause.^^ ?od atmhnle that is to. e«ension is an is ^iwiSension" In taet. .(the also an attribute of the divinity. God includes .ssence. The in the simplicity to th. divin. of his being ideas of all things and of their fX SSn«. is that it is ai • the human mind infinite 1/ fv^of i« unintelligible to relations.^^ We can distinguish in God two sorts of truths, relations of magnitude and relations of perfection, spec- ulative and practical truths, relations which arouse judgments by ^ reason of their evidence and relations which furthermorei excite movements.^^* Twice two is four, and a man is worth receivr» av more than ot pans, an animal ; in the first, we have any composition TVinc tliprp is no a speculative truth or relation of 1"'=:^ .rtriinity magnitude ; in the second, we have a relation of ±^-^ i^i^rS s perfection.^* God knows and loves all that he includes within the simplicity of His being, and he loves everything in propor- tion to its perfection or according as it is lovable.^* He loves the immutable order which consists of the relations of people have perfection. .«». He is *t3,f.il::is"TS'!"e''oir'"ht:riny thus essentially just. He cannot positively and directly will that any disorder occur in His works, for he esteems BouilUer. p. 109. all a Entretiens, p. 180. and r/. creatures according to the perfections of their •« iJnfretwn*, p. 180. archetypes.^* is M Entretiens, p. 184. making God God neither good, nor merciful, nor patient, accuRf d !)>' ArnnuM of as these Malebranche,„„,»,; ^aswas ««<-»'';^ > a* BouilUer remarks. ^^.^^ ^,,,,,ed of Spi- things As ^^^, are commonly understood. ^^ Such ideas the are unworthy of corporeal and of deifying arBouilUer .ay.. Malebranche But as a °,f act the infinitely perfect ^^ Bouillier, p. 49. -J--';-^"" seen it w being. Nevertheless he regards nozism. Cf. "f ; ^„d. as we have good extension in God, not ,^" de Mai- places /."; "J''J;[;ns-^n that he answers •• Bntretiewt, between ^ntelhgab^J^!"^*^;e -^ -«^--;^^^:," p. 191. the distinction THe Nature of •* ly ^. oin.berg. Entretiens, p. 192. ran. Cf. Bouilher. ?• *"?, Aristotelian Society, Malebrancne,j^^^^„^,,;'v'oc..cimy* of the " Entretiens, p. 193. as concewedJ^'by Knowledge *« Entretiens, p. 194. Bouillier makes it clear that without the presupposition of 1916-17, p. 174. a universal truth we are forced into skepticism, 63. » Entretiens, p. 186. p. On the eternal truths cf 0116- Laprune, Vol. I, pp. 208ir. «• Entretiens, p. 187. "• Entretiens. p. 195. « £ntreti.n*. p. 188 Malebranche and Spinoza con- B^„i„ier. p. 106. On * Entretiens, p. 198. 1882. rZee. kJ.ue rH.oso.Ui^ue, p. llOf, sult P. fateCr .^in^rie^^ MALEBRANCHE METAPHYSJCS AND no THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEOLOGY 77

him." God does not de- in the sense that he had no need works and punishes those who offend of us." But we were made for Our minds him and the completely self-sufficient. " motive and end of his decrees can only pend upon "^us ; and is be found ceasele^y \P- in himself." In what sense may without Lis save in so far as God -P^«^- God be said to have created the Le only acts love of the good" God world for his glory ? When an architect has us a natural and irresistible made a building of according to his love of him- excellent architecture he takes a because he wills to act in us secret satisfaction in it for the to us that our perfections." He can not will work witnesses the skill of his art.-*^ Thus one can self and of his divine say that the "pon the ess of own be directed beauty his work does him honor, it which is the effect of his because bears the char- ove the m- lovable. He wills that acter of the qualities he esteems and loves.*^ lovable in the place of the more When a second made us f-e to fo'^ person contemplates the m'aWe Order'be our law. Since he has work of the architect and admires the can be punished and rewarded proportions, the architect draws therefrom or not to follow that Order we a second glory which one man offends another, nor is chiefly founded on the love and The sinner does not offend God as admiration he has of his own of vengeance, qualities as an him for the sake of the plea-sure architect.** Now God loves his own qualities and does God punish - he cannot act otherwise than a his work which expresses these attributes but God punishes him because thus glorifies him as of his perfections." God is the work of the architect glorifies him. cording to the immutable order Whether or not men observer of the eternal laws.- honor the works of God as they severe, always an exact should, he draws eternal glory aCs from them.*« Nevertheless this glory would not be enough to The Theory of Providence. determine him to act, unless there were something divine and further the theory of infinite in the Neuvieme Entretien develops world itself.*^ The universe, however great, how- The re- of pantheism must be ever perfect it may be, in Providence. First of all, the errors so far as it is finite is unworthy of a being can wiU supposed that the infinitely perfect God whose worth is infinite.*^ Now only union with futed It ^ from a divine 1 ourselves a necessary emanation person can render the world nothing and tha? we are worthy of being created by a di- difficult to believe that vine being.*^ finds it God foresaw • The Divinity- Malebranche and permitted the original sin this really held this view. Even proves that a universe redeemed y Eere have been philosophers who by Jesus Christ is better than a impiety (Spinoza) agrees that God universe without sin.*« The the author who revived this Incarnation of the Word in Jesus is true could Christ being." And if this Jiow first renders the world worthy of its is an infinitely perfect creator.*® modifications of the divinity T things be only parts and But why did God wait for an eternity created ignorant. before creating the unjust in his parts, unhappy, world? It IS Is H perfectin to be because he must leave the finite creature virtuous people; the es- There are more sinners than sential marks of finitude brutaMmpious? ; now the great mark of dependence is conflict between the div.n- believers ; what a to have not existed. more VoTa^erthan An eternal world would appear as a nec- necessarily hated blasphemed, parts ! God essary emanation Hv and his^vn A from the divinity.^« God draws from the he is! A God aveng- by ?he greater part of what world, through Jesus Christ, a glory and unknown compose'201. 357n. p. 210. Malebranche, Vol. I. p. *' 0116-Laprune. La phUoHophie de EntretienM, p. 211. ** » Entretiens, p. 205. Entretiena, p. 212. *• *« 20e. Entretiena, 214. EntreHens, p. (Pntretiena VIII) and a miair- p. calls Spinoza » « Entretiena, « Malebranche --^^^ 83 and p. 36; p. 216. Cf. Bouillier, p. 117f. Joly, p. 87f. and chritunnet,^ 'j'^flA). ^Cfv.i. ouBouimer. p. p. 165f. {Miditations metaphystque et On Arnauld's criticism of able Malebranche's theory of Providence, cf. OUi-Laprune.^ ' *» Entretiens, p. 206. Vol. II, pp. 42ff. *» Entretiena, p. 207. ^ Entretiena, p. 223. ** Entretiena, p. 208. PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY 7g THE 79

all possible nity nor did he will from all eternity ; the three angles of a triangle to be fashion that he can." God sees equal produce «««h *",^ because he knew that they could not bo otherwise. On the works and all possible ways to .»"%«^ con- ^Jj:he is trary, glory, only according to what because he created the world in time, it is for that reason as he acts only for his own can be produced and better than if he had created it from all the work which eternity ; and it is be- he is determined to choose this work, honor him more cause he willed the three angles of a triangle to be conserved by ways which, joined to necessarily equal to two right angles works produced by any other that this is true and cannot be other- haiany otLr -^l^-'^^^^t ''^^ his attributes wise; and so in other cases. . bear the character of . . Malebranche would have his work but his ways must only be created and agreed with the contrary view expressed by the world more perfect than ours could English Platon- li a ist, is too wise and oves h. Cudworth. Cudworth says, in his beautiful language: conserved by less 'perfect ways God ''Now it is certain the universe he has c'-^ated. A that if the Natures and Essences of all things, as to glory too well, to prefer this to ways less simple and fertile their being such and such, do depend upon a Will of God that world more perfect but produced by of the d.vme attn- is essentially Arbitrary, there can be no such thing bear as much as ours the character as Science wou^^d not or full of impious persons, of mon- Demonstration, nor the Truth of any .Mathematical or Meta- butes ^^ This is why the world is not only permits monsters; physical Proposition be known any otherwise, than by some of disorders of all kinds.- He ste,^ Revelation of the he creates them out of respect Will of God concerning it, and by a certain he DOsUively creates them.- But In this way we can conceive Enthusiastick or Fanatiek Faith and Perswasion thereupon, that for the Srsality of his ways.- other, all these worte God would have such a thing to be true or false at effeJts that contradict each such a time, that alltLe or for so long. all these d-orde^s -hjch And so nothing would be true or false Naturally whth onHict and destroy each other, with their gov- but Positively only, all Truth and Science being universe, are not in contradiction meer Arbitrari- disfigure the ous things. intelligence, and no impo- . . . Wherefore, as for that argument that unless cause, and show no want of ernS uniformity in the the Essences and Verities of things prodigious fecundity and perfect depend upon the arbitrary tence,Vut a Will of God, there would be something that was not God, inde- laws of nature." pendent upon God; if it be well considered, it will prove a meer Divine Reason. Divine Will and Bugbear, and nothing so terrible and formidable as Cartesius his will is subordinate seemed to think it. For there is no other genuine God does not act by pure will, but Consequence deducible from this Assertion, that God is above that the Essences and Verities to his reason. To claim everything.^^^^^f..^^^^^^^This are independent upon the Will of God, but than his pure will is to upset that there is an eter- other rule good nal and immutable Wisdom it confounds in the Mind of . . spreads darkness so thick that God. . Now all ?lise principle the Knowledge makes of all things a chaos.- Ac- and Wisdom that is in Creatures, whether Angels and evil true and false, and because God or Men, is nothing else but a principle, the universe is perfect Participation of the one Eternal, cording to this Immutable, to this view, are as true achieve- and Increated Wisdom of God, or several signatures wmed it.- ^lonsters, according There is in tr^th of that one Archetypal Seal, or like so other of the designs of God.- many Reflections of one ments as any and the which we behold beauty truth and same Face, made in several glasses, whereof some are in God an eternal order in work and to point out clearer, some obscurer, some standing nearer, some usSe and we do not fear to criticise his further off."^^ God himself, We have now before us Malebranche \s This eternal order is the law^ of metaphysics and i^ defects.- theolog>^ characters." in their main outlines. The remaining are written in his substance in divine and affinities either expansions of ideas we have already to note some of the contrasts discussed or else be- It is interesting long Malebranche Descartes, it will ^e in the special rather than in the gen- involved in this doctrine of voluntarism m theology eral history of philosophy. The Dinrme Entretien remembered, proclaimed an ultimate discusses independent of, the magnificence of God in the grandeur and nrd^clares that the divine will is absolutely indefinitely large he says, -to number of his works, the simplicity divine understanding. "Thus,- and fecundity of the wavs and prior to, the by which world in he conserves and develops them, the divine providence niustrate, God did not create the VT-^r'"'' 11^^^eter- in the first impression of than if he created it from all movement on matter, and the idea that that it would be better thus this first step which was not determined by general laws was M Entretiemi, p. 224. » Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 248. »* Prori- 119 and 125. On the theory • Treatise ronrernint; « Entretiens, p. 226. Cf. Bouilher. pp. Eternal and Immutable Morality, written before 1688 pub- op. cU.. Vol. I, p. 381ir. Iwhed 1731. Cf. Selby-BiKg8. BrUish dence in general see 0116 Lapruno. Moralist, Vol. II, p. 256f. For an account of Cudworth see Tulloch, » Entretiens, ^.2^\. Rational Theology in Enpland in the XVIIth Century Vol II pp. 198-801. 5' Entretientt. p. 232. SYSTEM OF ETHICS PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 81 go THE

The Onzieme Entretien con- vet ^ided by infinite wisdom.«« Providence as revealed in [iluS^the same subject and discusses combinations o rarrangement of bodies and in the infinite natural and the supernatural.- Dhvsical and moral, and of the Chapter VIII : Malebranche *s System of Ethics. as revealed fhf^oSe Entretien discusses divine Providence and the manner in which God in the laws of mind and body, We have now to examine Malebranche 's system of moral the angels and spiritual grace distributes temporal goods through philosophy.* This we find expressed in the Trait e de Morale of The TreiV/eme ^./r.t.eH shows am^^^^^^^^ L^ fSSje us Christ^- 1684. This work is among the earliest attempts in modem phil- as revealed in the mfalh- other things the Providence of God osophy to found the moral life upon a rational basis and de- the Quatorzreme Entretien hfs Church-^ And lastly serves very careful consideration as a document in the biUty of demon^ history incomprehensibility of the mysteries is a shows how the of rationalism. In fact, Malebranche 's ethics completes the sys- and discusses the Incarnation of straTive proof of their truth, tem of Descartes, although of course it also transforms it. Des- divinity against the Socmians, and Jesu Christ, defends his cartes, it will be remembered, had relegated the practical life even the Angels themselves, can shows that no creature, not of the individual to the Church and the State. He did not feel Jesus Christ.®^ ' ' * adore God save through obliged to discuss practical matters, ' for, ' he said, ' as regards that which concerns conduct, every one is so confident of his own good sense that there might be found as many reformers as heads, if it were permitted that others than those whom God has established as the sovereigns of his people, or at least to whom he has given sufficient grace and zeal to be prophets, should be allowed to make any changes in that."^ Nevertheless there was contained in the im- \/ petus to a rational foundation of the moral life as well as of the theoretical life, and this tendency is expressed in the ethical system of Malebranche.

Love of the Eternal Order. The Traite de Morale opens with a reaffirmation of the doc- v/ trine of Vision in God. The Reason which enlightens all men is the Word, the divine Logos, or the wisdom of God.^ Thisi

reason or light I have in common with all men ; the pain I feel, for example, is a modification of my own substance but the truth that I contemplate is a good common to all minds.* Thus by means of reason I enter into communion with God and all intelligences and this spiritual society consists in participation in the intelligible substance of the Word, in which all spirits can nourish themselves.* Now in thus contemplating the divine substance I can discover a part of what God thinks, and also a part of what he wills, for he wills according to the Order.* That is, he loves things in proportion as they are lovable, and I can discover what things are more perfect, more estimable, and more lovable than others.*

' In general, on Malebranche's ethics, ef. Novaro, op. cit., and 0116-Laprune, op. eit., Vol. II, p. 4«8ff. ^

' Discourse on Method, Part VI, p. 119 of the Haldane and Ross translation. « Entretiens, p. 233ff. Vol. I. 29611. " Entretiens, p. * Morale, p. 1, 333fl. « EntretUns, p. * Morale, p. 2. •• Entretieng, p. 265flf. ;

SYSTEM OF ETHICS OF MALEBRANCHE 83 82 THE PHILOSOPHY of relations of perfection, or practical truth, that constitutes our substance of the Word contains within Now the intelligible perfection.** But if virtue is obedience to a divine law, obedi- of truths or relations, relations of magnitude itself two sorts ence to nature is merely obedience to divine decrees and is perfection. These relations of perfection con- and relations of necessity rather than virtue.'** We can resist the action of God Order which God consults when he acts stitute the immutable without disobeying the eternal Order, for, although God wills which should be the rule of the loves and the immutable Order only according to the eternal Order, he often acts contrary to and a false, all intelligences.^ There is thus a true actions of it.® For the eternal Order itself dictates that God act in a uni- with regard to all intelligences, for all m- a just and an unjust, form and constant manner.'** Thus, in consequence of his eter- behold the same relations of magnitude, telligences necessarily nal laws, he may act in particular cases in opposition to the the same relations of perfection or or speculative truths, and eternal Order. Hence to maintain that we should follow nature or of truths.^ As examples of relations of magnitude, practical is to maintain that we should follow what is necessarily contrary .Malebranche gives us the simple arithmetical speculative truths, to Order in many instances.^*^ If God moved bodies by particu- inequality between two plus two and four and five.« equality and lar volitions, it would be a crime to escape by flight from a fall- Thus Truth and Order are real, immutable, and necessary rela- ing wall ; for God has assuredly the right to take back the life in the substance of the divine Word, and he who tions contained he has given. *^ On the same theory it would be an insult to the beholds what God beholds and he who beholds these relations divine intelligence to correct the course of rivers. But since them loves what God loves.« regulates his love by God acts in accordance with general rules we can resist his in spite of his love of re- Man is free.^ He can seek truth He action without resisting his will.^^ We can, to some extent, can love the eternal Order despite concupiscence.^ pose ; he know the eternal Order, but the divine decrees are absolutely merit and demerit, and, since God loves his is thus a subject of unknown to us; hence we must abandon the chimerical virtue that all as they are lovable, and wills ^^ creatures in proportion of following nature, and follow rather reason. be rewarded and all who are culpable, pun- who resemble him love of the eternal Order is not only the principal like The ' labors to perfect himself, to make himself ished he who moral virtue; it is, in fact, the only true virtue.^^ If a man happiness.' For since God loves beings God works at his own gives his goods to the poor either because of vanity or natural the as they are lovable, and the more perfect are in proportion compassion he is not liberal, for it is not eternal Order that perfect will be the more powerful, the more lovable, the more rules him, but merely pride or disposition of the machine.^^ contented.** He then who cease- more fortunate, and the more themselves to danger, are not he Officers, who voluntarily expose reason, who loves the Order, participating as lessly consults courageous if ambition animates them; nor are soldiers if it is perfection, will participate in the divine hap- does in the divine abundance of spirits and fermentation of the blood that ani- piness and glory.® mates them.^^ This boasted noble ardor is either vanity or play knowledge, of love, and Man is capable of three things, of of the machine {jeu de machine) ; a little more wine is often all love the good, and enjoy the ; can know the good, of feeling he that is needed to produce more of it.^^ He who endures the individual in ' certain extent it depends upon the good To a to him is often neither moderate nor whether outrages which are done two, but it depends entirely upon God regard to the first patient.^^ It may be his laziness which renders him unmoved, good.^ But since God is just, he who knows he shall enjoy the and his ridiculous and stoical pride which consoles him and although man and loves him shall enjoy him.« It is strange that places him in idea above his enemies ; this again is only the dis- and pain do not depend upon him, but well knows that pleasure position of the machine, condition of his spirits, coldness of the to whether extent it does depend upon him as that to a certain blood, or melancholy.^' It is the same with all the virtues. If Order, he shall know the truth and love the eternal or not he love of Order is not the principle of them, they are false and pleasure and neglects the principle of eternal yet seeks only vain, in all ways unworthy of a rational being, who bears the happiness.® - j ^ t ^v. image of God himself, and communes with him by reason.^* the ultimate principle of duty, tor tne Here we come upon Uninspired by love of Order, they draw their origin from the been created. It is love of the eternal sake of which we have disposition of the body.^^ The Holy Spirit does not form them; veriu mere, la vertu universelle, la vertu Order This is ''la and whoever makes of them the object of his desires and the knowledge and love universelle, la vertu fondamentaV It is " Morale, p. 10. 5 Morale, p. 4. " Morale, p. 11. « Morale, p. 6. « Morale, p. 14. ' Morale, p. 7, >» * Morale, p. 8. Morale, p. 15. » Morale, p. 9. SYSTEM OF ETHICS OF MALEBRANCHE 85 84 THE PHILOSOPHY

ruptible, and should always be supreme.^^ God himself follows glory has a base soul, a mean spirit, and a cor- subject of his reason." We must not close our eyes to the light but accustom rupt heart." -^ ^ a the4rU ourselves to distinguish true light from the false gleams of con- Malebranche draws a distinction between virtue and greatest mis- fused feeling, or of sense." Intelligence is preferable to faith." To confuse these two is indeed one of the duties Faith passes but understanding abides forever. Faith is indeed not applied the method takes of all those moralists who have a great good because it leads to understanding, and because with- of the eternal Order; of clear ideas.^* Virtue is the inner love out it we cannot be worthy of understanding certain essential actions which can be the duties are merely the special outer neces- truths without which we can neither acquire solid virtue nor with or without love of the Order.^* Virtue performed eternal felicity." Nevertheless, if we leave the mysteries out of it, but it is possible to sarily makes him virtuous who possesses without account, faith totally without light, if it is possible, cannot ren- of humility, generosity, and liberality perform actions der us solidly virtuous. ^^ Those who have not enough light to .Men imagine that they are following vir- possessing virtue.^* acquire virtue just as well as those natural in- conduct themselves, can who they are in reality only following their tue when are better able to enter into themselves and contemplate the certain duties. Most clinations, which lead them to perform beauty of the eternal Order ; but, all other things equal, he who what virtue is and con- men are deceived by confused ideas as to mor^ enters most into himself is most solidly virtuous, and of two themselves better than others who are m reality sider loves for the eternal Order that is more meritorious into which dictates of eternal for it is impossible to follow the virtuous; more intelligence enters.^* to fail in some Order for any length of time without appearing and char- Love of the eternal Order, Malebranche holds, is identical ''duty."^* For to appear prudent, honest essential virtue of charity, which, however, is de- vice, and with the Christian is necessary sometimes to praise itable before men, it scribed in the Scriptures in somewhat vague language.^^ This silent when it is praised.^* To be esteemed nearly always to be of perfection holding be- foolhardy we shall immutable Order consists in relations be prodigal ; without being liberal we must tween the intelligible ideas contained in the substance of the not superstitious, we valiant men ; and if we are hardly pass as Word.^° Now there are two distinct sorts of love which are due regarded as libertines.^* shall be perfection.^^ There is the love of good-will {hienviellance) and eternal Order to Now universal reason is always the same, time and the love of union." In the love of union we regard the immutable; but morality (morale) changes according to is knowing object of our passion as the cause of our happiness and we de- place ^^ Among the Germans, virtue consists m and sire to united with it that the object may exert its full in- consists solely be drink.^^ Among the nobility, generosity how to fluence.*^ But the love of good-will is for people according to blood of those who have insulted us.^" Each in shedding the feel this love for even when they can- and his their merit, and we them his private morality, his private devotion, person has not benefit us.*^ Thus the power of effecting our happiness calls Whence comes this diversity? It is because private virtue.^« perfections call forth permit ourselves forth the love of union, while the other men do not always consult reason, because we beheve the love of good-will.*^ Now since God is the sole efficient cause the imagination.^^ We are too prone to to be guided by in the universe, since finite beings derive their whole efficacy believe, like the law is beyond our reach, and we that eternal from him, he alone is the proper object of love of union. To discover the eter- carnal Jews, that it is as difficult to gross and finite love of union is only possible on the It is love a object with a mount into heaven or descend into he . nal law as to false doctrine that they can causally influence us.*^ access it dwells within, eternal Order is not of easy ; true that The reverse is true, however, of the love of good-will.** outwards.^* We must silence sense, but we are always turned deserving of the love of good-will be rea- True, God is infinitely more and passion, and not imagine that we can imagination, than any finite creature can be.*- But he really communicates Reason.'^ without consulting , • sonable * i itself demands subjected to them some perfection.** The eternal Order reason is corrupt and should be Some hold that that we esteem and love creatures in proportion to the perfec- only a servant, that we must deny to faith, that philosophy is these perfections are known Malebranche. Man tion that they possess, in so far as our light." Perpetual equivocation, says the to us.** It is entirely impossible to love them precisely accord- and his own reason, and religion is itself is not his own light ing for our knowledge of the relations of immutable, and incor- to their perfection, true philosophy." Reason is infallible, " Morale, p. 21. >* Morale, p. 17. ^ Morale, p. 24t » » Morale, p. 18. Morale, p. 27. ^ w Morale, p. 28. Morale, p. 19. «• Morale, p. 29. w Morale, p. 20. PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE SYSTEM OF ETHICS 87 86 THE

knowledge of the he has a permanent disposition to love the good in prefer- perfection is much less exact than our when completely what to the evi!.^^ Furthermore, love may be either natural or relations of magnitude, and we do not know ence beings who love is a natural product of pleasure.^^ Free perfection the individual possesses." Nevertheless free.^' Natural are united with him, expresses a choice; it depends on reason, or liberty, on the are made in the image of God, and who love Again, a mem- of the soul to resist pressure.^^ The essential are of more value than any other creatures." power than a thousand species of love is the consent of the will/^^ Now God ber of Jesus Christ is more worthy of love of this only regards free love in the cases where both free and natural impious persons.-^ . . . accommodated to the love of union, which love are present. '^'* From all these considerations, Malebranche i Self-love can be power capable of affecting us, if self- concludes that the sole love which justifies us before God is an 1.; responds to and honors a necessary desire for happiness habitual, free and dominant love of the immutable Order." love is enlightened.^^ Man has a n

\'u ; render him happy he The Fourth Chapter of the First Part of the Traite de and he sees clearly that God alone can ; Even if a man is illuminating discussion of the relation of action and can therefore desire to be united with God." Morale an only thinks of the In the first place, we must recognize that actions produce does not know that God rewards merit and habit. the sake themselves in actions." power and goodness of God, his faith can lead him, for habits, and secondly that habits express with God.^* Thus self- Nevertheless the soul does not always act in accordance with its of his own happiness, to unite himself love of union. The reverse is dominant habit. The sinner could always have refrained from love is not directly opposed to the Order of justice particular sin, and the righteous man was always capable of true of the love of good-will.^* The eternal any to to merit, happiness unjust action : for the sinner was never wholly without love dictates that recompense be proportional an does not willingly endure limits to its hap- of Order, nor was the righteous man wholly without self-love.^** virtue ; but self-love this love may be, if Malebranche adds, in accordance with his Jansenistic piness and glory.2* However enlightened But, as contrary to Order, and it cannot tendency, free-will alone cannot save a man. No philosopher, it is not just, it is necessarily itself." however enlightened he may have been, whether , or be just without diminishing or destroying dispositions that nor even those whom we may suppose to The love of Order is not like particular Plato, or Epictetus, is not a particular creature have shed their blood for the sake of the eternal Order, shall can be lost or acquired ; for Order It is God and is be saved without the grace that faith alone bestows.^^ that one can wholly begin or cease to love." m completely renounce love of Order is the supreme virtue, then the means of ceaselessly impressed upon us." We cannot If In fact, the love of it are of the first importance. Of these INIalebranche reason nor wholly cease to love Order." acquiring concupiscence Mind, Liberty of Mind, and Order naturally rules us save when self-love or distinguishes three: Force of affects the unjust The first two are concerned with the dis- resist" Thus the beauty of justice often Obedience to Order.

its own advantage truth ; the last is concerned with making ethi- themselves, so that self-love itself finds it to covery of ethical from the Word all truth the dominant and habitual principle of our practical to conform to Order." All light comes ; cal in so far as a man thinks lives. first two principles, especially, sow the imprint of movement from the Holy Spirit ; hence, The order. as he loves, he loves, to some Descartes ' methodological canons. Let us examine them in he is united to reason, in so far fall into error with- extent, the eternal Order." For we cannot love of the good. Force of Mind. out using reason nor love the evil save by our the Thus self-love cannot destroy love of Order." To explain this cardinal virtue, Malebranche returns to with a natural love which reason alike It is not enough to love the Order basic principles of the whole system. Faith and love must be free, all things, easily accommodates itself to self-love." Our assure us, he says, that God is the unicjue cause of eternal Order enlightened and reasonable." Our love of the while experience shows that he acts according to certain laws. he will must be dominant; for however wicked a man may be, Thus the collision of two bodies is the occasional cause which The demons them- according feel some passing inclination for the Order." necessarily determines the efficacy of the general laws judges the dis- works.^^ Tj^^^g selves have still some love of the Order." God to which God produces thousands of effects in his single r i actions. A seek position of the soul, not its actual transitory it is God alone who enlightens spirits ; nevertheless, we may is only just before God act does not form a habit and a man " Morale, p. 35. * » Mornle. p. 36. » Morale, p. 30. » Morale, pp. 38 and 39. ** Morale, p. 31. » Morale, p. 40. » Morale, p. 32. ^ Morale, p. 43. » Morale, p. 47. •• Morale, p. 33. :

OF MALEBRANCHE SYSTEM OF ETHICS 89 88 THE PHILOSOPHY

to com- The one rule upon which Malebranche insists is that we in ourselves the occasional cause which determines him meditate only on clear ideas and incontestable facts. '^ To med- municate understanding to us.^" He has attached the presence to our itate on confused sentiments and on doubtful facts is a futile of ideas to the attention of the mind, and in proportion work: it is to contemplate phantoms.'^ The immutable and attention we shall have light.^^ So true is this that man, in his necessary Order should be the subject of our meditations, but ingratitude and stupidity, imagines that he is the cause of his there is nothing more abstract and less sensuous than this Or- knowledge.-'' God has made us occasional causes of our knowl- being der.'* It is true that the Order became sensible and visible in edge for many reasons, of which the first is that without of the actions and precepts of Jesus Christ; the Word made flesh, occasional causes of our knowledge, we could not be masters however, is only an indispensable model according w^hich of thinking, we should have none to by our wills ; for had we no power goods **la folie apparente de la foV* we are lead to reason.^'^ Jesus of willing and should not be in a position to merit the true Christ accommodated Himself to our weakness to draw us from for which we were made.^^ for it.'** Faith speaks to the mind through the body in order that The attention of the mind is, then, a natural prayer man may free himself from the body and enter the intelligible enlightenment.^*' Now those w^ho are made for this severe toil, the truth world.'® or labor of attention and who are always attentive to Knowledge of the eternal Order, which is our indispensable which ought to guide them may be said to possess Force of Mind begin at law, is a mixture of clear ideas and feelings.'-' All men know {force d'esprit).''' To acquire this force of mind we must that it is better to be just than to be rich ; but not all men know an early age. To begin is itself difficult. We become dis- this by clear ideas. Children and ignorant people know w^hen couraged and declare ourselves unfit for meditation. But if We with- they do wrong, but it is rather the secret reproach of reason do this we are renouncing virtue, at least in part.'* For gran- than clear understanding that warns them.^^ For Order may out the work of attention, we shall never comprehend the be speculatively apprehended and in this way it enlightens the deur of religion, the littleness of all that is not God, the absurd- Without mind without stirring it to action ; and in so far as it is thus ity of the passions, and of all our internal miseries. fashion." apprehended, the eternal order is clear. '^ But Order can also this labor, the soul will live blindly and in a disorderly should conduct be apprehended as the natural and necessary principle and rule There is no other way to obtain the light that of the actions of the soul ; as such it moves the soul without en- us; we shall be eternally under disquietude and in strange em- when we walk in darkness lightening it. Thus we can know the eternal Order either by barrassment ; for we fear everything clear idea or confused feeling.'^ This confused feeling of the and surrounded by precipices. It is true that faith guides and Order, however, is peculiarly open to the deceiving influence of it produces some light by^ the supports ; but it does so only as assure minds passion and concupiscence. ''^ Thus we must seek for clear ideas attention it excites in us ; for light alone is what can we must exercise the virtue of Force of ]\lind. like ours, which have so many enemies to fear.'* must avoid all How can we acquire Force of Mind? We Liberty of Mind. that divides the capacity of the mind, that is, all the objects, The second of Malebranche 's , which is also that flatter the senses and awaken the passions.'^ We must avoid drawn from the Cartesian methodology, is what he calls Liberty as much as possible all the sciences and employments which are of Mind. However much Force of Mind w^e may possess, we merely showy, in which memory alone works, and where the cannot work without cessation, and there are subjects so ob- imagination is too active.'^ Nothing is more opposed to reason scure that we cannot penetrate into them ; we must have another than imagination too well instructed, too delicate, too active, or virtue, Liberte d^esprit y according to which we withhold our rather, too malign and corrupt.'® A man must toil in the spirit judgment until we are forced to give it.**^ When we examine a to gain the life of the spirit, but to use one's mind to gain honor very complex question, and the mind finds itself surrounded by or gold is servile.'® That a workman should work with his body difficulties on all sides, reason permits that we abandon the ques- to gain the life of the body is according to Order, but that a tion, but also dictates that we suspend our judgment.^° To make magistrate, or a man of affairs, or a merchant spend the energy as great a use of Liberty as possible is thus an indispensable pre- of their minds in the acquisition of goods which are harmful to cept of logic and morality.*^ We must never believe until the their souls is a striking piece of madness.'^ evidence forces us to believe.*^

" Morale, p. 48. • Morale, p. 53. »* Morale, p. 4§. * Morale, p. 56. * Morale, p. 50. *• Morale, p. 59. * Morale, p. 51. *» Morale, p. 60. " Morale, p. 52. PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE SYSTEM OF ETHICS 91 90 THE

so far as he It is pleasant to judge of everything; and we can not investi- This holds of man as reasonable, of man in the citizen, the sol- gate without at least some pain.** Hence all ordinary language conducts himself according to reason/^ For other principles and it is is un galimatias perpetuel, a stream of nonsense.** Everyone dier the man of religion has, as such, he does not yet see believes that he understands what he says or what he hears, and reasonable that he follow them even though reason/^ But where faith only rejects new terms which may, nevertheless, be more clear clearly that they are conformable to nothing we must and intelligible than the old.** From the failure on the part of has made no decision, and custom prescribes And if we mankind to exert Liberty, Malebranche derives all those false adhere only to what we clearly and evidently see.^' authority and custom are explanations in which the scholastic philosophy abounded, such clearly and evidently see that human rather than reason. as, humidity and heat as the principles of generation and cor- mistaken, we must renounce everything Church cannot contra- ruption of all things, and the seminales and vertus prolifiques Of course, the infallible authority of the which explain how species run true to type.*^ And, lastly, the reason.*^ dict the same what Liberty of belief in Nature as an explanatory term comes from Force of Mind is to the search for truth exemption from origin.*® the possession of truth, or at least to Mind is to it for a to sus- of Mind we However important in science may be man For by the exercise that we make of Force error it is more important to suspend prop- of Mind, we are pend his judgment, much truth, and by the exercise of Liberty discover erly one's judgment in matters of morality.*^ The reason is Mind is necessary because the exempt from error.^^ Liberty of our mind may suspend that in these matters exact knowledge is difficult because lacks Force; it is necessary that the mind ideas are obscured by our passions.*^ We are often obliged to to know the truth. Ihe its iudgment where it lacks the power by the act before we clearly know what we should do; but, although mind can never deliver itself from ignorance but finite we must, in such cases, act, we must not believe more than the exercise of Liberty it can escape error." ^ m- , not be understood of Mind, are evidence compels us to believe.*^ This must These two cardinal virtues. Force and Liberty in perpetual doubt ; for between contrary, nothing is to mean that we are to remain common faculties among men : on the not belief there is an infinite series of unnamed states.*^ perfection. - Man is doubt and more rare, and no (me possesses them in As there is an infinite series of probabilities, the mind must put some mental exertion, but he cannot be naturally capable of although a ^veti mind.- These virtues each state of affairs in its proper place; for considered, ordinarily, to be of a strong principle may not be evident, it may be evident that the princi- by practice, and their ac(|uisition is a re- can only be acquired imagine that the suspension of original sin. To ple is probable.*^ We must not the soul to its primary state before the turn of in Liberty of Mind is easy. "Let a man one's nature but to re- judgment involved them is not to change or destroy acquire pass but one year," exclaims Malebranche, **in the commerce virtues are present to ditterent pair it*^ Furthermore, these nothing; same individual at of the world, hearing all that is said and believing individuals to ditferent extents and in the entering into himself at all times to find whether the inner truth extents.^^^ If they are not increased different times to different consent until there are uses the same language and always suspending his exercise thev necessarily diminish, for in extent by than Aristotle, wdser than scrarcely light appears ! I hold him much wiser contrary to concupiscence.^^ We can "*^ no virtues more divine Plato. still more Socrates, more enlightened than the medidate without pain and suspension of judgment is *' undertake the search tor difficult There are very few who Obedience to Order. courage to attain and few of these have the energ>' and truth The third great fundamental virtue, according to Male- *^' majority of those who undertook it it Weary and rebutted, the branch e, is Obedience to Order. Facility in rendering oneself console themselves with what they have at- the quest try to necessary for with a ridiculous attentive and in suspending judgment, although ^^^ They console themselves, perhaps, tained There is necessary they become deceivers, all solid virtue, is not the whole of virtue.*® scorn of truth,^ or with a base despair; or an exact obedience to divine law, a stable and dominant dispo- been deceived themselves.** having movements of the heart and all the Mind we must ceaselessly reflect on sition to regulate all the To acciuire Liberty of what pre.iudices. steps of conduct according to the eternal Order.*® For of men and on the causes of these the prejudices Force and Liberty of when we cease to marvel would it benefit a man to have enough We believe that we understand things become familiar with them. at them, that is, when we have « Morale, p. 64. «• Morale, p. 65. « 61. Morale, V. «* Morale, p. 66. *» Morale, p. 62. «• Morale, p. 70. ** Morale, p. 63. ; ;

SYSTEM OF ETHICS OF MALEBRANCHE 93 92 THE PHILOSOPHY century rationalists placed upon the function of clear ideas in concealed truths and avoid even the Mind to discover the most the moral and religious life should not blind us to the essential according to his lights and slightest errors if he did not live diversity of their systems. For Malebranche the ultimate source obedience which he owes to the di- withdrew himself from the of good lay in an absolute system of values in the divine mind

vine law?*® . . . « 4 u which possessed an absolute authority over the individual. Spi- this dominant disposition ? As we have How can we acquire noza, as is well known, rejected the teleological view of the of acts.*« We must often make firm seen, habits are built out world,^* and defined the "good" as that which we certainly repeated res- the Order ; these ' constant resolutions to obey ' * and know to be useful to us ; evil ' as that which we know to be a give us the disposition we are seeking olutions will gradually hindrance to us.^^ Spinoza thus regarded good and evil as not it cannot be but hard to do ; in fact, This is easy to conceive, inhering in the world itself, but as based upon human desires. .*« A man without di- .*^chieved without the aid of For Malebranche, on the other hand, there was, as we have without faith can very well desire vine grace and consequently seen, an immutable system of rationally apprehended values than life, in the absence of what he death or nothingness, rather which did not in any way depend upon the choice of the indi- not to exist, but we cannot desire to exist loves We can desire vidual. Malebranche is the faithful disciple of Plato and Augus- irresistible desire to be ; for we have an in a miserable condition tine, while Spinoza's view shows the stamp of modern nat- shall find a greater happi- happy.*® Now without faith that we uralism. we shall never be able to re- ness than that which we renounce, In the doctrine of love of the eternal Order we have the of di- nounce our dominant passion.*® And faith is the effect essential point of Malebranche 's ethics. The remainder of the ^ Malebranche shows in some detail, vine grace. Nevertheless, as Traits de Morale deals with either the religious and theological of IMind can prepare the mind the exercise of Force and Liberty side of morality or with certain practical applications which despise the passions and by means for faith, by teaching us to Malebranche makes of his doctrine. He thus discusses the means into our imaginations.'^^ of the purity which it introduces that religion furnishes to the acquisition of the love of Order.^" Force and Liberty of Mind, and Obedi- These three virtues, Jesus Christ is the occasional cause of grace. ^^ When we ap- phases of the original love of the ence to Order are so many proach the Sacraments our actual love of Order becomes habitual at the center of ]Malebranche s Order of Perfection which stands in consequence of the permanent desires of Jesus Christ.^^ The it such, for the truth and to serve ; ethical system. To know fear of hell is as good a motive as the desire for eternal felicity, essence of human merit. It is in- Malebranche, constituted the but in both cases we must distinguish the motive from the end.^^ of ethics with a system which teresting to compare this system Chapter IX shows why we must pray to the Virgin, the Angels regarded as the diametrical Malebranche would certainly have and the Saints, although not as occasional causes of grace.®^ that of Spinoza. Both laid an equal opposite of his system, The Second Part of the Traite de Morale is concerned with life. For ^ as the foundation of the moral stress upon clear ideas devoirs, that is to say, with particular external actions. We has adecjuate ideas it is active Spinoza, in so far as our mind have obligations to each of the divine attributes, to the divine ideas it is passive."^^ Tn fact, in in so far as it has inadequate power,®' to the divine wisdom,®^ and to the divine love.®^ In the only the activity of the mind, clear ideas, Spinoza places not Sixth Chapter of Part II Malebranche takes up the problem of distinct from human bondage, as well but also human freedom as our duties to the two societies of which we are members, the In so far as we know we are as immortality and love of God. "society of commerce," animated by passion, consisting of a are free and active, we are free and actiVe. In so far as we community of particular and transitory goods, with the com- and love God with his own eternal eternal, that is, we know fort and conservation of the life of the body as its end, and the ''The intellectual love of the knowledge and love of himself." "society of religion" sustained by faith, consisting in a com- not in so far as mind towards God is that very love of himself, ** Cf. Ethics, Part I, Appendix. so far as he can be explained through the he is infinite, but in « form of eternity Op. cit., Defs. I and II. Part IV. essence of the human mind regarded under the » Morale, p. 81. the intellectual love of the mind towards God in other words, «" Morale, p. 88. wherewith God loves himself.**" '* is part of the infinite love Morale, p. 8 Iff. of these great seventeenth The stress, however, which both » Morale, p. 89f. ~ Morale, p. 96f. «» Morale, p. 71. •» Morale, p. 147ff. «> Morale, pp. 72-79. «« 61 Ethics, Part III, Prop. I. _ ^ ^^^«^ Morale, p. 159ff. Part V, Prop. XXXVI. M Ethics, Part III. Defa. I and II. and •• Morale, p. 167ff. M Part V, Prop. XXXVI. trans. Elwes. ^

najM PHILOSOPHY OF MALEBRANCHE 94 THE

an end Every- munity of true goods with eternal happiness as spiritual society Our thing should be related to the eternal taken as external, for it obligations to other men should be all service to men an inner con- is very dangerous to make our general dangerous cern «« Intercourse with the world is in and the State, which There are two sovereign powers, the Church , / the image ^ ; the Prince are ruled by the Prince and the Bishop these the Bishop of Jesus Christ." To ^ of Omnipotent God, _ As for the powers the individual owes an absolute allegiance. to me that they should subjects," says Malebranche, "it seems concerned Mar- obey blindly, when only their interest « of Jesus Christ and his Church u' riage is the symbol of the union provided for by the Creator. and is a natural union evidently discusses the duties that each In the last chapter, Malebranche in working for one s person owes to himself and which consist own perfection and happiness." il I

»

•* Morale, p. 184ff. • Morale, p. 185. •« Morale, p. 187. « Morale, p. 189. " If orof«, p. 211. • Morale, p. 216. TO 219f. Morale, p. Vol. I. ethic, aa a whole ef. 0116-Laprune, »i Morale, p. 262f. On M»]ebr«nches 447f.

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