Why Women's Participation is Essential to Sustainable Peacebuilding: Lessons from Sierra Leone

by

Aimee White

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Appendices Copyright Releases (if applicable) TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT V LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS viii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Statement of Research Problem 1 1.2 Background 2 1.2.1 Socio-Political History of Sierra Leone and the 1991-2002 Conflict 2 1.2.2 Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in the Sierra Leonean Context 8 1.3 Methodology 11 1.4 Summary of Sections 13 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 16 CHAPTER 3 WOMEN'S ROLES IN THE CONFLICT 36 3.1 Victim 36 3.2 Participant 37 3.3 Peacemaker 40 CHAPTER 4 POST-CONFLICT IMPLICATIONS & THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WOMEN 47 4.1 Victim 47 4.2 Participant 49 4.3 Peacemaker 53 4.4 Lack of Political Will 56 CHAPTER 5 THE RWANDAN CONTEXT: A COMPARISON 60 5.1 Socio-Political History of Rwanda and the 1994 Genocide 60 5.2 Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in the Rwandan Context 62 5.3 Women's Roles in the Genocide 63 5.4 Post-Conflict Implications and Developments 67 CHAPTER 6 SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE TODAY 74 6.1 Progress 74 6.2 The Way Forward 79 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 90 7.1 What Lessons Can Be Learned? 90 7.2 Now What? 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY 98

iv ABSTRACT

Post-conflict countries will not achieve sustainable peace without the inclusion and participation of women in peacebuilding processes. In Sierra Leone, women were heavily involved in bringing about an end to the 1991-2002 conflict, but yet were largely excluded from political and decision-making processes in post-conflict context. The physical and structural gender-based violence women experienced throughout the conflict and the ways in which women took the lead in addressing these issues in the post-conflict context demonstrates women's essential but formally unrecognized role in peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. The post-genocide context in Rwanda provides a comparison for the ways in which women have seized the socio-political space opened up by conflict to challenge gender inequality and take an active role in the political structures of the country. There are a number of international policy frameworks to complement this process in post-conflict countries but international and national rhetoric must translate into concrete action.

v LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council APC All People's Congress AU African Union CDF Civil Defense Forces CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women CSO Civil Society Organization ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Observer Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration FAWE Forum for African Women Educationalists FSU Family Support Unit GAPS Gender Action for Peace and Security GBV Gender-Based Violence HDI Human Development Index LAWCLA Lawyer's Commission for Legal Assistance LAWYERS Lawyers Yearning for Equality, Rights, and Social Justice LRC Sierra Leone Law Reform Commission LSTC Luawa Skills Training Center MARWOPNET Mano River Women's Peace Network MDG Millennium Development Goals MIGEPROFE Ministry for Gender and Women in Development MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres NaCSA National Commission on Social Action NCDDR National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration NEWMAP Network of Women Ministers and Parliamentarians NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council PCHR Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights PROWA Progressive Women's Association PRWA Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder RPF Rwandese Patriotic Front RUF Revolutionary United Front SBU/SGU Small Boys/Small Girls Units SCR Security Council Resolution SLA Sierra Leone Army SLP Sierra Leone Police SLPP Sierra Leone People's Party

VI SLWF Sierra Leone Women's Forum SLWMP Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace STI Sexually Transmitted Infection TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNDDR United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration UNDP United Nations Development Program UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSD United Nations Statistics Division WHO World Health Organization WOMEN Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation WPM Women's Progressive Movement YWCA Young Women's Christian Association

vn ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Peter Arthur for his support and guidance over the past several months and for graciously finding the time to supervise my thesis outside the normal parameters of the program. I would also like to thank my other thesis committee members, Dr. Shelly Whitman and Dr. David Black, for their invaluable support and for coming on board at short notice amidst a very busy semester.

I am also grateful to my parents, Scott and Debbie White, for their whole-hearted support and understanding while I completed both of my degrees "in my own way," and for helping me find the space and time to do so. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my partner, Alan Hodgson, who has given me his constant support throughout this process, in ways too numerous to count and too selfless to measure.

vin CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Research Problem

The purpose of this thesis is to explore a paradoxical situation in Sierra Leone: one where women were heavily involved in bringing about an end to the 1991-2002 conflict, but yet were largely excluded from political and decision-making processes in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. It will be suggested that Sierra Leonean leadership is generally reluctant to include women in decision-making, aside from at the community level, and that they will likewise be reluctant to implement policy and legislation in the pursuit of gender equality, due to the country's widespread and socially accepted levels of gender inequality, which is often manifested in terms of gender based violence (GBV): both physical and structural forms of GBV. Thus, the central research problem and question to be explored by this thesis is:

• How can a society that perpetuates gender inequality and excludes women in

formal decision-making processes meaningfully recover from conflict, ensure

sustainable peace, and provide for the human security of its citizens?

Additionally,

• How can women use their positions as peacemakers to address other gender issues

in post-conflict reconstruction?

• And, to what degree does a post-conflict context provide a new starting point for

women to recreate their roles in society?

In answering each of these questions stated above, it will be useful to examine similar situations in other post-conflict contexts. The example of Rwanda will be discussed

1 briefly toward the end of this thesis. Finally, the overall perspective of this thesis is adopted from the Africana Womanist approach, which accounts for a variety of diverse perspectives and realities of African women, as well as asserts that men and women are on different sides of the same coin: that is, they must work together, as they have been for centuries, if there is any hope of achieving gender equality.

1.2 Background

1.2.1 Socio-Political History of Sierra Leone and the 1991-2002 Conflict

At independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was hailed as one of Africa's most promising countries. With it being the oldest modern polity on the continent, and with the oldest university, Sierra Leone entered independence with a sound economy, progressive politics, a wealth of natural resources and various burgeoning industries. The country was founded as the settlement of freed black slaves - hence "Freetown" being the name of its capital - who came from the United States in 1789 after the American War of

Independence. With this as a legacy and starting point, in 1964, Sierra Leone was described as "more than a symbol of freedom; it is an embodiment of the aspirations of

Africa" (J. Peter Pham, 2004, p. 2).

In the few years that followed independence, Sierra Leone was doing relatively well for itself, both politically and economically, under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai.

Though from a prominent and ethnic Mende family from the former British protectorate,

Margai had a knack for moving comfortably between the traditional Sierra Leone of his

2 family, and the modern, Westernized world of Freetown, where the descendents of the freed slaves lived for the most part, and were known as Krio (a variation of 'Creole' in

Sierra Leone). During the tenure of Margai and the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP),

Sierra Leone was admitted as the 100th member into the United Nations, which was observed as a further symbol of the country's promise in the world (Pham, pp. 1-2).

After his death, Margai was replaced as head of the SLPP by his brother, Sir Albert

Margai, who underhandedly enabled the party to become dominated by the Mende people. Naturally this did a great deal to fuel contention between the Mende and the

Temne, Sierra Leone's other ethnic majority, but also between the Mende and the Krio in

Freetown. Shortly afterwards, in 1967, highly competitive elections were held, installing

Siaka Stevens, a Temne, as prime minister and leader of the All Peoples' Congress

(APC). Stevens had barely been sworn into office, however, when he was ousted in a coup d'etat. One year later, in 1968, a civilian uprising led to the return of Stevens as prime minister, but the events preceding his return had caused him to develop a severe degree of paranoia. This led to a downward and despotic spiral in his leadership of Sierra

Leone, destroying the economy and the principles of parliamentary democracy, plunging the country into poverty, corruption, and debt, and eventually leading to the mass discontent among Sierra Leoneans - particularly the Mende - that fuelled the rebel uprisings in 1991.

Prior to the rebellion taking place, however, in 1985 Stevens retired and bequeathed the regime and the leadership of the APC to army chief Major General Joseph Momoh, who

3 did little to improve conditions in the country and simply maintained the corrupt and impoverished system he inherited. Eventually, as described by Adebajo, Kargbo and others, it was under and due to these conditions that the Revolutionary United Front

(RUF) - a militant group of (largely Mende) Sierra Leonean rebels propped up by then

Liberian President Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) - invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1991. The insurgency was subsequently funded by illegally and forcibly ravaging the diamond-rich regions of the country, such as Kono, which also fed back into the illicit diamond mining trade, the personal coffers of Taylor, and into the general instability in the West African region. The RUF systematically destroyed homes and farmland in search of diamonds to sustain their activities, as well as to enable the participation of their superiors in the illicit diamond trade.

If not murdered, the RUF terrorized and inflicted heinous act of violence on their fellow

Sierra Leoneans, including their trademark tactic of the amputation of limbs — usually of the hands or feet - the drugging and abduction of young children (both boys and girls) into the ranks of the RUF, as well as the thorough and calculated attempt to terrorize civilians by raping and torturing women and girls en masse. While child soldiers were used by every fighting faction in the conflict in Sierra Leone, in the RUF, it was those drug-induced children who often committed the atrocities; often an act of initiation into the group. Homeless youths from Freetown also willingly joined the RUF, gaining comfort from the enhanced stability and family-like support provided to them by the rebels than what was offered from living on the street. The Mende people of Sierra

Leone, the largest ethnic group, comprised the adult membership of the RUF. Thus, the

4 Mende regions, such as Kenema and Kailahun, were relatively unscathed by the civil war

(Adekeye Adebajo, 2004, pp. 168-169).

In Freetown, Momoh had made little effort or progress in resolving the conflict in Sierra

Leone and was subsequently overthrown in 1992 in a coup staged by the Sierra Leone

Army (SLA). Valentine Strasser led this coup, and then formed the National Provisional

Ruling Council (NPRC), over which he became the Chair. Acknowledging the lack of leadership demonstrated in relation to the conflict, in 1996, Chairman Strasser announced to the Sierra Leone diplomatic and consular corps that peace would not be achieved in

Sierra Leone unless it were also established in Liberia. Of this address, Abubakar Kargbo

(2000) notes:

He said that one of the factional leaders in the war in Liberia commanded a strong influence with the Sierra Leonean rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). He added that the NPRC Government was ready to establish contacts with any Liberian factional leader, aimed at reaching a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Sierra Leone, (p. 37) By acknowledging this regional link Strasser was admitting, perhaps historically, that

West African states share similar fates, and that they must work together if they desire peace and stability. However, Strasser was still unsuccessful in bringing RUF leadership to the negotiating table. Brigadier Julius Maada Bio replaced Strasser as head of the

NPRC in March 1996 through a palace coup. Alternatively, in his few months in office,

Bio was successful in establishing contacts within the RUF, which began the peace negotiation and democratization process in Sierra Leone (Kargbo, p. 38).

5 Meanwhile, a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), led by Nigeria, attempted to lend military support to the

Sierra Leonean government against the RUF. Previously, in 1995, the United Nations

Secretary-General had appointed a Special Envoy from Ethiopia, Berhanu Dinka, to oversee negotiations between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF in hopes of restoring peace (UNAMSIL, 2005). In May 1996, parliamentary and presidential elections were held, despite the ongoing conflict in the country, in which Dr. Ahmad

Tejan Kabbah and the revived SLPP were elected and whose authority was initially recognized by the SLA. Kabbah decided to bolster the SLA by requesting that the Civil

Defense Force (CDF) assist them and create a joint force. The CDF was comprised of the

Kamajors and the Gbethis: two large and traditional hunting societies in Sierra Leone.

Meanwhile, the RUF, who did not participate in the election, subsequently declared that the results were illegitimate. Dinka thus began facilitating the negotiation process in

Yamoussoukro, but it was quickly undermined when the RUF and the SLA - many of whom were insulted by the addition of CDF forces - joined forces in a junta and staged a coup d'etat in May 1997. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) governed this new regime and it was chaired by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Kabbah and his ousted government were forced to seek refuge in neighbouring Guinea (Kargbo, pp. 38-

40; Jeanne Ward, 2002, p. 35).

By 1997, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had imposed oil and arms embargoes on Sierra Leone in an attempt to thwart the economic incentives for the soldier/rebel factions in control, commonly known as "sobels". Less than one month

6 later, the junta leaders signed the Abidjan Peace Accord with the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone - their second attempt to negotiate a settlement - in which they conceded to a ceasefire that would be monitored by ECOMOG. Though publicly endorsed by the junta, it later denied that the agreement had been implemented based on the various grievances the junta had submitted against it (UNAMSIL, 2005).

ECOMOG became active militarily in early 1998, in response to persistent attacks by the junta forces. This led to the junta's retreat from Freetown, which facilitated President

Kabbah's return to office and to the termination of the UNSC's embargoes on the country. In July of that year, the UN created an Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

(UNOMSIL) for a trial period of six months, comprised of only 70 military observers.

Though UNOMSIL troops were unarmed, they were under the protection of ECOMOG and were able to document the activities and human rights violations of the junta rebels against the civilian population. They were also able to monitor the disarmament of combatants as part of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, as well as restructure the Sierra Leonean security forces (UNAMSIL, 2005).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, later that year the rebel forces attempted to recapture Freetown, leading to the retreat of the UNOMSIL mission into neighbouring Guinea. Shortly afterwards, ECOMOG troops regained control of Freetown, continuing in the back-and- forth struggle for control of the capital, which enabled the organization to reinstall the civilian government. These events led to further negotiations between the warring parties in 1999; this time in Lome, Togo. By 7 July 1999, all parties, agreeing to another

7 ceasefire and forming a unified national government, signed the Lome Peace Agreement.

It was this agreement that offered blanket amnesty to war criminals for acts such as torture and rape, and offered rebel leaders a place in government. It will be demonstrated in Chapter 3 how this agreement was also not to last (UNAMSIL, 2005).

1.2.2 Gender- Based Violence (GBV) in the Sierra Leonean Context

Sierra Leonean society is deeply patriarchal, with the status of women being historically inferior to that of men, and discrimination and inequality being trademarks of gender relations in the country. According to the 2004 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission (TRC), "Women have been excluded from decision-making in Sierra

Leone," for much of the history of the country, and still today, "Women are largely absent in the structures of government and traditional forums that are critical in formulating policies" (v. 2, c. 3, i. 347). This inequality has acutely affected women in terms of low literacy rates, extreme poverty, and few opportunities for income generation, while violations of their human rights and instances of gender-based violence (GBV) have been commonplace. It is for these reasons - particularly the disproportionately high rates of illiteracy and extreme poverty among women1 - that women are generally unable to insist upon or take advantage of their internationally acknowledged human rights. This in turn means that, in addition to their exclusion from the political sphere, women lack

1 According to the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) (2007b, c), adult (15+) literacy rates in Sierra Leone were recorded at 24 percent for women and 47 percent for men in 2004. For youth (15-24), literacy rates stood at 37 percent for females and 60 percent for males. In terms of economic activity rates, 56 percent of women were engaged in income-generating activities in 2004, in comparison to 94 percent of men, meaning women consisted of only 39 percent of the adult (15+) labour force in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, from statistics gathered in 2005, Sierra Leone ranked 177th of 177 countries according to the 2007/2008 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI).

8 the means and resources to find legal or political redress for the gender inequalities to which they are subjected (Karen Barnes [et al.], 2007, pp. 6,11,14).

According to Karen Barnes, Peter Albrecht and Maria Olson (2007), GBV is broadly understood as any form of violence that is carried out against someone based on their gender or sex. GBV can take such physical forms as "sexual violence, domestic violence, sex trafficking, harmful practices such as female genital mutilation, forced or early marriage, forced prostitution, sexual harassment, and sexual exploitation," (Barnes [et al.], p. 8) and it can also take on an equally potent form in its structural manifestation.

Structural GBV can be found in policies, practices, laws and cultural traditions that have direct consequences on a specific gender or sex. Laws that prevent women from owning property, or a state that does not recognize rape as a crime within the institution of marriage, for example, are structural forms of GBV.

In Sierra Leone, one of the most historically prevalent forms of structural GBV is caused by the complex legal system in the country. It has often been the case that the legal system, rather than protecting their rights, provides a great challenge for women. This is due to the formal recognition in the country of customary, Islamic, and general law.

According to Karen Barnes (et al.), "general law [is] made up of statutory and codified law inherited from the era of British colonial rule; customary law [is] made up of unwritten traditional codes and practices; and Islamic law [is] where statues related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance law are differentiated from those within customary law" (p. 14). Because most of the Sierra Leonean population lives outside of the capital

9 and are under the authority of the local courts, customary law is protected in the

Constitution, in that it recognizes that certain "customs are applicable to particular communities" (p. 14). The implications for women in terms of GBV, then, are that even if there are afforded equal rights and it is codified in general law, the majority of women in the country fall under customary law and do not necessarily benefit from these policies or rights if it is found to be in contradiction to customary law. Customary law, according to

Barnes (et al.), will often "exacerbate GBV, and results in the predominance of discriminatory attitudes and behaviour" (p. 14)

If this were not a complicated system already, various communities in Sierra Leone adhere to an additional legal system - informal law - in which legal decisions are made under the jurisdiction of the Chiefs and/or other traditional leaders in the community. In terms of GBV, this system is often the first or only resort for many Sierra Leoneans because of the ease of access and lower fees, but also because of the deeply embedded view that GBV is a private, family matter and should thus be addressed through informal measures (Barnes [et al.], p. 14). In fact, according to Jeanne Ward (2002), while technically someone convicted of rape could be sentenced up to fourteen years, general law in Sierra Leone did not consider domestic violence as a criminal act. In light of this, there is little incentive for the other legal structures in the country to take proactive measures in safeguarding women from GBV.

With the high prevalence of gender inequality and GBV in Sierra Leone, it is a question worth exploring as to whether or not its contributions to the insecurity of women - and its

10 larger implications for their exclusion from the political and decision-making structures in society - will prevent the country from achieving sustainable peace. I will argue that, as a human rights violation, GBV contributes to a broader trend of gender inequality, and human msecurity in Sierra Leone, which, in the post-conflict context, alienates over half the population, and will ultimately prevent sustainable peace from truly taking hold in the country. Equally, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, women have been instrumental at the community and civil society levels in attaining a certain degree of human security for other women and for their fellow citizens. These contributions should be formally recognized, supported and institutionalized in not only giving women a place in the decision-making structures of the country, but in supporting their important contributions to post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable peace, as well.

1.3 Methodology

The aforementioned research questions posed in this thesis, concerning the relationship between gender inequality and sustainable peace, will be investigated through the use of two case studies. The primary case study is based on the 1991-2002 conflict and its aftermath in Sierra Leone, while a brief comparison will be made with Rwanda regarding the 1994 genocide and its respective aftermath and implications for women. While the intention is not to detract from the importance of ethnic considerations in the discussion of Rwanda in this thesis, but because ethnicity was not a major factor in the conflict in

Sierra Leone, the focus, for the sake of comparison, will be on the roles women played in each country throughout and after the conflict/genocide, and the degree to which the political standing of Rwandan women is in marked contrast to women in Sierra Leone.

11 Thus, while there are significant differences in the nature and length of the conflict in

Sierra Leone and the genocide in Rwanda, for the purposes of this thesis, significant parallels exist concerning the traditional status of women in both countries, their peacebuilding activities during and after their respective conflicts, and also in terms of the potential women have in creating space in decision-making bodies at the national level. Moreover, while several more years have elapsed since the end of the genocide in

Rwanda than since the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone, this may indicate that the progress achieved by women in Rwanda is still quite possible for women in Sierra Leone.

For reasons of brevity and clarity, topics such as colonialism and religion will not be a focus in this thesis. While the historical roots of gender inequality in Sierra Leone and

Rwanda will be discussed to some degree, the focus of this thesis is more forward- looking in terms of the future and potential of gender equality taking root in each country during the period of reconstruction. Further, gender inequality appears to be a common theme across religious divides in Sierra Leone and has more to do with socio-cultural conceptions of gender than those created by religion.

The majority of the data collected to examine the research questions has come from secondary sources. Scholarly books and journal articles were used both to grasp the socio-political and historical contexts surrounding the conflicts in both countries, as well as to explore more specific topics of gender equality, women's participation as peacemakers, and the status of women in the post-conflict context. News and reportage

12 from such online sources as scholarly and civil society think tanks, non-governmental organization (NGO) websites, as well as from the United Nations and its various agencies

- the most notable of which being UNICEF, UNIFEM, and UNSD - provided front line information and innovative approaches regarding these issues, about action that is currently being undertaken at the grassroots, as well as statistical evidence regarding women subjected to GBV, and women's participation in the social and political structures of the two countries.

1.4 Summary of Sections

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will present a literature review that demonstrates the link between developing a lasting human security in a given country and the ability of women to contribute to this process. Also discussed are the various arguments about why women are effective peacebuilders: as stand alone agents for peace, as well as in contrast to men. Whether from a Western or African feminist standpoint, or from approaches such as Africana Womanism, it will be demonstrated that the majority of African women advocate working in partnership with men, not apart from them, but equally towards notions of non-violent relationships, equality and sexual liberation for African women.

Chapter 3 will go into greater detail regarding the conflict in Sierra Leone. It will discuss the various roles women played throughout the conflict (i.e., victim, participant, and peacemaker), and will demonstrate not only the extent of their victimization and

13 versatility, but the work and accomplishments on behalf of women's groups in bringing about peace and security.

Chapter 4 will discuss the implications of the conflict for both victims and participants, as well as the contributions of women peacemakers: the untapped potential of their work to establish a viable human security in post-conflict Sierra Leone, as well as the work they are doing in spite of their imposed limitations and the lack of political will emanating from the government. Female victims, for example, face sexual stigmatization and health issues such as HIV/AIDS and unwanted pregnancies, among others. Female ex- combatants were largely left out of formal processes such as Disarmament,

Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), and many engaged in risky income-generation activity such as prostitution. Women peacemakers were not rewarded for their efforts in ending the conflict: they were excluded from peace negotiations, as well as from the political and decision-making structures in Sierra Leone that were reconstructed in the aftermath of the conflict.

Chapter 5 will offer a comparative analysis of the genocide in Rwanda, in terms of the roles women played in the conflict as well as the political space that opened up to

Rwandan women in its aftermath.

Chapter 6 will present a situational analysis on Sierra Leone today: the progress the country has made in terms of decreasing structural GBV for women legally - i.e., the three Gender Bills, Family Support Units, etc. - but where they still need to go in terms

14 of bringing gender equality and human security into the every day lives of Sierra

Leoneans. The progress in Sierra Leone will be discussed also in terms of the reports made by the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the United Nations.

Chapter 6 will also cover the next steps for Sierra Leone, in terms of the way forward and complementary prescriptions.

Finally, in Chapter 7, conclusions and implications will be presented, bringing the following argument to a close: Post-conflict countries will not achieve sustainable peace and stability without the proper inclusion and participation of women in peacebuilding processes. This can largely be achieved through the active pursuit of an inclusive human security for its citizens of both genders. It is likewise achievable in conjunction with the purposeful inclusion and subsequent follow-through of women's issues into the formal peacebuilding processes initiated by national and international actors, which can be supported through international frameworks such as Security Council Resolution (SCR)

1325, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women

(CEDAW), and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly goal number three. Moreover, achieving gender equality in a post-conflict country will ease the transition to peace and contribute to the achievement and long-term sustainability of other developmental targets in terms of health, poverty, education, and so on. Finally, a dilemma will be discussed regarding the implications of removing women from the social sphere, as well as what the situation in Sierra Leone means for other countries and women elsewhere in the world.

15 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The modern concept of human security developed out of an increasing recognition by many in the international community that the traditional meaning of security was incomplete. That is, security, particularly throughout much of the 20 century, was primarily and exclusively interpreted as "security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust" (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). Until recently, the aspects of security related to individuals or groups of human beings was not prevalent or mainstreamed into the language and behavior of policy-makers worldwide, at least not as it relates to the hard power security concerns of nation states.

While the concept of human security was being discussed in academic and policy circles before this time, what is now known as the 'holistic' approach to human security was first formally disseminated and popularized in the 1994 Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War, it was hoped that the resources previously used for funding

Cold War-related conflicts could be redirected for long-term development planning in many of the developing countries that were implicated. The underlying philosophy of the long-term development strategy was thus coined human security, and according to UNDP

(1994, p. 22), the concept is comprised of four characteristics: (1) "human security is a universal concern", common to people everywhere in the world; (2) "the components of human security are interdependent," that is, insecurity in one part of the world can be felt

16 in all other parts; (3) "human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention," for example, the human and financial loss of HIV/AIDS victims versus the cost of treatment and prevention; and (4) "human security is people-centred."

More explicitly, UNDP (1994) defines human security in two ways: as "safety from such chronic threats as hunger disease and repression," as well as "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities" (p. 23). Gunhild Hoogensen and Kirsti Stuvoy (2006) put forward the notion that "security must be linked to empowerment of the individual," in that victimization and agency are inextricably linked, and are not in opposition. They further suggest that "security must begin with the individual, and security must be defined 'as freeing individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic and political constraints that prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (p.

211). These understandings and conceptions of security have further become recognized as "positive peace," that is, a conception of security that is more than just the absence of conflict or violence (negative peace).

Matt MacDonald, in Pauline Ewan's article Deepening the Human Security Debate:

Beyond the Politics of Conceptual Clarification (2002), suggests that the concept of human security "has been viewed as a potential response to the growing insecurity of security: a situation wherein the continued prioritization of military concerns at the state level in traditional discourses and practices of security has served to further individual

17 insecurity and failed to respond adequately to the most pressing threats to individuals throughout the world." (p. 277)2

The debates around human security are important to outline here: they offer important insights into the practical implications for broadening the security debate. Much of the criticism of the concept targets the way in which it dilutes the security discourse by overstretching the boundaries of what should be considered a security concern. The result is a lack of analytical clarity for scholars, and further, it renders the concept irrelevant to policymakers who need to work with clear priorities. Otherwise known as 'delimiters', those who would wish to narrow the concept of human security claim that "a holistic approach undermines effective causal analysis because a concept that combines elements as diverse as violent conflict, poverty and social well-being lacks the degree of analytical separation necessary for the analysis of dependent and independent variables" (Ewan,

2007, p. 184).

However, as noted by Pauline Ewan (2007), critics accuse delimiters of constraining scholarship by this over reliance on categorization and the need to place ideas within neatly defined structures, even if the result is not in line with reality. She says, "framing the difficulties that beset the human security agenda as though these are simply questions of analytical and practical utility 'depoliticises' the underlying issues of structural violence and distributive injustice that kill more people than the direct violence of war."

(Ewan, 2007, p. 185) By avoiding attempts to broaden traditional conceptualizations of

2 In Fox, M-J. 2004. "Girl Soldiers: Human Security and Gendered Insecurity." Security Dialogue. 35(4). P. 475.

18 security and challenge widely held assumptions about the nature of security, delimiters are simply maintaining the status quo. Ewan argues, "[While] scholars try to resolve the question of where the conceptual parameters of human security should be fixed, Western policy practices increasingly reflect the 'merging of security and development' that human security represents" (p. 187).

It is for this reason, then, that this thesis will proceed on the basis that, while flaws in the human security discourse are well noted, it is the current and mainstream approach to development and one that should be worked with and improved upon, rather than continuing the debate concerning its theoretical shortcomings. Indeed, even the argument that a broadened definition of human security ceases to be relevant to policy makers does not withstand the advent of policy initiatives such as MDGs, which are premised on holistic concepts such as human security, and that have been framing policy since their creation in the year 2000.

Human security in the African context, according to Nana Poku, Neil Renwick and Joao

Gomes Porto (2007), is the conceptual key to addressing the security concerns unique and arguably endemic to African states. To date it has largely been the case that, despite the general acceptance of a broader definition of security in the post-Cold War era, many leaders of African states still define security in terms of the ability of state apparatus to maintain or defend its territory, and likewise do not adequately account for the presence of insecurity from informal or non-state sources. Though meeting with increasing acceptance that cooperation is needed between leaders of states to address the multitude of problems they share, and "the interdependence of their polities, societies and

19 economies" (Poku, Renwick, & Porto, 2007, p. 1155), there remains an over-reliance in the rhetoric and behaviour of African politicians on concepts such as state sovereignty and acting on behalf of the national interest. This way of thinking is symptomatic of and leftover from the post-colonial, modernization era where the emphasis was on building a strong and highly centralized state. It includes, among other things, the aforementioned perception that the state apparatus (i.e., policy-makers, the military, etc.) is the be-all and end-all of security concerns (Poku [et al.], 2007, pp. 1155 - 1156).

Indeed, in light of the breakout of 42 (mostly intra-state) conflicts between 1968 and

2006 (Poku [et al.], 2007), many of the newly-independent African states have not been successful in addressing the security concerns of their citizens through this traditional conception of security. It is for this reason, then, that Poku (et al.) argue that, "only by formulating and executing policies that explicitly address the mutuality of developmental security challenges will the human potential of Africa be released" (p. 1156). Poku (et al.) purport that these developmental security challenges are already being targeted by the international community through the MDGs, and through the successful implementation of these policies and efforts, human security can be more adequately addressed by the

African state.

More recently, the African Union (AU) has put forward a more accurate reflection of security in the African context, by defining security in the following terms:

[In Africa] security means the protection of individuals with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for survival, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, access to education, healthcare,

20 and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his/her own potential.

This understanding of human security is drawn from the definition created by UNDP in

1994, and although noted for its universality, the definition of the AU goes even further to elaborate those aspects and concerns more relevant to every day people living in underdeveloped countries. This recognition of a specific brand of human security in

Africa is a laudable development in AU policy.

Poku (et al.) further identify four key challenges in the way of achieving the MDGs in

Africa, including as the fourth, "achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women" (p. 1156). Further, they put forward the argument that, "It is only by understanding the role of poverty and inequality- of resources, of access, of participation

- in conflict, that we can find more sustainable and therefore realistic solutions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding." (1164). While this is also the view taken in this thesis,

Poku (et al.) do not go nearly far enough here in drawing out the gender aspects of the fourth challenge listed above. Indeed, one could argue that the other three challenges they discuss - (1) establishing peace and security, (2) fostering good governance, and (3) tackling HIV/AIDS (as well as other diseases) - will not be achieved without the establishment of gender equality and the empowerment of women. Nevertheless, Poku (et al.) also make the distinction between positive and negative peace, in that human security requires the "active creation of structures and agencies to address the developmental sources of injustice that promote conflict," rather than peace being defined as simply the absence of conflict (p. 1165). In post-conflict countries like Sierra Leone, this is indeed a poignant distinction.

21 The concept of peacebuilding was once understood in the context of negative peace.

However, by the mid-1990s, and due to the subsequent concepts of human security and positive peace, peacebuilding meant a great deal more: according to Call and Cousens

(2008), peacebuilding no longer simply meant to "seek to ensure against conflict relapse but also redress "root causes," and not only of the war just ended but of all potential conflict" (p. 3). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in 2001, further delineated what was meant by the concept, by indicating that peacebuilding efforts are "aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms" (Call & Cousens, p. 6). Accordingly, such peacebuilding strategies require both short- and longer-term plans suited to the society in question in order to prevent future conflict. The UNSC further indicates that peacebuilding strategies must "focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence" (UN Security Council, 2001). Positive peace, then, is a peacebuilding goal that takes into consideration justice, equity, and other issues of the social and political realms. It also seeks to eliminate not only physical forms of violence, but structural and cultural violence as well.

According to Michelle Gawerc (2006), the important contribution of civilians to peacebuilding should not be overlooked or underestimated, and that there is strong

22 consensus in peacebuilding literature on the position that peace is not achievable or sustainable without active citizen engagement and inclusion in the peace process. Gawerc argues that, in the literature, "Many stress that without intensive grassroots activities and a strong foundation built for civil society, negotiations at the official level will not be able to "bring" either peace or justice," and furthermore, "The literature makes it clear that solutions must be adopted by local actors and it cannot be forced from above or imposed by the outside" (p. 441). Gawerc notes that there is widespread agreement that in both

South Africa and Northern Ireland, for example, peace would have never been achieved without the involvement of the general public and civil society through informal and formal means.

As proven leaders in civil society movements and at the grassroots level, the specific case for women's participation in a country's peace process is thus international in its application; it can be made for any number of countries, not in the Sierra Leonean case alone. According to Azza Karam (2001),

Strategies which can ultimately lead to a sustainable peace cannot be delegated only to one part of the population (e.g. men) during times of negotiations and peace-building. Involving women in peace negotiations... is not only a matter of providing a representative and gender-balanced number of people around the negotiating table. It is also an issue of giving voice to the needs, experiences, demands and hopes of a diverse array of people, in order to form an integral part of an evolving society, (p. 10).

Indeed, while the need to account for women and girls as victims in the peace process is becoming increasingly recognized, the contribution of women to the process itself and their expertise at the grassroots and civil society levels is still underappreciated in international and national policy circles, as well as in security scholarship. Swanee Hunt

23 (2005) argues, "Around the globe, women play a vital but often unrecognized role in

averting violence and resolving conflict. With expertise in grassroots activism, political

leadership [etc.]... these women bring new approaches to the security sphere process.

Sustainable peace, and therefore international security, depends on such innovations." (p.

251)

Hunt asserts that there are many platforms from which the argument to include women in

the peace process can be made: the first, and perhaps most obvious argument, being fairness. If decision-making is to be equitable, it should accurately reflect the population.

Thus, if roughly half the population is female, women should occupy a much greater

space in decision-making circles than they do at present. Due to the high degree of

victimization among women in post-conflict societies, the second platform is

compensation. The third platform is representation: according to Hunt it logically follows

that if women are not represented in decision-making bodies their concerns will likely not

be represented, or potentially chipped away at through bargaining if there is no one

present to defend their cause.

Finally, there is the fourth platform, which is efficiency. Hunt notes that, while throughout

history both women and men have played the parts of both warrior and peacemaker, it is

often the case that those around the peacemaking table are the warriors. However, "social

science research has demonstrated that women tend to be more cooperative and less

aggressive in their styles; and in conflict situations around the world," as Hunt notes in

reflection, "leaders of UN and other international peace missions have reported to me

24 their frustrations at not having access to women in the society, whom they perceive to be the steadiest voices of moderation." (p. 252) Indeed, any measure taken that aims to transform society must have buy-in from citizens from all walks of life - the stakeholders

- and the masses of a given country. In order to accomplish this and make the peacemaking efforts sustainable, the stakeholders must be adequately represented in the process (Hunt, p. 252).

Moreover, Hunt argues that women's perspectives on conflict and peace are usually distinct from those of men in four key ways. First, women have a track record of bridging ethnic, political, and cultural divisions. Hunt claims that not only do many of the women she interviews contend that they are 'more inclined toward consensus' than men, but her view is also supported by official statements from, for example, former UN Secretary-

General Kofi Annan who says: "For generations, women have served as peace educators, both in their families and in their societies. They have proved instrumental in building bridges rather than walls." (p. 252)

Second, as the discussion in Section III will demonstrate, with the actions of women's groups such as the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), women seem to be more in touch with the community and with society at its grass roots, and are able to provide solid evidence concerning violence or its potential throughout or in the aftermath of conflicts. Additionally, because of their proximity to the community, women are usually quite successful in mobilizing their communities for post-conflict processes such as rebuilding and reintegration of former combatants (Hunt, p. 254).

25 Third, women with or without recognized authority are skilled and innovative leaders in their communities, which Hunt argues is potentially driven by the historic under-funding of women's and/or grassroots activities, and by the persistent lack of recognition for their work, creating the need for creative strategizing and planning. "Precisely because they haven't been allowed full participation within power structures," Hunt argues in appreciation of women's innovation, "[that] women have learned to work 'outside the box'" (p. 255).

Finally, women consider their families in preventing and putting an end to conflict and are thus more heavily invested in seeing the process through. While many would decry the image of women being skilled as peacemakers because they are also mothers, Hunt points out that this is not the only reason why they are skilled, but equally, that it is still a legitimate and accurate argument. Many of the women Hunt has interviewed in post- conflict countries around the world, "repeatedly state that they feel driven by the need to ensure security for their families," and further, "They describe themselves as different from men with phrases such as 'after all, we bring life into the world so we don't want to see it destroyed'" (p. 255). Indeed it is in this way that Western feminism and African feminism sometimes clash: while for some Western feminists the role of 'mother' is socially constructed and a sign of male domination, for many African feminists as well as advocates of Africana Womanism, motherhood is a celebrated role and seen as a noble path for women apart from male domination. It is for this reason that many Western feminists have been rightly criticized for attempting to speak on behalf of women

26 worldwide, when women's realities and concepts of oppression vary not only between countries and regions, but within them as well.

The vital contribution of women to the peace process - including the various roles women can play throughout conflict - was recognized in 2000 through the adoption of Resolution

1325 by the UNSC. Resolution 1325 urges all states and parties to peace negotiations to account for the perspectives and needs of women, and that their equal participation in the peace process be ensured; regarding not only post-conflict reconstruction, but also in conflict prevention and in negotiations for peace (Dyan Mazurana & Khristopher

Carlson, 2004, p. ii). Importantly, and in addition to calling for the recognition of the impact of armed conflict on women, the importance of involving women at all levels of negotiation, and to support women's peace initiatives at the local level, Resolution 1325 draws special attention to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes by encouraging all involved, "to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependents" (UNSC,

2000). As we will see in Chapter 4, perhaps Resolution 1325 came too late for the female ex-combatants involved in the DDR programme in Sierra Leone.

Feminist thought is thus complimentary to the human security and peacebuilding discourses for its longstanding position that the prevalence of military security begs the question, 'security for whomV As Charlotte Bunch (2004) suggests, however, while there is great promise of having the unique security concerns of women addressed by human security in general, there is also the risk that they could be lost in attempts to mainstream and generalize the concerns into a wider debate. Bunch argues that feminist perceptions

27 of positive peace are integral to the human security debate and to post-conflict societies.

Violence against women in conflict is simply an addition to the GBV women experience in everyday life, making them mutually reinforcing forms of violence, which is already generally accepted by society. She argues, "[Violence] against women in war brings together the subordination of females with their membership in other targeted groups, expresses women's status as the property of the men in their community, and reflects social acceptance of violations of women more generally." (Bunch, 2004, p. 78)

While GBV affects people of both genders world wide, the vast majority of victims of are female and the majority of perpetrators are male. Barnes (et al.) contend that "GBV is inextricably linked to the gender norms and unequal power relations present in any given society, and violence against women is one of the most common manifestations of these inequalities" (p. 8). This explains why women, in so many countries, are left out of the political and economic spheres of decision-making. Further, Barnes (et al.) note how "the socialization of gender roles also encourages the perception of women as being objects or the property of men, and can lead to linkages between masculinity and violence" (p. 9).

Barnes (et al.) argue further that if women experience GBV in every day life the principles of human security simply are not being upheld. They argue further that such demonstrated inequalities for women have consequences for the progress of society writ large. They say, "While women and girls bear the largest and most direct costs of these inequalities, the costs cut broadly across society, ultimately hindering development and poverty reduction. GBV has economic, political and social consequences, as well as being the most prevalent security threat for women and girls" (p. 10). It is for this reason

28 that, in post-conflict reconstruction and in addressing the human security concerns of women in the aftermath of conflict, it is necessary to address, simultaneously, the structural, systemic and societal forms of women's subordination in society, on the periphery of the conflict. Accordingly, "when violence is tolerated in an everyday way in the family at the core of society," Bunch forwards, "children come to see violence as an inevitable part of conflict and a natural way to deal with differences in all areas of social order." (p. 78) Here, Bunch draws out the vital and interdependent link between the human security of women and that of the general population.

In Human Security and Peacebuilding through a Gender Lens: Challenges of

Implementation in Africa, Heidi Hudson (2006) approaches the subject with a combination of both gender and feminist approaches. She argues that despite the widespread recognition of the contribution of women to peacebuilding at the grassroots level, they are equally noted to be more or less excluded from formal processes as peace negotiators and political decision-makers in post-conflict transitions. She says, "Despite increased awareness of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls ...the transformation agenda of post-conflict reconstruction processes routinely fail to consider the gendered causes and consequences of armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction." (p. 3) In light of this, the argument put forward by Hudson is that gender is "a tool for building peace before and during the post-conflict period." (p. 4)

Hudson argues that employing a feminist perspective uncovers the various assumptions contained within the human security discourse. For example, vast differences between

29 and among human groupings are concealed and generalized by using the word 'human' in human security. Often, a direct consequence of this generalization is neglecting to consider the gender dimensions of security and human security, which leads to an incomplete understanding of a security situation. According to Hudson, "There is a real danger that collapsing femininity or masculinity into the term 'human' could conceal the gendered underpinnings of, for instance, conflict resolution and peacebuilding practices.

The term 'human' is presented as though it were gender-neutral, but very often it is an expression of the masculine." (p. 5) Equally, Hoogensen and Stuvey contend that key to the gender perspective on human security is making the distinction that 'gender' is not automatically synonymous with 'women': not only does this exclude men from the analysis, but making the mistake of equating gender and women "loses out on the dynamic relations of power between the identities of men and women that the concept of gender entails. The concept of gender... informs security theory about structural relations that go largely unrecognized, relations of dominance and non-dominance." (p. 216)

Moreover, one would be mistaken in examining or considering 'women' as a group, as there are clearly marked differences among and within groups of women. For example, differences between Western feminists and African feminists have emerged recently in response to the universalization of women's needs; despite their good intentions, these well-founded distinctions emerged in response to many women in the West attempting to speak on behalf of women in the global south. "In Africa in particular," Hudson notes,

"gender is intertwined with other identities such as race, class, nationality, and culture. If we therefore genuinely want to make sense of gender in Africa, we need to foreground

30 the specific assumptions of uniquely African sets of feminisms and allow space for indigenous approaches to human security to evolve." (p. 5) Conversely, "an overreliance on difference could in turn encourage cultural relativism, political fragmentation and a weakening of the feminist emancipatory agenda" (Hudson, p. 6). Quoting Ann Tickner,

Hudson asserts that "if feminism becomes paralyzed by women not being able to speak for others, then it will only reinforce the legitimacy of men's knowledge as universal knowledge" (p. 6). Thus, a balance between the two is required in order to affect change.

In their article entitled, "Gender, Resistance and Human Security," Hoogensen and

Stuvoy argue that applying a gender perspective to the human security discourse offers a better understanding of those who experience insecurities on the ground. They suggest that current conceptualizations are still overly 'top-down', in that the threshold for determining what precisely constitutes a human insecurity is still defined by international organizations and state-level institutions. Since the focus of human security is meant to be on the individual, it is ironic that political structures still have ultimate authority over what will be considered insecurity and what will not.

According to Hoogensen and Stuvoy, the top-down nature of the human security concept

"...entrenches the dominance of a global north and state-driven definitions of human security," resulting in it becoming "nothing more than an export commodity from

'secure' states directed towards those deemed worthy (who meet the threshold determined by the powers that be)." (p. 209) They argue that a gender approach to human security offers a wider interpretation of the concept in conjunction with a theoretical

31 conceptualization that reflects a more 'bottom-up' approach to the security concerns of the individual (p. 209). In this way, by approaching security from the bottom-up, theory and political practice become 'intimately linked'. Crucial to understanding this concept of security then, is recognizing that "security is often context- and structurally dependent." This recognizes that "problems of security are often rooted in social structures as much as they are caused by states" (p. 214).

Why is gender important to the study of human security? Hoogensen and Stuv0y argue it is because,

Gender is not fixed, rigid, or static; rather, owing to the power dynamics of the gender identity, it is often subject to reification and essentialism by dominant discourses... The lessons of gender provide the tools to evaluate other identity securities... the interaction of power and gender speaks to relations of dominance and non-dominance with regard to all relationships of identity, and hence security can be conceptualized as relations of dominance and non-dominance, (p. 218)

Viewing the concept of human security in terms of dominance and non-dominance then, according to Hoogensen and Stuvoy, is the most effective way of determining what constitutes human insecurities. This approach within the gender analysis likewise exposes the fallacy and the assumption that human insecurities do not exist within 'secure' states or, similarly, that there is not a notable population of secure individuals in 'insecure' states. Equally, this conception sheds light on the notion that relations of dominance and non-dominance do not only exist between genders but within genders, as well. (p. 218)

Though having been in existence since the 1980s, Africana Womanism seems to have only recently emerged in Western literature. Africana Womanism has been put forward by some scholars and activists as an alternative to feminist interpretations of the African

32 woman's experience. While Hudson (2006) describes it as merely one other form or alternative within African Feminisms, others, such as Clenora Hudson-Weems believe it to be not simply an approach or an idea, but a method that provides for 'uniquely African considerations and sensibilities,' and therefore should be seen as a definite alternative to

- not complementary to, nor part of- feminism in any its forms (i.e., African, Black, or

Western Feminisms). Quoted in an article by Pamela Yaa Asantewaa Reed (2001),

Hudson-Weems claims, "[The] concept is neither an outgrowth nor an addendum to feminism... It critically addresses the dynamics of the conflict between the mainstream feminist, the Black feminist, the African feminist, and the Africana Womanist (p. 168).

According to Hudson-Weems, eighteen descriptors should inform any analysis of the

African woman's existence. The Africana Womanist is therefore: (1) a self-namer; (2) a self-definer; (3) family-centered; (4) genuine in sisterhood; (5) strong; (6) in concert with the Africana man in struggle; (7) whole; (8) authentic; (9) a flexible role player; (10) respected; (11) recognized; (12) spiritual; (13) male compatible; (14) respectful of elders;

(15) adaptable; (16) ambitious; (17) mothering; and (18) nurturing. Indeed, Africana

Womanism is "grounded in African culture and, therefore, it necessarily focuses on the unique experiences, struggles, needs, and desires of African women." (Asantewaa Reed, p. 168).

It would appear that the Africana Womanist approach takes well into consideration the principles of human security, by its very nature of relating to the realties of African women, to individuals, everywhere; whether they be continental Africans, Diaspora, mothers, feminists, wealthy or impoverished. Similar to the gendered approach, only

33 more pronounced, Africana Womanism is likewise unique for its inclusion of men. In explaining the roots of the term, Hudson-Weems notes, "[In] naming, I tried to be reflective of two things, and that is ethnicity, or a cultural connection with Africa, and that's "Africana" and "Womanism" to deal with the gender that is being developed here.

Not to say we are anything separate from the male, because we're in the struggle together... the other side of the coin from the Africana man - collectively struggling, as we've always done as Africans" (p. 169). The unique sensibilities of the Africana

Womanist approach to the desires of African women make it a uniting force and a natural sounding board for those desires as it relates to human security and is thus invaluable to the human security discourse.

It is for these reasons that the need to incorporate women into peace processes is all the more urgent: Sierra Leone is fertile ground for doing so, as well as providing a case study for other post-conflict countries to consider. As discussed above, there are at least three possible approaches to linking the human security dialogue to the needs of women: a feminist approach, a gendered approach, and the Africana Womanist approach. The perspective of this thesis is that men and women need to work in partnership to achieve gender equality, thus adopting the view forwarded by Africana Womanism. Overall, however, because the lines between these approaches are often blurred, and the ends they pursue are often the same, I will not necessarily be forwarding one over the other. Rather, of more benefit to aims of this thesis, and after drawing on and highlighting the important contributions from all three, the focus will be to argue for a subsequent hybrid of

34 recommendations in the closing chapters of this thesis, rather than focus on their (albeit important) theoretical differences.

35 CHAPTER 3 WOMEN'S ROLES IN THE CONFLICT

Throughout the duration of the conflict, the majority of Sierra Leonean women fell into one of three categories: that of the victim, the participant, and/or the peacemaker.

Naturally these roles were not mutually exclusive, as certainly those women captured by the rebel forces and subsequently forced to fight could be considered both victim and participant, likewise could a former participant be a peacemaker, a peacemaker a victim, and so on. For the sake of clarity, however, the three roles will be discussed separately here. It is important to discuss the various roles women play because there is indeed a dynamic and fluctuating relationship between women and conflict: not one category is more important over the other, but relegating all women to the category of victim is deeply problematic. This serves to disempower women and oversimplify their experiences in conflict.

3.1 Victim

It is commonly argued that the consequences of armed conflict are often disproportionately felt by civilians: the majority of which, are women and children. The conflict in Sierra Leone is no exception, with brutal accounts from those women and girls who were victimized by the actions of the rebel forces, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), as well as those fighting forces sanctioned by and allied with the government, such as the

Civil Defense Force (CDF). According to the 2005 report of the Sierra Leone Truth and

3 See Modem Lawson-Betum (p. 30); UNSC Resolution 1325; and UNIFEM (2005, p. 1).

36 Reconciliation Commission (TRC), there was a deliberate and calculated attempt on the part of the rebel factions, in particular, to instill terror in the population by committing atrocities abhorrent to traditional norms and customs of Sierra Leonean society. For women and girls, this often included enduring any one or combination of the following: abduction, torture, rape, mutilation, sexual slavery, forced labour, forced pregnancy, and trafficking (Barnes [et al.], 2007, p. 11). Karen Barnes (et al.) note, "The war in Sierra

Leone was characterized by extreme brutality, and it is widely estimated that up to

250,000 women and girls in Sierra Leone were victims of GBV during the ten-year war."

(2007, p. 11) Given the high societal tolerance for GBV in Sierra Leone prior to the conflict, as discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, it is perhaps no surprise that the rebels saw women and sexual violence as a means to an end in their mission to terrorize civilians. The consequences for those women who were victimized by the conflict will continue later in the next chapter.

3.2 Participant

"While the majority of women in Sierra Leone experienced the war as victims," Barnes

(et al.) note, "they also perpetrated and collaborated in the violence, and played a role in influencing the conflict dynamics within their homes and communities" (p. 12). It was clear from the beginning that women and girls were involved in the RUF and AFRC operations, while the SLA and its CDF claimed to have only male membership. It was later acknowledged, however, that women were voluntarily recruited and/or forcibly abducted into all factions either as fighters, spies, or most commonly, as soldiers'

37 "wives." It is for this reason the term "participant" is used: so as to be inclusive and account for the various roles women and girls played in the day-to-day operations of the conflict and whether this participation was by choice or by force.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the CDF comprised two major groupings: the

Kamajors and the Gbethis. While the Kamajors were traditionally known as an exclusive hunting society for Sierra Leonean men, the Gbethis did not have gender-specific membership. Both groups, however, evolved into self-defense forces by the early to mid

1990s, and were amalgamated into the CDF in response to increased rebel attacks and pressure from the RUF. Equally, both groups within the CDF began enlisting women and girls early on in the conflict. The Gbethis, in particular, "[...] enlisted and initiated women and girls where they acted as integrated members of the CDF and were included in all ceremonies, amulets, and scarification. They served as commanders, frontline fighters, initiators, spiritual leaders, medics, herbalists, spies and cooks" (Mazurana &

Carlson, 2004, p. 13). It is worth considering whether or not those women who joined voluntarily did so for the same reason as some of the children mentioned in Chapter 1: for the socio-economic benefits of food, shelter and support offered by the various fighting factions.

As for the women and girls within the ranks of the RUF, they most often served the role of a soldier's "wife."4 Those who became the "wife" of a commander, despite being captors, were at times awarded a great deal of authority in day-to-day operations.

4 As the role of "wife" was forced upon the vast majority of women and girls once captured by the RUF forces, the term is kept in quotations.

38 According to Mazurana and Carlson, these women and girls "decided on a daily basis who in the compound would fight, provide reconnaissance, and raid villages for food and loot. Some counseled their captor husbands on war strategies, troop movement, and upcoming attacks." (p. 14) Commanders "wives" were also in charge of Small Boys and

Small Girls Units (SBU/SGU) and were likewise in charge of delegating work and movement. Consequently, however, this meant putting young fighters - both male and female - in great danger. The young girls who were sent to spy by soldiers "wives" risked sexual abuse and/or death as their task was to become intimate with men in the enemy forces in order to glean useful information. Equally, within the RUF, soldiers "wives" would attempt to protect the young girls in the SGU by using loot and resources to bribe or reward even the SBU for not abusing the girls, which was commonplace. However, it was often a combination of these roles, according to some former combatants, that provided the most security. For example, as a fighter as well as a "wife" of a common soldier, "you could protect yourself with your own weapon, you had access to food and loot, and your chances of escaping were greater, unlike captive "wives" of commanders who were closely guarded with little chance of escape" (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 12).

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme in Sierra Leone found that approximately 4,751 women in Sierra Leone participated in the various fighting forces5, but the number may actually be much greater because, as we will see in the next chapter, the DDR programme did not adequately take into consideration the gender dynamics of demobilization and as a result many women were unaccounted for.

5 See the United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (UNDDR) Resource Centre. Country Programme: Sierra Leone.

39 3.3 Peacemaker

Yet other women - with certain resources, opportunities, and moral resolve - played the altogether invaluable role of peacemaker throughout Sierra Leone's conflict. Indeed, in spite of dire circumstances, and in the face of overwhelming hardship, Sierra Leonean women came together in cooperative networks to provide for the population in areas where the government was failing, such as access to basic healthcare and income- generation. The rise in female-headed households due to the conflict also compelled women to band together so that they would all be able to provide for their families.

Eventually, according to Barnes (et al.), many of these women took up additional coping strategies by becoming actively involved "in organizing and participating in civil society peacebuilding efforts within their communities," (p. 12) and they continued to do so, lobbying government leadership at every level throughout the conflict and into its aftermath, despite various set-backs. Indeed, "rural and urban women from all classes and ethnic groups mobilized to form active organizations, conduct marches, and lead rallies for peace and justice," (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 15) out of which women's groups, such as the Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace (SLWMP), were born. Accordingly,

Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff (2000) notes how women came to form "non-political voluntary groups that focused on the advancement of the status and welfare of women and worked at the community level to provide them with material benefits and democratic opportunities not otherwise available."

40 The SLWMP was formed in the mid-1990s in response to the growing concern of women's organizations in the country over the conflict and their resolution to become actively involved in the promotion of peace. The SLWMP adopted an interventionist approach on the grounds that the military government could not be trusted to quell the national crisis and that "women were natural peacemakers who could bring unique skills to resolving the conflict" (Jusu-Sheriff, 2000). Notably, the first major accomplishment of the SLWMP was to inspire public dialogue about the conflict without necessarily making the issue confrontational or partisan, which afforded average citizens the opportunity to discuss these issues openly without fear of offending the military government, which, true to form, was defensive over their handling of the war and sensitive to public discussion if negative or critical. The SLWMP did so in January 1995 by organizing a "peace march" in Freetown, indicating the first time a women's organization in Sierra Leone had taken a public and pronounced political position, having been for so many years resigned to the social sphere (Peter Pham, 2004, p. 5).

The SLWMP also had a vital role to play in the lead up to the 1996 elections at the

Bintumani I conference: a national conference held to consult all major sectors of society on the way to proceed with the elections. While most conference attendees wished national elections to be held in Sierra Leone by the end of that year, the Chair - Sierra

Leonean diplomat James Jonah - was persuasive in his view that the elections should be held the following year in order to raise funds from international donors. The position paper submitted by the SLWMP, in conjunction with other women's organizations, declared that the only justifiable reason to further postpone national elections was if it

41 was to accommodate further national consultations; a position that was adopted as the consensus of the assembly, and which led to the Bintumani II conference. Bintumani II was considered a compounded success for women due to the strength shown by the conference moderator, Mrs. Shirley Gbujama. At Bintumani II a vote was to be held by

Sierra Leonean chiefs to show their support for or against an election. According to

Jeneba Koroma, there had been rumours that the National Provisional Ruling Council

(NPRC) were trying to undermine the vote by threatening those chiefs in favour of an election, and by selecting only a few chiefs, those not in favour, to speak at the conference. Koroma notes, "Mrs. Gbujama tactically and bravely asked the chiefs to speak individually, as they did at Bintumani I. The end result was a 'yes' vote from the chiefs for elections" (Koroma, 2007, p. 2). As the votes from the chiefs were essential to proceeding with the election, this leadership shown by Mrs. Gbujama was a crucial factor in bringing it about (Koroma, pp. 1-2).

Leading up to the election in 1996, women's groups, led by Women Organized for a

Morally Enlightened Nation (WOMEN), were active in pressuring the NPRC, who at the time was responsible the most recent military coup installing them at the head of state, to follow through from Bintumani II and hold democratic elections in the country. In fact,

"WOMEN was the first non-partisan women's group in Sierra Leone [promoting] women's representation and concerns in the period before elections" (Mazurana &

Carlson, p. 15). Additionally, these women's groups rallied together in their efforts, disseminating information and educating Sierra Leoneans on election procedures, providing a trained force of electoral observers, and by exerting pressure on the military

42 forces to respect the principles of a free and fair election. As the elections drew close, the

RUF intensified its terror tactics as a means of making citizens fearful of voting, which was a primary motivation behind the amputation of hands, so that citizens could not vote.

In response, the SLWMP began opening branches "in all accessible parts of the country to intensify democracy-promotion activities" (Pham, p. 5).

Despite their integral role in kick-starting the election process, once elected, President

Kabbah set about establishing a cease-fire and designing a peace plan; a process for which no women, not even these prominent groups, were consulted. Having suffered a great deal as a result of the conflict, and having invested so much in bringing about the democratically elected government, it was indeed a blow to the movement that none of these women or their organizations were present during the peace negotiations at

Abidjan. Accordingly, Jusu-Sheriff notes that,

Women believed that their hard work in the democratization process would be rewarded by places at the negotiating table, but politicians recognized that the ideas and attitudes thrown up by the women's movement had the potential of destabilizing traditional politics, so they discouraged further participation by women in leadership.

Given the decades of male-dominated politics in the country, Jusu-Sheriff argues that most women did not have the courage, or outright refused to change their approach from that of a civil society group to a political force that could have bargained for a place in the peace process. Indeed, "A civilian government that promised to take over responsibility for the peace process was a sufficient achievement for many of the women's groups who were not comfortable in the spotlight" (Jusu-Sheriff, 2000). As a result, groups such as the SLWMP began to unravel due to internal dissent over its

43 mandate, as some members wished to take a stronger and more political stance, others, as previously mentioned, were more comfortable on the sidelines. Ultimately, after the drafting the Abidjan Accord, the "SLWMP dissolved in acrimonious disputes between its members over the justice (or injustice) of the agreement" (Pham, p. 6).

Inevitably, perhaps, attempts to implement the Abidjan Peace Accord failed due to its over-accommodation of the RUF, as well as discontent and distrust among the rebel forces, military factions, and Kabbah's government. When Kabbah was subsequently overthrown in 1997 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), who then invited the RUF into the ruling party, it was clear that the end was not in sight for the citizens of Sierra Leone (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 15). Two years later, however, with the installation of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

(ECOMOG) in the country, Kabbah's government was once again restored to power in

Freetown and attempting to fend off further attack from the joint forces of the AFRC and

RUF. These events led Kabbah to pursue another peace plan, which eventually led to the signing of the Lome Peace Accord that same year.

It was the peace accord that marked an official an end to the war, though unrest continued into the years that followed, up until 2002. The Young Women's Christian Association

(YWCA) attempted to play a role in this round of negotiations, but even still women were only marginally included in the writing of the accord. The only reference to women in the entire accord, as noted by Nadine Puechgirbal (2004), was the following: "Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be

44 accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone" (p. 57).

Women were likewise entirely excluded from the process when it involved the design of key post-conflict bodies, such as the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace,

National Reconstruction and Development, and so on (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 16).

When it became clear that not even Lome could hold up against the aspirations of Foday

Sankoh - then leader of the RUF - women's movements became more aggressive and proactive in their approach. Women from the Sierra Leone Women's Forum (SLWF),

Sierra Leone's national umbrella for women's organizations, assembled and rallied in the streets of the capital not only to protest any attempt to prolong the war on the part of the

RUF, but also the inadequate consideration for the needs of women in the peace accords, and their paltry political representation after the elections. "The women on the streets called for an end to male domination and male-biased decisions within parliament,"

(Mazurana & Carlson, pp. 16-17) and rebuked the decision of the Kabbah government to accommodate Sankoh by appointing him as a minister. In 2000, an emboldened group of women took a step that Mazurana and Carlson argue played a "catalytic" role in bringing the conflict to a close once and for all. They describe the events as the following:

A group of elderly women, representing churches and mosques, requested a meeting with Sankoh, who was living in Freetown. The women came as an interfaith group with an agenda of peace at any cost. Upon arrival they were abused by Sankoh, his guards, and advisors, who refused to listen and mistreated them. The assembled older women stood outside of the house of Sankoh, hitched up their skirts, bent over, and bared themselves. In Sierra Leone, such an action by women of this age and standing constitutes the worst curse, sign of shaming, and insult that can be brought upon anyone, (p. 17)

45 The result of this courageous act meant that Sierra Leoneans were required, according to custom, to enforce and uphold its meaning. Despite their shock, it was not long after these events that citizens gained the courage to mobilize against the RUF, rather than continue to live in fear, and Mazurana and Carlson note that "Men in particular were mobilized to defend the power and honor of the women." (p. 17) Inspired by these events, more protests and demonstrations began to take place in Freetown, only this time rallying masses of Sierra Leoneans of both genders in the quest for peace. Just days later, Sankoh was arrested and the RUF began to disintegrate. The essential contributions of Sierra

Leonean women to peacebuilding in the post-conflict context will be discussed further and at length in Chapter 4.

46 CHAPTER 4 POST-CONFLICT IMPLICATIONS AND THE

CONTRIBUTIONS OF WOMEN

4.1 Victim

The implications of those women victimized by the conflict, as well as those who participated in it, are formidable. Due to the high prevalence of rape as a tool of war, women were subjected to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs), as well as risked bodily harm and injury. Barnes (et al.) note that, "The physical trauma associated with sexual violence caused serious reproductive health problems for many women. These include unwanted pregnancies, vesico-vaginal and vesico-rectal fistulas, prolapsed uterus, and infection with sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS"

(p. 11). As of 2005, the United Nations Statistics Division (2007a) estimated that over

43,000 adults (15+) in Sierra Leone were infected with HIV/AIDS, with approximately

60 percent of those infected being women.

Many of those women who were virgins at the time of their raping, or who bore children as a result, were shunned by their families and communities due to the traditional morality that governed many households, particularly in rural areas of Sierra Leone.6

Accordingly, Barnes (et al.) note how, "after the war many women faced stigma, ostracization and shame, and they were often rejected by their husbands for being raped or having been 'rebel wives'" (p. 12), which led some women to grapple with their

6 See Mazurana and Carlson, p. 22, and Barnes (et al.), pp. 11-12.

47 survival through risky income-generating activities, such as prostitution, and meant even further decreases in the likelihood of their obtaining an education. Indeed, according to a report by Amnesty International (2007a), "Rejection by communities and families also carries enormous economic consequences for the victims, who are excluded from their homes and cut off from possible means of livelihood. Survivors abandoned by their husbands are unlikely to marry again, leaving them as sole carers and supporters for their children" (p. 2). Not surprisingly, many women also suffered from depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and the surge in female-headed households after the conflict, and their limited access to income generation left many women and their families vulnerable to extreme poverty, which naturally has further implications in terms of their health and education (Barnes [et al.], 2007).

The conflict also left a legacy of sexual abuse and violence in the country, as well as a shift in traditional gender roles caused by the rise in female-headed households, and this has had negative implications in terms of GBV experienced by women even after the peace agreements were signed. Accordingly, Karen Barnes ([et. al], 2007) notes that,

"Women have been offered limited assistance to deal with the health, psychosocial and economic consequences of sexual violence experienced during the war and the continued discrimination they face in the post-conflict phase" (p. 2). Moreover, Barnes (et al.) argue that the failings of the judicial system to put in place legal machinery and provide justice for victims of GBV during the conflict, ".. .has contributed to a culture of impunity around GBV-related crimes" (p. 2). This lack of social, political and legal support has paid short shrift to the important role of women in peacebuilding during the conflict, by

48 excluding them so widely from these processes and failing to grant women any decision­ making authority that they so rightly deserved. As GBV and related concerns have received so little attention to date in reconstruction strategies, Barnes (et al.) predict that

"GBV is to be an endemic problem throughout Sierra Leone, and it prevents women from contributing to and participating fully in peacebuilding efforts" (p. 6).

4.2 Participant

Those women and girls who participated in the conflict, particularly within the CDF, experienced "stigmatization, threats, and abuse upon returning to the communities they had fought to protect" (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 13) due to the warfare and activities they engaged in that were traditionally unacceptable roles for women. Thus, for female ex- combatants, in the first months and years of post-conflict Sierra Leone, the outlook was equally unpromising. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process led initially by ECOMOG and later by the United Nations Observer Mission to

Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), though hailed as one of the most successful international interventions and programs of its kind to date, held a systemic bias in recognizing male combatants, but failed considerably those former combatants who were women

(Mazurana & Carlson, p. 19).

The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (NCDDR) aimed to achieve the following three objectives: to collect, register and destroy all weaponry and ammunition submitted by combatants; demobilize all combatants, whether

49 associated with the RUF, CDF, AFRC, or the SLA; and to offer support to former combatants throughout this process and facilitate their entry into a reintegration program.

At the time, there were an estimated 45,000 combatants in total, from all fighting forces,

12 per cent of which were women. In this first and second phases of DDR, eligibility of the combatant for the program was determined by their ability to answer a series of questions, their age (18 and older), and their aptitude for disassembling and reassembling their weapon. According to the NCDDR, this would prove whether or not they were a bona fide participant in the conflict. In phase three, group participation was permitted whereby a group could apply for entry into the program with one or multiple weapons between them. Combatants under 18 years of age were permitted to enter the program without a weapon; however, according to various reports children under 18 consistently underwent the weapons and entry test in order to gain admittance. (Mazurana & Carson, p. 18)

As DDR progressed, many male ex-combatants were unable to secure employment and were subsequently unable to support their families with the support given to them from the program. It was for this reason that the DDR program began extending applications for micro-credit to the ex-combatant's "wives." However, "for a female applicant to access the loans, she had to be present with a "husband," who was willing to identify her as his wife. No woman could claim benefits alone, regardless of the number of children she cared for." (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 18)

50 Furthermore, female ex-combatants did not always possess a weapon: women combatants in the CDF, for example, were required to hand their weapons to their commanders and it was they who transported the weapons to the DDR centers. Yet other women and girls, who played multiple roles in the fighting forces but were not primarily fighters, were privy only to communal weapons stores throughout the conflict and thus did not have a weapon to surrender. According to a survey of female ex-combatants by Mazurana and

Carlson (2004), "Of the study group that did not go through DDR, 46 percent cited not having a weapon as the basis for their lack of participation." (p. 20)

There were many other obstacles preventing women from participating in DDR, which were overlooked by those who designed and implemented the program. The same survey conducted by Mazurana and Carlson revealed that 21 percent of the women surveyed avoided the DDR processes and centers because they were afraid of confrontations or resurgences of violence between the ex-combatants from the various forces or factions.

Indeed, women with children, particularly those from the CDF, were fearful of staying at the center, as their children would often face threats and taunting from the children affiliated with the RUF. Women were additionally underserved by the DDR program due to its tendency to view and classify women and girls as solely abductees, followers,

"wives" or sexual captives of the camp in question. Since the DDR program was designed only to deal with former combatants, it was often due to over- or misclassification that women were left out of the process, and no further DDR programs

51 were subsequently developed to account for their experience in the conflict.

Accordingly, Mazurana and Carlson found that,

According to DDR officials, "wives," including those abducted, were to be explicitly excluded from formal entrance into DDR. The focus of DDR was on the main fighting forces, and "minority" groups would not be taken into consideration. However, since women and girls frequently played multiple roles, narrow classification of them as "wives" resulted in programmatic errors, (p. 21)

In fact, the survey conducted by Mazurana and Carlson found that, while 60 percent indicated having served as a "wife," only 8 percent claimed that it was their primary responsibility or role. (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 21)

Finally, other obstacles surfaced largely due to myths about the CDF, and cultural misunderstandings regarding age and adulthood. The former refers to the degree of buy- in to the idea that the CDF did not have female membership. For this reason, many women and girls claiming to be affiliated with the CDF were viewed with suspicion or turned away until these facts were later clarified. The latter created confusion and errors in the DDR program due to the conflict between - perhaps Western - constructs of age and adulthood, as opposed to adulthood defined by traditional rites of passage as is the case for many Sierra Leoneans. For example, a young girl under the age of 18 who has given birth is no longer considered a girl, so would have attempted to enter the program as an adult. This meant that young girls were often turned away as adults and unable to benefit from the program they were entitled to; the program designed for children.

7 A further implication of the classification system used by the DDR program was that there were an underreported number of women who participated in the conflict. In a survey of ex-combatants conducted by Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) of The Earth Institute at Columbia University, a more detailed screening system was used whereby the numbers of women claiming to have participated in the various fighting forces was significantly increased, finding a 3.5 percent rise in the number of women ex- combatants from the numbers reported by DDR (see Chapter 4).

52 Mazurana and Carlson note that, "This [was] not only detrimental to disarmament and demobilization, it also harms the women and girls. By being treated as passive victims or

"dependents," they are again stripped of control of their lives and their sense of dignity"

(p. 15). This lack of background and cultural sensitivity in the program led to great discrepancies in the potential of the DDR program to serve the needs and interests of female ex-combatants (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 21).

4.3 Peacemaker

However, despite the shortcomings of the DDR program in the country, women working alone as well as women's organizations recognized the need for intervention once more and became active in providing for these women and girls. Women around the country have taken in former child soldiers and both women and girl ex-combatants with children, providing them food, shelter and often skills training to help ease their social transition. "Women in Sierra Leone," Mazurana and Carlson note, "though under- resourced and unheralded, have filled in these programmatic gaps and done much to reintegrate former combatants, particularly women and child soldiers... and thereby worked to normalize and bring stability to their communities and their nation." (p. 22)

Interestingly, 55 percent of Mazurana and Carlson's study population indicated that a significant factor in their reintegration was the role women from the community played in their lives; a number that far outweighed the influence of traditional leaders and healers, as well as international aid and health workers, while being matched only by religious

53 leaders and social workers in the community, many of which, coincidentally, were also women. (Mazurana & Carlson, p. 23)

Groups and organizations of women also rose and formed in response to this need. For example, the Luawa Skills Training Center (LSTC), founded by a group of women in the

Makeni area, and the Women's Progressive Movement (WPM), have designed their own reintegration programs for their region. In them, women - whether combatants, abductees, or victims - receive skills training in areas such as tailoring, and are required to give a portion of their earnings back to the organization only once they start making and selling their own products. These programs serve to give women independence, a sense of purpose, income generation, and a way to transition back into everyday life

(Mazurana & Carlson, p. 24).

Other groups working in various regions across the country include the Progressive

Women's Association (PROWA) and the Forum for African Women Educationalists

(FAWE). PROWA is unique in its acceptance and encouragement of pregnant women into their programs, and FA WE offers non-traditional forms of skills training for women such as carpentry and masonry, which they have gone on to organize into efforts to rebuild schools and community centers that were destroyed in the conflict. Additionally, they have built new schools designed for girls' education. But their work goes beyond skills training to focus on potential roots of the problem, such as targeting illiteracy, as well as counseling and referrals to doctors for rape victims. FAW E itself provides pre- and post-natal care to those women survivors who are pregnant, and engage in

54 widespread sensitivity campaigns through radio, government, and schools. (Mazurana &

Carlson, p. 24)

Finally, the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), created in 2000 before the official end of the conflict, by a network of women from Liberia, Guinea, and

Sierra Leone (i.e., Mano River countries). MARWOPNET operated under the premise that as the primary targets and victims of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia, women have the right to be actively involved in the decision-making processes regarding those conflicts. The Network was designed to "complement nationally driven activities to consolidate peace, prevent future conflicts, and create sustainable peace, stability, and development." (Modem Lawson-Betum, 2005, p. 30). The original membership of

MARWOPNET came from all walks of life, and its success, according to Lawson-Betum, can be attributed to "the high degree of political and professional experience of the leadership... and its ability to access all key players from the top to the grassroots with clear and convincing messages." (p. 30).

The main activities undertaken by MARWOPNET include widespread dissemination of information campaigns, including the mass distribution of such important documents as the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the network's own publications, as well as international legal documents covering topics such as human rights, the rights of women and the child, and conflict prevention. Additionally, members from MARWOPNET engage in frequent and strategic fact-finding missions to sensitive areas within the three countries that could potentially erupt into conflict, and report on

55 them and urge both national and traditional leadership, as well as community-based and other civil society organizations to take preventative action. In the aftermath of the conflict, members of MARWOPNET paid visits to refugee camps in neighbouring

Guinea and Liberia, recruiting women to join the peace process, as well as working to reunite refugees with family members and helping them get home (Mazurana and

Carlson, p. 17)

Finally, the Network has also been credited with producing a documentary film on the value of peace and stability (notably the first of its kind), as well as creating sensitization campaigns for local radio stations and in both urban and rural schools (Lawson-Betum, p.

32). Of their work, Elisabeth Rehn, former UN Under-Secretary-General, Special

Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998-1999), is quoted by UNIFEM (2004) as saying, "Women are not just victims of war, they are also powerful agents of change. The Mano River Women's Peace Network is a strong example of how women are courageously working to bridge political, ethnic and cultural divides" (p. 2).

4.4 Lack of Political Will

In the aftermath of the conflict, women continued to fight for their right to be involved in the socio-political machinery of Sierra Leone. The post-conflict outlook was not entirely promising with the results of the DDR program, the vast number of women struggling to

56 survive by engaging in the sex trade, and by the reluctance of even the newly elected government to advance concerning women's rights.

Adding to the post-conflict dilemma for women, according to a 2007 report by Amnesty

International, is that the government of Sierra Leone has not been making a great deal of progress with the recommendations from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

(TRC). The Truth and Reconciliation process provided a comprehensive backdrop for the government of Sierra Leone to develop a post-conflict reparations program for victims. In the subsequent report submitted by the TRC in 2004, women were the focus in terms of recommended areas for action and reparations. Unfortunately, as Barnes (et al.) note,

"The recommendations related to GBV in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission are yet to be implemented, and the Ministry responsible for gender affairs is one of the weakest and least-funded ministries within the government." (p. 2). These recommendations include such targets as: free health care for women to address the medical ramifications of the sexual violence experienced during the conflict, and the setting up of National Commission on Social Action (NaCSA) as the main body to implement the reparations, which was eventually approved late in 2006, but to date no women's organizations have been involved, represented or consulted in its work.

Furthermore, there have been delays in establishing the Special Fund for War Victims as outlined in Article XXIX of the Lome Peace Agreement and, due to the aforementioned amnesty clause also found in the Lome Peace Agreement, the majority of war crimes have gone unpunished. In fact, the first three war criminals, all male and senior members

57 of the AFRC, were found guilty of 11 out of 14 war crimes and crimes against humanity only in June 2007. While this was a huge step forward in serving justice to those victimized in the conflict, the delays in doing so and the backlog of criminals yet to be tried is indicative of a greater problem within the government of Sierra Leone in being proactive in providing reparations for its citizens (Amnesty International, 2007, pp. 9-11).

If Sierra Leone is to properly recover from the devastation caused by the eleven year conflict, it must adequately take into consideration the contribution of women to a reconstructed, peaceful and prosperous country. By having their rights denied - whether through the actions of the rebels or armed forces throughout the conflict, or through the inadequate provision for women and girls through DDR, for example - these violations are in effect security issues: it limits and negatively impacts on the ability of all Sierra

Leoneans "to secure and enjoy their basic rights," and further, "...can also feed into a broader societal violence and can consequently compromise the country's transition to peace" (Barnes [et al.], p. 6).

The various roles women play in many civil and international conflicts are thus often underestimated. Whether as active participants or peacemakers in the conflict, women tend to be portrayed more as passive bystanders or victims, and while the vast majority are indeed deeply victimized by the conflict, "little regard is given to their actual and potential roles in fostering security" (Mazurana & Carlson, p. ii). With the prevalence of

GBV in Sierra Leone today, Barnes (et al.) argue that the social, economic, and security

58 costs of GBV to post-conflict reconstruction efforts are immense and often under­ estimated:

.. .women [are] more likely to be illiterate and suffer extreme poverty, their rights are frequently violated, and they have little access to resources or opportunities. This burden affects society as a whole, and can adversely affect the potential for sustainable peacebuilding and development by disempowering and marginalising more than half of the population, (p. 6)

Clearly, the contribution of women to the peace process in Sierra Leone, and their perseverance after the conflict in caring for victims and ex-combatants where national and DDR programs failed, indicates their invaluable contribution to security - and importantly, the human security - of Sierra Leoneans. Without this vital contribution, factors such as poverty, illiteracy, poor health, human rights abuses and societal rejection of former combatants would undoubtedly lead to further conflict and unrest. But it is not enough. Sierra Leone still remains at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development

Index (HDI) and women need support in carrying out these roles. The government of

Sierra Leone must recognize the work of women as vital to sustainable peacebuilding in the country and proactively implement measures toward achieving gender equality if there is hope for a full recovery from this brutal civil war.

59 CHAPTER 5 THE RWANDAN CONTEXT: A COMPARISON

5.1 Socio-Political History of Rwanda and the 1994 Genocide

Tensions between the two main ethnic groups in Rwanda - the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi - began and were fuelled during the years of Colonial rule8, when the

Tutsis were favoured and given positions in government by the Belgian colonial administrators. Under this administration, Hutu and Tutsi Rwandans were issued government identification cards indicating their ethnicity. In the years since, it has been argued that the distinctions between the two ethnicities were in fact largely fabricated by the colonizers in an attempt to co-opt the wealthier segment of the population, the Tutsi, and create a Rwandan class system, while having very little to do with ethnicity at all.

According to Ward (2002), "...it does seem clear that the colonization of Rwanda exacerbated class distinctions among the Tutsi elite and the Hutu populace. The

Belgians... issued ID cards for Tutsi and Hutu based on the number of cows they had, thus solidifying a previously porous social structure" (p. 27).

Legitimate or not, these social divisions between the two groups deepened in the years after independence. In fact, in 1959, during the transition to independence, a Hutu uprising resulted in a massacre of Tutsi, which prompted the first population of Tutsi

Rwandans to flee the country. These tensions simmered over the years to come, and exploded once more in the 1990s when a rebel army, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)

81897-1914 under a German Colonial Administration, and 1914-1962 under the Belgians.

60 comprised largely of exiled Tutsi, initiated a number of armed attacks in the name of democratic governance and the repatriation of Tutsi refugees (Ward, p. 27).

The response of Hutu President Habyarimana was to fuel hatred and fear of the Tutsis among Hutus, by reminding them of Tutsi hegemony from the colonial years, and by using overwhelmingly racist propaganda messages through the Rwandan media. He referred to all Tutsi as "cockroaches", creating an image of them as pests and a problem to be extinguished. A famous propaganda tool he employed was the "Hutu Ten

Commandments" which was meant to instruct Hutu men and women on their views and actions in relation to the Tutsi. When Habyarimana was assassinated in 1994, a full-scale offensive broke out led by the Presidential Guard, the Interahamwe, with the aim of targeting and eliminating all Tutsi. According to Sadye Logan (2006), they referred to this process as ethnic cleansing, and was "a goal that was pursued with extraordinary cruelty. People were burned alive, thrown dead or alive into pits, and often forced to kill their own friends or relatives" (p. 235). While at first the primary targets were men and boys, including those Tutsi men who held political positions, it quickly turned into a slaughter of all Tutsi, regardless of gender or age, because in genocide women are considered particularly insidious due to their ability to bring life - more Tutsi - into the world. The genocide lasted 100 days, and within that time frame a devastating 800,000

Rwandans, both Hutu and Tutsi, perished (Logan, pp. 234-235).

61 5.2 Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in the Rwandan Context

Similar to Sierra Leone, women in Rwanda have traditionally been afforded an inferior social and political status to men. With patriarchy influencing social relations and roles throughout much of Rwanda's history, women have played a relatively minor role in the political sphere of the country. Prior to the genocide in 1994, women consisted of 70% of the population in Rwanda and yet were viewed and expected to be dependent on their male relatives, while their primary roles in society is that of mother, wife, housekeeper, and field labourer. Indeed, Logan notes how women in Rwanda have been traditionally

"[valued] for the number of children they can produce. The ideal image of a Rwandan woman is that of a hard worker who is fertile and reserved" (p. 236).

While GBV and discrimination against women were commonplace prior to the genocide, as extremism flourished in the country in the years leading up to 1994, violent acts against women, propaganda denouncing Tutsi women, and harassment of all women

(regardless of race) also proliferated, fuelled by societal tensions. Elizabeth Powley

(2004) notes that, "The harassment of women in pre-genocide Rwanda mirrors the experience of women in other pre-conflict settings. Repression and rape, a gendered expression of the rising extremism, became more commonplace" (p. 3). The aforementioned "Hutu Ten Commandments" had three such "commandments" that were gender-related. It urged Hutu men and women to protect men from Tutsi women, because they were seductive and deceitful. Additionally, the "commandments" claimed that any

Hutu man, who married a Tutsi woman or made her his concubine, secretary, or protege,

62 was a traitor. It claimed that Hutu women were more honest, better-looking, more dignified, and were more hard-working in their roles as woman, wife and mother. Finally, the "commandments" called upon Hutu women to protect Hutu men and bring them to reason should they stray (Powley, 2004, pp. 3-4). While all Rwandans felt the consequences of the genocide, there are concrete examples that suggest women, both

Tutsi and Hutu women, were prime targets of the genocide. Indeed, "All Tutsi women were targeted, simply because they were Tutsi... [And] educated, elite women were attacked, regardless of their ethnicity. Some Hutu women were subjugated to violence by

RPF soldiers in revenge for the violence perpetrated by Hutu men" (Cecilia

Ntombizodwa Mzvondiwa, 2007, p. 101). Powley argues that the subsequent gender- and sexual-based violence that occurred can be linked to how women were traditionally viewed and treated in the country, in terms of gender inequality and discrimination that were socially acceptable prior to the genocide taking place. This is concurrent with the aforementioned argument of Charlotte Bunch (2004) who claims that violence against women in conflict is directly related to the pre-existing and socially acceptable levels of

GBV in a given society prior to the conflict taking place.

5.3 Women's Roles in the Genocide

Women in Rwanda also played a variety of roles in the genocide that follows the same typology laid out in the previous two chapters for Sierra Leone: the victim, the participant and/or the peacemaker. Indeed, the vast majority of women fell into either the victim or peacemaker categories, as it is estimated that only 2.3 percent of women actively

63 participated in the genocide, but this nonetheless means that women are not entirely blameless, nor can the 2.3 percent account for those women who succumbed to the bandwagon effect of the government's propaganda, and who were complicit in the genocide without having been a recognized or declared participant. According to Cecilia

Ntombizodwa Mzvondiwa (2007), "Some women participated in the genocide alongside their brothers, fathers and sons. They killed, tortured, informed, and collaborated with killers" (p. 102). However, as mentioned above, both Hutu and Tutsi women were victimized throughout the genocide. Rape, GBV, and sexual violence were also key tools of war in terrorizing the Rwandan population, leaving women facing the same fates as those in Sierra Leone: severe health and medical complications, unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections, ostracization by their home communities, as well as a rise in HIV/AIDS infections (Logan, p. 236).

In the aftermath of the genocide, women took an active a role in rebuilding their country.

Forming support networks and women's societies, women were at the forefront of social reconstruction, and in the words of President Paul Kagame, "women rolled up their sleeves and began making society work again" (Hunt, 2005, p. 255). One woman in particular, Aloisea Inyumba, who at the age of 26 became Minister for Family and

Gender in post-genocide Rwanda, spearheaded the monumental task of burying approximately 800,000 Rwandans along with creating a system called "Each One Take

One": A system whereby public campaigns were launched encouraging women to take one more child into their families who was orphaned by the genocide. As a result, families often became mixed between Hutu and Tutsi, and over 500,000 orphans were

64 taken into new homes (Elizabeth Powley, 2006). Inyumba was also instrumental in preparing and sensitizing communities for the return of perpetrators of the genocide who had been released from prison due to their not receiving legal due process (i.e., having waited too long to be tried in court).

Initiatives such as the Rwanda Path to Peace were created to enhance the socio-economic well-being of women, as well as promote reconciliation. With technical support from

UNIFEM, Rwandan women who are master weavers began organizing ethnically mixed groups to teach women the art of basket-weaving. As a longstanding tradition in Rwanda, basket weaving has not only been considered the country's greatest craft, but it has also been a crucial way to bring the community together for hundreds of years. Rollo Romig

(2006) notes, "In Rwanda, genocide widows are weaving baskets alongside the wives of war criminals, forging their own path to reconciliation - and economic recovery" (para.

1). The nature of the weaving groups means that weavers must sit and work closely together while sharing supplies, leading some to claim that the program succeeds where the traditional Gacaca9 courts fail (Romig, para. 12).

Key to the program was its business aspect and partnership with a Macy's department store in New York City: the baskets produced by the approximately 2,500 women involved in the program are exported and sold at this Macy's store. According to Willa

Shalit, the U.S. artist behind the business partnership, the decision to work with Macy's was made because it was the only department store that wanted to sell the baskets as

9 The Gacaca are traditional, community-based courts in Rwanda that were revived in the years following the genocide due to delays in prosecuting war criminals by the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (Ward, 2002).

65 designed by the Rwandan women and without alterations. The socio-economic impact of this program on basket-weavers in Rwanda, according to UNIFEM, has been felt in a number of ways. There has reportedly been a reduction in spousal abuse and GBV within the home "as women are able to provide for their families and often get their husbands involved," and Rwandan women with HIV/AIDS now enjoy a greater degree of respect in their communities, proper nutrition, and are able to afford crucial medications (Romig,

2006, para. 6). Moreover, it was reported that upon leaving prison, many former war criminals were quick to inquire and get involved in the basket-weaving program, which aided in their social and economic reintegration and that further contributed to the post- genocide reconciliation between victims and perpetrators (Romig, para. 18). Ensuring the sustainability of this program and business partnership is of course key to the longer-term economic stability of the basket-weavers, but it is just one example of how women are picking up the pieces left by the genocide and pushing the reconciliation agenda forward in Rwanda.

Numerous women's organizations were active in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, working to assist survivors of sexual violence and GBV. Pro-Femmes/Twese

Hamwe in Rwanda is the equivalent of Sierra Leone's SLWF, acting as an umbrella organization for local women's groups, networks, and NGOs. Under this umbrella came such legal NGOs as Haguruka, which has 330 paralegals working across the country to support victims of rape, in accessing doctors and police, as well as providing legal advice should the victim choose to prosecute. Four other women's organizations - Avega,

Barakabaho, Icyuzuzo, and Clinique de L'espoir - are all actively involved in addressing

66 GBV-related cases in the country, providing medical and emotional counseling to victims and with assistance from Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). Another notable organization is the Polyclinic of Hope which began working with women survivors of the genocide in

1995. Informed by the Rwanda Women's network philosophy and orientation toward women's empowerment, the Polyclinic encourages community networks and principles of mutual assistance while providing medical services free of charge, counseling services, advice on income-generating activities, and assistance in finding shelter to its clients. As in the case of Sierra Leone, many of these organizations have been bolstered and supported by international organizations such as UNDP, UNIFEM, UNICEF and the

WHO, among others, as well as by the Ministry for Gender and Women in Development

(MIGEPROFE), but one of the primary challenges these women's organizations continue to face is with regard to funding and support from national and international donors

(Jeanne Ward, 2002, 30-31).

5.4 Post-Conflict Implications and Developments

Rwandans recognized the shift in gender roles after the conflict due to the necessity - because of the losses in the male population - of women taking on untraditional leadership positions in social, political and economic spheres. The government and the country embraced this shift and opted for encouraging the empowerment of women and gender equality, rather than defaulting to traditional views and roles. "Their social structures were destroyed, their relationships and traditional networks were severed,"

Powley notes, "and [women] were left to head their households and communities" (2004,

67 p. 5). And, due to the victimization endured by women and their subsequent strength in the face of hardship, Rwandans, for the most part, adopted the view that women "bore the brunt of the genocide and therefore deserve a significant and official role in the nation's recovery" (Powley, 2004, p. 5).

Importantly, the first multiparty and parliamentary elections in post-genocide Rwanda were held in 2003 with women gaining 49 percent of the seats in parliament, which stands in marked contrast to the 19 percent of seats women held prior to the genocide.

This gave women an unprecedented standing in the political decision-making structures in the country; indeed the highest number of women in parliament in the world, rivaled only by Sweden, where 45 percent of women have seats.10 According to Hunt, the government of Rwanda developed innovative strategies and progressive policies toward gender equality in the country which allowed this to happen, including the adoption of a

30% target for women in parliament - which they overwhelmingly exceeded - and in light of this, "At national and grassroots levels, Rwandan women have made significant contributions to post-genocide recovery and reconciliation and women in governance have developed models for working across party and ethnic lines, strengthening partnerships and civil society" (p. 257).

The adoption of the quota system for women was a further indication of the country's commitment to such international frameworks as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and calls made by the Platform of

Action adopted by the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, and was

10 Based on 2006 statistics gathered by the United Nations Statistics Division.

68 reflected in the Constitution adopted by Rwanda in 2003, which explicitly stated the country's commitment to having 30 percent, a critical mass, of women in parliament

(Powley, 2004). In another statement, Kagame was quoted as saying, "The question of gender equality in our society needs a clear and critical evaluation in order to come up with concrete strategies to map the future development in which men and women are true partners and beneficiaries. My understanding of gender is that it is an issue of good governance, good economic management and respect for human rights" (Mzvondiwa, p.

103).

Two other electoral systems at the district level were designed to complement the inclusion of women at the national level. The first of these was a triple ballot voting system whereby voters at the district level were given three ballots: a general ballot (on which both men and women could run), a women's ballot, and a youth's ballot. The district council would then be comprised of the winners of the general ballot, which were often (but not always) men, one-third of the winners of the women's ballot, and one-third of the winners from the youth's ballot. This ensured that at least a certain percentage of women would be elected at the district level. The second electoral innovation concerned a parallel system of women's councils, elected solely by women, to work alongside the district council to ensure women's concerns are well-represented. Since the introduction of the women's councils by MIGEPROFE after the genocide, their role has greatly expanded to include advocacy and skills training with representatives from such fields as legal affairs, finance, health and education (Powley, 2004).

69 Women in parliament have made significant achievements despite the challenges associated with parliamentary delays and the criticisms that Rwanda's parliament in particular exercises little power in relation to the executive. Indeed for the first time in

Rwanda, in 1999, the right of women to own land was formally established in the Law on

Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions. Powley (2006) argues that this legal milestone should not be understated: "Particularly in light of the genocide, which destroyed and scattered families, women's right to inherit land was critical - not just as a matter of women's rights, but because it had a direct impact on issues such as food production and security, the environment, settlement patterns, and the livelihoods of families and children left behind" (p. 12).

Women in Rwanda today are considered to be an "important symbol of moderation... they are trusted with the tasks of reconciliation and reconstruction in part because they have not been implicated in the violence to the same extent as men" (Powley, 2004, p. 4).

Why this would be a deeply held view in Rwanda and not in Sierra Leone could be based on a number of cultural or contextual differences, but is a question for further study.

Unspeakable crimes against humanity characterized both the conflict in Sierra Leone and the genocide in Rwanda. While the time in which the respective conflicts elapsed and the nature of the combatants grievances are remarkably different, the cruelty, scale of violence, and the targeting of women are more comparable and similarly tragic. This is not to say that the conflict, as experienced by Sierra Leoneans, is at all the same as the realities faced by those who endured or fell victim to the genocide in Rwanda, it simply

70 means that there is a basis from which to compare the two countries in their post-conflict and post-genocide phases.

Women in Rwanda, then, were not only active in peacemaking during and after the genocide, but the Rwandan government also implemented affirmative action policies, bringing women into parliament and giving them their rightful place in the decision­ making structures of the country. Traditionally, Rwandan women did not enjoy a higher status in society than the women of Sierra Leone, but the key lies in the respective outcomes of each conflict: Where Rwanda pursued gender equality and affirmative action policies, Sierra Leone pursued the continued exclusion of women from the political sphere. Indeed, while GBV existed in both countries before, during, and even after the conflicts, in Rwanda, for example, an International Criminal Tribunal was established that recognized rape as a war crime (among others) and prosecuted those guilty of the crime accordingly, particularly higher-level officials. While the process was slow, it stands in marked contrast to Sierra Leone and the actions of President Kabbah, who granted amnesty for war crimes such as rape in the 1999 Lome Agreement, in hopes of gaining collaboration from the rebel forces in government.

What factors allowed these developments to take place in Rwanda but not, as of yet, in

Sierra Leone? Some have speculated that Kagame and other members of the RPF were heavily influenced by the exposure they received while in exile in Uganda, where a quota system is used in parliament to ensure women are elected from each district. Also due to their exile, it is said that members of the RPF, as a political party, were more sympathetic

71 to the case of women's exclusions, having faced discrimination and exile for being Tutsi.

Others have argued that the personal aspirations and politics of Kagame played a much larger role in the open-doors attitude toward women in government and the adoption of a

30% quota: indeed, many believe he was simply attempting to secure his hold on power by courting women politically, as they were the majority of the populace after the genocide and his primary support base.11 Powley (2006) notes that "[Critics] have countered that Kagame is allowing women to take on high-level positions, not out of a genuine commitment to gender equality, but in an attempt to play to the majority constituency. Further they charge that the women in these positions are easy tools for him to manipulate or control" (p. 4).

However, the important societal changes taking place from having this influx of women in leadership positions, whatever the intentions of Kagame, are not to be underestimated.

In interviews conducted for a background paper for The State of the World's Children

2007, Powley (2006) notes:

[Both] male and female parliamentarians emphasized that the increased number of women in parliament is providing an important model for future generations. As Member of Parliament Evariste Kalisa explained... "It is encouraging future generations to be ambitious and to follow in the footprints of their mothers. They are role models to children, to girls. When we will have these young girls studying in order to have a breakthrough as their mothers did, their living standards will be raised and those of the community in general." (p. 8)

While women in Rwanda are subjected to gender inequality and GBV even today, and while the legitimacy of Kagame including women in politics may be suspect, the government is nonetheless taking proactive and substantial steps forward in closing the

11 See Elizabeth Powley (2006), Mark Lacey (2005), et al.

72 gap between women and men, and with time and persistence, these steps will translate into the societal change noted above. The women of Rwanda also have a part to play in ensuring that this newfound recognition of their contributions to the decision-making structures of the country is maintained and continues to move forward: "In Rwanda, barriers to access have been largely removed, but attention must be paid to training and education for women candidates and women elected officials in order to strengthen their capacity and help consolidate these gains" (Powley, 2004, p. 11).

73 CHAPTER 6 SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE TODAY

Women and girls in Sierra Leone, before, during and after the conflict, were subjected to discrimination by practice, custom and law. There is no basis to justify the discrimination that women have endured in Sierra Leone. The legal apparatus that entrenches discrimination against women must be dismantled. - The 2004 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Volume 2, Chapter 3, Item 341)

6.1 Progress

Indeed, while Chapter II paints a bleak picture, the continued contributions to human security on the part of women's groups alone provides a great deal of hope, and there is yet notable progress undertaken by the government of Sierra Leone that should be mentioned. First and foremost, the Sierra Leone Law Reform Commission (LRC) was established shortly after the end of the war in 2002, with a mandate to examine and reform the legal system in Sierra Leone, in order to more accurately reflect the modernity of the country emerging from the conflict and update its laws accordingly. It was also designed with the purpose to centralize the legal system and create a coherent basis from which all other legal systems previously operating in the country could operate. A conference was held on the "Women's Law Reform Agenda" in 2003 which gave women a forum to discuss their more pressing legal needs and that resulted in a platform detailing the main areas in which the government was requested to take action: in education and training, violence against women, and succession and inheritance (Barnes [et al.], 2007, p. 20).

12 As mentioned in the Introduction, these legal systems include customary, Islamic and general law.

74 This initiative inspired several groups to join forces - including the Lawyer's

Commission for Legal Assistance (LAWCLA), MARWOPNET, the Parliamentary

Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) and Lawyers Yearning for Equality, Rights, and

Social Justice (LAWYERS) - to lobby the government to reform those laws that discriminate against women and deny them their international rights. The result of this advocacy campaign was the drafting of the "Gender Bills": Three bills demonstrating the government of Sierra Leone's willingness to strive for gender equality on the issue of customary marriages, domestic violence, and property inheritance. The Registration of

Customary Marriages and Divorce Act 2007 requires mutual consent between the two parties to marry and that they be a minimum of 18 years of age. The Act also grants women more control over their economic security by stipulating that a woman does not need to forfeit her marriage dowry in the event of divorce, as well as provides an avenue for women to apply for funding to support their children should the father not fulfill his financial obligations to the family (UNIFEM, 2007b, p. 1).

The Domestic Violence Act 2007 explicitly denounces domestic violence as criminal activity punishable by law, which up until this point, had always been considered a family and private matter to be handled discreetly and from within the home. The Act also outlines provisions for victims of domestic violence, placing the onus on the government to provide temporary safe houses, while the Family Support Units (discussed below) are enabled to act as mediator in the dispute, as well as provide legal assistance and support to those women who wish to go through legal channels with the matter.

75 According to a news release by UNIFEM, this Act is significant in that, "the offence of domestic violence is broadly defined to encompass physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, economic and verbal abuse, as well as conduct that harms or endangers an individual's safety, health or well-being, or undermines their privacy or dignity" (2007b, p.l).

Finally, the Devolution of Estates Act 2007 grants women a right to inheritance, which is an important step towards women's economic security in that it stipulates that a man's property be legally inherited by his wife and children, rather than by the male members of his family, as had been the custom in the past. Additionally, women have gained legal rights in the practice of "wife inheritance": outlawing the forced marriage of widows to a brother of their deceased husband. The merits of the three Acts - the Gender Bills - were debated and fast-tracked through parliament by President Kabbah in the lead-up to the

2007 elections, and notably, were passed on 14 June 2007.

Another promising feature of the current government's efforts to address GBV, that began even before the Gender Bills were conceptualized, is the establishment in 2001 of

Family Support Units (FSUs) within the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). FSUs were designed to address instances of GBV in the home by engaging in awareness-raising campaigns and community outreach, and by 2006 the units became operative in 26 localities across

Sierra Leone. The FSUs work in partnership with LAWCLA to provide victims with free legal advice and services. The FSUs then follow through by ensuring medical certificates are submitted as evidence and that the perpetrators are apprehended and subjected to the

76 judicial system. According to Barnes (et al.), "The FSUs are seen as a progressive, innovative response to the problem of domestic violence, and they have served as a good practice for other countries to follow" (p. 24). However, there are systemic challenges to the work of the FSUs, such as the limited office space in which the FSU workers operate, which compromises the confidentiality of victims who seek the FSUs help and puts them at further risk of public scrutiny and sexual stigmatization. Notably, however, the publicity surrounding the FSUs and their work has made great progress in decreasing the stigma associated with reporting GBV-related crimes. Equally, the enactment of the

Gender Bills has greatly increased the ability for the SLP to enforce gender sensitive policies and practices when dealing with the general public.

An initiative undertaken for the implementation of the Gender Bills and the advancement of women in the post-conflict context is the Network of Women Ministers and

Parliamentarians (NEWMAP). In partnership with UNIFEM, they are working to enhance women parliamentarians understanding and analysis of the Gender Bills, as well as their understanding and analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Sierra Leone technically ratified CEDAW in

1988 but due to the disruption caused by the conflict, was unable to fulfill its international reporting obligations. However, in December 2006, Sierra Leone submitted its first report: a compendium of the initial, first, second, third, fourth and fifth reports that were due to CEDAW, that brought Sierra Leone up to date. NEWMAP is now working on sensitization campaigns for parliamentarians of both genders with regard to

CEDAW and the findings of Sierra Leone's 2006 report (UNIFEM, 2006).

77 Other activities undertaken in this regard include the three day workshop for Sierra

Leonean police officers held by the government of Sierra Leone, in partnership with the

United Nations, in August 2007. The workshop was designed as a precursor to the elections held that same month, in an attempt to thwart breakouts of violence related to the elections and prepare the officers in advance for dealing with sensitive situations should they arise. The workshop concentrated on topics such as gender sensitivity and human rights, with the aim of "improving the way officers deal with the public and particularly how they handle domestic violence" (UNIFEM, 2007c, para. 4).

With these initiatives taken by the government of Sierra Leone, but with obvious room for improvement, there was recognition among civil society organizations that they needed to put pressure on the government to follow through with these programs and put policy into practice. On 1 November 2007, for example, a mass rally was held in

Northern Sierra Leone by local activists, in conjunction with Amnesty International, to do precisely that: the rally called on the government of Ernest Bai Koroma, who was sworn into office as President in September 2007 after winning in the August elections, to uphold the Gender Bills and to move forward in their implementation. The rally also called on the Koroma's government to commit to providing full reparations for the countless women who were victims of sexual and gender-based violence throughout the conflict. From this rally, Amnesty International released a report detailing the extent to which women are still coping with the affects of sexual violence and victimization from the war, to further draw the government's attention to the fact that, seven years after the

78 violence ended, more needed to be done to ensure justice for these women. Amnesty

International is also lobbying the government to revoke the amnesty granted to war criminals for crimes committed between 1991 and 1999 as stated in the Lome Accord.

The organization calls on the government of Sierra Leone to view the matter as one "of urgency and to prioritize rebuilding the justice system in order to effectively investigate all crimes committed during the conflict and prosecute those suspected to committing the crimes" (Amnesty International, 2007b, para. 17).

6.2 The Wav Forward

Never again should women in Sierra Leone be subjected to brutality. Every man and boy in Sierra Leone owes a duty to respect women and girls and to protect them from abuse at all times. -The 2004 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Volume 2, Chapter 3, Item 324)

Sierra Leone is thus well-placed to pose as a case study for other countries in post- conflict reconstruction: both in terms of where it has already come, where it still needs to go, and its potential in getting there. Rwanda provides a fine example of the potential for women to translate their work at the community level into greater decision-making authority in the political structures of the country. Luckily, a slate of national and international policy frameworks already exist in order to move this process along for

Sierra Leone; frameworks that will assist the country in gaining support both within and without for pursuing policies of gender equality and a post-conflict reconstruction agenda

79 that is inclusive of and seeks leadership from both genders. These frameworks will be detailed below in terms of how Sierra Leone should move forward.

The 2004 Report of the TRC claims that, "The Commission is persuaded that simply calling for the opening up of the political space for women is not sufficient. If Sierra

Leone is serious about giving a meaningful voice to women in representative politics, then more serious efforts have to be made to achieve this end" (v. 2, c. 3, i. 348).

Accordingly the TRC report recommends that political parties take a lead in devising a proportional representation system whereby no less than 30 percent of their candidates in elections are women and that legislation should subsequently be enacted as a follow up to these measures in order to see the changes implemented in future elections at all levels of government. Implementing this policy would be in line with the calls made by the

Platform for Action adopted by the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, for all countries to aspire to having 30 percent of positions in government held by women. This 30 percent is otherwise known as the "critical mass" needed for women to obtain influence in politics. Accordingly, Powley (2006) notes that, "Theoreticians and practitioners have long argued that women's ability to make an impact in male-dominated institutions will be limited until they are represented in numbers large enough to have a collective voice," (p. 2) which is this "critical mass."

Affirmative action and quota systems for women are endorsed by UNIFEM, CEDAW and others, but they are meant to be a temporary measure and a means to affect lasting societal change by shifting the political landscape, with the view that in time, women and

80 other marginalized groups will gain an equitable share of seats without any structural aids. Christine Chinkin (2004) notes that affirmative action policies are advocated in article four of CEDAW as '"temporary special measures' to accelerate 'de facto equality between men and women'" (p. 41). Furthermore, UNIFEM claims that quotas "are a first step on the path to gender equality, both a practical and a symbolic measure to support women's leadership. But they cannot replace long-term strategies that address the socio­ economic constraints that keep women from participating in the political process" (in

Nadine Puechgirbal, 2004, p. 62). However as a first step, the TRC claims that this recommendation is imperative, which they have defined as meaning requiring immediate action, and argues that "Such a stipulation will require all political parties to nurture and develop meaningful participation of women" (v. 2, c. 3., i. 349).

Further, the TRC recommends that the government of Sierra Leone work towards gender parity in pursuing a 50/50 policy for gender representation in politics over a ten-year timeframe starting from the issuing of the report, including in this the goal that 30 percent of cabinet posts be held by women, while likewise working towards a 50/50 policy of gender policy for these posts (i. 350-351). Finally, noting the absence of young women in leadership at all levels, the TRC "calls on the government, UNIFEM and the NGO sector to establish leadership programmes for women in both the provinces and Freetown to ensure that there is a new generation of women with sufficient skills to participate in public life" (v. 2, c. 3, i. 352).

81 Importantly, involving men in the process of gender equality is key to change taking hold in the country. Indeed, without buy-in from the male population, it will be very difficult to alter traditional or current structures so as to recognize women as important actors in policy-making and peacebuilding and to implement them accordingly. The report 2007 from Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS), which was the former UN Working

Group on Women, Peace and Security, found that involving men in the process of implementing SCR 1325 was vital to the process and offered a number of recommendations in doing so, such as: (1) Involving men in national action plans; (2)

Monitoring SCR 1325 implementation through specific indicators, such as the degree of the involvement of men; (3) Promoting alternative masculinities (i.e. as caring fathers and supportive spouses versus aggressors and militarized masculinities); (4) Creating accountability through such means as offering recognition to those men already in leadership positions who champion issues of gender equality; (5) Learning from the experience of involving men in gender equality campaigns in other countries and adapting them to other contexts; (6) Increasing and intensifying awareness and engaging in advocacy to "convert the "unconverted"" (p. 2); and finally, (7) Increasing resources to civil society organizations (CSOs) in tandem with their awareness raising work.

The GAPS report noted that in post-conflict contexts, there is evidence that rates of GBV rise due to the pent-up or leftover aggression of the men who were engaged in combat.

GAPS reports that evidence likewise exists that high rates of GBV in country can also be a precondition for or linked to future hostilities and violence because, "[Boys] raised around GBV learn that violence is part of being male, and may therefore be more

82 susceptible to being recruited by militias, etc." (p. 4). This is complementary to the argument made earlier by Charlotte Bunch who claims that children accustomed to GBV in the home will come to see violence as a natural solution to resolving differences between people. For this reason, GAPS argues further that the need for police forces to be trained to efficiently and sensitively deal with instances of GBV, for both the protection of women and in the pursuit of long-term peace and stability (2007, p. 4) Congruent with the standpoint of Africana Womanism, men and women must struggle together, as they always have, in the quest for gender equality; they must work together if there is any hope of achieving it. The activities and initiatives noted in the previous section that have been promoted by the government of Sierra Leone are major steps forward in the peacebuilding process of the country: holding the aforementioned workshops and through the creation of the FSUs, for example, but still more training and sensitization programs can be undertaken, particularly since the majority of workshop attendees and officers in

1 -1 the FSUs were and are women.

Similarly, the creation of the FSUs goes a long way to address the social needs related to human security and establishing positive peace. While the work of the FSU is invaluable, its mandate is limited to addressing GBV within the home, and does not include GBV or acts of sexual violence that takes place outside the home (i.e., rape by a non-family member). While this would be a large mandate for the FSUs to manage, Barnes (et al.) note that it simply indicates and "reinforces... the need to ensure that all SLP officers, not just those affiliated with FSUs, are able to identify and address all incidents of sexual

13According to UNIFEM (3 August 2007) the workshop was attended by 10 male and 40 female mid-level police officers. In the case of the FSUs, officers often need to be women when dealing with traumatized victims, but this does not exclude male officers and/or lawyers from the various other processes in implementing and supporting the program.

83 violence appropriately," (p. 24) requiring all SLP officers to undergo gender sensitivity and GB V awareness training. In terms of the composition of the police force itself, the government of Sierra Leone must continue working towards its target of having women consist of 30% of the SLP, a target which, as of 2007, the government has half-way achieved (UNIFEM, 2007a, p. 9).

The passage of the Gender Bills is likewise a great achievement in peacebuilding, as the elimination of structural forms of inequality is seen as a major component of promoting human security and fostering peace according to the UNSC, as discussed in Chapter 2.

The passage of these bills alone is not enough, however, if attitudes towards gender equality in society do not change, and if the populace is not given information regarding these laws and sensitized toward them as well. Barnes (et al.) argue that "Although these

Bills were signed into law by the Parliament in June 2007, they will need to be widely disseminated and coupled with sensitization strategies if they are to have any impact" (p.

2).

Along with SCR 1325, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are other important, international legal and policy frameworks through which women can progress in their struggle for gender quality. For example, the MDGs are a key policy framework for which international buy-in has already been achieved and are designed so that the results are sustainable and owned by the country that pursues their implementation. Specifically,

MDG 3 has as its focus the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women. According to the WHO website, "The attainment of MDG 3 will require a

84 comprehensive approach to overcome not only violence against women, but also gender- based discrimination in laws and policies, and deeply embedded cultural norms that perpetuate inequality," and further, "Efforts to empower women must address current norms and traditional social customs that legitimize violence against them, as well as legislation and enforcement of laws that discriminate against them" (p.l). The statement goes on to say that addressing GBV in the home is particularly important, arguing that women will never be treated as equals in society if they are not seen as equals in the home. With this as an already widely supported backdrop, one with international buy-in and resources, the government of Sierra Leone would do well to frame its gender equality initiatives in such terms; it is equally of benefit to women's groups across the country to also frame their work in this way. In so doing, there may be additional resources sought for their work from international donors for both government and civil society initiatives.

Similarly, the adoption in 2003 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and

People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (PRWA) is a more recent but equally useful policy tool for women to push forward their agenda of gender equality and participation. SCR 1325 is noted in the preamble of the PRWA and, according to

Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth (2006), it declares that women have a right to peace and equally, a right to being involved in the promotion and maintenance of that peace. Furthermore, they state that the PRWA "requires states parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure the increased participation of women in all aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitating" (p. 943), providing yet another avenue for women to advocate for their rightful participation in peacebuilding.

85 More broadly, the involvement of women in civil society organizations and peacebuilding efforts throughout and during the conflict was not without its lasting effects and likewise was an incredibly empowering experience for the women of Sierra

Leone. However, as Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff (2000) notes, women's movements in Sierra

Leone are held back by "the lack of an ideological framework to guide their peacebuilding activities," and this "blunted the movement's effectiveness. [The SLWFP] discussions were long and inclusive, but the analysis was shallow and the consensual style prevented a clear and consistent long-term vision being elaborated" (p. 3).

Accordingly, and more broadly, in a 2006 issue of Development, prominent African feminist Sylvia Tamale put forward a political manifesto of sorts in an attempt to rally the

African women's movement (generally), and other self-proclaimed African feminists

(specifically). In her short piece, she outlines why the need to rally is so urgent, the challenges and weaknesses of African feminism in its current form, and her suggestions for how she believes the movement should be proactive and make changes in its approach and substance. She claims that the general aversion to a feminist agenda around the world should be interpreted as an aversion to democracy and progressive change itself.

She says, "The issues for women are in fact issues that concern all world citizens. They are development issues. In Africa... the crisis multiplies tenfold. It will take a new revamped kind of feminism to resist and defeat this kind of backlash." (39)

86 One of the challenges and weaknesses of African feminism identified by Tamale is the gap between theory and practice. This gap is problematic due to what Tamale believes is a 'truncated feminism' in Africa. This is caused by a gap between feminist academics and those practitioners on the ground who Tamale claims work in 'separate cocoons.' Since rhetoric concerning gender equality and women's rights hardly leaves the legal sphere, this leads to an uninformed activism in practice. Questions about and understanding the

'what?' the 'why?' and the 'how?' are essential to providing the theoretical conditions for social transformation and without them there is little hope of moving forward. Another challenge to feminism in Africa, as identified by Tamale, is extremism and fundamentalism. She claims that all forms of fundamentalism - whether it be cultural, religious, or even economic fundamentalism (i.e., capitalism) pose a threat to the feminist movement in Africa and risk submerging the movement under these patriarchal structures. Thus, a deeper understanding and analysis of these structures is necessary in order to properly work against these forces in society and avoid the pitfalls they entail.

How should the African feminist movement change, then? Tamale suggests challenging the widespread aversion for many women in Africa to having their work identified as political in nature. She asserts that women's subordination and oppression is at its core a political issue and is therefore unavoidable, encouraging women to take a stand and make their political agendas known. Tamale also challenges feminist practitioners to embrace feminist theorizing and incorporate it into their work as a foundation and raison d'etre of the goals they seek to achieve. She says, "I cannot overemphasize the need for us to enhance our research capacities and vigorous engagement in producing home-grown

87 feminist theory" (p. 40) which will help in practitioners recognizing the links between sexuality and oppression. Finally, she insists that women's movements embrace radicalism in the sense of rejecting claims that radical feminist approaches cannot take root in Africa.

While this is indeed a plea to African women writ large, these challenges can be taken on board by the women's organizations in Sierra Leone, particularly given the criticism noted above by Jusu-Sheriff concerning the lack of ideological framework many of these women's organizations have in guiding their peacebuilding activities. Further in line with the argument of Tamale, Jusu-Sheriff also concedes that, throughout the conflict, "[The] women of Sierra Leone did succeed in creating an independent voice that articulated a... female perspective on a wide range of fundamental issues," and today, "The most useful contribution a women's movement could make to sustaining peace would be to regain that voice" (p. 3).

Finally, women in Sierra Leone must capitalize upon the political space that has been opened up as a positive side-affect from an unfortunate conflict, before that space closes up once more. Mzvondiwa (2007) discusses a paradox that is brought about by conflict and state failure, one that "can bring about new opportunities for women to transform their lives in terms of their independence and empowerment. Conflict opens up unintended spaces for empowering women, producing new socio-political and economic realties" (p. 102). Moreover, key to women taking hold of this opportunity is ensuring that they received adequate funding and resources. Barnes (et al.) argue that the response

88 by women's organizations to humanitarian needs in the country in the aftermath of the conflict "demonstrates the innovative responses that women develop at the community- level. However, they have very limited resources and capacity for sustaining the implementation of these projects in the long-term, making donor support critical to their ongoing activities" (p. 3).

Women in Sierra Leone can thus benefit from the lessons learned and strong example provided by the women in Rwanda who have gained from the political and social space that opened up after the genocide, as well as the currently international climate that is supportive of women's empowerment. Importantly, and as a strong facet of peacebuilding discussed in Chapter 2 by Gawerc, solutions to gender inequality and strategies for increased women's participation must be adopted locally, while international frameworks are useful as tools in achieving these goals. This is just one more area where strong women's groups such as MARWOPNET can take the lead: by developing home grown strategies and by insisting upon their rights and representation, they will be able to play an increasingly invaluable role in the everyday security of Sierra Leoneans that has to date gone unrecognized. "With those developments, their voices will become stronger and their actions bolder. That is the promise of this incipient social movement stirring within the sphere of foreign policy - the promise of inclusive security. Over the decades, it will be fascinating to watch it grow." (Swanee Hunt, p. 271)

89 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

We have seen the prowess of our women... that they can, without a doubt make the right political decisions for their country even in the midst of war. If for some reason our male counterparts are again fighting to put the missing pieces together, do not ignore the women who always know the solutions to the puzzles. — Jeneba Koroma14

7.1 What Lessons Can Be Learned?

What do the cases of Sierra Leone and Rwanda demonstrate and what lessons can be taken from their experiences?

This thesis has attempted to show that, by involving women in the peacebuilding and security processes of a post-conflict society, it will help create a renewed and enriched country with women taking active roles in the public sphere: in formal processes of political decision-making, at the forefront of civil society movements and in the institutionalization of equality and democracy in the country. Can a country that does not follow this path, one that perpetuates gender inequality, fully recover from conflict?

In Sierra Leone, women were heavily involved in bringing about an end to the 1991-2002 conflict, filling the vacuum left behind by the government and providing essential social services to Sierra Leoneans. But yet they were largely excluded from political and decision-making processes in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. As

14 In "Elections in Sierra Leone and rumors of War: The Role of Women." L'Occidental 29 July 2007.

90 discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, GBV existed prior to the conflict in both physical and structural forms, but was exacerbated throughout the conflict, and still exists today in a variety of forms. The government of Sierra Leone largely failed to address the immediate affects of sexual violence and GBV that resulted from the conflict, and has only recently begun to address the structural forms of GBV in legal system that has oppressed women for much of the country's history.

If women continue to experience both physical and structural forms of GBV in Sierra

Leone and continue to be left out of the peacebuilding and political processes of the country, the principles of human security simply are not being upheld by the government.

The arguments forwarded in Chapter 2 of this thesis by Karen Barnes (et al.), Michelle

Gawerc, and Azza Karam contend that, in light of this, sustainable peace will be very difficult to achieve in the country if not impossible. Thus, the inequality, marginalization and disempowerment of over half of Sierra Leone's population is a burden that affects the country as a whole and can compromise its ability to secure sustainable peace. The government of Sierra Leone has made some positive steps forward in this regard, but it has not come far enough, particularly given the amount of time that has elapsed since the end of the conflict and the signing of the Lome Peace Accord in 2002.

As discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, it remains to be seen whether or not the government of

Sierra Leone, under its new administration, will be proactive in including women in the political and security structures of the country, and account for those needs specific to women in the post-conflict context. It seems that the most extensive and exhaustive work

91 in this regard has been done at the grassroots level and by the women themselves. In light of any remaining or potential reluctance to move forward with an agenda for gender equality on the part of the government, women's groups must continue in their invaluable work in contributing to the social fabric and human security to women where the government fails to do so.

Women thus form a powerful social force in spite of any formal recognition, but the post- conflict context provides a new starting point for women to recreate their roles in society, only women must seize this opportunity before that window closes. Formal recognition may not be necessary for women to continue with their invaluable work, but as was demonstrated in the case of Rwanda in Chapter 5, it is important in the process of shifting societal values and perceptions: children who are raised in a Sierra Leone with prominent women in the public sphere will come to accept this as normal and from this generational change will occur.

As argued throughout this thesis, there currently exists an international environment favourable to the empowerment of women and the cessation of GBV. Women's organizations are well-placed to advocate for funding and resources to continue the work they do within the framework of many of these: most notably the SCR 1325, CEDAW and the MDGs; particularly MDG 3. Indeed, "There is currently a degree of momentum for addressing GBV more comprehensively, as SCR 1325 is gaining profile and the consequences of failing to deal with gender inequalities are being increasingly recognized" (Barnes [et al.], p. 3). Similarly, CEDAW is one of the most influential and

92 effective international frameworks to advance women's rights today, while the MDGs provide a mutual reinforcing process whereby achieving one Goal means achieving results in all eight.

Has Sierra Leone waited too long? Is their window of opportunity gone? It is possible, but it does not mean change will not come for the women of Sierra Leone, it just may take more time without the momentum and vacuum created by the end of the conflict. As the country leaves the conflict further and further behind them, women need to develop a strong, theoretical framework to guide them, and insist on their rights and representation, both from the international and national bodies that have to date offered these rights to them in theory, though not often in practice.

7.2 NOW What?

As previously stated, Sierra Leone is well-placed to pose as a case study for other countries in post-conflict reconstruction: both in terms of where it has already come, where it still needs to go, and its potential in getting there. Likewise, Rwanda provides a good example of the potential for women to translate their work at the community level into greater decision-making authority in the political structures of the country.

There are thus a number of countries that are emerging from conflict today, with traditionally low rates of women's participation in politics, which can glean important lessons from both Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Sudan, for example, signed an agreement with Chad in Dakar in March 2008, signifying the willingness of the two countries to

93 implement the previously failed peace accords that were signed over the preceding five years. There is a sense that this 2008 Dakar agreement may be tenuous as the rebel factions were not involved in its negotiation (BBC, 2008c). Indeed, in the Sierra Leonean case, the first peace agreement to take hold in the country after other failed attempts was in Lome, which involved all fighting factions at the table. There are dangers involved in this process as well, however, particularly for women. Should Sudan and Chad meet at the negotiating table again, they would do well to include these groups in the negotiations, as well as women's groups to ensure amnesties are not granted for war crimes such as rape and sexual violence, as was the case in Sierra Leone.

Similarly, in the aftermath of the election crisis in Kenya, with a peace agreement being signed in February 2008 between the newly elected President Mwai Kibaki, and the opposition leader Raila Odinga, these lessons are widely applicable (BBC, 2008b). It is perhaps too early to say whether or not these peace agreements will be tenable, but it is at this important and early stage that women's groups must take the lead in pushing for gender equality in their countries and for a place in the peacebuilding processes.

Equally, the UN should make a concerted effort to turn theory into practice with regard to

DDR and SCR 1325. Since their inception and even since the adoption of SCR 1325,

DDR programs around the world have continued to exclude gender sensitive programming, which has largely served to alienate women from the process. In the documentation for the current DDR program in Sudan, there is a promising section that targets vulnerable groups such as women, children and the disabled. Only time will tell as

94 to whether or not the unique needs of these groups will be addressed on the ground

(UNMIS, 2006).

Finally, with the newly independent country of Kosovo having been declared in February

2008, Kosovar women have a unique opportunity to capitalize on the space that has been opened up in the aftermath of independence (BBC, 2008a). As a new country seeking the approval and recognition of the international community, it is ripe with momentum for societal change, and the country's leaders may want to pursue a progressive political structure. This political environment will allow strong women's groups to stand up and claim their rights as well as lobby for their new country to sign onto such agreements as

CEDAW and recognize SCR 1325 when it drafts its new Constitution.

However, in many of the most recent peace negotiations in which UN member states and

Security Council states have been involved, there still remains only a rhetorical commitment to 1325 as traditional notions of war and security dominate the negotiations, which are likewise dominated by men. Women in post-conflict countries must be made aware of the international instruments available to them, if they are not aware already, and insist and demand that all actors - national and international - honor these commitments.

"Women must be allowed to participate fully in peacebuilding and conflict prevention in order to end sexual violence against women as a method of warfare and ensure women's full legal, socio-economic and political rights after the fighting was over" opens the fifty-

95 second session of the ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women on 29 February

2008 (para. 1). Indeed the rhetoric in the international community to support the essential role of women in peacebuilding abounds, the policy instruments to complement it are available and ready, and the recognition of the essential role women play in peacebuilding is becoming more wide spread than ever. Yet their participation is still only accounted for as a token entry in national strategies and peace accords.

Anne Marie Goetz of UNIFEM claims that while agreement exists that women should be included, in the eight years after the passing of SCR 1325, "very few women participated in peace talks as official negotiators or observers," and "Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes rarely addressed the needs of women associated with fighting forces, and post-conflict planning and financing for women's recovery was weak"

(ECOSOC, 2008, para. 3). Indeed the sexual and gender-based violence experienced by women in conflict is an age-old problem, but appears to be on the rise in many parts of the world. "By 2008," Ms. Goetz remarks, "it is reasonable to expect more alacrity and decisiveness in the international community's response to sexual violence" (para. 5).

Thus, future research arising from this thesis could, for example, explore the gap between rhetoric and action on behalf of the UN, where involved in peace negotiations and DDR programs, and discuss avenues for intervention available to women to close this gap.

Future research could also explore the following dilemma: To challenge patriarchy in a country such as Sierra Leone and pursue the rightful place of women in the political sphere - as opposed to staying in the social sphere where society tells them they belong - invariably risks removing women from that very social sphere (i.e., the grassroots and

96 community level) where their peacebuilding work has been most effective. Further, since violence against women in conflict is often in addition to the GBV women experience in everyday life, making them mutually reinforcing forms of violence, do long-standing cultural traditions such as female genital mutilation prevent women from truly being equal to men in society? Finally, to what degree does international attention and support translate into more gender equitable policies being enacted in the aftermath of a conflict?

Is there a positive correlation between external funding and support and the rise of women in the political decision-making machinery of a country (i.e., Rwanda,

Afghanistan)?

In all post-conflict countries, both present and future, the vital lesson is this: women are essential peacebuilders but are often hampered by gender inequality in the socio-political structures of their countries, and by the rhetoric in the international community that lacks action. Women's groups must be strong and take the lead. They must insist on the rights granted to them by international and national policy frameworks, bodies and actors, and insist that action replace words. Women in post-conflict societies must "take advantage of the transformative experiences of war and a weakened patriarchal order to build up a strong women's movement before it has become too late, before traditions that oppress women have returned to take over the space that had opened momentarily" (Puechgirbal, p. 61).

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