Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 9 Number 2 Summer Article 6 May 2020 Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutional Controversy Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.) David A. Gottenborg Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation David A. Gottenborg, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutional Controversy Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.), 9 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 239 (1980). This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact
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[email protected]. CASE NOTE Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutional Controversy Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.) DAVID A. GOTrENBORG* I. INTRODUCTION Although the United States Constitution expressly provides how the President may make treaties,1 it is completely silent as to the process by which treaties should be terminated. In Goldwater v. Carter,2 a number of members of Congress sought to have the constitutional question re- garding the proper procedures required for the termination of treaties ju- dicially resolved.3 The suit was filed in response to President Carter's an- nouncement 4 that he was terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China.' Therefore, while the narrower issue was whether the President could unilaterally terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty without first consulting the Congress, the entire separation of powers question as to the extent of permissible congressional involvement in treaty terminations was opened for judicial review.