Crises of Regional Cooperation in South Asia

Crises of Regional Cooperation in South Asia ZAGLUL HAIDER* Department of Political Science, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh Introduction INCE WORLD WAR II, while nation-states have been emerging with greater differentiation in terms of political and cultural identities, there Shas been a growing tendency among them towards cooperation and in- tegration. The new states seek to preserve their national security and achieve socio-economic development through cooperation with each other.1 The pro- liferation of diverse regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADAC), has been the result of this regional approach. In South Asia, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is one of the latest demonstrations of the growing interdependence among developing nations. The idea of SAARC was first mooted by late president Ziaur Rahman (Zia) of Bangladesh. In May 1980, President Zia pro- posed a summit of seven South Asian states (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and India), which was intended to establish a for- mal regional organization. All seven countries finally accepted the proposal, despite the initial reservations of India and Pakistan,2 and the first SAARC summit was held in Dhaka in 1985. At various stages of its growth, however, SAARC has faced recurrent crises3 that have posed a serious threat to its very existence. This article seeks to explore the multifarious crises of regional cooperation in South Asia. Security Dialogue © 2001 PRIO. SAGE Publications, Vol. 32(4): 423–437. ISSN: 0967-0106 [021769] 424 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001 The nature of the crises of regional cooperation in South Asia is very differ- ent from that of other regions. The crises that constrain mutual cooperation in this part of the world can be categorized into three types: political, economic and security. Political Crisis South Asia is a fragmented zone that historically failed to develop a sense of regional identity. Bilateral relations between most of the countries are defined by antagonism and mistrust. The major political crises among South Asian countries are listed below: Indo-Pakistani Dispute: India and Pakistan have fought four bloody wars in the post-colonial period, including the Kargil War during the summer of 1999. They were led into these wars by the Kashmir issue and the Bangladesh liberation struggle. The potentially explosive Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has never been formally resolved and is now perhaps the most in- tense and dangerous source of conflict between two countries. The new ‘line of control’ (LOC), which replaced the old 1947 ceasefire line after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, was accepted as the de facto dividing line in Kashmir by both India and Pakistan in the 1972 Simla Agreement. But some sections of the LOC in the more remote areas of northwestern Ladakh were never demar- cated on the ground, and there are still differences between Indian and Pakistani versions of the line, which lead to almost regular clashes between border guards.4 The Kargil War5 of 1999 was the fourth Indo-Pakistani war, eventually ending when Pakistan withdrew its troops as a result of diplomatic pressure from Washington. But the Kashmir conflict introduced an element of unprecedented volatility into relations between these two nuclear neighbours.6 Pakistan’s nuclear capability is a serious concern for India: Indian policy- makers believe that Pakistan’s nuclear capability might encourage it to step up its support for the insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir and that Pakistan might use nuclear weapons at an early stage in a conventional war in order to offset its inferiority in conventional weapons. In addition, Pakistan has stated that, while pursuing the doctrine of deterrence, it does not rule out the use of first strikes.7 In a nutshell, Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests brought to a head an old and persistent source of tension between two old enemies and further viti- ated bilateral relations. Indo-Bangladeshi Dispute: India played a dominant role in the liberation war of Bangladesh. As Bangladesh arrived at the threshold of independence, India emerged as its nearest friend. In order to formalize this relationship, a treaty of friendship, cooperation and peace for a period of 25 years was signed by Zaglul Haider Crises of Regional Cooperation in South Asia 425 the two governments on 17 March 1972. But this Indo-Bangladeshi nexus was very short-lived. Following the coup d’etat of 15 August 1975 and the fall of Sheikh Mujib’s government, mistrust, misunderstanding and suspicion em- bittered relations between the two countries. Since then, a number of bilateral issues have strained Indo-Bangladeshi relations, and some continue to do so. For example, the Ganges water dispute is a major source of disagreement. Farakkah, the most important barrage, was erected over the Ganges by India in order to divert its water to the Bhagirathi–Hooghly River to keep the port of Calcutta navigable and free from silt.8 This Farakkah barrage became the ‘Kashmir’ of Bangladesh’s grievances with India.9 Following the independence of Bangladesh, the Mujib and Indira governments signed a short-term agreement on 18 April 1975, which assigned 11,000–16,000 cusecs (cubic feet per second) of water to India from 21 April to 31 May 1975 (41 days) and secured the remaining 44,000–49,000 cusecs of water for Bangladesh.10 This short-term agreement expired on 31 May 1975, and after that India unilaterally started to withdraw almost all of the water (40,000 cusecs), which posed the threat of economic ruination for one-third of Bangladesh. India argued that, as the major riparian country for Ganges water in terms of catchment areas (98%), ulti- mate irrigation potential (94.5%) and the population living in the area, it had a legitimate right to utilize the water to its advantage.11 But the Indian claim clearly contravenes international law, which stipulates that a riparian state has a legal right to utilize the water of an international river in its territory only if its so doing causes minor or no injury to a co-riparian country.12 In November 1977, in the wake of serious Indo-Bangladeshi water diplomacy, Bangladesh’s President Zia and India’s Prime Minister Morarji Desai signed an agreement for a period of five years, which assigned 34,500 cusecs of water to Bangladesh and 20,500 to India during the leanest period (21 April to 30 May), and guar- anteed 80% of the available flow of water at Farakkah for Bangladesh in the leanest ten-day period. This accord came to an end in November 1982. On 7 October 1982, General Ershad and Indira Gandhi signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a period of 18 months, but this contained no guar- antee clauses. When the MOU expired on 6 April 1984, Bangladesh failed to obtain a further extension. A second MOU was signed in November 1985 for a period of three years, after Rajib Gandhi’s election as prime minister. This expired at the end of May 1988; from then until 11 December 1996, there was no MOU or agreement between the two countries. In the absence of water- sharing instruments, India recommenced its unilateral withdrawal of water, which caused an unprecedented reduction in the flow left for Bangladesh.13 Despite considerable diplomatic efforts – including summit diplomacy – between the two governments in 1992 and 1993, Prime Minister Begum Zia failed to secure an agreement over the sharing of Ganges water during her re- gime. However, with the return to power of the Awami League in Bangladesh – with Shekh Hasina as Prime Minister – and the emergence of the coalition 426 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001 government led by Dev Goweda in India, the prime ministers of the two countries signed a 30-year agreement on 12 December 1996.14 This agreement is based on the following formula: if the flow of water at Farakkah is 70,000 cusecs or less, India and Bangladesh will divide it equally between them; if the flow is 70,000–75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh will receive 35,000, and the rest will be diverted to India; if the availability is 75,000 cusecs or more, India will receive 40,000 and Bangladesh will receive the remainder of the flow.15 Un- fortunately, however, events following the agreement seem to indicate that it is not being implemented properly. According to its terms, during the first and second ten-day periods of March 1997 Bangladesh should have received 35,000 cusecs of water, but actually received only 21,000; while in the final 11 days of that month, Bangladesh should have received 29,688 cusecs of water, but actually received between a maximum of 25,088 cusecs on 23 March and a minimum of 6,457 cusecs on 27 March. Similarly, during the first ten days of April 1997, while Bangladesh should have received 35,000 cusecs under the accord, it actually received only 17,857. And although Bangladesh did receive its due share, 24,559 cusecs, during the second ten-day period of April 1997, during the last ten-day period of that month, it received only 27,695 of the 35,000 cusecs of water to which it was entitled.16 One leading water resource expert and a member of the Bangladesh–India Joint River Commission, Ainun Nisat, has admitted that Bangladesh has not been receiving the share of water it is due under the agreement.17 Although the data for the years 1998–2001 are not yet available, people alongside the river Padma have reported frustrating experiences with regard to water flow.

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