Robert A. Caro. Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002. xxiv + 1167 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-394-52836-6.

Reviewed by KC Johnson

Published on H-Law (June, 2002)

Lyndon Johnson and the Transformation of bles Caro's portrayal of Johnson--a mixed bag, the Senate with considerable strengths and substantial faws. Master of the Senate may surprise readers of Any reviewer of a book in the Years of Lyn‐ volumes 1 and 2 of Robert A. Caro's The Years of don Johnson series has to note its length (in this Lyndon Johnson.[1] Many of the Caro series's case, 1,040 pages, excluding endnotes), at once its characteristics are present--use of an extensive greatest strength and its greatest weakness. On base of interviews, efective story-telling tech‐ the positive side, the length and Caro's extraordi‐ nique, excessive length. But Master of the Senate nary interview base allow him to ofer the clear‐ presents a more nuanced view of Johnson than est explication of how Johnson wielded power in did the earlier books, especially Means of Ascent. the Senate. It is no wonder that the current Senate Caro still portrays Johnson as a fundamentally un‐ Majority Leader, Tom Daschle (D-SD), recently ad‐ ethical fgure willing to subordinate principles to mitted that he was reading the book to gain in‐ achieve partisan gain. But he also admires John‐ sights on how to improve his performance.[2] On son's ability to change how the Senate did busi‐ the negative side, a book 15 or 20 percent shorter ness, and, eventually, to use his power to help would have ofered a more readable account and pass the frst piece of civil rights legislation in presented a clearer argument without loss of con‐ nine decades. The book has three principal argu‐ text. Moreover, surprisingly in a book this long, ments: that Johnson's assumption of power re‐ Caro slights an important aspect of his story-- vealed elements of his character; that the 1950s Johnson's fnal three years as majority leader. presented a transformative period in the Senate's This book's opening section--a 105-page sum‐ institutional history; and that as the 1950s pro‐ mary of the history of the Senate before Johnson's gressed, Johnson's personal ambition and the pub‐ arrival following the 1948 election--is a good ex‐ lic good increasingly pointed to the same policy ample of material that could have been shortened options. In the end, Master of the Senate resem‐ with no real loss. This section's sources are thin, H-Net Reviews and the story it tells is familiar: the Constitution's ready shown in his dealings with Franklin Delano framers created the Senate to cool the passions of Roosevelt and --served him especial‐ the House; the upper chamber's reputation ly well now, as he ingratiated himself with the reached its height in the pre-Civil War era of the most powerful fgure in the postwar Senate, "great triumvirate" (Webster, Clay, and Calhoun); Richard B. Russell (D-GA). the Senate declined in the Gilded Age, becoming Much like Johnson, Russell was a complex the bastion of conservatism and corruption; in the man. As Caro shows, he could act patriotically, as twentieth century, the seniority system assumed when he led the Senate opposition to General an increasingly important role in the body; and Douglas MacArthur's critique of Harry Truman's because of the one-party nature of its politics, the Korean War policy. But for the most part, Caro South's Senate contingent expanded its infuence presents a less than sympathetic view of Russell, during the fve decades following 1900. with relentless (probably excessive) coverage of From this material, Caro stresses three items white Georgians' persecution of their African- that play an important role in the rest of the book. American fellow citizens--with the open encour‐ First, he notes, the seniority system encouraged agement of the political establishment that Russell the aging of the Senate. The average age of Sena‐ personifed. Russell never married, had few close tors crept upwards throughout the century; by the friends, and worked long hours--and thus was a time Johnson entered the Senate, most committee lonely man. Because Russell liked baseball, John‐ chairmen were in their late sixties or seventies. son developed an interest in the sport, and the Second, Caro emphasizes the importance of loop‐ two soon started going together to Washington holes in Rule 22 (the Senate rule that established Senators games. Because Russell was a power on procedures for imposing cloture against fli‐ the Armed Services Committee, Johnson success‐ busters) in enhancing Southern power. Third, he fully sought a slot on the panel. Because Russell shows how both these factors led to increasing frequently ate alone on the weekends, Johnson public and press criticism of the Senate as an in‐ started inviting his colleague for Sunday meals. As stitution--less for ideological reasons than on the Russell remarked later, Johnson was almost like grounds of inefciency. Still, Caro is not entirely the son he never had. convincing in his contention that the Senate as it This relationship was more, Caro reminds us, evolved departed noticeably from the framers' in‐ than a sentimental attachment of a lonely older tent. man and an ambitious younger colleague. Russell Thus stood the upper chamber that Johnson demanded an ideological price to enter his family: entered after an election tainted by charges of opposition to civil rights. Senator Johnson's maid‐ vote fraud. As in his earlier volumes, Caro stresses en speech thus demonstrated his fdelity to Rus‐ unattractive elements in Johnson's personality sell's cause. "We of the South," the new Senator and style, but he also convincingly shows John‐ declared, used the flibuster to fght prejudice-- son's ability to adapt his personality to meet that is, Northern prejudice against the South. And pressing political needs. This man with a massive Southern senators, Johnson claimed, wanted not ego spent hour upon hour in his frst Senate year to fan the fames of racial prejudice but to guard sitting quietly in the Senate chamber, getting a against the inevitable controversies between the sense of the institution. He also observed institu‐ races that would result from the enactment of civ‐ tional niceties by treating his senior colleagues il rights legislation. Some of Johnson's rhetoric with exaggerated deference. Indeed, Caro ob‐ was extreme even by his time's standards: the serves, Johnson's skill at cultivating older men--al‐ proposed Fair Employment Practices Commission

2 H-Net Reviews was unconstitutional because "if the Federal Gov‐ of the FPC's composition, blocking Olds all but ernment can by law tell me whom I shall employ, scuttled aggressive federal regulation of natural it can likewise tell my prospective employees for gas) and the dastardly tactics that Johnson, the whom they must work." In an interpretation of‐ chair of the subcommittee that handled the nomi‐ fered by no other senator, Johnson claimed that if nation, used to end Olds's career. Because of John‐ the FEPC could "compel me to employ a Negro, it son's identifcation with public power from the can compel that Negro to work for me. It might New Deal era, especially FDR's Rural Electrifca‐ even tell him how long and how hard he would tion Program, Olds expected fair treatment from have to work. As I see it, such a law would do him. Instead, Johnson dredged up misleading, out- nothing more than enslave a minority." A pleased of-context quotes from the 1920s, when Olds was Richard Russell termed the address "one of the a journalist for a public power organization, to ablest I have ever heard on the subject" (pp. imply that Olds had communist leanings. In the 212-215). early Cold War, this attack was enough--and Olds, If appeasing Russell was crucial to establish‐ despite his two terms in ofce, received fewer ing Johnson's power in the Senate, then appeasing than 20 votes in his renomination bid. The afair Texas oil and gas producers was crucial to estab‐ showed Johnson at his most brilliant politically-- lishing Johnson's power at home--especially as he he killed Olds's candidacy, obtained credit for his had triumphed by only eighty-seven votes in the action among Texas oil and gas interests, but act‐ 1948 Democratic primary. Johnson came to the ed covertly enough that he did not receive much Senate with a reputation as a New Deal liberal. In criticism from national liberals. 1937, he had made his initial foray into electoral Although blocking Olds helped consolidate politics in a special election to the House of Repre‐ Johnson's political base, it did little to bring him a sentatives that attracted national attention. Using national reputation. The outbreak of the Korean the slogan "Franklin D. and Lyndon B.," Johnson War gave him his frst chance to shine. Using his stoutly defended FDR and the New Deal when the connections with Russell, Johnson obtained the President was on the political defensive following chairmanship of a new subcommittee created to the Court-packing controversy. Johnson spent investigate defense mobilization. The subcommit‐ eleven years in the House of Representatives. tee was modeled on the World War II Truman Throughout his time in ofce, he remained a subcommittee, and the comparison with the earli‐ strong supporter of Roosevelt, one of the Presi‐ er body was lost on no one--press commentary at dent's few consistent backers in an increasingly the time termed the subcommittee a presidency conservative Texas delegation. Thus, although na‐ maker. Johnson understood the new ways that the tional liberal activists did not expect the new sen‐ postwar Congress could exercise power on inter‐ ator to adopt a progressive view on civil rights, national matters: through the efective use of they did anticipate a supporter on key economic what Caro terms "a new kind of staf suited to the questions. new, more complicated postwar world"; the abili‐ That expectation was called into question by ty to shape public opinion; and the importance of Johnson's performance in blocking the renomina‐ the image of bipartisan unity (p. 311). At the same tion of Leland Olds as chairman of the Federal time, Johnson's experience with the subcommittee Power Commission. The Olds battle is an impor‐ ofered another demonstration of his political tant event that most histories of the time mention skills; as Caro notes, LBJ had "a remarkable prof‐ but fail to explain in sufcient detail. Caro efec‐ ciency in the mechanics of politics, in the lower- tively shows both the issue's importance (because level, basic techniques that are essential to politi‐ cal success but that some politicians never seem

3 H-Net Reviews to learn" (p. 315). The subcommittee itself accom‐ counts stories of Johnson aides traveling back plished almost nothing legislatively or in terms of from Texas to Washington with money stufed in policy. But Johnson built his power by using tar‐ their pockets. Fourth, Johnson put in the extra geted press leaks and bombastic rhetoric that sug‐ time to make friends; he joined Warren Magnu‐ gested he was accomplishing something impor‐ son (D-WA), for instance, as the only senators to tant--as a Newsweek cover story suggested. attend the funeral of Senator Harry Byrd's (D-VA) It looked as if Johnson would have to relin‐ daughter. Fifth, he found a way to appeal to Sen‐ quish his subcommittee chairmanship after the ate liberals by reaching out to Hubert H. 1950 elections; Armed Services Committee chair Humphrey (D-MN), the liberal hero of the 1948 Millard Tydings (D-MD), up for reelection in 1950, Democratic convention who had been shunned by had made it clear that he would fold Johnson's in‐ more conservative Democrats since arriving in quiry into the general committee, beginning in the Senate. Finally, Johnson entered into a highly 1951. But Tydings did not return to the Senate in proftable (in many ways) alliance with Bobby 1951; also defeated were the Democratic majority Baker, the Senate aide whose career would be in‐ leader, Scott Lucas (D-UT), and the Democratic tertwined for Johnson's over the next ffteen whip, Francis Myers (D-PA). Caro sympathizes years. with the overwhelming difculties of being a Despite these procedural innovations, John‐ Democratic Senate leader--because of the South‐ son was hardly preeminent in the Senate: the ern 's power, the Democratic leader had most powerful member of the Democratic caucus relatively little room to maneuver, but nonethe‐ remained Richard Russell. After Truman fred less got blamed when the Senate failed to function MacArthur for insubordination in 1951, efciently. But Johnson recognized the potential MacArthur returned to the to a in the position, and, with Russell's backing, moved hero's welcome, and his claim that the Joint Chiefs into the Senate leadership in 1951, when he was of Staf endorsed his military strategy seemed to unanimously elected Democratic whip. threaten the supremacy of civilian control of mili‐ Because of the weakness of the new majority tary matters. Caro argues that Russell, who had leader, Ernest MacFarland (D-AZ), Johnson's pow‐ succeeded Tydings as chair of Armed Services, er as whip was substantial. And as he trans‐ played the key role in helping to dim MacArthur's formed the position, he also began to transform appeal. The hearings over which Russell presided the Senate. Beyond providing quiet assistance to were content-oriented rather than sensational, aged committee chairs, Johnson maximized his and they exposed the regional limits of political infuence in six concrete ways. First, he MacArthur's strategic vision. As one after another organized the use of Senate pairs--using his posi‐ member of the Joint Chiefs of Staf afrmed their tion to help absent Democratic senators arrange opposition to MacArthur's proposals, the general's pairs--and increasingly pushed the idea of live supporters lost the will to fght. The Senate had pairs, which heretofore had been rarely used. Sec‐ functioned as the framers intended, cooling tem‐ ond, Johnson used his contacts from the House, porary, dangerous passions. And, fresh from the traveling to Speaker Sam Rayburn's chambers ev‐ experience, Russell launched a bid for the 1952 ery day after the House ended business to discuss Democratic presidential nomination. legislative matters, thus making him the senator Caro's coverage of the 1952 and 1956 Demo‐ with the greatest ability to deliver the House. cratic presidential races is exceptionally good, Third, he used his Texas contacts to help raise and important in that Russell's 1952 bid played a funds for other Democratic candidates; Caro re‐ key, if unintended, role in LBJ's subsequent ca‐

4 H-Net Reviews reer. Although he began the race as a purely Russell and Russell's colleague, Walter George (D- Southern candidate, Russell increasingly enter‐ GA). As a result, the new Democratic leader gave tained hopes that he could prevail, partly because some satisfaction to liberals in the party caucus, his qualifcations seemed so superior to those of allowed freshmen senators to receive choice com‐ the other major announced candidates, Senator mittee slots, and managed the frst successful (D-TN) and former Vice President challenge to the culture of seniority that Caro be‐ Alben Barkley (D-KY). But Russell's Southern her‐ lieves formed a linchpin of the post-Civil War Sen‐ itage and his position on civil rights blocked any ate. chance he had of appealing to northern delega‐ Johnson's second major innovation came in tions, and the nomination went instead to his use of the Democratic Policy Committee. Here Governor Adlai Stevenson. Russell would never his success was all the more striking because of again attend a Democratic national convention. his ability to revolutionize the Senate without the Though he abandoned his presidential hopes, he upper chamber's powerful Southerners, them‐ would not give up on the idea of a Southern Presi‐ selves fgures of considerable political skill, un‐ dent in his lifetime. And he knew exactly whom derstanding the extent of his changes. As with his he wanted in that position--his Texas protégé, investigative subcommittee, Johnson proved his Lyndon Johnson, whom he saw as the only South‐ brilliance in using committee staf, in this in‐ erner that possibly could be elected nationwide. stance with a goal of creating a more efcient leg‐ Johnson himself became Democratic leader in islative process and mufing dissent. He named 1952, after Arizona voters replaced MacFarland Bobby Baker the liaison between the Policy Com‐ with a little-known department-store owner mittee and the Senate's standing committees, with named . In his frst days in his responsibility to check on the progress of legisla‐ new position, Johnson took on the seniority sys‐ tion. Eventually, in an unprecedented move, John‐ tem, and Caro's treatment of the new leader's po‐ son himself started consulting with the other com‐ litical maneuvering--opening up committee slots mittee staf directors, ofering suggestions on how for talented junior senators such as Humphrey, they could ensure passage of their committee's Mike Mansfeld (D-MT), and Stuart Symington (D- legislation. He thus attempted to use the Leader's MO)--is one of this book's impressive parts. We position to fashion a "Democratic" congressional long have known that Johnson transformed the agenda. position of majority leader--but Caro shows us Now that he had the power, Johnson set out to how he accomplished that feat. use it, though he was only Minority Leader (for Johnson's maneuvering had important conse‐ Democrats had lost control of the Senate in the quences for Democrats, because he ensured that 1952 elections that swept Republican Dwight the party had talented fgures on the 83rd Con‐ Eisenhower into the White House). But Johnson gress's key committees. Humphrey and Mansfeld saw in the Eisenhower presidency a political op‐ obtained seats on Foreign Relations; Symington, portunity for the Democrats--because of deep ide‐ the former Air Force secretary, on Armed Ser‐ ological divisions within the GOP, Johnson could vices; Magnuson on Appropriations; and Syming‐ make the Democrats the Senate party that sup‐ ton and Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) on Government ported the President's legislative agenda; in the Operations (the committee from which Joseph Mc‐ process, he could improve his stature as well. Carthy [R-WI] ran his anti-communist witch Johnson's handling of the Bricker amendment hunt). And Johnson fnessed the Senate barons to controversy showed him at his most efective--he agree to his schemes by ensuring the support of almost single-handedly blocked the amendment

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(which sought to limit the power of the executive tion (a meaningful power given his de facto con‐ to enforce treaties), made the Democrats appear trol of the Policy Committee) to afect the content to be the chief administration allies, and satisfed of legislation. And, under the guise of assisting Southerners and his own Texas supporters by older chairs such as Walter George (D-GA) of Fi‐ seeming to support restrictions on presidential nance (77 years old), James Murray (D-MT) of In‐ power. terior (78 years old), and Theodore Frances Green The Bricker amendment battle demonstrated (D-RI) of Rules (87 years old), Johnson took over as that when Johnson's personal power and political foor manager of a variety of bills, a privilege pre‐ concerns dovetailed with the national interest, he viously reserved for committee chairs. The leader‐ could have an extraordinary efect. But when the ship post also gave Johnson more patronage pow‐ two forces clashed, Johnson retreated. His re‐ er, which he used in both positive and negative sponse to McCarthyism best illustrates this pat‐ ways--he froze out those he did not like, such as tern--Caro portrays a senator with no stomach for Kefauver, Paul Douglas (D-IL), and Herbert taking on the Wisconsin demagogue, wary of the Lehman (D-NY), all part of a broader pattern political efects of seeming to attack McCarthy. whereby the (afected) humility that had charac‐ Johnson did have one important role in the con‐ terized his early tenure in the Senate passed troversy--he ensured that the Army-McCarthy away. hearings were televised--but beyond that move, My work with the Johnson presidential tapes the most striking aspect of his handling of Mc‐ has convinced me of the need for a more nuanced Carthy came in his caution. And though Caro of‐ view of how Johnson exercised political power. As fers reasons for Johnson's passivity--LBJ's fear of President, Johnson occasionally used bluster and moving too early, his desire to avoid making an intimidation. But more often he cajoled, begged, attack on McCarthy look like Democratic partisan‐ appealed to political self-interest, or invoked ship--Caro is not altogether convincing in explain‐ ideals to get his way. And he placed himself in a ing why the "master of the Senate" did not move position to use this "Johnson treatment" only more aggressively against a fgure who so fa‐ through his extraordinary mastery of legislative grantly violated the Senate's institutional norms. tactics. Caro ofers a similar conclusion in ex‐ The 1954 elections yielded a Senate with 48 plaining Johnson's mastery of the 1950s Senate, Democrats, 47 Republicans, and 1 independent, from the regularization of pairs to his successful Oregon Senator Wayne Morse. Johnson and Morse challenge of the Senate seniority system. But, Caro had not had a warm relationship at any point in notes, "perhaps the most striking example of the their careers--nor would they in the future, when creativity that Lyndon Johnson brought to the leg‐ Morse emerged as a chief critic of then-President islative process" came in his extensive use of Johnson's foreign policy. But with Morse holding unanimous consent agreements (p. 572). Because the balance of power in the Senate, Johnson gave the agreements limited time of debate and were him what he wanted: a seat on the Foreign Rela‐ impossible to amend, their proliferation produced tions Committee. In return, Morse voted with the a subtle but signifcant change in how the Senate Democrats to organize the Senate and made Lyn‐ did business. They shifted the legislative process don Johnson majority leader. Johnson was forty- away from public debates, which tended to stress six years old. the articulation of ideals, to backroom dealmak‐ ing, refecting Johnson's own conception of how Johnson's new position only accelerated his the Senate should function. Legislation, not edu‐ campaign to revolutionize the Senate. In particu‐ lar, he used his authority over scheduling legisla‐

6 H-Net Reviews cating the public, would be Johnson's chief mis‐ votes in the upper chamber. His mastery of the sion as leader. Senate did not yet extend to national politics. And then, at the height of his power, Johnson Johnson's failed presidential bid had one im‐ was almost struck down; on July 2, 1955, he suf‐ portant result, however--he concluded that, if he fered a serious heart attack. For several days, were to have a future in national politics, he doubts existed about whether he would survive. would have to deliver a Senate program that The heart attack produced two important political would appeal to liberals outside his regional base. changes for Johnson. First, he changed his rela‐ On a personal level, he reached out to prominent tionship with his staf. Although still a very dif‐ liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., John Ken‐ cult man for whom to work, he tried to avoid his neth Galbraith, and Philip and Kay Graham. They violent mood swings and started to treat his staf all made clear that Johnson would have to ensure with some respect. Second, the heart attack passage of a civil rights bill if he was to have a na‐ brought Johnson's wife back into his political life. tional future. Lady Bird Johnson was a personal of unusual A key theme of Master of the Senate is that as gifts. Like her husband, she showed ambition ear‐ the 1950s unfolded, Johnson (and, importantly, ly in life; during World War II, when Representa‐ Richard Russell) increasingly saw the national in‐ tive Johnson was briefy in the Pacifc, he turned terest and the Texan's political self-interest as over to her the day-to-day responsibility of run‐ complementary. The pattern's clearest example, ning his House ofce. Although Lady Bird had no Caro argues, was Johnson's central role in the pas‐ background in politics, after a few months the sage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Caro delayed the general assumption was that she could have won publication of this book for several years as he the seat had Lyndon remained in the military.[3] completed the interview base necessary for this After Johnson's return, he excluded her from his and future installments of the series. Unfortunate‐ political world, partly, no doubt, feeling threat‐ ly, that delay prevented Master of the Senate from ened by her performance. Caro goes into great de‐ adding much to the story of the Senate and 1950s tail at showing Johnson's dismissive treatment of civil rights legislation. Caro's general approach-- Lady Bird before the heart attack, and his willing‐ positioning LBJ as part of the Senate--pales in ness to turn to her again after it. Given her re‐ comparison with Robert Mann's The Walls of Jeri‐ markable abilities as First Lady, this change had cho, a joint study of Johnson, Humphrey, Russell, important long-term consequences. and civil rights and arguably the fnest work of The Washington press assumed that Johnson's congressional history ever published.[4] heart attack fnished him as a credible presiden‐ Mann and Caro agree that the act presented tial candidate, at least in 1956, but his rapid recov‐ yet another example of Johnson's legislative bril‐ ery and Eisenhower's own heart attack that year liance. Having decided to champion a civil rights changed the political equation. Johnson badly bill, Johnson confronted the key question of how wanted the 1956 nomination, but his experience to do so without alienating Southern senators, mirrored Russell's in 1952. Through the interven‐ without whose support he could not function as tion of Sam Rayburn, Johnson received the Texas majority leader. Russell played the key role here-- delegation's favorite-son nomination, but he was he recognized that Johnson's presidential chances out of his league at the Democratic convention: he depended on the passage of some form of civil assumed that his Senate colleagues could deliver rights legislation. And Johnson convinced many their state delegations as they delivered their Southerners that, as some bill would pass eventu‐

7 H-Net Reviews ally, they should cooperate with him to ensure in explaining Johnson's difculties. Why did a that the bill that did pass was weak. man who, as President, brilliantly led a Congress As the debate proceeded, Title III, which dominated by liberals struggle to do so when he made segregation illegal in schools and all public was in the Senate? Did Johnson encounter difcul‐ places, emerged as the bill's most explosive ele‐ ties because other senators had tired of his tac‐ ment. Southerners wanted Title III excised; liber‐ tics--or did it become harder to get his way when als and the Eisenhower administration viewed it he had to deal with more liberals? If the former, as the measure's heart. Johnson realized that he how transformative were Johnson's procedural in‐ had to fnd a way to keep Title III in the bill while novations? If the latter, could ideological shifts in rendering it meaningless. He accomplished this the populace at large change the way the Senate goal by arranging for an up-and-coming liberal does business? Both questions challenge the por‐ senator, Frank Church (D-ID), to introduce an trayal of the Senate that Caro ofers, and he amendment requiring jury trials for all alleged Ti‐ should have addressed them more thoroughly. tle III violations. Because no all-white Southern A weak beginning and end and a climactic jury would convict in a civil rights case, the jury- scene better told elsewhere limit the appeal of trial amendment fatally compromised Title III. Master of the Senate. But, for its detailed descrip‐ Johnson's political skills served him well: he ob‐ tion of how Johnson wielded power in the Senate, tained the votes of Church and other Western lib‐ its impressive analysis of how changes in parlia‐ erals for this amendment by pressuring Southern mentary norms transformed the upper house, its senators to vote for a bill dear to Church, a mea‐ nuanced explanations of the 1952 and 1956 Demo‐ sure calling for a federally fnanced public power cratic conventions, and its characteristically de‐ plant at Hells Canyon, Idaho. tailed storytelling style, Master of the Senate will Beyond the legislation's specifcs, Caro suc‐ be a key book in understanding postwar political cessfully, if somewhat excessively, establishes the and congressional history. absurdity of Johnson's later claims never to have Notes expressed any racist sentiments. What distin‐ [1.] Robert A. Caro, The Path to Power, vol. 1 guished Johnson from his Southern colleagues, of The Years of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Alfred Caro points out, was not a more progressive atti‐ A. Knopf, 1982); Robert A. Caro, Means of Ascent, tude on racial issues, but rather his ability to look vol. 2 of The Years of Lyndon Johnson (New York: beyond his personal bigotry to act for the public Alfred A. Knopf, 1990). Caro expects to complete good. the study with a fnal volume, now in progress. Caro sees Johnson's role in passing the 1957 [2.] Kirk Victor, "Deconstructing Daschle," Na‐ Civil Rights Act as his most important achieve‐ tional Journal, 31 May 2002. ment as majority leader. The book then races [3.] Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon through Johnson's last three years as Senate lead‐ Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960 (New York: Ox‐ er in a somewhat unsatisfactory fashion. Caro ford University Press, 1991), pp. 153, 186, 234. does little to challenge the conventional view that Johnson struggled in the late 1950s, especially af‐ [4.] Robert Mann, The Walls of Jericho: Lyn‐ ter a stunning Democratic performance in the don Johnson, , Richard Russell, 1958 midterm elections brought to the upper and the Struggle for Civil Rights (New York: Har‐ chamber a host of Northern and Western liberals court Brace, 1996). and gave the party an almost 2-to-1 majority.[5] But Caro leaves more questions than he answers

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[5.] Michael Foley, The New Senate: Liberal In‐ fuence on a Conservative Institution, 1959-1972 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

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Citation: KC Johnson. Review of Caro, Robert A. Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson. H- Law, H-Net Reviews. June, 2002.

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