UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in Sout-East Asia, 1905-1941 Bussemaker, H.Th. Publication date 2001 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Bussemaker, H. T. (2001). Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in Sout-East Asia, 1905-1941. in eigen beheer. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:04 Oct 2021 266 6 Chapterr 3. THEE NETHERLANDS. 3.1.. Introduction. Beforee the Second World War, the small European nation of The Netherlands possessed onee of the richest colonies in the world, i.e. the Netherlands East Indies. This was not by design,, but by coincidence, and in no small measure due to British 19th Century policy, whichh considered it preferable, after the Tractate of London of 1824, to have the Nether- landss East Indies1232 in the possession of a small European power rather than in the handss of a more powerful European competitor. Eseausee of the rise of Imperial Germany, the Royal Navy withdrew its battleships from Eastt Asia after concluding the Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty of 1902 with Japan, (page ij4j.lnn order to protect British interests over there, the void was filled by an Asiatic power, whichh for the first time in modem history gained a share in the stability of a large region. Thee Washington Treaties of 1922 eliminated the British-Japanese alliance, but substituted nothingg in its place, (pages 23 - 26). When parliamentary control and democracy disappea- redd from Japan in the thirties, Holland feared for its colony, as it had done after the Russo- Japanesee War. It is therefore rather amazing that the strength of the Dutch Navy defending thee NEI diminished after 1905, and in effect continued its decline during the interbellum untill it was too late to redress the situation. Inn the early thirties the defence of the NEI was at its nadir, and was almost embarrasingly weak,, even in Dutch eyes. The reason was not the size of the mother country, nor its lack off financial resources. The two Imperial powers of that day, England and France, had a populationn five times that of the Netherlands; nevertheless their Navies were respectively 266 and 11 times as large as the Dutch Navy. Italy and Japan had a far lower gross nationall income per head of population, but with populations 5 and 10 times as large they maintainedd fleets which were respectively 8 and 18 times as large as the Dutch fleet Lookingg at the money spent in 1933 on the respective fleets in terms of costs per head of population,, every Englishman paid four times as much, each Frenchman three times, and everyy Italian twice as much as each Dutchman. In terms of guilders, the expenses for the armyy in 1929 - 1930 per head of population were ƒ 19.04 in France, ƒ 13.40 in Switzer- land,, Belgium ƒ 11.47 and Holland ƒ 6.22.1233 The rather unique position of the Nether- landss in underspending on defense is also clear on comparison during the entire period of thee interbellum with other European countries large and small. Even taking into account mm For the sake of brevity the expression "Netherlands East Indies" will be abbreviated to "NEI" in this dissertation. iaïï P.F. Hoeksema de Groot: Onze defensie-politiek en de weermacht in Nederiandsch-lrxfê, Bussum 1936.. 9. With the exception of Switzerland, these figures compare well with figures given on pages 132 to 136 inn J.C.H. Blom: Durch kamen sie doch. Het Nederlandse defensiebeleid in de jaren dertig opnieuw beschouwd, inn G. Teitler, Ed.: Tussen crisis en oorlog. Dieren 1984. 267 7 thee difficulty of comparing international defence outlays123*, the conclusion therefore mustt be that, according to international standards, the Dutch simply did not spend enough too ensure an adequate defence of their empire between the wars. It has to be remarked, thatt before the First World War Dutch per capita spending on defence was generally on a parr with countries like Austria-Hungary, the United States, Italy and Switzerland, and considerablyy higher than countries like Japan, Russia and Belgium.1235 Thiss argument is reinforced by the quick increase in Dutch defence outlays in periods of rearmamentt Between 1910 and 1915 the defence expenditures increased with a factor 5.6,, between 1935 and 1939 with a factor 3.3. Moreover, during the Cold War period, the Dutchh defence expenditures corrected for inflation were three to four times higher per head off population than during the interbellum1238. Money therefore was not a problem. The Netherlandss have traditionally always been a rich nation within Western Europe. Thiss chapter will attempt to explain this remarkable situation, which is the more remarkable becausee there was enough awareness of it in the Dutch press, in public opinion and within thee ruling élite.1237 Nevertheless the defence weakness was not redressed in time- causingg the Anglo-Saxon powers concern and irritation, as has been discussed in thn previouss two chapters. Thiss chapter is titled "The Netherlands". Most of this chapter is dedicated to the defence of thee Netherlands East Indies, which was however determined by the policies and foreign diplomacyy of the government of the Netherlands. We have therefore chosen the name of thee mother country as title of this chapter. 3.2.. History of the Netherlands East Indies. Inn order to understand the political and economic environment, in which Dutch defence planningg for the NEI took place, we should provide a short overview of NEI political and economicc history for our non-Dutch readers. The colonial army was one of the pillars of Dutchh colonial society and was the largest employer in the colony, being paid by taxes leviedd in the NEI, and not in the Netherlands. This indeed complicates comparisons in defencee expenditures as given in the introduction to this chapter. The colonial army consistedd of more than 70% of indigenous soldiers. The loyalty of these volunteer soldiers too the Dutch cause was essential for upholding Dutch souvereignty over the island empire. Thereforee a short description of the colonial society in the late thirties should be given in orderr to understand Dutch defence policies and how these were affected by rising 1B** See for example Blom's article comparing defence outlays for the Dutch Army with those of other Europeann powers and the U.S.A. 1920-1940 in J.C.H. Btom: "Dutch kamen sie doch'-. Het Nederlands defensiebeleidd in de jaren dertig opnieuw beschouwd" In: G. TeWer Tussen Crisis en Oorlog - Maatschappij en krijgsmachtkrijgsmacht in de jaren "30. De Bataafsche Leeuw, Dieren 1984, 116 -143. ,a** A. Corvisier Dictionaire dWt et Wstoire KfStaires. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1988, table onn page 308 with military expenditures for the year 1910. iaii Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek: W/- en negentig jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1899 - 1994. CBS Voorburg/Heerlen,, 1994, 16, 120. 12377 For the anxieties about the Japanese threat as perceived by Governor-General Van Limburg Stirum, seee E.B. Locher - Scholten: "Een liberaal autocraat: gouverneur-generaal mr. J.P. graaf van Limburg Stirum (19166 - 1921)", Bijdragen en MededeSngen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (to be referred subsequentlyy as BMG), 95 (1980), 68 76. 268 8 nationalism. 3.2.1.3.2.1. Colonial History up to 1900. Onn 22 June 1596, four Dutch trading ships under Captain Comelis de Houtman anchored att Bantam Bay, west of contemporary Jakarta, establishing a relationship between a small countryy on the North Sea and an overseas territory now called Indonesia that was to last forr 353 years. De Houtman returned to Holland with enormous riches, causing a gold rush, withh enterprising Dutch traders in almost every important Dutch city founding trading associations1238.. Dutch State Secretary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt fused these competi- torss together in de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United East Indies Company) or VOCC in 1602, giving the VOC the monopoly of trade to all lands east of the Cape of Good Hope,, and west of South-America. The VOC has been rightly called the first modern trade corporationn in history, earning sizable profits for its stockholders. It drove the Portuguese fromm the Moluccas, thereby taking over their spice trade monopoly. In 1618 the Dutch VOC-chieff in the Indies, J.P. Coen, founded Batavia near Bantam as a warehouse facility too store goods from the Moluccas, China arid Japan before final shipment to Europe.1239 Thee VOC was a trading company, but had to defend its coastal warehouses {'factorijen'') againstt attacks from local potentates and other European competitors, such as Spaniards andd Englishmen. The VOC quickly developed a sizable military garrison force, and armed itss trade ships to fight off pirates. At the end of the eighteenth Century, the VOC held souvereigntyy over almost the whole of Java.