The Impact of Price Discrimination in Markets with Adverse Selection André Veiga* University of Oxford This version: November 25, 2016 [Please click here to download the latest version] Abstract Would consumer surplus increase if annuity rates were age-neutral? This paper characterizes the socially optimal contractibility of a given signal in mar- kets with adverse selection. A signal (e.g., age) partitions consumers into sub- sets (e.g., young and old). A regulator restricts price-discrimination on the basis of the signal if the consumer subsets where the level of cost is higher are also the subsets where there is greater deadweight loss due to adverse selection. Such signals are empirically common. To illustrate the welfare benefit of price dis- crimination policy, I use a structural model to estimate its impact on the UK annuities market. The model is estimated using proprietary data that include the annuity seller’s estimate of each individual’s longevity. I find that restricting price discrimination can increase consumer surplus by the equivalent of about £6.5 million per year. Keywords: Adverse Selection, Price Discrimination, Structural Estimation JEL Classification Codes: D82, L52,D41 *I thank Simon Cowan, Ian Crawford, Andrew Dilnot, James Duffy, Liran Einav, Basile Grassi, Sukriti Issar, Ian Jewitt, Michael Keane, Paul Klemperer, Jonathan Levin, Margaret Meyer, Simon Quinn, Howard Smith, Kirsten Smith, John Vickers, and E. Glen Weyl. Segye Shin provided outstanding re- search assistance. Department of Economics and Somerville College, University of Oxford, Manor Road Building, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK;
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[email protected]. 1 1 Introduction Would consumer surplus increase if annuity rates were not allowed to vary with age? Should these rates vary with gender? There is little guidance as to which individual characteristics (e.g., gender, age) should be contractible in a given setting.