Israel Faces the Ultra-Orthodox 12 Challenge: Why Now, and What Next? !e integration of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) sector t Why has the ultra-Orthodox issue moved to into the general Israeli society has been at the center the top of the political and social agenda at of the political agenda for over a year now, and is this particular time? expected to grip Israel in the coming months and years t What are the main components of proposed with a relatively high level of intensity. It is a complex changes in the ultra-Orthodox sector’s issue with many important and interconnected sub- relationship with the larger Israeli society? issues, so finding a single quick ‘solution’ that would satisfy all concerned parties is highly unlikely. In t What are the chances of implementing change, principle, the dynamics of Israeli Haredim vis-à-vis and what could facilitate or obstruct steps the wider society involve three key problems: their toward implementation? economic integration as a productive sector that contributes to Israel’s economy; equality in burden Background: '!e Year sharing – meaning, primarily, drafting Haredi youth of the Haredim' for IDF or national service; and reformulating the cultural-religious status quo to diminish the Haredi Israel’s ‘Year of the Haredim’ began with a legal crisis, influence on institutions that impact the lives of other continued with a coalition crisis, and concluded Israeli citizens.1 !e rapid demographic growth of the (for the time being) in a political reshu"ing that ultra-Orthodox (forecasts estimate that by 2020, 50% holds both challenges and opportunities for of the Jewish first-graders will be ultra-Orthodox) addressing tensions between the ultra-Orthodox reinforces the need for a timely response to these minority and the non-Orthodox majority in Israel. dilemmas. In the absence of appropriate solutions, !e legal crisis erupted in February 2012, when the they may prove intractable in the future. Supreme Court2 decided to revoke the extension !is paper is an elaboration of some fundamental of the Tal Law, which is the legal basis for Torato issues and how they have developed in the last year: Omanuto [lit. Torah Study is his main occupation] THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 189 arrangement, which exempted (couched as the Knesset’s largest party, joined under the ‘deferment of service’) over 60,000 Haredi Yeshiva leadership of Shaul Mofaz. !is surprise move, students from compulsory military duty. !e which granted the prime minister a majority of court’s action was the result of an appeal contesting 94 of 120 MKs, was justified by the two leaders the constitutionality of the arrangement allowing in a press conference as heralding a new agenda Yeshiva students to avoid military duty, arguing with four key action items: first among them, as that such an arrangement “violates the right defined by Netanyahu, was “to pass a fair and equal to equality as part of the basic right of human division of the burden to replace the Tal Law”; in dignity.” !e Tal Law’s annulment (August 2012) other words, to formulate a new law to replace the e#ectively toppled the legal structure enabling existing one exempting ultra-Orthodox students the exemption, and at least on its face, obliged from military duty. Following the coalition’s the Israeli government expansion, a commission ‘for equality in the and the IDF to prepare burden,’ headed by Kadima MK Yohanan Plesner, for the induction of many was set up and tasked with formulating the !e Plesner thousands of Yeshiva replacement bill. !e committee’s term, however, Committee students (in 2011 alone, was brief, ending abruptly in a political crisis after also considered 7,700 individuals, for the prime minister canceled it for undisclosed conscription the first time, formally reasons. Its conclusions, published only after it of Israel’s declared Torah study their was clear that Netanyahu had no intention of Arab citizens main occupation and endorsing them, asserted a key principle, ‘military had their military duty service for all,’ and included a 2016 target draft deferred). !e urgent rate of 80% of each recruitment-age cohort in the need to find an alternative Haredi sector. Heavy penalties were also stipulated to the Tal Law – which, on for draft evaders and the learning institutions one hand, would exempt harboring them. !e Plesner Committee also the state from a legal obligation it does not want considered conscription of Israel’s Arab citizens, and probably cannot meet without expending declaring that the principle of universal service considerable resources, and on the other hand, should also apply to them. Nevertheless, the would curb the upward trend in the number of Plesner Committee avoided setting specific target annual exemptions – triggered various political numbers for Arab service, suggesting that they maneuvers culminating in the coalition agreement be defined by a future committee set up for that with the Kadima Party (‘the Coalition of 94’ purpose. As mentioned, the prime minister had [Knesset members]) in the summer of 2012. reservations about the committee’s conclusions, In early May 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s finding its proposals exaggerated and “aggressive,” governing coalition was expanded when Kadima, and called for a more consensual and gradual 190 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE solution to the ‘equal burden sharing’ problem. Why Now? In any case, the dismantling of the Plesner Committee rang in the demise of the short-lived !ere is no single answer to the question why ‘grand coalition,’ and soon after, Netanyahu called Israeli society has reached its moment of crisis in for early elections. regard to the Haredim at this particular point in time. A confluence of several di#erent factors and !e legislative and political crises resulting from circumstances pushed the Haredi question to the the failure to find a Tal Law replacement were top of the agenda, while clearing the agenda of integral to the 2013 elections and the formation other competing issues. of a new coalition government. Haredi parties were not invited into this coalition, the result of !e Decline of the Peace Process an ultimatum by the two key leaders: Yair Lapid of the liberal centrist party Yesh Atid (!ere is a !e set of factors behind Future), and Naftali Bennett of the religious-Zionist the ascent of the Haredi Lapid: party Habait Hayehudi (!e Jewish Home). In the issue to the top of the I don’t believe negotiations leading to the coalition agreement, agenda certainly includes Shas and both leaders insisted that they would not join the marginalization of Yahadut the coalition unless the Haredi parties (Shas and political/diplomatic HaTorah can sit Yahadut HaTorah) were excluded. Lapid explained: issues, especially the Israeli- in a government “I don’t believe Shas and Yahadut Hatorah can sit Palestinian peace process. that will pursue in a government that will pursue the change for !is marginalization the change which we have campaigned: changing the criteria process actually began for which we for housing, a core education for all, burden immediately after the campaigned sharing, the requisite cuts in Yeshiva budgets.”3 collapse of the Camp In this, Lapid e#ectively made changing societal David conference in 2000 arrangements with the Haredim one of the new and the outbreak of the government’s top priorities. !e prime minister, Second Intifada, and has strengthened in recent who wanted the new coalition to include the years. A consensus opinion has crystallized in current member parties and the ultra-Orthodox Israeli society that questions the probability of a parties, was forced to come to terms with a reality diplomatic breakthrough vis-à-vis the Palestinian that encumbers him with a political agenda Authority, and of achieving a peace agreement. he never wanted. !is new reality also found 67% agreed with the statement, “regardless of expression in the agreements the prime minister which party wins the elections, the peace process ultimately reached with his coalition partners. !e with the Palestinians will remain stuck for reasons key points are discussed below. unrelated to Israel, and there is no chance for any progress in the foreseeable future.”4 !is consensus THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 191 has marginalized the Palestinian issue in favor of and with the two-bloc constellation no longer other topics on the national agenda, allowing a central element in coalition-building tactics, a focus on a more ‘civil’ agenda compared to the ultra-Orthodox have lost their bargaining previous years. !is preference has been evident position. !is was especially visible in the pact in every sector of Israeli society, but it has been between Yesh Atid and HaBayit HaYehudi, two especially salient among centrist and center-left parties with several political disagreements. !ey voters who, in previous years, had placed greater managed to locate considerable common ground emphasis on the peace issue. In 2013, they opted on other issues deemed more urgent by their to give priority to the top domestic/internal issues: leaders, allowing them to join forces despite their religion, society, and the economy (80% of Yesh political divide. Atid voters; 51% of all voters).5 !is shift not only !e Frustration of the Silent Majority impacted the 2013 For a while now, there has been a widespread !e perception election results, but also sentiment in the public discourse objecting that a the shaping of the new to what many Israelis regard as ‘minority rule.’ minority rules coalition. Historically, the Di#erent groups have identified this minority the majority political parties tended according to their worldviews: at times it has leads to to align in a right-left been the settlers, whom the Israeli left perceives agitation bloc formation – i.e.