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“Bad Bank”, “Nationalization”, “Guaranteeing Toxic Assets”: Choosing Among the Options

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“Bad Bank”, “Nationalization”, “Guaranteeing Toxic Assets”: Choosing Among the Options JANUARY 30, 2009 “Bad Bank”, “Nationalization”, “Guaranteeing Toxic Assets”: Choosing among the options Douglas J. Elliott The Initiative on Business and Public Policy provides analytical research and constructive recommendations on public policy issues affecting the business sector in the United States and around the world. “Bad Bank”, “Nationalization”, “Guaranteeing Toxic Assets”: Choosing among the options Douglas J. Elliott January 30, 2009 The Initiative on Business and Public Policy provides analytical research and constructive recommendations on public policy issues affecting the business sector in the United States and around the world. “BAD BANK”, “NATIONALIZATION”, “GUARANTeeING TOXIC ASSETS”: CHOOSING AMONG THE OPTIONS CONTENTS Summary 6 Bad Bank 7 Guarantees of Bad Assets 11 Nationalization 13 Overall Recommendation 16 JANUARY 2009 5 “BAD BANK”, “NATIONALIZATION”, “GUARANTeeING TOXIC ASSETS”: CHOOSING AMONG THE OPTIONS SUMMARY t is becoming increasingly clear that the $700 bil- closure problem, there is much greater uncertainty lion in TARP funds will not be sufficient to re- over what further measures should be taken to shore Istore the US financial system to good health. The up the financial system. Three particular ideas have first portion, of $350 billion, appears only to have received a growing amount of attention: establish- helped prevent a complete meltdown of our finan- ing a “bad bank”, guaranteeing toxic assets, and na- cial system, but has not averted significant further tionalizing one or more banks. This paper explains deterioration in recent months, particularly among the three approaches and their major variations, the weaker or less well-managed banks. The new with a discussion of the pros and cons. Administration and Congress soon will be debating how to spend the second $350 billion, and possibly The author recommends a combination of toxic as- the size of additional amounts to be committed. set guarantees and a mild form of nationalization, as this approach could both provide badly needed While some portion of the second $350 billion stability to the system and also could be tailored to clearly will be spent addressing the mortgage fore- the specific circumstances of different banks. Copyright © 2009 The Brookings Institution 6 The Initiative on Business and Public Policy | THE BROOKINGS INstitutiON “BAD BANK”, “NATIONALIZATION”, “GUARANTeeING TOXIC ASSETS”: CHOOSING AMONG THE OPTIONS Bad Bank Overview limiting the potential losses by moving them to a separate unit that could theoretically be allowed ome advocate setting up a “bad bank” with to go bankrupt. government assistance. This bad bank Swould take on the banking system’s worst This last point is central to such restructurings. or “toxic” assets, those with the most uncertainty The uncertain valuation of the troubling assets or about their value, primarily complex mortgage- liabilities must have a fixed limit from the point related securities. The bad bank would need funds of view of the good bank shareholders. In the to buy the assets and additional funds to provide case of the bad bank ideas being proposed, this it with a capital base to protect against the pos- generally means that there is some floor value sibility that values are in reality, or become over paid to the good bank for the toxic assets. There time, even lower than the initial valuation. may be a contingent amount on top of this, but some significant part of the payment has to have The twin terms, “good bank/bad bank” first came a fixed value, otherwise setting up the bad bank into wide usage in reference to the restructuring does not eliminate the uncertainty about the cap- of Mellon Bank in 1988. Mellon was drowning in ital adequacy of the remaining good banks. a sea of bad real estate-related loans and invest- ments. Worse, as with the present day, there was Bad banks have been used by some other coun- a great deal of uncertainty about the true value of tries that have encountered systemic banking these assets. Mellon chose to split into two banks, crises such as we face today, including Sweden’s with the bad assets moved into a bad bank called bank rescue plan from the early 1990’s. In Swe- Grant Street. The bad assets were marked down den’s case, which is much admired today, two of to fair values and substantial capital was injected the largest banks were taken over by the state to protect against further declines in valuation. and were restructured using the good bank/bad Moving those assets removed a great uncer- bank approach. Some other major Swedish banks tainty from Mellon, substantially improving the stayed out of government hands, but used a simi- comfort level of stockholders and creditors. The lar restructuring approach. The bad banks were elimination of this uncertainty allowed the rais- run off over time, selling assets as the markets for ing of additional capital and Mellon went on to those assets became more stable. flourish. Grant Street, for its part, was wound up over seven years without needing additional capi- Rationale tal injections. The premise of the bad bank approach is that many major banks have viable long-term busi- This success inspired a number of other good nesses, but are hamstrung in their ability to raise bank/bad bank restructurings over time, includ- new capital and sustain ongoing funding from ing at least one major insurance industry re- depositors and other creditors. Highly uncertain structuring, that of CIGNA’s property/casualty valuations of the toxic assets create major uncer- operations. CIGNA’s P/C operations had been tainties over the banks’ solvency and the true val- burdened by large and uncertain liabilities for as- ues of their equity and debt. Move those assets bestos and environmental losses. CIGNA’s stock off the balance sheet of the good bank and you market value went up by $2 billion on the day have a much more attractive business. The good of the restructuring announcement as a result of bank may be undercapitalized as a result of mark- JANUARY 2009 7 “BAD BANK”, “NATIONALIZATION”, “GUARANTeeING TOXIC ASSETS”: CHOOSING AMONG THE OPTIONS ing the assets to fair values and moving them to Key Operational Questions the bad bank, but the stream of future profits is strong enough to attract sufficient new capital The “bad bank” idea raises three key operational into the good bank from private investors. This questions: approach generally does not work if that stream of future profits is not attractive – there has to be What prices will be paid for the toxic assets? a “good bank” in there somewhere, or there is no This was one of the critical issues that kept the point to the exercise. TARP funds from being used as originally planned. It is very hard to value these assets – that fact is the A lesser advantage of setting up a separate bad root of many of the problems that has been plagu- bank is that it may be easier to manage such a ing our financial system. The toxic assets are gener- run-off operation on a stand-alone basis. That is, ally complex securities whose economic values are it may be easier to attract the best run-off manag- highly sensitive to conditions in the housing and ers if they are placed in an institution like a “bad credit markets. Still worse, the values often change bank” and given the right incentives to maximize in non-linear ways with movements of mortgage the value of the assets. It is probably true that default rates and other economic variables, because such focus is obtained best on a stand-alone basis, of the complicated way in which they have been but it is important not to overstate the advan- assembled out of other securities. In addition to tages, since the same actions are feasible within a this underlying uncertainty, the markets for these larger bank. (Most large banks have departments securities have become highly illiquid, making the for “special loans,” with their own experts in this prices at which the occasional transactions occur area.) very volatile and heavily influenced by supply and demand considerations that may have little to do Negatives with the underlying economic value of the securi- Few financial institutions experts would argue ties. As a result, different observers, including dif- against a bad bank as a matter of principle, since ferent banks, can put quite divergent valuations on they can clearly work as part of the answer when the same security while adhering to accepted ac- there is a banking crisis spurred by a large pool counting principles. of toxic assets. However, the devil is in the de- tails, since there are a number of key operational One suggestion has been to buy the toxic assets decisions that determine how the risks and re- at market values, based on the most recent trades. wards will be divvied up between shareholders, There are three potential problems with this. creditors, and taxpayers. Getting these wrong can prove expensive for taxpayers or can block the • There are thousands of distinct financial instru- restructuring by making it unattractive to share- ments and some of them have not traded in some holders or creditors. time, meaning there is no relevant known market value. It is worth emphasizing that the bad bank solu- tion could crystallize such large losses on toxic • Bankers argue that the trades have been “fire assets that it would create massive capital needs sales” that do not reflect the real economic value for certain of the “good” banks rendering them for an entity like the bad bank that can hold se- insolvent or deeply under-capitalized. In that curities until maturity. event, some form of capital infusion, such as one of the various forms of nationalization discussed below, may be necessary.
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