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The Berlin Declaration of the G20 Health Ministers (2017)

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The Berlin Declaration of the G20 Health Ministers (2017) Berlin Declaration of the G20 Health Ministers Together Today for a Healthy Tomorrow 1. We, the G20 Health Ministers, met for the first time ever in Berlin, Germany on 19-20 May 2017. 2. “Shaping an interconnected world” is a common goal of the G20, and health is key to “Building Resilience, Improving Sustainability, Assuming Responsibility”, the three main pillars of Germany’s G20 Presidency. Strong, sustainable and resilient health systems are critical for responding to global health challenges, for populations’ health, wellbeing, economic productivity and for developing a qualified workforce in adequate numbers. Ultimately they are the basis for a prosperous and stable society. Health is one of the most valuable resources for building a sustainable future and an outcome of our commitment. 3. By putting global health on the agenda of the G20, we affirm our role in strengthening the political support for existing initiatives and working to address the economic aspects of global health issues. We support the leading role of the World Health Organization (WHO), as the United Nations specialized agency for health, in global health cooperation. Furthermore, we seek to intensify global action and cooperation in order to address ever-evolving challenges and identify where the health sector can provide leadership and added value. 4. As the premier forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 can contribute to overcoming global health challenges. Global health risks, such as infectious disease outbreaks and antimicrobial resistance (AMR), have a severe impact on the lives and well-being of millions of people as well as on the global economy. Since these global challenges cannot be addressed by one country, region or sector alone, they call for a coordinated global response. For this reason, the G20 is well- placed to contribute to joint commitment and action in close cooperation with the WHO. This is critical in order to ensure a healthy tomorrow for all. Under the 2017 German G20 Presidency, the G20 focuses primarily on preventing and mitigating the devastating impact of health emergencies and counteracting the burden that AMR places on societies and economies. 5. We thank Germany for its leadership in 2017 and we are committed to the continuation of our dialogue on global health in Argentina. We will further promote health in the G20 and we reaffirm our commitment to achieve the health-related goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. - 2 - GLOBAL HEALTH CRISES MANAGEMENT 6. The global interconnectedness of societies, businesses and governments means that an infectious disease risk anywhere can become a health risk everywhere – with far-reaching humanitarian, social, political, economic and security consequences. Therefore, we highlight the need to reinforce joint commitment by the international community to strengthen countries’ health systems, particularly where they are weak and conditions for access to treatment and healthcare are poor, and to improve the management of global health crises. We recognize our unique position to lead by example and foster global preparedness for and responsiveness to health crises. 7. We conducted a simulation exercise during our meeting in Berlin in May 2017 in close cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO), as the lead agency for the international community on health emergencies and outbreak response, and the World Bank. We acknowledge the importance of carrying out regular simulation exercises at all levels. Such simulation exercises provide a unique opportunity for testing capabilities, policies and agreements, preparing and strengthening a coordinated global response and promoting accountability and transparency. 8. We acknowledge that efficient global health crisis management can only be ensured through compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). We will act accordingly within our obligations under the IHR and support the leadership and coordination of WHO in the event of health crises of international concern. We affirm WHO’s central role as health cluster lead in particular within the United Nations (UN) coordination mechanisms that are being put in place at the interface to the wider emergency response management, including through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s procedures for infectious disease events adopted in 2016. All relevant stakeholders, taking into account their respective capacities, need to be involved in preventing, preparing for and responding to current and future health crises, guided by the leadership of WHO. This includes recommended actions on a needs-based and disease burden basis, and to cooperate for making required medicines, diagnostics, vaccines and treatment available to the people in need. 9. The international community needs to fully support the WHO in order for the organization to be able to fulfil its role, including in capacity building and in preparing for and responding to health emergencies. In this respect, we acknowledge that WHO’s financial and human resource capacities have to be strengthened, including through adequate and sustainable funding for the Health Emergencies Programme and the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE). Likewise, we welcome and support the three pillars of the WHO reform, with its programmatic, governance and managerial focus. In addition, we welcome the development of the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) as a fast financing mechanism that can provide funds to countries to help fight an escalating serious outbreak. We acknowledge the need to draw on the expertise and resources of the World Bank and Regional Development Banks in addressing questions of financing for health. 10. We acknowledge the importance of building capacity and ensuring quality at national, regional and global level in order to promptly deploy trained personnel to emergencies and outbreaks. Initiatives to expand and deepen existing partnerships to enable such deployments are critical to bring greater coherence and coordination to emergency field operations. The G20 welcomes WHO’s role in coordinating a number of these partnerships including international health emergency deployments, the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, Standby Partners, as well as the Global Health Cluster. The G20 advocates for sustainable engagement, support and promotion of these partnerships. - 3 - 11. We recognize the importance of implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005), including by building and strengthening required core capacities within the context of health systems strengthening for prevention, detection, preparedness and response, as a key priority. We support the swift and comprehensive translation of the IHR into practice at national, regional and international level. This includes strengthened and coordinated assistance to countries to implement the IHR. 12. Given the importance played by the assets of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in maintaining the capacity of many countries with regards to their obligations under the IHR, and given the imminent eradication of Polio, we urge the timely and effective application of those assets to other programmes that could also contribute to maintaining the necessary capacity for those countries to continue meeting their obligations under the IHR. We also recognize the historic opportunity to contribute to global polio eradication. 13. Enhancing transparency facilitates the sharing of key information that can prompt faster responses by the international community. Early communication of disease outbreaks, including those which may constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), may be discouraged if countries are led to believe they will face negative consequences due to unjustified travel and trade restrictions by other countries. To limit the negative impact on economies and societies and to foster early communication, we reiterate our commitment to adhering to reporting obligations under the IHR concerning a potential or declared Public Health Emergency of International Concern and underline the importance of following relevant WHO recommendations, including those on travel and trade. 14. We acknowledge the need for improved monitoring and evaluation of IHR implementation, which may include voluntary external evaluations, and the identification of best practices in order to strengthen health systems and build the core capacities required under IHR. We also recognize the importance of developing and supporting national plans and providing technical assistance to address critical gaps identified during the evaluation process. 15. Research and Development (R&D) are necessary for the timely availability and development of new and improved quality medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and medical equipment for containing emergencies. This requires mobilization of national and international research efforts and facilities, and norms and commitments to share data and samples, in accordance with national legislation, and public health benefits in an inclusive, timely and transparent manner. In addition, sustainable funding and effective international R&D coordination is needed. We welcome and support new models for R&D preparedness including the “WHO R&D Blueprint”, the Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness (GLOPID-R) and the “Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)”, which is developing new vaccines for epidemics. We underscore the importance
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