OBTAINING A DRIVER’S LICENSE IN INDIA: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO STUDYING CORRUPTION*
MARIANNE BERTRAND SIMEON DJANKOV REMA HANNA SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN
We study the allocation of driver’s licenses in India by randomly assigning applicants to one of three groups: bonus (offered a bonus for obtaining a license quickly), lesson (offered free driving lessons), or comparison. Both the bonus and lesson groups are more likely to obtain licenses. However, bonus group members are more likely to make extralegal payments and to obtain licenses without know- ing how to drive. All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries (“agents”). An audit study of agents reveals that they can circumvent procedures such as the driving test. Overall, our results support the view that corruption does not merely reflect transfers from citizens to bureaucrats but distorts allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION Public service provision in many developing countries is rife with corruption. A basic question about such corruption is whether it merely represents redistribution between citizens and bureaucrats or results in important distortions in how bureau- crats allocate services. This question underlies the debate on the efficiency implications of corruption, with some arguing that cor- ruption merely “greases the wheels” of the bureaucracy and others arguing that it harms society.1 In this paper, we use detailed sur- vey data and experimental evidence to study this question in the context of one particular bureaucratic process: the provision of driver’s licenses in Delhi, India.
* This project was conducted and funded by the International Finance Cor- poration. We thank Anup Kumar Roy for outstanding research assistance. We are grateful to Lawrence Katz (the editor), three anonymous referees, Abhijit Banerjee, Gary Becker, Ryan Bubb, Anne Case, Angus Deaton, Luis Garicano, Ed Glaeser, Ben Olken, Sam Peltzman, Andrei Shleifer, and Jakob Svensson and to seminar participants at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Chicago GSB, LSE, Yale University, NYU, Ohio State University, the University of Florida, the University of Toronto, the World Bank, and the ASSA 2006 meeting for helpful comments. 1. For the “grease-the-wheels” view, see Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), and Lui (1985). For example, Huntington (1968) remarked that “[I]n terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, and honest bureaucracy.” For arguments on how corruption can harm society, see Myrdal (1968), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Klitgaard (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993), and Djankov et al. (2002).