A Secure Architecture for Untrusted Web Browser Plugins

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Secure Architecture for Untrusted Web Browser Plugins Diplomarbeit A Secure Architecture for Untrusted Web Browser Plugins Achim Weimert 9.März 2011 Technische Universität Berlin Fakultät IV Institut für Softwaretechnik und Theoretische Informatik Professur Security in Telecommunications Betreuender Hochschullehrer: Prof. Dr. Jean-Pierre Seifert Betreuender Mitarbeiter: Dipl.-Inf. Matthias Lange Erklärung Die selbständige und eigenhändige Ausfertigung versichert an Eides statt Berlin, den Achim Weimert Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Background 5 2.1 Sandboxing . .5 2.2 Dynamic Content . .6 2.2.1 Client-Side Programming Support . .6 2.3 Plugins . .8 2.3.1 Plugin Interfaces . .8 2.3.1.1 Netscape Plugin API . .9 2.3.1.2 Pepper Plugin API . 11 2.3.1.3 MozPlugger . 11 2.3.2 Important Plugins . 12 2.3.2.1 Adobe Flash Player . 12 2.3.2.2 Java Applets . 12 2.3.2.3 Microsoft Silverlight . 13 2.4 Content Handling in Browsers . 13 2.5 Browser Architecture . 14 2.5.1 Browser Extensions . 15 2.5.2 Multi-process Architectures . 15 2.6 Threat Analysis . 17 2.6.1 Attacking Web Browser Availability . 17 2.6.2 Unrestricted File System Access . 17 2.6.3 Unrestricted Network Access . 18 2.6.4 User Interface Forgery . 19 2.6.5 Attacking Web Browser Integrity . 20 2.6.6 Summary . 21 2.6.7 Threat Model and Assumptions . 22 3 Design 25 3.1 Designing a Secure Plugin API . 25 3.2 Execution Model . 26 3.2.1 Threading Model . 27 3.2.2 Event Model Using Callbacks . 27 3.2.3 Virtual CPU Model . 27 3.3 Information Flow . 28 3.3.1 vCPU System Calls . 28 3.3.2 Event Handling . 29 V Contents 3.3.3 Handling of Pending Events . 30 3.3.4 Handling of Data Events . 31 3.3.5 Host Main Loop . 32 3.4 Scheduling . 32 3.5 Synchronization . 34 3.5.1 Thread-Synchronization with Upcalls . 34 3.5.2 Thread-Synchronization with other Threads . 34 3.5.3 Thread-Synchronization with Upcalls and other Threads . 34 4 Implementation 37 4.1 vCPU . 37 4.1.1 Sandboxing Using ptrace ...................... 37 4.1.2 Setup of Host-Client Interaction . 38 4.1.3 Event Handling . 39 4.1.4 Host Main Loop . 39 4.1.5 vCPU System Calls . 40 4.1.5.1 vCPU System Call Execution . 40 4.1.5.2 vCPU System Call Types . 40 4.1.6 Race Conditions Between Events and System Calls . 41 4.1.7 User Level Resume . 42 4.2 Threading Library . 45 4.2.1 Scheduling . 45 4.2.2 Synchronization . 46 4.2.2.1 Mutex . 46 4.2.2.2 Condition Variable . 47 4.2.2.3 Semaphore . 48 4.2.3 Client Prioritization of Data Events . 49 4.2.4 Dynamic Memory Allocation . 49 4.3 Example Execution . 50 4.4 Video Playback Using Plugin . 51 5 Evaluation 55 5.1 System Call Roundtrip . 55 5.2 Context Switch . 55 5.3 Comparing User-level Resume with syscall_resume ........... 56 5.4 Event Latency . 57 5.5 Data Event Latency . 58 5.5.1 Influence of Thread Priorities on Latency . 59 5.5.2 Influence of Event Buffer Size on Latency . 60 5.6 Computation Overhead . 61 5.7 Data Throughput . 62 5.8 Video Playback Using Plugin . 63 6 Related Work 67 6.1 Browsers . 67 VI Contents 6.1.1 Transparently Securing Plugins in Internet Explorer . 67 6.1.2 Chromium Sandbox . 67 6.1.3 Google Native Client . 68 6.1.4 OP Web Browser . 69 6.1.5 Microsoft Gazelle . 69 6.2 Operating Systems . 70 6.2.1 Chromium OS . 70 6.2.2 Illinios Browser Operating System . 71 6.2.3 Capsicum . 71 7 Conclusion 73 7.1 Outlook . 73 7.2 Future Work . 73 A Summary (German) 77 Glossary 79 Bibliography 81 VII List of Figures 2.1 A NPAPI plugin’s lifecycle. 10 2.2 Architecture and dependencies of modern web browsers . 15 2.3 Screenshot of a plugin reading the local file system. 18 2.4 Screenshot of a plugin reading the file /etc/passwd............ 19 2.5 Screenshot taken before detouring the function gettimeofday...... 20 2.6 Screenshot taken after detouring the function gettimeofday....... 21 2.7 Threat Model . 22 4.1 vCPU host and client interaction . 42 4.2 vCPU execution example . 52 5.1 Event latency with computational threads . 58 5.2 Event latency with data handling threads . 59 5.3 Latency distribution . 60 5.4 Data event latency with computational threads . 61 5.5 Data event latency with data handling threads . 62 5.6 Latency dependence on buffer size . 63 5.7 Delivery time dependence on buffer size . 64 5.8 Data throughput . 65 IX List of Tables 5.1 Time consumption of system calls . 55 5.2 Time consumption of context switches . 56 5.3 Time consumption of user-level resume and syscall_resume ...... 57 5.4 Event latency . 57 5.5 Computation overhead . 61 5.6 Data throughput . 62 5.7 Video decoding performance . 64 XI 1 Introduction The Internet has changed the way people access information and communicate. At its beginning, it was mainly used for connecting remote mainframes. For example, a computer with high computing capabilities could provide its processing capacity to remote researchers. Other usages include the transmission of larger amounts of data (e.g. using FTP software) as well as communication within specific groups based on email or within larger groups based on Usenet. A structured way of retrieving information was available in the form of Gopher, which was designed to present text documents in a hierarchical manner. In the 1990s, the world wide web emerged as interlinked web pages which are delivered over the Internet. At that time, the first web browsers and web pages were developed to solve the problem of referencing, retrieving and displaying documents. Web pages mainly consisted of formatted text and hyperlinks as defined by the markup language HTML. Describing a web page, HTML was rendered and displayed by the browser. Using hyperlinks, different web pages could reference each other, giving the user a mean to easily navigate from one web page to the next one. This new way of accessing documents quickly became popular and information was increasingly being published using web pages. At that time, user interaction could only be reflected in a web page by navigating to a new web page. The user experience would benefit from a more dynamic interaction mode. To that end, the static nature of early HTML was not suitable. First trials on replacing traditional applications with websites were being made, for the development of websites featuring rich user interfaces and complex user interactions, programming support was found necessary. For example, due to the missing support for programming inside web pages, dynamic web applications like email or chat clients were not possi- ble. Consequently, limited programming support for interpreted scripting languages was added to browsers in the form of JavaScript and VBScript. Using those scripting languages, web pages and their elements could dynamically be modified. Comparing favorably with refetching of a web page, scripting support greatly improved the possi- bilities for dynamic web pages. Being supported by many browsers, JavaScript gradually pushed back VBScript and became widely used on web pages. Browsers at that time were missing support for multimedia content like video play- back or rich document (e.g. Portable Document Format - PDF) and advanced graphic formats (e.g. Scalable Vector Graphics - SVG). Whenever the user navigated to such a resource, the browser offered to download the file. After the download was completed the user could open the file using a locally installed application. As the user experience would improve by dispensing the additional steps and displaying commonly used content types inside the browser, the inclusion of complex documents evolved as a new require- ment. For different reasons, support for those documents could not be added using the available scripting languages. For example, being an interpreted language, JavaScript 1 1 Introduction performance was not suitable for the calculations involved in video decoding. Addition- ally, as JavaScript is executed in a limited runtime environment, hardware acceleration for rendering complex graphics was not available. Support for compiled programming languages could have been added. As a result, the browser would download the source code,.
Recommended publications
  • On the Uniqueness of Browser Extensions and Web Logins
    To Extend or not to Extend: on the Uniqueness of Browser Extensions and Web Logins Gábor György Gulyás Dolière Francis Somé INRIA INRIA [email protected] [email protected] Nataliia Bielova Claude Castelluccia INRIA INRIA [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT shown that a user’s browser has a number of “physical” charac- Recent works showed that websites can detect browser extensions teristics that can be used to uniquely identify her browser and that users install and websites they are logged into. This poses sig- hence to track it across the Web. Fingerprinting of users’ devices is nificant privacy risks, since extensions and Web logins that reflect similar to physical biometric traits of people, where only physical user’s behavior, can be used to uniquely identify users on the Web. characteristics are studied. This paper reports on the first large-scale behavioral uniqueness Similar to previous demonstrations of user uniqueness based on study based on 16,393 users who visited our website. We test and their behavior [23, 50], behavioral characteristics, such as browser detect the presence of 16,743 Chrome extensions, covering 28% settings and the way people use their browsers can also help to of all free Chrome extensions. We also detect whether the user is uniquely identify Web users. For example, a user installs web connected to 60 different websites. browser extensions she prefers, such as AdBlock [1], LastPass [14] We analyze how unique users are based on their behavior, and find or Ghostery [8] to enrich her Web experience. Also, while brows- out that 54.86% of users that have installed at least one detectable ing the Web, she logs into her favorite social networks, such as extension are unique; 19.53% of users are unique among those who Gmail [13], Facebook [7] or LinkedIn [15].
    [Show full text]
  • Cisco Telepresence Management Suite 15.13.1
    Cisco TelePresence Management Suite 15.13.1 Software Release Notes First Published: June 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. www.cisco.com 1 Contents Preface 3 Change History 3 Product Documentation 3 New Features in 15.13.1 3 Support for Cisco Meeting Server SIP recorder in Cisco TMS 3 Support for Cisco Webex Desk Limited Edition 3 Webex Room Panorama series to support 20000 kbps Bandwidth 3 Features in Previous Releases 3 Resolved and Open Issues 4 Limitations 4 Interoperability 8 Upgrading to 15.13.1 8 Before You Upgrade 8 Redundant Deployments 8 Upgrading from 14.4 or 14.4.1 8 Upgrading From a Version Earlier than 14.2 8 Prerequisites and Software Dependencies 8 Upgrade Instructions 8 Using the Bug Search Tool 9 Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request 9 Cisco Legal Information 10 Cisco Trademark 10 Cisco Systems, Inc. www.cisco.com 2 Cisco TelePresence Management Suite Software Release Notes Preface Change History Table 1 Software Release Notes Change History Date Change Reason June 2021 Release of Software Cisco TMS 15.13.1 Product Documentation The following documents provide guidance on installation, initial configuration, and operation of the product: ■ Cisco TelePresence Management Suite Installation and Upgrade Guide ■ Cisco TelePresence Management Suite Administrator Guide ■ Cisco TMS Extensions Deployment Guides New Features in 15.13.1 Support for Cisco Meeting Server SIP recorder in Cisco TMS Cisco TMS currently supports Cisco Meeting Server recording with XMPP by default. As XMPP is deprecated from Meeting Server 3.0 onwards, it will only support SIP recorder. For such Cisco Meeting Server with SIP recorder, the valid SIP Recorder URI details must be provided in Cisco TMS.
    [Show full text]
  • Plugin to Run Oracle Forms in Chrome
    Plugin To Run Oracle Forms In Chrome Emmott deuterate prenatal. Ataxic Clarance ambuscades: he tinkles his lairdships phonetically and occupationally. Slovenian and electrifying Ishmael often shuns some peregrination transversally or clapping competently. Desupport of Java Applet Plugin is my Forms Application at. Good Riddance to Oracle's Java Plugin Krebs on Security. Support the the java plug-in used to friend these applications ends with this version of Firefox. Oracle Forms Browser Alternatives DOAG. Note Chrome is not supported for Oracle Formsbased EBS applications Supported Java plug-ins also differ according to the operating system great well as. Configure browser to favor the Adobe PDF plug-in and open. Many recent browser versions include their particular native PDF plug-ins that automatically. Similar to Chrome Firefox will drop support must all NPAPI plugins such as. Oracle Forms 12c version can apology be used without a browser while still keeping the native appearance of the application Either JDK or Java Plugin JRE has not be installed on the client PC An inn of inventory to trigger this answer of configuration can blood found love the Forms web configuration file formsweb. Ui objects in the new row is not only one of the following parmaments in to determine whether you never supported. Why need use Google Chrome for Oracle APEX Grassroots Oracle. How something I run Oracle Forms 11g locally? After you download the crx file for ThinForms 152 open Chrome's. So her whole application is a web based login and stealth launch Java J-initiator. The location for npapi will not clear history page in apex competitors and chrome release and to run oracle forms in chrome, more of the application express file that they would prompt.
    [Show full text]
  • Effects and Opportunities of Native Code Extensions For
    Effects and Opportunities of Native Code Extensions for Computationally Demanding Web Applications DISSERTATION zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. Phil. im Fach Bibliotheks- und Informationswissenschaft eingereicht an der Philosophischen Fakultät I Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin von Dipl. Inform. Dennis Jarosch Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät I: Prof. Michael Seadle, Ph.D. Gutachter: 1. Prof. Dr. Robert Funk 2. Prof. Michael Seadle, Ph.D. eingereicht am: 28.10.2011 Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 16.12.2011 Abstract The World Wide Web is amidst a transition from interactive websites to web applications. An increasing number of users perform their daily computing tasks entirely within the web browser — turning the Web into an important platform for application development. The Web as a platform, however, lacks the computational performance of native applications. This problem has motivated the inception of Microsoft Xax and Google Native Client (NaCl), two independent projects that fa- cilitate the development of native web applications. Native web applications allow the extension of conventional web applications with compiled native code, while maintaining operating system portability. This dissertation determines the bene- fits and drawbacks of native web applications. It also addresses the question how the performance of JavaScript web applications compares to that of native appli- cations and native web applications. Four application benchmarks are introduced that focus on different performance aspects: number crunching (serial and parallel), 3D graphics performance, and data processing. A performance analysis is under- taken in order to determine and compare the performance characteristics of native C applications, JavaScript web applications, and NaCl native web applications.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Change Your Browser Preferences So It Uses Acrobat Or Reader PDF Viewer
    How to change your browser preferences so it uses Acrobat or Reader PDF viewer. If you are unable to open the PDF version of the Emergency Action Plan, please use the instructions below to configure your settings for Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge. Firefox on Windows 1. Choose Tools > Add-ons. 2. In the Add-ons Manager window, click the Plugins tab, then select Adobe Acrobat or Adobe Reader. 3. Choose an appropriate option in the drop-down list next to the name of the plug-in. 4. Always Activate sets the plug-in to open PDFs in the browser. 5. Ask to Activate prompts you to turn on the plug-in while opening PDFs in the browser. 6. Never Activate turns off the plug-in so it does not open PDFs in the browser. Select the Acrobat or Reader plugin in the Add-ons Manager. Firefox on Mac OS 1. Select Firefox. 2. Choose Preferences > Applications. 3. Select a relevant content type from the Content Type column. 4. Associate the content type with the application to open the PDF. For example, to use the Acrobat plug-in within the browser, choose Use Adobe Acrobat NPAPI Plug-in. Reviewed 2018 How to change your browser preferences so it uses Acrobat or Reader PDF viewer. Chrome 1. Open Chrome and select the three dots near the address bar 2. Click on Settings 3. Expand the Advanced settings menu at the bottom of the page 4. Under the Privacy and security, click on Content Settings 5. Find PDF documents and click on the arrow to expand the menu 6.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Analysis of Firefox Webextensions
    6.857: Computer and Network Security Due: May 16, 2018 Security Analysis of Firefox WebExtensions Srilaya Bhavaraju, Tara Smith, Benny Zhang srilayab, tsmith12, felicity Abstract With the deprecation of Legacy addons, Mozilla recently introduced the WebExtensions API for the development of Firefox browser extensions. WebExtensions was designed for cross-browser compatibility and in response to several issues in the legacy addon model. We performed a security analysis of the new WebExtensions model. The goal of this paper is to analyze how well WebExtensions responds to threats in the previous legacy model as well as identify any potential vulnerabilities in the new model. 1 Introduction Firefox release 57, otherwise known as Firefox Quantum, brings a large overhaul to the open-source web browser. Major changes with this release include the deprecation of its initial XUL/XPCOM/XBL extensions API to shift to its own WebExtensions API. This WebExtensions API is currently in use by both Google Chrome and Opera, but Firefox distinguishes itself with further restrictions and additional functionalities. Mozilla’s goals with the new extension API is to support cross-browser extension development, as well as offer greater security than the XPCOM API. Our goal in this paper is to analyze how well the WebExtensions model responds to the vulnerabilities present in legacy addons and discuss any potential vulnerabilities in the new model. We present the old security model of Firefox extensions and examine the new model by looking at the structure, permissions model, and extension review process. We then identify various threats and attacks that may occur or have occurred before moving onto recommendations.
    [Show full text]
  • Multi-File Course Files Upload Interface and Browsers Not Supporting NPAPI Plugins
    Multi-file Course Files Upload Interface and Browsers Not Supporting NPAPI Plugins Date Published: Mar 23,2017 Category: Product:Browsers_Learn; Version:X9_1 Article No.: 000073448 Product: Blackboard Learn Type:Support Bulletin Bulletin/Advisory Information: Update (Published March 23, 2017) Mozilla has removed Netscape Plugin Application Programming Interface (NPAPI) plugin support from Firefox beginning with version 52, which was released on March 7, 2017. Original Bulletin (Published August 26, 2015) In September 2015, Google Chrome will stop supporting NPAPI plugins. This includes the use of Java in the web browser. Before this date, it is possible to configure Chrome to allow this content; after this date, it will no longer be possible to use the multi-file drag-and-drop interface in Course Files or the Content Collection. The new Edge browser from Microsoft also does not support NPAPI plugins. Users wanting to access the multi-file upload interface should use a browser that supports NPAPI and a Java runtime environment. Blackboard will continue to support this interface, but only on supported web browsers that support NPAPI plugins. Chrome and Edge will continue to be supported browsers, but the multi-file upload interface in Course Files and the Content Collection will not be supported on these browsers. Another possible workaround is to use the the Multiple File Upload feature with in the Content Collection. Simply ZIP the needed files and then use the Upload Zip Package or Download Package function. Enter the Course > Click on Content Collection > Click on Course folder > Click on Upload > Select the function to upload the Zipped folder.
    [Show full text]
  • FAQ NPAPI for Website
    FAQ NPAPI Q: NPAPI is being de-supported by many browsers. What is Ellucian doing to support browsers going forward for Banner INB and Oracle Forms? As long as NPAPI is supported by a browser, we will continue to test and support our Banner Oracle Forms-based releases, including INB, on that browser. As long as the browser is supported by Oracle Forms and Reports 11gR2, we will continue to test and support our Banner Oracle Forms-based releases according to the supported configurations as documented by Oracle. All Banner XE applications (9.x versions) and all Banner transformed pages will be supported in current releases of Chrome, Firefox, Safari and MS Edge according to our published browser support policy. We will also continue to support IE 10 and 11 for Banner INB to allow customers to share a common browser across administrative applications. At this time, Banner INB will only be supported on IE 10 and IE 11 for as long as Microsoft continues to support this browser. Please refer to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer FAQ where Microsoft states: Internet Explorer 11 will be supported for the life of Windows 7, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10. Q: Will Ellucian support the Chrome browser for Oracle Forms-based applications? All Banner XE applications (9.x versions) and all Banner transformed pages will be supported in current releases of Chrome, Firefox, Safari and MS Edge according to our published browser support policy. As of Chrome version 45 (September 2015), the Google Chrome browser does not support NPAPI, which impacts plugins of all types, including Java, which is required for Banner INB.
    [Show full text]
  • Migrating from Java Applets to Plugin-Free Java Technologies
    Migrating from Java Applets to plugin-free Java technologies An Oracle White Paper January, 2016 Migrating from Java Applets to plugin-free Java technologies Migrating from Java Applets to plugin-free Java technologies Disclaimer The following is intended to outline our general product direction. It is intended for information purposes only, and may not be incorporated into any contract. It is not a commitment to deliver any material, code, or functionality, and should not be relied upon in making purchasing decisions. The development, release, and timing of any features or functionality described for Oracle’s products remains at the sole discretion of Oracle. Migrating from Java Applets to plugin-free Java technologies Executive Overview ........................................................................... 4 Browser Plugin Perspectives ............................................................. 4 Java Web Start .................................................................................. 5 Alternatives ....................................................................................... 6 Native Windows/OS X/Linux Installers ........................................... 6 Inverted Browser Control ............................................................... 7 Detecting Applets .............................................................................. 7 Migrating from Java Applets to plugin-free Java technologies Executive Overview With modern browser vendors working to restrict or reduce the support of plugins like
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers
    An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers Gaurav Aggarwal Elie Bursztein Collin Jackson Dan Boneh Stanford University CMU Stanford University Abstract Even within a single browser there are inconsistencies. We study the security and privacy of private browsing For example, in Firefox 3.6, cookies set in public mode modes recently added to all major browsers. We first pro- are not available to the web site while the browser is in pose a clean definition of the goals of private browsing private mode. However, passwords and SSL client cer- and survey its implementation in different browsers. We tificates stored in public mode are available while in pri- conduct a measurement study to determine how often it is vate mode. Since web sites can use the password man- used and on what categories of sites. Our results suggest ager as a crude cookie mechanism, the password policy that private browsing is used differently from how it is is inconsistent with the cookie policy. marketed. We then describe an automated technique for Browser plug-ins and extensions add considerable testing the security of private browsing modes and report complexity to private browsing. Even if a browser ad- on a few weaknesses found in the Firefox browser. Fi- equately implements private browsing, an extension can nally, we show that many popular browser extensions and completely undermine its privacy guarantees. In Sec- plugins undermine the security of private browsing. We tion 6.1 we show that many widely used extensions un- propose and experiment with a workable policy that lets dermine the goals of private browsing.
    [Show full text]
  • Lock-In-Pop: Securing Privileged Operating System Kernels By
    Lock-in-Pop: Securing Privileged Operating System Kernels by Keeping on the Beaten Path Yiwen Li, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, Sam Weber, and Justin Cappos, New York University https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc17/technical-sessions/presentation/li-yiwen This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC ’17). July 12–14, 2017 • Santa Clara, CA, USA ISBN 978-1-931971-38-6 Open access to the Proceedings of the 2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference is sponsored by USENIX. Lock-in-Pop: Securing Privileged Operating System Kernels by Keeping on the Beaten Path Yiwen Li Brendan Dolan-Gavitt Sam Weber Justin Cappos New York University Abstract code needed to run such a system increases the odds that Virtual machines (VMs) that try to isolate untrusted flaws will be present, and, in turn, that tens of millions code are widely used in practice. However, it is often of user machines could be at risk [25]. Furthermore, iso- possible to trigger zero-day flaws in the host Operating lation will not work if a malicious program can access System (OS) from inside of such virtualized systems. In even a small portion of the host OS’s kernel that contains this paper, we propose a new security metric showing a zero-day flaw [12]. Both of these drawbacks reveal the strong correlation between “popular paths” and kernel key underlying weakness in designing OSVM systems – vulnerabilities. We verify that the OS kernel paths ac- a lack of information as to which parts of the host kernel cessed by popular applications in everyday use contain can be safely exported to user programs.
    [Show full text]
  • Open Benchmark Alignment
    Benchmark Selection Guide, Vol. 1 Doing it Right Art Morgan Performance Engineer, Intel Corporation Spring 2015 Legal Disclaimers Software and workloads used in performance tests may have been optimized for performance only on Intel microprocessors. Performance tests, such as SYSmark* and MobileMark*, are measured using specific computer systems, components, software, operations and functions. Any change to any of those factors may cause the results to vary. You should consult other information and performance tests to assist you in fully evaluating your contemplated purchases, including the performance of that product when combined with other products. For more information go to http://www.intel.com/performance. Intel is a sponsor and member of the BenchmarkXPRT* Development Community, and was the major developer of the XPRT* family of benchmarks. Principled Technologies* is the publisher of the XPRT family of benchmarks. You should consult other information and performance tests to assist you in fully evaluating your contemplated purchases. © 2015 Intel Corporation. Intel, Intel Inside and other logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Intel Corporation, or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries. * Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others. 2 About this Guide This guide uses benchmark comparison tables to help you select the right set of tools for Windows*, Android* and Chrome* platform evaluations. Benchmarks covered in this guide: . General Guidance on Platform Evaluations 3DMark* 1.2.0 ANDEBench* PRO AnTuTu* v5.6.1 . Benchmark Selection for Windows BaseMark* CL BatteryXPRT* 2014 CompuBench* CL 1.5 for OpenCL* . Benchmark Selection for Android CompuBench* RS 2.0 for RenderScript* CrXPRT* 2015 Geekbench* 3.3.1 .
    [Show full text]