Bank Regulation and the Effectiveness of Open Market Operations
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JOHN H. KAREKEN Universityof Minnesota Bank Regulation and the Effectiveness of Open Market Operations IN THIS PAPER I am occupied with whether recent changes in U.S. bank regulatorypolicy have made the Federal Reserve less effective as a centralbank than it was. In passing, I am also occupied with how U.S. regulatorypolicy may change over the years immediatelyahead and withwhether, depending on how the policy changes,the FederalReserve is going to end up less effective than it is at present. For me, effective has a very narrowmeaning: the FederalReserve is effective to the extent that, by means of (domestic) open market operations, it can in some appropriatesense control the nominalgross nationalproduct of the United States. Insteadof nominalGNP, I might, of course, have chosen realGNP as the FederalReserve's targetvariable or, alternatively,the averageof prices of all goods and services currently produced by resident companies. Most would agree, however, that nominalGNP responds, if perhapswith a lag, even to a fully anticipated change in the Federal Reserve's portfolio of Treasurysecurities or, in other words, to a fully anticipatedofficial open marketoperation. And by choosing nominalGNP, I avoid the questionof how its components, real GNP and the GNP deflator, respond to anticipatedand unantici- patedchanges in the FederalReserve's portfolioof Treasurysecurities. The Federal Reserve is not limited to engaging in open market operations.It can try to influence U.S. nominalGNP by, for example, I am obligedto membersof the BrookingsPanel for helpfulcomments and to so many othercolleagues, near and distant,that I cannotlist all of them. Severalmust, however, be singledout: CarterH. Golembe,Robert Litterman, and Neil Wallace. 405 406 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1984 changing discount rates or the required reserves ratio. We can also imagineit engagingin "open mouth"operations or, as in 1966,attempting by threatto persuade banks to do this or that. It seems to me, though, thatmost FederalReserve officialsand knowledgeableoutsiders believe that nominal GNP should be controlledby official open marketopera- tions. That is why I define effective as I do. Thereis anotherdefinition to be highlighted.In partbecause regulatory policy has been changed, differences in classes of U.S. financialinter- mediariesare not nearly as pronouncedas they were. It is now at best extremely difficult to distinguish between the commercialbanks and savings and loan associations (S&Ls) doing business in the United States, except by appealto niceties of law thatas a practicalmatter mean precious little. I thus think of the U.S. bankingindustry as being made up of all of the federally and state-charteredS&Ls (and for what little they add, the savings banks) in the United States, federally and state- charteredU.S. commercialbanks, and U.S .-based commercialbanking subsidiariesof foreign bankingorganizations. Although on occasion it will be necessary to refer specificallyto commercialbanks or to S&Ls, I mean both when I use the word bankswithout qualification. In the section of the paper that follows immediately, I consider whether government regulationof banks is necessary for an effective centralbank. ThereafterI review relevantrecent changes in U.S. bank regulatory policy and go into whether those changes have made the FederalReserve any less effective than it was. To conclude, I speculate about U.S. regulatorypolicy of the years immediatelyahead and about whetherthe most likely changes in policy will makethe FederalReserve less effective than it is now. In the first section of the paperI arguethat there mustbe government regulationif the centralbank is to be effective, able, that is, by means of open marketoperations to influencenominal GNP, and that the type of government-imposedrestriction required depends on the payments technology being used.' That propositionis to be read as a warning,at 1. As maybe apparent,the phrase"by meansof openmarket operations" is important. Since other ways of influencingnominal GNP may exist, there is no implicationthat government-imposedrestrictions are in general necessary. Indeed, Hall has proposed paying interest on requiredreserves and using the rate paid to influencenominal GNP. See Robert E. Hall, "Optimal Fiduciary Monetary Systems," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 12 (July 1983),pp. 33-50. But it is no partof my purposeto decide how best to controlnominal GNP. John H. Kareken 407 least by those who are ideologicallydisposed toward laissez faire. Under the laissez faire bankingpolicy, nominalGNP is beyond the reach of the centralbank that is limited to engagingin open marketoperations. To put the point anotherway, underthe laissez fairepolicy any officialopen marketoperation is without effect. In the second section I review and appraiserecent relevantchange in U.S. bankregulatory policy. And relevant is to be stressedbecause most of the changes in that policy have no bearingon the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve. Geographicrestrictions come immediatelyto mind. They have been eased somewhat, but even if eliminatedthe Federal Reserve would not now be any more or less effective than it was. I therefore consider only those parts of policy governing bank interest payments to depositors and the activities in which banks (and bank holdingcompanies) may engage. Goingbeyond bank regulatorypolicy, I also appraise the much-publicizedemergence of the nonbankbanks or, to use a phrasethat anyone who still cares aboutour languageshould prefer,the loophole banks. I concludethat despite potentiallysignificant changes in policy and the emergence of loophole banks, the Federal Reserve is in at least one sense not appreciablyless effective thanit was. Thereis the possibility,though, of the FederalReserve being unwilling to control nominal GNP. What if it is confrontedby, for example, an incipient financialcrisis? I am far from sure that the Federal Reserve, althougha lender of last resort with responsibilityfor what happens to nominalGNP, can ever find itself torn. But if it can, then, as I argue in the last section of the paper, easing or eliminatinggovernment-imposed restrictionsmay makeit less effective. In that connection, the important question is what Congress and the regulatoryagencies do in the years aheadand, morespecifically, how they managethe potentialfor riskiness in banking. The Need for Government Regulation In this section I argue that governmentregulation is necessary if a centralbank is to be able to influencenominal GNP by exchangingbonds for currency or currency for bonds. (For now, that is what effective means:being able to influencenominal GNP.) I also arguethat the type of government-imposedrestriction required depends on the payments 408 BrookingsPapers on Economic Activity, 2:1984 technologybeing used. I do not reallyestablish either proposition, since all I do is considera few specificpayments technologies. I am, however, seeking only plausibility.Moreover, the assumedpayments technology of the first subsection would seem a good approximationof that being used currentlyin the United States. Its distinguishingcharacteristic is that, just as in the United States of the present, some purchases are made with currency. THE SUPPLY OF CURRENCY I find it convenient to define intermediationas makingsmall-denom- inationclaims out of large-denominationclaims or as substitutingsmall for large-denominationclaims. To illustrate,a private-sectorcompany buys a ninety-daybearer claim on the government,a claim with face or maturityvalue of $ 10,000,and then sells 10,000ninety-day bearer claims to the large-denominationgovernment claim, each with a face value of $1. Presently it will be necessary to go into what the buying and selling prices are. Here, though, it suffices to note that in doing what it was describedas doingthe private-sectorcompany is not only intermediating but also supplyinga tangiblemeans of paymentor currency,an alterna- tive to the government-issuedor officialcurrency. But if private-sector companies are free to intermediateor supply currency,then nothingof any consequencefollows froman officialopen marketoperation.2 The centralbank is ineffective. The precise meaning offree to intermediatemay be apparent:there is unimpeded(zero-cost) entry into and exit from the private-sectorintermediation industry. For a central bank to be ineffective, it must also be assumed, though, that intermediationis a constant average-cost activity.3 And, further, the government's cost of intermediatingmust be identical to the private sector's cost. But that last assumption seems innocuous; even when thereis greatincentive, keepinga technologysecret is nearto impossible. 2. I borrow from Neil Wallace, "A Legal RestrictionsTheory of the Demand for 'Money' and the Role of MonetaryPolicy," QuarterlyReview of the Federal Reserve Bankof Minneapolis,vol. 7 (Winter1983), pp. 1-7. 3. If x > y, then issuingx small-denominationclaims, each with face value z/x, where z is the face value of the large-denominationclaim, must cost more than issuingy small- denominationclaims, each with face value z/y. The constantaverage cost is, however,for the issue of a given numberof small-denominationclaims, say n. So the assumptionis that if issuingn claimsagainst a large-denominationclaim costs c dollars,then issuing 2n claims againsttwo large-denominationclaims costs 2c dollars. John H. Kareken 409 We can suppose that any private-sectorcompany engaged in inter- mediationsells its small-denominationclaims, those with face value