To What Extent Can British Newsreel Coverage of the Korean War Be Considered Propagandist in Nature?

CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by University of Birmingham Research Archive, E-theses Repository TO WHAT EXTENT CAN BRITISH NEWSREEL COVERAGE OF THE KOREAN WAR BE CONSIDERED PROPAGANDIST IN NATURE? By PETER WILLIAM COOK A Thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham For the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History School of History and Cultures University of Birmingham March 2012 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT Throughout history ‘myth’ has developed from events on the battlefield, often, the creation and circulation of ‘propagandist interpretations’ has been deliberately pursued by belligerents. Nonetheless, definitive clarifications of how and why mythologies develop remain difficult to establish. Theorists have however provided a theoretical model facilitating examination of the ideologies encoded within texts. This thesis suggests social communication remains ‘self-gratifying’ to the encoder and decoder and will explore how and why ideological interpretations of events, forwarded by those who circulate information, may be considered propagandist in nature within the historical context of the Korean War. Significant quantities of audio-visual material provided a valuable sample of media coverage which constructed the ‘reality’ of events for the cinema industry’s target audience of predominantly working class patrons. This reality defined the United Nations only military clash with aggressive communism, during a period of significant international tension. This study will focus upon diplomatic activity, the military situation and British aspects of the conflict between mid-1950 and late January 1951; illustrating how audio-visual material sought to insulate a section of British society against the ideologies of Soviet sponsored communism. Thus the Cold War was fought on the cinema screen in addition to the battlefield. DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to Professor J.A.S. Grenville ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The assistance of the following is gratefully acknowledged: special thanks to Dr Gavin Schaffer, Senior Lecturer in British History at the University of Birmingham for his direct supervision, patience, support and encouragement throughout, particularly concerning the expansion of my academic horizons. Thank you must also go to the staff of the University of Birmingham’s Post Graduate Department, Learning Support Service, Library and relevant university and external archives for their friendly, supportive and efficient service. Finally, thanks to my family and friends who have endured my repeated absence over the duration of this study. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE - Introduction - page 1 CHAPTER TWO - The Theoretical Approach to Media Analysis - page 31 CHAPTER THREE - Coverage of Diplomatic Activity at the United Nations June to July 1950 - page 44 CHAPTER FOUR - The Military Situation July to October 1950 – page 62 CHAPTER FIVE - Interlude: Events of Early October 1950 and the State-Military-Media Relationship - page 103 CHAPTER SIX - Crisis: Late October1950 to the end of January1951 - page 123 CHAPTER SEVEN - The Depiction of Britain and the Commonwealth at War in Korea - page 153 CHAPTER EIGHT - Conclusion – page 162 ABBREVIATIONS BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation IRD - Information Research Department MAD - Mutually Assured Distribution MOI - Ministry Of Information NKPA - North Korean People’s Republic POW - Prisoner Of War ROK - Republic of Korea (often used to describe the armed forces) UN - United Nations UNC - United Nations Command US/USA - United States of America 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION During the twentieth century nations and individuals alike faced no greater challenge than the experience of warfare. Given the frequency, geographic diversity and increasingly industrial nature of those experiences, perhaps the greatest challenge to face mankind during this period was how, in future, to avert the outbreak of all-consuming warfare. The rise of polarised political ideologies, following the traumatic experiences of the First World War, served to increase the probability of conflict. For the progressive Western liberal democracies, neither ideological absolute maintained particular appeal while both often provoked revulsion amongst Western leaders. Nazi Germany, although conservative and anti- communist, was militaristic and expansive in temperament. The Soviet Union was viewed with similar suspicion due to its revolutionary doctrines, despite being a necessary ally in the fight against Fascism from 1941 to 1945. Thus, with the final defeat of National Socialism in 1945, the likelihood of a clash between the liberal democracies and the world’s surviving totalitarian power bloc became increasingly likely. Indeed, significant political personalities in the West began warning of such tensions prior to the fall of the Third Reich and were aware of the increased dangers following the advent of nuclear weapons. Thus mankind had reached the apex of total war, as by 1949 the world’s leading and competing superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, possessed the power to effectively end civilisation. The ideological alliance system which emerged from 1945 saw the competing political entities experience friction in two main geographic regions: Central 2 Europe and the Far East.1 The Berlin air lift became one of the best known examples of increased tensions in the immediate post war era, as did the establishment of communism on mainland China by 1949.2 The advent of atomic weapons changed the nature of warfare as total victory or irrecoverable defeat were no longer viable conclusions to pursue, particularly as a nuclear power, or one supporting an ideological satellite on the verge of defeat, may unleash its atomic arsenal to stave off capitulation. Thus the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ [MAD], entered the political vocabulary of the Cold War era.3 This nihilistic concept can trace its origins to the doctrine of limited war, one that had been thrashed out on the hills of the Korean Peninsula between 1950 and 1953 in the world’s first major post-war conflict. Initially the communist North had pursued a swift conclusion to the fighting through a mechanised drive into South Korea. Total victory was later courted by American military and political leaders, culminating in MacArthur’s drive to the Yaul River in late 1950. However, both sides eventually learnt that pursuit of total war aims may draw in larger powers and increase the risk of escalating toward nuclear confrontation in the event of general war between the USA and the Soviet Union. Despite a great deal of sabre rattling by the United States, regarding the deployment of atomic weapons on the battlefield and against mainland China, it is testament to American reserve that ‘the bomb’ was never deployed, during the 1 Although Africa and the oil rich Middle East can also be considered significant zones of ideological competition. 2 For a reliable exploration of the events of the immediate post Second World War period see, J.L. Gaddis, The Cold War (London, 2005), pp. 1-68. 3 See P.M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day (Manchester, 2003), p. 251. 3 most dire periods of fighting, where the military situation was bleak and American casualties significant. However, this reserve may have been rooted in the desire to avoid antagonising the UN assembly, or domestic and international public opinion; particularly as the opinion of America’s allies was entirely opposed to an escalation of hostilities.4 Thus the ‘total war’ taking place inside Korea developed, through strategic necessity, into the new concept of ‘limited war’. The moderate aims of this untried concept were effectively pursued by General Ridgway approximately seven months into the conflict. The transition to a limited war was a difficult one for all parties. America was riding high on victory in the Second World War, anti-communist hysteria at home and a desire to repel aggression in Korea, whilst Asiatic communism had become merged with triumphant nationalism. These factors encouraged both sides to initially flirt with total war objectives. As the war stagnated upon static lines, the threat of escalation receded gradually and the status- quo of pre 1950 began to return around the 38th parallel, the concept of limited war became entrenched in the world’s military-political psyche. However, this transition presented Western authorities with significant difficulties beyond the military and international political spheres. The nature of authoritarian communist regimes allowed central control of media output by the authorities. The majority of press activity was directed by the party, thus the media behaved as a mouth piece of state. Ideological divergence would bring severe punishment, thus ensuring the media did not 4 The sentiment which existed amongst America’s allies was well known at the time and discussed

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