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Evolutionary Psychology's Saga Continues

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Evolutionary Psychology's Saga Continues COMMENTARY Steps toward convergence: Evolutionary psychology’s saga continues Jerome H. Barkow1 Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada B3H4P9 et us not ask whether the brain dict that those who are formidable or Cosmides’ theory of the use of anger in is ‘‘really’’ a biological computer. attractive should have a ‘‘greater sense social interaction. It turns out that other The more productive question is of entitlement,’’ be more prone to an- approaches are more complementary whether it is useful to think of ger, and be more likely to see conflicts than competitive. For example, Fessler Lthe brain as a computer, one designed resolved in their favor than the less for- (9) argues that ‘‘the male flash of anger by evolution to solve problems of adap- midable or attractive. Once a favorable is ‘designed’ to diminish transgressions tation via specialized ‘‘circuits’’ and ‘‘ar- settlement has been reached, anger in the service of acquiring and maintain- chitecture.’’ Does this biocomputational should wane. Their data are largely con- ing control over a variety of economic approach, pioneered by Leda Cosmides sistent with these expectations. Attrac- and social resources.’’ Rather than theo- and John Tooby (1) and then developed tive women and strong men are more rizing about the brain, however, Fessler and expanded by them and others [such likely than others to use anger to focuses on explaining cultural variation as David Buss (2, 3), Geoffrey Miller increase WTRs. in the use of anger. He predicts that the (4, 5), and Steven Pinker (6)] lead to importance of male anger will be high theory and research that further our Does Hypothesis Intuitiveness Matter? in societies in which ‘‘valuable resources understanding of human behavior? Crit- Here is a small point: Some reviewers can be [more easily] appropriated,’’ ics notwithstanding (e.g., ref. 7), the evi- privilege the counterintuitive hypothesis, ‘‘overarching social institutions’’ offer dence of the article in this issue of dismissing the intuitive with ‘‘trivial, we less rather than more protection, and PNAS (8), indeed, of the myriad books the preservation of social relationships and research papers produced by the is relatively unimportant because indi- Cosmides–Tooby school of thought, is Traits that we may find viduals do not depend heavily on those ‘‘yes.’’ But, of course, there are caveats. relationships. He finds strong support Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides (8) posit unsavory are for this thesis in his analysis of Nisbett the existence of welfare tradeoff ratios and Cohen’s (10) important work on (WTRs), the ratio between the welfare nevertheless also honor cultures in the American South of another and that of the actor. These and Southwest. Fessler’s approach is WTRs are presented as ‘‘not just post products of our particularly useful for social scientists hoc theoretical constructs but...real working in naturalistic settings, where neurocognitive elements within the evolutionary history. people have established social relation- human motivational architecture.’’ If ships and are mindful of how their Sally’s WTR ‘‘circuitry’’ is giving a rela- current behavior may affect their repu- tively high weight to Jane’s interests already knew that.’’ Are Sell, Tooby, tations. In such settings, even a biocom- rather than her own, the ratio will be in and Cosmides (8) simply using complex putational approach would require a Jane’s favor and she will do well in her language to make commonsense predic- much broader range of inputs and calcu- negotiations with Sally over resources. tions? They would argue, to the con- lations than anger and attractiveness. We humans have therefore been se- trary, that frequent anger is often la- Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides, who are fully lected to seek to increase the WTR oth- beled a sign of weakness or even of aware that they have tested ‘‘just two ers are according us, and we can do this pathology rather than an attribute of the out of a larger potential set of negotia- because the WTR not only ‘‘integrates’’ already advantaged. In fact, however, tive factors,’’ would likely agree. There relatively fixed factors such as kinship, folk wisdom tends to take the contrary is no logical contradiction between reciprocation, and aggression, but also view, seeing the strong and attractive as Fessler on the one hand and Sell, takes many other factors into account, often self-centered and selfish. This folk Tooby, and Cosmides on the other, and including our readiness to get angry. In observation, if accurate, would be con- there is no apparent impediment to the effect, we may unconsciously use anger sonant with the theory and findings development of a broad theory of anger to bully another into recalculating a summarized in the previous paragraph. that integrates the two sets of ideas. WTR in our favor, causing that person Let us ignore that possible fact. The de- to give more weight to our interests gree to which a hypothesis is or is not Putting Ontological Status Aside than they otherwise would. But who consistent with folk wisdom or intuition Have Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides (8) uses anger in this tactical way? ‘‘Anger is not ordinarily relevant to a scientific conclusively established that as we inter- is more likely to be triggered when an evolutionary psychology: if we accept act with others our neurological systems actor is positioned to make the price of that human intelligence is largely a so- are automatically calculating WTRs? resisting recalibration high’’ (8). People cial intelligence and a product of social No, not unless one has a great deal of who are more ‘‘formidable’’ (physically competition then it would be surprising faith in construct validity: accurate pre- stronger) than others (generally males) indeed if folk wisdom was not some- diction can make a construct useful but are more able to ‘‘inflict costs on the times accurate. target’’ and are therefore more likely to use anger. So are those who are more Anger and Culture Author contributions: J.H.B. wrote the paper. able to confer benefits on others, e.g., A more substantial issue is whether The author declares no conflict of interest. the attractive, especially attractive there are alternative evolutionary treat- See companion article on page 15073. women. Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides pre- ments competing with Sell, Tooby, and 1E-mail: [email protected]. www.pnas.org͞cgi͞doi͞10.1073͞pnas.0907723106 PNAS ͉ September 1, 2009 ͉ vol. 106 ͉ no. 35 ͉ 14743–14744 Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 is not, in my opinion, sufficient for one women), sibling rivalry, preoccupation ticular approach represented by Sell, to be as certain of its ontological status with one’s relative standing, nepotism, Tooby, and Cosmides (8), however, con- as are Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides. What and individual and collective aggression tinues to draw fire, perhaps because has been demonstrated is that the WTR are not pathologies or even errors to be their biocomputationalism unabashedly construct, like the biocomputation per- corrected once and for all by morality locates our ‘‘failings’’ in the architecture spective in which it is situated, is at this and religion or at least proper child so- of the human brain. point in history a productive way in cialization, they are strategies that have This is not to say that criticisms of which to apply the evolutionary perspec- often, at least in the past, been biologi- this field are always entirely empty. For tive to human behavior. It is leading to cally adaptive. Like socially valued traits example, the plasticity of the developing theory, hypotheses, and data that are such as love, loyalty, cooperativeness, human brain pointed out by Buller (7) broadly compatible with other evolu- and forgiveness, traits that we may find and Gibson (14) suggest that biocompu- tionary perspectives rather than devel- unsavory are nevertheless also products tational modules are likely to be vari- oping into an encapsulated and self- of our evolutionary history. Evolution- able and contingent, but it is difficult to perpetuating citation circle. Eventually ary psychology is the enemy of those see this as a fatal conceptual weakness the Cosmides and Tooby biocomputa- who, like some Marxists, espouse the because the framework easily encom- tional approach may be replaced by perfectibility of our species and there- passes such variability. Even if the Cos- more complex theoretical formulations, fore reject a field that asserts that the mides and Tooby school of thought is but in the meantime, as the Bohr model less attractive elements of our evolved indeed guilty, at times, of simplification, of the hydrogen atom did in its day for human nature are not errors to be elimi- that is only to be expected: theoretical particle physics, that approach is moving nated on our way to perfection but bat- models necessarily simplify, and when us forward and does not appear to have tles each generation must fight anew. predictions nevertheless receive empiri- any demonstrably superior competition. Perhaps there are ways in which the cal support it is difficult to argue that a Why, then, has there been so much op- tendency to use anger as a negotiating simplification is excessive. position to the approach, some of it tactic may be mitigated, just as good It would be interesting to see Sell, rather emotional? The answer may have parenting can mitigate sibling rivalry. Tooby, and Cosmides (8) move on to to do with the unromantic portrait of From the perspective of Sell, Tooby, link their work to the construct of self- human psychology it is painting. and Cosmides (8), however, tactical an- esteem, an idea that received rather ger is part of our biology and cannot be early evolutionary attention (15–17). In Perfectibilite´ Perdue definitively eliminated by, say, a change this view, self-esteem is an internal indi- The most notable finding of the article in the distribution of wealth.
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