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Home , Carrie Lam, Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong independence, Luke de Pulford

REPORT 12.18.19 The New Battleground for Kong’s Political Independence: ’s Response to the Mask Ban

Jackson Neagli, LL.M. Candidate, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

The past nine months of protests in appearing to warn against party-state have elicited no shortage of retaliation.6 After violent protests on the condemnatory remarks from mainland 70th anniversary of CCP rule, Secretary ’s media outlets. Official responses to General remarked that “Anyone the protests have tended to rely on tropes, who attempts to split any region from such as American “black hands”1 fostering China will perish, with their bodies smashed “color revolutions”2 in a bid to “challenge and bones ground to powder.”7 Despite Xi’s China’s sovereignty”3 or even “hurt the colorful remarks, however, Euro-American feelings of the Chinese people.”4 media coverage of Beijing’s response to the Much of this party media rhetoric has protests remained fleeting at best. been ignored by Euro-America media outlets It is notable, then, that a brief, and China watchers. This is understandable. Chinese-only statement on the protests Beijing seems to bring out the same from Zhang Tiewei, spokesperson of the jingoistic propaganda lines whenever Legislative Affairs Committee of the Standing the (CCP) feels Committee of the National People’s Congress threatened, and given the current trade (NPCSC), elicited a strong and sustained war, the United States is an obvious target response from Euro-American China The NPCSC statement for party-state ire. The same rhetoric of watchers and reporters.8 The statement, constitutes Beijing’s “black hands” and “color revolutions” published on November 19 by Xinhua, most dramatic was deployed by the CCP propaganda China’s official state-run press agency, affirmative measure apparatus during the last round of pro- warned that a ruling by the Hong Kong High regarding the Hong democracy protests in 2014.5 By framing Court9 (CFI) overturning the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests as lawless riots government's ban on face masks at public Kong protests to date. fomented by evil foreign forces, the party- gatherings had “severely weakened” the state attempts to simultaneously discredit special administrative region’s capability to the protesters and their cause. This is part of govern, and asserted that only the central a broader strategy to mobilize public opinion people’s government is entitled to interpret along “us versus them” lines, which in turn Hong Kong’s constitution. aims to bolster CCP legitimacy through the The NPCSC statement constitutes “rally ‘round the flag” effect. Beijing’s most dramatic affirmative measure On occasion, Beijing’s propaganda regarding the Hong Kong protests to date. regarding the Hong Kong protests has This point has been widely acknowledged been shrill enough to attract Euro- by Western media, and merits sustained American media coverage. In early attention from Euro-American analysts. August, Beijing warned protesters not to This brief outlines the context, meaning, and “underestimate the firm resolve [of] the potential effects of the NPCSC’s November central government,” a cryptic message 19 statement. If enforced, the NPCSC’s BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT // 12.18.19

statement may signal the extension of legislature and July 16 march featuring unchecked central dictatorship over Hong nearly two million Hong Kongers, protesters Kong’s political apparatus. This drastic frequently wore masks to maintain their response to the CFI’s mask ban ruling—an anonymity and defend themselves from appealable decision regarding an ineffectual tear gas.13 After massive protests marred policy measure – demonstrates Beijing’s the 70th anniversary of CCP rule on October resolute determination to crush the Hong 4, during which the Kong protests, and indicates that the (HKPF) used over 1,400 canisters of tear gas stakes may be even higher than protesters in a single day and shot a student protester, previously thought. Lam promulgated the mask ban.14 When the mask ban went into effect on October 5, 24 members of Hong Kong’s BACKGROUND: THE PROTESTS legislative council applied to the CFI for of the executive ordinance. The statement in question was delivered The legislators’ petition, which was by the NPCSC in response to a judgment subsequently joined with another petition delivered the previous day by the CFI, in from a veteran activist, challenged the which two judges struck down an executive mask ban on six discrete legal grounds. ordinance issued by Hong Kong’s chief On November 18, Judges Godfrey Lam and executive, , under the 1922 Anderson Chow published the CFI’s opinion, “Emergency Regulations Ordinance” upholding three of the six grounds raised by 10 (ERO). The effect of the ordinance, known the petitioners. It was this opinion to which formally as the “Prohibition on Face Covering the NPCSC responded the next day. Regulation” (PFCR) and colloquially as the Between the filing of the petition and “mask ban,” was to prevent individuals from the CFI’s decision, the mask ban was widely wearing face coverings to public meetings, ignored. The recent sieges of the Chinese and requiring that individuals wearing masks and Hong Kong remove them if a police officer so demanded. Polytechnic University15 make it clear that Lam had implemented the mask ban the mask ban did little to disincentivize following several months of unrest related protesters in general, and nothing to prevent to the HK government’s attempt to pass them from wearing masks in particular. sweeping legislation earlier this year. In February 2019, Hong Kong’s government announced its intention to LEGAL HISTORY amend Hong Kong’s extradition law in a way that would allow for case-by-case To fully grasp the implications of the CFI’s to . Fearing ruling, and the potential ramifications of the exposure to a legal system where conviction NPCSC’s subsequent statement, a quick legal rates are upwards of 99%, and Stalin-esque history lesson is in order. forced confessions remain commonplace, Hong Kong was a British colony until thousands filled the streets of Hong Kong in 1997. In 1984, the British and Chinese late March to protest against the proposed governments agreed to the Sino-British bill.11 The protests rapidly escalated as Lam’s Joint Declaration, which stipulated that government refused to back down from its Hong Kong would be restored to Chinese pro-extradition position, and Lam withdrew sovereignty on July 1, 1997, with several the bill in early September.12 important conditions. Section 3(3) of the joint declaration guaranteed Hong Kong’s right to maintain an independent judiciary, THE MASK BAN and stipulated that “laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically Throughout the protests that led to the unchanged.” Section 3(1), however, required withdrawal of the extradition bill, including that Hong Kong’s territorial status as a the July 1 storming of Hong Kong’s “special administrative region” (HKSAR) of 2 THE NEW BATTLEGROUND FOR HONG KONG’S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: BEIJING’S RESPONSE TO THE MASK BAN

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was Kong judiciary, and enshrines the Hong subject to Article 31 of China’s constitution, Kong courts’ ability to interpret their own which in turn states that “The systems constitution. Article 160 allows the NPCSC to be instituted in special administrative to determine whether or not pre-existing regions shall be prescribed by law enacted laws contradict the Basic Law. by the National People's Congress (NPC) in The NPCSC has utilized its powers the light of the specific conditions.” The under Articles 158 and 160 of the Basic broad language of Article 31 is characteristic Law, and more broadly Article 31 of China’s of Chinese legislation, and appears to be constitution, to influence Hong Kong’s designed to afford the NPC, China’s party- judiciary on several occasions since 1997.16 dominated rubber-stamp legislature, the In 1999, the NPCSC effectively overruled a widest possible latitude to control its special Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal decision administrative regions. regarding the right of abode for children When sovereignty over Hong Kong of permanent residents, siding with the was formally transferred from the United CCP’s handpicked chief executive over the Kingdom to the PRC in 1997, the “Basic Law” “independent” judiciary.17 In 2004, the replaced the colonial Letters Patent and NPCSC issued an unprompted interpretation Royal Instructions as Hong Kong’s effective of two annexes to Article 45 of the Basic constitution. The Basic Law continues to Law, governing electoral reforms that would serve as the touchstone of Hong Kong’s ensure in the election effective legal system. It confirms that Hong of the SAR’s chief executive.18 Despite Kong will continue to have an independent the absence of a request for guidance (as The NPCSC has utilized judiciary (Article 2), and that laws previously required by Art. 158 Basic Law), the NPCSC its powers under in force in Hong Kong remain in force to interpreted the annexes so as to snuff the Articles 158 and 160 the extent that they do not contravene Basic Law’s guarantee of universal suffrage. of the Basic Law, and the rest of the Basic Law (Article 8). Article In the 2011 Hemispheres case, a Hong Kong more broadly Article 31 19 complements Article 2, stipulating that Court of Appeal decision was overturned HKSAR will be vested with independent by the Court of Final Appeal after the CFA of China’s constitution, judicial power. Article 85 expressly indicates requested an interpretation from Beijing to influence Hong that Hong Kong’s courts should operate free regarding Hong Kong’s sovereign immunity Kong’s judiciary on 19 from interference, a narrower application of standard. Prior to the 2011 case, Hong several occasions the broad principle established in Article 22, Kong adhered to a “restrictive” theory of which stipulates that the Chinese government immunity according to the UK’s 1978 State since 1997. shall not interfere in Hong Kong’s affairs. Immunity Act. The NPCSC does not appear The Basic Law also furnishes certain to have identified the act as “incompatible” “inviolable” rights and protections with the Basic Law in 1997, but this did for Hong Kong citizens (Article 28), not stop the organ from invalidating the complemented by Hong Kong’s effective legislation 14 years later. adoption of the International Covenant on In 2016, the NPCSC issued another Civil and Political Rights in the 1991 Hong unprompted interpretation regarding the Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. Hong Kong ’s pending decision Certain sections of the Basic Law, on the status of two legislators-elect to however, clearly allow the CCP to influence Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.20 The Hong Kong’s political process, as well two lawmakers had been disqualified as its judiciary. Article 11 refers to the from office for advocating Hong Kong aforementioned Article 31 of the Chinese independence during their swearing-in, constitution, and Article 158 explicitly and the Hong Kong government sought vests the National People's Congress a judicial review application to prevent Standing Committee (NPCSC) with the the lawmakers from retaking their oaths. power to interpret the Basic Law. Article Before the high court could rule, the 158, however, only explicitly allows the NPCSC issued an interpretation banning NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law when the legislators-elect from assuming office, such guidance is requested by the Hong sparking widespread protests. 3 BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT // 12.18.19

The NPCSC’s recent mask ban the Basic Law endowed the NPCSC with the interpretation is not the first time that the exclusive right to find laws incompatible CCP has relied on an extraordinarily broad with the Basic Law, holding that the construction of its powers under the Basic NPCSC’s decision not to declare the ERO Law to intervene in Hong Kong’s judiciary. unconstitutional in 1997 did not preclude The November 19 interpretation, however, the CFI’s ability to subsequently find the may very well be the party’s most brazen, legislation incompatible with the Basic Law. and most consequential, intervention to Second, the court held that sections date. For an indication of why this might be 3(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the mask ban the case, we turn to the CFI’s judgment. were unenforceable as a matter of legal principle. These sections prohibited citizens from wearing face coverings to THE JUDGMENT authorized, peaceful demonstrations. Lam and Chow held that the mask ban’s The CFI heard six arguments from 25 abrogation of the rights to privacy, freedom petitioners. Three of the arguments asserted of expression, and peaceful assembly was that the mask ban was unconstitutional not proportional to the “legitimate aims” because of the procedure used to sought by the ordinance, especially in promulgate it, and another three argued Of the CFI’s three light of the lack of evidence regarding the that the ban was invalid as a matter of legal measure’s effectiveness. holdings in favor of principle. The judges, after considering all six The court applied a similar line of the petitioners, the arguments, ruled in favor of the petitioners reasoning to Section 5 of the mask ban, NPCSC’s November on three of them. which required citizens wearing masks First, the court held that the Emergency to uncover their faces at the request of 19 response appears Regulations Ordinance (ERO), which Lam to be aimed at one in police officers. Lam and Chow held that, had used to promulgate and enforce the especially given the lack of limitations on particular: the ruling mask ban, was incompatible with Hong this exercise of police power (in the UK, that “The ERO, insofar Kong’s Basic Law. The ERO empowers Hong for instance, a police officer must be of a Kong’s chief executive to make and enforce certain rank to demand that citizens remove as it empowers the CEIC regulations that circumscribe basic rights to make regulations on face coverings), Section 5 of the mask so long as the executive “considers” an ban exceeded the scope of “reasonable” any occasion of public “occasion of emergency or public danger” means to achieve its legitimate aim of danger, is incompatible to exist. Judges Lam and Chow held that law enforcement. Put more simply, the with the Basic Law.” the ERO, where enforced on the subjective court held that the mask ban failed to “public danger” criterion, created an appropriately balance the abrogation of unconstitutional delegation of legislative individual rights of privacy, freedom of power to the executive branch. Given the expression, and , breadth of the ERO—“public danger” is not with the dubious societal benefit of fewer defined anywhere in the applicable statutory anonymous protesters. law, and “consider” is an extremely flexible term—the court found that the ERO, when exercised on the grounds of “public danger,” THE CCP’S RESPONSE effectively created “a separate source of laws that are primary legislation in all but name.” Of the CFI’s three holdings in favor of the While case law from the colonial era had petitioners, the NPCSC’s November 19 upheld the ERO on multiple occasions, the response appears to be aimed at one in CFI found that Hong Kong’s constitutional particular: the ruling that “The ERO, insofar order under the Basic Law was substantially as it empowers the CEIC to make regulations different from that under the colonial Letters on any occasion of public danger, is Patent and Royal Instructions, such that incompatible with the Basic Law.” the ERO was incompatible with the Basic The NPCSC statement—the meaning of Law. The court rejected the (Hong Kong) which is ambiguous, and which may not government’s assertion that Article 160 of constitute a formal “interpretation” per 4 THE NEW BATTLEGROUND FOR HONG KONG’S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: BEIJING’S RESPONSE TO THE MASK BAN

Article 158 of the Basic Law—takes aim not legislature and executive branches. This is at the CFI’s particular interpretation of the only possible where courts have authority Basic Law, but rather the HK judiciary’s to interpret all laws promulgated by the authority to interpret the Basic Law more other branches. Beijing is claiming that, in a broadly. In a single extraordinarily brazen system where it controls the appointment stroke, the NPCSC appears to assert that of the executive (due in no small part to the Hong Kong judiciary no longer has the its 2004 interpretation of the Basic Law), authority to interpret its own constitution: and that executive has power to rule by “香港特别行政区法律是否符合香港基本 fiat under the ERO, Hong Kong’s courts 法，只能由全国人大常委会作出判断和 have no authority to use the Basic Law to 决定，任何其他机关都无权作出判断和决 balance executive power. The NPCSC’s line 定”。 of reasoning has the potential to expand Beijing’s influence over Hong Kong to the Or in English: “Whether the laws of the point of unchecked dictatorship. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are compatible with the Basic Law can only be determined and decided by the IMPLICATIONS Standing Committee of the National People's Congress: All other organs have no right to Protestors initially demonstrated against make such judgments and decisions.” the extradition law because they saw it as a further infringement upon the rapidly eroding This is the crux of the NPCSC’s liberties guaranteed by the Sino-British Joint “interpretation.” The CCP does not take Declaration and Basic Law. Hong Kongers’ issue with the CFI’s application of the fears with respect to extradition were proportionality test to the mask ban, recently validated by the CCP’s detention or even its eventual finding that the and torture of a Hong Kong national and mask ban should be voided. Instead, the British consular official, Simon Cheung, after commanding heights of the Chinese party- he observed anti-extradition protests at the state are sending a message that only the request of the British consulate.21 NPCSC has the authority to determine the The NPCSC’s November 19 statement, constitutionality of Hong Kong’s laws. whether authoritative “interpretation” or The NPCSC applies its reasoning to the not, indicates that the stakes are far higher ERO in particular, claiming (as Hong Kong’s than the protestors may have imagined. government did before the CFI) that because Instead of the occasional kidnappings and the NPCSC did not explicitly find the ERO to torture of Hong Kong citizens (no prize in be incompatible with the Basic Law in 1997, and of itself), the protesters are now fighting Articles 8 and 160 of the Basic Law together against the imposition of China’s uniquely suggest that the ERO cannot subsequently cruel brand of justice on their own territory. be held unconstitutional. This line of While Euro-American analysts are reasoning appears to rely on the principle finally starting to give Hong Kong protesters that all laws that precede the Basic Law, and the attention they are due, protestors that have not been found unconstitutional have long suspected that they are fighting by the NPCSC itself, remain on the books not against a single extradition law or unless Beijing says so. The NPCSC’s position chief executive, but for universal suffrage appears to be one of political convenience, and freedom from CCP domination more rather than legal principle, since it seems broadly. This conviction was reflected in the to directly contravene the committee’s tidal wave of support for pro-democracy interpretation in the 2011 Hemispheres case. lawmakers in Hong Kong’s late-November The potential political implications of the district council elections.22 NPCSC’s declaration cannot be understated. Pro-democracy activists, however, Democratic systems with a separation of face an uphill battle. The , powers rely on an independent judiciary to instead of pressuring China to honor the check the lawmaking authority of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, has busied 5 BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT // 12.18.19

itself advertising for Huawei,23 and trying The last time the CCP exhibited a similar to keep political tensions from torpedoing degree of paranoia was in 1989. As is well the deal to sell British Steel to a Chinese known everywhere but the very country competitor.24 Cambridge’s Wolfson College where it occurred, the CCP resolved student has publicly refused to revoke Lam’s protests in spring and summer of that year honorary doctorate.25 After he was tortured by ordering the People’s Liberation Army while in China on embassy business, Simon (PLA) to massacre hundreds or thousands of Cheung was dismissed by the Foreign & peaceful protesters in central Beijing.31 But Commonwealth Office for his trouble.26 even the 1989 travesty does not do justice The United States, for its part, recently to the CCP’s present level of paranoia. Back passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and in 1989, Democracy Act (HKHRD),27 and several was surrounded by handpicked “yes-men” lawmakers (most notably in the PLA, but also had to contend with and Ted Cruz) have been ardent in their senior party leaders like Zhao Ziyang, who support of pro-democracy protestors, but opposed the regime’s decision to murder meaningful international support for the student demonstrators.32 The contemporary movement has been minimal thus far. consolidation of power under “People’s As the protests have escalated over the Leader” (人民领袖) Xi Jinping has already course of the summer and into autumn, it far eclipsed that of Deng.33 Despite his “red The NPCSC’s November has become increasingly clear that pro- first generation” credentials and uniquely 19 ruling is the clearest democracy activists have sought to apply powerful “commissar” status, even Deng was pressure to Beijing directly, in addition to the unable to engineer the detention of millions indication yet that less-than-representative government of the of Chinese citizens in domestic concentration the protesters have SAR itself. Petitioning for Lam’s resignation, camps,34 or discipline over a million party succeeded in drawing defacing PRC symbols at the Legislative cadres (many of them political rivals) in a the party-state’s Council and Liaison Office,28 toting American sweeping “anti-corruption” campaign.35 flags to protests,29 drawing explicit What we are witnessing in Hong Kong political attention, allusions to the taboo Tiananmen massacre could very well be every China watcher’s in addition to its of 1989,30 and putting direct pressure on worst nightmare with respect to the past propaganda aspersions. U.S. lawmakers to pass the HKHRD are all half-decade of power consolidation under evidence of democracy activists’ full-court Xi Jinping. If Xi wakes up one morning and press against Beijing. The NPCSC’s November decides to send the PLA down from the 19 ruling is the clearest indication yet that mainland to liquidate the Hong Kong protests, the protesters have succeeded in drawing there is every indication that such an order the party-state’s political attention, in would be unflinchingly obeyed. Hong Kongers addition to its propaganda aspersions. wanted Beijing’s attention, and now they The November 19 statement also have it. The stakes have never been higher. demonstrates the immense paranoia that will likely characterize the CCP’s response to future protests in Hong Kong. The NPCSC responded to a ruling upholding an ineffective mask ban by drastically reasserting Beijing’s authority over Hong Kong’s judiciary. In response to a temporary setback in the enforcement of a feckless policy measure (the Hong Kong government will almost certainly appeal), the Zhongnanhai felt compelled to strip Hong Kong courts of the ability to interpret their own constitution, and empower their puppet leader to rule by executive fiat.

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7. AFP, “Efforts to Split China Will End ENDNOTES in ‘bodies Smashed and Bones Ground to 1. Frank Ching, “Opinion: China Powder’ Says Chinese President Xi Jinping,” Names Its Bogeyman in Hong Kong: Black , October 14, 2019, Hands and Foreign Forces,” The Globe https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/10/14/ and Mail, August 13, 2019, https://www. efforts-split-china-will-end-bodies- theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article- smashed-bones-ground-powder-says- chinas-bogeyman-black-hands-and- chinese-president-xi-jinping/. foreign-forces/. 8. Donald Clarke, “Hong Kong High Court 2. “Color revolutions” are instances Decision Invalidating Mask Ban,” The China of popular unrest that have sporadically Collection (blog), November 19, 2019, threatened autocratic governments over https://thechinacollection.org/hong-kong- the past 30 years, from the Czech “Velvet high-court-decision-invalidating-mask- Revolution” of 1989, to the Arab Spring ban/.新华网,“全国人大常委会法工委发 protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and 言人就香港法院有关司法复核案判决发表 Yemen in 2010-2011. Chinese state media 谈话-新华网,”新华网, November 19, 2019, frequently claims that such “revolutions” http://www.xinhuanet.com/gangao/2019- are supported by operatives from American 11/19/c_1125246732.htm. intelligence agencies, or “black hands.” 9. Also known as the “Court of First See Kris Cheng, “Beijing Deems Hong Kong Instance,” or CFI. Protests ‘colour Revolution,’ Will Not Rule 10. Godfrey Lam and Anderson Chow, IN out Intervention,” Hong Kong Free Press, THE MATTER of the Emergency Regulations August 8, 2019, https://www.hongkongfp. Ordinance, Cap 241 and IN THE MATTER of the com/2019/08/08/beijing-deems-hong- Prohibition on Face Covering Regulation, Cap kong-protests-colour-revolution-will-not- 241K, No. HCAL 2949/2019 (High Court of rule-intervention/. the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 3. Stuart Lau and Jeffie Lam, Court of First Instance November 18, 2019). “‘Challenging Chinese Sovereignty Crosses 11. Guardian staff, “‘My Hair Turned a Red Line’: Xi,” , White’: Report Lifts Lid on China’s Forced July 1, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/ Confessions,” , April 12, 2018, news/hong-kong/politics/article/2100843/ sec. World news, https://www.theguardian. xi-jinping-challenging-chinese- com/world/2018/apr/12/china-forced- sovereignty-hong-kong-crosses. confessions-report. 4. Arjun Kharpal, “Chinese Anger over 12. Karishma Singh, “Timeline: Key Hong Kong Ensnared 3 Big US Businesses Dates in Hong Kong’s Protests,” , This Week—and Critics Say They Bent to October 1, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ Beijing,” CNBC, October 10, 2019, https:// article/uk-china-anniversary-timeline- www.cnbc.com/2019/10/10/china-anger- idUSKBN1WG3XK. over-hong-kong-ensnares-apple-nba- 13. SCMP Reporters, “As It Happened: activision-blizzard.html. Hong Kong’s Historic March as ‘2 Million’ 5. “Hong Kong’s Color Revolution,” People Peacefully Protest,” South China , October 15, 2014, Hong Kong Morning Post, June 16, 2019, https://www. edition, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/ hkedition/2014-10/15/content_18739914.htm. article/3014695/sea-black-hong-kong- 6. “China Warns HK Protesters Not to will-march-against-suspended; Karen ‘Play with Fire,’” BBC News, August 6, 2019, Zhang et al., “Young Protesters Storm and sec. China, https://www.bbc.com/news/ Deface Legco as Anarchy Engulfs Admiralty,” world-asia-china-49246304. South China Morning Post, July 1, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ politics/article/3016839/protesters-storm- and-vandalise-legislative-council-anarchy.

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14. Karen Leigh, Sheryl Tian Tong Lee, 20. Jackson Neagli, “Independence and Natalie Lung, “Hong Kong’s Descent from Chinese Characteristics: Chinese to Emergency Rule: 118 Days of Unrest,” Communist Party’s Growing Disdain for Bloomberg.com, accessed December 2, 2019, Activism,” https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/ Baker Institute Blog, November 22, 2016, hong-kong-protests-timeline/; Emma http://blog.bakerinstitute.org/2016/11/22/ Graham-Harrison and Verna Yu, “Hong Kong student-blog-independence-from-chinese- Protester Shot with Live Round during China characteristics-chinese-communist- National Day Rally,” The Guardian, October partys-growing-disdain-for-hong-kong- 1, 2019, sec. World news, https://www. independence-activism/. theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/01/hong- 21. John Sudworth, “Former UK kong-protester-shot-with-live-round- Consulate Worker Says China Tortured Him,” during-china-national-day-rally. BBC News, November 20, 2019, sec. China, 15. K. K. Rebecca Lai, “How Universities https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- Became the New Battlegrounds in the china-50457262. Hong Kong Protests,” The New York Times, 22. Pablo Robles, “Hong Kong District November 19, 2019, sec. World, https://www. Council Elections: Winners and Losers,” nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/18/world/ South China Morning Post, accessed asia/hong-kong-protest-universities.html. December 2, 2019, https://multimedia. 16. Zheping Huang and Huang, Echo, scmp.com/infographics/news/hong- “A Brief History: Beijing’s Interpretations of kong/article/3039600/hong-kong- Hong Kong’s Basic Law, from 1999 to the district-council-elections-2019/index. Present Day,” Quartz, accessed December html?src=social. 2, 2019, https://qz.com/828713/a-brief- 23. Sean O’Neill Richard Lloyd Parry, history--interpretations-of-hong- Asia Editor Chief Reporter |, “Huawei Pays kongs-basic-law-from-1999-to-the- BBC to Make Promotional Video,” The Times, present-day/. November 14, 2019, sec. News, https:// 17. Standing Committee of the National www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bbc-staff- People’s Congress, “The Interpretation by hopping-mad-over-glowing-huawei- the Standing Committee of the National video-2f0k26sw5. People’s Congress of Articles 22(4) and 24. Samuel Osborne, “British Steel Could 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Be Rescued by £70m Deal with Chinese Special Administrative Region of the People’s Firm,” The Independent, November 11, Republic of China,” June 26, 1999, https:// 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/ www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/ news/business/news/british-steel-latest- images/basiclawtext_doc17.pdf. liquidation-buyer-china-jingye-group- 18. Standing Committee of the National scunthorpe-a9197861.html. People’s Congress, “The Interpretation by the 25. Luke de Pulford, “Academic Honours Standing Committee of the National People’s Should Reflect a University’s Values, so Why Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III Has Carrie Lam Still Got One?,” Hong Kong of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Free Press, November 25, 2019, https:// Special Administrative Region of the People’s www.hongkongfp.com/2019/11/25/ Republic of China,” April 6, 2004, https:// academic-honours-reflect-universitys- www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/ values-carrie-lam-still-got-one/. images/basiclawtext_doc18.pdf. 26. John Sudworth, “Former UK 19. Phillip Georgiu and Sonny Payne, Consulate Worker Says China Tortured Him,” “Filling the State Immunity Lacuna in Hong BBC News, November 20, 2019, sec. China, Kong: The Congo Case,” Jones Day, accessed https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- December 2, 2019, https://www.jonesday. china-50457262. com/en/insights/2011/07/filling-the-state- immunity-lacuna-in-hong-kong-the- congo-case.

8 THE NEW BATTLEGROUND FOR HONG KONG’S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: BEIJING’S RESPONSE TO THE MASK BAN

27. Emily Cochrane, Edward Wong, 34. Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, and Keith Bradsher, “Trump Signs Hong “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose Kong Democracy Legislation, Angering How China Organized Mass Detentions of China,” The New York Times, November Muslims,” The New York Times, November 27, 2019, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes. 16, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/11/27/us/politics/trump-hong- com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/ kong.html. china--documents.html. 28. Fore Steve, “Why Vandalising the 35. Choi Chi-yuk, “China Has Jailed so Chinese Emblem Differs from Vandalising Many Corrupt Elites That It’s Running out of the Goddess of Democracy,” Hong Kong Free Cells,” South China Morning Post, February Press HKFP, July 27, 2019, https://www. 14, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/ hongkongfp.com/2019/07/27/vandalising- china/policies-politics/article/2133251/ chinese-emblem-differs-vandalising- xi-jinpings-anti-graft-drive-has-caught- goddess-democracy/. so-many. 29. Torres Ella, Guy Davies, and Karson Yu, “Why Exuberant Hong Kong Protesters Are Waving American Flags - ABC News,” AUTHOR ABC News, November 28, 2019, https:// Jackson Neagli (Rice ’17) is a guest abcnews.go.com/International/exuberant- contributor for the Baker Institute China hong-kong-protesters-waving-american- Studies Program. He is presently reading flags/story?id=67371063. for an LL.M. in international law at the 30. Wang Chaohua, “Standing University of Edinburgh on the second year Up to Beijing, 30 Years Apart,” The of a Marshall Scholarship. During his first Atlantic, September 4, 2019, https:// year in the United Kingdom, he obtained an www.theatlantic.com/international/ MA in Chinese studies from SOAS, University archive/2019/09/hong-kong-beijing- of . At Rice, he was a research See more Baker Institute Reports at: tiananmen-carrie-lam/597379/. www.bakerinstitute.org/baker-reports assistant for Steven Lewis, Ph.D., the C.V. 31. Amnesty International, “1989 Starr Transnational China Fellow at the Tiananmen Square Protests,” Amnesty This publication was written by a Baker Institute. researcher (or researchers) who International UK, May 31, 2019, participated in a Baker Institute project. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/china- Wherever feasible, this research is 1989-tiananmen-square-protests- reviewed by outside experts before it is demonstration-massacre. released. However, the views expressed 32. Max Fisher, “This 1989 Speech herein are those of the individual Is One of China’s Most Important,” author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Vox, June 2, 2014, https://www.vox. Baker Institute for Public Policy. com/2014/6/2/5772016/this-1989-speech- is-one-of-the-most-important-in-chinas- © 2019 Rice University’s Baker Institute history-and. for Public Policy 33. Tom Phillips, “Xi Jinping Becomes This material may be quoted or Most Powerful Leader since Mao with China’s reproduced without prior permission, Change to Constitution,” The Guardian, provided appropriate credit is given to October 24, 2017, sec. World news, https:// the author and Rice University’s Baker www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/ Institute for Public Policy. xi-jinping-mao-thought-on-socialism- china-constitution. Cite as: Neagli, Jackson. 2019. The New Battleground for Hong Kong’s Political Independence: Beijing’s Response to the Mask Ban. Baker Institute Report no. 12.18.19. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

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