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Constitutional Historyâ•fldevelopment of Admiralty

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Constitutional Historyâ•fldevelopment of Admiralty Western New England Law Review Volume 8 8 (1986) Article 2 Issue 2 1-1-1986 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY—DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1857 William W. Adams Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation William W. Adams, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY—DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1857, 8 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 157 (1986), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/2 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY-DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1857 I. INTRODUCTION The federal constitutional grant of "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"1 was the center of bitter controversy through­ out much of the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1789, when the Constitution was adopted, admiralty jurisdiction here and in England was limited to a handful of maritime cases arising on the high seas. 2 Nevertheless, by 1857,3 federal judges sitting in admiralty had ac­ quired a jurisdiction which permitted them to hear cases arising wholly within a state and between citizens of the same state. Such a development cut across the Diversity Clause as well as the states' righters' attitudes towards the territorial integrity of individual states. Consequently, the debate over the proper reach of admiralty jurisdic­ tion figured prominently in the constitutional and political crises which culminated in the Civil War. This article traces the development of federal admiralty jurisdic­ tion from its modest beginnings in the constitutional grant to the Civil War, when federal district courts sitting in admiralty acquired the ju­ risdiction they have today. Because American admiralty jurisdiction was almost always considered in light of English and colonial prece­ dent, it is necessary to examine in some detail the jurisdiction of the 1. u.s. CONST. art. III, § 2. 2. English admiralty jurisdiction in 1802 was "confined in matters of contract, to suits for seamen's wages, or those on hypothecations; in matters of tort to actions for as­ sault, collision, or spoil; and in quasi-contracts to actions by part owners for security, and actions of salvage." 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 692 (1973) (quoting A. BROWNE, 2 CIVIL LAW 122 (1802». Browne was Professor of Civil Law at the University of Dublin, and his two volume work was frequently cited as authority by federal courts. Marshall cited Browne in Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 2, 23 (1807). 3. The last sustained dissents to the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the admiralty grant appeared in Jackson v. Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857). 157 158 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW (Vol. 8:157 English High Court of Admiralty and the colonial vice-admiralty courts before turning to the activity of the federal courts after 1789. II. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION BEFORE 1789 The jurisdiction of the English High Court of Admiralty in the eighteenth century was the product of several centuries of ultimately unsuccessful quarrelling with the common law courts over jurisdic­ tional boundaries.4 The common law courts triumphed during the seventeenth century. Through vigorous use of the writ of prohibition they succeeded in restricting admiralty jurisdiction to matters arising exclusively on the high seas. 5 Subject matter jurisdiction as such did not exist, for the locale of the incident or transaction giving rise to the action was determinative. Thus, a writ would issue enjoining an ad­ miralty proceeding when part of the transaction occurred on land. The colonial vice-admiralty courts, like the English High Court of Admiralty to which they were subordinate, were simiiarly subject to the writs of prohibition issuing from colonial common law courts. The vice-admiralty courts nevertheless possessed greater latitude in deciding cases which would have drawn a writ of prohibition in Eng­ land. Moreover, because of special long-standing statutory authority, the vice-admiralty courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the colonial common law courts over actions arising from breaches of the revenue, trade, and navigation laws. Such cases in England were tried only at common law before a jury. During the Revolution and the Confedera­ tion, the individual states established admiralty courts whose jurisdic­ tion reflected the traditional English common law gloss on admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, on the eve of the adoption of the Constitution, admiralty jurisdiction in the United States bore the contours of con­ temporaneous English practice. Two statutes passed during the reign of Richard II restricted the jurisdiction of the English admiralty courts. By the first of these stat­ utes, passed in 1389, admirals and their deputies were forbidden to "meddle henceforth of anything done within the realm, but only of a thing done upon the sea."6 By the second, passed in 1391, admiralty was deprived of jurisdiction over "all manner of contracts, pleas and 4. See F. WISWALL, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE SINCE 1800, AN ENGLISH STUDY WITH AMERICAN COMPARISONS 1-19 (1970). 5. For example, an action on a debt created on the high seas could be tried only at common law if the payment was on land. Bridgeman's Case, 80 Eng. Rep. 162 (K.B. 1614). 6. 13 Rich. 2, ch. 5. 1986] DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY 159 quereles and of all other things done or arising within the bodies of counties, as well by land as by water.'" The English common law courts had a centuries-long quarrel with the admiralty courts over ju­ risdictional boundaries. Each claimed that the other encroached on its jurisdiction. By the middle of the seventeenth century the common law courts acquired the upper hand. 8 The common law courts' success was owing principally to the la­ bors of Lord Coke who developed effective use of the writ of prohibi­ tion pro defectu jurisdictionis. 9 A defendant in an admiralty proceeding applied to the King's Bench for a writ of prohibition, and if the court agreed that common law properly had jurisdiction, a writ issued enjoining the admiralty judge from hearing the case. This natu­ rally had the effect of forcing the plaintiff in the admiralty proceeding to bring his action at common law if he wanted to maintain it. The King's Bench, basing its authority for the writs of prohibition on the statutes of Richard II, built a substantial body of case law defin­ ing admiralty jurisdiction. In determining what was within the body of a county, the King's Bench gradually excluded admiralty from ju­ risdiction over navigable inland waterways, ports, and havens. Thus, the locality over which the admiralty courts had jurisdiction was the area within the ebb and flow of the tide, except, of course, where the tide intruded into the body of a county. As part of the restriction to locale, the common law courts inge­ niously justified a rule excluding admiralty from jurisdiction over most maritime contracts. Reasoning that both making and performance were part of a contract, the common law took jurisdiction over con­ tracts made on land, though the contemplated performance was very clearly within the ebb and flow of the tide and without the body of a county. Naturally, only torts committed within the ebb and flow of the tide and without the body of a county were properly cognizable in admiralty. 10 7. 15 Rich. 2, ch. 3. A third statute, 2 Hen. 4, ch. 11, enacted in 1400, gave a defend­ ant wrongfully sued in admiralty a cause of action for double damages at common law. 8. See generally, I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 548-59 (1971). 9. The common law courts also used writs of certiorari, supersedeas, and mandamus to prevent admiralty courts from hearing certain cases. Id. Another device was the use of nontraversable fictions in pleading, such as an allegation that the underlying transaction occurred at Cheapside. See Talbot v. Three Brigs, I Oall. 95, 99 (Pa. 1784). 10. "Torts committed on the high seas; contracts made on the high seas to be there executed; proceedings in rem on bottomry bonds executed in foreign parts; the enforcement ofjudgments of foreign Admiralty courts; suits for the wages of mariners-were almost the only pieces of jurisdiction which it was allowed to exercise." 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 557. 160 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:157 Although the subject of much debate in the United States during the first few decades of the nineteenth century, II it is clear that the colonial vice-admiralty courts in North America were at least formally bound by the restrictions placed on the English High Court of Admi­ ralty, to which the vice-admiralty courts were inferior. 12 The few ex­ tant reports of vice-admiralty proceedings show frequent references to the phrase "within the body of a county" and occasional references to the statutes of Richard 11.13 Moreover, some colonies attempted to incorporate the statutes of Richard II into local legislation. 14 Colonial common law courts likewise possessed authority to issue writs of pro­ hibition in appropriate cases and frequently did SO.15 Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the vice-admiralty courts sometimes decided cases which, had they been brought in admiralty courts in England, would have drawn writs of prohibition. 16 This lati­ tude undoubtedly led to the blurring of jurisdictional lines between colonial common law and vice-admiralty courts.
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