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Pressure Systems Stored-Energy Risk Threshold Analysis

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Pressure Systems Stored-Energy Risk Threshold Analysis PNNL-18696 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830 Pressure Systems Stored-Energy Threshold Risk Analysis SS Paulsen August 2009 DISCLAIMER This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor Battelle Memorial Institute, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY operated by BATTELLE for the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY under Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830 Printed in the United States of America Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0062; ph: (865) 576-8401 fax: (865) 576-5728 email: [email protected] Available to the public from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Rd., Springfield, VA 22161 ph: (800) 553-6847 fax: (703) 605-6900 email: [email protected] online ordering: http://www.ntis.gov/ordering.htm This document was printed on recycled paper. (9/2003) PNNL-18696 Pressure Systems Stored-Energy Threshold Risk Analysis SS Paulsen August 2009 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Richland, Washington 99352 Summary Federal Regulation 10 CFR 851, which became effective February 2007, brought to light potential weaknesses regarding the Pressure Safety Program at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The definition of a pressure system in 10 CFR 851 does not contain a limit based upon pressure or any other criteria. Therefore, the need for a method to determine an appropriate risk-based hazard level for pressure safety was identified. The Laboratory has historically used a stored energy of 1000 lbf-ft to define a pressure hazard; however, an analytical basis for this value had not been documented. This document establishes the technical basis by evaluating the use of stored energy as an appropriate criterion to establish a pressure hazard, exploring a suitable risk threshold for pressure hazards, and reviewing the methods used to determine stored energy. The literature review and technical analysis concludes the use of stored energy as a method for determining a potential risk, the 1000 lbf-ft threshold, and the methods used by PNNL to calculate stored energy are all appropriate. Recommendations for further program improvements are also discussed. iii Contents Summary ...................................................................................................................................................... iii 1.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1.1 1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................... 1.1 1.2 Purpose ...................................................................................................................................... 1.2 1.3 Approach ................................................................................................................................... 1.2 2.0 Literature Review .............................................................................................................................. 2.1 2.1 Explosion Energy ...................................................................................................................... 2.1 2.1.1 Compressed Gas Energy ................................................................................................ 2.2 2.1.2 Energy in Liquids Below Boiling Point ......................................................................... 2.3 2.1.3 Energy for Non-Ideal Gas, Vapor, and Flashing Liquid ................................................ 2.3 3.0 Design Principles ............................................................................................................................... 3.1 3.1 Basic Overpressure Design Principles ...................................................................................... 3.1 3.2 Criteria of Damage/Injury ......................................................................................................... 3.1 3.3 Determining the Blast Wave Pressure ....................................................................................... 3.1 4.0 Calculations ....................................................................................................................................... 4.3 4.1 Ideal Gas Expansion .................................................................................................................. 4.3 4.2 Blast Wave Calculations ........................................................................................................... 4.4 4.2.1 1000 lbf-ft Blast Wave ................................................................................................... 4.4 4.2.2 1 lbf-ft Blast Wave ......................................................................................................... 4.5 4.2.3 500 lbf-ft Blast Wave ..................................................................................................... 4.5 4.2.4 10000 lbf-ft Blast Wave ................................................................................................. 4.5 4.3 Comparative Stored Energy ...................................................................................................... 4.6 4.4 Tabulated Results ...................................................................................................................... 4.7 5.0 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 5.1 6.0 Recommendations ............................................................................................................................. 6.1 7.0 References ......................................................................................................................................... 7.1 Appendix A Internet Articles Regarding Flash Powder Energy ............................................................... A.1 v Tables Table 4.1. Pressure Wave using Ideal Gas Law ........................................................................................ 4.3 Table 4.2. Stored Energy of Everyday Items ............................................................................................ 4.6 Table 4.3. Tabulated Stored Energy Analysis Results .............................................................................. 4.7 vi 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Background Title 10, Part 851, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 851) establishes worker safety and health requirements to govern contractor activities on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites. This regulation went into effect on February 9, 2007. Pressure Safety is one of the disciplines specifically covered by this regulation, as detailed in Appendix A, Section 4. Section 851.3 defines pressure systems as “all pressure vessels, and pressure sources including cryogenics, pneumatic, hydraulic, and vacuum. Vacuum systems should be considered pressure systems due to their potential for catastrophic failure due to backfill pressurization. Associated hardware (e.g., gauges, and regulators), fittings, piping, pumps, and pressure relief devices are also integral parts of the pressure system.” Appendix A, Section 4 states “contractors must establish safety policies and procedures to ensure that pressure systems are designed, fabricated, tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, and operated by trained and qualified personnel in accordance with applicable and sound engineering principles.” The regulation goes on to state that all pressure systems and components shall conform to the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, ASME B31 (Code for Pressure Piping), and the strictest applicable state and local codes. Part (c) further states, “When national consensus codes are not applicable (because of pressure range, vessel geometry, use of special materials, etc.), contractors must implement measures to provide equivalent protection and ensure a level of safety greater than or equal to the level of protection afforded by the ASME or applicable state or local code. Measures must include the following: (1) Design drawings, sketches, and calculations must be reviewed and approved by a qualified independent design professional (i.e., professional engineer). Documented organizational peer review is acceptable. (2) Qualified personnel must be used to perform examinations and inspections of materials, in-process fabrications, non-destructive
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