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Geographical Overview | Middle East and turkey Israel: Return to the Polls Panorama and Regional Uncertainty alain dieckhoff1 occurred: from 42 seats in the Knesset before elec- Research Director, Centre national de la recherche tions, they went down to 31. This decline can be scientifique (CNRS) attributed to the fact that the electoral union dis- Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, pleased two Likud constituency groups: on the one Sciences Po Paris hand, liberal right voters, because the unified list was undeniably deeply anchored in militant nationalism; and on the other hand, traditionalist voters, who did the January 2013 Elections not at all appreciate the “secular” image of the Rus- Turkey | Middle East and Geographical Overview sian-speaking party. Suddenly, the Likud had lost On 22 January 2013, the Israelis held the early leg- centre and right-wing votes, a loss that benefited the islative elections that Prime Minister Benjamin Net- centre party Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”), led by anyahu had wished for. While hitherto enjoying a the journalist Yair Lapid (19 seats) and Naftali Ben- stable political majority (66 MPs out of 120), he de- nett’s The Jewish Home (12 seats). These two par- cided to make use of his relatively widespread popu- ties were the revelations of the elections. 193 larity to strengthen his party’s parliamentary pres- Though the success of Yair Lapid’s party had been ence, particularly before difficult budget decisions. anticipated by surveys, its extent was not. This is Ultimately, he only partially succeeded in this aim. most likely due to the mobilisation of the middle Certainly, in March 2013, Netanyahu was appointed class, essentially secular Israelis overwhelmed by Prime Minister for the third time, thus becoming the the disproportionate load of taxes and military con- politician to remain at the head of the Israeli govern- scription they bear. This is the same middle class ment the longest after David Ben Gurion. This politi- that protested massively over the summer of 2011 in cal longevity is quite an accomplishment in and of the “tent movement” to demand greater social jus- itself, considering the high parliamentary volatility tice, and more particularly the regulation of real es- characterising the Israeli democracy. The fact re- tate prices and the reduction of direct taxes. mains, however, that the electoral strategy of Besides social concerns, the second motivation strengthening the Likud party failed, and the results that led voters to choose Yesh Atid was the grow- held some surprises. ing sense of injustice in the face of generous ex- With the elections in perspective, Benjamin Netan- emptions from military service for ultra-orthodox yahu had forged an alliance with the Russian-speak- Jews. Whereas secular and nationalist-religious 2013 ing party, Yisrael Beiteinu, headed by the Minister of Israelis, if they are men, spend three years serving Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman.2 The aim was to in the military and then carry out periods in the re- expand their joint constituency. However, the inverse serve until they are forty, 55,000 students of the 1 He has published Le conflit israélo-arabe (Armand Colin, 2011) and edited The Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel (Routledge, 2013). By the same token, he has also co-edited, together with Frédéric Charillon, the annual publication Afrique du Nord/Moyen-Orient published by La Mediterranean Yearbook Documentation Française. 2 Lieberman resigned from his post in mid-December 2012, after being charged with fraud and embezzlement in a case involving companies in Med. Belarus. IE institutes of Talmudic studies are exempt from mili- of the solution of two States, which Naftali Bennett tary obligations by virtue of an old agreement from rejects; and secondly, the rather alarming regional Panorama 1948. This general exemption means that the bur- context is hardly conducive to bold advances. den of military service is not shared equally. Moreo- ver, since the exemption requires them to dedicate themselves wholly to the study of the Torah, young Growing risk of regional Isolation ultra-orthodox Jews are not allowed to work but de- pend on various types of social aid funded by the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock State budget. On 14 November 2012, Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defence after further deterioration of the Besides social concerns, the second Gaza Strip situation. The launching of this military motivation that led voters to choose campaign demonstrated that, four years after Oper- Yesh Atid was the growing sense of ation Cast Lead, nothing had really been settled be- tween Israel and Hamas. After 1,500 air raids car- injustice in the face of generous ried out by Israeli aviation against rocket launchers, exemptions from military service for weapons workshops and official buildings while Ha- ultra-orthodox Jews mas launched 1,500 rockets and missiles against Geographical Overview | Middle East and Turkey | Middle East and Geographical Overview Israel (for the first time including Tel Aviv and Jerusa- lem), the “mini-war” came to a close, eight days lat- The second revelation of the elections, The Jewish er, with a new cease-fire maintaining a fragile status Home, shares Yesh Atid’s concern for equality. What quo. distinguishes it is its highly nationalist message: it is While Israel was engaged in a military wrestling in favour of the annexation of the entire Zone C (60% match with Hamas, a more subdued political strug- of the West Bank territory still under Israeli control), gle was being carried out by Tel Aviv vis-à-vis the 194 which explains how it garnered a great deal of sup- Palestinian Authority (PA). In an attempt to break the port in West Bank settlements. In any case, The persistent stalemate, Mahmoud Abbas chose to Jewish Home has managed to expand its following bring the case of Palestine before the international well beyond this ideological constituency by luring community, obtaining Palestine’s non-member ob- voters, even along the Mediterranean coast, who are server status with the UN (November 2012). This attracted by the “high-tech entrepreneur” facet of symbolic victory did not, however, change anything the party’s new leader, Naftali Bennett, from a family in practice, as the Israeli government demonstrated of American immigrants. by taking double retaliation, i.e. launching new plan- In view of the election results, Benjamin Netanyahu ning and construction programmes (including in has formed a coalition government gathering Yesh Zone E-1, to the east of Jerusalem), and temporarily Atid, The Jewish Home and the centre party Hatnua, freezing the transfer of taxes collected by Israel on led by former Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni, behalf of the PA. Through these gestures, Netanya- around the Likud party. Its immediate task will be hu wished to indicate that no Palestinian State would threefold: start working on enlisting ultra-orthodox see the light without Israel’s consent. Jews; devise an institutional reform to reduce parlia- Can we expect a relaunch of negotiations during 2013 mentary fragmentation; implement a budget of aus- Barack Obama’s second term? In principle, an terity. The latter measure will entail budget cuts, in- American president free from the concern of re- cluding for the defence ministry, so as to check the election can afford to be bolder, but it is not certain growth of public deficit (4.2% of the GDP in 2012). that Obama will take this path, since he was al- On the other hand, the relaunching of negotiations ready deeply involved in the Israeli-Palestinian with the Palestinian Authority – at an impasse for question at the beginning of his first term without Mediterranean Yearbook years now – stands little chance of being a priority. obtaining significant results. During his official visit There are two reasons for this: first of all, the coali- to the Middle East in March of 2013, he was, Med. Med. IE tion partners are divided, Yair Lapid being in favour moreover, very careful not to announce any action plan whatsoever. The only tangible gain is the an- the downfall of the regime would represent an unde- nouncement of the official reconciliation between niable strategic gain in many regards (end of the al- Tel Aviv and Ankara after a nearly three-year falling liance with Teheran, weakening of Hezbollah). At the Panorama out pursuant to the interception by the Israeli navy same time, Israeli leaders are well aware that the end of a Turkish ship seeking to break the naval block- of Baathist Syria could be accompanied by pro- ade on Gaza (nine Turkish activists were killed dur- longed chaos, with destabilising regional effects. ing the assault). This announced rapprochement Syria under the Assads was an obstinate adversary clearly owes a great deal to the deep transforma- of Israel but understood the power relations quite tions taking place in the region, which are a matter well and was always careful not to cross certain red of concern for both Turkey and Israel. lines (in particular on the military level). What will happen tomorrow in the “new Syria”? A Disquieting Arab Spring The end of the Mubarak regime constituted a stra- The downfall of the regime would tegic loss for Israel. Although political disagree- represent an undeniable strategic ments had not been lacking over the thirty years of gain in many regards. At the same Mubarak’s presidency, the two countries, tied by an alliance with the United States, shared the same time, Israeli leaders are aware that concern for confining the influence of Islamist forc- the end of Baathist Syria could be Turkey | Middle East and Geographical Overview es. The revolution in Egypt has had very rapid ef- accompanied by prolonged chaos fects. The deterioration of the security situation on the Sinai Peninsula, a phenomenon that is not new, has accelerated during the chaotic transition The developments in Jordan are likewise followed stage, under the action of activist groups involving with attention.
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