DOCSLIB.ORG

State of Play in Agriculture Negotiations: Country Groupings’ Positions

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
State of Play in Agriculture Negotiations: Country Groupings’ Positions Analytical Note SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-2 Original: English STATE OF PLAY IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: COUNTRY GROUPINGS’ POSITIONS DOMESTIC SUPPORT PILLAR SYNOPSIS This note provides an overview of the position of various countries and group of countries active in the WTO agriculture negotiations with respect to critical issues discussed in the domestic support pillar. Similar information on the market access pillar, on the export competition pillar and on the cotton initiative is available in Analytical Notes N° SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-1, SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-3 and SC/AN/TDP/AG/4- 4 respectively. January 2008 Geneva, Switzerland This Analytical Note is produced by the Trade for Development Programme (TDP) of the South Centre to contribute to empower the countries of the South with knowledge and tools that would allow them to engage as equals with the North on trade relations and negotiations. Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce the contents of this Analytical Note for their own use, but are requested to grant due acknowledgement to the South Centre and to send a copy of the publication in which such quote or reproduction appears to the South Centre. Electronic copies of this and other South Centre publications may be downloaded without charge from: http://www.southcentre.org. Analytical Note SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-2 January 2008 STATE OF PLAY IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: COUNTRY GROUPINGS’ POSITIONS DOMESTIC SUPPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS: INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................2 FORMULA FOR THE REDUCTION OF OVERALL TRADE DISTORTING SUPPORT (OTDS) ........................................................................................................................................3 TIERED FORMULA FOR THE CUTS IN FINAL BOUND TOTAL AMS (AMBER BOX) ........5 PRODUCT-SPECIFIC CAPS ...............................................................................................7 REDUCTION IN DE MINIMIS............................................................................................9 BLUE BOX, INCLUDING EXPANSION OF CRITERIA........................................................11 GREEN BOX REVIEW AND CLARIFICATION ..................................................................14 PEACE CLAUSE .............................................................................................................16 MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE .............................................................................16 ANNEXES: ANNEX 1: MEMBERS OF COUNTRY GROUPINGS ..........................................................20 ANNEX 2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS...................................................................................21 INTRODUCTION 1. The WTO agriculture negotiations are organised around the three pillars, mainly market access, domestic support and export competition. This note describes the position of various countries and group of countries active in the WTO agriculture negotiations with respect to critical issues discussed in the domestic support pillar. 2. The note provides an overview of the position of the following countries and groupings: United States, European Communities, G10, G20, Cairns Group, G-33, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the African Group and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). Annex 1 contains a list of the countries participating in each of these groupings. A glossary is included in Annex 2, which offers a definition of various concepts and terms used throughout the note. 3. Similar information on the market access pillar, on the export competition pillar and on the cotton initiative (sponsored by a group of African countries) is available in Analytical Notes N° SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-1, SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-3 and SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-4 respectively. 2/24 Analytical Note SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-2 January 2008 Critical Negotiation Issue: FORMULA FOR THE REDUCTION OF OVERALL TRADE DISTORTING SUPPORT (OTDS) Country Groupings: United States European Union G-10 G-20 Cairns Group - According to the tiered - According to the tiered - According to tiered formula - Offensive interest: wants to - The group is divided on formula contained in the formula contained in the contained in the Draft achieve effective cuts and this issue. Countries that use Draft Possible Modalities Draft Possible Modalities Possible Modalities1 Japan disciplines. the Amber Box support are dated July 20071, the US dated July 20071, the EU would be placed in the more hesitant to undertake would be placed in the would be placed in the top middle band - Level of cuts: commitments. middle band. band. 9 80% for OTDS above - The other developed USD 60 billion - The US supports the - The EU supports the countries members of this 9 75% for OTDS above following level of cuts per following level of cuts per group are likely to fall in the USD 10 billion and up to band: band: lowest of the three bands of USD 60 billion 9 75% for OTDS above Level of cuts: the formula agreed for 9 70% for OTDS at or USD 60 billion (top 9 70% for OTDS above reduction of OTDS. below USD 10 billion; band) USD 60 billion, 9 53% for OTDS up to 9 60% for OTDS up to USD - Defensive interest, - Insists that countries with USD 60 billion (middle 60 billion particularly with regards to relative high levels of trade band) 9 50% for OTDS at or reduction of Amber Box; distorting support vis-à- vis 9 31% for OTDS at or below USD 10 billion; the value of agricultural below USD 10 billion production should make (lowest band) - Insists that countries with additional cuts to those relative high levels of trade required by the tiered - The US would like to be distorting support vis-à-vis approach; placed in the middle tier the value of agricultural 1 [75] [85]% cut for OTDS above USD 60 billion, [66] [73]% cut for OTDS above USD 10 billion and up to USD 60 billion and [50] [60]% cut for OTDS at or below USD 10 billion. The thresholds for the three bands have been agreed, however the specific level of cuts per band are yet to be agreed. Small low income recently acceded members with economies in transition, developing country members with no AMS commitments and NFIDCs shall not be required to make reduction commitments on OTDS. Developing country members with AMS commitments will reduce two thirds of the reduction rate agreed for developed countries. 3/24 Analytical Note SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-2 January 2008 with a reduction of 53% production should make - Requires front-loading of while the EU will be placed additional cuts to those commitments (e.g imposing in the highest tier for cuts of required by the tiered higher cuts during the early 75%; approach (e.g. Japan, years of implementation) Norway, Switzerland, etc) - Developing countries - Proposes that developing entitled to “slightly lesser countries without AMS cuts” over a longer entitlements must be implementation period than exempted from undertaking developed countries. reduction commitments on trade-distorting domestic support. -Seeks to incorporate the concept of OTDS to article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture -Supports binding of base level in members’ schedules Critical Negotiation Issue: FORMULA FOR THE REDUCTION OF OVERALL TRADE DISTORTING SUPPORT (OTDS) Country Groupings: G-33 LDCs African Group ACP - The group does not have a common - Would like significant reduction on - Underlines the importance of - Would like the formula to result in position on this issue; all forms of trade distorting support, meeting the Doha objective of real meaningful and effective reductions taking into account all SDT reductions in trade distorting in the domestic support granted by - Generally supportive of the provisions and recognising the need support; developed countries to their farming principle of proportionality applied for transitional measures that will communities; to developing countries offset the negative short-term effects - States that African countries must of removal of subsidies (in terms of be provided enough policy space for - Indicates that ACP countries should 4/24 Analytical Note SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-2 January 2008 reducing or removing LDCs’ the development of farming be allowed to maintain policy space preferential margins into the markets communities, based on fair and for the development of their farming of developed countries). equitable targets of poverty communities based on targets of reduction, food and livelihood poverty reduction, food and security and rural development. livelihood security, rural development and other development - Proposed that OTDS for the US policy objectives. should be between 10 and 12 billion USD and that EU and Japan should undertake an 80% cut. - Modalities on domestic support should include disciplines to prevent box-shifting. Critical Negotiation Issue: TIERED FORMULA FOR THE CUTS IN FINAL BOUND TOTAL AMS (AMBER BOX) Country Groupings: United States European Union G-10 G-20 Cairns Group - Defensive interest; - Defensive interest; - Generally defensive interest Offensive interest. - Offensive interest; given that they have high -According to the tiered - According to the tiered levels of amber box support; Proposed the following - Agrees with proposal to formula contained in the formula contained in the thresholds for the tiers: establish three tiers, with the Draft Possible Modalities Draft Possible Modalities - According to the tiered 9 above USD 25 billion, EU in the highest tier, dated July 20072, the US dated July 20072 the EU formula contained in the 9 above USD 15 billion and followed by the US and would be placed
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture
    Order Code RL32916 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Agriculture in the WTO: Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture May 12, 2005 Randy Schnepf Specialist in Agricultural Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Agriculture in the WTO: Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture Summary The Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations, completed in 1994, represented the first significant step toward reforming international agricultural trade. Under the UR negotiations, domestic policies and trade policies were viewed as interconnected. As a result, WTO member countries committed to disciplines in agricultural support in three broad areas — domestic agricultural support programs, export subsidies, and market access — often referred to as the three pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture (AA). In addition, members also agreed to provisions concerning the handling of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, dispute settlement procedures, and the continuation of the reform process. Under the auspices of the UR’s AA, WTO member countries agreed to limit and reduce the most distortive domestic support subsidies — referred to as amber box subsidies and measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) index. Several types of indirect subsidies were identified as causing minimal distortion to agricultural production and trade, and were provided exemptions — green box, blue box, de minimis, and special treatment — from WTO disciplines. Export subsidies were capped and subject to reductions in both value and volume. In addition, members agreed to improve market access for internationally traded agricultural products by converting non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) into tariffs (a process called tariffication); binding existing tariffs at January 1, 1995, levels; and reducing tariffs from bound levels with the all-product average tariff being reduced faster than tariffs for individual products.
    [Show full text]
  • WT/L/413 12 September 2001 ORGANIZATION (01-4292)
    WORLD TRADE WT/L/413 12 September 2001 ORGANIZATION (01-4292) Original: English TWENTY-SECOND MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE CAIRNS GROUP Punta del Este, Uruguay 3-5 September 2001 Communication from Australia The following communiqué from the 22nd Ministerial Meeting of the Cairns Group held in Uruguay, has been received from the Permanent Mission of Australia with the request that it be circulated to Members. _______________ CAIRNS GROUP COMMUNIQUE 1. The 22nd Ministerial meeting of the Cairns Group1 was held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 3-5 September 2001. The meeting marked 15 years since the Group's inception and it was also a return to the city where 15 years ago the Uruguay Round was launched. Reflecting on this double anniversary, Ministers said the Group was a singularly long-lasting and successful example of coalition building between countries of great diversity. 2. Ministers emphasized, however, that in spite of their efforts over these years to reform agricultural trade much remained to be done. Ministers said that in an increasingly globalized world with a rules-based multilateral trading framework, the time was well overdue to bring agriculture fully under the WTO so that producers could compete fairly on the basis of their comparative advantage. Ministers expressed concern that total OECD support is currently running at almost US$1 billion per day, and protection provided by both tariffs and non-tariff barriers, including unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary measures, remained very high. Correcting this situation would lead to a substantial increase in global GDP and generate significant gains to developing countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Differentiation Between Developing Countries in the WTO
    Differentiation between Developing Countries in the WTO Report 2004:14 E Foto: Mats Pettersson Differentiation between Developing Countries in the WTO Swedish Board of Agriculture International Affairs Division June 2004 Authors: Jonas Kasteng Arne Karlsson Carina Lindberg Contents PROLOGUE.......................................................................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................... 5 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 9 1.1 Purpose of the study............................................................................................................................. 9 1.2 Limitations of the study ....................................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Background to the discussion on differentiation................................................................................ 10 1.4 Present differentiation between developing countries in the WTO.................................................... 12 1.5 Relevance of present differentiation between developing countries in the WTO .............................. 13 1.6 Outline of the new differentiation initiative......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Alea Iacta Es: How Spanish Olives Will Force a Radical Change of the CAP Jacques Berthelot ([email protected]), SOL, 7 November 2018
    Alea iacta es: how Spanish olives will force a radical change of the CAP Jacques Berthelot ([email protected]), SOL, 7 November 2018 Contents Summary Introduction I – The sequence of the investigation and the arguments put forward by the protagonists 1.1 – The products at issue: processed ripe olives, raw olives or both? 1.2 – The anti-dumping investigation 1.3 – The countervailing (or anti-subsidies) investigation II – Complementary fundamental arguments 2.1 – Why the EU agricultural products are not exported at their "normal value" 2.2 – Almost all EU product-specific agricultural domestic subsidies may be sued under the AoA and ASCM 2.3 – Which subsidies are product-specific (PS)? 2.4 – The case of the EU alleged PS decoupled direct payments 2.4.1 – Spanish ripe olives receive fully decoupled PS subsidies 2.4.2 – Why the other EU agricultural subsidies are not decoupled but are essentially PS 2.4.2.1 – The mixed behaviour of the guardians of the temple of decoupled subsidies 2.4.2.2 – The EU mantra that decoupled subsidies imply a market orientation of the CAP 2.4.2.3 – The reasons why the EU agricultural subsidies are not decoupled but mainly PS 2.4.2.4 – The case of input subsidies 2.4.3 – The WTO Appellate Body has departed from the GATT definition of dumping 2.4.4 – The best rebuttals of the assertion that the EU subsidies are decoupled NPS III – The consequences to draw to delete dumping and to build a totally new CAP 3.1 – Deleting the dumping impact of EU exports, particularly to developing countries 3.1.1 – Changing
    [Show full text]
  • Agriculture at the Uruguay Round: the European Union´S Hindering Position Towards Trade Liberalization
    ISA-FLACSO Joint Conference Buenos Aires, July 24th, 2014 Agriculture at the Uruguay Round: the European Union´s hindering position towards trade liberalization Patricia Nasser de Carvalho Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) [email protected] 1 Abstract The European Union started acting as unified trading actor in GATT negotiations in the 1960s and in the same decade launched it´s Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) that since then helped hindering a multilateral trade agreement on agriculture. The Uruguay Round, which started in 1986, prolonged for an agriculture dispute, was finished in 1994 with an agreement to reduce non-tariff barriers to agriculture imports and tariffs were scheduled for phased reductions. In this context, this article proposals are to a) discuss the European Union's position on negotiations that led to the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) including the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and the Dispute Settlement Agreement (which in theory should improve the process of resolving trade conflicts) b) show that although those agreements were set to ensure a more harmonic trade negotiations to liberalize trade on agriculture, the European Union did not change it's essence protectionist agriculture policy, since CAP continued hindering an agreement with concrete results towards liberalization on agriculture. The aim is to show that although all these agreements, high price levels, barriers to foreign trade and pressure under the common budget persisted and deepened in the European agriculture market after the URAA. 1. Introduction The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU), one of the most important symbols and paradigmatic policies of the European regional integration process and that could best fulfill the aim of building a unified image of Europe, had completed fifty years in 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • Subsidies on Upland Cotton
    United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (WT/DS267) Executive Summary of the Rebuttal Submission of the United States of America September 1, 2003 Introduction and Overview 1. The comparison under the Peace Clause proviso in Article 13(b)(ii) must be made with respect to the support as “decided” by those measures. In the case of the challenged U.S. measures, the support was decided in terms of a rate, not an amount of budgetary outlay. The rate of support decided during marketing year 1992 was 72.9 cents per pound of upland cotton; the rate of support granted for the 1999-2001 crops was only 51.92 cents per pound; and the rate of support that measures grant for the 2002 crop is only 52 cents per pound. Thus, in no marketing year from 1999 through 2002 have U.S. measures breached the Peace Clause.1 2. Brazil has claimed that additional “decisions” by the United States during the 1992 marketing year to impose a 10 percent acreage reduction program and 15 percent “normal flex acres” reduced the level of support below 72.9 cents per pound. However, the 72.9 cents per pound rate of support most accurately expresses the revenue ensured by the United States to upland cotton producers. Even on the unrealistic assumption that these program elements reduced the level of support by 10 and 15 percent, respectively (that is, the maximum theoretical effect these program elements could have had), the 1992 rate of support would still be 67.625 cents per pound, well above the levels for marketing years 1999-2001 and 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • Multilateral Trade Negotiations the Uruguay
    RESTRICTED MULTILATERAL TRADE MTN.GNG/AG/W/2 NEGOTIATIONS 26 July 1991 THE URUGUAY ROUND Special Distribution Original: English Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT) Negotiating Group on Agriculture CAIRNS GROUP: MANAUS MEETING - MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE Set out below is the text of the communiqué issued by Cairns Group Ministers at their meeting at Manaus, Brazil, on 9 July 1991. The Cairns Group has requested that it be circulated to participants in the Negotiating Group on Agriculture. * 1. Ministers of the Cairns Group"1" today expressed their deep concern at the current lack of serious political engagement in the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture. They stressed once again their disappointment over the failure of the Brussels Ministerial meeting intended to conclude the Uruguay Round in December 1990. 2. Cairns Ministers called upon leaders of the major industrialized countries at their forthcoming London Summit to exert leadership by facing squarely the political decisions necessary to fundamentally reform world agricultural production and trade. 3. Since the Brussels conference agricultural trading tensions between the major industrial exporters have continued to intensify, especially through the uncontrolled and aggressive use of export subsidies. The continuing damage to the interests of Cairns Group countries caused by the failure of the multilateral system to deal effectively with the trade- distorting impact of agricultural subsidies underlined the need for urgent ' reform. Ministers noted that despite repeated commitments to reduce support, total transfers to agriculture by way of direct payments and consumer transfers in OECD countries had increased by 12 per cent in 1990 to US$299 billion. Ministers and representatives of the Cairns Group (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay) met in Manaus, Brazil, 8-9 July 1991.
    [Show full text]
  • Countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Agricultural
    Countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Agricultural policy issues in the context of the World Trade Organization Countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Agricultural policy issues in the context of the World Trade Organization Lars Brink FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ROME 2014 The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO. E-ISBN 978-92-5-108449-6 (PDF) © FAO, 2014 FAO encourages the use, reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product. Except where otherwise indicated, material may be copied, downloaded and printed for private study, research and teaching purposes, or for use in non-commercial products or services, provided that appropriate acknowledgement of FAO as the source and copyright holder is given and that FAO’s endorsement of users’ views, products or services is not implied in any way. All requests for translation and adaptation rights, and for resale and other commercial use rights should be made via www.fao.org/contact-us/licence-request or addressed to [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of the Wto Agreement on Agriculture on Food Security in Developing Countries
    135 EAAE Seminar Challenges for the Global Agricultural Trade Regime after Doha THE IMPACT OF THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE ON FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Jelena Birovljev University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Economics in Subotica, Serbia [email protected] Biljana Ćetković University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Economics in Subotica, Serbia [email protected] Abstract: Free trade has become a modern-day creed, accepted by both wealthy industrialized countries and many governments of developing countries as the generator of economic growth, development and employment. However, free trade has also been condemned by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries as the tool through which the economic dominance of wealthy, developed countries is institutionalized and maintained. Agriculture has been one of the most controversial issues in the multilateral trade negotiations for the past fifty years. The aim of this article is to examine food security implications of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. It discusses the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which is systematically favoring agricultural producers in industrialized countries at the expense of farmers in developing countries, and explores ways in which the Agreement may be modified to achieve a more equal chance for success for both parties. The article also deals with the extent to which realization of the Agreement’s stated objective – the establishment of a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system—is likely to advance food security in developing countries. The first section defines food security, discusses the relationship between trade and food security, and analyzes the impact of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture on food security in developing countries.
    [Show full text]
  • English EXPORT SUBSIDIES Item / Parameter
    South Centre Analytical Note October 2002 SC/TADP/AN/AG/3 Original: English EXPORT COMPETITION-MAIN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS EXPORT SUBSIDIES Item / Parameter Modalities Proponents Comments • Policy coverage of As defined in Article 9.1 (a) to 9.1 (f) of the Cairns Group, United States, Philippines, further commitments Agreement of Agriculture China, European Union, Multifunctionality Group • Product specificity of As specified in each Member’s schedules Cairns Group, United States, Philippines, commitments China, European Union, Multifunctionality Group • Base levels: 1) Bound levels resulting from the Uruguay Round 1) Cairns Group, United States, China, European Union, Multifunctionality Budgetary outlays Group commitments 2) Average (notified) subsidy outlays for 1995- 2) Philippines Quantity commitments 2000 South Centre Analytical Note October 2002 SC/TADP/AN/AG/3 • Formula/target for further 1) Elimination of export subsidies (GDCs) through 1) Cuba, Dominican Republic, El commitments reduction commitments on equal annual Salvador, Honduras, Kenya, instalments during the implementation period Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, (United States, China), inclusive of a down- Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Zimbabwe payment of 50 per cent the first day of (GDCs), United States, China, Cairns implementation (Cairns Group, Philippines) Group, Philippines 2) Reduction of export subsidies conditional to 2) European Union, Multifunctionality commitments on export credits, guarantees and Group insurance programmes as well as in food aid. No specific proposal presented as yet 3) Switzerland 3) Modulation proposal: Commitment to an overall export subsidy reduction target of (X) per cent. Flexibility to reduce subsidies on specific products or group of products at a lower rate than the overall target as long as compensation is provided by larger than required reductions in other product or group of products 4) Cairns Group, China, Philippines, 4) S&D: maintenance of current flexibilities GDCs, India, United States??, provided for in Art.
    [Show full text]
  • Moftic WTO Monitor
    This issue of The WTO Monitor focuses on issues of specific interest to small 1 The developing countries such as those in CARICOM. Would There Be War After Nine Years of Peace The ‘Due Restraint’ proviso, more commonly referred to as the ‘Peace Clause’, W contained in Article 13 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), shields countries granting subsidies which conform with the conditions specified in the T Agreement from being challenged under other WTO agreements, particularly Articles 6.3(a)-(c) and 6.4 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measure (SCM) Agreement and O related provisions. This Clause expired at the end of 2003, however there appears to be disagreement with regard to the exact expiration date. According to Article 13, this moratorium is supposed to last for the duration of the implementation period of the AoA. Implementation period in this context, according to Article 1 of the AoA which M deals with definitions, means “the six-year period commencing in the year 1995, except that, for the purpose of Article 13, it means the nine-year period commencing in 1995.” For the majority of WTO Member States, as well as senior officials of the O Secretariat (Dr Supachai), the nine-year period expired at the end of 2003. Of late, however, another interpretation as regards the actual expiration date of the Peace N Clause was advanced by the US and the EU, which sees expiration at sometime in 2004. I Although the deadline has elapsed, Members are still expected to decide whether or not to support an extension of the Peace Clause.
    [Show full text]
  • World Trade Organization Here in Doha, Qatar
    WORLD TRADE WT/MIN(01)/ST/96 11 November 2001 ORGANIZATION (01-5674) MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE Original: English Fourth Session Doha, 9 - 13 November 2001 LITHUANIA Statement by H.E. Mr Evaldas Ignatavicius Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I am glad to have this opportunity to address you on behalf of Lithuania at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization here in Doha, Qatar. It is my pleasure and duty to present you our thoughts and share our opinion on the agenda and objectives of this conference. This Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha is very important to us, since it is the first Ministerial Conference where my country participates as a fully fledged Member of the WTO. After a complex accession process we are happy to be in the WTO "club" and to have this opportunity to participate in the discussion on global trade issues. It strengthens our feeling that we are a part of the integrated world economy, able to enjoy benefits and fulfil obligations arising thereof. The current situation in the world places a huge responsibility on the WTO, as a global Organization. It is WTO that can help us to restore confidence in the future of global economy. We believe that launching a new WTO negotiations round would strongly contribute to that. Since a success of a new round is very important to the world community, we must be very cautious. Failure of Seattle must be taken into account, and mistakes that contributed to the failure must not be repeated. We live in a diverse world, a world where numerous interests struggle.
    [Show full text]