Philosophy 513/Topics in Recent and Contemporary Philosophy: Bias and Objectivity

Princeton University Spring 2016 Wednesdays 5-7:50 Marx 201

Sarah McGrath Thomas Kelly 209 Marx Hall 221 1879 Hall [email protected] [email protected]

An examination of select philosophical issues related to the themes of bias and objectivity. A central focus will be on issues arising from the inevitable, but often inordinate, influence of our prior beliefs, preferences and theories on our subsequent judgments, decisions, and assessments of alternatives.

All readings listed below will be available on the Princeton blackboard site for the course under Course Materials. Schedule is subject to change at the discretion of the instructors.

1. February 3rd. Introduction/Course overview

2. February 10th. Status quo bias and the sunk cost fallacy

Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord, “The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics.” Ethics 116 (4) 2006: 656-679.

Thomas Kelly, “Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past.” Noûs 38 (1) 2004: 60–85.

3. February 17th. Status quo bias and conservatism about value

G.A. Cohen. “Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value.” In Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon (OUP 2011): 203 -230.

Jacob M. Nebel, “Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value.” Ethics 125 (2) 2015: 449-476.

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4. February 24th. Belief perseverance and conservatism in epistemology

Gilbert Harman, “Positive versus Negative Undermining” and “Implicit Commitments.” Chapters 4 and 5 (pp.29-53) of his Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (MIT Press, 1986).

Lawrence Sklar, “Methodological Conservatism.” Philosophical Review 84: 374- 400. Reprinted as Chapter 1 in his Philosophy and Spacetime Physics (1985).

David Christensen, “Diachronic Coherence and Epistemic Impartiality,” Philosophical Review 109 (3) July 2000: 349-371.

5. March 2nd. Kuhn’s classic account of dogmatism and commitment in science

Thomas Kuhn, “The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research.” In Crombie (ed.) Scientific Change.

Thomas Kuhn, “The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions” and “The Resolution of Revolutions.” Chapters IX and XII of his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

6. March 9th. Kripke’s dogmatism paradox

Saul Kripke, “On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge.” Chapter 2 of his Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (OUP 2011): 27-51. Please read pages 39-44 only.

Gilbert Harman, excerpt from Thought. Please read pages 148-149 only.

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, “The Dogmatism Puzzle.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2013): 1-16.

March 16th—NO CLASS (Princeton University spring break)

7. March 23rd. Biased assimilation of evidence and belief polarization

C.G. Lord, Lee Ross, and M.R. Lepper, “Biased Assimiliation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979): 2098 -2109.

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Thomas Gilovich, “Seeing What We Expect to See: The Biased Evaluation of Ambiguous and Inconsistent Data”. Chapter 4 of his How We Know What Isn’t So (The Free Press, 1991).

Thomas Kelly, “Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization.” The Journal of Philosophy 105 (10) 2008: 611-633.

8. March 30th. Bias and perceptual experience

Susanna Siegel, “How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?” Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Susanna Siegel, “Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013): 240-272.

9. April 6th. Irrelevant influences on belief

G.A. Cohen, “Paradoxes of Conviction.” Chapter 1 of his If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Harvard, 2000): 7-19.

Roger White, “You Just Believe That Because….” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1) 2010: 573-615.

Miriam Schoenfield, “Permission To Believe: Why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief.” Noûs 47 (1) 2013: 193-218.

10. April 13th. Biased intuitions and methodology in ethics

Michael Huemer, “Revisionary intuitionism.” Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1) 2008: 368-392.

Sarah McGrath, “Levels of Generality.” Excerpt from Knowledge in the Moral Domain (draft).

11. April 20th. Is it rational to discriminate against good-looking people?

Dan Moller, “The Epistemology of Popularity and Incentives.” Thought 2(2) 2013: 148-156.

Robert Nozick, “Bias,” pp.100-106 in his The Nature of Rationality (Princeton University Press, 1993).

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12. April 27th. Reason-giving and rationalization

Hilary Kornblith, “Distrusting Reason.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1) 1999:181-196.

Adam Elga, “On Overrating Oneself…and Knowing It,” Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2) 2005: 115-24.