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Internacionals 234 SOME INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS HAVE a JULY 2020 STRATEGY in LIBYA, OTHERS NOT

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Internacionals 234 SOME INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS HAVE a JULY 2020 STRATEGY in LIBYA, OTHERS NOT CIDOB ISSN: 2013-4428 notesinternacionals 234 SOME INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS HAVE A JULY 2020 STRATEGY IN LIBYA, OTHERS NOT Francis Ghilès, Senior Associate Researcher, CIDOB @FrancisGhiles icolas Sarkozy and David Cameron did a bril- Nine years after removing Muammar liant job removing Muammar Gaddafi and Gaddafi different regional strategies con- left a Libya size hole for Islamists, Muslim NBrotherhood, ISIS, Salafists and assorted “democrats” verge in Libya: to fill. That is the inevitable consequence having cre- ated a power vacuum and believing, or pretending to The EU has been reduced to the role of believe, that democracy will emerge out of nowhere. bystander, paralysed by the conflict Nine years into the Libya conflict, three facts stand out that deserve closer analysis. between Italy and France which support opposite sides in Libya. France, long a One can list any number of things that emanate from major player, has been side-lined by Rus- Libya which present a challenge to Europe, starting with the pressure of uncontrolled migration, going sia and Turkey. through Russia and Turkey’s presence and the desta- bilising effects on the wider region, not least Tunisia. Turkey has strongly asserted its influence Paralysed by the conflict between Italy and France in the eastern and central Mediterranean, which support opposite sides in Libya and its discom- fort at Turkey’s expanding influence, the EU has been by giving military support to the Govern- reduced to the role of bystander. France, long a major ment of National Accord in Tripoli. player, has been side-lined by Russia and Turkey. Russia, through the private mercenary Through its Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) policy, launched in 2006, Turkey has strongly asserted its Wagner Group, supports Khalifa Haftar, influence in the eastern and central Mediterranean, the master of Benghazi. by giving military support to the Government of Na- tional Accord (GNA) in Tripoli at the turn of the year, Algeria already missed the opportunity when it was being pressed very hard by the leader of of the Libyan National Army (LNA), self-styled Mar- to influence events in Libya at the very shall Khalifa Haftar, whose political base is in the east- start of the conflict. Today, the Algerian ern city of Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica. senior military brass is busy fighting its On the EU’s irrelevance, France has a lot to answer own people’s aspiration towards demo- for to its fellow European nations, especially Italy. It cracy and less corruption. claims it is trying to bring the two sides together in CIDOB notes internacionals 234. JULY 2020 CIDOB notes internacionals 234. JULY 2020 1 Libya but has, all along, supported Khalifa Haftar. It on maritime boundaries in the central Mediterranean, believes the chaos in Libya is a major stimulant to ille- which is based on fait accompli and cuts through Greek gal immigration in Europe and feeds the spread of ji- waters around Cyprus and Crete. The EU has threat- hadism but did little to help Italy when the latter faced ened new sanctions over Turkish drilling operations a wave of illegal migrants from Libya in 2015. It wor- but in the event of the Turkey-Libya deal being thrown ries about the spread of jihadism but has never uttered out by international courts, the pending legal battle a single word against the huge impact of Saudi cash will delay exploration by Turkey’s rivals. There is no disbursed over a generation until for that very same shortage of gas for export in the Mediterranean in the purpose across North West Africa. Such funding was years ahead so Turkey is, essentially, projecting politi- only cut back recently but the damage had been done. cal power. A third aspect is Algeria’s absence from the Libya con- Nor can Mr Erdogan resist provocation vis a vis Greece. flict which is seldom discussed. A country which was, Last month a small group of Turkish soldiers shepherd- arguably, the major military player has lost much of ed refugees towards the border with Greece. When the influence it once yielded in the region, other than Greek guards pushed them back, the Turkish Interior its role of guaranteeing the security of Tunisia. The Ministry labelled the Greek government as “Nazis”. Algerian senior military brass is busy fighting its own Turkish officials and media have repeatedly insulted people’s aspiration towards democracy and less cor- Emmanuel Macron and depicted the EU as a failed or- ruption. Nor has it been capable of rethinking a strate- ganisation incapable, in their eyes, of dealing with the gic doctrine which is out of date as we enter the third Covid-19 pandemic. Megaphone diplomacy is Mr Er- decade of the XXI century. Algeria is faced with a sharp dogan’s speciality but it does little to promote rational decline in foreign revenue, 95% of which derives from debate. exports of oil and gas; the lack of a well thought out blueprint on economic reforms and a president whose Turkey has deployed an estimated 7000 Arab and Turk- recent election is viewed as lacking in legitimacy by men mercenaries on the ground in Libya since last Jan- millions of Algerians. uary, backed by high altitude long-endurance drones and anti-aircraft batteries. As a result, France claims it is trying to bring the two sides the GAN retook the air base on Al Watya, south of Tripoli, on 18 May and together in Libya but has, all along, supported forced Russian mercenaries to be evac- uated to Al Jufra military base, 650km Khalifa Haftar. south east of Tripoli, where Russia has stationed Mig29 and Su24 fighter jets. Khalifa Haftar has reopened the Libya Turkey pursuying an ambitious regional policy embassy in Damascus which was closed in 2012 and contracted fighters from Bashar al Assad’s militias. To the dismay of many of its European partners, Turkey The Syrian conflict has been exported to Libya, com- is engaging in an ever more ambitious regional policy plete with militias of Syrian origin and a Turkish-Rus- which pits it against many of its NATO allies, Russia, the sian standoff. The US withdrawal from the conflict is United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt. The latter three accelerating despite warnings to Russia from the US back Khalifa Haftar. Russia, through the private merce- military command in Africa, Africom. Combined with nary Wagner Group supports the master of Benghazi. So European internal divisions, this has allowed President does France. However, the French government has seen Erdogan to pursue his neo-ottoman ambitions, and its influence in Libya virtually disappear, while Germa- Russia increasingly act as a referee for Mediterranean ny and Italy back the GNA and president Fayez al-sar- conflicts. raj. Ever since Nicolas Sarkozy took the lead in topping Gaddafi in 2011, Italy has deeply resented the manner Whether Turkey gains more influence in Tunisia and in which France has attempted to strong arm it out of its Algeria in the long term is an open question. It al- former colony. Turkey for its part is mindful of Italian in- ready is the second largest foreign director investor terests in Libya, notably its special links with the town of in Algeria, after China and ahead of the EU. In Tuni- Misrata and its interests the Green Stream pipeline that sia, a dysfunctional system of government offers op- runs through Western Libya to Italy. portunity for Turkish meddling. President Kaïs Said is quite ignorant of international affairs and uninter- When he intervened decisively to support the GNA ested in regional developments. The government is militarily last winter, president Recep Tayyip Erdogan weak and has its hands full with the economic and played a deft set of cards. Beyond looking to recoup bil- social crisis. This gives Rachid Ghannouchi, the lead- lions of dollars of contracts unfinished under Gaddafi er of the Islamist Nahda, who presides the national and getting in first when it comes to the reconstruction assembly in Tunis, undue influence in diplomatic af- needed after the fighting, he signed a new agreement fairs. Ghannouchi is very close to Erdogan and his 2 CIDOB notes internacionals 234. JULY 2020 CIDOB notes internacionals 234. JULY 2020 party is alleged to have received funds from Turkey. The conflicts which bedevil the Sahel region have deep The prime minister Elyes Fakhfakh cannot alienate political, tribal and climatic roots some of which can be Nahda which is part of the ruling coalition. Turkey traced back to the policy known as “Françafrique”, a put pressure on Tunisia last winter to allow it to use a short hand for the web of what its critics view as neo-co- military base in the south of the country to help with lonial agreements which France signed with its former its operation in Libya. Tunisian leaders refused and west African colonies after they became independent were backed by Algeria. sixty years ago. Most observers agree that Françafrique has done little to promote good governance. The broader Turkish domestic political scene must nev- er be forgotten, what the French historian of the Med- A recent amendment to the draft new Algerian con- iterranean, Fernand Braudel, called le temps long. A stitution will specifically allow the Algerian army to presidential election is due in June 2023, followed four intervene abroad if the country’s leaders decide it is months later by the celebration of the centenary of the necessary. Why this “new” article is being inserted is foundation of the Turkish Republic. In Mr Erdogan’s anybody’s guess as the army has already intervened vision, Turkey must be seen as embodying modernity abroad, notably in Egypt in 1967 and 1973.
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