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Report No. 3365-PO Portugal: Recent Economic Developments and the Medium-Term Perspective with Special Reference to Resource Mobilization Public Disclosure Authorized (In Two Volumes) Volume I: Recent Economic Developments and Prospects September 21, 1981 Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office FILE CPY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY X >U Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of the %brid Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Until) 1971 1 US Dollar 28.323 Escudos I Escudo .037 US Dollar 1972 1 US Dollar 27.011 Escudos I Escudo .037 US Dollar 1973 1 US Dollar 24.673 Escudos 1 Escudo = .041 US Dollar 1974 1 US Dollar 25.408 Escudos 1 Escudo = .039 US Dollar 1975 1 US Dollar 25.553 Escudos I Escudo .039 US Dollar 1976 1 US Dollar 30.227 Escudos 1 Escudo .033 US Dollar 1977 1 US Dollar 38.227 Escudos 1 Escudo .026 US Dollar 1978 1 US Dollar = 43.940 Escudos 1 Escudo 0.023 US Dollar 1979 1 US Dollar 48.924 Escudos 1 Escudo 0.020 US Dollar 1980 1 US Dollar 50.062 Escudos 1 Escudo 0.020 US Dollar FISCAL YEAR January - December This report is based on the findings of a mission which visited Portugal between June 23 and July 11, 1980. The mission comprised A. R. Roe (mission leader), P. J. Lazar (general economist), W. S. Kee (public finance specialist) and S. Mitra (IMF). The draft of this report was sent to the Portuguese Government in March, 1981, and was discussed in Lisbon in July 1981. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PORTUGAL: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THE MEDIUM-TERM PERSPECTIVE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RESOURCE MOBILIZATION. (IN TWO VOLUMES) VOLUME II PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION Table of Contents Page No. PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION .............. 1 A. An Overview ..................................... 1 B. bavings and the Flow of Funds ................... 5 C. Resource Mobilization and Public Enterprises.... 10 D. Public Finance .................................. 16 E. The Private Sector: Households .................. 24 F. SQme Concluding Remarks ......................... 30 ANNEX II THE PORTUGUESE TAX SYSTEM................33 APPENDIX II ................................................. 37 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of , their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. VOLUME II PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION A. An Overview 3.1 In the ten years preceding the revolution, the conservative eco- nomic policies adopted in Portugal resulted in an extremely sound financial position in which domestic saving was consistently high relative to gross domestic investment. As Table 3.1 indicates, an important aspect of this was the high level of public sector saving. 3.2 After the revolution the position changed dramatically. Public saving was decimated by many factors including the boost to expenditure as- sociated with the expansion of public sector employment, the newly acquired burden of the nationalized industries and the costs of an expanded welfare system. Household saving was reduced as a consequence of the higher con- sumption levels associated with the colonial returnees, and the decline in income inequality, as well as by the slump in migrants' remittances. Corporate saving was reduced by the squeeze on profitability associated with the loss of conventional markets, labor problems and by the control on prices. It was also hit by the higher costs associated with new employment legislation, the rapid rise in wage rates and the higher cost of imported fuels, and other inputs. Whereas in 1973, domestic savings was adequate to finance 111 percent of gross investment, by 1976 it was only sufficient to finance 60 percent of the total. This was in spite of the fact that invest- ment grew by only 32 percent in nominal terms during this period and fell slightly in real terms. Savings in nominal terms fell by 28 percent over that same three-year period. 3.3 This situation imposed a very considerable strain on financial intermediaries as firms in both the public and private sectors attempted to make good their inadequate operating positions by higher levels of borrow- ing. In the absence of sufficient savings, this in turn obliged the Central Bank to finance a large proportion of credit through rediscounting opera- tions and money creation. Credits extended by the financial community to the productive sectors increased from Esc. 250 billion at the end-1973 to Esc. 348 billion by mid-1976. At the same time, the proportion of these credits granted by, or rediscounted with, the Central Bank rose from 5.6 percent to 27 percent of the total. 3.4 Another very important consequence of the deterioration in company finances was its effect on the composition of private savings. Throughout the sixties, corporate saving was the major element in saving and normally accounted for over 50 percent of the total. By 1975 the position had rad- ically changed and the share of company saving had fallen to 8 percent as - 2 - Table 3.1: GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS AND DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 1962-1979 Gross Domestic Gross National Public Investment Savings Savings Savings/ Public Savings/ Esc. Billion Esc. Billion Esc. bln Investment GNS 1963 15.7 12.7 2.0 0.80 0.15 1968 24.4 26.9 4.2 1.10 0.15 1970 41.8 45.3 8.4 1.08 0.18 1971 37.7 42.9 8.5 1.13 0.19 1972 46.7 59.7 7.7 1.27 0.12 1973 73.9 82.4 8.7 1.11 0.10 1974 84.3 63.4 1.3 0.75 0.02 1975 61.5 35.0 -9.2 0.56 -0.26 1976 97.3 58.0 -13.0 0.59 -0.22 1977 157.9 101.9 -12.6 0.64 -0.12 1978 180.5 147.3 -26.3 0.81 -0.17 1979 207.8 214.2 -37.9 1.03 -0.17 compared with a share for the household sector of over 70 percent.l/ Although there has been some recovery in company saving, it now accounts for only 40 percent of total saving, as compared with 77 percent for households. This large switch in the sectoral composition of saving has important implications for the institutional arrangements to allocate saving. It is not clear that the Portuguese institutional structure has yet made the necessary adjustment. 3.5 In the recovery phase of the economy since 1977, domestic resource mobilization has been strengthened in several important ways which together produced a near balancing of domestic savings and investment by 1979. As far as household saving is concerned, the most important contribution to this development has been the rejection of Portugal's traditional stance of stable but highly negative real interest rates and the adoption of interest rates which are radically higher than in the past. This development is discussed in more detail in Chapter I of this report. The evolution of interest rates in the past few years is described in Table 3.2. The increases in interest rates have contributed to an extremely rapid growth of deposits in the banking system and especially time and savings deposits which have been the subject of the largest interest rate increases (see Table 3.3). In an economy in which the banks are the dominant outlet for 1/ As Table 3.1 has already indicated, public saving became negative in 1975. The dependence of external saving was extremely high by then. -3- Table 3.2; PORTUGAL - MAXIMUM INTEREST RATES 1972 c/ 1975 1976 1977 1978 From From From From Dec. Dec. 19 July 1 Feb. 28 Aug. 26 May 26 Onwards Rediscount Rate 4.0 6.50 6.50 8.00-12.00 13.00-18.00 18.00-23.00 Deposit Rates Sight Deposits a/ 1.0-3.0 1.00-4.00 1.00-4.00 1.00-4.00 1.00-4.00 1.00-4.00 15-90 Days 3.25 4.50 4.50 5.00 6.00 8.00 19-180 Days 4.25 6.50 6.50 7.50 9.00 12.00 180 Days-1 Year 5.25 9.50 9.50 11.00 15.00 19.00 1-2 Years 5.75 10.50 10.50 12.00 16.00 20.00 Over 2 Years 6.75 10.50-11.50 10.50-11.50 12.00-13.00 16.00-17.00 20.00-21.00 Standard Lending Rates b/ Up to 90 Days 5.75 7.75 8.75 10.25 14.75 18.25 90-180 Days 5.75 8.25 9.25 10.75 15.25 18.75 180 Days-i Year 6.5 9.50 10.50 12.00 16.50 20.00 1-2 Years 7.25 10.75 11.25 12.75 17.00 20.50 2-5 Years 7.75 11.75 12.25 13.75 17.75 21.25 5-7 Years 8.00 12.25 12.75 14.25 18.75 22.25 Over 7 Years 8.25 12.75 13.25 14.75 18.75 22.25 Source: Bank of Portugal, Boletim Trimental, March 1980. a/ Payable to individuals only. The precise rate depends partly on the level of the deposit. b/ Lower rates prevail for preferred types of credit, such as for agriculture, exports, housing, and labor-intensive and export-oriented investments. The types of projects which receive subsidies have changed through time.