URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA New Master-Planned Cities and Local Land Rights: The Case of Konza Techno City,

FEMKE VAN NOORLOOS, DIKY AVIANTO and ROMANUS OTIENO OPIYO

Consortia of investors, developers and architects, sometimes in collaboration with national governments, have proposed a number of new utopian urban mega- projects or ‘new cities’ across Africa. While such speculative, planned forms of satellite urbanization increasingly gain att ention in urban development debates, empirical evidence on their impacts is lacking, particularly when it comes to access to land and livelihoods of surrounding populations. In this paper we delve into the Kenyan experiences with Konza Techno City, the newly planned city south of envisioned to become Africa’s main ICT hub or ‘Silicon Savannah’. While there is currently litt le more than a fence that has been put up around the planned city, real life eff ects are clearly visible. As a buff er zone was established around the project to prevent ‘informality’, surrounding villages experience insecurity of land tenure and livelihoods. On the other hand, the area has att racted many people seeking opportunities or speculating on future profi t. The case illustrates that the mere announcement of a new city can trigger various forms of direct and indirect exclusion. It also shows that the fast-tracking of the project by high government interests can cause problems for community consultation and participation, but also that the state is highly ambivalent, and has litt le power to prevent delays or control informal development. Rather than being a simple instance of ‘land grab’, spatial diff erences and temporal changes make for a constantly shifting landscape of actual and potential impacts. The main problem of new cities lies in the failure to accept ‘informal’ development as being an intrinsic part of African cities.

In search for ways to jump on the ‘world city’ new property investments in Africa’s cities train, governments across Africa are increasingly often take the form of entirely new master- lured by the promises of visionary urban mega- planned cities built up from scratch as self- projects or ‘heterotopias’ (Carmody and Owusu, contained enclaves, often at the peripheries of 2016; Côté-Roy and Moser, 2018; van Noor- existing cities. This new wave of utopian new loos and Kloosterboer, 2018; Watson, 2013). In city plans is still to some extent a drawing recent years a variety of investors, developers board exercise (the majority of the projects and architects have proposed master-planned have not been constructed – van Noorloos new cities for Africa, sometimes in collabora- and Kloosterboer, 2018), but although not yet tion with national governments: van Noorloos realized, their eff ects are already being felt. and Kloosterboer (2018) count at least seventy Urban megaprojects are an important part (planned and existing) from 2000 to 2017. Such of current mainstream global urbanism and

420 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA are criticized as ‘urban revolutions from above’ particularly problematic as many projects (Sheppard et al., 2015) that displace the poor take place in hybrid peri-urban or ‘rurban’ in favour of elitist spaces. As part of the spaces, which are already highly complex in increasingly global flows of urban finance, terms of land governance. Against the back- knowledge and ideas, new city master plans ground of increasing land scarcity and global are springing up around Africa’s cities, which struggles over land rights, Africa’s new cities are viewed as a new global frontier of urban raise concern, particularly given their large investment (Côté-Roy and Moser, 2018; Watson, scale and enclave character. Analysing Africa’s 2013). For governments and other national new cities through the concept of urban land and urban stakeholders, the temptations of grab allows us to delve more deeply into the shiny modern images are difficult to resist in local effects and actual implications on the the midst of ‘Africa rising’ rhetoric (Côté-Roy ground, in their full complexity. and Moser, 2018). In their glossing over (or While new cities increasingly gain attention at best ignoring) existing cities, new master- in urban development debates, empirical evi- planned city plans are criticized for envision- dence on their implications is lacking. What ing elitist enclaves which do not solve urban happens to surrounding people’s access and problems and may present new risks. They rights to resources, particularly land? Who can create socio-spatial segregation through benefits or loses? While many of these new walling and gating, and by providing housing cities are still on the drawing board and may that is inaccessible for the large majority of not get beyond that, the planning and early the urban poor. Furthermore, they enhance construction phases of some of the projects fragmentation of urban governance through can give us insights into the possible impacts. privatization of service delivery in these In this paper we draw from the Kenyan experi- enclaves (Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015; Murray, ences with Konza Techno City, the newly plan- 2015; van Noorloos and Kloosterboer, 2018; ned city south of Nairobi envisioned to become Watson, 2013). Africa’s main ICT hub or ‘Silicon Savannah’. The literature on new cities in Africa has This article is based on a three month field taken a variety of directions in recent years, research conducted in Nairobi, and but recurring themes are the cities’ policy Makueni Counties on the proposed Konza framings, planning models, and (to a lesser City, in February to May 2017 (Avianto, 2017). extent) financial flows (Carmody and Owusu, Questionnaire surveys were conducted with 2016; Cirolia, 2014; Côté-Roy and Moser, 2018; inhabitants of Old Konza (28) and Malili (35) Fält, this issue; Grant, 2015; van Noorloos who were selected randomly – the survey and Kloosterboer, 2018; Watson, 2013). One was meant to collect basic demographic and issue that is often overlooked, also by planners livelihood characteristics, and a few opinions and policy-makers, concerns the consequences on the project and process. Semi-structured of these projects for pre-existing and surround- interviews (8) were conducted with govern- ing populations and their livelihoods and ment officials, urban planning experts, and access to resources (van Noorloos and Klooster- local leaders, and informal conversations, field boer, 2018). Today’s African utopian new city observations, and transect walks with inhabi- plans provide particularly salient examples of tants of the two villages complemented the the large-scale speculative urban land invest- data collection. In addition, the planning pro- ments that have been discussed under the cess was documented by means of planning concept of ‘urban land grabs’ (Klaufus et al., documents, expert interviews and secondary 2017; Steel et al., 2017; van Noorloos et al., literature. In this way we combined quali- 2018). Given the large scale of the projected tative data analysis on the planning process, urban visions, dramatic changes in land access livelihood changes, and perceptions on and use can be expected. Such changes are impact with descriptive statistics of live-

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 421 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA lihoods, perceptions and participation/ frontier of urban investment (Côté-Roy and consultation, to provide an exploratory yet Moser, 2018; Watson, 2013; Sheppard et al., holistic picture. 2015). In this article, after presenting a literature The master-planned new city is one of review on new cities and urban land grabs the global urban models that is driven into and presenting the conceptual framework African cities through the actions of global that underlies the research, we present a brief consultancies, architects and planners, finan- description of the Konza Techno City project cial institutions and the like (Côté-Roy and and its surrounding area and population. Moser, 2018; Carmody and Owusu, 2016). Then we briefly present the situation in New master-planned cities have a longer his- terms of land tenure and access to land in the tory in Africa, linked to post-independence project and the surrounding buffer zone. After new capital cities such as Abuja (Keeton that we provide an analysis of the project’s and Provoost, forthcoming), but most of the impacts with regards to access to land, which current plans are different particularly in evolves along two lines (partly along the their dependence on private sector finance framework of ‘urban land grabs’ developed and planning. Many of these utopian visions by Van Noorloos et al., 2018): (1) indirect dis- are today planned as public-private partner- placement chains through land tenure insecur- ships, but governments are often relegated ity and speculative development in the buffer to providing cheap land and putting in place zone, and (2) the ambivalence of actors related regulations. For them, the temptations of to the project. We conclude that Konza cannot shiny modern images are difficult to resist in be analysed as a simple case of ‘land grab’: the midst of ‘Africa rising’ rhetoric (Côté-Roy spatial differences and temporal changes and Moser, 2018). The building of symbolic make for a constantly shifting landscape of power through hypermodern ‘world cities’ in actual and potential impacts. New cities’ order to attract attention – hence investment – failure to work with urban informality is a key in the global economy is an important reason problem that extends also to their dealings for local and national governments to become with surrounding communities. involved in such projects (Goldman, 2011; Steel et al., 2017). In their glossing over (or at best ignoring) existing cities in favour of global Literature Review and Conceptual connections (Carmody and Owusu, 2016), new Framework: New Cities as Urban Land master-planned cities’ plans are criticized Grabs? for envisioning elitist enclaves which do not Urban megaprojects are an important part solve but potentially worsen urban problems of current mainstream global urbanism, and (van Noorloos and Kloosterboer, 2018). They criticized as ‘urban revolutions from above’ risk socio-spatial segregation through walling (Sheppard et al., 2015) that displace the poor and gating and by providing housing that is in favour of elitist spaces. Within the neo- inaccessible to the large majority of the urban liberal trend of intensifi ed inter-city com- poor. Furthermore, they enhance fragmenta- parison and competition, city governments tion of urban governance through privatization work hard to acquire an image as ‘world of service delivery (Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015; cities’, which tends to result in the replication Murray, 2015; van Noorloos and Kloosterboer, of existing urban models in top-down ways 2018; Watson, 2013). The new city develop- in new places (Bunnell, 2015; Carmody and ments on the African continent so far seem Owusu, 2016; Côté-Roy and Moser, 2018; highly speculative and consumptive (‘bubble McCann; 2011, 2013; McCann and Ward, urbanism’: Steel et al., 2017), rather than 2012; Roy and Ong, 2011). In that context enhancing the necessary productive economic African cities are represented as a new global development such as new industries:

422 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA

Current urban investments build on existing In these spaces in between the rural and the weaknesses rather than transforming them; they urban, the complexity of land governance off er mostly opportunities for speculation and arrangements, with many intersecting land quick profi t to be made from residential and commercial development, thereby reinforcing the claims and types of tenure/governance, often externally dependent character of urbanisation. leaves the poor without much protection in (van Noorloos and Kloosterboer, 2018, p. 1237) the face of land development (van Noorloos and Kloosterboer, 2018). Nevertheless, some caution is needed in Such concerns are the subject of a widen- assessing the actual consequences of new ing body of literature on global ‘land grabs’ cities: as already mentioned most are only in or large-scale land investments in the Global the planning phase and some may not get South. While this debate used to be pre- beyond that. Also, inevitably there will be dif- dominantly rural, recently researchers have ferentiation between new cities. Even though argued for a more integrated view of the most new cities are developed as privatized rural and the urban in land investments (see enclaves and therefore exclusionary by design, the introduction to this special issue).1 For experiments in ‘inclusive design’ are emerging example, the transformations engendered for some cities (Keeton and Provoost, forth- by urban land investments are not limited to coming). Inclusive and sustainable ‘mixed city’ the urban: often they profoundly transform planning is sometimes mentioned as a specific the rural surroundings of cities (Zoomers aim, but as the case of Appolonia City (Ghana) et al., 2017). Indeed, the impacts of Africa’s shows, multiple rationalities can easily over- new cities reach well beyond the city and, rule such ambitions in reality (Fält, this issue). given their location in the peri-urban areas, Furthermore, government-planned new satellite their potential displacement and livelihood cities are also re-emerging, often meant as impacts (due to pressure on resources and the a way for authoritarian states to provide commons) bear much resemblance to typical housing for the poor and middle classes, but ‘rural’ land grab cases. By using the concept also to assert political authority (Croese and of ‘urban land grabs’, researchers attempt to Pitcher, 2019; Planel and Bridonneau, 2017). make sense of the increasing scarcity of land The effects of new cities are thus diverse and and pressures on land worldwide, and the can only be assessed in the long term. At the specific configurations of these developments same time, urban megaprojects and master in the urban sphere (Steel et al., 2017 and visions do create certain types of impact from Introduction to this issue). their first planning phase onwards (De Boeck, The notion of urban land grabs can advance 2011; Smith, 2017). One type of effect that is research on new cities in various ways. The already observable, even if the cities have not literature on new cities thus far has focused been built, concerns access to land and the on the policy framings, planning models and livelihoods of surrounding populations. visual spectacles of the ‘fantasies’ and, to a Large-scale urban projects can create severe lesser extent, on the financial flows (Carmody land conflict and displacement, as their sur- and Owusu, 2016; Cirolia, 2014; Côté-Roy and rounding spaces are hardly ever ‘empty’ Moser, 2018; Fält, this issue; Grant, 2015; van (Leitner and Sheppard, 2018). While large- Noorloos and Kloosterboer, 2018; Watson, scale slum demolition within cities is widely 2013). While such issues are key and logical reported, the less well known instances of as many of these projects are still in a starting large-scale land development in the peri- phase, research is inevitably often scaled at urban interfaces around African cities are also the national or global levels: what happens at problematic. These suburban and peri-urban the local level is often unclear. By framing the areas are exactly the places where most new phenomenon of new cities in land grab terms city projects – the satellite cities – are planned. we delve more deeply into the local effects

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 423 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA and look at displacements, consultations and blurred, particularly in current rural-urban livelihood changes which result from these land grabs where people’s urban aspirations new planning models, policies and financial are heightened (ibid.) Hence multiple types of flows. accumulation, contestation and displacement In furthering the urban land grab debates, can be involved (Leitner and Sheppard, 2018). Van Noorloos et al. (2018) have proposed The second argument states that a deeper three new directions: (1) focusing on the investigation into the actors involved in sequential chain of effects of displacement; urban land grabs, and their changing roles (2) paying more attention to the ambivalent and contradictory interests, is needed. While roles and contradictory interests of different ‘land grab’ and ‘development’ are often pre- actors; and (3) taking the three-dimensional sented as a dichotomy with rural cases aspects of land development into account. frequently presented as land grabs and urban In this article we take this framework as a cases as development, the urban cases of land starting point and aim to further the first two acquisitions show us that it is not so easy to of these lines with the case study of Konza draw the line or assign clear ‘culprits’ for Techno City in Kenya.2 land-related exclusions and displacements, First, focusing on the sequential chains of due to the complex multitude of hardly displacement means that displacement should traceable actors involved (van Noorloos et not be regarded as a one-off process, but rather al., 2018). The role of the state, for instance, is as a long-term development which may include often ambivalent: in African new cities we see various steps and contradictory develop- the role of the state varying from being a mere ments. Not only direct outright dispossession land broker to an outright urban developer should be problematized (e.g. Gillespie, 2016), (Cain, 2014; Murray, 2015; van Noorloos et but also indirect types of displacement that al., 2018; Watson, 2013), although the broker often occur over longer periods of time, such role seems more common. The variety of as different types of gentrification, and en- scales and state institutions involved in any closure of the commons (van Noorloos et al., development project also urges us to see the 2018). In the conversion of peri-urban spaces state as consisting of multiple, contradictory to new urban projects, such indirect displace- actors and interests. Often the state is also ment chains often occur through the mechan- unable to steer process outcomes in these isms of excluding pastoralists and other complex projects (van Noorloos et al., 2018). temporary or mobile populations from access One example of this inability is the stalling of to land and other natural resources that were many new city projects such as Wescape and previously available for use. Dell’Angelo et Modderfontein (South Africa) and Hope City al. (2017) coin this phenomenon ‘commons (Ghana) (see for an overview Van Noorloos grabbing’. Similar exclusions occur when new and Kloosterboer, 2018). In addition, we can land is reclaimed from the sea, impacting mention the frequent emergence of wide- fishermen’s livelihoods (van Noorloos et al., spread ‘informal’ development around the 2018). The all-encompassing character of new new cities, as in the older ‘new city’ of Brasilia cities may also reinforce the tendency to (Scott, 1998). New migrants flock to the sur- formalize and ‘modernize’ the informal (e.g. roundings of planned new cities in antici- ‘clean the city’ of street vendors, street pation of economic opportunities and specula- hawkers, etc.), thereby intensifying exclusion- tive developments, which also shows that the ary mechanisms. In addition, those types of ideal of a unified ‘local community’ is very displacement where people wholly or partly problematic. Analysing the multitude and am- consent to their relocation (voluntary dis- bivalence of actors around urban land deals is placement) also need to be taken seriously: the important as these complicate the question of voluntary versus involuntary dualism is often who is responsible for important issues such

424 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA as consultation and resettlement, and thus who the fi rst idea for the city emerged in 2006 at people can turn to for fulfilling their rights. the MIC, from 2008 onwards the planning process started. After multiple changes in project size and location, in 2010–2011 the Konza Techno City: land in the current location was bought. The Project and Its Surroundings This greenfi eld site far away from existing Konza Techno City is an ambitious new city infrastructures was chosen for a much more plan in Kenya. The project is managed by a ambitious plan (interview, former MIC policy- Development Authority, a semi-governmental maker). More state investment was thus institution or special purpose entity working needed before any private investment could under (and reporting to) the Kenyan Ministry be att racted, therefore in 2012 the Konza of Information and Communications (MIC), Technopolis Development Authority (KoTDA) which develops partnerships with a number was established (IFC, 2014; interview, former of (mostly international) private developers MIC policy-maker). In 2013, former President (Konza Technopolis, 2015).3 The US-based Mwai Kibaki broke ground in Malili to mark consultancy Tetra Tech leads the master plan- the start of the project. Indeed, the project ning. A number of other consultancy com- was planned at the national level, primarily panies have also been important in advancing by the MIC (which is the only state institute the project, such as the World Bank’s Inter- represented in the KoTDA), but with high national Finance Corporation (acting as a lead national symbolic power and presidential advisor on project structuring and bid out) backing (see also Splinter, 2014). and McKinsey (IFC, 2014; Smith, 2017). While This national government interest is also

Figure 1. Main entrance to the Konza Techno City project. (Source: Avianto, 2017)

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 425 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA clear from the fact that Konza Techno City Intra-governmental problems were blamed: has been an iconic part of the Kenya Vision KoTDA lacked the capacity to oversee urban 2030 national development strategy, which planning and adequately deal with the com- aims to further the country’s economy to plex institutional and legal framework reach a middle-income status, based on the (Splinter, 2014; Konza Technopolis, 2015), but service sector, particularly Information and it also was not autonomous enough to claim Communication Technology (ICT) (Govern- its own assigned budget from government ment of Kenya, 2007; interview with MIC). and exert power to get things started (Konza Within this vision, the strategy for Nairobi Technopolis, 2015; The Star, 2018). The global ‘Nairobi Metro 2030’ aims to reinvent the financial crisis probably also played an important city as a ‘world class African metropolis’ role (Smith, 2017) in stalling investment. It and ‘an iconic and globally attractive city’ is not entirely clear how the newly installed (Smith, 2017). As part of this strategy Konza government (2017) intends to further the Techno City was envisioned as a flagship project. project that would become the ‘Silicon Valley The Konza Techno City site (5,000 ha), in- of Kenya’ (or ‘Silicon Savannah’): a major cluding its planned buffer zone (20,000 ha), ICT hub meant to ‘spearhead technological falls within three counties: Machakos, Makueni, innovation and development’ at the national and Kajiado. The area is part of the arid and level, by attracting ‘high-tech industries, semi-arid lands (ASALs), where pastoralism start-ups, and universities’ and by providing is historically an important source of liveli- national and global connectivity (Konza Tech- hood. The buffer zone was established to nopolis in Klaufus et al., 2017). Konza Techno prevent ‘uncontrolled’ informal developments City, which is planned about 60 km south of from popping up around the project, as these Nairobi as a satellite city, is holistic and multi- could become an ‘eyesore’ and discourage functionally planned, combining housing, investors (interview, urban planning expert; offices/work, a university, a hospital, schools, Wapenaar, 2015). The project area itself is hotels, shopping, etc. The Ministry of Informa- currently not used or inhabited, but there tion and Communications through KoTDA are two main communities in the buffer zone leases the land (5,000 ha in total) to private area: Old Konza and Malili (figures 2 and developers for 99 years and provides public 3). Both are very different in their land use, infrastructure and regulatory guidelines. The livelihoods and histories. Table 1 shows the project would create 17,000 jobs and attract basic characteristics of our survey sample in 200,000 residents. both villages (N = 63). Despite government’s high ambitions, The community of Malili or Malili Centre Konza Techno City has been suffering from used to be part of the Malili Group Ranch delay and intra-governmental conflict. While which took up much of the current Konza the government was responsible for develop- Techno City area (this will be explained ing basic infrastructure (IFC, 2014), due to below). The group ranch members allocated funding difficulties it was three years before land for a small commercial centre near the the first infrastructure provision began, and Nairobi– highway, which is now today there is hardly any construction (apart Malili Centre (Mulinge, 2014). Around 2010 from slight progress on roads, water boreholes and 2011 the town experienced slow growth: and electricity infrastructure – Government some fixed structures were set up, such as of Kenya, 2018). The major part of the area shops and hotels. As transect walks and in- to be developed is currently just grassland formal conversations with residents show, with a fence. With multiple delays it is in- after the announcement of Konza Techno creasingly uncertain whether the city will ever City in 2012, growth started to take off more be created as envisaged (The Star, 2018). rapidly, and a lot of land was further sub-

426 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA divided and sold. One respondent who had lived in Malili for 10 years explained: ‘It was nothing here 10–12 years ago. It was only empty land and then people started coming here for searching new business opportunity’. The announcement of Konza Techno City and the associated expectations also attracted large numbers of newcomers from all over Kenya in search of job opportunities, and with hopes for better infrastructure and increasing land prices. Urbanization intensified and more and more semi-permanent structures were constructed (transect walks and informal con- versations Malili). The current population is estimated at 1,500–2,000. Malili’s population today consists mostly of recent migrants who arrived less than 2 years ago (40 per cent – table 1). Most rent their house (77 per cent – table 1), while most of the original share- holders of the group ranch live elsewhere (interview, member of the County Assembly of Makueni). Malili Centre has grown into a Figure 2. Land tenure around Konza Techno City. residential and commercial town, with services (Source: Avianto, 2017, modifi ed from Ministry of such as shops, kiosks, hardware, food joints, Lands map)

Figure 3. Aerial view of Konza Techno City and its surroundings. (Source: Avianto, 2017)

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 427 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA

Table 1. Main characteristics of survey sample (Source: authors’ survey, N = 63) Characteristic/question Old Konza Malili Gender 7 females, 21 males 13 females, 22 males Age 18–34: 18 18–34: 17 35–51: 4 35–51: 14 52+: 5 52+: 0 Missing: 1 Missing: 4 Number of years living in area 0–2 years: 5 0–2 years: 14 3–10 years: 5 3–10 years: 19 11–20 years: 5 11–20 years: 1 21+ years: 13 21+ years: 1 Main industry of employment Farming/pastoralism: 9 Farming / pastoralism: 5 Construction: 5 Construction: 5 Trade and services: 6 Trade and services: 20 Casual work: 4 Casual work: 2 Unemployed/other: 4 Unemployed/other: 3 (majority of respondents farm, some as a secondary activity) Ethnic group Kamba: 15 Kamba: 21 Kikuyu: 2 Kikuyu: 4 Maasai: 9 Maasai: 1 Other: 2 Other: 5 Missing: 4 Ownership of house Rent: 10 Rent: 27 Own: 18 Own: 6 Squatt ing: 0 Squatt ing: 2 Opinion on whether government 16 agree, 47 disagree should control land use in buff er zone water selling points, salons, small guest houses are farmers on their own lands and/or are and road side selling. People’s livelihoods pastoralists, although often combined with revolve around commercial activities, services other sources of livelihood (table 1). Old and trading (table 1). Konza provides for commercial activities such Old Konza is a small town to the south of as shops, food joints, and salons, through a Konza Techno City site, with a population small market. between 1,000 and 2,000. In the 1970s the first settlers came to this empty land and started Land Access and Land Tenure in farming and growing livestock in a collective and around Konza Techno City manner, though not under the formal group ranch policy (interviews Old Konza). Most Access to land and land tenure in the area people in Old Konza are long-term inhabit- is more complex than it initially seems. The ants, 64 per cent having lived there for more government bought the Konza Techno City than 10 years; most own their house (also 64 project land in 2010–2011. It was previously per cent – table 1) and have built permanent part of the Malili Group Ranch which had structures. The rapid developments of Malili already been subdivided in 2005–2006 among have not arrived in Old Konza yet, as it is its more than 2,000 shareholders (interviews more distant from the highway. Most people inhabitants; Johari, 2015). Group ranches were

428 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA

Figure 4. Market area in Old Konza. (Photo: D. Avianto) set up by law in large parts of Kenya after of the County Assembly of Makueni; Johari, independence up until the 1980s, in order to 2015). Hence the process has involved some increase productivity of the arid and semi- confl ict and fraud, including a court case. arid lands (ASALs).4 In the case of the Malili, The project’s 20,000 ha buffer zone is the land formerly occupied by white sett lers was major cause of contention around land use bought up as a group ranch by a large group and access nowadays. We briefly outline the of shareholders (interviews with inhabitants; basics of land tenure in Old Konza and Malili Johari, 2015). For various reasons many of the villages, to provide the background for the group ranches started to subdivide and indi- analysis. As a privatized and individualized vidualize land not long after establishment part of the group ranch, initially Malili in- (Mwangi, 2007), in the case of the Malili group habitants mostly had individual private owner- ranch particularly because of internal mis- ship over their subdivided land plots (DPP, management and confl ict which decreased 2013). However, this changed somewhat over profi tability (Johari, 2015). After subdivision time. Malili’s rapid development in recent it was often diffi cult to maintain livelihoods years took place in the absence of planning on small pieces of land (e.g. 7.8 ha in the and infrastructure provision. Hence, further case of Malili) and many people started to land subdivisions were not formalized: land sell their land. For Konza Techno City, the administration was overruled by the speed of government negotiated with the directors of developments (Mulinge, 2014; Mwau, 2013). this group ranch and reached an agreement As a result, an informal land buying and for purchase. However, shareholders who house rental market emerged, along with had lost their plots claim the amount they semi-permanent houses and buildings. When received was too litt le (interview, member Old Konza was established by settlers in the

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 429 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA

1970s, the land was owned by the government displacements, and new land-use and zoning and people were considered squatters, although regulations can create livelihood insecurity. they were tolerated (interviews inhabitants). With the aim of keeping out informal In the 1990s the government started giving development from springing up around the out allotment letters of the land to each project, a buffer zone was established around household individually. These letters do not the project. The investors or land owners are entail much more than a promise and hence required to adhere strictly to a comprehensive fail to provide strong land tenure security, Local Physical Development Plan (LPDP), which is why people are still struggling to which sets guidelines and standards on how receive stronger types of ownership (inter- the roads, sewerage, and other infrastructure views inhabitants). within the buffer zone should be constructed (DPP, 2013). Old Konza was assigned as a zone of ‘modern agriculture’ and Malili as Buff er Zone, Repulsion and a commercial zone. The plan proposes that Att raction: Displacement Chains Malili will be further subdivided to create a As proposed in the concept of indirect dis- sub-zone for residential development, mainly placement, we cannot evaluate displacement low- and medium-density (Mulinge, 2014). eff ects by looking only at direct project land, Any construction needs to be approved by or only at instances of actual land lease or KoTDA. At this point, any further construction acquisition. The experiences around Konza or subdivision of land is frozen (Konza Tech- Techno City show that the creation of extra nopolis, 2017). infrastructure and buff er zones can fuel Table 1 shows that approximately three-

Figure 5. Informal sett lement buildings in Malili marked for demolition. (Photo: D. Avianto)

430 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA quarters of survey respondents are against source rights, a limited focus on direct displace- the government land-use regulations from ment or expulsion of sitting land users tends the LPDP. In interviews, residents explained to overlook important land users and liveli- that they are afraid they will be unable to live hoods dependent on the spaces in other ways. up to high ‘modern’ building standards and Particular groups which are often overlooked hence risked demolishing of their house, or are mobile and temporarily inhabiting groups being bought out by high-income earners and such as (peri-)urban farmers (De Boeck, 2011; well-off investors who can meet the required Zoomers et al., 2017; Shannon, in this issue), development standards. Indeed, some informal fishers and pastoralists. Old Konza consists structures in Malili have been assigned as ‘to of long-term (partly Maasai) inhabitants with, be demolished’ (see figure 5) but given project to some extent, pastoralist and agriculture- delays no further action has been taken (inter- based livelihoods (see table 1). The fence view, urban planning expert). In the meantime, constructed around the Konza Techno City interview respondents indicated being more project site established a barrier which pre- cautious about putting up permanent structures, vented local pastoralists from grazing their hence many of the new structures in Malili herds of cattle in the area, which they had remain semi-permanent. Old Konza inhabitants traditionally used for that purpose (interview, were also afraid that the land-use planning chief Old Konza) (figure 6). Currently pastor- would affect their already rather insecure alists are seen grazing cattle near the Nairobi– land rights or outlaw their livelihoods. Mombasa highway, which poses road safety In addition, in assessing the impacts of problems. large-scale urban plans on land-use and re- On the other hand, while some groups

Figure 6. Fences surrounding the Konza Techno City project area. (Photo: D. Avianto)

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 431 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA may risk indirect displacement, other groups broker and provider of public infrastructure. may be attracted to the area exactly because As the project delays illustrate, this role is not of the Konza Techno City plans, as is the case a simple one: the state seems unable to steer in Malili. In tandem with population growth, process outcomes in such a complex project high land speculation has been ongoing in (van Noorloos et al., 2018). The reasons for Malili. Apart from people seeking employ- the inability of the Kenyan state (so far) to ment, many also arrive seeking an increase develop the project, in spite of high-level in land prices and quick gains. Indeed, support including the presidency, can be inhabitants and experts generally agreed that found in the fragmented nature of planning land prices have increased considerably since in Kenya and contradictory interests within 2006–2007, and a number of group ranch the Kenyan state (Manji, 2015). While the MIC shareholders has been able to earn a good was deeply involved in advancing its vision profit. It thus shows that even if no real con- for the project and committed to starting struction has yet happened, the mere exist- construction fast, its expertise is in ICT and ence of a project plan creates impacts. Vil- not in urban planning or land development. lagers’ views on rising land prices and specula- This lack of expertise led to multiple changes tion are mostly rather positive (interviews). in the project and failure to have public plan- While some benefit from opportunities, the ning documents and environmental licensing majority of Malili settlers live in vulnerable documents submitted and approved (Splinter, circumstances (transect walks, interviews), 2014). The clash between ambitious objectives and hopes for employment are hard to be and institutional possibilities is also to blame: fulfilled. Paradoxically, many of these recent other important central government institu- settlers now face insecurity in their access tions such as the Ministry of Lands and to land and livelihoods: not only will their Physical Planning and the National Environ- access to housing possibly be affected by the mental Management Authority were not suffi- buffer zone regulation, they also face extra ciently involved in Konza’s high aspirations insecurities as a result of the chaotic local and plans from the start, and communication land market, with rapid land transfers and was ineffective (ibid.). multiple claims on the same plot of land The state is thus an ambivalent actor in (Mwau, 2013). A potential new displacement the development of new towns. This ambi- chain is thus set in motion. valence is also clearly visible in the scalar developments and inter-county conflicts that emerged around Konza Techno City. The new Ambivalent Actors: State vs Communities city plans run through three different counties In this section we analyse the multitude and whose governments all claim the project in ambivalence of actors around Konza Techno order to enhance their image and increase tax City. These issues are key to understanding revenues. It is important for county govern- land rights, as they aff ect the way the state ments to earn their own incomes, given deals with land acquisitions and with the Kenya’s devolution of power as outlined in buff er zone issue (including consultations with the 2010 Constitution. While metropolitan residents), and how people respond. governance in a city-region would potentially While Konza Techno City is backed by high- be a solution in this case, the idea of metro- level economic and political interests, the role politan planning in Kenya (which was part of of state institutions is contradictory and the the Nairobi Metro 2030 plan) was abolished state is far from monolithic. Through KoTDA, after devolution of power to counties became with the Ministry of Information and Com- the new standard in 2010 (interview, former munication (MIC) as the main government MIC policy-maker; Splinter, 2014). Despite institute involved, the state acts as a land devolution policy, in the face of new city

432 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA plans such as Konza with its overarching the green light was given probably left very Development Authority, the counties hardly little room for this. Both Konza and Malili have any real say in the developments, apart dwellers mostly knew about the project from being able to develop land-use plans through the mass media (e.g. a speech by (Interview, member of County Assembly of the president on Konza on television), and Makueni). only about half of them knew about buffer The planning of the buffer zone around zone regulations (survey). A little more than the Konza project is a clear example of how a third of respondents was informed about fragmented governance and internal power the project through a baraza meeting (com- struggles within the state have influenced munity meeting with the chief). The Develop- local land rights. The first plan for a buffer ment Authority has organized a number zone, developed by the MIC, set out to pro- of such meetings leading up to the project hibit any development in the buffer zone. (interview, chief Old Konza), which is a However, the Ministry of Lands and Physical formality to fulfil planning regulations (the Planning in 2014 lifted the ban on develop- 2010 Constitution as well as Environmental ment, providing a window for land owners Impact Assessment require public participa- to put up buildings within the framework tion – , 2016). However, of the Local Physical Development Plan as according to the Old Konza chief, these meetings outlined above (Mark, 2014). Hence at least were characterized by one-way information contradictory roles and interests within the flows, rather than actual participation. The government saved residents from having their degree of the citizen participation was only villages completely removed. However, the on the ‘informing’ level. Such participation manner in which the plan will be imple- is often dismissed as tokenism or symbolic mented and whether buildings will be de- (Arnstein, 1969). molished is still unclear for inhabitants (Konza The lack of adequate public participation Technopolis, 2017; interviews inhabitants), does not mean inhabitants’ perceptions of adding to their land tenure insecurity. the project were necessarily negative: rather, While the KoTDA and MIC were over- communities were heterogeneous in their ridden a few times by the Ministry of Lands vision. Also, their opinions have changed over and Physical Planning, the general trend was time, as there turned out to be a wide gap that very high pressure was exerted by the between people’s high expectations and the MIC over other ministries to advance the pro- very volatile and insecure nature of the new ject quickly and disregard procedures (Splint- city. People’s perceptions of the project gener- er, 2014). This was because of the strategic ally started out positively, with high expecta- interest of Konza Techno City as a national tions of employment and business opportuni- status project within . ties (e.g. shops) as well as urban services From literature it appears that when political (interviews with inhabitants). For example, a stakes are high and projects are developed 40-year-old woman, working as a shop-keeper, with reference to the ‘national interest’, there was expecting job opportunities for her is a large risk of fast-tracking procedures, daughter who had almost finished secondary which may heighten land tenure insecurity school. Other people hoped to earn a good and thwart public participation in planning income from selling their land. There was also (Datta, 2015; Goldman, 2011; van Noorloos an ethnic element in the positive perception: and Kloosterboer, 2018). These problems Kamba are the main ethnic group in the area indeed materialized in Konza Techno City. and bringing the project to ‘their’ land gave Participation by and informed consultation them pride and hope to boost their region with the inhabitants have hardly taken as they feel ‘left behind’ by government. place. The speed of developments as soon as Interestingly, the Maasai minority was more

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 433 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA critical, also because of the limitation of their who were drawn by new aspirations and grazing land mentioned before (interviews). opportunities. These new inhabitants were not In any case, as many respondents indicated, necessarily elites as is often assumed: in Malili, initial widespread positive perceptions of new vulnerable migrants coincide with land Konza Techno City in both villages have speculators and developers. Finally, the gradually made way for scepticism due to results of this study highlight the ambivalence delays and political problems. It is important of actors around new city projects (van Noor- to note such changes over time in the actors’ loos et al., 2018). Konza Techno City’s powerful roles and interests, which take place even backing by high-level economic and political before any construction has started. interests caused a lack of quality consultation and participation of surrounding inhabitants in the project planning. On the other hand, Discussion and Conclusion the fragmented and ambivalent character of This article has provided exploratory empiri- the state caused huge delays, which caused cal evidence for African new cities’ impacts further frustration among surrounding inhab- on people’s access to land and livelihoods. It itants, who were initially more welcoming has highlighted that new cities are inserted of the project (though their views were also into real places with pre-existing activities, heterogeneous). humans, and livelihoods which start to change Indeed, this peri-urban case of land invest- and co-evolve as soon as an idea for a new ment shows us that it is not easy to draw the city is elaborated. We have noted that the peri- line between ‘grab’ and ‘development’ or urban spaces where many new cities are assign clear ‘culprits’: spatial differences and planned, are hardly ever empty, and insertion temporal changes make for a constantly shifting of new structures in such locations brings a landscape of actual and potential impacts. risk of displacement, both physically and eco- While the often-studied policy framings and nomically. In Konza Techno City the potential realities, the planning models, and the finan- and real displacements were relatively small, cial flows of new cities are important in given the low population density in the area, understanding how and why new cities are yet they still provide interesting insights into re-emerging in Africa (Carmody and Owusu, the process. 2016; Cirolia, 2014; Côté-Roy and Moser, 2018; In the planning of Konza Techno City, a Fält, this issue; Grant, 2015; van Noorloos variety of land-related problems have emerged and Kloosterboer, 2018; Watson, 2013), the long before any real construction has started. local impacts of these projects deserve more The case illustrates well that the risk of dis- attention in themselves. As the rural land placement in the context of new cities includes grab literature has shown, local impacts, more than just direct dispossession of land views and responses to land deals are multi- within the project area. Over time, different ple and complex and differ according to types of displacement chains can evolve (van space and time (Sassen, 2014; Zoomers, 2010; Noorloos et al., 2018). Indirect displacement Zoomers et al., 2017): they are in themselves in this case took place by impeding the highly influenced by global processes. When (partly) mobile livelihoods of pastoralists, the investment is peri-urban, these issues are and potentially by the establishment of a only intensified, and intermingled with pre- buffer zone with new land-use regulations existing urban transformations, aspirations around the new city – land tenure and liveli- and livelihoods. hood insecurity for the future is the main The main problem of new cities lies in issue there. At the same time, displacement the failure to accept ‘informal’ development chains that caused repulsion also ran parallel as being an intrinsic part of African cities to processes of attraction of new inhabitants (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014). This problem is

434 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA well-known: new cities are often planned as Bunnell, T. (2015) Antecedent cities and inter- gated middle-class or higher-class enclaves referencing eff ects: learning from and extending disconnected from the real cities. What this beyond critiques of neoliberalisation. Urban Studies, 52(11), pp. 1983–2000. case of Konza Techno City also shows is Cain, A. (2014) African urban fantasies: past lessons that the negation of informality also clearly and emerging realities. Environment and Urbani- presents itself in the planning of new cities’ zation, 26(2), pp. 561–567. surroundings, and thereby impacts the Carmody, P. and Owusu, F.Y. (2016). Neoliberalism, daily lives and prospects of pre-existing and urbanization and change in Africa: the political surrounding residents, by making access to economy of heterotopias. Journal of African land and livelihood less secure. On the other Development, 18, pp. 61–73. hand, the fragmentation of governance and Cirolia, L.R. (2014) Escaping the challenges of the consequent delays and failure to act, have the city: a critique of Cape Town’s proposed satellite town. Urban Forum, 25, pp. 295–312. only increased informal and speculative land Côté-Roy, L. and Moser, S. (2018) ‘Does Africa not developments around Konza Techno City deserve shiny new cities?’ The power of seductive and made it all the more difficult to reach a rhetoric around new cities in Africa. Urban Studies. utopian ‘well-planned’ vision for the country. e-pub ahead of print, htt ps://doi.org/10.1177/ 0042098018793032. Croese, S. and Pitcher, M.A. (2019) Ordering power? The politics of state-led housing delivery under NOTES authoritarianism – the case of Luanda, Angola. 1. For an explanation and discussion of how Urban Studies, 56(2), pp. 401–418. the originally rural concept of ‘land grab’ can be Datt a, A. (2015) New urban utopias of postcolonial useful for analysing developments in cities, see India: ‘entrepreneurial urbanization’ in Dholera the introduction to this special issue, as well as smart city, Gujarat. Dialogues in Human Geo- the work by Zoomers et al. (2017) and Steel et al. graphy, 5(1), pp. 3–22. (2017). De Boeck, F. (2011) Inhabiting ocular ground: Kin- 2. The third line of thought is less relevant here, shasa’s future in the light of Congo’s spectral as it focuses more specifically on the vertical urban politics. Cultural Anthropology, 26(2), pp. dimensions of inner-city investments. 263–286. Dell’Angelo, J., D’Odorico, P., Rulli, M.C. and 3. The master plan for phase I is prepared by Marchand, P. (2017) The tragedy of the grabbed a consortium of ten international development commons: coercion and dispossession in the companies, among which are global, US-based, global land rush. World Development, 92, pp. Germany-based, and Kenya-based consultants, 1–12. architects, and real estate advisors, and the IT firm Cisco based in San Jose, CA, USA (Klaufus DPP (Director of Physical Planning) (2013) Konza et al., 2017). Local Physical Development Plan - (2012-2030). Nairobi: Ministry of Lands. 4. A group ranch can be defined as ‘a livestock Gillespie, T. (2016) Accumulation by urban dispos- production system or enterprise where a group session: struggles over urban space in Accra, of people jointly own freehold title to land, main- Ghana. Transactions of the Institute of British Geo- tain agreed stocking levels and herd their live- graphers, 41(1), pp. 66–77. stock collectively which they own individually’ (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968, in Ng’ethe, 2009). Goldman, M. (2011) Speculative urbanism and the making of the next world city. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(3), pp. 555–581. REFERENCES Government of Kenya (2007) Kenya Vision 2030: The Arnstein, S.R. (1969) A ladder of citizen participa- Popular Version. Available at: htt p://vision2030. tion. Journal of the American Planning Association, go.ke/inc/uploads/2018/05/Vision-2030-Popular- 35(4), pp. 216–224. Version.pdf. Avianto, D. (2017) Konza Techno City and Its Impact Government of Kenya (2016) County Public Participa- on Surrounding Local Communities. Masters tion Guidelines. Nairobi: Ministry of Devolution Thesis, University of Utrecht. and Planning and Council of Governors.

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 435 URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA

Government of Kenya (2018). Kenya Vision 2030: Manji, A. (2015) Bulldozers, homes and highways: Sector Progress and Project Updates. June 2018. Nairobi and the right to the city. Review of Available at: htt p://vision2030.go.ke/publication/ African Political Economy, 42(1), pp. 1–19. kenya-vision-2030-sector-progress-project-up Mark, O. (2014) State lifts ban on Konza buff er dates-june-2018/. land use. Business Daily. Available at: htt p:// Grant, R. (2015) Sustainable African urban futures. www.businessdailyafrica.com/State-lifts-ban- Stocktaking and critical refl ection on proposed on-Konza-buff er-land-use-/-/539546/2232384/- urban projects. American Behavioral Scientist, /3jgtcf/-/index.html. 59(3), pp. 294–310. Mulinge, M. (2014) Emerging Human Sett lement IFC (International Finance Corporation), World Patterns around the Planned Konza City: A Bank (2014) Public-Private Partnership Stories Case of Malili Centre. Bachelor Thesis, Uni- Kenya: Konza Technology City (KMIP). Washing- versity of Nairobi. ton DC: IFC. Available at: htt p://documents. Murray, M.J. (2015) Waterfall City (Johannesburg): worldbank.org/curated/en/5638614680 privatized urbanism in extremis. Environment & 01776522/pdf/96904-BRI-PUBLIC-PPPStories- Planning A, 47(3), pp. 503–520. Kenya-KonzaTechnologyCity-KMIP.pdf. Mwangi, E. (2007) The puzzle of group ranch sub- Johari, A. (2015) Kenya’s Konza Techno City: division in Kenya’s Maasailand. Development Utopian Vision Meets Social Reality. Independent and Change, 38(5), pp. 889–910. Study Project (ISP) Collection, Paper 2024. Keeton, R. and Provoost, M. (eds.) (forthcoming) Mwau, B. (2013) The planned hatches the un- Urban Africa – A Handbook for New Planned planned. Living the City: Urban Africa. Available Cities. Rott erdam: nai010 Publishers. at: htt ps://slumurbanism.wordpress.com/2013/ 08/02/the-planned-hatches-the-unplanned/. Klaufus, C., van Lindert, P., van Noorloos, F. and Steel, G. (2017) All-inclusiveness versus Ng’ethe, J. (2009) Group Ranch Concept and Practice exclusion: urban project development in Latin in Kenya with Special Emphasis on Kajiado District. America and Africa. Sustainability, 9, 2038. Rome: FAO. Available at: htt p://www.fao.org/ doi:10.3390/su9112038. Wairdocs/ILRI/x5485E/x5485e0t.htm. Konza Technopolis (2015) Abridged Strategic Plan Parnell, S. and Pieterse, E. (eds.) (2014) Africa’s 2020. Nairobi: Konza Technopolis. Available Urban Revolution. London: Zed Books. at: http://www.konzacity.go.ke/wp-content/ Planel, S. and Bridonneau, M. (2017) (Re)making uploads/2014/12/KoTDAs-Strategic-Plan-2020- politics in a new urban Ethiopia: an empirical Abridged-Version.pdf. reading of the right to the city in Addis Ababa’s Konza Technopolis (2017) Frequently Asked condominiums. Journal of Eastern African Studies, Questions (FAQs) about Konza Technopolis. 11(1), pp. 24–45. Nairobi: Konza Technopolis. November 2017. Roy, A. and Ong, A. (eds.) (2011) Worlding Cities: Available at: htt p://www.konzacity.go.ke/wp- Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global. content/uploads/2014/12/Frequently-Asked- Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Questions-about-Konza-Technopolis-Nov Sassen, S. (2014) Expulsions. Brutality and Complex- ember-20171.pdf. ity in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Leitner, H. and Sheppard, E. (2018) From Harvard University Press. kampungs to condos? Contested accumulations Scott , J.C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain through displacement in Jakarta. Environment Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have and Planning A, 50(2), pp. 437–456. Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. McCann, E. (2011) Urban policy mobilities and Sheppard, E., Gidwani, V., Goldman, M. et al. (2015) global circuits of knowledge: toward a research Introduction: urban revolutions in the age of agenda. Annals of the Association of American global urbanism. Urban Studies, 52(11), pp. Geographers, 101(1), pp. 107–130. 1947–1961. McCann, E. (2013) Policy boosterism, policy mobilities, and the extrospective city. Urban Smith, C. (2017) ‘Our changes’? Visions of the Geography, 34(1), pp. 5–29. future in Nairobi. Urban Planning, 2, pp. 31–40. McCann, E. and Ward, K. (2012) Policy Splinter, E. (2014) Between Vision and Reality: The assemblages, mobilities and mutations: toward Troublesome Implementation of Neoliberal a multidisciplinary conversation. Political Studies Projects. MSc Thesis University of Amsterdam. Review, 10(3), pp. 325–332. Steel, G., van Noorloos, F. and Klaufus, C. (2017)

436 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 NEW MASTER-PLANNED CITIES AND LOCAL LAND RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KONZA TECHNO CITY, KENYA

The urban land debate in the global south: new Wapenaar, M. (2015) Formal Planning & Informal avenues for research. Geoforum, 83, pp. 133–141. Sett lement. The Case of Konza Technology City. The Star (2018) Kenya struggles to actualise Konza MSc thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam. ‘Silicon Savannah’ city. The Star, 11 December. Watson, V. (2013) African urban fantasies: dreams Available at: https://www.the-star.co.ke/ or nightmares? Environment and Urbanization, news/2018/12/11/kenya-struggles-to-actualise- 26(1), pp. 215–231. konza-silicon-savannah-city_c1864178. Zoomers, A. (2010) Globalization and the foreign- van Noorloos, F. and Kloosterboer, M. (2018) ization of space: the seven processes driving Africa’s new cities: the contested future of the current global land grab. Journal of Peasant urbanisation. Urban Studies, 55(6), pp. 1223– Studies, 37(2), pp. 429–447. 1241. Zoomers, A., van Noorloos, F., Otsuki, K., Steel, G. van Noorloos, F., Klaufus, C. and Steel, G. (2018) and van Westen, G. (2017) The rush for land Critical commentary: land in urban debates: in an urbanizing world – from land grabbing unpacking the grab-development dichotomy. towards developing safe, resilient and sustain- Urban Studies, e-pub ahead of print, doi able cities and landscapes. World Development, 10.1177/0042098018789019. 92, pp. 242–252. van Noorloos, F. and Avianto, D. (forthcoming) New Towns, Old Places. Four Lessons from Konza Techno City, in Keeton, R. and Provoost, M. (eds.) Urban Africa – A Handbook for New Planned Cities. Rott erdam: nai010 Publishers.

BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 44 NO 4 437